# Amicus Curiae Brief — Lucia v. SEC, 138 S. Ct. 2044 (2018) (No. 17-130) > Briefs, arguments, decisions, and more. URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385016_0772%3A22 ## Record - **Collection:** Supreme Court brief - **Document type:** Amicus Curiae Brief - **Published:** January 1, 2018 ## Text No. 17-130 IN THE Supreme Court of the United States RAYMOND J. LUCIA, ET AL.., Petitioners, Vv. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, Respondent. On Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit BRIEF FOR COURT-APPOINTED AMICUS CURIAE IN SUPPORT OF THE JUDGMENT BELOW JONATHAN D. HACKER ANTON METLITSKY DEANNA M. RICE (Counsel of Record) SAMANTHA M. GOLDSTEIN ametlitsky@omm.com O’MELVENY & MYERS LLP O’MELVENY & Myers LLP 1625 Eye Street, N.W. Times Square Tower Washington, D.C. 20006 Seven Times Square (202) 383-5300 New York, N.Y. 10036 (212) 326-2000 JAMES W. CROOKS O’MELVENY & MYERS LLP 400 South Hope Street Los Angeles, Cal. 90071 (213) 430-6000 Attorneys for Amicus Curiae i QUESTION PRESENTED Whether administrative law judges of the Secu- rities and Exchange Commission are Officers of the United States within the meaning of the Appoint- ments Clause. il TABLE OF CONTENTS Page INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE ....0...........ccc000000 1 RELEVANT CONSTITUTIONAL, STATUTORY, AND REGULATORY IIIT cick: scrihinteilnicisisiniahsnineensempneieanmuseteninnndnns | STATEMENT OF THE CASE .....................cccceeseeeeeees 1 A. Administrative Law Judges And The Administrative Procedure Act...................... 3 B. Securities And Exchange Commission i niisdserneainnatnaenditaninenctiigubpsibtiinidennbataevenisen 6 C. Proceedings Before The Commission ......... 12 DUD casetnccictncistitsersttnennsinrenicnsie 13 SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT........00000.0..............0000 14 TUE schicisertihitipeitisiiepiciiintininelicitiieaigindetmmencemnsisnennysnt 21 I. ONLY SOMEONE WHO HAS BEEN LAWFULLY DELEGATED AUTHORITY TO BIND THE GOVERNMENT OR THIRD PARTIES IN HER OWN NAME CAN BE AN “OFFICER” UNDER THE APPOINTMENTS CLAUSE................0.:cc000000 23 A. Only Persons Who Have Been Lawfully Delegated Authority To Bind The Government Or Third Parties Can Be Constitutional Officers .......................... 24 Il. iii TABLE OF CONTENTS (continued) Page B. Appointees Who Have Authority To Bind The Government Or Alter Private-Party Rights Only As Agents Of A Superior Officer Are Not Themselves Constitutional Officers ........... C. This Court Should Not Expand The Meaning Of The Term “Officers Of The United States” Beyond Its Historically Understood Limits ....................:cccceeeeeeeeeeees SEC ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGES ARE NOT “OFFICERS OF THE UNITED STATES” FOR PURPOSES OF THE APPOINTMENTS CLAUSE ................0000:0000000 A. SEC ALJs Are Not Constitutional “Officers” Because They Cannot Bind The Government Or Alter The Rights Of Private Parties In Their Own Name..... 1. SEC ALJs Have No Authority To Bind The Government Or Private Parties ........... 2. SEC ALJs Are Not Comparable To Article Ill Judges In Any Relevant B. SEC ALJs’ Employee Status Is Consistent With The Purpose Of The Appointments Clause.................ssscccsssseoeees 34 iv TABLE OF CONTENTS (continued) Page C. Congress Has Not Adopted The View That ALJs Are Constitutional “Officers Of The United States” .........................6c000 54 Ill. THE COURT HAS NOT INSTRUCTED THE COURT-APPOINTED AMICUS TO BRIEF THE PARTIES’ REMEDIAL AND REMOVAL ARGUMENTS .............:.ccccccceeeeees 58 IE cas ececsnctcemensssscseveinretseresnaenrssterseennneti 60 v TABLE OF AUTHORITIES CASES Andrade v. Regnery, 824 F.2d 1253 (D.C. Cir. 1987)............. Auffmordt v. Hedden, 137 U.S. 310 (1880)............crrrrerreeees Bandimere v. SEC, 844 F.3d 1168 (10th Cir. 2016)............. Buckley v. Valeo, GIG TAB. FC ie ecsescecvscvcesescevesenrcevscecees Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478 (1978)........cccccccesseeeeeeeeeeees Dep't of Transp. v. Ass'n of Am. R.Rs., 135 S. Ct. 1225 (2015).........cccccceceeeeeeeees Edmond v. United States, 520 U.S. 651 (1997)........ccccccssereereerereeees Ex parte Hennen, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 230 (1839)................ Ex parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371 (1880)............ccccccreeeees FCC v. Allentown Broad. Co., 349 U.S. 358 (1955)........ccccccssceseereeeeeees Page(s) vi TABLE OF AUTHORITIES (continued) Page(s) Fed. Mar. Comm'n v. S.C. State Ports Auth., Se es PE CE riadé-tisudcvibietedicdoctidssbniomenders 52 Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., ee Ne ee i cinicrtncs iasiecsniieendebinniaden 3, 28, 29 Freytag v. Comm’r, es Se essen iccsoccsescdnesessececessesents passim Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United States, Be eis I EE cttiniinacischicadebinivecnsewsscpenventsiaenie 31 I.N.S. v. Chadha, Ee ee I tbiscenninteasrsctecichebstinicccsacinn 25, 49 Kay v. FCC, 396 F.3d 1184 (D.C. Cir. 2008).............c.c0ccscceeee 14 King v. Burnell, SIE MT ENB PITID cesseciiccenusscadvuioendectdbustndenee 26 Lamar v. United States, a I is ic cestcda ns cgucenestnediniicsnds 55 Myers v. United States, Se a eansenes 31 Ramspeck v. Fed. Trial Exam'rs Conf, Pe ri RAO i astdncscannstecesciscossctunsied 3, 4, 5, 52 vil TABLE OF AUTHORITIES (continued) Page(s) Rice v. Ames, AR ER SE eo ee RSID oP 30 Roell v. Withrow, I | aie 50 Steele v. United States, Be ee EE cc ccnscaceodecestncectoonnssecstcivedie 33, 55 Stone v. Comm’, 866 F.34 343 (D.C. Cir. 1968)...........cccccecccccecesss 38 United States v. Allred, nN te 30 United States v. Germaine, ee es ME Oi ictintiecccscccbceseccocssenses 3, 22, 33, 55 United States v. Gitma, 25 F. Cas. 1323 (C.C.E.D. Va. 1879)................. 30 United States v. Hendee, er dds cep iaamigaken 55 United States v. Mundell, fe GT ek ee | eee 33 CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS Peis Ns GU, Bla eh Gils Di cctinseiesciesseccedsenpasecenans 18, 39 Ss Cs MIO Oh OO Ole ie Ci Sececsdconcdicdadesacctienscnseant 42 vill TABLE OF AUTHORITIES (continued) Page(s) oe ee Re G1 Pemee i enernan ee i % | Ss, HN, CPUS Se Oi cicnncacsticstadnenenescssccistestamccunaniedl 42 STATUTES is Oe ee ccceenisacccacs ini csenniinctciasigsiaidintirasieseaiiats 5, 6, 56 Oe ee MEINE cicascincaiecndesocsannssesiCeccamevnndtibebaiiibeiniiah 5, 6, 56 Oe te Oe elotcnrticscesatncctcbbicenscisinoreninceesesiocamntsiitini 57 Ge Ee ees Oe i etiiccncacieenccictnscupcipinmnniebiitinnpininds 6, 56 ey ici stnaceeshinlabincasivaiadinsciincinnaniosnk 6, 56 Bh egal Oe AI seniessnividesicisuisarbstsbntoninestierivibebindiesameese 5, 7, 57 ae Oe BI datcicincicscsesiecnccssttsestivescciatiiitetisnndubiainns 58 a Bee celicciciniensiccsamasdcceieneitndncsicnteivassignigtabiiatie 5 OP Oe SI brcvesvnisincisiijesiicnsomiinianmuacatnansceaitecahens 5, 58 rs We ciesevicsspicasiciessinndicsiemmiiniaiiaauniiin 7 BD IE, Oe PEM tvineeccsarscisstinncnctacntcneieentaiepmiea passim ee Wea cea esvisinninshnisinenasinaeentipitennbikunisinesics 9, 49 Be as OD crtdnseriscnnnesuiidisienbineliaiisaiiedieiobvanbetinietl 50 ee CS SINR seaicnstihesiicsacnsisceisivtisnreniuionnicctegesinttcisotonn 50 ix TABLE OF AUTHORITIES (continued) Page(s) a ee ai avinistrnntticiannintiiniindavencieuactnniias 50 i Serenata I stnriesinreninincsasactintninticitisiinciaininaiiin 50 OE Brett Oe ae S OE ENS Le 50 Bee Sy Oe PN ict cntasritincidtiinieninnninuniiniintanetiiuveiiaes 37 Re Re Oe pte stcasiinistsictuvidcnlsionisesiabiuneniaseliiaints 50 Act of Aug. 4, 1790, 1 Stat. 146 ...................00000 32, 33 Act of Feb. 28, 1871, 16 Stat. 433..............0...00000000 30 Act of June 8, 1872, Ch. 335, 17 Stat. 283............. 31 Act of Sept. 24, 1789, Ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73......31, 32, 33 An Act of 1898, Ch. 447, 30 Stat. 445.000... cee 40 An Act of 1898, Ch. 466, 30 Stat. 476...............0000 40 Pub. L. No. 87-592, 76 Stat. 394 (1962) .............006 7 Pub. L. No. 89-554, 80 Stat. 378 (1966) ................ 56 Pub. L. No. 95-251, 92 Stat. 183 (1978) .............00 4 REGULATIONS SF Fir eile Oh SOG thiccatincsicsenisntinmmmitcnmeiionsanen 8,9 Sr A re - x TABLE OF AUTHORITIES (continued) Page(s) a cinsdasieanasercenmlpanniian ~ I oi scenicahcotesdbsasialatioabsierenctetooneals 9 Oe a cris aadicdemntvonmsagmredndas 11 Fs Oe sD ienscacecnaisnseieseiccnjeuncieasosionendiis 9, 49 I ais isirciccensscaseisions 9, 10, 11, 45 ee Se ee ER diceterinicinisnemenesniessintmssicnsonns passim shoe & Yaa 10, 14, 44 Ee Sree rclils OF GA cach diecsiceessnhenmibecnrutdiivniatmonianectenivnadin 7 37 Fed. Reg. 16,787 (Aug. 19, 1972) .....c.cccccccceseseoeee 4 RULES Sie ANNs W's: Ui rcinreniioininsininsnsiesinehaneiusdadenianiacitianicantia 50 Se a Be Ce cecacinndansinrnssincinsnnaniacemnitiaetionts 37 is Ms incest cai caiicditinitabinssiiincdiduiinbramnannininnie 38 OTHER AUTHORITIES 1 Asher C. Hinds, Hinds’ Precedents of the House of Bea TesNNNSSS C1GGT) ...0.00ccccresersccsescccssescosces 27, 40 xi TABLE OF AUTHORITIES (continued) Page(s) Administrative Procedure Act, Promotion of Hearing Examiners, SE Gs FRE I, TO CAGED) cicccccescccssccccccssecesesees 57 Administrative Procedure Act: Legislative History, 79th Congress, 1944-46..............00... 56, 57 Application of the Emoluments Clause to a Member of the President’s Council on Bioethics, RR re eee 42 Appointment—Holding of Two Offices— Commissioner of Labor, 26 Op. Att'y Gen. 247 (1907) .......ccccccscscccceceseeees 24 Attorney General’s Manual on the Administrative Procedure Act (1947) ............ 6, 45 Barron & Kagan, Chevron’s Nondelegation Doctrine, 2001 ee BS, een 53 Civil-Service Commission, 13 Op. Att’y Gen. 516 (1871) ....................... 34, 48 Common Legislative Encroachments on Executive Branch Authority, oe RE ih) errs 28 xii TABLE OF AUTHORITIES (continued) Page(s) Constitutionality of Proposed Regulations of Joint Committee on Printing, ae eee 27, 41 Constitutionality of the Ronald Reagan Centennial Commission Act of 2009, 2009 WL 2810453 (O.L.C. Apr. 21, 2009)......... 41 Deputy Clerks of United States District Courts—Premium on Official Bonds, 29 Op. Att’y Gen. 593 (1912) ............cccceeeeseeeeeees 34 Floyd R. Mechem, A Treatise on the Law of Public Offices and CG CIID cevtsserosistsnsctitennctapatesieinhmaionh 24 BERR. Bom. om. GRE CROP on ccccctccccscosccsviassasstiernns 55 In re Alchemy Ventures, Inc., 2013 WL 6173809 (SEC Oct. 17, 2013)............. 11 In re Raymond J. Lucia Cos., 2012 WL 3838150 (Sept. 5, 2012)..................000 12 In re Raymond J. Lucia Cos., 2013 WL 3379719 (July 8, 2013).................eeee 12 In re Timbervest LLC, No. 3-15519 (SEC June 23, 2015) ................c0000ee 7 xiii TABLE OF AUTHORITIES (continued) Page(s) Jennifer L. Mascott, Who Are “Officers of the United States”? , 70 ESA 32 Office—Compensation, 22 Op. Att'y Gem. 184 (1806) ........ccccccccerccccesceees 24 Officers of the United States Within the Meaning of the Appointments Clause, | __,, S ne passim Opinion of the Justices, 3 Greenl. (Me.) 481 (1822) ................ccc0cc0000e 26, 27 Paul Verkuil et al., The Federal Administrative Judiciary, Admin. Conf. of the United States, Recommendations and Reports, Vol. II, BEY WII ccececsncccecscaccuscéececavecaveses 3, 6 Proposed Commission on Deregulation of International Ocean Shipping, yo Lk S| 39, 40 Proposed Legislation to Grant Additional Power to The President’s Commission on Organized Crime, 7 Op. O.L.C. 128 (1983) ..............0000+. 38, 39, 41, 50 xiv TABLE OF AUTHORITIES (continued) Page(s) Robert J. Jackson, Jr., Fact and Fiction: The SEC’s Oversight of Administrative Law Judges, The CLS Blue 4 11 SEC, Order (Nov. 30, 2017), https://www.sec.gov/litigation/opinions/ i sirntetiastecntrcinntnnnsiniitnininnpademcnmes 7 The Constitutional Separation of Powers Between the President and Congress, Se Te eee 22, 34 SN a I net caiman 25 INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE By order dated January 18, 2018, this Court in- vited Anton Metlitsky to brief and argue this case as amicus curiae in support of the judgment below. The court below held that administrative law judges of the Securities and Exchange Commission are not “Officers of the United States” under the Appoint- ments Clause of the United States Constitution.' RELEVANT CONSTITUTIONAL, STATUTORY, AND REGULATORY PROVISIONS Relevant constitutional, statutory, and regulato- ry provisions are reproduced in the appendix to this brief. STATEMENT OF THE CASE The Appointments Clause regulates the means of appointment of “Officers of the United States.” U.S. Const. art. Il, § 2, cl. 2. “Principal” officers must be appointed by the President “by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate.” Jd. Congress may also provide for “inferior Officers” to be appoint- ed in that manner, but alternatively may “vest the Appointment of such inferior Officers, as they think proper, in the President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of Departments.” /d. The Appointments Clause is primarily “designed to preserve political accountability relative to im- portant Government assignments.” Edmond ov. ! No counsel for a party authored this brief in whole or in part, and no person other than amicus curiae and his firm made a monetary contribution to this briefs preparation or submission. 2 United States, 520 U.S. 651, 663 (1997). In light of that purpose, the “Officers of the United States” who must be appointed in the manner required by the Clause include only those persons who both hold a continuing government position “established by |[fed- eral] Law,” U.S. Const. art. Il, § 2, cl. 2, and who have the authority, in their own name, to “bind|] the government or third parties for the benefit of the public,” Officers of the United States Within the Meaning of the Appointments Clause, 31 Op. O.L.C. 73, 77 (2007) (“2007 OLC Op.”). In this way, federal appointees authorized to “exercise the power of the United States” by binding the government or private parties are “accountable to the President”—either directly or through a senior official who is himself a presidential appointee—and the President is in turn “accountable to the people.” Dep't of Transp. v. Ass'n of Am. R.Rs., 135 8. Ct. 1225, 1238 (2015) (Alito, J., concurring). By contrast, “a person whose acts have no au- thority and power of a public act or law absent the subsequent sanction of an officer or the legisla- ture”—for example, a person exercising “advisory” or “investigative” functions—is not an “Officer of the United States” but an employee. 2007 OLC Op. 95, 98 (quotations omitted). The overwhelming majority of those working in the Executive Branch are mere employees—.i.e., “lesser functionaries subordinate to officers of the United States,” Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 126 n.162 (1976)—who need not be appointed under the Appointments Clause. In 1879, this Court estimated that 90% of all federal workers were “un- doubtedly” employees, not officers. United States v. 3 Germaine, 99 U.S. 508, 509 (1879). By 2010, “[t/he applicable proportion” of non-officer employees had “of course increased dramatically.” Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 506 n.9 (2010). The question presented in this case is whether administrative law judges (“ALJs”) employed by the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC” or “Commission”) are inferior “Officers of the United States,” such that they must be appointed in con- formity with the Appointments Clause. Pet. i. The background relevant to answering the question pre- sented is as follows: A. Administrative Law Judges And The Administrative Procedure Act 1. The “rapid growth of administrative law” be- ginning in the early Twentieth Century increased the number of agency hearings to the point that “the agency heads ... [could] rarely preside over hearings in which evidence is required.” Ramspeck v. Fed. Trial Exam'’rs Conf., 345 U.S. 128, 130 (1953). “The agencies met this problem ... by designating hearing or trial examiners to preside over hearings for the reception of evidence.” Jd. at 130-31; see also Paul Verkuil et al., The Federal Administrative Judiciary, Admin. Conf. of the United States, Recommenda- tions and Reports, Vol. Il, 1992 ACUS 770, 799 (1992) (“hearing examiners presided at adjudications before enactment of the [Administrative Procedure Act (APA’)|, and the term ‘examiner’ was used at least as early as 1906”). Those examiners “made a report to the agency setting forth proposed findings of fact and recommended action,” with the “final de- 1 cision” left to the agency heads. Ramspeck, 345 U.S. at 131. Before Congress enacted the APA, employing agencies themselves determined hearing examiners’ compensation and promotion under the Classifica- tion Act of 1923, placing the examiners in a “depend- ent status” to those agencies. /d. at 130. This re- sulted in “[mJany complaints ... against the actions of the hearing examiners, it being charged that they were mere tools of the agency concerned and subser- vient to the agency heads in making their proposed findings of fact and recommendations.” /d. at 131. 2. Congress in the APA sought to address con- cerns about the independence of hearing examin- ers—known today as ALJs*—and considered “the se- curing of fair and competent hearing personnel ... the heart of formal administrative adjudication.” Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 514 (1978) (quota- tion omitted). The APA thus “contains a number of provisions designed to guarantee the independence of [ALJs].” Id. In particular, Congress “intended to make hear- ing examiners a special class of semi-independent subordinate hearing officers by vesting control of their compensation, promotion and tenure in the Civil Service Commission to a much greater extent than in the case of other federal employees.” Ramspeck, 345 U.S. at 132 (quotation omitted). 2 Hearing examiners were first referred to as “administra- tive law judges” by regulation in 1972, 37 Fed. Reg. 16,787 (Aug. 19, 1972), and then by statute in 1978, Pub. L. No. 95- 251, 92 Stat. 183 (1978). 5 Thus, “[eJach agency” may “appoint” ALJs, 5 U.S.C. § 3105, but the Office of Personnel Management (“OPM”)—formerly the Civil Service Commission— determines who is qualified to hold that position, id. § 5372. Agencies have no authority to alter an ALJ's salary, id., and no “action” (including removal) can be taken by the agency against the ALJ except “for good cause established and determined by the Merit Systems Protection Board,” id. § 7521(a). 3. Although the APA granted ALJs structural independence from their employing agencies, it did not grant them any independent policymaking or de- cisional authority, instead ensuring that ALJs re- main “subordinate” to their agencies. Ramspeck, 345 U.S. at 132; see also 5 U.S.C. § 557(c) (referring to ALJs as “subordinate employees”). Thus, as a gen- eral matter, the APA authorizes ALJs to “preside at the taking of evidence” in formal adjudications, 5 U.S.C. § 556(b)—which includes the power, for ex- ample, to “issue subpoenas,” “receive relevant evi- dence,” and “regulate the course of the hearing,” id. § 556(c)—and to issue “initial decision[s],” id. § 557(b). But the Act also ensures that on “appeal from or review of the initial decision, the agency has all the powers which it would have in making the in- itial decision” itself. Id. Thus, the agency has final and plenary authori- ty over ALJ decisions not only as to questions of law but also as to questions of fact. See FCC vu. Allen- town Broad. Co., 349 U.S. 358, 364-65 (1955). The APA, in other words, ensures that evidence is taken and facts are determined “in the first instance by an official not subject to agency coercion,” but that “the 6 agency retains full power over policy, a power it can exercise when it performs its reviewing function.” 1992 ACUS at 803; see also Attorney General’s Man- ual on the Administrative Procedure Act 83 (1947) (agency “is in no way bound by the decision” of ALJ and “retains complete freedom of decision—as though it had heard the evidence itself”). 4. Congress has defined the terms “officer” and “employee” as used in Title 5 of the U.S. Code. The statutory definition of “officer” includes only individ- uals who must be appointed in the manner provided by the Appointments Clause, 5 U.S.C. § 2104, while the definition of “employee” includes officers and those appointed by, among others, “an individual who is an employee under this section,” id. § 2105(a)(1)(D). Title 5 refers to ALJs as “employ- ees.” See, e.g., id. § 556(c) (“employees presiding at hearings”); id. § 557(b) (“presiding employee”). B. Securities And Exchange Commission ALJs The question presented in this case turns on the powers of the ALJs employed by the SEC. Pet. i.° The duties and authority of SEC ALJs are set forth in SEC regulations promulgated under authority Congress has granted the SEC. 1. The SEC is a five-member independent agen- cy whose members the President appoints by and 5 As petitioners note, there are nearly 2,000 ALJs across the federal government, many of whom appear to exercise func- tions different from those of SEC ALJs. Pet. Br. 41-42. Whether ALJs other than SEC ALJs are “Officers of the United States” is not at issue here. 7 with the advice and consent of the Senate. See 15 U.S.C. § 78d(a). Among other functions, the Com- mission is empowered to enforce federal securities laws and regulations. See, e.g., id. § 78d. One mechanism for SEC enforcement is an administra- tive action within the Commission. 17 C.F.R. § 202.5(b). The Commission itself is authorized by 5 U.S.C. § 3105 to appoint ALJs to preside over such hear- ings. Since 1962, however, Congress has authorized the Commission to delegate “any of its functions” other than rulemaking to “a division of the Commis- sion, an individual Commissioner, an administrative law judge, or an employee or employee board.” 15 U.S.C. § 78d-1(a); see Pub. L. No. 87-592, 76 Stat. 394, 394-95 (1962). The Commission under this au- thority had (until recently) delegated the power to hire ALJs to SEC staff, who typically chose from a list of qualified candidates provided by OPM.‘ Pet. App. 295a-297a.® * Cameron Elliot, the ALJ who presided below, was an ALJ at the Social Security Administration before the SEC, and he may have been hired by the SEC under a process somewhat different from that described above. Notice at 2, Jn re Timber- vest LLC, No. 3-15519 (SEC June 23, 2015) (filed by SEC En- forcement Division), https://perma.cc/5RMX-R6V4. It is undis- puted, however, that ALJ Elliot was “hired without the in- volvement of individual Commissioners.” /d. 5 On November 30, 2017, the Commission “ratified” the appointment of its current ALJs, including the ALJ who pre- sided over petitioners’ hearing, and ordered a reopening of the record in all cases then still pending before the SEC. See SEC, Order (Nov. 30, 2017), https://www.sec.gov/litigation/opinions/ 2017/33-10440.pdf. The Commission took no action, however, 8 2. a. The SEC has delegated certain authorities to its ALJs under the statute just described, which authorizes the Commission to delegate “any of its [non-rulemaking] functions” to (among others) ALJs. 15 U.S.C. § 78d-1(a). Subsection (b) of that statute provides that the “Commission shall retain a discre- tionary right to review the [delegated] action ... upon its own initiative or upon petition,” and lists circum- stances in which Commission review is mandatory. Id. § 78d-1(b). Subsection (c) provides that if plenary discretionary review of delegated functions is not sought or undertaken, “then the action of any” dele- gee (including an AL,.J) listed in subsection (a) “shall, for all purposes, including appeal or review thereof, be deemed the action of the Commission.” Id. § 78d- l(c). ALJs’ authority is thus limited by the scope of delegation from the Commission. By regulation, “lajll proceedings shall be presided over by the Commission or, if the Commission so orders, by a hearing officer.” 17 C.F.R. § 201.110. The “hearing officer” may be, among others, an ALJ. Id. § 201.101(a)(5). ALJs are responsible for “con- duct{ing] hearings” and for ensuring “the fair and orderly conduct of the proceedings.” Jd. § 200.14(a). And the Commission grants ALJs “the authority to do all things necessary and appropriate to discharge [their] duties,” including administering oaths, receiv- ing evidence, ruling on motions, issuing subpoenas, with respect to cases (like this one) in which a petition for judi- cial review had already been filed. See Resp. Br. 3 n.2. 9 and issuing an initial decision on whether the securi- ties laws have been violated. Jd. § 201.111. b. The Commission, however, has not delegated ALJs authority to bind the government or private parties. Rather, as the SEC explained in the pro- ceedings below, the Commission retains “plenary au- thority over the course of ... administrative proceed- ings and the rulings of [its] law judges—before and after the issuance of the initial decision and irrespec- tive of whether any party has sought relief.” Pet. App. 91a (quotation omitted). For instance, although ALJs may issue subpoe- nas, see 17 C.F.R. §§ 200.14(a)(2), 201.111, they can- not enforce them—only a federal district court can enforce an SEC subpoena, including by contempt, and only at the request of the Commission itself. 15 U.S.C. § 78u(c). The only authority the ALJ has to punish “[clontemptuous conduct” is to exclude the offender from the hearing room or preclude her from representing a party in the proceeding—actions that are subject to immediate de novo review by the Commission. 17 C.F.R. § 201.180(a)(1), (2). ALJs also lack authority to issue a decision on the merits that binds the Commission or private par- ties. Rather, the ALJ prepares an “initial decision,” which “include[s] findings and conclusions, and the reasons or basis therefor, as to all the materi- al issues of fact, law or discretion presented on the record and the appropriate order, sanction, relief, or denial thereof.” Id. § 201.360(b). The Commission “may affirm, reverse, modify, set aside or remand for further proceedings, in whole or in part,” any initial decision. Jd. § 201.411(a). The Commission may 10 “make any findings or conclusions that in its judg- ment are proper and on the basis of the record.” Jd. The Commission’s review is de novo as to both law and facts. Id.; see 15 U.S.C. § 78d-1(b). And while the Commission as a matter of practice accords “con- siderable weight” to some ALJ credibility findings, it does not accept such findings “blindly,” Pet. App. 92a-93a n.117 (quotation omitted), and is under no legal obligation to accept or defer to those findings at all, see 17 C.F.R. §§ 201.411(a), 201.452. Finally, the Commission’s review is not limited to the record before the ALJ. Rather, the Commis- sion may—as it did in this case, see infra at 12— remand the matter to the ALJ “for further proceed- ings,” 17 C.F.R. § 201.411(a), including “the taking of additional evidence,” id. § 201.452, and may even elect to “accept or hear additional evidence” itself, id. c. Notably, no ALJ initial decision can become final without a subsequent affirmative act of the Commission. The Commission will review an AL.J’s initial decision on a petition for review, id. § 201.411(b), and can do so sua sponte if no petition is filed, id. § 201.411(c). Even if the Commission de- cides not to conduct plenary review, the AL.J’s deci- sion does not automatically become final, nor does it otherwise carry any force of its own. Rather, no ini- tial decision by an ALJ becomes final until the Commission enters its own finality order. ld. § 201.360(d)(2). Moreover, were the Commission ev- er to delegate to ALJs the authority to issue a deci- sion that took effect without the Commission’s af- firmative sanction, that decision would, by operation 11 of statute, be the decision of the Commission, not the ALJ. See 15 U.S.C. § 78d-1(c). Thus, contrary to petitioners’ assertion that an SEC ALJ decision becomes final even if it is not “af- firmatively adopted by the agency,” Pet. Br. 32, no initial decision becomes final simply because of “the lapse of time”; it is “the Commission’s issuance of a finality order” that makes an initial decision not se- lected for plenary review “effective and final.” Pet. App. 90a (quotation omitted). As the Commission emphasized below, the “effect of this rule ... is that [SEC] ALJs’ initial decisions ... do not become the final and effective decision of the agency without af- firmative action on [the Commission’s] part— specifically, [its] issuance of a finality order.” Pet. App. 90a n.109. The same is true if an ALJ finds a party to be in “default.” 17 C.F.R. § 201.155. An initial decision based on default has no effect absent further action by the Commission. See In re Alchemy Ventures, Inc., 2013 WL 6173809, at *4 (SEC Oct. 17, 2013); 17 C.F.R. § 201.360(d)(2).® 6 Petitioners state that “[ijn about 90% of cases, ... the ALJ’s initial decision ‘become{s] final without plenary agency review.” Pet. Br. 32 (quoting Bandimere v. SEC, 844 F.3d 1168, 1180 n.25 (10th Cir. 2016)). SEC Commissioner Jackson recently provided context for that statistic. During 2014 and 2015, 80% of all SEC ALJ decisions arose from a default, and in the remainder of initial decisions that did not receive plenary review, no petition for review was filed. Review was sought in approximately 10% of cases, and granted in every one of those. Robert J. Jackson, Jr., Fact and Fiction: The SEC’s Oversight of Administrative Law Judges, The CLS Blue Sky Blog (Mar. 9, 2018), https://perma.cc/EM5Y-B7R2. 12 C. Proceedings Before The Commission 1. On September 5, 2012, the Commission insti- tuted administrative proceedings against petitioners for four alleged violations of the Investment Advisers Act. See In re Raymond J. Lucia Cos., 2012 WL 3838150 (Sept. 5, 2012). The Commission assigned ALJ Elliot to oversee the initial stages of the pro- ceeding. See id. After the ALJ issued an initial decision conclud- ing that petitioners had violated the securities laws as to one of the four charges and recommending sanctions, see In re Raymond J. Lucia Cos., 2013 WL 3379719 (July 8, 2013), the Commission sua sponte remanded the case for further findings on the three charges the ALJ did not address in that initial deci- sion, concluding that “even if no party chooses to seek review, the law judge’s findings would assist {the Commission’s] determination of whether to or- der review on [its] own initiative,” Pet. App. 242a. The ALJ subsequently issued a revised initial decision, considering the additional three charges and concluding that “[t]he sanction determinations made in the [original initial decision] remain[ed] ap- propriate.” Pet. App. 118a. 2. a. Both petitioners and the SEC Division of Enforcement petitioned for review. The Commission granted review and concluded, based “on an inde- pendent review of the record,” except as to unchal- lenged factual findings, that petitioners violated the securities laws and imposed the sanctions recom- mended by the ALJ. Pet. App. 39a-40a. 13 b. The Commission also rejected petitioners’ ar- gument that the AL.J’s initial decision was void be- cause the ALJ was an “Officer of the United States,” concluding that “the appointment of Commission ALJs is not subject to the requirements of the Ap- pointments Clause,” Pet. App. 86a, because they are employees, not constitutional officers, see Pet. App. 86a-95a. Two Commissioners dissented on the merits, and also noted that an Article III court should decide the Appointments Clause issue. Pet. App. 110a- ll4a. D. Proceedings Below The court of appeals denied petitioners’ petition for review of the Commission’s decision, including their Appointments Clause challenge. The court explained that SEC ALJs are not “Of- ficers of the United States” required to be appointed in conformity with the Appointments Clause because they have not “been delegated sovereign authority to act independently of the Commission,” and do not “have the power to bind third parties, or the gov- ernment itself, for the public benefit.” Pet. App. 16a. SEC ALJs, the court reasoned, cannot issue any de- cision that becomes final absent affirmative Com- mission action. Pet. App. 14a-15a. And ultimate de- eision-making authority in all events remains with ‘ne Commission: the Commission reviews ALJs’ ini- tial decisions de novo and it “may make any findings or conclusions that in its judgment are proper and on the basis of the record,” Pet. App. 18a-19a (quoting 17 C.F.R. § 201.411(a)); the Commission “controls 14 the record for review and decides what is in the rec- ord,” Pet. App. 19a (quotation omitted); the Commis- sion “may ‘remand for further proceedings,” id. (quoting 17 C.F.R. § 201.411(a)), or “the taking of additional evidence,” id. (quoting 17 C.F.R. § 201.452); and the Commission may “hear addition- al evidence” itself, id. (quoting 17 C.F.R. § 201.452). Moreover, “the Commission may defer to [ALJs’] credibility determinations where the record provides no basis for disturbing the finding, but ... is not re- quired to adopt the credibility determinations of [the] ALJ.” Jd. (citing Kay v. FCC, 396 F.3d 1184, 1189 (D.C. Cir. 2005)). The court of appeals granted rehearing en banc, Pet. App. 244a-246a, but denied the petition for re- view by an equally divided court, Pet. App. la-2a. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT l. A federal appointee is an “Officer of the Unit- ed States” under the Appointments Clause if she holds a continuing position established by federal law (which is undisputed here) and she has been delegated (i) the power to bind the government or private parties (ii) in her own name rather than in the name of a superior officer. A. The consistent understanding of Congress, the Executive Branch, and knowledgeable observers since the Founding era is that an individual is an “Officer of the United States” only if (among other things) she has been delegated a portion of the sov- ereign authority of the United States, meaning that she can bind the government or alter the rights of private parties. Persons whose acts have no force 15 absent the subsequent sanction of a superior officer, in contrast, are not constitutional officers. Thus, for example, persons who can authorita- tively interpret the law, bring enforcement actions and make litigation decisions on behalf of the United States, promulgate regulations, or issue decisions binding on private parties may be constitutional of- ficers. It has been established since at least the Nineteenth Century, however, that persons who per- form investigative functions but can only make rec- ommendations based on the results of their investi- gation are not officers. That is so even if those indi- viduals have power to perform hearing-related func- tions such as issuing subpoenas, administering oaths, taking testimony, and receiving documents. That result is fully consistent with this Court's precedent. B. It has also been understood since the First Congress, and this Court’s cases confirm, that even an individual who has de facto authority to bind the government or alter private-party rights is not a constitutional officer for purposes of the Appoint- ments Clause if she can only exercise that authority in the name of a superior officer rather than in her own name. Such an individual is considered an agent of a principal who is a constitutional officer, not an officer herself. The principal—i.e., the consti- tutional officer—will be held accountable for the acts of the agent done in the principal’s name. C. This Court’s modern cases have described constitutional officers as those who exercise “signifi- cant authority pursuant to the laws of the United 16 States.” Buckley, 424 U.S. at 126. Although the Court has not had occasion to flesh out the precise contours of that standard, it is fully consistent with the longstanding historical rule just described. Petitioners and the Solicitor General argue for a substantially broader understanding of officer sta- tus, relying on a portion of this Court’s opinion in Freytag v. Commissioner, 501 U.S. 868 (1991), that describes as “significant” certain hearing-related functions of the Tax Court special trial judges at is- sue there—i.e., taking testimony, conducting trials, ruling on the admissibility of evidence, and enforcing compliance with discovery orders. Some of these functions bind neither the government nor private parties, so the Court’s opinion could be read as adopting a broader understanding of officer status inconsistent with the longstanding view described above. But Freytag’s holding is fully consistent with that longstanding view, and this Court should not construe the opinion more broadly, for several rea- sons. First, the special trial judges in Freytag could bind the government and private parties by issuing final judgments in their own name in some circum- stances. It is true that language in the Court’s opin- ion suggests that the Court might have viewed the hearing-related functions described in the previous paragraph as by themselves sufficient to make spe- cial trial judges constitutional officers, even absent the ability to enter final binding judgments. But that language was unnecessary to the holding in Freytag, and in any event, even those hearing- related functions included the ability to bind the 17 government and private parties, because special trial judges have the authority to enforce their own dis- covery orders by punishing contempt. While other functions set forth in the opinion—such as ruling on the admissibility of evidence—are unrelated to any enforcement authority, the Court did not consider whether such powers alone would suffice to establish officer status, and there is no basis to read Freytag broadly to indicate that they would, inconsistent with the historical understanding described above. Second, not only could petitioners’ standard call into question the constitutionality of the appoint- ment process of untold number of federal actors who perform “significant” functions, it would also cast significant doubt on the constitutionality of the more-than-a-century-old practice of establishing in- vestigative commissions whose members, including members of Congress, are not appointed in the man- ner prescribed by the Appointments Clause. These commissions generally do not have the power to pun- ish contempt, but do have the power to issue sub- poenas, administer oaths, examine witnesses, and receive documents—i.e., similar powers to those ex- ercised by the special tria! judges in Freytag (and SEC ALJs). Despite these powers, both Congress and the Executive Branch have repeatedly concluded that so long as a commission can only make recom- mendations based on the results of the investigation but not act on those recommendations—for example, by promulgating a regulation—the commission members are not constitutional officers. That con- clusion is crucial not only for purposes of the Ap- pointments Clause, but also because the Incompati- 18 bility Clause, U.S. Const. art. Il, § 6, cl. 2, prevents members of Congress from being appointed to feder- al “Offices.” Petitioners’ understanding of Freytag would likely preclude members of Congress from serving on such commissions, and invalidate more than one hundred years of consistent practice and understanding. Third, limiting officers to persons who have au- thority to bind the government or private parties in their own name furthers the purpose of the Ap- pointments Clause. The President (directly or through his direct subordinates) is appropriately held to account for persons who bind the government or private parties in their own name. But there is no reason to hold the President accountable for those whose acts require subsequent sanction by a superi- or—or those who can act only in a superior’s name— because the President will be held accountable for the acts of the officer who grants subsequent sanc- tion or in whose name the act is done. Fourth, the historical understanding provides Congress and the President an administrable rule for determining when the Appointments Clause and other provisions that turn on officer status (such as the Foreign Emoluments Clause) apply. A rule that hinges officer status on the “significance” (in a collo- quial sense) of a person’s functions would make it difficult for Congress and the President to structure the government consistent with those provisions. Il. SEC ALJs are not constitutional officers be- cause, although they occupy continuing positions in the federal government established by law, they sat- 19 isfy neither of the traditional rule’s other necessary prerequisites for officer status. A. An SEC ALJ has no authority to bind the Commission in any respect because the Commission can review any ALJ decision or determination— including credibility findings and decisions about what constitutes the record—de novo. The fact that the Commission sometimes chooses to defer to an ALJ’s credibility determinations even though it is not required to do so is irrelevant, because what matters is whether the Commission is bound by any ALJ act. It is not. Nor can SEC ALJs alter the rights of private parties (or bind the Commission) by entering final decisions—even in cases when the Commission does not conduct plenary review, an ALJ decision has no force at all until the Commission affirmatively en- ters a finality order. The Solicitor General contends that despite the Commission’s finality-order re- quirement, an AL.J initial decision that the Commis- sion decides not to review de novo is a final decision of the ALJ because it “shall, for all purposes ... be deemed the action of the Commission.” 15 U.S.C. § 78d-1(c). That is wrong for two reasons. First, § 78d-1(c) only applies to actions that the Commis- sion has delegated ALJs the authority to perform in the first place, and the Commission has not delegat- ed ALJs the authority to enter decisions that have any effect without affirmative Commission adoption. Second, even if the Solicitor General’s understanding of subsection (c) were correct, all final decisions un- der that provision are issued in the Commission’s name, not the ALJ’s. The ALJ, in other words, acts 20 only as the Commission’s agent, and the fact that every final decision is entered in the Commission’s name ensures that it is the Commissioners who are held accountable. Petitioners also argue that SEC ALJs are consti- tutional officers even absent the power to enter bind- ing decisions because SEC ALJs possess hearing- related powers similar to those of the special trial judges in Freytag, including the power to issue sub- poenas, swear oaths, and receive evidence. But those are not functions limited to constitutional of- ficers. And ALJs have no authority to punish con- tempt (or do anything else) in a manner that alters a party’s legal rights. Moreover, although SEC ALJs share some fea- tures in common with Article II] judges and other adjudicators the Court has held are constitutional officers, the powers that render those persons offic- ers—e.g., the power to enter binding judgments and punish contempt—are powers that SEC ALJs lack. B. Holding that SEC ALJs are employees rather than officers promotes the core accountability pur- pose of the Appointments Clause because no SEC ALJ decision has binding effect absent affirmative Commission action, and every binding decision is made in the Commission’s name. The Commission- ers will thus be held fully accountable for those deci- sions. C. Nothing in the APA or the securities laws suggests that Congress understood ALJs in general or SEC ALJs in particular to be constitutional offic- ers. To the contrary, every indication is that Con- 21 gress has always understood that ALJs are civil- service employees, not “Officers of the United States.” Ill. If this Court holds that SEC ALJs are con- stitutional officers, petitioners present an argument about the appropriate remedy for an Appointments Clause violation, and the Solicitor General asks the Court to decide whether restrictions on ALJs’ re- moval are constitutional (or whether a serious con- stitutional question can be avoided by narrowly con- struing those restrictions). The Court has not invit- ed Court-appointed amicus to take a position on ei- ther question, because neither implicates arguments “in support of the judgment below.” 138 S. Ct. 923. Moreover, the Court did not add a question present- ed concerning the removal question despite requests that it do so, indicating that the removal question is not properly before the Court. ARGUMENT The Appointments Clause requires that “Offic- ers of the United States” be appointed by the Presi- dent with the advice and consent of the Senate, ex- cept that Congress may alternatively provide that “inferior Officers” be appointed by the President alone, the Head of a Department, or a Court of Law. U.S. Const. art. I], § 2, cl. 2. The ALJ who presided over petitioners’ hearing, and the SEC’s other ALJJs, were not initially appointed in any of those ways, but instead were selected by SEC staff under authority delegated from the Commission. See supra at 7. The question presented is whether that manner of ap- pointing SEC ALJs is unlawful because they are constitutional officers. The answer is no. 22 As the parties ultimately agree, the question whether SEC ALJs must be appointed pursuant to the Appointments Clause turns on whether SEC ALJs “exercis[e] significant authority pursuant to the laws of the United States.” Buckley, 424 U.S. at 126.7 This Court has not had occasion to articulate the precise scope of that constitutional precondition. But a centuries-old understanding of the term “Of- ficers of the United States” yields a rule fully con- sistent with the Appointments Clause’s purpose and this Court’s cases: An individual wields “significant authority” only if she holds an office that has been “delegat([ed] by legal authority ... a portion of the sovereign powers of the federal government.” 2007 OLC Op. 78; see Resp. Br. 15. And for the reasons explained below, that criterion is satisfied only if the individual has (i) the power to bind the government or third parties (ii) in her own name rather than in the name of a superior officer. ’ Petitioners suggest that any appointee whose position includes “tenure, duration, continuing emolument, or continu- ous duties” is a constitutional officer. Pet. Br. 18 (quoting Auffmordt v. Hedden, 137 U.S. 310, 327 (1890)). It is true that holding “a continuing position[]” in the federal government “es- tablished by law”’—as SEC ALJs indisputably do, see supra at 4-5—is a necessary precondition for officer status. See, e.g., Freytag, 501 U.S. at 881; Germaine, 99 U.S. at 511-12; see also The Constitutional Separation of Powers Between the President and Congress, 20 Op. O.L.C. 124, 139-42, 145-47 (1996). But as the Solicitor General explains, it is not sufficient. An official must both “wield significant authority” and “occupy a continu- ing office” to become an “Officer of the United States.” Resp. Br. 17-18 n.3; accord 2007 OLC Op. 73-74. 23 SEC ALJs are not “Officers of the United States” because they can do neither of these things. An SEC ALJ has no authority to bind the government or al- ter the rights of third parties at all. And regardless, even if an SEC ALJ in theory had such authority, it could be exercised solely in the name of the Commis- sion, not in the ALJ’s own name. The decision below should be affirmed. I. ONLY SOMEONE WHO HAS BEEN LAW- FULLY DELEGATED AUTHORITY TO BIND THE GOVERNMENT OR THIRD PARTIES IN HER OWN NAME CAN BE AN “OFFICER” UNDER THE APPOINTMENTS CLAUSE As the Solicitor General agrees, an individual appointed to a continuing, statutorily created posi- tion in the federal government exercises “significant authority pursuant to the laws of the United States,” Buckley, 424 U.S. at 126, and is therefore a constitu- tional officer, only if she has been delegated power to “exercise a portion of the sovereign authority of the United States.” Resp. Br. 15. Such sovereign au- thority primarily consists of the power to “bin[d] the government or third parties for the benefit of the public, such as by administering, executing, or au- thoritatively interpreting the laws.” 2007 OLC Op. 77; see Resp. Br. 15.8 And even appointees who have ® “Delegated sovereign authority also includes other activ- ities of the Executive Branch concerning the public that ... have long been understood to be sovereign functions, particularly the authority to represent the United States to foreign nations or to command military force on behalf of the government.” 2007 24 such authority are not constitutional officers unless they have authority to exercise it in their own name rather than as a mere agent of a superior officer. A. Only Persons Who Have Been Lawfully Delegated Authority To Bind The Gov- ernment Or Third Parties Can Be Con- stitutional Officers 1. a. It has long been understood—and at least the Solicitor General does not dispute, Resp. Br. 15—that a constitutional officer is an individual “in- vested with some portion of the sovereign functions of government, to be exercised by him for the benefit of the public.” Floyd R. Mechem, A Treatise on the Law of Public Offices and Officers § 1, at 1-2 (1890). As Mechem’s treatise explained, “[rjeflecting the un- derstanding from the first hundred years of Ameri- can law, including pre-Founding English law,” 2007 OLC Op. 84, the “delegation ... of some of the sover- eign functions of government” is the “most important characteristic which distinguishes an office,” and “luJnless the powers conferred are of this nature, the individual is not a public officer,” Mechem, supra, § 4, at 5; accord 2007 OLC Op. 77; Office— Compensation, 22 Op. Att’y Gen. 184, 187 (1898); Appointment—Holding of Two Offices— Commissioner of Labor, 26 Op. Att’y Gen. 247, 249 (1907). This Court has explained, albeit in a somewhat different context, what it means to exercise a portion OLC Op. 77. Those other types of sovereign authority are not implicated here. 25 of the sovereign powers of the United States—viz., to take action that “alter|s] the legal rights, duties and relations of persons,” whether private parties or gov- ernment actors. [.N.S. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 952 (1983); see also The Federalist No. 64, at 436 (Jay) (referring to the Constitution’s allocation of “power to do” each “act of sovereignty by which the citizens are to be bound and affected”). The question is not whether the person can or does exercise functions that can be considered important—the fact that countless federal employees have “substantial prac- tical authority” does not make them subject to the Appointments Clause. 2007 OLC Op. 98. Rather, the understanding since the Nation’s early years has been that the sine qua non of officer status is the lawfully delegated authority to exercise “legal pow- er” and “bind[] the government or third parties for the benefit of the public.” Jd. at 77, 98 (quotation omitted). Acts that bind the government include filing en- forcement actions in court or before an administra- tive body, making litigation decisions that bind the United States, and issuing binding interpretations of the law. Acts that bind private parties include issu- ing regulations that carry the force of law and enter- ing final decisions in adjudications (which often also bind the government). Individuals holding continu- ing federal positions who exercise such sovereign au- thorities must be appointed pursuant to the Ap- pointments Clause. By contrast, “a person whose acts have no au- thority and power of a public act or law absent the subsequent sanction of an officer or the legisla- 26 ture”—for example, a person exercising “advisory” or “investigative” functions—is not an “Officer of the United States” but an employee. Id. at 95, 98 (quo- tation omitted). Thus, persons serving on an inves- tigatory commission with the power (for example) to issue subpoenas, administer oaths, and examine witnesses but no authority to act on their findings or recommendations are not “Officers of the United States.” See infra at 39-42. b. This understanding of the meaning of a pub- lic “office” or “officer” is reflected in commentary from knowledgeable observers beginning before the Founding and continuing through the Nation’s first Century. The Continental Congress, for example, under- stood officers in England to be “persons holding sov- ereign authority delegated from the King that ena- bled them in conducting the affairs of government to affect the people ‘against [their] will, and without [their] leave.” 2007 OLC Op. 82 (quoting King v. Burnell, Carth. 478, 478 (K.B. 1700)). Similarly, in 1822, the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine—in providing “the fullest early explication” of the term “Officer of the United States,” id. at 83— explained that “[t]here is a manifest difference be- tween an office, and an employment under the gov- ernment,” Opinion of the Justices, 3 Greenl. (Me.) 481, 482 (1822). An office “implies a delegation of a portion of the sovereign power to, and possession of it by the person filling the office,” that “in its ef- fects[,] ... will bind the rights of others.” Jd. Mere employment, in contrast, characterizes appointees who are “agent/s] act[ing] only on behalf of [their] 27 principal”—i.e., a superior officer—whose “sanction is generally considered as necessary to give the acts performed the authority and power of a public act.” Id. Surveying these and other materials, the Judici- ary Committee of the House of Representatives in 1899 similarly concluded that an “office” requires a delegation of sovereign authority, which “involves necessarily the power to (1) legislate, or (2) execute law, or (3) hear and determine judicially questions submitted,” 1 Asher C. Hinds, Hinds’ Precedents of the House of Representatives 604, 607 (1907) (“Hinds”)—i.e., the power to “bind the Government or do any act affecting the rights of a single individ- ual citizen,” id. at 610. Thus, the Committee con- cluded, membership on “a commission created by law to investigate and report, but having no legislative, judicial, or executive powers,” did not constitute an “office.” Id. at 604. Likewise, the Executive Branch’s longstanding view has been that an “Officer of the United States” is someone holding a continuing position created by federal law who has authority to “bind[] the govern- ment or third parties for the benefit of the public,” 2007 OLC Op. 77, whereas a mere employee is “a person whose acts have no authority and power of a public act or law absent the subsequent sanction of an officer or the legislature,” id. at 95 (quotation omitted); see also Constitutionality of Proposed Regu- lations of Joint Committee on Printing, 8 Op. O.L.C. 42, 48 (1984) (while the “administration and en- forcement” of the law must be performed by constitu- tional officers, “investigative and informative” func- 28 tions need not be); Common Legislative Encroach- ments on Executive Branch Authority, 13 Op. O.L.C. 248, 249 (1989) (person occupying position that is merely “advisory,” “investigative,” or “informative” does not qualify as an officer). 2. This Court’s more recent cases have stated that a constitutional officer has the power to exercise “significant authority pursuant to the laws of the United States.” Buckley, 424 U.S. at 126; see Frey- tag, 501 U.S. at 881; Edmond, 520 U.S. at 663; Free Enter. Fund, 561 U.S. at 486. The Court has not had occasion to more concretely articulate the governing standard, but as the Office of Legal Counsel has ex- plained, “the phrase ‘significant authority pursuant to the laws of the United States” should be under- stood as a “shorthand for the full historical under- standing of the essential elements of a public office.” 2007 OLC Op. 87. And this Court’s cases from the beginning have labeled “officers” only those holding a continuing position in the federal government who are, at a minimum, authorized to bind the govern- ment or alter the rights of private parties. a. This Court’s recent cases reflect this under- standing. The heads of the Federal Election Com- mission at issue in Buckley were authorized to “ad- minister and enforce” federal legislation, and their “enforcement power [was] both direct and wide rang- ing.” 424 U.S. at 111. They therefore possessed power both to bind the United States and to alter private parties’ rights. And the members of the Pub- lic Company Accounting Oversight Board in Free En- terprise Fund were “charged with enforcing” various securities laws and standards, and were authorized 29 to issue regulations that carry the force of law. 561 U.S. at 485. The Tax Court special! trial judges and Court of Criminal Appeals military judges this Court consid- ered in Freytag and Edmond possessed similar au- thorities to bind the government and alter third- party rights. Court of Criminal Appeals judges, for example, review de novo the most serious court- martial judgments, Edmond, 520 U.S. at 662, and review of their decisions is limited, particularly as to factual findings, id. at 664-65. Moreover, Court of Criminal Appeals judges have authority to “render a final decision on behalf of the United States,” subject to review by superior executive officers. Jd. at 665. Tax Court special trial judges also have the power, among other things, to enter final decisions in some cases. Freytag, 501 U.S. at 882, 891; see infra at 36. This Court’s modern cases, in short, have never held to be a constitutional officer anyone lacking au- thority to bind the government or alter the legal rights of private parties. b. The same is true of this Court’s earlier cases. As the Solicitor General correctly explains, many of those cases concerned “whether Congress intended to treat a position it had created by statute as an ‘of- fice,’ not whether the functions of the position were so significant that the Constitution required that the position be held by an officer” of the United States. Resp. Br. 24. Therefore not all of those cases provide particularly helpful guidance about the type of sig- nificant authority this Court has deemed necessary for constitutional officer status. See id. 30 Even so, the positions that this Court’s earlier cases called “offices” were delegated power to bind the government or alter private rights. See, e.g., Ex parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371, 380 (1880) (federal mar- shals had authority, among other things, to “keep the peace and protect [election] supervisors in the discharge of their duties,” “prevent fraudulent regis- tration and voting,” and “immediately to arrest any person who commits, or attempts to commit, ... any offence against the laws of the United States”); id. at 379-80 (election supervisors authorized, among other things, “to cause such names to be registered as they may think proper to be so marked ... and for purpos- es of identification to affix their signatures to each page of the original list,” “to challenge any vote the legality of which they may doubt,” and to “require|}” deputy marshals to perform certain duties, Act of Feb. 28, 1871, 16 Stat. 433, 436%); United States v. Allred, 155 U.S. 591, 594-95 (1895) (federal circuit court commissioners, among other things, “issue/|d] warrants,” “cause[d] the offenders to be arrested and imprisoned, or bailed, for trial,” and “institute|d] prosecutions under the laws relating to crimes against the elective franchise and civil rights of citi- zens’); Rice v. Ames, 180 U.S. 371, 374 (1901) (extra- dition commissioners, like other commissioners, had power to issue arrest warrants and imprison offend- ers); Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United States, 282 ® See also United States v. Gitma, 25 F. Cas. 1323, 1323 (C.C.E.D. Va. 1879) (relevant Act “provides that ‘when required’ to do so by the supervisors it shall be the duty of deputy mar- shals to ‘attend the polls’ in their districts or precincts” (em- phasis added)). 31 U.S. 344, 353 n.2 (1931) (federal district court com- missioners had authority, among other things, to “arrest and imprison” defendants, to “issue warrants for” fugitives, to “issue search warrants,” and to “in- stitute prosecutions under laws relating to the elec- tive franchise and civil rights”); Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 158 (1926) (postmaster first- class assumed to be an officer was authorized by statute to, among other things, resolve certain dis- putes, Act of June 8, 1872, Ch. 335, 17 Stat. 283, 307, issue money orders, id. at 297-300, and “affix his signature to the certificate of sufficiency of guar- antors or sureties,” id. at 313); Myers, 272 U.S. at 159 (U.S. Attorney, who can make litigation deci- sions on behalf of the United States, is an “inferior officer”); Ex parte Hennen, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 230 (1839) (district court clerk described as an “inferior officer” was required to provide a bond to the United States in case of a suit brought against him, see Act of Sept. 24, 1789, Ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73, 76, making clear that he exercised authority that affected individual rights). This Court’s cases are thus fully consistent with the traditional understanding that federal appoin- tees are “Officers of the United States,” requiring appointment in conformity with the Appointments Clause, only if (among other things) ‘ey have au- thority to bind the government or alter the rights of private parties. 32 B. Appointees Who Have Authority To Bind The Government Or Alter Private- Party Rights Only As Agents Of A Supe- rior Officer Are Not Themselves Consti- tutional Officers Although the authority to bind the government or private parties is a necessary precondition of con- stitutional officer status—and the lack of it here re- solves this case, see infra Part Il—it is not sufficient. Longstanding practice, Executive Branch under- standing, and this Court’s precedents all confirm that even an appointee to a continuing position in the federal government who has the de facto power to bind the government or alter private rights is not a constitutional officer if that power cannot be exer- cised in the appointee’s own name, but only in the name of a superior who is a constitutional officer. The First Congress, for example, established various deputy positions and vested appointment au- thority for those positions in the deputies’ principals even though the principals were not department heads. Specifically, the First Congress authorized marshals, collectors, and surveyors—none of whom was the head of a department—to appoint their own deputies to assist them in their duties. 1 Stat. 73, 87; Act of Aug. 4, 1790, Ch. 35, 1 Stat. 145, 155; see also Jennifer L. Mascott, Who Are “Officers of the United States”?, 70 Stan. L. Rev. 443, 525-26 & nn.491-96 (2018) (explaining why the appointing of- ficers were not department heads). The fact that the First Congress chose a method of appointment for these deputies that the Appoint- ments Clause does not specify demonstrates that it 33 did not consider them to be constitutional officers. Yet these deputies had substantial authority to im- pact the rights of nongovernmental parties. To take one example, deputy marshals assisted their princi- pal in maintaining custody over federal prisoners. 1 Stat. 73, 88; see United States v. Mundell, 6 Call. 245, 246, 248-49 (C.C.D. Va. 1795). To take another, collectors could authorize their deputies to grant permits for ships to unload imported goods. 1 Stat. 152, 155. The First Congress thus understood that deputies who acted only as agents of their superiors (rather than under authority delegated to their own office) need not be constitutional officers. This Court reached the same conclusion in Ger- maine, where it held that a civil surgeon appointed by the commissioner of pensions was not a constitu- tional officer because “[h]je [wa]s but an agent of the commissioner.” 99 U.S. at 512; accord Auffmordt, 137 U.S. at 328. And in Steele v. United States, 267 U.S. 505 (1925), the Court concluded that deputy marshals were “not in the constitutional sense ... of- ficer[s] of the United States” even though they, along with the marshal, “are the persons chiefly charged with the enforcement of the peace of the United States, as that is embraced in the enforcement of federal law,” id. at 508, and even though deputy marshals are “called upon to exercise great responsi- bility and discretion in the service of” their duties, id. Executive Branch opinions have long reflected the same view. In 1871, for example, the Attorney General explained that Congress provided non- Article II selection methods for positions such as 34 deputy marshal because “the office was substantially in the principal.” Civil-Service Commission, 13 Op. Att’y Gen. 516, 521 (1871). These deputies, in other words, were only the “representatives” of a principal who was ultimately “responsible for their conduct.” Id. Deputy district court clerks, in contrast, were of- ficers because they were not only granted authority to “do every act which [their] principal[s] might do,” but could do them in their “own name as deputy.” Deputy Clerks of United States District Courts— Premium on Official Bonds, 29 Op. Att’y Gen. 593, 597 (1912). Thus, as the Office of Legal Counsel has more recently explained, an “agent” who “acts only on behalf of his principal” and has no power in his own office is merely an employee. 2007 OLC Op. 98 (quotation omitted); cf. The Constitutional Separa- tion of Powers Between the President and Congress, 20 Op. O.L.C. at 144 n.57 (“That an employee may not exercise independent discretion does not, of course, mean that his or her duties may not encom- pass responsibilities requiring the exercise of judg- ment and discretion under the ultimate control and supervision of an officer.”). This long-established rule “preserve|s} political accountability,” Edmond, 520 U.S. at 663, because the principal will be held accountable for the agent’s acts in the principal's name. C. This Court Should Not Expand The Meaning Of The Term “Officers Of The United States” Beyond Its Historically Understood Limits Petitioners (and the Solicitor General) seek to expand the category of constitutional officers dra- 35 matically beyond its historical limits, contending that this category is “expansive” and “sweeping.” Pet. Br. 16. Although petitioners never clarify exact- ly how “significant authority” should be measured, they suggest that the category includes any authori- ty that can colloquially be described as important, significant, or non-ministerial. See, e.g., Pet. Br. 21- 23. And they rely heavily on this Court’s statement in Freytag that characterized as “significant” the au- thority of special trial judges to “take testimony, conduct trials, rule on the admissibility of evidence, and ... enforce compliance with discovery orders.” 501 U.S. at 881-82. Petitioners contend that any federal appointee who exercises similar hearing- related functions (including SEC ALJs) must be a constitutional officer. Pet. Br. 23; see Resp. Br. 21. It is true that language in Freytag could be con- strued broadly to require that anyone who exercises authority that could be deemed “significant” in a col- loquial sense—such as presiding over a hearing—is an officer even if she has no authority to bind the government or alter private-party rights, let alone to do so in the name of her own office. But Freytag never considered, let alone purported to alter, the longstanding traditional view of the scope of the Ap- pointments Clause. Cf. 2007 OLC Op. 86 (the refer- ence to “significant authority” in Buckley and subse- quent cases “does vary somewhat from the well- established historical formulation, but nothing in the Court’s opinion suggests any intention to break with the longstanding understanding of a public office or fashion a new term of art” (citation omitted)). And there is no need to adopt petitioners’ and the Solici- 36 tor General’s ahistorical and overly broad construc- tion to support the holding in Freytag, which is fully consistent with the traditional understanding. Petitioners’ reading of Freytag, moreover, would have significant negative practical consequences (in- cluding calling into question the constitutionality of more than a century’s worth of presidential and con- gressional investigative commissions), would not materially advance the purpose of the Appointments Clause, and would be difficult for the political branches to administer. 1. The traditional rule fully supports the Court’s holding in Freytag because the special trial judges at issue in that case undoubtedly had author- ity to bind the government and private parties, in at least two respects. First, they could enter binding final judgments in their own name in some circumstances, 501 U.S. at 882, which suffices to establish their officer sta- tus. It is true that the Court’s opinion stated that the authority to issue final judgments “would” con- firm special trial judges’ officer status “[e]ven if” their hearing-related duties described above “were not as significant” as the Court believed. Jd. Even so, special trial judges’ ability to enter final judg- ments fully supported the Court’s holding, and it was therefore unnecessary to the Court’s holding to consider the constitutional status of other appointees who do not possess such authority. Second, the hearing-related functions of special trial judges that this Court collectively labeled “sig- nificant” included the power to bind the government 37 and private parties by “enforc[ing] compliance with discovery orders.” Jd. at 881-82. As the SEC ex- plained below, special trial judges had “power to en- force compliance with discovery orders” because they had authority to punish contempt. SEC C.A. En Banc Br. 31 (quotation omitted).!° And the “power of contempt is a hallmark of an adjudicative official’s status as a constitutional officer,” id. at 33, precisely because it is a power to bind the government and private parties. The Solicitor General acknowledges this con- tempt power but argues that what the Court in Frey- tag found important was that special trial judges could enforce discovery orders, and not “the particu- lar type” of enforcement power special trial judges possessed. Resp. Br. 21 n.4 (quotation omitted). But it is not apparent what authority other than the power to punish contempt allowed special trial judg- es to “enforce compliance with discovery orders,” 501 U.S. at 882, as the Commission acknowledged below, SEC C.A. En Banc Br. 31. If special trial judges lacked contempt power, they would have been “de- pendent upon [a] court for enforcement” of a subpoe- na or other order. Proposed Legislation to Grant ‘© The Court in Freytag noted the Tax Court’s contempt power. See 501 U.S. at 891 (citing 26 U.S.C. § 7456(c)). The Tax Court has delegated to special! trial judges various hearing- related powers, including the power to issue subpoenas, admin- ister oaths, examine witness, and rule on the admissibility of evidence, and has also delegated “such further and incidental authority ... as may be necessary for the conduct of trials and other proceedings.” Tax Ct. R. 181 (1990). Congress labeled the contempt power an “incidental” authority in the statute granting that authority to the Tax Court. 26 U.S.C. § 7456(c). 38 Additional Power to The President’s Commission on Organized Crime, 7 Op. O.L.C. 128, 130 (1983). Admittedly, the other special trial judge func- tions that this Court mentioned—i.e., the power to “take testimony, conduct trials, [and] rule on the admissibility of evidence,” Freytag, 501 U.S. at 881- 82—are unconnected to the power to punish con- tempt or otherwise bind the government or alter pri- vate-party rights. But Freytag did not consider whether—let alone conclude that—any such authori- ty alone would have been enough to establish officer status. Certainly, the mere mention of such func- tions among others that do empower special trial judges to bind parties should not be read to overcome the centuries-old understanding that the power to bind the government or private parties is a neces- sary condition for constitutional officer status.!! 2. Adopting petitioners’ standard would also have significant adverse practical consequences. For one thing, a rule that classifies anyone who performs “important,” “significant,” or “non- ministerial” tasks as an officer could result in sub- jecting, for example, every government attorney, in- vestigator, and law-enforcement officer to the Ap- '! Special trial judges arguably also have power to bind the government in another respect: the Tax Court must accept their findings of fact unless “clearly erroneous.” See Tax Ct. R. 183(d) (“the findings of fact recommended by the Special Trial Judge shall be presumed to be correct”); see also Stone v. Comm’, 865 F.2d 342, 347 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (interpreting same language in prior version of Tax Court rules to provide for clearly erroneous standard of review). 39 pointments Clause. Petitioners’ rule could cast doubt on the constitutionality of the method of ap- pointment of many thousands of civil servants. Adopting petitioners’ and the Solicitor General's reading of Freytag, moreover, would call into signifi- cant doubt the validity of a more-than-a-century-old, unbroken congressional practice of establishing commissions that include members not appointed under the Appointments Clause—including mem- bers of Congress—and that have historically been granted authority to exercise hearing-related powers akin to those possessed by special trial judges (and SEC ALJs, see infra at 48-50), but not the power to punish contempt. For example, such commissions typically possess the powers incident to investiga- tion, e.g., to issue subpoenas, administer oaths, col- lect documents, and call and examine witnesses. See, e.g., Proposed Legislation to Grant Additional Power to The President’s Commission on Organized Crime, 7 Op. O.L.C. at 130 & n.7 (list of many such commissions); Proposed Commission on Deregulation of International Ocean Shipping, 7 Op. O.L.C. 202, 202 (1983) (discussing congressional commissions). If such authorities sufficed to establish officer status, then these commissions would be irredeemably un- constitutional: even if they could otherwise be staffed with properly appointed constitutional offic- ers, members of Congress would absolutely be pre- cluded from serving on them by the Incompatibility Clause, which prohibits Senators and Representa- tives from being “appointed to any civil Office under the Authority of the United States.” U.S. Const. art. I, § 6, cl. 2. 40 Yet both Congress and the Executive have for more than a century consistently concluded that such committees pose no Appointments Clause or Incompatibility Clause problem precisely because, despite the hearing-related powers they (like special trial judges) possess, such commissions can investi- gate, make findings, and make recommendations, but (unlike special trial judges) they cannot enforce those findings or recommendations to bind the gov- ernment or private parties. Thus, for example, the House Judiciary Commit- tee’s 1899 report described earlier, after “extensively survey|ing] the definition of an ‘office,” 2007 OLC Op. 85, and concluding that investigation and report- ing are not officer functions, see supra at 27, applied its analysis to certain commissions that Congress had recently created, considering whether the In- compatibility Clause precluded members of Congress from serving on them, Hinds at 611. The Committee concluded that commission membership was not an office, even when the commission was empowered to, for example, administer oaths, issue subpoenas, and collect documents and examine witnesses. See, e.g., An Act of 1898, Ch. 447, 30 Stat. 445; An Act of 1898, Ch. 466, 30 Stat. 476. The Office of Legal Counsel similarly has con- cluded that investigative commission members are not constitutional officers despite subpoena and oth- er related powers when they “possess no enforce- ment authority or power to bind the Government.” Proposed Commission on Deregulation of Interna- tional Ocean Shipping, 7 Op. O.L.C. at 202; see also id. at 203 (noting relevant commission’s power to is- 41 sue subpoenas and examine witnesses); see also Con- stitutionality of Proposed Regulations of Joint Com- mittee on Printing, 8 Op. O.L.C. at 48 (non-officers may exercise “investigative and informative powers of the type generally delegated to congressional committees”). And that Office has specifically con- cluded that non-officers can issue subpoenas and administer oaths, and explained that the subpoena power in particular “has not been viewed as the ex- ercise of a coercive power”: the issuing agent is “de- pendent upon the courts for enforcement” of the sub- poena by punishing contempt, and no “matter what the issuing agent finds out, it cannot, in the absence of any other power, use the information to do any- thing, such as enact or execute a law, adjudicate a dispute, or otherwise take any affirmative action which will affect an individual’s rights.” Proposed Legislation to Grant Additional Power to The Presi- dent's Commission on Organized Crime, 7 Op. O.L.C. at 130 (quotation omitted). The same is true of other hearing-related powers, such as the power to call witnesses, admit evidence, and administer oaths—if those authorities do not include the power to use the information collected “to do anything” that binds the government or private parties, it has uniformly been understood that those powers need not be wielded by officers. !2 ‘2 The Office of Legal Counsel has also made clear that such commissions would meet the other requirements of a con- stitutional office—e.g., tenure and continuing duties—if the commission could take binding action based on its findings. See, e.g., Constitutionality of the Ronald Reagan Centennial Commission Act of 2009, 2009 WL 2810453, at *2 & n.6 (O.L.C. 42 Petitioners’ argument that hearing-related powers similar to those typically possessed by inves- tigative commissions establish officer status cannot be reconciled with this joint Legislative and Execu- tive Branch practice and understanding." 3. Petitioners’ standard would also not materi- ally advance the purpose of the Appointments Clause, namely, “to preserve political accountability relative to important Government assignments.” Edmond, 520 U.S. at 663. The constrained historical understanding of the attributes of a constitutional office appropriately en- sures that the President (directly or through a direct appointee) will be accountable for the acts of those who themselves bind the government or private par- ties, because the President or his direct appointee is responsible for appointing the actor who exercised that authority. By contrast, when “a person[’s] ... Apr. 21, 2009) (“members of an unpaid commission ... [can] hold offices in the constitutional sense” (citing prior opinions)). '3 Petitioners’ sweeping construction could also have un- predictable implications for the application of other constitu- tional provisions that turn on “Officer” status, such as the Im- peachment Clause and the Foreign Emoluments Clause, both of which only apply to constitutional officers. U.S. Const. art. I, § 9, cl. 8; id. art. I, § 4; see, e.g., Application of the Emoluments Clause to a Member of the President’s Council on Bioethics, 29 Op. O.L.C. 55, 70-71 & n.8 (2005) (describing and approving the traditional view of the Department of Justice that “Office of Profit or Trust under [the United States)” in the Foreign Emol- uments Clause is synonymous with “Officer of the United States” in the Appointments Clause, thereby limiting the num- ber of persons in the federal workplace who are subject to the complex restrictions of the former). 43 acts have no authority ... absent the subsequent sanction of an officer,” 2007 OLC Op. 95 (quotation omitted), the officer who grants the “subsequent sanction” (and the President or the President’s direct subordinate who appointed that officer) will be, and should be, held directly accountable for the decision. Likewise, when an employee acts solely in the name of a superior officer, that superior will be blamed or praised for acts done in his name—regardless of the method by which the employee was hired—and the President is accountable for the superior’s appoint- ment. Cf. Andrade v. Regnery, 824 F.2d 1253, 1257 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (such delegation “does not offend the Appointments Clause so long as the duly appointed official has final authority over the implementation of the governmental action”). 4. Finally, construing “Officer of the United States” to turn on the authority to bind the govern- ment or alter private rights in the officer's own name—rather than on an amorphous standard based on a subjective assessment of the perceived im- portance or significance of the appointee’s authority —would provide an administrable rule for Congress and the Executive Branch to determine which posi- tions require compliance with the Appointments Clause and other constitutional provisions applicable to officers. Adopting petitioners’ vague standard would complicate the political branches’ efforts to comply not only with the Appointments Clause but also other constitutional provisions (such as the For- eign Emoluments Clause, see supra at 42 n.13) that turn on officer status. 44 Il. SEC ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGES ARE NOT “OFFICERS OF THE UNITED STATES” FOR PURPOSES OF THE AP- POINTMENTS CLAUSE Under the foregoing principles, SEC ALJs are not constitutional officers subject to the Appoint- ments Clause. A. SEC ALJs Are Not Constitutional “Offic- ers” Because They Cannot Bind The Government Or Alter The Rights Of Pri- vate Parties "» Their Own Name 1. SEC ALJs Have No Authority To Bind The Government Or Private Parties a. SEC ALJs have no authority to bind the Commission in any respect. Congress provided that “the Commission shall retain a discretionary right to review the action of any [delegee, including an] ad- ministrative law judge, ... upon its own initiative or upon petition of a party to or intervenor in such ac- tion.” 15 U.S.C. § 78d-1(b). Consistent with that di- rective, the Commission can revisit de novo any find- ing of fact or determination of law made by an ALJ, see id., and “ultimately controls the record for review and decides what is in the record,” Pet. App. 91a; see 17 C.F.R. §§ 201.411(a), 201.452. Thus, unlike (for example) the Court of Criminal Appeals military judges in Edmond, whose factual findings could be revised only when not supported by substantial evi- dence, 520 U.S. at 665, every decision an SEC ALJ makes can be revised fully by the Commission, so the Commission “is in no way bound by the decision” 45 of the ALJ, Attorney General’s Manual on the Ad- ministrative Procedure Act 83 (1947). Petitioners and the Solicitor General believe it important that, as a factual matter, the Commission often decides to defer to an AL.J’s credibility deter- minations, Pet. Br. 24; Resp. Br. 36-37, but that is irrelevant: it is undisputed that the Commission has no legal obligation to defer to ALJ credibility deter- minations, and thus that ALJs have no authority to bind the Commission, see Pet. App. 92a-93a n.117, which is what matters for officer status. If and when the Commission chooses to defer to the ALJ, the Commission itself is accountable for that decision. b. SEC ALJs also lack authority to make final decisions that are binding on private parties (or the Commission). They are authorized only to issue ini- tial decisions, 17 C.F.R. § 201.360, which have no force of their own—no party’s rights are affected un- til the Commission issues a final decision. The Commission can issue a final decision after conducting plenary review, either when a petition for review is filed, id. § 201.411(b), or when the Com- mission elects to review the AL.J’s decision on its own initiative, id. § 201.411(c). If the Commission decides not to conduct plenary review, an ALJ initial decision cannot take effect until the Commission is- sues a finality order. Jd. § 201.360(d)(2).'4 Even in the case of a default, the ALJ must issue an initial ‘4 Petitioners err in describing finality orders as “non- discretionary.” Pet. Br. 33. The Commission issues a finality order only if it has decided not to exercise its discretion to con- duct plenary review. 17 C.F.R. § 201.360(d)(1). 46 decision, which is then subject to review through one of the mechanisms just described. See supra at 11. Both petitioners and the Solicitor General em- phasize that the Commission does not actually en- gage in plenary review in most cases. Pet. Br. 32-33; Resp. Br. 22. That is true, see supra at 11 n.6, but beside the point. The relevant question, as petition- ers admit, “is simply whether a position possesses delegated sovereign authority to act in the first in- stance, whether or not that act may be subject to di- rection or review by superior officers.” Pet. Br. 30- 31 (quoting 2007 OLC Op. 75). SEC ALJs have not been delegated “sovereign authority to act in the first instance” because their initial decisions do not themselves alter the legal rights of individuals (or bind the government). Those initial decisions “have no authority and power of a public act or law absent the subsequent sanction of an officer,” 2007 OLC Op. 95 (quotation omitted)—i.e., the sanction of the Commission either after plenary review or through the issuance of a finality order. The lack of any delegated power to issue binding decisions distinguishes SEC ALJs from the special trial judges in Freytag. See supra at 36. It also dis- tinguishes SEC ALJs from judges on the Court of Criminal Appeals in Edmond. Those judges had au- thority to enter binding final decisions in their own name, subject to review (but not de novo review) by superior executive officers. Hdmond, 520 U.S. at 665; see also U.S. Edmond Br., 1997 WL 33018, at *25 (Court of Criminal Appeals “authorized by stat- ute to issue final decisions that are reviewable under a deferential standard”). As petitioners and the So- 47 licitor General correctly note, Pet. Br. 29; Resp. Br. 35, the fact that the Court of Criminal Appeals’ final decisions were reviewable by a superior executive officer was, in part, what made those judges inferior rather than principal officers. Edmond, 520 U.S. at 665. But the fact that they could issue final deci- sions that became effective absent subsequent sanc- tion by a superior officer is at least one reason why those judges were constitutional officers in the first place. c. The Solicitor General recognizes that under Commission regulations, even when the Commission decides not to conduct plenary review, an AL.J’s ini- tial decision has no force absent a Commission final- ity order. Resp. Br. 35. He contends, however, that “the ALJ’s decision is still the Commission’s final de- cision by operation of [§ 78d-1(c)],” id., which pro- vides that if the Commission declines to exercise re- view, or if no review is sought, “then the action of [the delegee, including an] administrative law judge, ... Shall, for all purposes, including appeal or review thereof, be deemed the action of the Commission,” 15 U.S.C. § 78d-1(c). That is incorrect. Subsection (c) does not come into play at all unless the ALJ exercises a function delegated under subsection (a). But the Commission has not delegated ALJs the authority to enter a deci- sion that can have effect without the Commission’s affirmative sanction through a finality order. See supra at 10-11. Thus, subsection (c)’s “deemed” pro- vision does not apply to ALJ initial decisions. Moreover, even if the Solicitor General’s reading of § 78d-1(c) were correct, it would only confirm that 48 SEC ALJs are not constitutional officers. After all, § 78d-1(c) deems an ALJ's initial decision to be the decision of the Commission, not the ALJ. In other words, even if ALJs had de facto authority to alter a party’s rights, they could only do so in the name of the Commission. In this respect, ALJs are akin to the non-officer deputies that Congress established as early as 1789—“agent[s]" who “act[{] only on behalf of [their] principal,” i.e., the Commission. 2007 OLC Op. 98 (quotation omitted). The fact that Congress did not delegate SEC ALJs any power to issue decisions in their own name shows that they are not officers but “representatives” of the Commission, which is ulti- mately “responsible for their conduct,” Civil-Service Commission, 13 Op. Att'y Gen. at 521, and which can and will be held accountable for that conduct, con- sistent with the Appointments Clause’s purpose, see supra at 1-2. d. Petitioners and the Solicitor General also rely heavily on other functions SEC ALJs may perform when presiding over hearings. They note that SEC ALJs may, for example, administer oaths, issue sub- poenas, hold hearings, take testimony, and admit evidence. Pet. Br. 23; Resp. Br. 21. But as explained earlier, it has long been understood that non-officers can exercise such hearing-related powers—powers routinely possessed by bodies serving investigative functions whose members are not constitutional of- ficers. See supra at 39-42. Petitioners and the Solicitor General point to Freytag’s statement that the power to “take testimo- ny, conduct trials, rule on the admissibility of evi- 49 dence, and ... enforce compliance with discovery or- ders,” 501 U.S. at 881-82, is “significant.” But SEC ALJs do not have the power to “enforce” discovery or any other orders in any way relevant to the Ap- pointments Clause, because they “have no authority to punish disobedience of discovery orders or other orders with contempt sanctions of fine or imprison- ment.” Pet. App. 7a; see supra at 9. Indeed, as the Commission explained, SEC ALJs are even “power- less to enforce their subpoenas. The Commission it- self would need to seek an order from a federal dis- trict court to compel compliance.” Pet. App. 94a n.120 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 78u(c)). SEC ALJs only have power to deal with “contemptuous conduct” “during a proceeding”—they can exclude the offend- ing party from the hearing room or prevent him from representing others in the proceedings. 17 C.F.R. § 201.180(a). That limited authority is subject to immediate review by the Commission, _ id. § 201.180(a)(2), and if not reviewed is deemed an ac- tion of the Commission, 15 U.S.C. § 78d-1(c), so it cannot create officer status. See supra at 47-48. And even if done in the ALJ’s own name, this pow- er—along with SEC AL.Js’ other hearing-related powers, such as the power to admit evidence—is an authority anyone performing an investigative func- tion would have. Such authority, by itself, does not establish a constitutional office, see supra at 39-42, because its exercise does not by itself “alter[{] the legal rights, duties and relations of persons.” Chadha, 462 U.S. at 952. To be sure, an officer who does have authori- ty to bind the government or private parties may use 50 powers inherent in conducting a hearing or investi- gation to find the facts necessary to determining the parties’ legal rights. But if “no matter what [a fed- eral actor] finds out” at the conclusion of the hearing or investigation, the actor cannot “use the infor- mation to do anything, such as enact or execute a law, adjudicate a dispute, or otherwise take any af- firmative action which will affect an individual’s rights,” Proposed Legislation to Grant Additional Power to The President's Commission on Organized Crime, 7 Op. O.L.C. at 130 (quotation omitted), she is not an officer. To be sure, an appointee’s role in “shaping the record” through such functions, Pet. Br. 24; Resp. Br. 20, 24, could suggest officer status if the appointee’s evidentiary rulings and other acts actually “shaped the record” in a manner binding on the agency.'® But as explained above, no SEC ALJ's evidentiary ‘8 Contrary to petitioners’ suggestion, magistrate judges are not officers based solely on their ability to “shape the evi- dentiary record” in a federal court case. Pet. Br. 30. Magis- trate judges are authorized to enter final judgments, 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(1), and enter unreviewable orders, Roell v. Withrow, 538 U.S. 580, 585 (2003); 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(3). They may also enforce those orders and others through the contempt power, and may summarily order imprisonment or a fine. 28 U.S.C. § 636(e). Magistrates can also issue arrest warrants, 18 U.S.C. § 3041; authorize criminal complaints, Fed. R. Crim. P. 3; order pre-trial detention, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3141(a), 3142(a)(4); detair ma- terial witnesses, 18 U.S.C. § 3144; try misdemeanor cases, 18 U.S.C. § 3401(a); and impose sentences for petty offenses with- out the parties’ consent, 28 U.S.C. § 636(a)(4). Magistrate judges are therefore constitutional officers for reasons having nothing to do with their ability to “shape the evidentiary rec- ord.” 51 ruling is binding on the Commission, which has ple- nary authority to determine and analyze the rec- ord—an authority the Commission exercised in this case. See supra at 12. SEC ALJs simply have no power to bind the government or private parties, let alone the power to do so in the ALJ’s own name ra- ther than that of the Commission. SEC ALJs there- fore are not constitutional officers subject to the Ap- pointments Clause. 2. SEC ALJs Are Not Comparable To Article Ill Judges In Any Relevant Respect Petitioners and the Solicitor General also argue that SEC ALJs are constitutional officers because of a “parallel between ALJs and Article III judges.” Resp. Br. 25; see Pet. Br. 18-20. Not so. SEC ALJs preside over proceedings that “are adversarial in nature.” Butz, 438 U.S. at 513. ALJs thus may do many things that Article III judges also do, including exercise the hearing-related functions described above. And ALJs are “functionally compa- rable” to judges in the sense that “the process of agency adjudication,” like the process by which a court decides a case, is “structured so as to assure that the hearing examiner exercises his independent judgment on the evidence before him, free from pres- sures by the parties or other officials within the agency.” Id. Thus, ALJs’ adjudicative functions render them sufficiently analogous to trial judges to afford ALJs absolute immunity for actions taken in presiding over agency hearings. /d. at 514. The similarities between agency adjudications and judicial proceed- 52 ings also warrant granting the States sovereign im- munity in agency proceedings held before ALJs, Fed. Mar. Comm'n v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743, 753-67 (2002), although the final decision in Federal Maritime Commission was rendered by the Commis- sion, not an ALJ, id. at 750. But it does not follow that SEC ALJs must be “Officers of the United States” simply because district court judges are. SEC ALJs lack the crucial authorities that district courts possess—viz., the authority to bind the gov- ernment or private parties, for example by entering binding final judgments or punishing contempt. SEC ALJs thus are nothing like district court judges in any way that matters for Appointments Clause purposes. It is certainly true, as the Solicitor General ex- plains, Resp. Br. 27, that Congress in the APA sought to make ALJs “a special class of semi- independent subordinate hearing officers.” Ramspeck, 345 U.S. at 132 (quotation omitted). Congress achieved this balance by giving ALJs “lim- ited separation from their agencies with respect to ‘their tenure and compensation,” Pet. Br. 37 (quot- ing Ramspeck, 345 U.S. at 132 n.2), so that they would be able to maintain neutrality in evaluating evidence and formulating their initial decisions, see supra at 3-5. But as petitioners recognize, by keep- ing ALJs within the agency, Congress also ensured that hearing examiners would be “subordinate to their respective agencies” in “every ... significant re- spect” other than “tenure and compensation.” Pet. Br. 37-38. Crucially, Congress did not seek to in- crease ALJ independence—and certainly not SEC 53 ALJ independence—by granting ALJs independent authority to bind the government or private parties. That is the authority that matters, and it is lacking here. There is some irony, moreover, in petitioners’ complaint that, despite the structural independence that Congress has provided ALJs, they are still not sufficiently “independent.” Pet. Br. 38-40. If that is so, adopting petitioners’ position would only make matters worse, since requiring appointment by a high-level political officer is itself a form of political control over the appointee. Cf. Barron & Kagan, Chevron’s Nondelegation Doctrine, 2001 Sup. Ct. Rev. 201, 223 n.80 (2001) (“Presidents often have a good deal of actual control over independent agencies [despite for-cause removal restrictions] by virtue of their appointments and other powers.”). Congress gave agencies like the Commission flexibility to en- hance ALJs’ structural independence beyond what the APA requires by authorizing them to delegate the power to hire ALJs to non-political employees— as the Commission had until recently done, see supra at 7—while at the same time reserving policymaking and decisionmaking authority (and thus accountabil- ity) to the Commission. The manner in which Con- gress achieved this balance is fully consistent with the Appointments Clause, and there is no reason to disturb it. B. SEC ALJs’ Employee Status Is Con- sistent With The Purpose Of The Ap- pointments Clause The Appointments Clause’s accountability pur- pose is fully served by classifying SEC ALJs as em- 54 ployees rather than constitutional officers. Because “the Commission is not bound in any way by its ALJ[s’] decisions,” “the blame for its unpopular deci- sions,” as well as the praise for its good ones, “fall(s] squarely on the commissioners and, in turn, the president who appointed them.” Bandimere, 844 F.3d at 1198 (McKay, J., dissenting). Indeed, be- cause SEC ALJ decisions have no force without sub- sequent Commission action—and because those de- cisions in all events are issued in the name of the Commission, not the ALJ—it is “quite clear where the buck stops” in matters initially heard by an SEC ALJ. Id. Thus, “[s]o long as the commissioners have been validly appointed”—which no one disputes here—“the Appointments Clause is satisfied.” /d. (emphasis added). C. Congress Has Not Adopted The View That ALJs Are Constitutional “Officers Of The United States” Finally, petitioners (but, notably, not the Solici- tor General) also argue that “Congress provided, in both the securities laws and the APA, that ALJs are ‘officers,” a designation petitioners say “is all but dispositive of [SEC ALJs’] status under the Ap- pointments Clause.” Pet. Br. 12. Although congres- sional intent is “not dispositive of the constitutional question here,” Resp. Br. 29, Congress has long made abundantly clear its view that ALJs are not constitutional officers but employees. Petitioners correctly note that the APA original- ly described ALJs as “officers,” and the securities laws refer to them as “officers of the Commission.” See Pet. Br. 35-36. But that does not mean that 55 Congress understood SEC ALJs to be constitutional officers for purposes of the Appointments Clause. Petitioners cite Germaine, which concluded that the statutory term “Officer of the United States” there carried the same meaning as under the Appoint- ments Clause. 99 U.S. at 510. Unlike in Gern sine, however, Congress has never referred to ALJs as of- ficers of the United States. And even if Congress had used that more specific term, this Court has held that the phrase “officer of the United States,’ when employed in the statutes of the United States, is to be taken usually to have the limited constitutional meaning,” but can also “include others than those appointed by the President, heads of departments, and courts.” Steele, 267 U.S. at 507. Congress's ref- erence to ALJs as simple “officers” or “officers of the Commission” does not demonstrate an intent to cre- ate a constitutional office. See also Lamar v. United States, 240 U.S. 60, 65 (1916) (“words may be used in a statute in a different sense from that in which they are used in the Constitution”); United States v. Hen- dee, 124 U.S. 309, 313 (1888) (clerk was “officer” un- der compensation statute, even though he was “not, in the constitutional sense of the word, an officer of the United States”). In any event, any doubt about Congress’s under- standing was erased in 1966, when it restated and codified Title 5 of the U.S. Code “without substantive change.” H.R. Rep. No. 89-901, at 1 (1965). Peti- tioners correctly explain that Congress in 1966 “de- fined ‘officer’ in the APA as ‘an individual ... re- quired by law to be appointed in the civil service by’ ‘the President,’ ‘a court of the United States,’ or ‘the 56 head of an Executive agency’ or ‘military depart- ment.” Pet. Br. 36 (emphasis in original) (citing 5 U.S.C. § 2104(a)(1)); see Pub. L. No. 89-554, 80 Stat. 378, 408-09 (1966). What petitioners miss, however, is that Congress simultaneously deleted every refer- ence to ALJs (then called “hearing examiners”) as “officers,” and replaced each such reference with “employee,” e.g., 80 Stat. 386-87, which is how these provisions read today, e.g., 5 U.S.C. §§ 556, 557 (de- scribing ALJ as “presiding employee”); see also id. § 2105(a) (defining “employee” to include individuals “appointed in the civil service by ... an individual who is an employee under this section”). The fact that Congress added definitions of “officer” and “em- ployee” to Title 5 and at the same time made clear that ALJs were employees refutes petitioners’ con- tention that Congress understood ALJs to be consti- tutional officers. '® ‘6 Petitioners err in asserting that the APA's legislative history shows that Congress “understood that hearing examin- ers would be executive Officers.” Pet. Br. 36. When formulat- ing the APA, Congress considered a proposal! “that the Judicial! Conference appoint an officer to appoint and remove examin- ers,” Administrative Procedure Act: Legislative History, 79th Congress, 1944-46, at 50, which raised concerns about possible “constitutional problems as to the appointing power,” id., given that “the Judicial Conference is a committee and not a court,” id. at 42. The problem was not that hearing examiners had to be appointed in conformity with the Appointments Clause, but that a position assigned responsibility for appointing and re- moving hearing examiners for all agencies might have to be filled by a constitutional officer chosen under the Appointments Clause—which would not have occurred under the proposal! that the Judicial Conference choose the appointing officer, be- cause the Judicial Conference is not a court of law (or depart- 57 Petitioners also suggest in passing what appears to be a statutory argument: that by granting the “agency” authority to appoint ALJs, 5 U.S.C. § 3105, Congress intended that ALJs could be appointed on- ly by agency heads, an obligation petitioners believe “the Commission has failed to discharge,” Pet. Br. 3. Not so. Congress authorized the Commission to del- egate “any of its functions to,” among others, “an employee.” 15 U.S.C. § 78d-1(a). Petitioners do not explain why this broad delegation authority does not encompass delegation of the power to hire AL.Js. To the extent petitioners contend that the word “agency” in § 3105 precludes delegation because it necessarily refers only to the head of the agency, that construction is implausible. For example, the very next section of the Code uses the phrase “the head of an Executive department.” 5 U.S.C. § 3106. And Title 5 elsewhere uses the term “agency head.” E.g., id. § 608. Had Congress intended that ALJs could be appointed only by a department head, it ment head). Congress, of course, ultimately decided that hear- ing examiners would be “appointed and removed within the usual framework of the public service,” id. at 50, an arrange- ment that raised no constitutional concerns at all. Petitioners also incorrectly contend that the Attorney General, when asked to opine on the extent of the Civil Service Commission's authority under section 11 of the APA, deemed hearing examiners constitutional! officers. Pet. Br. 37; see Ad- 41 Op. Att'y Gen. 74 (1951). The Attorney General! instead con- cluded that section 11 would pose no Appointments Clause problem even if ALJs were inferior officers. See id. at 79-80. The Attorney General therefore did not have to—and in fact did not—consider whether ALJs actually were inferior officers. 58 would have used one of those readily available for- mulations. The fact that Congress did not do so con- firms that it considered ALJs employees that need not be appointed under the Appointments Clause. Ill. THE COURT HAS NOT INS1 RUCTED THE COURT-APPOINTED AMICUS TO BRIEF THE PARTIES’ REMEDIAL AND REMOV- AL ARGUMENTS Petitioners present arguments about the appro- priate remedy for an Appointments Clause violation. Pet. Br. 42-58. The Solicitor General, meanwhile, argues that if the Court reverses the court of appeals as to the Appointments Clause question, it should also consider whether Congress’s decision to grant ALJs “good cause” removal protection is unconstitu- tional, and whether the Court can avoid that ques- tion by construing “for cause” and the Merit System Protection Board’s authority under 5 U.S.C. § 7521 narrowly. Resp. Br. 39-55. This brief does not con- sider those questions because the Court has not in- structed Court-appointed amicus to take a position on them. A. Amicus was appointed to “brief and argue this case ... in support of the judgment below.” 138 S. Ct. 923. Petitioners’ remedial arguments by their terms are relevant only if the judgment below is re- versed. The Court has thus not instructed the Court-appointed amicus to address those arguments. B. So too with the Solicitor General's removal argument. The judgment below rests on the conclu- sion that SEC ALJs are not constitutional officers. The Solicitor General argues that the Court should 59 reach the removal question “[s]hould the Court agree that the Commission’s ALJs are officers.” Resp. Br. 39-40 n.7. If the Court concludes that SEC ALJs are officers under the Appointments Clause, the judg- ment below would be reversed regardless of the an- swer to the removal question. See Pet. Cert. Reply 11. Because any argument as to removal would not be in support of the judgment below, it is similarly outside the scope of amicus’s appointment. Moreover, the Court has indicated that the re- moval issue is not properly before it. The Solicitor General asked the Court at the certiorari stage to add an additional question concerning removal if the Court did not believe that issue to be within the scope of the question presented in the petition. Resp. Cert. Br. 21, 26. Petitioners objected, explain- ing that the removal question was not “even remote- ly encompassed by petitioners’ question presented,” Pet. Cert. Reply 10, and presented several additional arguments for why the Court should not consider the removal question, including that it has never been decided by any court and that the answer would not affect the judgment, id. at 9-11. But petitioners spe- cifically “requeste|d}” that if “the Court nevertheless [were] inclined to decide the removal issue now,” that “the Court [should] formulate a specific ques- tion on that topic,” as the Solicitor General had also requested. Jd. at 11. This Court declined to add an additional question presented, indicating the Court’s agreement with petitioners that the removal ques- tion is not properly before it. 60 CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, the decision below should be affirmed. Respectfully submitted, JONATHAN D. HACKER ANTON METLITSKY DEANNA M. RICE (Counsel of Record) SAMANTHA M. GOLDSTEIN ametlitsky@omm.com O'MELVENY & MYERS LLP O’MELVENY & MYERS LLP 1625 Eye Street, N.W. Times Square Tower Washington, D.C. 20006 Seven Times Square (202) 383-5300 New York, N.Y. 10036 (212) 326-2000 JAMES W. CROOKS O’MELVENY & MYERS LLP 400 South H Street Los Angeles, Cal. 90071 (213) 430-6000 March 26, 2018 APPENDIX la RELEVANT CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS Article I, Section 6, Clause 2 of the United States Constitution (Incompatibility Clause): *~** [Njo Person holding any Office under the United States, shall be a Member of either House during his Continuance in Office. Article I, Section 9, Clause 8 of the United States Constitution (Foreign Emoluments Clause): No Title of Nobility shall be granted by the United States: And no Person holding any Office of Profit or Trust under them, shall, without the Consent of the Congress, accept of any present, Emolument, Office, or Title, of any kind whatever, from any King, Prince, or foreign State. Article II, Section 2, Clause 2 of the United States Constitution (Appointments Clause): *~** (The President] shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint Am- bassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, Judges of the supreme Court, and all other Officers of the United States, whose Appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and which shall be es- tablished by Law: but the Congress may by Law vest the Appointment of such inferior Officers, as they think proper, in the President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of Departments. 2a Article II, Section 4 of the United States Con- stitution (Impeachment Clause): The President, Vice President and all civil Officers of the United States, shall be removed from Office on Impeachment for, and Conviction of, Treason, Brib- ery, or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors. RELEVANT STATUTES 5 U.S.C. § 554: Adjudications. *~** (d) The employee who presides at the reception of ev- idence pursuant to section 556 of this title shall make the recommended decision or initial decision required by section 557 of this title, unless he becomes unavail- able to the agency. Except to the extent required for the disposition of ex parte matters 2s authorized by law, such an employee may not— (1) consult a person or party on a fact in issue, un- less on notice and opportunity for all parties to partic- ipate; or (2) be responsible to or subject to the supervision or direction of an employee or agent engaged in the per- formance of investigative or prosecuting functions for an agency. An employee or agent engaged in the performance of investigative or prosecuting functions for an agency in a case may not, in that or a factually related case, participate or advise in the decision, recommended decision, or agency review pursuant to section 557 of 3a this title, except as witness or counsel in public pro- ceedings. This subsection does not apply— (A) in determining applications for initial li- censes; (B) to proceedings involving the validity or ap- plication of rates, facilities, or practices of public util- ities or carriers; or (C) to the agency or a member or members of the body comprising the agency. *~** 5 U.S.C. § 556: Hearings; presiding employees; powers and du- ties; burden of proof; evidence; record as basis of decision. (a) This section applies, according to the provisions thereof, to hearings required by section 553 or 554 of this title to be conducted in accordance with this sec- tion. (b) There shall preside at the taking of evidence— (1) the agency; (2) one or more members of the body which com- prises the agency; or (3) one or more administrative law judges ap- pointed under section 3105 of this title. This subchapter does not supersede the conduct of specified classes of proceedings, in whole or in part, by or before boards or other employees specially pro- vided for by or designated under statute. The func- 4a tions of presiding employees and of employees partic- ipating in decisions in accordance with section 557 of this title shall be conducted in an impartial manner. A presiding or participating employee may at any time disqualify himself. On the filing in good faith of a timely and sufficient affidavit of personal bias or other disqualification of a presiding or participating employee, the agency shall determine the matter as a part of the record and decision in the case. (c) Subject to published rules of the agency and within its powers, employees presiding at hearings may— (1) administer oaths and affirmations; (2) issue subpenas authorized by law; (3) rule on offers of proof and receive relevant evi- dence; (4) take depositions or have depositions taken when the ends of justice would be served; (5) regulate the course of the hearing; (6) hold conferences for the settlemen. or simplifi- cation of the issues by consent of the parties or by the use of alternative means of dispute resolution as pro- vided in subchapter IV of this chapter; (7) inform the parties as to the availability of one or more alternative means of dispute resolution, and encourage use of such methods; (8) require the attendance at any conference held pursuant to paragraph (6) of at least one representa- tive of each party who has authority to negotiate con- cerning resolution of issues in controversy; (9) dispose of procedural requests or similar mat- ters; 5a (10) make or recommend decisions in accordance with section 557 of this title; and (11) take other action authorized by agency rule consistent with this subchapter. *~** 5 U.S.C. § 557: Initial decisions; conclusiveness; review by agency; submissions by parties; contents of de- cisions; record. (a) This section applies, according to the provisions thereof, when a hearing is required to be conducted in accordance with section 556 of this title. (b) When the agency did not preside at the reception of the evidence, the presiding employee or, in cases not subject to section 554(d) of this title, an employee qualified to preside at hearings pursuant to section 556 of this title, shall initially decide the case unless the agency requires, either in specific cases or by gen- eral rule, the entire record to be certified to it for de- cision. When the presiding employee makes an initial decision, that decision then becomes the decision of the agency without further proceedings unless there is an appeal to, or review on motion of, the agency within time provided by rule. On appeal from or re- view of the initial decision, the agency has all the pow- ers which it would have in making the initial decision except as it may limit the issues on notice or by rule. When the agency makes the decision without having presided at the reception of the evidence, the presid- ing employee or an employee qualified to preside at hearings pursuant to section 556 of this title shall 6a first recommend a decision, except that in rule mak- ing or determining applications for initial licenses— (1) instead thereof the agency may issue a tenta- tive decision or one of its responsible employees may recommend a decision; or (2) this procedure may be omitted in a case in which the agency finds on the record that due and timely execution of its functions imperatively and un- avoidably so requires. (c) Before a recommended, initial, or tentative deci- sion, or a decision on agency review of the decision of subordinate employees, the parties are entitled to a reasonable opportunity to submit for the considera- tion of the employees participating in the decisions— (1) proposed findings and conclusions; or (2) exceptions to the decisions or recommended decisions of subordinate employees or to tentative agency decisions; and (3) supporting reasons for the exceptions or pro- posed findings or conclusions. The record shall show the ruling on each finding, con- clusion, or exception presented. All decisions, includ- ing initial, recommended, and tentative decisions, are a part of the record and shall include a statement of— (A) findings and conclusions, and the reasons or basis therefor, on all the material issues of fact, law, or discretion presented on the record; and (B) the appropriate rule, order, sanction, relief, or denial thereof. x*** 7a 5 U.S.C. § 2104: Officer. (a) For the purpose of this title, “officer”, except as otherwise provided by this section or when specifi- cally modified, means a justice or judge of the United States and an individual who is— (1) required by law to be appointed in the civil ser- vice by one of the following acting in an official capac- ity— (A) the President; (B) a court of the United States; (C) the head of an Executive agency; or (D) the Secretary of a military department; (2) engaged in the performance of a Federal func- tion under authority of law or an Executive act; and (3) subject to the supervision of an authority named by paragraph (1) of this section, or the Judicial Con- ference of the United States, while engaged in the per- formance of the duties of his office. (b) Except as otherwise provided by law, an officer of the United States Postal Service or of the Postal Reg- ulatory Commission is deemed not an officer for pur- poses of this title. 5 U.S.C. § 2105: Employee. (a) For the purpose of this title, “employee”, except as otherwise provided by this section or when specifi- cally modified, means an officer and an individual who is— 8a (1) appointed in the civil service by one of the fol- lowing acting in an official capacity— (A) the President; (B) a Member or Members of Congress, or the Congress; (C) a member of a uniformed service; (D) an individual who is an employee under this section; (E) the head of a Government controlled corpo- ration; or (F) an adjutant general designated by the Sec- retary concerned under section 709(c) of title 32; (2) engaged in the performance of a Federal func- tion under authority of law or an Executive act; and (3) subject to the supervision of an individual named by paragraph (1) of this subsection while en- gaged in the performance of the duties of his position. *~** 5 U.S.C. § 3105: Appointment of administrative law judges. Each agency shall appoint as many administrative law judges as are necessary for proceedings required to be conducted in accordance with sections 556 and 557 of this title. Administrative law judges shall be assigned to cases in rotation so far as practicable, and may not perform duties inconsistent with their duties and responsibilities as administrative law judges. 9a 5 U.S.C. § 5372: Administrative law judges. (a) For the purposes of this section, the term “admin- istrative law judge” means an administrative law judge appointed under section 3105. (b)(1)(A) There shall be 3 levels of basic pay for ad- ministrative law judges (designated as AL—1, 2, and 3, respectively), and each such judge shall be paid at 1 of those levels, in accordance with the provisions of this section. (B) Within level AL—3, there shall be 6 rates of basic pay, designated as AL—3, rates A through F, re- spectively. Level AL—2 and level AL—1 shall each have 1 rate of basic pay. (C) The rate of basic pay for AL—3, rate A, may not be less than 65 percent of the rate of basic pay for level IV of the Executive Schedule, and the rate of basic pay for AL—1 may not exceed the rate for level IV of the Executive Schedule. (2) The Office of Personnel Management shall de- termine, in accordance with procedures which the Of- fice shall by regulation prescribe, the level in which each administrative-law-judge position shall be placed and the qualifica [Text truncated at 120,000 characters. The full text is on the page linked above.] --- Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385016_0772%3A22. Public record. Not legal advice.