# Amicus Curiae Brief — Rehaif v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 914 (2019) (No. 17-9560)

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Amicus Curiae Brief
- **Published:** January 1, 2019

## Text

No. 17-9560

IN THE
Supreme Court of the United States

HAMID MOHAMED AHMED ALI REHAIF,
Petitioner,

Vv.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Respondent.

On Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of
Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit

BRIEF OF AMICUS CURIAE
EVERYTOWN FOR GUN SAFETY IN SUPPORT
OF RESPONDENT

ERIC A. TIRSCHWELL
Counsel of Record

MARK ANTHONY FRASSETTO

WILLIAM J. TAYLOR JR.

KRYSTAN HITCHCOCK

EVERYTOWN LAW

450 LEXINGTON AVE, #4184

NEW YORK, NY 10017

(646) 324-8222

etirschwell@everytown.org

Counsel for Amicus Curiae Everytown for Gun Safety

April 1, 2019

TABLE OF CONTENTS

PR CEE FEAF Ee BP oriccccerececassvescccesvsecoracocosone il
INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE ............::ccececseees 1
INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF ARGU-

PENNE E Sircsdvosvsdccicscvessénceccessecoinsnseesssevesessisessonceesi 2
FAITE cenicicninnniunisanichitinnenindnduanteassanianaiecccsserseees 6

1. Section 922(g) and Its State Law Counterparts
Share a Common History and Development
and Have Been Interpreted by Courts in
PII: winsidstaaidincisedaliansicccalcindoiiatbiadidsapnsdddpesinmssniness 6

A. The History and Development of
Modern Prohibited Possessor Laws ...... 6

B. State and Federal Courts Have
Interpreted Their Prohibited Possessor
I i etre 10

II. State Courts Have Consistently Interpreted
their Prohibited Possessor Laws as Not
Requiring a Mens Rea for Prohibited Status. 11

A. State Courts Have Interpreted
Prohibited Possessor Statutes Lacking a
Statutory Mens Rea to Require
Knowledge of Possession, But Not of
II INIIIINL ccchcvoniendcsuscnidicnsesebans 12

-ji-

B. State Courts Have Also Interpreted
Prohibited Possessor Statutes with a
Textual Mens Rea Element to Exclude
Knowledge of Status. ...............cccc000000+- 18

C. State Courts Have Provided A Variety of
Reasons for Excluding Knowledge of
Status as an Element in Prohibited
FORSOISNE COTIROD, cca cescstscesissccsesbinssness 20

COPE IEIIIS eccectccccechicconesciecisnsiondedadddiaibanmanmnunt 23
APPENDIX - State Prohibited Possessor Statutes -

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases
Bibbins v. State, 367 P.3d 750 (Nev. 2010).............. 16
Billups v. State, No. 2016-KA-01378-COA, 2018 Miss.
App. LEXIS 461(Miss. Ct. App. 2016) .................. 15
Branch v. Commonwealth, 593 S.E.2d 835 (Va. Ct.
TTT intial crtiatnctisentemrindanntnateantinintunnitancnennns 19

Commonwealth v. McGee, 2015 Pa. Dist. & Cnty.
Dec. LEXIS 393 (Pa. C.P. Berks Cty., Feb 26, 2015)

aeinensiapenthigsiaanudoenspesareunpusnwedecsacteneuaentianssennesescoaanennsesens 15
Creamer v. State, 605 So. 2d 541 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
I neasinddeidiahaniaiisineinibbdiaensienaiinastheniiananpenbinnesianuvintnnnatn 14

Dickerson v. New Banner Inst., 460 U.S. 103 (1983). 3
Fisher v. State, 290 Ark. 490 (Ark. Sup. Ct. 1986) .. 14
Foister v. Commonwealth, No. 2004-CA-002409-MR,

Ree SS ee 14
Gabrelcik v. State, No. AO7-0627, 2008 Minn. App.
Unpub. LEXIS 579 (Ct. App. 2008)....................... 16
Johnson v. State, 2014 Tex. App. LEXIS 3732 (Tex.
I Ws orate ariinatiatipniicstnadnenaennensew 15
Kipp v. State, 704 A.2d 839 (Del. 1998).................... 19
Kolbe v. Hogan, 849 F.3d 114 (4th Cir. 2017) (en
RES REDS SST RRS Sa eee ae 1
Malone v. State, 786 S.E.2d 558 (Ga. Ct. App. 2016)
Gksinantaneeisennmnrbnnnaienadedantrenmnanensomnentsnnssenmennenraneeeetee 16

Medina v. Whitaker, 913 F.3d 152 (D.C. Cir. 2019)... 7
Myers v. United States, 56 A.3d 1148 (D.C. 2012)... 14
Nicholson v. State, 77 So.3d 1214 (Ala. Crim. App.

IEE erssdeedeaiiasabiocenindiianininemnsttigetnaiinnniananteatnnntatansinegsauens 14
People v. Adams, 903 N.E.2d 892 (Ill. App. Ct. 2009)
ssialeiniidanitiaduiapnthndntcdnadepatinmimasttennestessnnueeieareneien 19

People v. DeWitt, 275 P.3d 728 (Colo. App. 2011)3, 18,
22

-iv-

People v. Nieto, 247 Cal.App.2d 364 (Ct. App. 1966) 16
People v. Tenorio, 590 P.2d 952 (Colo. 1979)............ 18
People v. Tice, 558 N.W.2d 245 (Mich. Ct. App. 1996)
cinpaiienannecignamumiuisegdepamnnemeiiasineeemienennntibaédanientiion 15
Peruta v. Cty. of San Diego, 824 F.3d 919 (9th Cir.
ES Ea eee Bae 1
Poole v. State, 152 P.3d 412 (Wyo. 2007).................. 19
Rhone v. State, 825 N.E.2d 1277 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005)
Jeiieceicenianiiaenanitedabittiianiininidilantenbdiatsinlinideanitinnitiaaaniatin 19
Saadig v. State, 387 N.W.2d 315 (lowa 1986).......... 11
Samba v. State, 49 A.3d 841 (Md. Ct. of Spec. App.
TT iacstuininiccnanepscnnicecencumnitiansempennndtatiantiinitlliicstiiatseaeiiass 15
Scarborough v. United States, 431 U.S. 563 (1977)... 3
Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600 (1994).......... 21
State v. Bailey, 757 S.E.2d 491 (N.C. Ct. App. 2014)

State v. Black, 624 N.W.2d 363 (Wis. 2001)............. 21
State v. Boyd, 973 A.2d 138 (Conn. App. Ct. 2009).. 14
State v. Buchholz, 723 N.W.2d 534 (N.D. 2006) ...... 16
State v. Dolsby, 145 P.3d 917 (Idaho Ct. App. 2006) 14
State v. Elred, 564 N.W.2d 283 (N.D. 1997)............. 16
State v. Haddenham, 793 P.2d 279 (N.M. 19990)....... 15
State v. Hall, No. A-15-548, 2016 Neb. App. LEXIS
125 (Neb. Ct. App. June 21, 2016) ................0...... 15
State v. Harmon, 541 P.2d 600 (Ariz. Ct. App. 197519
State v. Heald, 382 A.2d 290 (Me. 1978) .................. 15
State v. Holman, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 790,
CR, GD, Ta Ric cntesescinssniiiiniininsstentninieaiineantnnds 15
State v. Howard, 339 P.3d 809 (Kan. Ct. App. 2014)
sunesteeesnindiiiiisiaanmsmnitesngminaiinpianenisuesiiieetleniaineee 10, 13, 21
State v. Johnson, 942 N.E.2d 347 (Ohio 2019)......... 19
State v. Jones, 487 A.2d 1278 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
SE winicsiconanstinialeiniinncsenineimetsnimibaiassinsinancsctiitntinitiininitag 16
State v. Ojeda, 350 P.3d 640 (Utah Ct. App. 2015).. 19

-V-

State v. Phillips, 493 N.W.2d 238 (Wis. Ct. App.
“SE RAREREST ioe: ie 17
State v. Rainoldi, 268 P.3d 568 (Or. 2011)........passim
State v. Reed, 928 P.2d 469 (Wash. Ct. App. 1997) . 13
State v. Semakula, 946 P.2d 795 (Wash. Ct. App.

State v. Stern, 186 A.3d 1099 (Vt. 2018) ............0..... 16
State v. Storks, 836 So. 2d 638 (La. Ct. App. 2002). 14
State v. Stratton, 567 A.2d 986 (N.H. 1989)............. 14
State v. Valentine, 998 P.2d 479 (Haw. 2000).......... 21
United States v. Castleman, 572 U.S. 157 (2014) ...... 1
United States v. Rehaif, 888 F.3d 1138 (11th Cir.

EE, FE SEAS SS ee ee a 21
United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc., 513 U.S. 64

TRESS SEES Ea Rae samen 21
United States v. Yancy, 621 F.3d 681 (7th Cir. 2010) 7
Voisine v. United Siates, 136 S. Ct. 2272 (2016)........ 1
Williams v. Staie, 565 P.2d 46 (Okla. Crim. App.

= PORES. FEN ia eR SE 15
Statutes
Ae ae ane nee Serer ne s
ce reeled passim
HD sc cnc cscessunssiicniensancessonsitnineenitnil x
0 2,4
1OBS Gal Bhat: GHG, aha. BHD ..........000cccecscecsceee. cose. ieee
1923 Cenn. Pub. Acts 3707, ch. 252...............2..000e00e+ 7
I EE a Ce CE x
ES eee ™
1955 Nev. Sess. Laws 185, ch. 132 ...............2.......0-006 fal
1994 Wash Sess. Laws 2196, 2217 ch. 6, § 402.......... “4
2010 lowa Acts 358, ch. 1083.................-.:ccccecsecerereeneee 9

2014 La. Aets 1573, Act. No. 196...............:c-.cscesserseens 9

-vi-

Act of July 8, 1932, Pub. L. No. 72-275, ch. 465, § 4,
NE cliaiicciantieniienmtaratrenuininaiinianainentecneten 8

An Act to Regulate Commerce in Arms, Pub. L. No.
75-785, ch. 850, § 2, 52 Stat. 1250 (June 30, 1938) 8

Calle. Rov. Stat. § 18-12-1208 q........0..00.c.cecscscccseceeceesees 18
NE SS ee 12
RO KS) 12
Pub. L. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-371 .00.........cccccceceeeee 9
Pub. L. No. 90-618, 82 Stat. 1213-36 (Oct. 22, 1968). 8
Pub. L. No. 99-308, 100 Stat. 449 ................:.ccccececeeees »
Other Authorities

A Bill to Provide for the Uniform Regulation of
Revolver Sales (1922), reprinted in Handbook of the
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws and Proceedings of the Thirty-Fourth
| ED me

AK Pattern Jury Ins. — Crim. 11.61.200(A)(1)......... 20

David T. Hardy, The Firearms Owners Protection Act:
A Historical and Legal Perspective, 17 Cumb. L.

Hawaii Rev. Crim. Jury Instr. 15.07........................ 20
Jacquelyn C. Campbell et al., Risk Factors for
Femicide in Abusive Relationships: Results from a
Multisite Case Control Study, 93 Am. J. of Public
Health 1089 (2003). ........ Siisisabeervelinailiaptinndinadsiaine 4
Mariel Alpher et al., U.S. Dep't of Justice, 2018
Update on Prisoner Recidivism: A 9- Year Follow-up
Period (2005-2014) (2018).........2....-ceceeeeneververenereeseees 4
Report of Committee on An Act to Regulate the Sale
and Possession of Firearms, published in Fortieth
Conference Handbook of the National Conference of
the Uniform State Laws and Proceedings of ihe
Annual Meetings 530 (1930).................c.cccceceeeeeeees a’

-vii-

Tara N. Richards et al., A 10-year Analysis of
Rearrests Among a Cohort of Domestic Violence
Offenders, 29 Violence & Victims 887 (2014) .........

United States Sentencing Commission, Quick Facts:
Felon in Possession of a Firearm (2018),
IED pests ctiniciinpnceniininbinisienisiniccnianvnivasa

ste

INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE'

Everytown for Gun Safety is the nation’s largest
gun-violence-prevention organization, with over five
million supporters across all fifty states. It was
founded in 2014 as the combined effort of Mayors
Against Illegal Guns, a national, bipartisan coalition
of mayors combatting illegal guns and gun trafficking,
and Moms Demand Action for Gun Sense in America,
an organization formed after twenty children and six
adults were murdered in an elementary school in
Newtown, Connecticut. Everytown also includes a
large network of gun-violence survivors who are em-
powered to share their stories and advocate for respon-
sible gun laws.

Everytown works to promote and support pub-
lic safety measures that can save lives, including laws
that keep guns out of the hands of people with danger-
ous histories, such as felons, domestic abusers and
those with dangerous mental illnesses.

Everytown has drawn on its expertise to file
amicus briefs in numerous cases implicating gun
safety issues, including in briefs to this Court about
the proper interpretation of federal firearms law, of-
fering historical and doctrinal analysis that might oth-
erwise be overlooked. See, e.g., Voisine v. United
States, 136 8. Ct. 2272 (2016); United States v. Cas-
tleman, 572 U.S. 157 (2014); Kolbe v. Hogan, 849 F.3d
114 (4th Cir. 2017) (en banc); Peruta v. Cty. of San

' The parties have consented to the filing of this brief, and
no counsel for any party authored it in whole or part. Apart from
amicus curiae and their counsel, no person contributed money in-
tended to fund the briefs preparation and submission.

2.

Diego, 824 F.3d 919 (9th Cir. 2016) (en banc). It seeks
to do the same here.

INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF
ARGUMENT

The brief of the United States persuasively ex-
plains why the text, circuit court case law, and legis-
lative history strongly support the conclusion that
prosecutions under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) and 18 U.S.C. §
924(a)(2) do not require the government to prove that
a defendant had knowledge of his prohibited status.
This brief is intended to provide the Court with an ad-
ditional body of law reinforcing this consensus view:
state court decisions interpreting and applying the
state law counterparts to § 922(g).

These state laws, on the books in nearly every
jurisdiction in the country, arose out of the same leg-
islative efforts in the 1920s and 1930s that led to the
current federal prohibited possessor statute, and they
continue to be interpreted in parallel to federal law to-
day. Like the virtually unanimous federal courts of ap-
peals, state courts too have consistently held that the
government is not required to prove a criminal defend-
ant’s knowledge of his prohibited status (i.e., that he
is a felon or a convicted domestic abuser or within one
of the other prohibited categories set forth in the stat-
ute). Indeed, as the Oregon Supreme Court observed
in 2011, “[e]very court—state and federal—that has
considered the question has held that no such proof is
required.” State v. Rainoldi, 268 P.3d 568, 577 n.1 (Or.
2011).

Be

Petitioner asks this Court to redefine this well-
established standard in a way that will impact not
only his prosecution, but the prosecutions of all those
who violate the federal prohibition on certain catego-
ries of people possessing firearms. That is a dangerous
course.

Section 922(g) and its state counterparts are
among the most important tools law enforcement has
for preventing gun violence. In 2017 alone, there were
over six-thousand convictions for violating 18 U.S.C. §
922(g), about nine percent of all federal convictions.
United States Sentencing Commission. Quick Facts:
Felon in Possession of a _ Firearm (2018),
https://bit.ly/2Ce9Isn. And, as this Court has made
clear, “Congress sought to rule broadly” in enacting
the federal prohibition, so as “to keep guns out of the
hands of those who have demonstrated that ‘they may
not be trusted to possess a firearm without becoming
a threat to society.” Scarborough v. United States, 431
U.S. 563, 572 (1977) (quoting 114 Cong. Rec. 14773).
States have pursued the same core goal through their
own parallel laws. See, e.g., People v. DeWitt, 275 P.3d
728, 736 (Colo. App. 2011) (state prohibited possessor
law intended to prevent “all convicted felons from pos-
sessing a firearm to avoid ‘substantial risk of harm to
the public”).

Prohibited possessor laws at both the federal
and state levels thus punish the possession of fire-
arms by “presumptively risky people,” Dickerson v.
New Banner Inst., 460 U.S. 103,112 n.6 (1983), who
are most likely to commit future acts of violence. The
data back this up. For example, according to a Depart-
ment of Justice analysis, more than thirty-nine per-
cent of felons (or, more specifically, state prisoners

aie

sentenced to a year or more in prison)—who are pro-
hibited from firearm possession by § 922(g)(1)—were
arrested for a violent crime within nine years of being
released from prison.? Similarly, one study found that
more than fifty percent of those convicted of a domestic
violence offense—who are prohibited from firearm
possession by§ 922(g)(1) or § 922(g)(9)—are rearrested
for another domestic violence crime within ten years,
and even more are rearrested for nondomestic violence
crimes.’ And, significantly, the presence of a firearm
in a domestic violence situation makes it five times
more likely that a woman will be killed.‘

Like § 922(g)(1), state prohibited possessor stat-
utes are also an essential tool for local police and pros-
ecutors to prevent gun violence in their communities.
Every state has laws prohibiting firearm possession by
at least some of the categories of people listed in §
922(g). And each of these laws, like § 922(g)(1), prohib-
its firearm * sssession by at least some felons.®

To be sure, these state laws are written differ-
ently from the federal statute. None adopts a mens rea

2 Mariel Alpher et al., U.s. Dep’t of Justice, 2018 Update
on Prisoner Recidivism: A 9-Year Follow-up Period (2005-2014)
11 tbl.7, 15 (2018), https://bit.ly/21 BxgrR.

3 Tara N. Richards et al., A 10-year Analysis of Rearrests
Among a Cohort of Domestic Violence Offenders, 29 Violence &
Victims 887, 897 (2014).

4 Jacquelyn C. Campbell et al., Risk Factors for Femicide
in Abusive Relationships: Results from a Multisite Case Control
Study, 93 Am. J. of Public Health 1089, 1092 (2003).

5 An appendix listing citations for current state prohib-
ited possessor statutes is attached to this brief. Some of these
statutes may have been revised since the date of the decisions
cited in this brief.

-§.

through a specifically applicable separate statutory
provision like §§ 922(g) and 924(a)(2). They also vary
from jurisdiction to jurisdiction in several respects, in-
cluding who is prohibited and for how long, whether
an intent standard is explicitly set forth in the statute,
and the level of that intent. For example, the prohib-
ited possessor laws in more than thirty states and the
District of Columbia lack any mens rea requirement
in the statutory text.® In contrast, prohibited posses-
sor laws of a smaller number of other states include
statutory mens rea provisions that are unambiguously
applicable only to possession.’

Notwithstanding these and other textual differ-
ences, and just like the federal courts when it comes to
§ 922(g), state courts applying and interpreting their
prohibited possessor statutes are in agreement on one
thing: a defendant’s knowledge of his prohibited sta-
tus is not an element required to be proved for

6 See the list of state prohibited possessor statutes set
forth in the appendix for Alabama, Arkansas, California, Con-
necticut, District of Columbia, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho,
Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Michigan, Min-
nesota, Mississippi, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New
Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota,
Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South
Dakoia, Tennessee, Texas, Vermont, Washington West Virginia,
and Wisconsin.

7 See, e.g. Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-8-102 (“Any person who has
previously pleaded guilty to or been convicted of committing or
attempting to commit a violent felony . .. who uses or knowingly
possesses any firearm” is guilty of a felony.); lowa Code § 724.26
(prohibited possessor statute providing that “[a] person who is
convicted of a felony . . . who knowingly has under the person's
dominion and control or possession . . . a firearm or offensive
weapon is guilty of a class ‘D’ felony”).

-6-

conviction. This consistent state-level judicial and leg-
islative understanding provides an additional body of
authority supporting and reinforcing the broad na-
tional consensus that violating prohibited possessor
statutes simply means knowingly possessing a fire-
arm subsequent to becoming a member of the prohib-
ited class. The shared federal-state history and judi-
cial approach also raises the concern that the Court’s
decision in this case as to the proper interpretation of
the federal prohibitor statute could have wider and
unintended ramifications for the interrelated state
prohibitor regimes as well.

ARGUMENT

I. Section 922(g) and Its State Law Counter-
parts Share a Common History and Devel-
opment and Have Been Interpreted by
Courts in Parallel.

A. The History and Development of Modern
Prohibited Possessor Laws.

18 U.S.C. § 922(g) and analogous state prohib-
ited possessor laws share a common history, which be-
gan at the state level. Starting in the 1920s, in re-
sponse to rising violent crime, states began to prohibit
the possession of firearms by certain categories of per-
sons who “pose a risk to the public.” Rainoldi, 268 P.3d
at 575-77 (summarizing development of state prohib-
ited possessor laws).* This effort was initially led by

8 While the current state and federal prohibited possessor
laws stem directly from legislation first passed in the 1920s and

“Fe

the United States Revolver Association (USRA), a
marksmanship group, which drafted model legislation
to regulate firearms. Jd. The USRA Model Act prohib-
ited the possession of firearms by anyone “convicted of
a felony against the person or property of another or
against the Government of the United States or any
State,” among other classes of persons. A Bill to Pro-
vide for the Uniform Regulation of Revolver Sales
(1922), reprinted in Handbook of the National Confer-
ence of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws and
Proceedings of the Thirty-Fourth Annual Meeting 728-
29 (1924). Several states quickly enacted the USRA
Model Act in an effort to reduce violent crime, begin-
ning with Connecticut and California. See, e.g., 1923
Cal. Stat. 695, ch. 339; 1923 Conn. Pub. Acts 3707, ch.
252.

The USRA Model Act’s success led to its adap-
tation by the National Conference of Commissioners
on Uniform State Laws, which modified the Model
Act’s prohibitions to restrict anyone “convicted . . . of a
crime of violence” from possessing firearms and
adopted it as the Uniform Firearms Act (UFA). See Re-
port of Committee on An Act to Regulate the Sale and
Possession of Firearms, published in Fortieth Confer-
ence Handbook of the National Conference of the Uni-
form State Laws and Proceedings of the Annual Meet-
ings 530, 537 (1930). Several states used the UFA as
a model, as did Congress when it passed gun

‘30s, prohibitions on the possession of firearms by so-called “un-
virtuous citizens,” including even nonviolent felons and other
criminals, date back to the founding. See Medina v. Whitaker, 913
F.3d 152, 158-60 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (quoting United States v. Yancy,
621 F.3d 681, 684-85 (7th Cir. 2010)) (summarizing founding-era
history).

-8-

regulations for the District of Columbia in 1932. Act of
July 8, 1932, Pub. L. No. 72-275, ch. 465, § 4, 47 Stat.
650; see, e.g., 1931 Pa. Laws 497; 1935 S.D. Sess. Laws
355.

In 1938, Congress adopted the language of the
UFA in passing the first national prohibition on the
possession of firearms by anyone “who is under indict-
ment or has been convicted of a crime of violence or
who is a fugitive from justice.” An Act to Regulate Com-
merce in Arms, Pub. L. No. 75-785, ch. 850, § 2, 52
Stat. 1250 (June 30, 1938). States continued to pass
their own prohibited possessor laws in the years that
followed. See, e.g., 1955 Nev. Stat. 185, ch. 132 (“no
person who has been convicted of a felony . . . shall own
or have in his possession . . . any pistol, revolver or
other firearm capable of being concealed”). In 1968,
again facing rising crime as well as a string of assas-
sinations, Congress passed the Gun Control Act,
which expanded the federal prohibited possessor cate-
gories to most of those now found in the current law,
including anyone convicted of a felony. Pub. L. No. 90-
618, 82 Stat. 1213-36 (Oct. 22, 1968). And, finally, in
1986, the Firearms Owners Protection Act (FOPA)
added an express “knowingly” requirement in §
924(a)(2) (see Pub. L. No. 99-308, 100 Stat. 449)—
which, as the United States has explained, had al-
ready long been applied to § 922(g) prosecutions by the
federal courts. U.S. Br. 29.9

® In passing FOPA, Congress distinguished between vio-
lations of the dealer licensing provisions in 18 U.S.C. § 921, which
had to be violated “willfully,” and the criminal provisions in § 922,
which preserved the court-acknowledged “knowingly” standard.
Compare 18 U.S.C. § 924(a)(1)(D) (2012), with id. § 924(a)(2); see
also David T. Hardy, The Firearms Owners Protection Act: A

-9-.

Since passage of the Gun Control Act and
FOPA, the close relationship and interaction between
federal and state prohibited possessor laws has con-
tinued. Many states have amended their laws to be
more consistent with the language and interpretation
of the federal statute. See, e.g., 2014 La. Acts 1573,
Act. No. 195 (codified at La. R.S. § 14:95.10) (prohib-
iting those convicted of domestic violence from pos-
sessing firearms, consistent with the federal prohibi-
tor at § 922(g)(8)); 2010 lowa Acts 358, ch. 1083 (codi-
fied at lowa Code § 724.26(3) (prohibiting those un-
der final domestic violence restraining orders from
possessing firearms, consistent with the federal pro-
hibitor at § 922(g)(9)). States have also continued to
influence the development of the federal prohibited
possessor law. Most notably, in 1996, Congress fol-
lowed the lead of six states and the District of Colum-
bia by prohibiting the possession of firearms by those
convicted of domestic violence offenses. Pub. L. 104—
208, 110 Stat. 3009-371 (codified at 18 U.S.C. §
922(g)(9)); see, e.g., 1994 Wash Sess. Laws 2196, 2217
ch. 6, § 402 (codified at Wash. Rev. Code Ann. §
9.41.040).

Historical and Legal Perspective, 17 Cumb. L. Rev. 585, 653
(1986) (“Certain offenses, distinguished by their more serious na-
tures, are singled out for a requirement only that accused viola-
tors know of their actions. The remaining provisions of the Act
require stiffer proof that the defendant ‘willfully’ violated the
statute.”)

-10-

B. State and Federal Courts Have Inter-
preted Their Prohibited Possessor Laws
in Parallel.

This parallel development of state and federal!
prohibited possessor statutes is mirrored by the paral-
lel development of state and federal interpretations
and applications of the required mens rea under pro-
hibited possessor laws. Despite significant differences
in mens rea language and the precise scope of the pro-
hibited possessor categories, federal and state courts
have interpreted the status element of their prohib-
ited possessor statutes roughly identically, with state
courts at times relying on or citing federal case law, as
well as that of sister states, for guidance on the appli-
cation of their own prohibitions.

For example, in State v. Howard, a Kansas in-
termediate court of appeals found that “[a]jlthough
mental culpability varies based on the wording of a
specific statute, . . . several other state and federal
courts have interpreted similar felon-in-possession
statutes and concluded that the prosecution does not
have to prove the defendant knew of his or her felon
status.” 339 P.3d 809, 822 (Kan. Ct. App. 2014). Simi-
larly, the Washington state intermediate court of ap-
peals likewise looked to the federal courts’ interpreta-
tion of § 922(g) in rejecting the argument that the
state’s prohibited possessor statute required
“knowledge that the possession is unlawful.” State v.
Semakula, 946 P.2d 795, 798 (Wash. Ct. App. 1997).
And in Saadig v. State, the lowa Supreme Court ex-
plained that its application of that state’s law was “in
accord with the California Supreme Court as well as
federal decisions under the federal statute proscribing

-11-

firearm possession by convicted felons.” 387 N.W.2d
315, 323-24 (lowa 1986).

Il. State Courts Have Consistently Interpreted
their Prohibited Possessor Laws as Not Re-
quiring a Mens Rea for Prohibited Status.

Like the federal courts of appeals, state courts
have consistently interpreted state prohibited posses-
sor laws to require a mens rea only for the possession
element of the crime. While there are certainly signif-
icant variations in the statutory language and legal
traditions across the states, the understanding on this
issue has been remarkably consistent. See, e.g.,
Rainoldi, 268 P.3d at 577 n.1 (citing cases). Whether
based on specific or general statutory text or other ju-
dicial interpretation of the state’s criminal law, each
of these state cases reaches the same conclusion — con-
sistent with the conclusion reached by the federal cir-
cuits and urged here by the United States: there is not
and should not be a mens rea requirement for the pro-
hibited status element of prohibited possessor
crimes. !°

10 Everytown was able to find relevant materials for forty-
four states and the District of Columbia. Massachusetts does not
have an analogous law and instead applies its prohibited posses-
sor categories through its licensing law. Everytown was unable
to find relevant materials from Montana, South Dakota, Rhode
Island, South Carolina, and West Virginia.

-12-

A. State Courts Have Interpreted Prohibited
Possessor Statutes Lacking a Statutory
Mens Rea to Require Knowledge of Pos-
session, But Not of Prohibited Status.

As noted above (at p. 5 n.6), the majority of state
prohibited possessor laws lack a specific statutory
mens rea. The courts in these jurisdictions have there-
fore decided the scope of the mens rea requirement by
looking to a catch-all mens rea statute or through case
law requiring a guilty mind to convict for most crimi-
nal statutes. In these states, the courts have consist-
ently applied a knowledge requirement to the posses-
sion element, while not requiring any mens rea for the
prohibiting status.

In State v. Rainoldi, for example, the Oregon Su-
preme Court rejected a claim that in order to be guilty
of “felon in possession of a firearm, the jury had to con-
clude that defendant knew that he was a felon.” 268
P.3d at 570. Oregon law required “a culpable mental
state with respect to each material element of the of-
fense that necessarily requires a culpable mental
state.” Id. However, the court rejected the application
of a culpable mental state to the status element, find-
ing it inconsistent with the text of the statute, with
“the nature of the element at issue” which pertains to
“the status of the defendant” and not his conduct, and
with the underlying legislative purpose to prevent the
possession of firearms by individuals with dangerous
histories. Jd. at 573-578."

'! The Rainoldi case addresses Or. Rev. Stat. Ann. §
166.270, a prohibition on possession of firearms by felons that
does not include mens rea in the statute’s text. Another broader
prohibited possessor statute, Or. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 166.250,

-13-

Other states with similar statutes have reached
the same result. In State v. Howard, a defendant ap-
pealed the exclusion of evidence from his prohibited
possessor trial, claiming it was exculpatory because it
proved he did not know he was a felon. 339 P.3d at
819. Kansas’s prohibited possessor statute does not set
forth a mens rea, so the defendant relied on another
statute, which makes a “culpable mental state . . . an
essential element of every crime defined by this code.”
Howard, at 823 (citing Kan. Stat. Ann. § 21-5202). The
court rejected this argument, finding: “(T]he State
only has to prove the defendant intentionally, reck-
lessly, or knowingly engaged in the conduct that con-
stitutes the crime. Here the prohibited conduct is pos-
sessing the firearm.” Jd.; see also State v. Reed, 928
P.2d 469, 471 (Wash. Ct. App. 1997) (allowing evi-
dence about defendant’s lack of knowledge about pre-
vious conviction only as relevant to determining
whether the prohibiting conviction was obtained in an
unconstitutional manner and therefore could not serve
as the predicate for the offense).

Other state courts interpreting prohibited pos-
sessor laws lacking a statutory mens rea have not di-
rectly addressed the argument that the prosecution
should be required to prove knowledge of status. But
in a number of these states the courts have upheld
convictions obtained using jury instructions requiring
mens rea only for the possession element, or have de-
scribed the necessary elements of the crime as only re-
quiring mens rea for the possession element. For ex-
ample, in State v. Stratton, the New Hampshire Su-
preme Court found that “[t}he prosecution was

requires knowing possession.

-14-

required to prove that the defendant knowingly
owned, possessed or controlled the firearms and that
he was a convicted felon.” 567 A.2d 986, 990 (N.H.
1989). Similarly, in Nicholson v. State, an Alabama
appellate court interpreted the state’s prohibited pos-
sessor statute to require “knowing possession of the
gun,” and simply a “prior conviction for a crime of vio-
lence.” 77 So.3d 1214, 1215-1216 (Ala. Crim. App.
2011). Many other states without statutory mens rea
in their prohibited possessor statutes have taken the
same path, requiring knowledge of possession but not
of a defendant’s prohibited status. '”

'2 Arkansas: Fisher v. State, 290 Ark. 490, 493-94 (Ark.
Sup. Ct. 1986) (“[t}]he requisite mens rea is that the defendant
‘purposely, knowingly, or recklessly’ . . . ‘possess{ed) or own|ed}
any firearm”); Connecticut: State v. Boyd, 973 A.2d 138, 144
(Conn. App. Ct. 2009) (requiring intent to possess and status as
a felon); District of Columbia: Myers v. United States, 56 A.3d
1148, 1149 (D.C. 2012) (“[T]he Government must prove. . . One,
that the Defendant possessed a firearm; two, that he did so know-
ingly and intentionally. .. And three, that at the time the Defend-
ant possessed the firearm, the Defendant had been convicted of a
felony.”) (internal quotation marks omitted); Florida: Creamer
v. State, 605 So. 2d 541, 542-43 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992) (requir-
ing prior felony conviction and knowing possession of a firearm);
Hawaii: State v. Valentine, 998 P.2d 479, 482, 489 (Haw. 2000)
(“A person commits the offense of Prohibited Possession of a Fire-
arm if having been previously convicted of committing a felony
he intentionally, knowingly or recklessly owns, possesses or con-
trols any firearm.”); Idaho: State v. Dolsby, 145 P.3d 917, 920
(Idaho Ct. App. 2006) (“[T]he act of knowingly possessing the fire-
arm is all that the state is required to prove.”); Kentucky:
Foister v. Commonwealth, No. 2004-CA-002409-MR, 2005 WL
3334518, at *1, *3 (Ky. Ct. App. Dec. 9, 2005) (Commonwealth
required to show defendant “knew the gun was present”); Loui-
siana: State v. Storks, 836 So. 2d 638, 640 (La. Ct. App. 2002) (to
convict a defendant of illegal possession of a firearm by a

68.

convicted felon, the State must prove that “the offender was
aware that a firearm was in his presence and that the offender
had a general criminal intent to possess the weapon”); Maine:
State v. Heald, 382 A.2d 290, 297 (Me. 1978) (“Possession statutes
such as 15 M.R.S.A. § 393, making it unlawful for a felon to pos-
sess a firearm, require no particular scienter, except the
knowledge of the presence of the firearm and its character as
such.”); Maryland: Samba v. State, 49 A.3d 841, 858 (Md. Ct. of
Spec. App. 2012) (“The possession charge requires an affirmative
showing of knowledge in order to establish appellants dominion
and control over the weapon.”); Michigan: People v. Tice, 558
N.W.2d 245, 247-48 (Mich. Ct. App. 1996) (allowing defendant to
argue he was not legally a felon, but not considering his lack of
knowledge); Mississippi: Billups v. State, No. 2016-KA-01378.-
COA, 2018 Miss. App. LEXIS 461, *9-10 (Miss. Ct. App. 2018)
(felon-in-possession statute requires that defendant “unlaw-
fully, willfully, and feloniously . . . possess(ed] a firearm... and
halve] been previously convicted of a felony”); Nebraska: State
v. Hall, No. A-15-548, 2016 Neb. App. LEXIS 125, *5-6 (Neb. Ct.
App. June 21, 2016) (felon-in-possession conviction valid because
there was sufficient evidence that defendant “knowingly pos-
sessed three firearms after having been previously convicted of a
felony offense”); New Mexico: State v. Haddenham, 793 P.2d
279, 286 (N.M. 1990) (“[Defendant] only had to have known that
the gun [possessed] was a firearm.”); Oklahoma: Williams v.
State, 565 P.2d 46, 49 (Okla. Crim. App. 1977) (“intent or
knowledge” of possession necessary to convict defendant); Penn-
sylvania: Commonwealth v. McGee, 2015 Pa. Dist. & Cnty. Dec.
LEXIS 393, at *27 (Pa. C.P. Berks Cty., Feb 26, 2015) (possession
element requires “both the knowledge to control and the intent to
exercise that control”), affd, No. 73 MDA 2015, 2016 PA. Super.
Unpub. LEXIS 259 (Pa. Super Ct. Jan. 29, 2016) Tennessee:
State v. Holman, No. W201501744-CCA-R3-CD, 2016 Tenn.
Crim. App. LEXIS 790, *7-8 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2016) (“intent,
knowledge, or recklessness suffice{] to establish the culpable
mental state’... Here, the defendant, a convicted felon, acted at
least recklessly by driving a vehicle that he knew had a firearm
inside”); Texas: Johnson v. State, No. 01-13-00213-CR, 2014 Tex.
App. LEXIS 3732, *4-5 (Tex. App. 2014) (“To establish unlawful
possession of a firearm by a felon, the State must prove ... that

-16-

In a number of other states where the prohib-
ited possessor statutes do not set forth a mens rea, the
courts have interpreted the prohibited possessor stat-
utes to be strict liability offenses. This interpretation
necessarily excludes a mens rea requirement for the
status element. See, e.g., People v. Nieto, 247 Cal. App.
2d 364, 368 (Ct. App. 1966) (applying strict liability);
Malone v. State, 786 S.E.2d 558, 560 (Ga. Ct. App.
2016) (“[T]he State need only prove that the accused is
a convicted felon and in possession of a firearm.” (in-
ternal quotation marks and citation omitted)).'*

In practice, however, these strict liability states
are not substantially different from other states’ laws

the accused was previously convicted of a felony offense and pos-
sessed a firearm. . . . Possession is a voluntary act if the possessor
knowingly obtains or receives the thing possessed . . .”); Ver-
mont: State v. Stern, 186 A.3d 1099, 1104-05 (Vt. 2018) (prohib-
ited possessor conviction requires defendant to have “intention-
ally possessed a firearm”).

18 See also Gabrelcik v. State, No. AO7-0627, 2008 Minn.
App. Unpub. LEXIS 579, at *7 (Minn. Ct. App. 2008) (“In
Minesota, the elements of the offense of being a person ineligible
to possess a firearm do not include knowledge.”); Bibbins v State,
367 P.3d 750, 2010 WL 3341923, at *1 (Nev. 2010) (crime “com.
pleted when the ex-felon obtains possession of a firearm”); State
v. Jones, 487 A.2d 1278, 1284 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. 1985) (apply-
ing strict liability, but requiring evidence that defendant in-
tended to use the object as a deadly weapon); State v. Bailey, 757
8.E.2d 491, 493 (N.C. Ct. App. 2014) (applying strict liability but
requiring something approaching knowledge to prove posses-
sion); State v. Elred, 564 N.W.2d 283, 290 (N.D. 1997) (“Section
62.1-02-01 does not have a culpability requirement. It is a strict
liability statute.”); State v. Buchholz, 723 N.W.2d 534, 538 (N.D.
2006) (“[t)he offense of felon in possession of a firearm is a strict
liability offense”).

SF

with a mens rea requirement because possession is in-
terpreted to require some level of knowledge. For ex-
ample, in Jn re Ronnie L., a minor defendant in a juve-
nile delinquency hearing was charged with possession
of a firearm found in a jacket he had borrowed from a
friend. 463 N.Y.S.2d 732, 732 (Fam. Ct. 1983). He
claimec that he was unaware of the presence of the
firearm and therefore could not be adjudicated delin-
quent. Jd. The court accepted that defendant’s lack of
knowledge could be a defense, before ultimately reject-
ing it on the facts, finding that the prohibited posses-
sor statute at issue is “a strict liability crime,” but still
requires “a voluntary act,” which must be done “inten-
tionally” or “knowingly.” Jd. at 733-34. The court
acknowledged that the distinction between strict lia-
bility and knowledge in possession crimes was illusory
because both “necessarily involve[] a culpable mental
state.” Jd. at 734. Similarly, in Wisconsin, courts have
interpreted the prohibited possessor statute “to im-
pose strict criminal liability,” State v. Phillips, 493
N.W.2d 238, 240 (Wis. Ct. App. 1992), but to convict
under the statute the state is “required to show that
the felon ‘possessed’ the firearm with knowledge that
it is a firearm” and “knowingly had actual physical
control” over it. State v. Black, 624 N.W.2d 363, 371
(Wis. 2001).

-18-

B. State Courts Have Also Interpreted Pro-
hibited Possessor Statutes with a Textual
Mens Rea Element to Exclude Knowledge
of Status.

Like the federal law, several states’ prohibited
possessor statutes have a statutorily defined mens
rea. In these cases, the mens rea applied through the
statute consistently has been found to extend only to
the prohibited possession, and not to the defendant’s
status as a person prohibited from possessing fire-
arms.

One example is Colorado. Similar to the federal
law, Colorado’s prohibited possessor statute initially
lacked a statutory mens rea, but was interpreted by
the state courts to require knowledge of possession.
See People v. Tenorio, 590 P.2d 952, 957 (Colo. 1979)
(requiring knowledge of possession). Colorado’s stat-
ute was subsequently amended, adding a mens rea re-
quirement obligating prosecutors to prove a defendant
“knowingly possesse[d], use[d], or carrie{d] upon his or
her person a firearm. . . subsequent to the person’s
conviction for a felony.” Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-12-108.
When a defendant in a prohibited possessor case
claimed that the revised statute required the applica-
tion of the “knowingly” mens rea to the prohibited sta-
tus element of his crime, the court rejected that claim
as inconsistent with the text and purpose of the stat-
ute. Instead, the court held, the “[k]nowingly’ mental
state” applied only “to the possession element of the
offense, and not to the prior felony conviction ele-
ment.” DeWitt, 275 P.3d at 735.

Other state courts, interpreting statutes with a
statutory mens rea more clearly limited to only the

-19-

possession element, have unsurprisingly come to the
same conclusion. The Wyoming Supreme Court found
that “[t]he only mens rea requirement for a conviction
is knowledge that the instrument possessed is a fire-
arm” and that “no requirement exists that the defend-
ant know his status as a convicted felon.” Poole v.
State, 152 P.3d 412, 414 (Wyo. 2007). The lowa Su-
preme Court found that “[k]nowledge of felony status
is not an element of this crime.” Saadig, 387 N.W. at
324. In Kipp v. State, the Delaware Supreme Court
found that “to be guilty of the offense, the defendant
need only know that he or she possessed the weapon.”
Kipp v. State, 704 A.2d 839, 842 (Del. 1998). And the
Ohio Supreme Court likewise ruled that “the state
need not prove a culpable mental state for the element
that a defendant is under indictment for or has been
convicted of [the legally relevant offense].” State v.
Johnson, 942 N.E.2d 347, 348 (Ohio 2010); see also
Branch v. Commonwealth, 593 S.E.2d 835, 836 (Va.
Ct. App. 2004) (“the pertinent conduct proscribed .. .
is merely that of ‘being a felon’ and ‘knowingly and in-
tentionally being in possession of a firearm”); Rhone
v. State, 825 N.E.2d 1277, 1286 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005)
(Indiana law “does not require proof that [defendant]
knew he was a serious violent felon”); see also People
v. Adams, 903 N.E.2d 892, 896-97 (Ill. App. Ct. 2009)
(“the State must show that the defendant had a prior
felony conviction and knowingly possessed a firearm”);
State v. Harmon, 541 P.2d 600, 602 (Ariz. Ct. App.
1975) (“The intent which the legislature has chosen to
punish is the intent to possess the pistol.”); State v.
Jones, 865 S.W.2d 658, 662 (Mo. 1993) (applying a
knowledge requirement to the possession element);
State v. Ojeda, 350 P.3d 640, 645 (Utah Ct. App. 2015)

-20-

(distinguishing between prohibition on firearms pos-
session by unlawful users of controlled substances,
which requires no mens rea as to status, and the pro-
hibition on those in possession of controlled sub-
stances, which statutorily requires knowledge or in-
tent).'4

C. State Courts Have Provided A Variety of
Reasons for Excluding Knowledge of Sta-
tus as an Element in Prohibited Possessor
Crimes.

State courts interpreting statutes both with
and without statutory mens rea provisions have of-
fered a range of justifications for concluding that proof

14 While the case law cited above is all consistent in the
result reached, model jury instructions from Hawaii and Alaska
do extend mens rea to a defendant’s prohibited status. See Ha-
waii Rev. Crim. Jury Instr. 15.07 (“There are five material ele-
ments of the offense of Possession or Control of a Firearm or Am-
munition for a Firearm by a Person Convicted of Specified Crimes
.... 5. That, ... the Defendant believed, knew, or recklessly dis-
regarded the substantial and unjustifiable risk, that he/she had
previously been convicted of committing [a prohibiting crime]”);
AK Pattern Jury Ins. — Crim. 11.61.200(A)(1) (requiring that “the
defendant was aware of or recklessly disregarded the fact that he
had been [convicted of a prohibiting crime] by a court of this state,
a court of the United States, or a court of another state or terri-
tory”). As discussed above, however, Hawaii case law appears to
be inconsistent with such an approach. See Valentine, 998 P.2d
at 489 (prohibited possessor crime occurs when a defendant who
“previously [was] convicted of committing a felony . . . intention-
ally, knowingly, or recklessly owns, possesses[,] or controls any
firearm”). Alaska lacks sufficient case law to judge the signifi-
cance of the model jury instruction.

2%.

of a defendant’s knowledge of his prohibited status is
not required. Many have broadly adopted the reason-
ing of the court of appeals here, distinguishing be-
tween a defendant’s knowledge of his “own status” and
his knowledge of his prohibited conduct. United States
v. Rehaif, 888 F.3d 1138, 1146 (11th Cir. 2018); accord
Rainoldi, 268 P.3d at 574 (distinguishing between
“status” and “conduct” elements and finding that sta-
tus “ordinarily does not require proof of a culpable
mental state”); State v. Valentine, 998 P.2d 479, 486-
88 (Haw. 2000) (distinguishing between “conduct,”
which requires mental culpability, and “attendant cir-
cumstances,” which do not); Saadig, 387 N.W.2d at
323 (general intent crimes require that defendant “in-
tended to do the proscribed act”) (citation omitted);
Howard, 339 P.3d at 823 (“[T]he State only has to
prove the defendant intentionally, recklessly, or know-
ingly engaged in the conduct that constitutes the
crime. Here the prohibited conduct is possessing the
firearm.”).'5

‘6 Contrary to petitioner's assertions, Pet. Br. 26-27, this
approach is fully consistent with Staples v. United States, 511
U.S. 600, 619 (1994), and United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc.,
513 U.S. 64, 72-73 (1994), because it still requires proof of a de-
fendant’s knowledge of the “elements of an offense that concern
the characteristics of other people and things.” Rehaif, 888 F.3d
at 1146; see U.S. Br. 22-26, 44-45. Thus, while states overwhelm-
ingly exclude knowledge of one’s own status as an element, they
universally require knowledge that the object possessed is a fire-
arm. See, e.g, Black, 624 N.W.2d at 371 (to obtain a conviction
under prohibited possessor law, “the State is only required to
show that the felon ‘possessed’ the firearm with knowledge that
it is a firearm”); In re Ronnie L., 463 N.Y.S.2d at 734 (although
statute was strict liability, it still required knowledge that the
object possessed is a firearm).

22.

State courts have also looked to the statutes’
underlying policy when assessing whether to apply
mens rea to the status element. In Rainoldi, for exam-
ple, the Oregon Supreme Court found that the risk
“that persons who have been convicted of a felony pose
. . . to the public” “exists regardless of a person’s
knowledge of the legal significance of the conviction.”
Rainoldi, 268 P.3d at 577. Similarly, a Colorado inter-
mediate court of appeals found that because the pro-
hibited possessor statute’s purpose is to prevent “all
convicted felons from possessing a firearm to avoid
‘substantial risk to the public,” it would be “incon-
sistent . . . to require proof of defendant’s knowledge
of his or her convicted felon status before prohibiting
the possession of a firearm.” Dewitt, 275 P.3d at 736
(citation omitted).

* * * * *

The overwhelming body of federal and state
precedent, legislative history, and case law applying
and interpreting prohibited possessor statutes weighs
strongly against revising the current interpretation of
the federal law. Such a change, occurring thirty-three
years after the enactment of the Firearms Owners
Protection Act, and after multiple subsequent revi-
sions of federal firearms law, see U.S. Br. 33 & n.*,
would be inconsistent with the near-uniform interpre-
tation of both § 922(g) and its state law counterparts.
It would make prosecutions of those illegally in pos-
session of firearms under § 922(g) more difficult. And
while not binding on state courts, the Court’s ruling
here could also be used to call into question the settled
application of any number of states’ prohibited

2%.

possessor laws, which have been interpreted consist-
ently with the federal law.

CONCLUSION

The judgement of the court of appeals should be
affirmed.

Respectfully submitted,

Eric A, TIRSCHWELL

Counsel of Record
MARK ANTHONY FRASSETTO
WILLIAM J. TAYLOR JR.
KRYSTAN HITCHCOCK
EVERYTOWN LAW
450 LEXINGTON AVENUE, #4184
New York, NY 10017
(646) 324-8222
etirschwell@everytown.org

April 1, 2019 Counsel for Amicus Curiae

APPENDIX

-App. 1-

APPENDIX
State Prohibited Possessor Statutes

Ala. Code § 13A-11-72

Alaska Stat. § 11.61.200

Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-3102
Ark. Code Ann. § 5-73-103
Cal. Penal Code § 29800

Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-12-108
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-217
D.C. Code § 22-4503

Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, § 1448
Fla. Stat. Ann. § 790.23

Ga. Code Ann. § 16-11-131
Haw. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 134-7
Idaho Code Ann. § 18-3316
720 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 5/24-1.1
Ind. Code Ann. § 35-47-4-5
lowa Code § 724.26

Kan. Stat. Ann. § 21-6304

Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 527.040
La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 14:95.1
Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 15, § 393
Md. Code Ann., Pub. Safety § 5-133
Mich. Comp. Laws Serv. § 750.224f
Minn. Stat. Ann. § 624.713
Miss. Code Ann. § 97-37-5

Mo. Rev. Stat. § 571.070
Mont. Code Ann. § 45-8-313
Neb. Rev. Stat. Ann § 28-1206
Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 202.360
N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 159:3
N.J. Rev. Stat. § 2C:39-7

N.M. Stat. Ann. § 30-7-16

-App. 2-

N.Y. Penal Law § 265.02

N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-415.1
N.D. Cent. Code § 62.1-02-01
Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2923.13
Okla. Stat. tit. 21, § 1283

Or. Rev. Stat. § 166.250

Or. Rev. Stat. § 166.270

18 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 6105
R.L. Gen. Laws § 11-47-5

S.C. Code Ann. § 16-23-500
S.D. Codified Laws § 22-14-15
Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-1307
Tex. Penal Code § 46.04

Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-503
Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 13, § 4017
Va. Code Ann. § 18.2-308.2
Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 9.41.040
W. Va. Code § 61-7-7

Wis. Stat. Ann. § 941.29

Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-8-102

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385016_0844%3A08. Public record. Not legal advice.