# Amicus Curiae Brief — Azar v. Allina Health Servs., 139 S. Ct. 51 (2018) (No. 17-1484)

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Amicus Curiae Brief
- **Published:** January 1, 2018

## Text

No. 17-1484

IN THE
Supreme Court of the United States

ALEX M. AZAR, II, SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND
HUMAN SERVICES,
Petitioner,
Ve
ALLINA HEALTH SERVICES, et ai.,
Respondents.

On Writ of Certiorari to the
United States Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia Circuit

BRIEF OF THE AMERICAN HOSPITAL
ASSOCIATION, FEDERATION OF AMERICAN
HOSPITALS, AND ASSOCIATION OF AMERICAN
MEDICAL COLLEGES AS AMICI CURIAE IN
SUPPORT OF RESPONDENTS

MELINDA REID HATTON SHEREE R. KANNER
MAUREEN D. MUDRON SEAN MAROTTA

LAWRENCE HUGHES Counsel of Record

AMERICAN HOSPITAL KYLE M. DRUDING
ASSOCIATION HEATHER A. BRIGGS

800 Tenth Street, N.W. HOGAN LOVELLS US LLP

Two City Center 555 Thirteenth Street, N.W.

Suite 400 Washington, D.C. 20004

Washington, D.C. 20001 (202) 637-4881

(202) 638-1100 sean.marotta@hoganlovells.com

Counsel for American Counsel for Amici Curiae
Hospital Association

Additional Counsel:

KATHLEEN TENOEVER

ERIN RICHARDSON

FEDERATION OF
AMERICAN HOSP!TALS

750 9th Street, N.W.

Suite 600

Washington, D.C. 20001

(202) 624-1500

Counsel for Federation of
American Hospitals

FRANK TRINITY

IvY BAER

ASSOCIATION OF AMERICAN

MEDICAL COLLEGES

655 K Street, N.W.

Suite 100

Washington, D.C. 20001

Counsel for Association of
American Medical Colleges

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

TABLE OF AUTHORITIEG...................:cccccceeeeeeeeeeeees ii

STATEMENT OF INTEREST .................cc-cceecssssseeees 1

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT?......0.0000......cccccccssseseeeeeees 3

RERERPEEIDUE cxcesecsncsonscenescsstosemnnssemimomntenninsmaniesienin 5
I. NOTICE AND COMMENT FOR

If.

SUBSTANTIVE LEGAL STANDARDS
IMPLEMENTING THE MEDICARE ACT
IS ESSENTIAL GIVEN MEDICARE’S

SIZE AND SCOPE ............cccssssssssscssssssssonsosees

PETITIONERS NEW POLICY ON
PART C DAYS CHANGES A
SUBSTANTIVE LEGAL STANDARD
AND THEREFORE REQUIRED NOTICE

Pa es

A. Section 1395hh(a)(2) Required Notice

ee Ce cveccncimtictnnmnconnininiedniieentins

B. The Government’s Workability Con-

cerns Are OverblowD.................ccccecccceeeeeeees
CONCLUSION

(i)

ss

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Page
CASES:

Allina Health Servs. v. Sebelius,

746 F.3d 1102 (D.C. Cir. 2014) .................. 8, 10, 11
American Nat'l Red Cross v. S.G.,

ER 13
Appalachian Power Co. v. EPA,

208 F.3d 1015 (D.C. Cir. 2000)... 17, 18
Billings Clinic v. Azar,

901 F.3d 301 (D.C. Cir. 2018)...............ccccecccecceceeeee 7
Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp.,

CO ET 17
Catholic Health Initiatives lowa Corp. v.

Sebelius,

718 F.3d 914 (D.C. Cir. 2013)................................ 7
Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp.,

CT 17
Clarian Health W., LLC v. Hargan,

878 F.3d 346 (D.C. Cir. 2017) ............0000000000.... 5, 21
Department of Homeland Sec. v. MacLean,

EE 12
Environmental Integrity Project v. EPA,

425 F.3d 992 (D.C. Cir. 2005) .................ccccccces 11
FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc.,

EES SE 10
MCI Telecomms. Corp. v. FCC,

57 F.3d 1136 (D.C. Cir. 19965) ..............ccccccccccseeeeeee 9
National Elec. Mfrs. Ass’n v. EPA,

99 F.3d 1170 (D.C. Cir. 1996) .................ccecceceeeees 9

ey

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

National Med. Enters. v. Bowen,

851 F.2d 291 (9th Cir. 1988)......................

National Petrochemical & Refiners
Ass'n v. EPA,

643 F.3d 958 (D.C. Cir. 2011)....................

Northeast Hosp. Corp. v. Sebelius,

657 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2011).....................

Perez v. Mortgage Bankers Ass'n,

135 S. Ct. 1199 (2015)...................cceeeeeeeeees

Russello v. United States,

464 U.S. 16 (1983B)..................22.00ceececessseeses

South Shore Hosp., Inc. vy. Thompson,

308 F.3d 91 (ist Cir. 2002) ......................-

Schweiker v. Gray Panthers,

453 U.S. 34 (1981)...........22..0ccccseeeeeeseneneserees

Shalala v. Guernsey Mem'l Hosp.,

614 U.S. B7 (1GOB)..................0ecesceceeseseeeeres

Shalala v. Illinois Council on Long Term
Care, Inc.,

GBD USB. 1 (BOOO).................0ccscererececeresseeeseee

Smiley v. Citibank (S. Dakota), N.A.,

517 U.S. 735 (1996)..........---..ccceeeneeeeeeeesens

Trust Under Will of Wills v. Burwell,

306 F. Supp. 3d 684 (E.D. Pa. 2018).........

United States v. Mead Corp..,

533 U.S. 218 (2OO1)...............---ececeeeeneeeeeees

iv

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

Page
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS:
Health All. Hospital Leominster, Mass. v.
BlueCross BlueShield Ass’n/NHIC Corp.,
No. 06-0984, 2013 WL 11261923
a csusinsvanes 20

LAC ESRD Pre-Composite Rate Grp. v.
BlueCross BlueShield Ass’n/ Blue Cross of
Cal.,
No. 92-0110G, 1999 WL 766795 (PRRB
SE PEE ee ee 20

Provena Health 2006 LIP SSI Percentage

Cale. Grp. v. National Gov't Servs., Inc.,
No. 09-0939GC, 2015 WL 10371518

AE 20
STATUTES:
ERECTILE Ee ae Re 13
_ EERE a eae ee 13
42 U.S.C. § 1396hh(aX(2) ........ eee passim
ee een 15
EE 12
Administrative Procedure Act,
i 13
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of
1987, Pub. L. No. 100-203, § 4035(b).......... 14
REGULATIONS:
42 C.F.R. pt. 405, subpt. Ro. 15
42 C.F_R. § 405.1842(f(1 ii)... 15

| ____eeRE NR e e eaee 15

Vv

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

Page
Office of Mgmt. and Budget, Final Bulletin
for Agency Good Guidance Practices,
72 Fed. Reg. 3432 (Jan. 25, 2007) ............. 9, 17, 18

LEGISLATIVE MATERIAL:
H.R. Rep. No. 100-391 (1987).......................ccceceeees 14

and the Like-Should Federal Agencies Use

Them to Bind the Public?,

fa 18
Certers for Medicare & Medicare Servs.,

CMS Fast Facts: CMS Program Data -

Populations (July 2018), available at

Centers for Medicare & Medicare Servs.,
National Health Expenditure Data:
Histertent (Jan. 8, 2018), available at
Juliette Cubsski & Tricia Neuman, 7 The
Facts on Medicare Spending and Financ.
ing, Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation
(June 22, 2018), available at
https://bit.ly/2BTku4o ... is aaiadiaeasednicn ae

David L. Franklin, Legislative Rules,
Nonlegislative Rules, and the Perils of the
Short Cut, 120 Yale L.J. 276 (2010) .................... 21
Jacob E. Gersen, Legislative Rules
Revisited, 74 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1705 (2007)............ 13

a ea ee ee lll

vi

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

Page
Eleanor D. Kinney, The Accidental Admin-
istrative Law of the Medicare Program,
15 Yale J. Health Policy, L. & Ethics 111

Mem. from Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of
Justice (Nov. 16, 2017), available at
https-//bit.ly/2E2otkb ..............-...-00ccceeeeeeeees 18, 19

Kevin W. Saunders, Interpretative Rules
with Legislative Effect: An Analysis and A
Proposal for Public Participation,
1986 Duke L.J. 346 (1986).............-..-.-...ecceee 10
Eugene Scalia, Essay, The Value of Public
Participation in Rulemaking,
Penn. Reg. Rev. (Sept. 25, 2017), availa-
ble at https-//bit.ly/2IKUOZK ..............----..c.cceee 10

IN THE
Supreme Court of the United States

No. 17-1484

ALEX M. AZAR, II, SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND
HUMAN SERVICES,

Petitioner,
v.

ALLINA HEALTH SERVICES, et al.,

Respondents.

On Writ of Certiorari to the
United States Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia Circuit

BRIEF OF THE AMERICAN HOSPITAL
ASSOCIATION, FEDERATION OF AMERICAN
HOSPITALS, AND ASSOCIATION OF AMERICAN

MEDICAL COLLEGES AS AMICI CURIAE IN
SUPPORT OF RESPONDENTS

STATEMENT OF INTEREST
The American Hospital Association, Federation of
American Hospitals, and Association of American
Medical Colleges respectfully submit this brief as
amici curiae.'

' No party or counsel for a party authored or paid for this brief
in whole or in part, or made a monetary contribution to fund
the briefs preparation or submission. No one other than amici
or their members or counsel made a monetary contribution to
the brief. All parties have consented to the filing of this brief.

2

The American Hospital Association (AHA) repre-
sents nearly 5,000 hospitals, healthcare systems, and
other healthcare organizations. AHA members are
committed to improving the health of the communi-
ties they serve and to helping ensure that care is
available to and affordable for all Americans. The
AHA educates its members on healthcare issues and
advocates to ensure that their perspectives are
considered in formulating health policy.

The Federation of American Hospitals (FAH) is the
national representative of more than 1,000 investor-
owned or managed community hospitals and health
systems throughout the United States. FAH’s mem-
bers include teaching and non-teaching hospitals in
urban and rural America, as well as inpatient reha-
bilitation, psychiatric, long-term acute care, and
cancer hospitals. Dedicated to a market-based
philosophy, the Federation provides representation
and advocacy on behalf of its members to Congress,
the Executive Branch, the judiciary, media, academ-
ia, accrediting organizations, and the public.

The Association of American Medical Colleges
(AAMC) is a not-for-profit association representing
all 152 accredited U.S. and 17 accredited Canadian
medical schools, nearly 400 major teaching hospitals
and health systems, and 90 academic and scientific
societies. Through these institutions and organiza-
tions, the AAMC represents 173,000 full-time faculty
members, 89,000 medical students, 129,000 resident
physicians, and more than 60,000 graduate students
and postdoctoral researchers in the biomedical
sciences.

The question presented here is of tremendous im-
portance to amici’s members. The federal Medicare

3

program enables amici’s members to provide the
wide range of critical healthcare services on which
their patients and communities rely. And the pa-
tients and communities for whom this issue of Medi-
care administration matters most are among the
country’s most vulnerable.

By evading the notice-and-comment process re-
quired by 42 U.S.C. § 1395hh(a)(2), the Department
of Health and Human Services (HHS) and the Cen-
ters for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) were
allowed to impose their own substantive policy views
without understanding their direct impact on
healthcare providers and those they serve. That
procedural shortcut leads to policies that harm those
affected by them, as well as inconsistency and uncer-
tainty in how providers’ Medicare reimbursements
may be determined from year to year. Because
“(njotice and opportunity for comment are critically
important for determining and meaningfully consid-
ering the true impact of any payment policy change
on hospitals” (Br. in Opp. 38), the Court should
affirm the judgment below.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

I. Notice and comment is a mainstay of adminis-
trative law. Rightly so. Notice and comment is a
critical procedural protection that enables public
participation for those stakeholders most likely to be
affected by contemplated agency policymaking and
allows agencies’ decisionmaking to be informed and
responsive. To be sure, adding this additional layer
of protection comes with certain trade-offs. But
when an agency seeks to create, define, and regulate
the rights, duties, and obligations of parties in a
manner that entails substantial real-world impact,

4

notice and comment should be required. And for
changes that alter the substantive legal standards
governing Medicare payments, Congress has man-
dated precisely that. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395hh(a)(2).
The size and scope of the federal Medicare program
demonstrate why notice and comment is essential for
agency conduct altering payment policies. Even
seemingly minor changes carry the potential for
enormous consequences. The extensive history of
this litigation, including CMS’s repeated attempts to
evade the specific payments due Respondents, re-
flects the stakes for agency action, even if the agency
tries to underplay the significance of those actions.
Had the proper procedures been followed from the
outset, the parties and the public alike would have
benefitted from the notice and comment Congress
prescribed for exactly these circumstances.

II. Congress here required the opportunity for pub-
lic participation through notice and comment before
HHS and CMS could alter the Disproportionate
Share Hospital (DSH) fraction calculations that
determine the payments due providers under the
DSH program. The text of Section 1395hh(a)(2),
distinct from the Administrative Procedure Act
(APA), extends to any change to the substantive legal
standards governing Medicare payments. Petition-
ers after-the-fact justification offered in defense of
CMS’s decision to forgo notice and comment by
labeling its Medicare-fraction calculations “interpre-
tive only” lacks merit.

That Congress required CMS to undertake notice
and comment here does not mean CMS must always
do so. Nor does the fact-sensitive decision below
render the Medicare program unworkable more

5

broadly. True guidance documents, which instruct
but do not dictate, need not go through notice and
comment, as subsequent case law applying the
decision below confirms. See Clarian Health W., LLC
v. Hargan, 878 F.3d 346 (D.C. Cir. 2017). The deci-
sion below therefore will not upset HHS and CMS’s
administration of the Medicare program.

The Court should affirm the D.C. Circuit’s judg-

ment.
ARGUMENT

I. NOTICE AND COMMENT FOR
SUBSTANTIVE LEGAL STANDARDS
IMPLEMENTING THE MEDICARE ACT IS
ESSENTIAL GIVEN MEDICARE’S SIZE AND
SCOPE.

Congress required notice and comment for any
“rule, requirement, or other statement of policy” that
“changes a substantive legal standard governing”
payments for Medicare services, 42 U.S.C.
§ 1395hh(a)(2), for good reason. When it comes to
Medicare, seemingly small changes can have out-
sized results. This case is a perfect example.
Whether Part C days count in the Medicare or Medi-
caid fraction has substantial real-world impact. That
decision alone affects billions of dollars of federal
funding according to the Government’s own estimate.
See Pet. 14. It is precisely the sort of substantive
legal standard that should be subject to public input.

1. Medicare is a program of great importance to the
health of our nation. Total Medicare benefits en-
tailed more than $700 billion in federal spending in
2017, almost double the $425 billion spent in 2007.
Juliette Cubaski & Tricia Neuman, The Facts on
Medicare Spending and Financing, Henry J. Kaiser

6

Family Foundation (June 22, 2018).2 Medicare
expenditures were also 15 percent of total federal
spending in 2017; by 2028, Medicare’s share is
expected to rise to 18 percent. See id. And Medicare
alone accounts for roughly 20 percent of the $3.3
trillion a year spent on health care nationally. See
Centers for Medicare & Medicare Servs., National
Health Expenditure Data: Historical (Jan. 8, 2018).°
In Calendar Year 2018, CMS estimates that an
average of 59.1 million people will have received
benefits under Parts A and B each month. Centers
for Medicare & Medicare Servs., CMS Fast Facts:
CMS Program Data - Populations (July 2018).*

With its growth, the Medicare program has become
“a massive, complex health and safety program * * *
embodied in hundreds of pages of statutes and
thousands of pages of often interrelated regulations.”
Shalala v. Illinois Council on Long Term Care, Inc.,
529 U.S. 1, 13 (2000). And its administration is
difficult. “Over the years, HHS and CMS have come
to appreciate their roles as regulatory and procure-
ment agencies when it comes to the administration of
the Medicare program. But the history of the pro-
gram suggests that HHS and CMS did not come
easily to this realization.” See Eleanor D. Kinney,
The Accidental Administrative Law of the Medicare
Program, 15 Yale J. Health Policy, L. & Ethics 111,
138 (2015). Today, Medicare is “governed by a
complex web of legislative rules, interpretive rules
and manuals, policy guidance and computer pro-

? Available at https://bit.ly/2BTku4o.
® Available at https://go.cms.gov/1Jy5kin.
* Available at https://go.cms.gow/1JjCGaC.

7

grams” that “guide a host of decisions” concerning
the program’s operations. Jd. at 111. As a result,
even seemingly small tweaks to a subcomponent of
the Medicare program can have far-reaching conse-
quences.

2. The saga of the policy at issue here—whether
Part C managed-care patients should be counted as
entitled to benefits under the Part A fee-for-service
component of the Medicare program—exemplify why
Congress wanted public input on all substantive
standards. The DSH adjustment is just one part of
the constantly changing and “byzantine process” that
governs Medicare payments to hospitals. Billings
Clinic v. Azar, 901 F.3d 301, 309-311 (D.C. Cir.
2018); accord Schweiker v. Gray Panthers, 453 U.S.
34, 43 (1981) (describing the Medicare program as
“Byzantine” and “among the most intricate ever
drafted by Congress.”). Similarly “byzantine” is the
process for determining the “Medicare and Medicaid
fractions” used to “provide a proxy for the total low-
income patient percentage” when calculating the
DSH adjustment itself. Catholic Health Initiatives
lowa Corp. v. Sebelius, 718 F.3d 914, 916 (D.C. Cir.
2013). “Many aspects of the DSH adjustment have
been challenged over the years,” see id. at 917, as
would be expected given this complexity and the
Government’s shifting understanding of that legal
landscape.

Whether Part C days are included in the Medicare
or Medicaid fraction may seem like a minor issue.
But it has far-reaching effects. As Petitioner
stressed in its bid for this Court’s review, the status
of Part C days implicates $3 to $4 billion in Medicare
spending that supports the work of hospitals that
disproportionately serve vulnerable populations. See

8

Pet. 14. And for the individual hospitals whose
funding turns on that determination, “the practical
consequences of this dispute number in the hundreds
of millions of dollars.” Northeast Hosp. Corp. v.
Sebelius, 657 F.3d 1, 5 (D.C. Cir. 2011); accord Allina
Health Servs. v. Sebelius, 746 F.3d 1102, 1107 (D.C.
Cir. 2014) (observing the “enormous financial conse-
quences for the hospitals”). The effects go far beyond
the financial, however, as that funding translates
directly into a wide range of critical services for low-
income patients. Given these effects, the determina-
tion to include Part C days in the Medicare or Medi-
caid fraction calls out for notice and comment like
any other major policy change.

Petitioner argues that upholding the decision below
would mire the Medicare system in red tape by
subjecting every CMS decision to notice and com-
ment. Pet. Br. 41-43. That concern is overblown, as
we explain below. Infra pp. 19-22. Petitioner’s true
motive instead is to seek a special rule that allows
CMS to avoid the DSH-adjustment payments due by
changing a substantive legal standard governing the
payment calculation without advance notice and
comment. By recharacterizing as mere suggestions
CMS’s mandates to Medicare contractors, hospitals,
and the Provider Reimbursement Review Board
(PRRB), and then disclaiming Section 1395hh(a)(2)’s
purportedly burdensome and unworkable notice-and-
comment procedures, Petitioner is trying to escape
CMS’s payment obligations. The Court should not
allow that to happen.

3. Notice and comment is not just the law. It also
improves policy outcomes. This Court has long
recognized that “fairness and deliberation” should

9

undergird any “administrative action with the effect
of law.” United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218,
230 (2001).

Notice and comment is the principal way “to assure
due deliberation.” Smiley v. Citibank (S. Dakota),
N.A., 517 U.S. 735, 741 (1996). And it serves two
central purposes. First, providing for notice and
comment directs the regulatory process “to reintro-
duce public participation and fairness to affected
parties after governmental authority has been dele-
gated to unrepresentative agencies.” National Elec.
Mfrs. Ass’n v. EPA, 99 F.3d 1170, 1174 (D.C. Cir.
1996) (quoting MCI Telecomms. Corp. v. FCC, 57
F.3d 1136, 1141 (D.C. Cir. 1995)). Second, notice and
comment “promoties] informed agency action” by
making sure that “the agency will have before it the
facts and information relevant to a particular admin-
istrative problem.” Jd. (quoting MCI Telcomms., 57
F.3d at 1141). By guaranteeing both public partici-
pation and informed agency action, the notice-and-
comment requirement works toward a better admin-
istrative process for all.

To be sure, the notice-and-comment process may
require that agencies invest greater time and delib-
eration than they may otherwise be inclined to do.
But in the Medicare context and outside of it, “[p|re-
adoption notice-and-comment can be most helpful for
significant guidance documents that are particularly
complex, novel, consequential, or controversial.” See
Office of Mgmt. and Budget, Final Bulletin for Agen-
cy Good Guidance Practices, 72 Fed. Reg. 3432, 3438
(Jan. 25, 2007). And when “controlling effect” is
given to agency conduct setting a substantive legal
standard on issues of sufficient “importance,” such
rules should “be promulgated only following public

10
participation.” Kevin W. Saunders, Interpretative
Rules with Legislative Effect: An Analysis and A
Proposal for Public Participation, 1986 Duke LJ.
346, 383 (1986).

Notice and comment helps not just the public, but
also the courts. Just as notice and comment allows
“the public * * * a chance to speak and be heard,” it
allows a reviewing court to assess whether “the
public [was] listened to” and whether “its evidence
and point of view” were considered. Eugene Scalia,
Essay, The Value of Public Participation in Rulemak-
ing, Penn. Reg. Rev. (Sept. 25, 2017) (emphasis in
original). That enables the federal courts to provide
a meaningful check on administrative conduct and
inject another layer of accountability into the pro-
cess, which is critical to our constitutional frame-
work. See FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556
U.S. 502, 536 (2009) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (ex-
plaining the importance of judicial review given “the
administrative agency’s unique constitutional posi-
tion” as “the exact locus of its powers present ques-
tions that are delicate, subtle, and complex”).

The Medicare program, too, benefits from notice
and comment. By refusing to allow public participa-
tion on the challenged policy concerning the treat-
ment of Part C patients in the Medicare and Medi-
caid fractions, CMS deprived itself and the public of
the benefits of these statutorily mandated procedural!
protections. Indeed, had CMS opened up the deci-
sionmaking process to public scrutiny rather than
“pull a surprise switcheroo,” Allina Health Servs.,

* Available at https://bit.ly/2fKUoZk.

11

746 F.3d at 1108 (quoting Environmental Integrity
Project v. EPA, 425 F.3d 992, 994 (D.C. Cir. 2005)),
Respondents’ resort to this torturous litigation may
never have been necessary. When it works as in-
tended, notice and comment catches mistakes before
they are made. Without it—as here—it can lead to
over a decade of litigation.

Il. PETITIONER’S NEW POLICY ON PART C
DAYS CHANGES A SUBSTANTIVE LEGAL
STANDARD AND THEREFORE REQUIRED
NOTICE AND COMMENT.

Petitioner argues that CMS’s calculation of the so-
called Medicare fraction—a portion of the formula
that determines the DSH payment given to hospitals
serving the most-vulnerable populations—did not
require notice-and-comment rulemaking because it
was merely a “nonbinding interpretation of a stat-
ute.” See Pet. Br. 20-41. That litigation position is
not only contrary to the Medicare Act, as described
above, it is also at odds with the APA, and the con-
temporaneous views of CMS’s own officials.

Further, it is contrary to the government’s—
including the current Administration’s—view of the
line between interpretive and legislative rules out-
side the Medicare context. The Department of Jus-
tice and other federal agencies have concluded that
rules that create, define, and regulate the rights,
duties, and obligations of parties—whatever their
label—are substantive legal standards and must be
subjected to notice and comment. CMS could not
include Part C days in the Medicare fraction without
first going through notice and comment.

12

A. Section 1395hh(a)(2) Required Notice and
Comment Here.

1. Petitioner contends that Congress in Section
1395hh(aX2) actually imported the APA, including
its interpretive-rule exemption for notice and com-
ment. Pet. Br. 22-28. But three different canons of
construction counsel against that conclusion.

First, Congress did not import or cross-reference
the APA’s interpretive-rule exemption in Section
1395hh(aX(2). Cf. 42 U.S.C. § 7607(d) (stating that
the Clean Air Act’s rulemaking provisions “shall not
apply in the case of any rule or circumstance referred
to” in the APA’s interpretive-rule exception). Con-
gress “knew how to distinguish between regulations
that have the force and effect of law and those that
did not, but chose not to do so in” Secticen
1395hh(aX2). Department of Homeland Sec. v.
MacLean, 135 S. Ct. 913, 921 (2015).

Second, Petitioner's argument would result in Sec-
tion 1395hh(a\(2)’s rulemaking provision meaning
the exact same thing as the APA’s, despite using
different language. Yet the Court “refrain|s) from
concluding * * * that the differing language * * * has
the same meaning.” Russello v. United States, 464
U.S. 16, 23 (1983).

Finally, the APA provides the “default” rules when
an agency's organic act does not provide specific
ones. See National Petrochemical & Refiners Ass’n v.
EPA, 643 F.3d 958, 961 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (Brown, J.,
dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc) (noting
the “default notice-and-comment procedures of the
APA”). If Section 1395hh(a)(2) were to mean the
exact same thing as the APA’s rulemaking provision,
then Congress would have had no reason to pass

13
Section 1395hh(a\(2). And this Court “requirjes} a
change in language to be read, if possible, to have
some effect.” American Nat’ Red Cross v. S.G., 505
U.S. 247, 263 (1992). Reading Section 1395hh(a)(2)
to be congruent with the APA would make Con-
gress’s amendment adding the section a nullity.

2. For more than seventy years, the APA has gov-
erned federal agencies engaging in rulemaking. 60
Stat. 237 (1946). Under the APA, agencies must
provide a public notice-and-comment period to “give
interested persons an opportunity to participate in
the rule making [process| through submission of
written data, views, or arguments.” 5 U.S.C.
§ 553(c). The APA distinguishes between “substan-
tive” or “legislative” rules and “interpretive” rules.
Generally speaking, promulgating “legislative” rules
requires notice and comment, while “interpretive”
rules do not. Compare id., with id. § 553(d). But the
APA does not define the difference between the two.

Despite decades of case law, the distinction be-
tween “legislative” and “interpretive” rules remains
muddled. The “precise meaning” of the “term ‘inter-
pretative rule,’ or ‘interpretive rule,” has been “the
source of much scholarly and judicial debate.” Perez
v. Mortgage Bankers Ass’n, 135 S. Ct. 1199, 1204
(2015) (declining to “wade into that debate”). The
line is one that “breeds bewilderment and frustra-
tion” and has variously been called “fuzzy,’ ‘tenu-
ous,” ‘baffling,’ ‘blurred,’ and ‘enshrouded in consid-
erable smog” by courts and commenters alike. See
Jacob E. Gersen, Legislative Rules Revisited, 74 U.
Chi. L. Rev. 1705, 1708-09 (2007) (citations and
footnotes omitted).

14

Congress enacted the Medicare Act’s distinct no-
tice-and-comment requirements—which direct HHS
to engage in notice-and-comment rulemaking for any
“rule, requirement, or other statement of policy” that
“establishes or changes a substantive legal standard
governing * * * payment for services”—aga.ost this
backdrop. See Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of
1987, Pub. L. No. 100-203, § 4035(b). Congress was
concerned that “important polices [were] being
developed without benefit of the public notice and
comment period.” H.R. Rep. No. 100-391, at 430
(1987).

So rather than rely on an amorphous distinction
between legislative and interpretative rules, Con-
gress laid down a bright line: Any HHS action—even
one that is a mere “statement of policy”—that “estab-
lishes or changes a substantive legal standard” in the
enumerated areas must go through notice and com-
ment. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395hh(a\(2). Section
1395hh(a)\(2)’s text reflects that congressional deci-
sion, declining to incorporate the APA’s broad ex-
emption for interpretative rules. See Pet. App. 12a.

Under the proper Section 1395hh(a)(2) standard,
CMS’s inclusion of Part C days in the Medicare
fraction had to go through notice and comment. As
the D.C. Circuit explained, CMS’s inclusion of Part C
days in the Medicare fraction was a “requirement”
because CMS’s contractors are required to use the
fraction that CMS calculates when making DSH
payment decisions. Pet. App. 12a. CMS’s inclusion
of Part C days in the fraction is also a change in
standards because CMS previously excluded Part C
days from the Medicare fraction. Jd. at 13a. And
CMS’s inclusion of Part C days in the Medicare
fraction is a substantive legal standard because it

15

“define|s| the scope of hospitals’ legal rights to pay-
ment for treating low-income patients.” /d. at 14a.
The D.C. Circuit correctly concluded that CMS’s
inclusion of Part C days in the Medicare fraction had
to undergo notice and comment.

3. Petitioner’s contention that CMS’s calculation of
the Medicare fraction was merely nonbinding guid-
ance falls all-the-more flat because CMS’s own
Provider Reimbursement Review Board (PRRB)
understood the policy to bind it, not merely guide it.

The PRRB is an independent administrative forum
that hears disputes concerning final reimbursement
determinations made by CMS or by Medicare con-
tractors. See 42 C.F.R. pt. 405, subpt. R; 42 U.S.C.
§ 139500(a); Pet. App. 25a. The PRRB is required to
apply the Medicare Act, agency regulations, and
CMS rulings. See 42 C.F.R. § 405.1867. But the
PRRB need not follow “interpretive rules, general
statements of policy, and rules of agency organiza-
tion, procedure, or practice.” Id.

The PRRB can authorize expedited judicial re-
view—allowing the appellant to skip over the PRRB
portion of the Medicare appeals process—when “/t|he
Board lacks the authority to decide a specific legal
question” because it challenges “the substantive or
procedural validity of a regulation or CMS ruling.”
Id. § 405.1842(f)(1 ii). In other words, if the appel-
lant’s challenge goes to the validity of a substantive
standard, the PRRB itself can authorize the appel-
lant to bypass the Board’s review. See id.

Here, in granting expedited judicial review of
whether CMS’s 2012 DSH calculations were proce-
durally invalid, the PRRB found it was bound by the
vacated 2004 rule incorporating Part C patient days

16

as part of the Medicare fraction. Pet. App. 57a, 72a;
see also Resp. Br. 16-17. The PRRB understood that
“it is bound by the regulation,” regardless of whether
the regulation itself was “valiu.” Pet. App. 57a, 72a
(emphases added). And what the Board did not say
is equally important: had it viewed the decision as a
nonbinding “interpretive rule” or “statement of
policy,” as Petitioner asserts it should have, the
Board would have considered CMS’s calculations but
been free to deviate from them.

Importantly, the PRRB also granted expedited
judicial review based upon its determination that it
was “without the authority to decide the legal ques-
tion of whether the regulation regarding the treat-
ment of Medicare Part C days is valid and whether
the Secretary's actions * * * are legal.” Id. Simply
put, the PRRB concluded that it did not have author-
ity to determine the legality of the agency’s action
following vacatur of the 2004 rule.

The PRRB’s decision to grant expedited judicial
review cannot be squared with Petitioner's made-for-
litigation assertion that CMS had issued a “nonbind-
ing interpretlive]” standard only. Rather, the record
belies that assertion. Not only were Respondents’
arguments before the PRRB uncontested, the inter-
mediary on the other side of Respondents’ appeal did
not oppose expedited review. Jd. Further, the D.C.
Circuit held that the PRRB properly concluded that
expedited judicial review was warranted (Pet. App.
10a-lla), and Petitioner has not contested that
finding in this Court. Thus, as the case comes to this
Court, CMS’s own independent adjudicators correctly
determined that the inclusion of Part C days in the
Medicare fraction was a binding standard.

17

That conclusion dramatically undercuts Petition-
ers argument that the PRRB could have come to its
own conclusion as to whether Part C days were
properly included. This Court declines to credit
agency litigating positions that are “wholly unsup-
ported * * * by administrative practice,” Bowen v.
Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 212 (1988),
and that are a “post hoc rationalization advanced by
an agency seeking to defend past agency action
against attack.” Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham
Corp., 567 U.S. 142, 155 (2012) (citation, internal
quotation marks, and brackets omitted). It should do
so again and reject Petitioners argument that the
PRRB could have rejected CMS’s inclusion of Part C
days in the Medicare fraction.

4. Petitioner’s contention that CMS’s inclusion of
Part C days in the Medicare fraction was merely a
nonbinding interpretation is further undercut by the
Government’s own warnings against slapping the
“interpretive” label on substantive legal standards.

The Office of Management and Budget in 2007
issued a best-practices document cautioning that
“lelxperience has shown” that interpretive docu-
ments “may be poorly designed or improperly imple-
mented,” and these “documents may not receive the
benefit of careful consideration accorded under the
procedures for regulatory development and review,”
including notice and comment. 72 Fed. Reg. at 3432.
As the D.C. Circuit has summarized the typical
offending pattern: “Congress passes a broadly word-
ed statute. The agency follows with regulations * * *.
Then as years pass, * * * the agency offers more and
more detail regarding what its regulations demand
of regulated entities. Law is made, without notice
and comment, without public participation.” Appa-

18

lachian Power Co. v. EPA, 208 F.3d 1015, 1020 (D.C.
Cir. 2000).

That creation of substantive legal standards with-
out advance notice and comment comes with serious
consequences. As OMB further warned, “[cloncern
about whether agencies are properly observing the
notice-and-comment requirements * * * has received
significant attention. The courts, Congress, and
other authorities have emphasized that rules which
do not merely interpret existing law or announce
tentative policy positions but which establish new
policy positions that the agency treats as binding
must comply with the APA’s notice-and-comment
requirements, regardless of how they initially are
labeled.” 72 Fed. Reg. at 3433; see also Robert A.
Anthony, Interpretive Rules, Policy Statements,
Guidances, Manuals and the Like-Should Federal
Agencies Use Them to Bind the Public?, 41 Duke L.J.
1311 (1992); 72 Fed. Reg. at 3432 n.2.

Just this past year, the Department of Justice an-
nounced its own position that “interpretations” such
as the one at issue here require notice and comment.
The Attorney General cautioned in a November 2017
memorandum that “the Department has in the past
published guidance documents—or similar instru-
ments of future effect by other names, * * * —that
effectively bind private parties without undergoing
the rulemaking process.” Mem. from Att’y Gen., U.S.
Dep’t of Justice 1 (Nov. 16, 2017).° He then an-
nounced that “(t]he Department will no longer en-
gage in this practice. Effective immediately, De-
partment components may not issue guidance docu-

® Available at https://bit.ly/2E2otkb.

19

ments that purport to create rights or obligations
binding on persons or entities outside the Executive
Branch.” Id.

These problems with substantive standards adopt-
ed without notice and comment are precisely the
ones Congress intended to solve when it enacted
Section 1395hh(a)(2). When a policy such as the one
offered by CMS here effectively binds regulated
parties and agency officials alike, the agency must
first go through proper notice-and-comment chan-
nels. Petitioner's attempt to relabel its policy a
“nonbinding interpretation” is simply another in-
stance of a rule masquerading as a guidance docu-
ment. The Court should not countenance it.

B. The Government’s Workability Concerns
Are Overblown.

Petitioner contends that an “interpretation of Sec-
tion 1395hh” giving effect to the statute’s plain
language “would substantially undermine HHS’s
ability to administer Medicare in a workable man-
ner.” See Pet. Br. 41-43. But Petitioner's admin-
istrability concerns are overblown. Not all CMS
policies need go through notice and comment; just
those, like the determination here, that substantive-
ly alter how providers are paid.

1. CMS need not engage notice and comment for
true guidance documents that do not tie the hands of
the agency or the PRRB. For instance, Petitioner
frets that a ruling for Respondents will upend the
Provider Reimbursement Manual. Pet. Br. 41-42.
But this Court and others have repeatedly concluded
that the Manual is merely an interpretive guide that
does “not have the force and effect of law.” See, e.g.,
Shalala v. Guernsey Mem’! Hosp., 514 U.S. 87, 99

20

(1995); South Shore Hosp., Inc. v. Thompson, 308
F.3d 91, 103 (1st Cir. 2002); National Med. Enters. v.
Bowen, 851 F.2d 291, 293 (9th Cir. 1988); see also
Trust Under Will of Wills v. Burwell, 306 F. Supp. 3d
684, 693 (E.D. Pa. 2018) (holding that comparative-
volume consideration in a CMS Survey & Certifica-
tion Memorandum provided only “some form of
guidance as to how the legal standards are applied”
when “the agency maintains the same authority to
grant or deny applications as it would without a
stated public policy”). The decision below does not
challenge these consistent holdings.

CMS generally also need not put its policies
through notice and comment when they can be
disregarded by agency adjudicators like the PRRB.
The PRRB can—and does—routinely reject CMS
guidance as inconsistent with the Medicare Act or
HHS regulations. See, e.g., Provena Health 2006 LIP
SSI Percentage Calc. Grp. v. National Gov't Servs.,
Inc., No. 09-0939GC, 2015 WL 10371518, at *5
(PRRB Dec. 30, 2015); Health All. Hospital Leomin-
ster, Mass. v. BlueCross BlueShield Ass’n/NHIC
Corp., No. 06-0984, 2013 WL 11261923, at *7 (PRRB
Sept. 24, 2013); LAC ESRD Pre-Composite Rate Grp.
v. BlueCross BlueShield Ass’n/Blue Cross of Cal.,
No. 92-0110G, 1999 WL 766795, at *9 (PRRB Sept.
21, 1999). When the PRRB can and does reject a
CMS determination, that is strong evidence that the
determination does not bind the agency and thus is
not a “requirement” under Section 1395hh(a)(2). But
those instances stand in stark contrast to the Medi-
care-fraction determination challenged here, which
the PRRB understood to bind it. See supra pp. 15-16.

2. Tellingly, Petitioner's administrability fears
have not materialized in the D.C. Circuit. The D.C.

21

Circuit in applying the decision below has not ap-
plied a blanket rule that all Medicare administrative
materials issued by HHS and CMS now require
notice and comment, as the Petitioner apparently
fears. The D.C. Circuit has held that instructions in
the Medicare Claims Processing Manual issued by
CMS “do not alter the applicable legal standards”
when those instructions “set forth an enforcement
policy” only. Clarian Health, 878 F.3d at 354-356.
The D.C. Circuit observed that, unlike the Part C
days DSH policy here, “the agency maintains the
same authority * * * that it had prior to the adoption
of the Manual instructions” and the instructions
neither “change the legal standards that govern the
hospitals” nor “change the legal standards that
govern the agency” because “the instructions bind
neither CMS nor the Board in adjudications.” /d.
That is exactly right. And it confirms that CMS can
operate under the test adopted below.

If anything, Medicare’s regulatory process may run
more efficiently under Section 1395hh(a)(2)’s rela-
tively clearer “substantive legal standards” test. The
uncertainty about when notice and comment is
required under the APA’s legislative—interpretive
dichotomy, supra, pp. 13-14, pervades rulemaking
challenges. “Even by the standards of administra-
tive law—a field in which uniform, predictable rules
of black-letter law are hard to come by—the result-
ing litigation is considered notoriously difficult.”
David L. Franklin, Legislative Rules, Nonlegislative
Rules, and the Perils of the Short Cut, 120 Yale L.J.
276, 278 (2010). The D.C. Circuit’s standard, under
which notice and comment are required when the
agency policy would change a substantive legal
standard affecting the rights, duties, and powers of

22

regulated parties (Pet. App. 12a-14a), is more-
definitive, providing more guidance to CMS policy-
makers than the APA’s amorphous tests and better
aligned with the text of the Medicare statute. But at
the very least, it will not grind the machinery of the
Medicare system to a halt.

23

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, as well as those in Re-
spondents’ brief, the D.C. Circuit’s judgment should

be affirmed.

MELINDA REID HATTON

MAUREEN D. MUDRON

LAWRENCE HUGHES

AMERICAN HOSPITAL
ASSOCIATION

800 Tenth Street, N.W.

Two CityCenter

Suite 400

Washington, D.C. 20001

(202) 638-1100

Counsel for American
Hospital Association

KATHLEEN TENOEVER
ERIN RICHARDSON
FEDERATION OF
AMERICAN HOSPITALS
750 9th Street, N.W.
Suite 600
Washington, D.C. 20001
(202) 624-1500

Counsel for Federation of

American Hospitals

DECEMBER 2018

Respectfully submitted,

SHEREE R. KANNER
SEAN MAROTTA
Counsel of Record
KYLE M. DRUDING
HEATHER A. BRIGGS
HOGAN LOVELLS US LLP
555 Thirteenth Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20004
(202) 637-4881
sean.marotta@hoganlovells.com

Counsel for Amici Curiae

FRANK TRINITY

IvY BAER

ASSOCIATION OF AMERICAN
MEDICAL COLLEGES

655 K Street, N.W.

Suite 100

Washington, D.C. 20001

Counsel for Association of
American Medical Colleges

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385016_0826%3A10. Public record. Not legal advice.
