# Amicus Curiae Brief — Digital Realty Trust, Inc. v. Somers, 138 S. Ct. 43 (2017) (No. 16-1276)

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Amicus Curiae Brief
- **Published:** January 1, 2017

## Text

No. 16-1276 DCT 17 2017

Or FICE OF THE CLERK

Du The
Supreme Court of the Binited: States

*

DIGITAL REALTY TRUST, INC.,

Petitioner,
v.

PAUL SOMERS,
Respondent.

*

On Writ Of Certiorari To The
United States Court Of Appeals
For The Ninth Circuit

«

BRIEF OF TAXPAYERS AGAINST FRAUD
EDUCATION FUND AS AMICUS CURIAE
IN SUPPORT OF RESPONDENT

o-
JACKLYN DEMAR CLAIRE M. SYLVIA
TAXPAYERS AGAINST FRAUD Counsel of Record
EDUCATION FUND ALEXANDER WESTERFIELD
1220 19th St., N.W., PHILLIPS & COHEN LLP
Suite 501 100 The Embarcadero,
Washington, DC 20036 Suite 300
(202) 296-4826 San Francisco, CA 94105
(415) 836-9000
csylvia@phillipsandcohen.com
SEAN X. MCKESSsy
DAVID JOCHNOWITZ
JOHN W. TREMBLAY
PHILLIPS & COHEN LLP

2000 Massachusetts Ave., N.W.
Washington, DC 20036

—==—===—==_={=™7{x"#z*~#~#*{=KxK=[]]"=x=—{]{{]{"]""]"_=_{z__&_&z*__&_x&z&*—aé~=sesE$e_
COCKLE LEGAL BRIEFS (800) 225 6964
WWW .COCKLELEGALBRIEFS.COM

i

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page
GI CRI ENED ans csevesvsvosscsveccsscrevsncescccens l
yy (RAO SP ity ye. 9 iy 5 | -. nen enn iv
INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE..............0...004. 1
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT .............................. 1
STE cad chpiiiastedahiicasiltninnarnabesesnusnpastnceksaviess 4

I. At the time it enacted Dodd-Frank, Con-
gress understood that the failure to en-
courage and respond to whistleblowers
had undermined protection of investors
EERE ES SEE SO PPO EOE 4

A. Whistleblowers sought to expose the
fraud and noncompliance that led to
the Madoff scandal and the financial
crisis but were ignored and suffered
I carstathiekcotseteeccdecsss dacsovcks haious 4

B. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act failed to pre-
vent the financial crisis or adequately
protect whistleblowers .....................6+. 6

©

Whistleblowers generally raise concerns
internally and often suffer retaliation
BO nick misecinanansdstenndneeneesdinaacaictases 7

Il. Congress enacted the Dodd-Frank whistle-
blower provisions to curb fraud and protect
investors by encouraging both internal re-
porting and reporting to the government
through interrelated incentives and protec-
ND co nlineted cats Gannett ccabarbcvsscneuarevencaheeinese 10

ITT,

IV.

li

TABLE OF CONTENTS — Continued

Page

Both industry and the Commission under-
stood the anti-retaliation provision to
protect internal reporting regardless of
whether an individual also reported to the
COIIIIIID. i icciccncscscocccesiasdinsdetasnsatiaananicnen

The contemporaneous understanding of
the anti-retaliation provision is consistent
with the statute’s text, structure, and the
underlying congressional policy ................

A. The term “whistleblower” can have dif-
ferent meanings within the statute even
if the statute defines the term..............

1. The term “whistleblower” must take
a different meaning in the anti-
retaliation provision than it does in
the reward provision to give full ef-
fect to the statute’s protections for
whistleblowers.................:-0.ceeseeseeers

2. The statute’s design also supports
context-specific definitions.............

B. Applying Dodd-Frank’s anti-retaliation
protections to persons who report inter-
nally furthers Congress’s purpose in en-
suring that information about potential
Grn BD SOE oovcccccnssccciecsuinistinanaien

12

15

15

17

19

il

TABLE OF CONTENTS — Continued
Page
C. Petitioner’s reading of the statute would

frustrate Congress’s purpose by render-
ing it less likely that whistleblowers

will report misconduct.....................0606 24
ri ccecesininansconnceseassesasseses 27

iv

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Page
CASES
Atl. Cleaners & Dyers v. United States, 286 U.S.
I cconstscoumccnccsesnctitcsdinuecsenteiabaiaiiedidealand 15, 23
Envtl. Def. v. Duke Energy Corp., 549 U.S. 561
ESSE ees aera rene ween ms 15
Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337 (1997).......... 16, 19
Star Athletica L.L.C. v. Varsity Brands, Inc., 137
Bh Re IE iccccesidsinictinacessinininiaeatiiantaaniant 26
United States v. Heirs of Boisdoré, 49 U.S. (8
I Ss sc cccineiniichaceaiecheridictinceiepammtiaiamndinaihihae 26
Utility Air Regulatory Group v. EPA, 134 S. Ct.
EERE TPIS SERS eee 16, 17, 19, 21, 22
Yates v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1074
ee ear ean ee ae ae eee oars 21 n.5, 22
STATUTES
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer
Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203,
124 Stat. 1376 (2010)
A re liicckcncsintinsiaemiintensnaiatniogandy passim
ee ee BD givccresccsenstasnsesensietoniinentiiaicadl 17
Be Ps Oe PD sesetesecccsccenccecccescenecses 10, 20, 22
15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(d (2A) .... 2.0. 11, 18, 25 n.6
15 U.S.C. § T8u-G(EM2MB) ............2eceeecerceceerenees 11 n.2
BEE Cie OO PID bn ncccecccncccccncccscccsscnsssctveenes 12
15 U.S.C. § 78u-GCh)(1 (ANGI)... eee cece eee 20 n.4
15 U.S.C. § 78u-60h)(1 (A)GID....... eee 20, 23
gt oh St | eee 11,18

BE CEG, F Fe Pi ccc cc escscecenessnbscosssccsenccnsensevonsennns 10

Vv

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ~— Continued

Page

Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002,

Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745

§ 302, codified at 15 U.S.C. § 7241.................00......... 6

§ 404, codified at 15 U.S.C. § 7262 ................ccccc cece 6

§ 806, codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1514A............... 6, 7, 12

§ 906, codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1350...............0...0...0.... 6
ne oe anniediaaemamonens 12
REGULATIONS
17 C.FR. § 240.21F-2.......... ASA A et SS passim
gk 8) | EE ae een 22
Pe ee I ccticiernniinicnnntbinemianengeatn 14, 23
17 C.LE.R. § 240.21 F-2(DX1Ni)............2-00-0e-reeeeeeeee 21n.5
py gk e BY 8 15
OTHER AUTHORITIES
155 Cong. Rec. S4412 (daily ed. Apr. 20, 2009)............ 8

Assessing the Madoff Ponzi Scheme & Regulatory
Failures: Hearing Before the H. Subcomm. on
Capital Mkts., Ins., and Gov't Sponsored En-
ters. of the Comm. on Fin. Servs., 111th Cong.

Thomas L. Carson et al., Whistle-Blowing for
Profit: An Ethical Analysis of the False Claims
Act, 77 J. Bus. Ethics 361 (2008)................cc0cccecceeeees 8

William D. Cohan, Was this Whistle-Blower
Muzzled?, N.Y. Times, Sept. 21, 2013, at SR4 .......... 5

vi

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES — Continued

Comment Letter from Association of Corporate
Counsel to Secretary Murphy (Dec. 15, 2010),
https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-33-10/s73310-

Comment Letter from Davis Polk & Wardwell
LLP to Secretary Murphy (Dec. 17, 2010),
https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-33-10/s733 10-

Comment Letter from Thompson Hine LLP to
Secretary Murphy (Dec. 3, 2010), https://www.

sec.gov/comments/s7-33-10/s73310-26.pdf........

Comment Letter from U.S. Chamber of Com-
merce and U.S. Chamber Institute for Legal
Reform to Secretary Murphy (Dec. 17, 2010),
https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-33-10/s733 10-

Terry Morehead Dworkin et al., Internal vs. Ex-
ternal Whistleblowers: A Comparison of Whis-
tleblowing Processes, 17 J. Bus. Ethics 1281

Ethics Res. Ctr., Inside the Mind of a Whistle-
blower: A Supplemental Report of the 2011

National Business Ethics Survey (2012)...........

The False Claims Act Correction Act of 2007:
Joint Hearing on H.R. 4854 Before the Sub-
comm. on Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual
Prop. and the Subcomm. on Commercial and
Admin. Law of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary,

ee EEE BOT 0F ce

Page

vii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES — Continued
Page

The False Claims Act Correction Act (S. 2041):
Strengthening the Government’s Most Effec-
tive Tool Against Fraud for the 21st Century,
Hearing on S. 2041, The False Claims Act Cor-
rection Act Before the S. Comm. on the Judici-

I, Fee Ne rctrseietimieicmiceteinnisandatetncasssnncts 8
Fin. Crisis Inquiry Comm’n, The Financial Cri-
RP I re CE sirscvemcncicsistnseviceiemsesemccnss Kt

Mark Jickling, Cong. Research Serv., RL32718,
Barriers to Corporate Fraud: How They Work,
ET ST: ae 8

Jessica R. Mesmer-Magnus et al., Whistleblow-
ing in Organizations: An Examination of Cor-
relates of Whistleblowing Intentions, Actions,
& Retaliation, 62 J. Bus. Ethics 277 (2005) ............. 9

Richard E. Moberly, Unfulfilled Expectations:
An Empirical Analysis of Why Sarbanes-Oxley
Whistleblowers Rarely Win, 49 Wm. & Mary L.
Be ET neccsiscnbsveiivintseedenandedeaietidanibeselaadibetieblinetansnis 7

Public Policy Issues Raised by the Report of the
Lehman Examiner: Hearing Before the H.
Comm. on Fin. Servs., 111th Cong. (2010) ............... 5

Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, 2016 Annual Report to
Congress on the Dodd-Frank Whistleblower
FE GEE skctscadainenciniaiiechinatinniagvamieliks 24, 25

Subprime Lending & Securitization & Gov’t-
Sponsored Entities: Hearing Before the Fin.
Crisis Inquiry Comm ’n (2010) ...........sc000eeceeeeeeeees 4,5

1

INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE'

Taxpayers Against Fraud Education Fund
(“TAFEF”) respectfully submits this brief as amicus
curiae.

TAFEF is a nonprofit, tax-exempt organization
dedicated to advancing and protecting whistleblower
approaches to fraud enforcement by federal and state
authorities. TAFEF consulted with legislative and
agency stakeholders in drafting the whistleblower pro-
visions of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and
Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank”) and the ac-
companying rules and regulations. TAFEF’s members
regularly make whistleblower submissions to the Se-
curities and Exchange Commission (the “Commis-
sion”) on behalf of individuals to protect investors and
markets through a public-private partnership.

°

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

This case calls for the application of a well-settled
principle: when interpreting a statute, courts and
agencies should look to the whole statute to best
effectuate Congress’s intent. When the statutory def-
inition of a term is in tension with the statute’s
substantive provisions, courts and agencies adopt

1 No party’s counsel authored this brief in whole or in part,
and no persons or entities other than amicus, its members, or its
counsel, made a monetary contribution intended to fund the prep-
aration or submission of this brief. All parties have consented to
the filing of this brief.

2

context-appropriate definitions to resolve this ten-
sion. Dodd-Frank’s whistleblower provision, 15 U.S.C.
§ 78u-6, defines “whistleblower” as an individual who
reports to the Commission. By not referencing in-
dividuals who raise concerns internally, however, this
definition undermines the statute’s operation and
the clear legislative intent behind it. The Commission,
by adopting context-appropriate definitions of “whis-
tleblower” to protect internal whistleblowers against
retaliatior, 17 C.F_R. § 240.21F-2, addressed this prob-
lem as it should: by giving full effect to the statute Con-

gress enacted.

I. Rule 21F-2 recognizes that Congress passed
Dodd-Frank to solve particular problems. Congress
heard a series of similar stories while investigating the
2008 financial crisis and the Madoff Ponzi scheme:
whistleblowers tried to alert their employers and the
government to massive securities frauds, but were
both ignored and retaliated against. Whistleblowers
lost their jobs and were blacklisted by the financial ser- °
vices industry. The frauds that whistleblowers sought
to expose eventually collapsed, costing investors tril-
lions and bringing global capital markets nearly to a
halt.

II. In response to these crises, Congress passed
Dodd-Frank to prevent similar problems in the future.
A key component of Dodd-Frank is its whistleblower
program, for which Congress drew upon testimony and
other evidence before it, including its experience with
other whistleblower laws. Congress was aware that fi-
nancial rewards alone would not encourage whistle-
blowers to step forward: whistleblowers—particularly

3

those in the financial services sector—also needed
more robust protections against retaliation than those
offered by Sarbanes-Oxley. Dodd-Frank’s whistle-
blower provision includes both incentives to report and
protections from retaliation to encourage whistleblow-
ers to speak up about securities fraud. The whistle-
blower protections include confidentiality provisions
aimed at preventing industry blacklisting.

III. When the Commission adopted rules imple-
menting Dodd-Frank’s whistleblower provisions, the
regulated community and the Commission agreed that
Congress intended to protect whistleblowers who re-
ported potential securities laws violations, regardless
of whether the reports were made internally or to the
Commission or both. The Commission’s Rule, 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.21F-2, implements this shared understanding of
the whistleblower provisions.

IV. Rule 21F-2 likewise comports with the stat-
ute’s text, structure, and underlying policy. Mechanica]
application of the statutory definition, as Petitioner
urges, ignores the structure of Section 78u-6 by render-
ing its anti-retaliation and confidentiality provisions
incompatible. Petitioner also ignores much of the stat-
ute’s text, and its reading produces results that ad-
vance no apparent legislative purpose. Confronted
with similar circumstances, this Court has adopted
context-appropriate definitions over statutory defini-
tions and has ordered that agencies do the same. Rule
21F-2 follows this command.

The decision below should be affirmed.

a

4

ARGUMENT

I. At the time it enacted Dodd-Frank, Con-
gress understood that the failure to encour-
age and respond to whistleblowers had
undermined protection of investors and the

markets.

A. Whistleblowers sought to expose the
fraud and noncompliance that led to
the Madoff scandal and the financial
crisis but were ignored and suffered re-
taliation.

The 2008 financial crisis and the Madoff scheme
collectively destroyed trillions of dollars in wealth. In
response, Congress held hearings and created the Fi-
nancial Crisis Inquiry Commission (*“FCIC”) to inves-
tigate the causes of the crisis. As Congress considered
how to prevent these problems from reoccurring, it
heard testimony from whistleblowers who had tried to
stop the misconduct and to alert the government to the
wrongdoing, but who went unheeded and were left un-
protected.

The FCIC heard testimony from Richard M.
Bowen, III, who shared his experiences as a Citigroup
whistleblower. See Subprime Lending & Securitization
& Gov’t-Sponsored Entities: Hearing Before the Fin.
Crisis Inquiry Comm’n (2010) (statement of Richard
M. Bowen, III). Mr. Bowen had emailed senior man-
agement in November 2007 to warn of “significant
but possibly unrecognized financial losses existing

5

within Citigroup.” Jd. at 2. He identified, among other
things, tens of billions in risky loans that the company
had warranted to investors and that Citigroup may
have been required to repurchase if the borrowers de-
faulted. Jd. First he was ignored, then he was stripped
of most of his responsibilities, and finally he was fired.
William D. Cohan, Was this Whistle-Blower Muzzled?,
N.Y. Times, Sept. 21, 2013, at SR4. Within a year of Mr.
Bowen’s email, Citigroup’s stock fell by more than
ninety-five percent.

Congress heard directly from several whistleblow-
ers, including Matthew Lee, who had been with Leh-
man Brothers for 14 years. Public Policy Issues Raised
by the Report of the Lehman Examiner: Hearing Before
the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 111th Cong. 75-77 (2010)
(statement of Matthew Lee). Lee alerted senior man-
agement to accounting and valuation irregularities
that made the firm appear to be on stronger financial
footing than it was. Jd. He was fired within a week. Jd.
Two other Lehman whistleblowers suffered the same
fate. Jd. at 68 (statement of Rep. Kilroy). Months later,
Lehman filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection af-
ter 158 years of operation.

The most prominent pre-crisis whistleblower, Harry
Markopolos, told Congress that he had alerted the
Securities and Exchange Commission to the Madoff
Ponzi scheme in 2000. Assessing the Madoff Ponzi
Scheme & Regulatory Failures: Hearing Before the H.
Subcomm. on Capital Mkts., Ins., and Gov’t Sponsored
Enters. of the Comm. on Fin. Servs., 111th Cong. 5

6

(2009) (statement of Harry Markopolos) (“Markopolos
Testimony”). After determining that Madoff’s claimed
returns were impossible, Mr. Markopolos reported to
the Commission in 2000, 2001, 2005, 2007, and 2008,
but nothing happened. Jd. In 2008, after investors had
entrusted over $50 billion to Madoff’s management,
the scheme collapsed. Jd. For speaking up, Mr. Mar-
kopolos was blacklisted from the financial industry. Jd.
at 38-39.

B. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act failed to pre-
vent the financial crisis or adequately
protect whistleblowers.

As Congress set out to address these issues, it was
not working on a blank slate. Congress had enacted the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116
Stat. 745 (“Sarbanes-Oxley”), to prevent the kinds of
serious public harm that followed massive frauds at
public companies, most notably Enron and WorldCom.
With Sarbanes-Oxley, Congress sought to compel com-
panies to establish processes—such as audit proce-
dures and internal reporting—to discover and stop
wrongdoing. Among other provisions, Sarbanes-Oxley
mandated increased internal controls relating to fi-
nancial reporting, see id. §§ 302, 404, 906, to protect
shareholders by encouraging publicly-held companies
to engage in greater self-regulation. See Fin. Crisis
Inquiry Comm’n, The Financial Crisis Inquiry Report
60 (2011). For similar reasons, Sarbanes-Oxley also
included modest protections for whistleblowers at
publicly-traded companies. See Sarbanes-Oxley § 806.

7

Of relevance here, these protections included protec-
tions from retaliation for raising concerns about sus-
pected wrongdoing internally. See id. § 806(a)(1)(C)
(codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(a)(1)(C)).

But the Sarbanes-Oxley approach of reliance on
self-regulation proved ineffective and did not prevent
the financial crisis of 2008. Nor did the Act adequately
protect whistleblowers. A study reviewing the first
three years of Sarbanes-Oxley whistleblower cases
found them “remarkably one-sided,” with less than
seven percent of whistleblowers winning their cases.
Richard E. Moberly, Unfulfilled Expectations: An Em-
pirical Analysis of Why Sarbanes-Oxley Whistleblowers
Rarely Win, 49 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 65, 91 (2007).

C. Whistleblowers generally raise concerns
internally and often suffer retaliation as
a result.

While Congress was investigating the causes of
the 2008 financial crisis, it was learning more about
experiences of whistleblowers generally.

The 111th Congress, which enacted Dodd-Frank,
also passed the Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act
of 2009 (*“FERA”), Pub. L. No. 111-21, 123 Stat. 1617,
to amend the False Claims Act. In the FERA debates,
Congress considered the experiences of False Claims
Act whistleblowers, who often raised concerns inter-
nally notwithstanding the potential financial rewards
for reporting to the government. As Senator Grassley
stated, “[mlost of the whistleblowers whom I know

8

about did not even know about whistleblower protec-
tion laws, did not even know about false claims laws
until they go into it.” 155 Cong. Rec. $4412 (daily ed.
Apr. 20, 2009). And indeed, studies had found “no evi-
dence” that the financial incentives of the False Claims
Act discourage internal whistleblowing. Thomas L.
Carson et al., Whistle-Blowing for Profit: An Ethical
Analysis of the False Claims Act, 77 J. Bus. Ethics 361,
367 (2008).

Reports to and testimony before Congress empha-
sized that whistleblowers raised concerns internally
at their peril. For example, a 2004 Cong. Research
Serv. report described the difficulties of pointing out
suspected wrongdoing in a corporate setting and iden-
tified the types of retaliation that whistleblowers
suffered. See Mark Jickling, Cong. Research Serv.,
RL32718, Barriers to Corporate Fraud: How They
Work, Why They Fail 31 (2004). In hearings before the
110th Congress, a False Claims Act whistleblower
described her termination for raising concerns inter-
nally and urged Congress to adopt “comprehensive
retaliation protections.” The False Claims Act Correc-
tion Act (S. 2041): Sirengthening the Government’s
Most Effective Tool Against Fraud for the 21st Century,
Hearing on S. 2041, The False Claims Act Correction
Act Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th
Cong. 19-21 (2008) (statement of Tina M. Gonter). The
111th Congress also heard that entire industries
can retaliate against whistleblowers. See Markopolos
Testimony at 15, 38-39, 42 (whistleblowers blacklisted
from the financial services industry for speaking up).

9

Social science supported this testimony. A study
pre-dating Dodd-Frank noted that in “circumstances
where an organization is dependent upon the continu-
ation of the wrongdoing or when they are not depend-
ent upon the whistleblower ... the organization is
more likely to retaliate against the whistleblower and
continue the wrongdoing.” Jessica R. Mesmer-Magnus,
et al., Whistleblowing in Organizations: An Examina-
tion of Correlates of Whistleblowing Intentions, Actions,
& Retaliation, 62 J. Bus. Ethics 277, 281 (2005). That
same study also found that whistleblowers who report
significant and/or frequent wrongdoing face greater
risks of retaliation. Jd. at 292. Retaliation against
internal whistleblowers is swift, and often occurs
immediately after they report internally. See Terry
Morehead Dworkin et al., Internal vs. External Whis-
tleblowers: A Comparison of Whistleblowing Processes,
17 J. Bus. Ethics 1281, 1296 (1998).

Congress had known about these threats to whis-
tleblowers for decades, and had historically legislated
to protect against them. In hearings before the 110th
Congress, Representative Linda Sanchez noted that
Congress added anti-retaliation provisions to the False
Claims Act in 1986 after “witnesses testified that they
didn’t blow the whistle on fraud because there was no
anti-retaliation protection.” The False Claims Act Cor-
rection Act of 2007: Joint Hearing on H.R. 4854 Before
the Subcomm. on Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual
Prop. and the Subcomm. on Commercial and Admin.
Law of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. 124
(2008).

10

II. Congress enacted the Dodd-Frank whistle-
blower provisions to curb fraud and protect
investors by encouraging both internal re-
porting and reporting to the government
through interrelated incentives and protec-

tions.

In Dodd-Frank, Congress addressed each of the
hurdles facing whistleblowers through comprehensive
legislation with provisions that work in tandem to bet-
ter protect investors by incentivizing and protecting
whistleblowers.

Congress recognized that Sarbanes-Oxley pre-
sented an unattractive risk-benefit ratio to financial
services whistleblowers and sought to address this fail-
ure with Section 78u-6. Before Dodd-Frank, whistle-
blowers had no financial incentive to come forward
to the Commission. Although some whistleblowers
had contacted the government anyway, Congress was
aware that many who knew of the conduct that precip-
itated the financial crisis had not. Section 78u-6 made
reporting to the government more appealing by offer-
ing whistleblowers ten to thirty percent of any Com-
mission recovery over one million dollars that resulted
from their information. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(b)(1). To ad-
dress whistleblowers’ concern that the Commission
would ignore their information, Congress mandated
that the Commission create an Office of the Whistle-
blower to administer Section 78u-6. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-
7(d).

11

In response to the financial service industry's
blacklisting of whistleblowers, Congress enacted two
confidentiality provisions to protect their identities.
First, Section 78u-6 provides that whistleblowers may
submit information to the Commission anonymously.
15 US.C. § 78u-6(d)(2A). Second, it prohibits the
Commission from “disclos{ing] any information, in-
cluding information provided by a whistleblower to the
Commission, which could reasonably be expected to re-
veal the identity of a whistleblower” absent excep-
tional circumstances. Jd. § 78u-6(h)\(2)(A).?

Finally, Congress adopted a provision that pro-
tects whistleblowers in the circumstances in which
they typically face retaliation. Section 78u-6 provides
that:

No employer may discharge, demote, suspend,
threaten, harass, directly or indirectly, or in
any other manner discriminate against, a
whistleblower in the terms and conditions of
employment because of any lawful act done by
the whistleblower—

(i) in providing information to the Com-
mission in accordance with this section;

(ii) in initiating, testifying in, or assist-
ing in any investigation or judicial or ad-
ministrative action of the Commission

2 Although whistleblowers must reveal their identities to the
Commission before payment of an award, this has no bearing on
the Commission’s obligation to kee» confidential any information
that might identify the whistleblower. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(d)(2)(B).

12

based upon or related to such infor-
mation; or

(iii) in making disclosures that are re-
quired or protected under the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act of 2002 (15 U.S.C. 7201 et seq.),
this chapter, including section 78j-1(m) of
this title, section 1513(e) of Title 18, and
any other law, rule, or regulation subject
to the jurisdiction of the Commission.

Id. § 78u-6(h)(1)(A). Subdivision (iii) references Sar-
banes-Oxley, which addresses internal reporting, see
18 U.S.C. § 1514A(aX1\(C), and Section 1513(e), which
addresses assistance to the government not reached by
Subdivision (ii), see 18 U.S.C. § 1513(e). The remaining
references serve as a catchall to address other required
and protected reports.

Ill. Both industry and the Commission un-
derstood the anti-retaliation provision to
protect internal reporting regardless of
whether an individual also reported to the

Commission.

Upon Dodd-Frank’s enactment, both industry ac-
tors and the Commission agreed that Section 78u-6’s
anti-retaliation provisions protected whistleblowers
who reported internally regardless of whether they
reported to the Commission. In a Commission rulemak-
ing for the statute’s implementing regulations, regu-
lated entities and their legal representatives argued
that the Commission should require internal reporting
as a condition for receiving awards. They claimed that

13

mandatory internal reporting supported internal com-
pliance programs without undermining whistleblower
protections because whistleblowers were protected
against retaliation under Section 78u-6:

e “(An internal reporting] requirement
would not significantly disadvantage
valid whistleblowers because of .. . safe-
guards against retaliation for internal re-
porting contained in the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act and the whistleblower provisions [of
Dodd-Frank]. . . .” Comment Letter from
Davis Polk & Wardwell LLP to Secretary
Murphy (Dec. 17, 2010), https://Awww.sec.
gov/comments/s7-33-10/s73310-200. pdf.

* “We recognize the valid concern that
some employees will fear retaliation for
blowing the whistle. The solution to that
problem is not, however, a scheme to un-
dermine important and effective internal
compliance and reporting systems; ra-
ther, employees who fear retaliation may
rely on the anti-retaliation provision con-
temporaneously enacted by Congress.”
Comment Letter from Association of Cor-
porate Counsel to Secretary Murphy (Dec.
15, 2010), https://www.sec.gov/comments/
s7-33-10/s73310-126.pdf;

e “An internal reporting requirement is
unlikely to have a negative effect on the
proposed rules, as companies would be
given a more immediate opportunity to
cure or mitigate potential violations and

14

the whistleblower would remain pro-
tected by the anti-retaliation provisions
in the Dodd-Frank Act.” Comment Letter
from Thompson Hine LLP to Secretary
Murphy (Dec. 3, 2010), https://Awww.sec.
gov/comments/s7-33-10/s73310-26.pdf.

The Commission’s final rule—Rule 21F-2—also re-
flects the view that the statute’s anti-retaliation pro-
visions protect internal reporting. See 17 C.FR.
§ 240.21F-2(b).

Ironically, industry's main argument that the
Commission should require internal reporting was
that whistleblowers would otherwise bypass internal
compliance and go straight to the Commission to ob-
tain an award. See, eg., Comment Letter from US.
Chamber of Commerce and U.S. Chamber Institute for
Legal Reform to Secretary Murphy (Dec. 17, 2010),
https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-33-10/s73310-194.pdf
(“Businesses have a strong self-interest in detecting
and eliminating illegal conduct within their organiza-
tions. ... For these reasons, large numbers of compa-
nies have implemented strong internal reporting
systems to obtain information about potential wrong-
doing. .. . And we have no objection to the establish-
ment of a reasonable whistleblower program that
allows individuals to bring actionable information to
the attention of the SEC when the company itself is
unwilling or unable to engage in effective self-polic-
ing.”). Exactly this result, however, would follow from
Petitioner’s reading of the statute—that employees

15

must report to the Commission to benefit from the
anti-retaliation protections of Dodd-Frank.

The Commission agreed that Congress did not in-
tend Dodd-Frank to undermine internal reporting and
subsequently promulgated several regulations to en-
courage, but not require, whistleblowers to report in-
ternally before coming to the Commission. E.g., 17
C.F.R. § 240.21F-6(a)(4) (increasing award for whistle-
blowers who first report internally).

IV. The contemporaneous understanding of
the anti-retaliation provision is consistent
with the statute’s text, structure, and the
underlying congressional policy.

A. The term “whistleblower” can have dif-
ferent meanings within the statute even
if the statute defines the term.

The Commission’s regulation applies a context-
appropriate definition of “whistleblower” for the anti-
retaliation provision in Section 78u-6. This Court has
endorsed such an approach when—as here—it best ef-
fectuates Congress’s intent.

Context often forces identical words and phrases
to take different meanings within the same statute,
even when that statute defines them. Although the de-
fault presumption is that a given term has the same
meaning throughout a single statute, e.g., Envtl. Def.
v. Duke Energy Corp., 549 U.S. 561, 574 (2007), this pre-
sumption “readily yields” to context, as a single term
may take on different meanings “in the same statute
or even in the same section,” Atl. Cleaners & Dyers v.

16

United States, 286 U.S. 427, 433 (1932). And when the
meaning of a term derived from statutory context
clashes with its statutory definition, the contextual
meaning takes precedence. E.g., Robinson v. Shell Oil
Co., 519 U.S. 337, 343-44 (1997).

For example, despite the statutory definition of
“employee” in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, that
term takes on different meanings in the Act’s substan-
tive provisions when those provisions are inconsistent
with the definition. Rod.nson, 519 U.S. at 342-43. Title
VII defines “employee” as “‘an individual employed by
an employer,’” a definition that appears to cover only
current employees. Jd. at 342 (quoting 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e(f)). The statute’s substantive provisions, how-
ever, extend protections to “employees” who fall outside
that definition. Title VII provides for the reinstate-
ment and hiring of “employees,” which are remedies
applicable only to former and prospective employees,
respectively. Jd.; see also id. at 343 n.3 (“employee”
plainly covers prospective employees elsewhere in Ti-
tle VII). The Court interpreted “employee” to have
meanings different from the statutory definition as
context required. Id. at 343-44.

Likewise, the Clean Air Act broadly defines “air
pollutant” as “‘any physical, chemical, biological, [or]
radioactive ... substance or matter which is emitted
into or otherwise enters the ambient air.’” Utility Air
Regulatory Group v. EPA, 134 S. Ct. 2427, 2439 (2014)
(quoting 42 U.S.C. § 7602(g)). But the statute would be-
come impossible to administer if each provision that
employed that term regulated every “air pollutant” as

17

the definition suggests. Id. at 2444. The Court held
that the EPA’s implementing regulations must adopt
different, context-specific definitions for “air pollutant”
to give effect to the whole statute. Jd. at 2442; see also
id. at 2452 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissent-
ing in part).

1. The term “whistleblower” must take
a different meaning in the anti-
retaliation provision than it does in
the reward provision to give full ef-
fect to the statute’s protections for
whistleblowers.

Although Section 78u-6 defines the term “whistle-
blower,” applying that definition to the anti-retaliation
provision precludes the statute’s protective provisions
from operating in tandem, producing results that
Congress could not have intended. The term “whistle-
blower” must take context-specific meanings through-
out Section 78u-6 to give full effect to the statute’s

substantive provisions.

€uction 78u-6 defines “whistleblower” as “any in-
dividual who provides, or 2 or more individuals acting
jointly who provide, information relating to a violation
of the securities laws to the Commission, in a manner
established, by rule or regulation, by the Commission.”
15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(a)(6). Petitioner mechanically applies
this definition to the anti-retaliation provision, argu-
ing that it prohibits employers from retaliating against
an employee who has reported internally only if that
employee has reported to the Commission. But the

18

other whistleblower protection provisions in Section
78u-6 reveal the need for context-appropriate defini-
tions.

Petitioner’s reading of the statute denies its confi-
dentiality benefits to internal whistleblowers who also
report to the Commission. The statute provides that
whistleblowers may submit information and award
claims to the Commission anonymously. 15 U.S.C.
§ 78u-6(d)(2)(A). It also prohibits the Commission from
“disclos[ing] any information, including information
provided by a whistleblower to the Commission, which
could reasonably be expected to reveal the identity of
a whistleblower” absent exceptional circumstances. /d.
§ 78u-6(h)(2)(A). Applying the statutory definition of
“whistleblower” to the anti-retaliation provision is in-
compatible with these confidentiality provisions: whis-
tleblowers entitled to both types of protections would
be forced to choose between them.

Consider an individual who makes an internal
report protected by Sarbanes-Oxley, later submits in-
formation anonymously to the Commission, and subse-
quently suffers retaliation for the internal report.
Under Petitioner’s reading, the statute protects her
from retaliation: she is a “whistleblower” who reported
to the Commission, and also reported internally. To
plead her anti-retaliation claim, however, she would
have to plead that she qualified as a “whistleblower”
under the statutory definition: i.e., that she submitted
information to the Commission. This would force her
to sacrifice one statutory protection—anonymity in
reporting to the Commission—to secure another—

19

anti-retaliation remedies.’ Moreover, under this read-
ing the confidentiality protections are rendered inco-
herent: she would be required to reveal herself as a
Commission whistleblower, while the Commission
would still be required to keep that information confi-

dential.

If a statute’s provisions cannot operate in tandem
when a term takes a single meaning, that single mean-
ing yields to a multiplicity of meanings determined by
context, even if the term is defined by the statute. Util-
ity Air, 134 S. Ct. at 2444; Robinson, 519 U.S. at 343-
44. Applying the statutory definition of “whistle-
blower” throughout Section 78u-6 creates precisely
this problem: statutory provisions designed to comple-
ment each other instead conflict, with the activation of
one rendering the other inoperative. Resolving this
tension requires “whistleblower” to take distinct mean-
ings, derived from context, as Rule 21F-2 does.

2. The statute’s design also supports
context-specific definitions.

Section 78u-6’s two distinct policies—incentives
and protection—work in tandem to encourage finan-
cial industry whistleblowers. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6. Apply-
ing context-specific definitions to those provisions
serves these distinct policies.

§ Anti-retaliation claims filed under subdivisions (i) and (ii)
do not present this problem: a whistleblower filing such a claim
has by definition been identified—at least by her employer—as
having contacted the Commission.

20

When Congress wanted only those whistleblowers
who reported to the Commission to benefit from a pol-
icy, it said so in the text of the provision effecting that
policy. The statute’s incentive pivvision mandates
awards for “whistleblowers who voluntarily provided
original information to the Commission that led” to a
successful enforcement action. Jd. § 78u-6(b)(1). Re-
quiring a report to the Commission makes this provi-
sion administrable: to reward a whistleblower for
useful, timely information, the Commission must be
able to trace that information to a whistleblower.

By contrast, the substantive provision protecting
whistleblowers who report internally contains no lan-
guage requiring a report to the Commission, id. § 78u-
6(h)(1)(A)(iii), nor would such a requirement have
anything to do with the goals of Subdivision (iii). Re-
porting to the Commission does not serve any purpose
related to protecting whistleblowers from retaliation.
And reading Subdivision (iii) to require reports to the
Commission—as Petitioner advocates—yields absurd
consequences. On Petitioner’s reading, Subdivision (iii)
protects internal whistleblowers who have also re-
ported to the Commission, but its text requires no
connection whatsoever between the report to the Com-
mission and the internal report. Jd.‘ A whistleblower

* Congress plainly knew how to require such a connection:
the immediately preceding subdivision protects whistleblowers
who assist Commission investigations only when those investiga-
tions are “based upon or related to” information the whistleblower
provides to the Commission. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(h)(1 (Ai).

21

could thus report a suspected violation to the Commis-
sion one week, internally report a completely unre-
lated violation the week after, and be entitled to the
anti-retaliation protections of Dodd-Frank for the in-
ternal report only because of the unrelated earlier re-
port to the Commission. There is no reason that
reporting an unrelated violation to the Commission
should make the internal report protected by Dodd-
Frank’s anti-retaliation protections.°

While the statutory definition of “whistleblower”
suggests that reporting to the Commission is a condi-
tion of applying Dodd-Frank’s retaliation protections,
applying this definition to the anti-retaliation provi-
sion furthers no aim apparent from the statute and
produces absurd results. When context-specific defini-
tions better advance a statute’s regulatory design than
statutory definitions, the context-specific definitions
control, Utility Air, 134 8. Ct. at 2440.

5 Petitioner’s fear that, if the statutory definition does not
apply, Subdivision (iii) would protect whistleblowers whose inter-
nal reports have nothing to do with the securities laws, see Br. 38,
is unfounded. First, Rule 21F-2 protects from retaliation only
those internal whistleblowers whose information “relates to a pos-
sible securities law violation” or a violation of Sarbanes-Oxley. See
17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-2(b\1)(i). Second, the context of a statute
imposes .easonable restraints on potentially overbroad language.
See Yates v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1074, 1082 (2015) (given
context in which term appears, “tangible object” cannot include
fish).

22

B. Applying Dodd-Frank’s anti-retaliation
protections to persons who report in-
ternally furthers Congress’s purpose in
ensuring that information about poten-
tial fraud is reported.

The Commission’s rule follows a well-worn path:
“In law as in life .. . the same words, placed in differ-
ent contexts, sometimes mean different things.” Yates,
135 S. Ct. at 1082. Rule 21F-2 accordingly applies
context-specific definitions to effectuate Congress’s
purpose for Section 78u-6: expanding whistleblower
protections so that companies and the government can
more quickly address problems affecting investors and
the markets. “From a legal, administrative, and func-
tional perspective—that is, from a perspective that as-
sumes that Congress was not merely trying to arrange
words on paper but was seeking to achieve a real-world
purpose—|this] way of reading the statute is the more
sensible one.” Utility Air, 134 S. Ct. at 2453 (Breyer, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).

With its context-specific definitions, the Commis-
sion’s rule gives effect to each provision of Section
78u-6. Rule 21F-2 distinguishes between two types of
whistleblowers: those who seek awards and those who
seek anti-retaliation remedies. Following the text of
the corresponding substantive provision, the rule per-
mits only those individuals who submit information to
the Commission to apply for an award. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-
6(b)(1); 17 C.LF-R. § 240.21F-2(a). Likewise, the rule ex-
tends anti-retaliation protections to any individual
who has reported a possible violation of the securities

23

laws to the Commission or internally. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-
6(h)(1)(A)Gii); 17 C.FLR. § 240.21F-2(b).

Rule 21F-2 completely resolves the tension be-
tween the substantive provisions of Section 78u-6.
Consider again the case of an individual who reports
internally, then reports anonymously to the Commis-
sion, and is then fired for her internal report. Under
the Commission’s regulation, she receives each benefit
Congress enacted: she may file an anti-retaliation
claim under Dodd-Frank without having to plead her
contact with the Commission to establish eligibility as
a “whistleblower.” She thus remains anonymous to the
public as a Commission whistleblower, and the Com-
mission’s obligation to keep confidential information
that might identify her is not rendered incoherent.

Rule 21F-2 also recognizes that Congress enacted
Dodd-F rank as a response to crises in the financial ser-
vices industry that whistleblowers had sought to pre-
vent. See Atl. Cleaners, 286 U.S. at 435 (historical
context of statutes informs their interpretation). In the
wake of these crises, Congress intended to prevent fu-
ture violations of the securities laws by enhancing
protections for all whistleblowers—the bulk of whom
report internally—who warn of such violations. Ex-
empting the majority of whistleblowers from these pro-
tections would undermine Congress’s intent.

24

C. Petitioner’s reading of the statute would
frustrate Congress’s purpose by render-
ing it less likely that whistleblowers will
report misconduct.

Petitioner’s reading of Section 78u-6 is flatly at
odds with Congress’s purpose in enacting Dodd-Frank.
Congress was aware that nearly all whistleblowers re-
port internally, and that extending protections to those
whistleblowers would enhance compliance with se-
curities laws and better protect investors. See pp. 7-9,
supra. And whistleblowers continue to report inter-
nally: in the wake of Dodd-Frank, ninety-seven percent
of whistleblowers first reported internally, and eighty-
nine percent escalated first reports internally. Ethics
Res. Ctr., Inside the Mind of a Whistleblower: A Supple-
mental Report of the 2011 National Business Ethics
Survey 13 (2012). Yet under Petitioner’s reading of the
statute, Dodd-Frank’s anti-retaliation provision does
not cover internal whistleblowers—by far the largest
group—uniess they report to the Commission before
their employer retaliates against them. This frustrates
the goals of a statute designed to encourage and pro-
tect whistleblowers.

In addition, Petitioner’s reading of the statute
makes the confidentiality protections illusory for indi-
viduals seeking anti-retaliation remedies. Half of all
award recipients eligible to report anonymously do so,
and all whistleblowers enjoy the statute’s confidential-
ity protections. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, 2016 Annual Re-
port to Congress on the Dodd-Frank Whistleblower

25

Program 18 (2016).* On Petitioner’s reading, whistle-
blowers fired for reporting internally could not pursue
Dodd-Frank’s anti-retaliation remedies without com-
promising these confidentiality provisions.

Moreover, Petitioner’s reading would produce the
very result that industry urged the Commission to
avoid: undermining internal compliance regimes. The
vast majority of whistleblowers who eventually contact
the Commission first report internally. Sec. & Exch.
Comm’n, 2016 Annual Report to Congress on the Dodd-
Frank Whistleblower Program 18. Yet Petitioner’s
reading of the statute would encourage whistleblowers
to bypass compliance and go straight to the Com-
mission in order to receive the benefit of the anti-
retaliation provision.

Finally, Petitioner’s reading does not serve the
statute’s policies: incentivizing and protecting whistle-
blowers to better protect investors. Applying Dodd-
Frank’s protections to whistleblowers simply looking
to flag and fix misconduct within their organizations
gives them the same robust protections as those who
report to the Commission, making retaliation less
likely. Protecting internal whistleblowers also pre-
serves scarce government resources, allowing the Com-
mission to focus its attention on corporations that fail
to adequately self-regulate. And corporations keep
their chance to correct issues internally, benefitting

® Only whistleblowers represented by counsel at the time of
their submission may report to the Commission anonymously. 15
U.S.C. § 78u-6(d)(2A).

26

their shareholders by avoiding the unwanted expense
and attention of a Commission investigation.

Achieving these benefits requires only the appli-
cation of a long-followed, unexceptional principle: “In
expounding a statute, we must not be guided by a sin-
gle sentence or member of a sentence, but look to the
provisions of the whole law, and to its object and pol-
icy.” United States v. Heirs of Boisdoré, 49 U.S. (8 How.)
113, 122 (1850), quoted in Star Athletica L.L.C. v. Var-
sity Brands, Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1002, 1010 (2017). This
statute’s “object and policy” is protecting investors by
encouraging all whistleblowers, and that should guide
its interpretation.

27

CONCLUSION

The judgment of the court of appeals should be
affirmed.

Respectfully submitted,
JACKLYN DEMAR CLAIRE M. SYLVIA
TAXPAYERS AGAINST FRAUD Counsel of Record
EDUCATION FUND ALEXANDER WESTERFIELD
1220 19th St., N.W., PHILLIPS & COHEN LLP
Suite 501 100 The Embarcadero,
Washington, DC 20036 Suite 300
(202) 296-4826 San Francisco, CA 94105
(415) 836-9000
csylvia@phillipsandcohen.com
SEAN X. MCKESSY
DAVID JOCHNOWITZ
JOHN W. TREMBLAY
PHILLIPS & COHEN LLP

Counsel for Amicus Curiae

October 17, 2017

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385016_0745%3A21. Public record. Not legal advice.
