# Motion — National Ass'n for the Advancement of Colored People, Inc. v. South Carolina ex rel. Daniel

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Motion
- **Published:** January 1, 1985
- **Citation:** 469 U.S. 1101

## Text

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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED freeRNOT . srevae
OCTOBER TERM, 1984 pe weetet

_. _ The National Association For The Advance-
» ment of Colored People, Inc., et al.,

Appellants,

vs.
me
South Carolina, ex rel. Michael Roland
Daniel, et al.,

Bee Me Appellees.

ae ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES

ae.” DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT

me OF SOUTH CAROLINA

i) | MOTION TO DISMigs

: ‘

|... Corley Singletary Porter Post Office Box 11867

+ and Dibble, P.A. Columbia, SC 29211
Terrell iL. Glenn* (303) 753-7268
M. Crum

! Office Box 11390
= Columbia, SC 29211
(803) 799-9800

Attorneys for Appellees, §§ Attorney for Appellee

~Déniel, Dennis, and Sheheen
Joseph A. Wilson, II* Treva G. Ashworth*
|» Charles W. Gambrell, Jr. Post Office Box 11549
cy Post Office Box 11549 Columbia, SC 29211
_. - Columbia, SC 29211 _ . (803) 7538-2072

, 283) 758-2072

a ! Attorneys for Appellee Attorney for Appellee
sf Schwartz Ellisor

*Counsel of Record

No.

IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
OCTOBER TERM, 1934

The National Association For The Advance-
ment of Colored People, Inc., et al.,

Appellants,
vs.

South Carolina, ex rel. Michael Roland
Daniel, et al.,

Appellees.

ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES
DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT
OF SOUTH CAROLINA

MOTION TO DISMISS

McNair Glenn Konduros David Rudd

Corley Singletary Porter Post Office Box 11867

and Dibble, P.A. Columbia, SC 29211
Terrell L. Glenn* (303) 7538-7268

M., Elizabeth Crum
Post Office Box 11390
Columbia, SC 29211
(303) 799-9800

Attorneys for Appellees, Attorney for Appellee

Daniel, Dennis, and Sheheen

Williams

Joseph A. Wilson, II* Treva G. Ashworth*

Charles W. Gambrell, Jr. Post Office Box 11549
Post Office Box 11549 Columbia, SC 29211
Columbia, SC 29211 (803) 758-2072
(803) 758-2072

Attorneys for Appellee Attorney for Appellee

Schwartz Ellisox

*Counsel of Record

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

ge 2
ee ar 3
EEE eee ee ee 3

Constitutional and Statutory

EN, re 4
mumaeese GE CMO COBE.... wc ccc reverses 5
Argument:

1. This appeal should be dis-
missed since appellants admit that
the order appealed herein has been
vacated and thus any action by
this Court is an advisory
Te eee GA a 5 6 ee woe 8 A Kae eo 10

2. This appeal should be dis-

missed for want of jurisdiction as
the order objected to is not final
and none of the cited statutes
confers jurisdiction in this

3. This appeal should be dis-
missed because it seeks relief
that is either redundant or which
appellant should have obtained by
prompt action in the court below
FE OTe CRC CETL TETT Ee Fey

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Aetna Life Insurance Co. v. Haworth,
(Be Oe. i gs eee re eee 14

Allen v. State Bd. of Elections,
a cea ee eh cs 0 6-0 8 9 4 ee 21

Baltimore and Ohio R.R. Co. v.
Interstate Commerce Commission,
SiS Wiha. Se Re a ha ek EAS Oe Os 17

Battle v. Anderson, 708 F.2d 1523
(10th Cir. 1983), cert. dismissed,
U.S. , 104 &. CE. 1049

CEOS oc cies certo cadavers she ecnanrees 18

Di Bella v. United States, 369
De Ran CRD ss Ober eee ee ees at, SS

Golden v. Zwicker, 394 U.S. 103
S RO oko 5k ee Ke Le eee 14

Gunn v. University Committee, 399
re | OB |) ar reer re eee 20

Hayburn's Case, 2 Dall. 409, 1 L.
| ie: Ak. } errr re Ce ooo ee 14

Highland Supply Corp. v. Reynolds
Metals Co., 327 F.2d 725 (8th Cir.

WS i ok hb 6 oa se eee ee ee eee 12

Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S.

Se NS ik bm 6A ARR 14

North Carolina v. Rice, 404

Vis Bee CEPR) + sks vdeewrewsen 14, 15, 16
ii

:

Rogers v. Hill, 289 U.S. 582
et) reer rere ee eee 12

Theodoropoulos v. Thompson-Starrett
Co., 438 F.426 3350, Soe. (ae Cit.
1969), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 905

Oly, PREPS Tere ee C Ie Cae PREC SPREE ll
United States v. Alaska S.S. Co.,

253 UB. TES CERRO Pec eee ee eee eo renr 15
United States v. Ferreira, 13

How._40, 14 L. BG. SB (iSSE)..... ka, aid
United States v. Munsingwear,

ce. ES ee Be | ere ery 25, 26
STATUTES

28 O.B. 6. 3 Re ee sae REE RTS 20
20 U.8.6. 3 Bes ces cd dh caweeceee ase 22
€2:0.B.C. 5 UOT seis ce eee sen 28, 23
42 0.4.0. 9 19) sia 21
MISCELLANEOUS

Correspondence and Public Papers
of John Jay, 486 (1891).......ccccees 13

U. S. Constitution, Article III,
Sagtion:>S.. Gieee 3. 6 sceccixe 33; Bax 27

Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil

ee Ree eae 19

ee eer |

NO

IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
OCTOBER TERM, 1984

The National Association for the
Advancement of Colored People, Inc., et
al.,

appellants,

versus

South Carolina, ex rel. Michael Roland
Daniel, et al.,

Appellees.

ON APPEAL FROM THE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA

MOTION TO DISMISS

Pursuant to Rule 16.1(a) of
the Rules of the Supreme Court of the
United States, appellees Michael Aozend
Daniel, Rembert C. Dennis, and Marshall
Williams, Robert J. Sheheen, Raymon
Schwartz, Jr., and James B. Ellisor
move the Court to dismiss the appeal
herein on the ground that this appeal
is not within the Court's

jurisdiction.

Opinion Below

The July 31, 1984, opinion of
the district court is set forth in
appellants' jurisdictional statement at
pages 3a to 5la. The July 31, 1984,
order of the district court which is
the subject of this appeal is set forth
in appellants' jurisdictional statement
at pages Sia and 52a. The order
vacating the July 31, 1984, order of
the district court and the opinion
attached thereto are set forth in
appellants' jurisdictional statement—at

pages 53a through 63a.

Jurisdiction

This appeal is not within the
jurisdiction of the Court. No statute
permits this appeal directly from the

2

22 EEE

district court. No statute or
constitutional provision permits this
appeal from an order that has_ been

vacated by the district court.

Constitutional and Statutory

Provisions Involved

The pertinent provision of the
United States Constitution, Article
III, Section 2, Clause 1, is set forth
in appellants' jurisdictional statement
at a. The pertinent statutory
provisions, 28 U.S.C. § 1253 and 42
U.S.C. § 1973c, are set forth in
Appendices A and B to appellees' motion

to dismiss.

Statement of the Case

Appellees Dr. George Graham,
H. Sam Stilwell. and W. Richard Lee
instituted this action on June 13,
1984, against certain named state
officials to obtain a court ordered
interim reapportionment plan for the
South Carolina Senate so that elections
could be held for these offices in
1984. The NAACP and several of its
members intervened as plaintiffs and
Joe Wilder intervened as a defendant.

The district court set an expedited

‘The General Assembly of
South Carolina had passed a permanent
statutory plan and submitted it to the
District Court for> the District of
Columbia for preclearanc® under 42
U.S.C. § 1973c in 1983. That court had
scheduled the trial for October 22,
1984, a date too late for elections to
be held under the statutory plan in
1984.

4

schedule for filing of briefs on the
issues raised in the pleadings and for
proposed reapportionment plans. The
district court, after determining that
it should exercise \ its equitable
jurisdiction to adopt 5 wees for use in
Senate elections in 1984, received the
plans of parties to the suit. None of
the plans presented were the same as
the statutory plan then under considera-
tion for Section 5 preclearance in the
District Court for the District of
Columbia.

The district court held a
trial on the merits on July 26, 27, and
30, 1984. The Court gave each party an
opportunity to present proposed plans
for use in the 1984 elections and to
present whatever evidence he desired in
support of his plan and in opposi-
tion to all other parties' proposed

plans.

On July 31, 1984, the district
court entered an order which adopted an
interim reapportionment plan for the
South Carolina Senate and which set a
schedule to enable the State to hold
Senate elections in 1984.* Along
with that order the district court
filed an opinion which explained the
reasons that the Court had decided to
exercise its equitable jurisdiction in
the manner it did. Subsequent to the
district court's adoption of an interim
reapportionment plan, the General
Assembly of South Carolina passed and
the Governor signed S. 1093 adopting a

permanent reapportionment plan for the

*That schedule provided for
candidate filing to begin on August 13,
1984, and squeezed all other neces-

Sary steps into the time remaining
prior to the general election date.

South Carolina Senate and a schedule of
elections for 1984 only. Act 626 of
1984. The Attorney General granted
Section 5 preclearance to the plan but
objected to the schedule for 1984
Senate elections contained in the Act,
J. S. App. 57a, a schedule identical to
the one contained in the district
court's order. ite
Thereafter, defendants Daniel,
Dennis, and Wittens moved the district
court to vacate its order that 1984
Senate elections be held under the
interim court-adopted plan to permit
the 1984 elections to proceed under Act
626. Since the Attorney General had
objected to the schedule contained in
Act 626, which was identical to the
schedule in the district court's July

31, 1984 order, Daniel, Dennis, and

Williams also moved the court to amend
the schedule in the July 31, 1984
order.’

The district court vacated
that part of the July 3lst order which
adopted an interim plan, thereby permit-
ting the plan in Act 626 to be used in
1984, and amended the schedule to
provide new deadlines for the conduct
of Senate primaries and preparation for

the general election in 1984.

*Insufricient ime remained
to recall the Gengral Assembly,
introduce and pass new statutory

schedule and have it precleared in time
for the senate electidns to be held on
the general election day in 1984.

¢
4
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Argument

i. This appeal should _ be

dismissed since appellants admit that

the order appealed herein has_ been

vacated and thus any action by this

Court is an advisory opinion.

In their jurisdictional
statement appellants admit that the
order they seek to appeal has_ been
vacated and superseded by a subsequent
order of the same court and that their
appeal is therefore moot. J.S. 12-13,
15. Appellants nevertheless wish to
appeal the opinion of the district
court that was filed with the vacated
order, an opinion which is neither part
of, nor related to,,any extant order of
the district court.

No operative portion of the

July 31, 1984, order remains. The

decree contained in the July 31, 1984,
order has been vacated or superseded in
its entirety by the August 13, 1984,
order. Consequently, no appeal of the
vacated July 31, 1984, order is

necessary or appropriate. Battle v.

Anderson, 708 F.2d 1523 (10th Cir.

1983), cert. dismissed, v.38. ;

104 S. Ct. 1019 (1984); Theodoropoulos

v. Thompson-Starrett Co., 418 F.2d 350,

353, (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 398

U.S. 905 (1970).

Appellants seek to avoid this
compelling conclusion by stating that
parts of the July 31, 1984, order were
not vacated by the district court.
That contention is manifestly errone-
ous. Neither component of the July 31,
1984, order remains to be executed.
The plan was vacated and the schedule
was amended.

10

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Appellants confuse the
concepts “order” and "opinion." The
terms are not synonymous. An order is
a directive issued by a court to the
parties. An opinion is a_ court's
statement of reasons for its order. or

judgment. Rogers v. Hill, 289 U.S.

582, 587 (1933). The parts of the July
3lst opinion that appellants contend
were not vacated are not part of the
district court's order but are merely
reasons that explain its order.
Appellate courts review
judgments, decrees, and orders, not
mere opinions or statements of reasons

for orders. United States v. Ferreira,

13 How. 40/ 14 L. EG. 42 (1851);

Highland Supply Corp. Vv. Reynolds

Metals Co., 327 F. 2d 725, 729 (8th

Cir. 1964). This appeal should be
dismissed because the order of July 31

ll

no longer remains for this Court to
review. Review of the opinion is not a

judicial function, United States v.

Ferreira, 13 How. at 47. Review of the

vacated order would be purely hypotheti-
cal.

In their insistence on this
appeal of a vacated order, appellants
ask this Court to violate a principle
articulated by the first Chief Justice
of this Court: a prohibition against
advisory opinions. Issuance of
opinions unrelated to a controversy
_betveen two parties is not a judicial
fenevion and accordingly will not be
performed by the Court. Correspondence
and Public Papers of John Jay, 486
(1891). This fundamental limitation on
action by the Court, derived from
Article III, Section 2, Clause 1, has
been consistently and repeatedly

12

adhered to in the nearly two centuries
Since Chief Justice Jay declined
Secretary OL State Jefferson's
invitation to express the Court's views

on hypothetical issues. E.g., North

Carolina v. Rice, 404 U.S. 244 (1971),

Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 346

(1911); Hayburn's Case, 2 Dall. 409, 1

L. Ed. 436 (1792).
When an issue is not moot, it
involves a substantial controversy of

"immediacy and reality," Golden v.

/

Zwicker, 394 U.S. 103, 108 (1969),

which "admit[s] of specific’ relief
through a decree of a _ conclusive
character, as distinguished from an
Opinion advising what the law would be
on a hypothetical state of facts."

Aetna Life Insurance Co. v. Haworth,

300 U.S. 227, 241 (1937). Since the
district court's order has been

13

vacated, a decree of this Court would
have no effect on the parties. Appel-

lants concede that the August 13, 1984,
order, which vacated the July 31, 1984,
order, rendered this appeal moot. J.S.
15. The import of the appeal becoming
moot is that all allegations of error
in the district court's reasoning
behind its order are also moot. Battle

v. Anderson, 708 F. 2d at 1527.

"Mootness is a jurisdictional

question because the Court is not

empowered to decide moot questions or

Se

abstract propositions.'" North Caro-

lina v. Rice, 404 U.S. at 246, quoting

United States v. Alaska S. S. Co., 253

G.g. 43, ié (€23020). The lack of
power to review moot issues results
from the prerequisite in Article III,
Section 2, Clause 1 that judicial power
be exercised only in a case or contro-

14

versy. North Carolina v. Rice, 404

U.S. at 246. By admitting that this
appeal is moot, appellants admit this
Court's lack of jurisdiction to hear

this appeal. North Carolina v. Rice,

404 U.S. at 246.

$ This appeal should _ be

dismissed for want of jurisdiction as

the order objected to is not final and

mone of the cited statutes confers

jurisdiction in this Court.

Appellants have appealed this
case directly from a three judge
district court in South Carolina. Noa
Statute permits them to by-pass’ the
Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals’ and
bring this appeal directly to this

court. Furthermore, appellants have

PRESET 2 Ee eS neon se ee eee

taken this appeal from a conditional,

interim order of a three judge district
court. No authority exists to permit
the appeal of such a non-final order to
either this court or the circuit court
of appeals.

"The general principle of
federal appellate jurisdiction, derived
from the common law and enacted by the
First Congress, requires that review of

nisi prius proceedings await’ their

termination by final judgment." Di

Bella v. United States, 369 U.S. 121,

124 (1962). Absent an express statu-
tory exception, only final judgments
and final decrees may be appealed.

Baltimore and Ohio R.R. Co. Vv.

Interstate Commerce Commission, 215

U.S. 216 (1909). The July 31, 1984,
order is not a final judgment from

which an appeal may be taken.

16

SNE iA AT A ORAS EAD OD AI SAE aie pO SEAS RTE (aE FOORS

eleciths

5 Ca Nish SAILS 9 oe POA

To be final a judgment "must
terminate the litigation between the
parties on the merits of the case, so
that, if there should be an affirmance
here, the court below would have
nothing to do but to execute the
judgment or decree which had _ been

rendered." Benjamin v. DuBois, 118

U.S. 46, 48 (1886). In this case, as

wa

in Benjamin v. DuBois, the order at

issue is not one which could be
executed if it were affirmed. The
final order in this case, which has
been implemented, was filed August 13,
1984, and effects completely different
relief from the July order. fThe July
31, 1984, order is clearly not a final
order and, therefore, is not within

this Court's jurisdiction. Baltimore

and Ohio R.R., 215 U.S., 216.

17

Appellants seek to deprive the
Court of several of the advantages of
the final judgment rule by appealing a
vacated order. The mootness”~ that
resulted from subsequent circumstances
in this case is a common occurrence
that works to the advantage of
appellate courts by eliminating the
need for many appeals. Wright and

Miller, Federal Practice and

Procedure: Civil Section 3907 at 432.

The finality requirement and

prohibition against piecemeal appeals

is intended to "discourage undue
litigiousness and leaden-footed
administration of justice," Di Bella

v. United States, 369 U.S. at 124.

This appeal of an order that has been
vacated is an excellent example of
undue litigation that clogs the
judicial system.

18

Moreover, no statute confers
jurisdiction on the Court to Rar this
appeal directly from the district
court. Neither statute cited by appel-
lants in favor of jurisdiction is appli-
cable. Section 1253 of Title 28
permits direct appeals to this Court
only from orders of three judge courts
that grant or deny injunctions. Since
the July 31, 1984, order has been
vacated, it neither grants nor deni?s
an injunction. Accordingly, this Court
has no power under 28 U.S.C. § 1253 to

accept this appezi. Gunn v. University

Committee, 399 U.S. 383, 390 (1970).

No jurisdiction exists under
Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, 42
U.S.C. § 1973c, either. Section 5
confers jurisdiction on the District
Court for the District of Columbia, but
no other district court, for the

19

purpose of issuing declaratory
judgments concerning the purpose and
effect of voting changes, and confers
jurisdiction on this Court to hear
direct appeals of such declaratory
judgment actions. 42 U.S.C. § 1973c.
This is not a Section 5
declaratory judgment action and is not
on appeal from the District of
Columbia. The South Carolina district
court has no jurisdiction under Section
5. Section 5 grants exclusive
jurisdiction of actions, thereunder to
the district court in the District of
Columbia. 42 U.S.C. § 1973c. Jurisdic-
tion for the district court in South
Carolina to enjoin violations of
Section 5 is conferred only by 42
¥.6.¢. § 19735 (4) and that section does
not provide for direct appeals to this
Court. Accordingly, the Voting Rights

20

Act does not, in Section 5 or else-

where, confer jurisdiction on _ this
Court to hear a direct appeal from a
three judge district court in the

District of South Carolina. But see

Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393

U.S. 544 (1969).

The requirement that this
matter be heard by a district court of
three judges is contained not in
Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, as
the district court erroneously
concluded, but in 28 U.S.C. § 2284.
That section also does not permit
direct appeals to this Court. If the
July 3lst order were a final order, the
appeal would lie to the Fourth Circuit
Court of Appeals, not directly to this

Court from the district court.

21

# This appeal should _ be

dismissed because it seeks relief that

is either redundant or which appellants

should have obtained by prompt action

in the Court below but did not.

The finality requirement also
permits district courts the opportunity
to correct mistakes since ordinarily
only the final order in a case is
appealable. In this case, the district
court, having recognized that reappor-
tionment is primarily a legislative
function, foresightfully provided that
if a statutory plan became available
before candidate filing began under the
court's interim plan, the parties could
ask that its order be vacated. J.S.
App. 5la-S2a. The contemplated condi-
tion occurred and the district court
vacated its plan on August 13, 1984.

22

The district court also superseded the
remainder of its July 31, 1984, order,
which had provided a schedule for 1984
Senate elections under the court-
adopted plan, with an entirely new
schedule for use with the permanent
statutory plan. J.S. App. 53a et.
seq. This Court would serve no
judicial purpose and waste. judicial
resources by accepting this appeal from
a conditional interim order that the
district court has already vacated.
The relief sought here is_' redundant.
The order of July 31 having been
vacated and superseded the opinion
which supported its conclusion is of no
effect. To reason otherwise is_ to
grant to the district court the power
to render advisory opinions.

Appellants cite no case that

suggests. they are entitled tc the

23

relief requested. Each of the cases
they cite on page 16 of their
jurisdictional statement involves’ an
appeal from a final order or judgment,
which remained extant at the time of
the appeal. Appellants seek to appeal
from a conditional interim order which
has been vacated by the court below.
Each of the cases they cite had become
moot between the time judgment was
entered and the appeal was heard. this
case ,is not moot; only the issue of the
July 31, 1984, order is moot. There-
fore, the relief granted in the cases
appellants cite, remand with directions
to dismiss the action, is
inapptopriate.
Moreover, the relief appel-

lants seex should be denied for the
Same reason that remand was denied in

United States v. Munsingwear, 340 U.S.

24

36 (1950), the case upon which they

principally rely. Appellants, like the

United States in Munsingwear, could

have asked the district court for the
relief they seek from this Court. They
failed to take advantage of that
available remedy. Appellants, having
slept on their rights, now want this
Court to do for them what they could
have done for themselves. United

States v. Munsingwear, 340 U.S. at

40-41. As. this Court concluded in

Munsingwear, the request should be

denied.

25

Conclusion

This appeal is a waste of
judicial resources. It is the epitome
of the kind of piecemeal litigation
this Court has consistently refused to
permit, and exemplifies the reasons
this Court generally reviews only final
orders of the lower courts. The issue

herein is moot, by appellants' own

admission. Appellants seek from this
Court an advisory opinion on
hypothetical questions. Jurisdiction

to hear this appeal is not conferred by
any statute and is precluded by the
limitations in Article III, Section 2,
Clause 1 of the Constitution.

Appellees Daniel, Dennis, and
Williams, Sheheen, Schwartz, and

Ellisor respectfully submit that this

26

Court lacks jurisdiction to hear this
appeal and, therefore, appellees'

motion to dismiss should be granted.

Respectfully submitted,

McNAIR GLENN KONDUROS CORLEY
SINGLETARY PORTER AND DIBBLE, P.A.
Terrell L. Glenn*

M. Elizabeth Crum
Post Office Box 11390
Columbia, SC 29211
(803) 799-9800

THE SENATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
James P. Fields, Jr.
Helen T. McFadden
Post Office Box 142
Columbia, SC 29202
(803) 758-8989

Attorneys for Appellees
Daniel, Dennis & “7illiams

David Rudd
Post Office Box 11867
Columbia, SC 29211
(803) 758-7268
Attorney for Appellee
Sheheen

27

Joseph A. Wilson, II*
Charles W. Gambrell, Jr.
Post Office Box 11549
Columbia, SC 29211
(803) 758-2072
Attorneys for Appellee
Schwartz

Treva G. Ashworth*
Post Office Box 11549
Columbia, SC 29211
(803) 758-2072
Attorney for Appellee
Ellisor

*Counsel of Record

28

Appendix A

28 U.S.C. § 1253. Direct appeals from

decisions of three judge courts

Except as. otherwise provided by law,
any party may appeal to the Supreme
Court from an_- order granting or
denying, after notice and hearing, an
interlocutory or permanent injunction
in any civil action, suit or proceeding
required by any Act of Congress to be
heard and determined by a district

court of three judges.

la

Appendix B

42. 3.8.8, § 1973c. Alteration of

voting qualifications and _ procedures;

action by State or political

subdivision for declaratory judgment of

no denial or abridgement of voting

rights; three-

judge district court; appeal to Supreme

Court

Whenever a State or political subdivi-

Sion with respect to which the
prohibitions set forth in section
1973b(a) of this title based upon
determinations made under the first
sentence of section 1973b(b) of this
title are in effect shall enact or seek
to administer any voting qualification
or prerequisite to vocing, or standard

practice, or procedure with respect to

1b

voting different from that in force or
effect on November 1, 1964, or whenever
a State or political subdivision with
respect to which the prohibitions set
Fee in section 1973b(a) of this title
\pased upon determinations made under
the secon” sentence of ‘sjction 1973b(b)
of this title are in effect shall enact
or seek to administer any voting
qualification cr prerequisite to
voting, Or standard, practice, or
procedure with respect to voting
different from that in force or effect
on November 1, 1968, or whenever a
State or political subdivision with
respect to which the prohibitions set
forth in section 1973b(a) of this title
based upon determinations made under
the third sentence of section 1973b(b)
of this title are in effect ‘shall enact
or seek to administer any voting

qualification or prerequisite to

a a

voting, or standard, practice, or
procedure with respect to voting
different from that in force or effect
on November 1, 1972, such State or
subdivision may institute an action in
the United States District Court for
the District of Columbia for a
declaratory judgment that such
qualification, prerequisite, standard,
practice, or procedure does not have
the purpose and will not have the
effect of denying or abridging’ the
right to vote on account of race or
color, or in contravention of the
guarantees set forth in section
1973b(f£)(2) of this title, and unless
and until the court enters’ such
, Judgment no person shail be denied the
right to vote for failure to comply
with such qualification, prerequisite,
standard, practice, or procedure:

Provided, That such qualification,

prerequisite, standard, practice, or
procedure may be enforced without such
proceeding if the qualification,
prerequisite, standard, practice, or
procedure has been submitted by the
chief legal officer or other appro-

priate official of such State or
subdivision to the Attorney General and
the Attorney General has not interposed
an objection within sixtv days after
such submission, or upon good cause
shown, to facilitate an expedited
approval within sixty days after such
Submission, the Attorney General has
affirmatively indicated that such
objection will not be made. Neither an
affirmative indication by the Attorney
General that no objection will be made,
nor the atocner General's failure to
»bject, nor a declaratory judgment
entered under this section shall bar a

subsequent action to enjoin enforcement —

of such qualification, prerequisite,
standard, practice, or procedure. In
the event the Attorney General
affirmatively indicates that no
objection will be made within the
sixty-day period following receipt of a
submission, the Attorney General may
reserve the right to reexamine’ the
submission if additional information
comes to his attention during’ the
remainder of the sixty-day period which
would otherwise require objection in
accordance with this’ section. Any
action under this section shall be
heard and determined by a court of
three judges in accordance with the
provisions of section 2284 of Title 28
and any appeal shall lie to the Supreme

Court.

Sb

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385017_0106%3A3. Public record. Not legal advice.