# Supplemental Brief — Va. Uranium, Inc. v. Warren, 138 S. Ct. 293 (2017) (No. 16-1275)

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Supplemental Brief
- **Published:** January 1, 2017

## Text

No. 16-1275

Ju the
Supreme Court of the Anited States

»
nl

VIRGINIA URANIUM, INC., et al.,
Petitioners,
.

JOHN WARREN, et al.,
Respondents.

ee
a

On Petition For A Writ Of Certiorari

To The United States Court Of Appeals
For The Fourth Circuit

MARK R. HERRING Topsy J. HEYTENS
Attorney General Solicitor General!
AC Counsel of Record
Deputy Attorney General MATTHEW R. MCGUIRE
PAUL KUGELMAN Deputy
Senior Assistant OFFICE OF THE VIRGINIA
Attorney Genera! Hye yo
202 North Street
J eee Richmond, VA 23219
Attorney (804) 786-7240
General solicitorgeneral@vag state.va_us
April 23, 2018

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page
pF Be i
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES .......................-.2--000+ ii
ET chertiriinsteieitnninttiensenscnonnesdniniinuetnimenss 4
A 4

B. This case is a poor vehicle for addressing
preemption under the AEA ....................... 6

C. This case raises no issue of general or ur-
I I ccscenscsssnscsnenesseesnsssecessesees 11
ELE ae ee 13

ii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Page

CASES
Ashcroft v. Iqbal,

Le ee 6
Bond v. United States,

EEE EE EET a een a a 10
Cooper v. Harris,

TT Aaa aT 8
Easley v. Cromartie,

I intra et erene en einitanmmieiaininel i)
English v. General Elec. Co.,

ee a 5
Entergy Nuclear Vt. Yankee, LLC v. Shumilin,

733 F.3d BOS (Bd Cir. 2O1B) .............ccccccccccccecerereeeeeees 4
Hartman v. Moore,

| 9
Massachusetts v. United States,

EE Ee 7
Nordlinger v. Hahn,

EE eee 9
Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Res.

Conservation & Dev. Comm’n,

461 U.S. 190 (1983) ...............00c0cccccceee 3, 4, 5, 8,9, 11
Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp..,

464 US. ee 5

Skull Valley Band of Goshute Indians v. Nielson,
376 F.3d 1223 (10th Cir. 2004),
cert. denied, 546 U.S. 1060 (2005) ............................ 4

iii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES — Continued

Page

U.S. Bank NA. v. Vill. at Lakeridge, LLC,

No. 15-1509 (Mar. 5, 2018) ..............22.cccccccceeeeeeeeeneee 10
Wyeth v. Levine,

| ITT EE LOT a Em 8
STATUTES
Atomic Energy Act (AEA)

a rcenicnnssnicsseninrenninntiiniiatonsl 1

iii niitinertastebecnsenianiinnidemamiidiibiaéatd 5

ee i rceencitiriinninaresenincsamcnsasiisadinttinaiiiniimmaans 12
RULES

Be Es i i enecnnsmneetanpnensncensoennsnnsenssmsctasctansnememscumenetl 6

l

IN THE
SUPREME COURT
OF THE UNITED STATES

VIRGINIA URANIUM, INC., ET AL.,
PETITIONERS,

Vv.

JOHN WARREN, ET AL.,
RESPONDENTS.

SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF FOR RESPONDENTS

The federal government argues that a 36-year-old
Virginia policy that went unchallenged for 33 years
might (or might not) be preempted by a federal statute
that has been on the books for 54 years based on a con-
struction of that statute given in a 35-year-old decision
of this Court—a decision that, like all decisions of this
Court interpreting that same federal statute, held that
it did not preempt the allegedly usurped state law.

To be clear: This case does not involve whether the
Commonwealth of Virginia may impose a moratorium
on conventional uranium mining. The federal govern-
ment acknowledges that it does not, has never, and in-
deed cannot regulate such mining. U.S. Br. 3, 13, 23.
The federal government also admits that, notwith-
standing the Atomic Energy Act (AEA), 42 U.S.C.
§§ 2011 et seq., States may regulate uranium mining,
including by banning it altogether. U.S. Br. 18. Indeed,

2

the government even agrees that States may ban con-
ventional uranium mining based on concerns about the
safety of the mining process itself. See U.S. Br. 16
(“State regulation of conventional uranium mining is
permissible if that regulation is grounded on concerns
about mining itself, which is not subject to NRC regu-
lation.”); accord U.S. Br. 12-13, 18.

But even though States have plenary power over
conventional uranium mining, the federal government
argues that both lower courts erred—and the case
should move forward—based on petitioners’ allega-
tions about the Virginia legislature’s motives and a
concession we have never made. As for the former, the
government asserts that petitioners “have adequately
alleged that ... the Commonwealth has banned ura-
nium mining not because of concerns about mining
per se, but because of fears about radiological hazards
associated with the next steps of the uranium-
development process, which NRC regulates under the
AEA.” U.S. Br. 12. The government also suggests we
“have conceded that, for purposes of [our] motion to
dismiss,” U.S. Br. 23, the courts should take as true pe-
titioners’ allegations that Virginia’s moratorium was
motivated “solely” by radiological safety concerns asso-
ciated with milling and tailings. U.S. Br. 22. As a result,
says the government, this Court “need not decide what
evidence would be necessary or sufficient to prove
those allegations” were the case to proceed beyond the
motion-to-dismiss stage. U.S. Br. 23.

These arguments illustrate the weakness of the
government’s position and the untenable situation it

3

would create for States. They also highlight why this is
a poor case for addressing the preemptive scope of the
AEA. As this Court has explained in evaluating that
very same statute, “inquiry into legislative motive’—
itself always a potentially “unsatisfactory venture”—
can be “particularly pointless” where (as here) there
are no doubts about a State’s ability to achieve a par-
ticular result and the only question is whether the
State has relied on a proper justification for doing so.
Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Res. Conserva-
tion & Dev. Comm’n, 461 U.S. 190, 216 (1983) (Pacific
Gas). The problems will only be compounded if claims
about what motivated a particular State’s legislature
to enact (or fail to repeal) a longstanding state policy
are treated as allegations of fact that must be pre-
sumed true for purposes of a motion to dismiss. And
the problems will only multiply if the list of state poli-
cies open to challenge is expanded to include not only
those touching on matters regulated by the federal
government but also state policies regulating activities
that are, themselves, “subject to state rather than fed-
eral regulation.” U.S. Br. 23.

Fortunately, there is no need for the Court to wade
into those matters because there is no need for the
Court to take this case. Both lower courts agreed about
the proper outcome here, and their decisions upho.ding
Virginia’s three-decade-old moratorium on uranium
mining do not conflict with either the decisions of this
Court or another court of appeals. Nor does this peti-
tion for a writ of certiorari raise any issue of general
importance. Despite vague expressions of concerns, see

4

U.S. Br. 22, the government identifies no tangible
harms caused by Virginia’s moratorium and no actual
projects or activities that would be impeded were this
Court simply to leave undisturbed the status quo that
has prevailed since 1982. In short, “it is for Congress
to rethink the division of regulatory authority in light
of its possible exercise by the States to undercut a fed-
eral objective” and “[t]he courts should not assume the
role which our system assigns to Congress.” Pacific
Gas, 461 US. at 223.

ARGUMENT
A. There is no conflict

The government suggests that the lower courts’
resolution of this case conflicts with three others: this
Court’s decision in Pacific Gas; the Tenth Circuit’s de-
cision in Skull Valley;' and the Second Circuit’s deci-
sion in Entergy.” U.S. Br. 19-21. But those cases are all
distinguishable for the same basic reason: each arose
directly out of activities that are themselves identified
in the text of the AEA for regulation by the federal gov-
ernment. Pacific Gas involved the construction of new
nuclear power plants. Skull Valley involved storage fa-
cilities for spent nuclear fuel. And Entergy involved
rules governing existing nuclear power plants. This

* Skull Valley Band of Goshute Indians v. Nielson, 376 F.3d
1223 (10th Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 1060 (2005).

* Entergy Nuclear Vt. Yankee, LLC v. Shumlin, 733 F.3d 393
(2d Cir. 2013).

5

case, in contrast, involves conventional uranium min-
ing—an entire category of activity that the federal gov-
ernment acknowledges remains “subject to state
control.” U.S. Br. 9; accord U.S. Br. 13, 16.

That distinction matters for reasons that are both
textual and intensely practical. Textual because the
clearest statutory basis for preemption based on the
underlying “purpose” of a state regulation—42 U.S.C.
§ 2021(k)—is part of a broader provision whose entire
function is to expand state regulatory authority by per-
mitting States to regulate in areas that otherwise
would be under exclusive federal control. Practical be-
cause all of the difficulties with—and disruptions
threatened by—judicial inquiries into legislative mo-
tive would only be compounded by expanding their
scope to include state regulation of “antecedent ac-
tivitlies]” (U.S. Br. 9) not otherwise under federal con-
trol. See infra Part B.

The claimed conflict with Pacific Gas also fails for
another reason. Like the decision below—and like the
two other decisions of this Court that followed it—Pa-
cific Gas rejected a preemption claim and upheld the
challenged state laws. 461 U.S. at 216; accord English
v. General Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 90 (1990); Silkwood v.
Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 258 (1984). It is at
least arguable that some of the language in Pacific Gas
was “unnecessary to the Court’s holding” and thus “dic-
tum.” Pacific Gas, 461 U.S. at 223-24 (Blackmun, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
But regardless of how that question is answered, the
fact remains that this Court has never invalidated a

6

state law based on the preemption theory urged here.
For that reason, too, there is no “conflict| |” between the
decision below and the “relevant decisions of this
Court.” S. Ct. R. 10(c).

B. This case is a poor vehicle for addressing
preemption under the AEA

The government further errs in contending that
“|t]his case presents a suitable vehicle to address the
question presented.” U.S. Br. 23. The linchpin of the
government’s vehicle analysis is its assertion that we
“have conceded . . . for purposes of [our] motion to dis-
miss [that] the courts should take as true petitioners’
allegation that the Virginia moratorium was moti-
vated by radiological-safety concerns.” U.S. Br. 23.

1. Because the point may prove critical were this
Court to grant review, it is important to be clear about
what we have and have not “conceded.” Like any party
who moves to dismiss for failure to state a claim, we
“take all of the factual allegations in the complaint as
true.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). In var-
ious filings in this case, we also have assumed that “one
of the purposes behind enacting [the moratorium] was
to address potential radiological safety concerns.”
Resp’t Mem. in Supp. of Mot. to Dismiss 15 (emphasis
added; footnotes omitted).

That said, we have never conceded that legislative
purpose is purely a question of fact (historical or oth-
erwise). Nor have we conceded, even for purposes of
the underlying motion to dismiss, that the Virginia

7

legislature’s sole purpose in imposing a moratorium on
conventional uranium mining was based on radiologi-
cal safety concerns associated with uranium milling
and tailings. See, e.g., Reply in Supp. of Mot. to Dismiss
& Resp. to Cross-Mot. for Summ. J. 8 n.9 (noting that
“much of the evidence highlighted by the [petitioners]
speaks not to radiation or radiological issues, but gen-
eral concerns about health, safety and welfare”).*

2. The government is similarly wrong in assur-
ing the Court that it could simply assume that Vir-
ginia’s law was wholly motivated by an allegedly
improper purpose, while leaving for another day all
thorny questions about “what evidence would be nec-
essary or sufficient” to prove such allegations. U.S. Br.

* The Fourth Circuit identified no basis for saying we “con-
cede|d|” that the Commonwealth “lacks a non-safety rationale for
banning uranium mining.” Pet. App. 10a. Such a concession would
be irrelevant in any event because the federal government
acknowledges that Virginia may ban uranium mining based on
safety concerns—even radiological safety concerns—so long as
those concerns are grounded in the safety of the mining process
rather than milling and tailings. See U.S. Br. 16.

As Judge Traxler noted in dissent, a footnote in our court of
appeals’ brief states—in response to a claim about what would
happen if this case reached the summary judgment stage—that
we have “conceded the truth of |petitioners’] claims about legislu-
tive motive only for purposes of their Rule 12(b\6) motion.” Resp.
C.A. Br. 15 1.58 (cited in Pet. App. 29a n.9). Even if this statement
could reasonably be construed as broader than others we have
made about how Rule 12 operates —and it should not—this Court
is not bound by “concessions” involving the proper operation of
Rule 12(bX6). See, e.g., Massachusetts v. United States, 333 U.S.
611, 624 n.23 (1948) (explaining that this Court is “not bound to
accept [a legal concession] as either sound or conclusive of the lit-
igation. It is not, even in terms, a confession of error.”).

8

23. For one thing, as explained above, respondents vig-
orously challenge the assumption that provides the
predicate for those assurances.

But the government’s assurances also are wrong
because they attempt to skate over several difficult
questions about how analysis of legislative purpose
works in this context. For now, consider just two:

In this context, is legislative “purpose” a question
of fact, a question of law, or a mixed question? In Wyeth
v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555 (2009), for example, this Court
analyzed Congress’s purpose in a preemption case
without giving any deference to (or even referencing)
any trial court findings. Jd. at 566-68, 573-81. In the
voting rights context, however, this Court has treated
legislative intent in drawing electoral districts as a fac-
tual question that is reviewed for clear error, and, as a
result, state legislators often are deposed and forced to
testify. See, e.g., Cooper v. Harris, 137 S. Ct. 1455, 1466,
1473-75 (2017). The gover~-ment’s brief simply as-
sumes that this context fs 4 into the question-of-fact
bucket. But none of this Court’s previous decisions
clearly answers that question.‘

* The government errs in describing Pacific Gas as “deferring
to lower court’s factual assessments” of the purpose of the chal-
lenged state law. U.S. Br. 15 (emphasis added). What this Court
actually said was that its “general practice is to place considerable
confidence in the interpretations of state law reached by the fed-
eral courts of appeals.” Pacific Gas, 461 U.S. at 214 (emphasis
added). Courts of appeals, of course, have no power to make fac-
tual findings.

9

Or take another question: What is the required re-
lationship between an allegedly invalid purpose and
any other purposes that may also have motivated the
challenged state action? Does the challenger need to
prove: (a) that the alleged improper purpose was the
but-for cause of the legislative enactment, cf. Hartman
v. Moore, 547 U.S. 250, 260 (2006); (b) that the improper
purpose predominated over other valid purposes, cf.
Easley v. Cromartie, 532 U.S. 234, 241 (2001); (c) that
there is no rational purpose for the law other than the
improper purpose, cf. Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 US. 1, 6
(1992); or (d) something else? None of the Court’s pre-
vious decisions in this area squarely address that
question—though Pacific Gas says that where (as
here) it is clear that Congress did not displace the
States’ traditional authority to reach a given outcome
(here, a moratorium on conventional uranium mining)
“it should be up to Congress to determine whether a
State has misused the authority left in its hands.” Pa-
cific Gas, 461 U.S. at 216.

In our view, the better answers are that this type
of inquiry is more akin to a legal question than a fac-
tual one and that the relevant materials show that the
Virginia legislature had a variety of concerns in mind
when enacting the moratorium. Pet. App. 178a, 182a-
88a. The government's question-of-fact position ig-
nores the profound difficulties posed by attempting to
discover facts underlying a nearly 40-year-old enact-
ment by a state legislature that maintains a paucity
of legislative history. Even more troublingly, the ques-
tion-of-fact view could create the untenable situation

10

where district courts reach different conclusions about
whether a given state law is preempted and those dif-
fering conclusions are then subject to clear-error re-
view on appeal. Cf. U.S. Bank NA. v. Vill. at Lakeridge,
LLC, No. 15-1509, slip op. at 8 (Mar. 5, 2018) (“[Wljhen
applying the law involves developing auxiliary legal
principles of use in other cases|,| appellate courts
should typically review a decision de novo.”). But re-
gardless of whether this Court agrees with our assess-
ment, those are the types of questions that would need
to be answered before petitioners could be granted any
relief.

3. It also is worth noting the breadth of the fed-
eral government’s position. In its view, a preemption
challenge to a state law regulating an activity commit-
ted entirely to the States’ control could survive a mo-
tion to dismiss as long as the plaintiff alleges an
improper legislative motive for passing an otherwise
facially valid law. Such a rule would permit virtually
any preemption challenge to advance to discovery, sub-
jecting the State and its officials to potentially intru-
sive inquiries about what motivated a state legislature
to adopt a law regulating activities that are themselves
entirely unregulated by the federal government. But
“|t}he allocation of powers in our federal system pre-
serves the integrity, dignity, and residual sovereignty
of the States,” Bond v. United States, 564 U.S. 211, 221
(2011), and the federal government offers nothing but
speculation to justify why such an intrusion in state
sovereignty is necessary. This is especially true given
that Congress retains ample authority “to rethink the

11

division of regulatory authority” if it disagrees with
Virginia’s longstanding policies about conventional
uranium mining. Pacific Gas, 461 U.S. at 223.°

C. This case raises no issue of general or ur-
gent importance

It bears repeating that Virginia’s moratorium on
conventional uranium mining has been in place since
President Reagan’s first term and went completely un-
challenged until the end of the second Obama Admin-
istration. At worst, that sort of delay could give rise to
a defense of laches or the like. But even at best, it badly
undermines any claim about the urgency of this issue.

The federal government has not identified any
pressing need for this Court’s intervention. The gov-
ernment makes no claim that the actual policy at issue
in this case—Virginia’s moratorium on conventional
uranium mining—.is, has, or can be expected to cause
any harm whatsoever to the national interest. Tell-
ingly, the government offers no support to petitioners’
overheated claims of dire harm to “our economy [and}

° As we pointed out to both courts below, Congress undertook
a substantial revision of the AEA early this century with the pas-
sage of the 2005 Energy Policy Act without disturbing the ura-
nium mining moratorium in Virginia or any other State. See, e.z.,
Resp’t Mem. in Supp. of Mot. to Dismiss 11. This too undermines
the federal government’s implicit contention that the “clear and
manifest purpose of Congress” was to displace Virginia’s exercise
of its sovereign police power. Pacific Gas, 461 U.S. at 206.

12

national security.” Compare Pet. Cert. Reply 10-12,
with US. Br. 22.°

The government vaguely suggests that the ques-
tion presented here is “likely to recur in other nuclear-
safety contexts,” U.S. Br. 9, and that “the Fourth Cir-
cuit’s analysis” might permit other States to take other
steps that might be harmful to federal interests. U.S.
Br. 22. But the government fails to identify any con-
crete state policies that have been enacted—or even
general proposals that have been made—during the 14
months since the Fourth Circuit’s decision in this case
or the 28 months since the district court’s decision.
Better to let sleeping dogs lie.

® Nor could it, given the Nuclear Regulatory Commission’s
plenary power to conduct mining operations to meet national se-
curity needs. See 42 U.S.C. § 2096.

13

CONCLUSION

The petition for a writ of certiorari should be de-
nied.

Respectfully submitted,
MARK R. HERRING Tosy J. HEYTENS
Att C , Solicitor G j
STEPHEN A. CoBB Counsel of Record
Deputy Attorney General MATTHEW R. MCGUIRE
Pan, Rucmsan Deputy Solicitor General
Senior Assistant OFFICE OF THE VIRGINIA
Attorney General ATTORNEY GENERAL
202 North Ninth Street
J. per eee ee . Richmond, VA 23219
Gane (804) 786-7240
sohicitorgeneral@vag state.va.us

No. 16-1275

In the Supreme Court of the Anited States

VIRGINIA URANIUM, INC., ET AL., PETITIONERS

v.

JOHN WARREN, ET AL.

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

BRIEF FOR THE UNITED STATES
AS AMICUS CURIAE SUPPORTING PETITIONERS

NOEL J. FRANCISCO
Solicit

General
Counsel of Record
JEFFREY H. Woop
General
MALCOLM L. STEWART
Deputy Solicitor General
ANN - t meryny on
ANDREW P. AVERBACH é = a tettor
CHARLES E. MULLINS VARU CHILAKAMARRI
JEREMY M. SUTTENBERG Attorney
Attorneys Department of Justice
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Washington, D.C. 20530-0001
Commission SupremeCtBriefs@usdoj. gov

Washington, D.C. 20555 (202) 514-2217

QUESTION PRESENTED

Whether the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (AEA),
42 U.S.C. 2011 et seg., preempts state laws that prohibit
activities within a State’s regulatory jurisdiction (here,
conventional uranium mining) when such laws are
grounded in radiological-safety concerns about related
activities that are federally regulated under the AEA
(here, the milling of uranium ore and disposal of “tail-
ings” byproduct).

(1)

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

Eehowent of the United Bieteti cccccccscccscscscessccsesesesvescessecsensscccsseneeess 1
Statement saceupenqensapuemuiannenesersatonsmmnmnes 1
A. Regulatory background. ................c.csecseeseeeeneenenes 1
BF ee il ccresccncnnsccsenssscnssecsssasensensesssencccoss 7

C. The proceedings below .............. +

Uranium will “never be wrestled completely free
from military and political exigencies.” James RK.
Wilch, Comment, GATT and the Half-Life of Urani-
um Industry Protection, 10 N.W. J. INTL L. & Bus.
150, 192 (1989). As Congress has previously ob-
served:

[T]he Government's inventories of source and
special nuclear materials represent a precious
national asset. Unlike other materials which are
perishable ... the uranium inventory represents
a vast nonperishable asset with intrinsic value in

29

units of usable energy. Wisely managed, it can
contribute to the common defense and security
and to the welfare of the Nation.”

1964 Report at 3122. In preempting the field of nu-
clear safety, Congress determined that the federal
government was best positioned to balance the need
for domestic production and development of nuclear
material against the radiological hazards attendant
to those activities. Uranium’s importance to numer-
ous national strategic interests underscores courts’
responsibility to zealously guard federal policy from
state obstruction.

Here, Virginia has enacted a blanket prohibition on
ur’ (ium mining due to concerns about the radiologi-
cal hazards of post-mining activities —activities com-
mitted exclusively to the Commission's regulatory au-
thority. To prevent state subversion of a critical na-
tional policy, the Court should reaffirm that the Act's
preemptive scope turns on the purpose and effect of a
state's statute, even when, as here, the text of the
statute purports to regulate activities appropriately
within the state’s jurisdiction.

30

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court should reverse
the Fourth Circuit's decision.

Respectfully submitted,

Counsel for Amici Curiae
July 26, 2018 * Counsel of Record

No. 16-1275
IN THE

Supreme Coxrt of the United States

VIRGINIA URANIUM, INC., ET AL.,
Petitioners,
We
WARREN, ET AL.,

Respondents.

On Writ of Certiorari to the
United States Court of Appeals
for the Fourth Circuit

BRIEF OF ENTERGY OPERATIONS, INC. AND
ENTERGY NUCLEAR OPERATIONS, INC. AS
AMICI CURIAE IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONERS

MARCUS V. BROWN KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN
WILLIAM B. GLEw, JR. Counsel of Record
ENTERGY SERVICES, INC. SANFORD IL. WEISBURST

639 Loyola Avenue ELLYDE R. THOMPSON

New Orleans, LA 70113 QUINN EMANUEL URQUHART
Timoruy A. NGAU & SULLIVAN, LLP

51 Madison Ave., 22nd F'.

Enrandy Gunvicns, INC New York, NY 10010

-nr-daoenage—— 7+ (212) 849-7000

Jackson, MS 39213 kath! Hivan@
quinnemanuel.com

Counsel for Amici Curiae Entergy Operations, Inc.,
and Entergy Nuclear Operetions, Inc.

July 26, 2018

WiLsonw-EPes Prinrine Co, inc. — (202) 789-0086 — WasinaTon,D C. 20002

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE

TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF THE

ARGUMENT
I.

B.

THE LOWER COURTS HAVE
PROPERLY HELD PREEMPTED
ATTEMPTS OF CERTAIN STATES
TO INTERFERE WITH FEDERAL
AUTHORITY OVER NUCLEAR
SAFETY UNDER THE GUISE OF
PERMISSIBLE STATE

SPU EPURIETIIION cxccevcccccsccseeencnsnsncsscnesecee

The Lower Courts Have
Invalidated State Laws Whose
Facial Neutrality Was Found
Pretextual For A Purpose To

Regulate For Radiological Safety ...

1. EEE AE
2. EE

The Lower Courts Also Have
Invalidated Pretextual Efforts To

2. Washington, Kentucky,

Maine, and Connecticut.......

eR S RHR See ee eee See eee Sees eee

ee eee eee eee eee eesseseee=

SS SSS SSS SS SSeS SSS See SSS SS SSH SSS SSS HESS SSS HH EE

SPHSSS SSS SSS SSS SHES SS SSS SSS SSS SHES SSS HHT SSS HH HR ESE HHH Ee

il
C. A State's Imposition Of Financial
Requirements On
Decommissioning Is Preempted

When Imposed For The Purpose
{ge

ll. STATE REGULATION OF
RADIOLOGICAL SAFETY IS
COSTLY AND UNNECESSARY
GIVEN THE NRCS
COMPREHENSIVE
ee See D ecaccceoveveccccnsovsccnnszsenscocoocens

CONCI AUSION PTeTTTTT TTT Tet

iii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
CASES Page

Conn, Yankee Atomic Power Co. v.
Haddam Planning & Zoning Comm'n,
2001 WL, 1898262
GS 8 19, 20

Conn. Yankee Atomic Power Co. v.
Haddam Planning & Zoning Comm'n,

19 F. App’x 21 (2d Cir. 2001) ...............0... 19
English v. Gen. Elec. Co.,

He circteenccsccnnsnesteneiencensicuiiabiaiiions A
Entergy Nuclear Vt. Yankee, LLC

v. Shumlin,

733 F.3d 393 (2d Cir. 2013) ......5, 6, 7, 8, 11, 24

Entergy Nuclear Vt. Yankee, LLC
v. Shumlin, 838 F. Supp. 2d 183
(D. Vt. 2012).............. 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 24, 25

Entergy Nuclear Vt. Yankee, LLC v.
Shumlin, 2011 WL 2811317

ee 24
Ky. Nat. Res. & Envtl. Prot. Cabinet v.

United States, 534 U.S. 973 (2001)................ 18
Long Island Lighting Co. v. Suffolk County,

628 F. Supp. 654 (E.D.N.Y. 1986) ........... 13, 14
McCreary County v. ACLU of Ky.,

Ee 10

Me. Yankee Atomic Power Co. v. Bonsey,
107 F. Supp. 2d 47 (D. Me. 2000) ............ 20, 21

iv

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES— Continued
Page

Me. Yankee Power v. Me. Pub. Util. Comm'n,
581 A.2d 799 (Me. 1990) .................... 21, 22, 23

Nielson v. Private Fuel Storage, L.L.C.,
546 U.S. 10GO (BO0B)...............2.cccccccecseeeeeeeeeeeee 14

Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Res.
Conservation & Dev. Comm'n,
cr 4, 22

Skull Valley Band of Goshute Indians
v. Leavitt, 215 F. Supp. 2d 1232

Skull Valley Band of Goshute Indians
v. Nielson, 376 F.3d 1223
Nc 14, 15, 17, 26

Suffolk County v. Long Island Lighting Co.,
554 F. Supp. 399 (E.D.N.Y. 1983) ........... 12, 13

Suffolk County v. Long Island Lighting Co.,
728 F.2d 52 (2d Cir. 1984) ....................... 12, 25

United States v. Commonwealth of Kentucky,
252 F.3d 816 (6th Cir. 2001).................... 18, 19

United States v. Manning,
434 F. Supp. 2d 988 (E.D. Wa. 2006) ...... 18, 19

United States v. Manning,
527 F.3d 828 (9th Cir. 2008).............. 17, 18, 19

Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v.
Entergy Nuclear Vt. Yankee, LLC,
683 F.3d 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2012) ................ 24, 25

v
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

Page

REGULATIONS

53 Fed. Reg. 24018-01, 24073 ...............cccccccceee 22
LEGISLATIVE MATERIALS

Mass. Bill H. 1147 (2017).................00.000.0000000 27

& |”, ere 26

Mass. Bill S. 1836 (2017)....................c.ccccccceeeeees 27

Maas. Bill S. 1837 (9017)..................00........0000000 26
OTHER AUTHORITIES

Dan Fagin, Lights Out at Shoreham, Newsday

| ES See ae 14

Carl MacGowan, 38 Years After Massive Protest,
Shoreham Nuke Plant Sits Empty, Newsday
ESS VR see ee 26

Matthew Muratore, Should the Pilgrim Nuclear
Power Station Be Required to Pay an Annual
$25 Million Decommissioning Fee, Bos. Globe
ERE EEE ee le 27

l
INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE'

Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. and Entergy
Operations, Inc. (together, “Entergy”) hold licenses
issued by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
(NRC”) to operate nuclear power plants in seven
States: Arkansas, Louisiana, Massachusetts,
Michigan, Mississippi, New York, and Vermont.
These plants collectively employ approximately 6,000
professionals, and those that remain in operation
generate nearly 9,000 megawatts of power annually.
As an NRC license-holder, Entergy must comply with
expansive NRC regulations governing every aspect of
nuclear power generation—from construction to
decommissioning.

Entergy has been subjected to state regulation of
these plants motivated by a radiological safety
purpose and hence federally preempted under the
majority approach in the lower courts. Such
regulation has put Entergy (and other similarly
situated licensees) in the difficult position of either
challenging the regulations as preempted or
complying with the state regulation (often at great
cost). Because Entergy operates nuclear facilities in
multiple States, it has a particular interest in
ensuring that nuclear facilities are not impermissibly
saddled with radiological safety-motivated state

' Pursuant to Rule 37.3, the parties have consented to the filing
of this brief Letters of consent have been filed with the Clerk.
No counsel for any party authored this brief in whole or in part,
and no counsel or party made a monetary contribution intended
to fund the preparation or submission of this brief. No person
other than amici curiae made a monetary contribution to its
preparation or submission.

2

regulations in light of the already comprehensive
NRC scheme.

INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY
OF THE ARGUMENT

The question before the Court is whether the
Atomic Energy Act (“AEA”) preempts a State from
regulating in its otherwise permissible sphere when
the State does so for the purpose of regulating
radiological health and safety. Virginia is not alone
in burdening nuclear power generation by using
facially legitimate state authority as a pretext for
regulating radiological safety. As described below,
numerous States have taken actions imposing costly
and unnecessary radiological safety-based regulation
on every phase of the nuclear generation cycle,
including construction, operation, storage of spent
nuclear fuel (“SNF”), and decommissioning. And the
lower courts have properly looked behind the face of
those efforts to their true purpose and readily found
them preempted.

For example, States previously have attempted to
impose the following facially neutral regulations,
where the evidence showed that the State’s true
purpose was to regulate radiological safety: (1)
requiring legislative approval for a nuclear power
plant that had operated for decades to continue
operating pursuant to its NRC license; (2) imposing a
$5 million fee for consideration of an application to
build an SNF storage facility; (3) requiring a $15
million payment for the ability to construct and move
SNF to a dry cask storage facility; and (4) enacting a
prohibition punishable as a misdemeanor on any
person role-playing a county official for purposes of
emergency planning. In all of these examples, the

3

regulations on their face fell within the traditional
realm of state authority. And yet, in each of these
examples, clear evidence showed that the State's
motivating purpose was a concern about radiological
safety, resulting in their preemption.

Even when this type of regulation does not result
in complete elimination of the nuclear activity within
the borders of the State, as it does in the instant case,
nuclear plant owners and operators can be subject to
what the Federal Circuit has referred to as
“blackmail” as a condition of performing activities
properly subject to the jurisdiction of the NRC. NRC
licensees must consider whether to challenge such
improper regulation in costly litigation or comply with
the regulation as a business expense. In this manner,
a State’s ability to impose costs through improper
legislation or regulation is one tool that local
politicians use to stunt and even eliminate America’s
nuclear power production in clear violation of federal
law and policy. For this reason, the AEA preemption
framework should, as the majority of lower courts
have held, require an inquiry into the purpose behind
state and local laws and regulatory actions. This does
not leave States remediless; they are free to bring
their nuclear safety concerns to the NRC's attention,
and they are barred only from engaging in direct
regulation based on their concerns.

Amici do not repeat Petitioners’ arguments on the
scope of AEA preemption. Rather, they describe
several past examples where States have acted from
a radiological-safety purpose and discuss the practical
costs that those regulations imposed before they were
successfully challenged.

A
ARGUMENT

I. THE LOWER COURTS HAVE PROPERLY
HELD PREEMPTED ATTEMPTS OF
CERTAIN STATES TO INTERFERE WITH
FEDERAL AUTHORITY OVER NUCLEAR
SAFETY UNDER THE GUISE OF
PERMISSIBLE STATE REGULATION

Nuclear power provides low-cost energy with little
to no greenhouse gas emissions. It is an important
source of domestic energy, enabling Americans to
reduce reliance on fossil fuels, and an important tool
in maintaining the reliability of the United States
power grid. In the United States, the NRC regulates
radiological health and safety through all phases of
nuclear power generation, pursuant to the AKA. As
this Court has held, “the federal government has
occupied the entire field of nuclear safety concerns,
except the limited powers expressly ceded to the
states.” Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Res.
Conservation & Dev. Comm’n (“PG&E”), 461 U.S. 190,
212 (1983). This Court has “defined the pre-empted
field, in part, by reference to the motivation behind
the state law.” English v. Gen. Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72,
84 (1990).

Despite the clear language of the AKA, Congress’
clear expression of its intent to occupy the field of
nuclear safety, and this Court’s holdings, some States
have sought to regulate nuclear facilities based on
radiological safety concerns throughout the lifecycle
of nuclear power generation in a manner inconsistent
with federal law and policy. Contrary to the result
reached below by the Fourth Circuit, it is entirely
appropriate—and indeed, necessary—for courts to
inquire into the purpose behind state actions affecting

5

nuclear power generation in order to determine
whether they are preempted. Time and again, the
lower courts have properly determined that state
action, although facially permissible, was undertaken
for an impermissible radiological safety purpose and
hence invaded the field exclusively regulated by the
NRC.

A. The Lower Courts Have Invalidated
State Laws Whose Facial Neutrality
Was Found Pretextual For A

Purpose To Regulate For
Radiological Safety

1. Vermont

In Entergy Nuclear Vermont Yankee, LLC v.
Shumlin, 838 F. Supp. 2d 183 (D. Vt. 2012), affd in
relevant part, 733 F.3d 393 (2d Cir. 2013), both the
district court and the Second Circui ‘« ‘d invalid as
preempted a Vermont law found . ove aimed at
regulating radiological safety. The Vermont Yankee
Nuclear Power Plant (“Vermont Yankee”) had
operated for more than 30 years when, in advance of
applying to the NRC for a license renewal for a new
term of operation, the Vermont legislature passed a
law requiring State approval for continued operation.
In 2002, Entergy Nuclear Vermont Yankee, LLC
(“ENVY”), had purchased the plant, making clear at
the time that it would seek to increase the generation
capacity of the plant, construct a dry cask storage
facility,? and seek the NRC’s approval to operate the

* The fuel rods used to power the reactor are stored in deep
pools of treated water after they have been used. These rods can
be moved into sealed metal cylinders on a concrete pad, known

6
plant beyond the March 2012 date in its original NRC

operating license. Kntergy Nuclear, 838 F. Supp. 2d
at 191.

After approving the sale of Vermont Yankee to
ENVY from the prior state-utility owners, the
Vermont State government sought to thwart
continued operation of the plant. First, although a
state law banning SNF storage had a carve-out for the
owners of the nuclear plant, the attorney general
interpreted that provision not to apply to ENVY but
only to the prior owners. Entergy Nuclear, 838 F.
Supp. 2d at 194. Next, the Vermont legislature
passed two bills, known as Act 74 and Act 160, that
effectively gave the Vermont legislature a pocket veto
over continued operation of the plant, requiring the
legislature to pass a bill affirmatively allowing
continued operation. /d. at 189. Then, to assist in
implementation of Acts 74 and 160, the legislature
passed Act 189, which required what it termed a
“reliability” assessment of the plant but which in fact
called for state investigation into radiological
safety systems at the plant. /d. at 212-13. At each
turn, Vermont legislators sought, in the remarkably
candid words of one committee member, to “find
another word for safety,” id. at 203, 229, such that the
State could regulate radiological safety under the
guise of permissible state activity. ENVY and
Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. “ENOI,” the NRC-
licensed operator for the plant) sued, the district court
enjoined the relevant state laws as preempted, an’

as dry casks, for long-term storage. Antergy Nuclear, 733 F.3d
at 400 n.7.

7

the Second Circuit affirmed. Entergy Nuclear, 733
F.3d at 398.

As to SNF storage, the legislative history made
clear that legislators opposed, on radiological safety
grounds, any sort of enactment that would permit
construction of a dry cask storage facility. Entergy
Nuclear, 838 F. Supp. 2d at 195. Indeed, the district
court detailed how “more than a dozen witnesses
testiflied] regarding their safety concerns
surrounding spent fuel storage.” /d. Legislators
raised these safety concerns even though an expert
witness hired by the legislative counsel had advised
them that “a lot of the concerns that citizens have are
concerns that you can’t address directly the way they
want them to be addressed.” /d. (emphasis added).
One legislator, for example, suggested that a concern
about the safety of a dry cask storage facility could be
rooted in the need for “some money” because, “if the
federal government or Entergy doesn’t protect it,
we're going to have to do it because we are not going
to let our citizens .. . blow up.” Another asked
whether there might be a “creative use of statute,”
whereby “someone might have a safety issue in mind,”
but instead invoke the aesthetic interest in shielding
“the visible impact of these casks from the river.” Jd.
Indeed, the district court noted that “[ojther
references to safety by legislators and witnesses are
too numerous to recount.” /d.

Ultimately, the legislature passed Act 74, which
compelled ENVY to seek approval from the state
public utility commission to construct the dry cask
storage facility and, as a condition of its passage,
required ENVY to agree to deposit more than $15
million into a Clean Energy Development Fund. /d.

8

at 200. The bill incorporated a memorandum of
understanding ENVY and ENOI had entered into
with the State that imposed numerous conditions
governing radiological health and safety. Hntergy
Nuclear, 733 F.3d at 402.5 Yet the legislative
enactment still required ENVY to obtain legislative
approval for storage of SNF generated after the
original license term. Entergy Nuclear, 838 F. Supp.
2d at 197.

The battle over SNF storage promptly led to one
over the continued operation of the Vermont Yankee
plant itself. /d. at 202. Again, legislators evinced a
belief that the NRC would not protect sufficiently the
safety of Vermont residents and sought to act based
upon nuclear safety concerns. /d. at 202-07.
Comments on the bill requiring state approval of
continued plant operation linked safety to reliability
and economics—a plant shut down for nuclear safety
reasons could not provide power or economic benefit
to the State. /d.

These themes echoed throughout the legislature's
consideration of the bill, and legislators again sought

® The conditions included that the SNF storage pad be located
“at least one hundred feet from a floodplain, apace the storage
casks to permit access to individual casks ‘to the greatest extent
possible,’ configure the spent-fuel pool so that high-decay heat
assemblies are surrounded by low-decay heat assemblies,
perform temperature monitoring and monthly manual radiation
surveillance of the storage casks and report the results to the
[Vermont state agency], not store waste generated outside
Vermont on site, remove ‘high level’ spent nuclear fuel from
Vermont ‘as quickly as possible, and conduct a study addressing
the stability of the proposed new spent nuclear fuel storage
facility based upon a stated concern that an adjacent river bank
might erode and collapse.” Entergy Nuclear, 733 F.3d at 402.

to clothe their safety concerns in non-safety terms by
“find[ing] another word for safety.” /d. at 203. As the
bill progressed, legislators cautioned one another to
speak in terms of economic benefit or reliability —
because “we don’t say safety when we're talking
Vermont Yankee in this room.” /d. at 206. As
enacted, Act 160 required legislative approval for
operation of the Vermont Yankee plant after March
2012. Id. at 210.

Once Act 160 was enacted, the legislature
introduced a bil! to provide for a comprehensive
assessment of the Vermont Yankee plant. /d. The bill
originally was titled “An Act Relating to an
Independent Safety Assessment of the Vermont
Nuclear Facility,” and called for “an independent
safety assessment” of the Vermont Yankee plant. /d.
As the legislature considered the bill, “[sjafety’ was
either replaced with ‘operating,’ ‘operational,’ or
‘emergency,’ or omitted altogether” but otherwise
“little change|d] to the substance of the bill.” /d. at
211. Notwithstanding these “editorial” revisions, and
a change of the title to refer to a “Vertical Audit and
Reliability Assessment,” the legislators still referred
to it as a safety study. /d. at 211-12 (‘I support the
review of the safety of Vermorit Yankee.”). As a
senator introducing the bill explained: “[W]hat this
bill does, in essence, is the governor has called for an
independent safety assessment, the congressional
delegation has called for an independer’ safety
assessment, the Legislature has talked about the
need to do something. What this bill does is define
what we mean by an assessment. And we talk about
a reliability assessment because safety is not within
our purview.” /d. at 212 (alteration in original).

10

The bill passed and became Act 189, leading to a
years-long study of the Vermont Yankee plant that
included analyzing systems crucial to the safe
generation of nuclear power that are subject to
exclusive NRC regulation. /d. at 212-13. The 300-
page study concluded the plant was “operated
reliably.” /d. Nonetheless, the legislature never
voted to approve continued operation of the Vermont
Yankee plant. /d. at 215-16. Rather, ENVY and
ENOI filed suit, 11 months before expiration of their
NRC license. /d. at 217.

After examining this legislative history in detail,
the district court noted that, although “a legislature's
stated reasons will generally get deference,’ a Court
cannot be ‘so naive’ in its purpose inquiry to accept
‘any transparent claim.” /d. at 228 (quoting
McCreary County v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 863-
64 (2005)). “Inquiry into the legislative history of Act
160 is particularly important here, where there is
evidence the statute was motivated by and grounded
in radiological safety concerns, and the statute on its
face empowers future legislatures to apply the statute
to deny continued operation for radiological safety
reasons and evade review.” /d. The district court
thus concluded that “concerns regarding the
radiological safety of Vermont Yankee were a primary
motivating force for giving the legislature the power
to take no action” and thereby disallow continued
operation. /d. at 229. “[Rjeferences, almost too
numerous to count . . . reveal legislators’ radiological
safety motivations and reflect their wish to empower
the legislature to address their constituents’ fear of
radiological risk, and beliefs that the plant was too
unsafe to operate... .” Jd. Beyond that, Act 160

11

lacked a plausible non-safety purpose, a consideration
that, even apart from explicit mentions of safety in
the legislative record, demonstrated circumstantially
that the law was motivated by safety concerns. /d. at
229-30.

Likewise, the district court found Act 74, related
to SNF storage, preempted because “the legislature's
desire and intent to regulate the radiological safety of
dry cask storage is crystal clear.” /d. at 231. Thus,
even though the laws at issue had been largely
scrubbed of any safety language, the legislative record
left no doubt that the legislature had acted based on
radiological safety concerns.

The Second Circuit affirmed in relevant part.
Entergy Nuclear, 733 F.3d at 398. Reasoning that
this Court has “defined the preempted field, in part,
by reference to the motivation behind the state law”
in analyzing preemption under the AEA, the Second
Circuit “agree[d] with the district court's careful
analysis of the legislative intent motivating
Vermont's enactment of Act 160 insofar as the district
court identified radiological safety as the Vermont
legislature's primary purpose in enacting the
statute.” /d. at 419-20 (internal quotation marks
omitted).*

2. New York

The Second Circuit had issued a similar ruling
nearly thirty years earlier concerning safety-based
regulation by New York's Suffolk County of the
Shoreham Nuclear Plant. As construction of the plant

‘ Following nearly a decade of disputes, the Vermont Yankee
plant announced in 2012 its intention to shut down at the end of
2014 for economic reasons.

12

neared completion, Suffolk County filed suit against
the plant's owner, Long Island Lighting Co.
(“LILCO"), bringing an array of state-law claims.
Suffolk County v. Long Island Lighting Co., 554 F.
Supp. 399, 402 (.D.N.Y. 1983), affd, 728 F.2d 52 (2d
Cir. 1984). The County alleged that construction
defects had caused the cost of constructing Shoreham
to balloon and that certain costs would be passed onto
ratepayers, and sought damages related to the state-
law claims. /d. at 402-03. But its complaint pointed
to design and construction problems, including those
that allegedly failed to comply with AEA regulations,
and sought as a remedy an inspection and suspension
in operation. /d. at 402-03. Although the County
purported to base its claims on facially permissible
concerns about cost overruns during construction, the
district court held that the County had used this cost
overrun concern as a pretext for its true purpose
namely, to impose additional safety inspections and
regulations on the Shoreham plant. /d. at 405.

The Second Circuit affirmed, rejecting the
County's argument that the AEA “does not preempt
its tort and contract claims because those claims are
not directed at radiological safety hazards—an area
concededly reserved to the NRC-—but rather at the
‘pocketbook’ issue of unreasonable and excessive
cost.” 728 F.2d at 56. The Second Circuit explained
that “safety concerns pervade the complaint.” /d. at
59. Beyond the safety concerns animating the
complaint, the County impermissibly sought to
invade the NRC’s exclusive regulatory authority. /d.
The Second Circuit thus concluded that Suffolk
County's “only avenue .. . is to continue its
proceedings in the administrative forum—the NRC

13

for safety-related concerns and the [New York State
Public Service Commission] for economic claims.” /d.
at 64.

Undeterred by this unsuccessful lawsuit, Suffolk
County withdrew from emergency response planning
to prevent Shoreham from complying with NRC
regulations requiring local government participation
in such planning. Long Island Lighting Co. v. Suffolk
County, 628 F. Supp. 654, 659 (.D.N.Y. 1986). When
the NRC appeared prepared to allow Shoreham
special dispensation to move toward operation
without such local participation, the Suffolk County
legislature used its police power to enact a local law
that criminalized participation in a test of the
emergency plan involving simulation of local
government roles. /d. at 659. Violation of the local
law was a misdemeanor, punishable by a year in jail
and $1,000 fine. /d.

With a proposed test of the emergency plan weeks
away, LILCO sued Suffolk County, seeking to enjoin
application of the local law as preempted. /d. at 660.
The district court held not only that the Suffolk
County law “impermissibly interferes with a
preempted federal area,” but also that by “failing to
articulate a non-safety rationale, Suffolk County
impermissibly intruded into a federally preempted
area when it enacted” the law. /d. at 665. Despite the
fact that States and local governments retain some
authority with respect to nuclear power plants, :d.,
the district court could not ignore the fact that “|t}he
County is on record . . . as opposing the opening of the
Shoreham facility on the grounds that no emergency
evacuation plan is safe for Suffolk County.” /d. Thus,
because the County passed the law “in an attempt to

14

continue its opposition to the Shoreham facility on the
basis of a perceived radiological hazard,” the court
concluded that the County had “impermissibly
intruded into a sphere of authority reserved
exclusively to the federal government by Congress.”
Id. at 666.

In the end, the Shoreham Nuclear Plant never
commenced commercial operation due to the dispute
over the evacuation plans. Ultimately, LILCO settled
with the State of New York in 1989, and billions of
dollars in ultimately unnecessary construction costs
were funded by the ratepayers.®

B. The Lower Courts Also Have
Invalidated Pretextual Efforts To
Regulate Storage And Disposal Of

Nuclear Materials
Certain States also have exercised facially
permissible authority to impermissibly regulate the
transportation, storage, and management of SNF and
other radiologically contaminated materials based on
nuclear safety concerns. In this area too, lower courts
have found that state action is preempted by federal

law.

1. Utah

In 1997, a company named Private Fuel Storage
began to lease Skull Valley reservation tribal land in
order to build an SNF storage facility. Skull Valley
Band of Goshute Indians v. Nielson, 376 F.3d 1223,
1228 (10th Cir. 2004), cert. denied sub nom., Nielson
v. Private Fuel Storage, L.L.C., 546 U.S. 1060 (2005)

5 See Dan Fagin, Lights Out at Shoreham, Newsday (Nov. 30,
2007), https: //bit. ly/2v3ZLeR.

15

The company applied for a spent fuel storage license
to the NRC. /d.

In the years that followed, Utah enacted a
complicated web of state regulations to discourage
and to forestall any SNF from being transported or
stored in Utah. See id. In essence, Utah enacted laws
that made the Skull Valley project impossible and the
cost associated with even pursuing a _ license
prohibitive.

First, Utah passed a new law prohibiting the
transfer, storage, treatment, or disposal of high-level
nuclear waste in the State. Jd. It also provided that
the governor, along with county officials and the state
legislature, could separately approve an SNF storage
facility if a license was issued by the NRC and upheld
by a court. /d. at 1228-29. The law required state
licensing by the Department of Environmental
Quality, including an onerous application process. /d.
at 1229. The State’s Department of Transportation
had the authority to approve any transportation of
SNF. /d. Further, the law required substantial fees
in order to apply for and obtain a license to manage
SNF in Utah, including a non-refundable application
fee of $5 million and coverage for 75% of unfunded
potential liabilities, potentially in the hundreds of
millions or billions of dollars. Jd. The law also
revoked limited liability protections for SNF storage
facilities, placing the owners and operators at
personal risk, a requirement otherwise unheard of in
Utah's corporate governance laws. See id.

Second, the Utah legislature empowered county
officials to reject all proposals for storing or
transporting SNF, or to enact a comprehensive land
use plan for health and general well-being if any SNF

16

work was approved. /d. at 1229-30. Additionally,
county governments were barred from providing
municipal services to SNF facilities, including fire,
garbage, water, sewer, and electricity, among others.
Id. at 1230.

Finally, Utah departed from its general policy of
allowing the Department of Transportation to
regulate rail crossings in favor of a requirement that
any dispute regarding an SNF facility's use of rail
crossings be administered only after agreement of the
governor and legislature. /d. Utah also designated
additional roads statewide as public safety interest
highways, thereby allowing the Department of
Transportation to control those roads, divested the
county of control over the access road to the proposed
facility, and required gubernatorial and legislative
agreement before eminent domain could be used for
an SNF company. /d.

In 2001, after nearly four years of this expanding
web of laws and regulations, Skull Valley Band filed
suit, alleging that Utah had overstepped the bounds
of its police power in enacting laws designed to
frustrate the establishment of an SNF facility based
on nuclear safety concerns. Skull Valley Band of
Goshute Indians v. Leavitt, 215 F. Supp. 2d 1232,
1238 (D. Utah 2002). The district court granted
summary judgment to Skull Valley Band, ruling, inter
alia, that, while Utah normally has every right to
regulate the traffic on its roads, it may not do so for
an impermissible nuclear safety purpose. /d. at 1249
(concluding that the road restrictions “directly and
substantially affect the decisions made by those who
build or operate nuclear facilities concerning

17

radiological safety levels and fall within the pre-
empted field”).

The Tenth Circuit affirmed, holding that “a state
cannot use its authority” in traditional areas of
regulation “as a means of regulating radiological
hazards.” 376 F.3d at 1248. The court noted that,
among other things, a $5 million application fee for a
license to manage SNF, untethered to any costs the
State would bear in processing the application, laid
bare the motivating purpose of nuclear safety. See id.
at 1246.

2. Washington, Kentucky,
Maine, and Connecticut

Other cases similarly illustrate that some States
have used facially legitimate state authority as a way
to regulate storage and disposal of radioactive
materials based on radiological safety concerns.

For instance, in United States v. Manning, 527
F.3d 828 (9th Cir. 2008), the Ninth Circuit held
preempted Washington’s “Cleanup Priority Act,” a
law enacted based on a ballot initiative that
concerned the treatment of mixed waste. The law
related to the Hanford Nuclear Reservation within
the State, a facility operated by the Department of
Energy that served as a treatment, storage, and
disposal site for radioactive and non-radioactive
hazardous waste. /d. at 830-31. Washington
residents had voted on a ballot measure “to prevent
the addition of new radioactive and hazardous waste
to the Hanford nuclear reservation until the cleanup
of existing contamination is complete.” /d. at 831
(internal quotation marks omitted).

18

The United States Government challenged the law
as preempted, and the district court and Ninth Circuit
both agreed that it was. /d. While the State could
regulate the non-radioactive hazardous components
of mixed waste, in this instance, the law's policy
section revealed as its purpose that it was “the State’s
intent to regulate radioactive safety.” /d. at 837
(noting law described “Hanford as a dump for
‘radioactive and/or hazardous or toxic wastes” and
“warnied|] that Washington’s economy could be
harmed ‘from any accident releasing radiation”);
United States v. Manning, 434 F. Supp. 2d 988, 1003
(E.D. Wa. 2006) (“[T]he true aim of the [law] is not the
hazardous waste component of mixed waste, but
rather the radioactive component.”). Thus, the Ninth
Circuit held that “[a] key purpose of the CPA is to
regulate the radioactive component of mixed waste, as
well as the nonradioactive component, for health and
safety reasons. Accordingly, the CPA is preempted by
the AEA.” /d. at 839.

In United States v. Commonwealth of Kentucky,
252 F.3d 816, 824 (6th Cir. 2001), cert. denied sub
nom., Kentucky Natural Resources & Environmental
Protection Cabinet v. United States, 534 U.S. 973
(2001), the Sixth Circuit rejected Kentucky's attempt
to regulate radioactive waste through permitting
conditions for the disposal of solid waste. Kentucky
sought to prohibit a uranium enrichment facility
owned by the Department of Energy from disposing of
“[sjolid waste that exhibits radioactivity above de
minimis levels.” /d. at 820. The Sixth Circuit noted
that “the AEA preempts any state attempt to regulate
materials covered by the Act for safety purposes.” /d.
at 823. The conditions sought to limit “the amount of

19

‘radioactivity’ and ‘radionuclides’ that DOE may place
in its landfill” and “impose these conditions to protect
human health and the environment.” /d. Thus,
although the AEA does not regulate all solid waste,
Kentucky was preempted from regulating the
radioactive component of solid waste because the
permit conditions “regulate materials covered by the
AEA based on . . . safety and health concerns.” /d.

In both the Washington and Kentucky cases, the
courts determined that an impermissible nuclear
safety purpose preempted the regulations even
though the States facially regulated materials under
their authority and the AEA did not authorize the
NRC to regulate such materials. Manning, 527 F.3d
at 836 (Unquestionably, the State has the authority
to regulate nonradioactive hazardous materials.”);
Commonwealth of Kentucky, 252 F.3d at 822 (noting
that, under the applicable regulatory scheme, “state
and local governments will play a lead role in solid
waste regulation”).

Even when the lower courts have rejected
challenges to such State laws, they have inspected the
purpose behind the laws, and sent warning signals to
States to stay within the permissible realm of their
non-preempted police power authority. For instance,
in Connecticut Yankee Atomic Power Co. v. Haddam
Planning & Zoning Commission, 2001 WL 1898262,
at *3 (D. Conn. Apr. 23, 2001), affd 19 F. App’x 21 (2d
Cir. 2001), the owners of the Connecticut Yankee
nuclear plant sought to enjoin as preempted a zoning
regulation that had changed the zoning of the plant to
residential after the plant’s construction. When
Connecticut Yankee—-which already had operated for
decades and had started decommissioning—sought

20

approval to re-zone the property to industrial to allow
it to construct a dry cask storage facility, its zoning
application was denied. /d. Although the local official
had “publicly stated that the Town would seek to
preclude implementation of the planned dry cask
storage system regardless of the outcome of the
Zoning proceeding,” the district court required
Connecticut Yankee to seek a building permit to begin
construction on the dry cask storage facility before the
court would address the preemption question. /d. at
*4. Nonetheless, the district court noted that the
preemption argument was strong, and likely would
succeed if the State thwarted Connecticut Yankee’s
ability to build the dry cask storage facility. /d. at *4
n.1.

In Maine Yankee Atomic Power Co. v. Bonsey, 107
Ff. Supp. 2d 47 (D. Me. 2000), the district court
likewise cautioned Maine against a nuclear safety-
motivated use of its Meially legitimate state
authority. Maine's Site Law required approval of the
construction or opegation of “any development of state
or regional significance that may substantially affect
the environment.” /d. at 49. Although the law had
not existed at the time the plant was constructed,
Maine asserted that the law applied to the nuclear
power plant during its decommissioning, specifically
to construction of the dry cask storage facility. /d.
The owners of Maine Yankee challenged the
application of the Site Law to the plant, but the
district court held the law could apply to the extent
Maine used it to regulate “for purposes other than
protection against radiation hazards.” /d. at 54. Still,
the district court admonished the State to stay within
its permissible sphere, in light of the fact that “[o}ne

21

might take a hint from the Board’s apparent interest
in matters nuclear—its demand for the safety report
on the proposed storage system for example,” that it
intended to regulate for a radiological purpose. /d. In
this same vein, the State “cannot employ a ‘financial
capacity’ requirement to indirectly regulate in the
field of spent nuclear fuel storage.” /d. at 55.

While the State had not yet exceeded its authority,
the district court clearly signaled that it would grant
the appropriate relief if Maine did overreach:
“Perhaps the state’s conduct of its administrative
proceedings will reveal a transparent effort to
exercise regulatory authority reserved to the federal
government. Perhaps not. Time will tell. If so,
declaratory and injunctive relief will surely and
swiftly follow.” Jd. at 56.

Cc. A State’s Imposition Of Financial
Requirements On Decommissioning
Is Preempted When Imposed For
The Purpose of Nuclear Safety

A preemption challenge to a State’s attempts to
regulate decommissioning on an “economic” basis also
has been successful when the evidence showed that
the State’s true purpose stemmed from a nuclear
safety concern.

In 1981, the owners of the Maine Yankee nuclear
plant sought approval from FERC to adjust its rates
to reflect the costs of decommissioning the plant. Me.
Yankee Power v. Me. Pub. Util., 581 A.2d 799, 800
(Me. 1990). While the FERC proceeding was pending,
the Maine legislature enacted the Nuclear
Decommissioning Financing Act ((NDFA”). /d. The
NDFA required any nuclear plant operator to file a

22

decommissioning plan with the Maine Public Utilities
Commission (“MPUC”) for review and approval and
established decommissioning financing
requirements. /d. Shortly thereafter, Maine Yankee
reached a settlement with FERC to establish a
decommissioning financing plan, and Maine Yankee
submitted the plan to MPUC under the NDFA, which
eventually was approved in 1983. /d. at 801-02.

In 1988, FERC permitted Maine Yankee to adjust
its decommissioning financing plan. Jd. at 802.
Maine Yankee again moved that the MPUC approve
the amendment to the plan, but the MPUC rejected
the amendment. /d. Maine Yankee appealed
MPUC’s decision and challenged the constitutionality
of the NDFA. Jd. Although the MPUC attempted to
justify its decommissioning regulations as economic
in nature and thus outside of the purview of the NRC
and the AEA, this argument failed. /d. at 805.

The Maine Supreme Court, following this Court's
decision in PG&E, reasoned that, “[bJecause Congress
has clearly manifested an intent to maintain
‘complete control over the safety and nuclear aspects
of energy generation,” the NDFA was preempted by
the AEA. /d. at 805-06 (quoting PG&E, 461 U.S. at
212). This was so even though the State had
purportedly targeted the NDFA at the economic
impact of decommissioning nuclear facilities.
Initially, the court explained that, even if “regulatory
actions may have an economic impact,” it “does not
mean that they lie outside NRC’s jurisdiction.” /d. at
805 (quoting 53 Fed. Reg. 24018-01, 24073). In
addition, looking to the legislative history of the
NDFA, it was clear that the State sought to regulate
safety aspects of nuclear decommissioning. /d. The

23

NDFA was enacted, in part, because “timely proper
decommissioning of any nuclear power plant... is
essential to protect public health, safety, and the
environment.” /d. (alteration in original). The court
concluded that any attempt to regulate
decommissioning is preempted if it impermissibly
infringes the NRC's exclus've regulatory authority
regarding the safety aspects of nuclear
decommissioning, regardless of how the state
legislature frames the regulation. /d. at 805-06.

Il. STATE REGULATION OF RADIOLOGICAL
SAFETY IS COSTLY AND UNNECESSARY
GIVEN THE NRC’S COMPREHENSIVE
REGULATIONS

When States regulate the nuclear field in an effort
to address safety concerns, they not only intrude upon
an exclusive federal sphere but also impose
inefficiencies and costs that can be prohibitive. When
States make pretextual forays into the regulation of
the nuclear industry, the owners and operators are
forced to undertake additional expense to comply with
such regulations or else to challenge them. Such
expense hampers the successful operation and
decommissioning of the Nation's nuclear facilities.

The regulatory framework and enforcement
mechanisms used by the NRC and reviewing courts to
enforce the AEA are clear and predictable. Parties
can participate in NRC rulemaking and follow NRC
actions and processes to determine how the NRC
might act in any particular situation. The operable
standards apply across all States, regardless of local
political imperatives. Any departure from the clarity
provided in NRC regulations and rulemaking
introduces uncertainty and _ inefficiencies and

24
complicates the operation and administration of
America’s nuclear power generation.

In the Vermont Yankee case discussed above, the
Second Circuit agreed with the district court that
ENOI and ENVY would face irreparable harm from
enforcement of the preempted statute—to wit, a
complete shut down of Vermont Yankee. Entergy
Nuclear, 733 F.3d at 423. Undoubtedly, such a result
would have had deleterious financial consequences
for ENVY and ENOI. But the actions of Vermont—
motivated by safety concerns—already had imposed
substantial costs. ENVY and ENOI were forced to
undertake significant political expenditures. See, e.g.,
Entergy Nuclear, 838 F. Supp. 2d at 194-95, 199-202.
The threat of a potential shutdown also required
costly employment measures to retain the specialized
workers who run the Vermont Yankee plant. Entergy
Nuclear Vt. Yankee, LLC v. Shumlin, No. 1:11—cv-99-
jem, 2011 WL 2811317, at *6 (D. Vt. July 18, 2011).
And, of course, the litigation itself imposed additional
costs. See, e.g., Entergy Nuclear, 838 F. Supp. 2d at
189 (referencing preliminary injunction hearing and
three-day bench trial! on the merits).

When the Federal Circuit had occasion to review
ENVY’s payment of millions of dollars into the Clean
Energy Development Fund as part of a lawsuit
related to the Department of Energy's breach of its
contractual obligation to take possession of SNF for
permanent disposal, it determined these costs were
likely preempted as well. Vi. Yankee Nuclear Power
Corp. v. Entergy Nuclear Vt. Yankee, LLC, 683 F.3d
1330 (Fed. Cir. 2012). While ENVY had been required
to make payments into the Clean Energy
Development Fund as one step to securing approval

25

to construct a dry cask storage facility, the Federal
Circuit concluded that those costs were not
recoverable because Vermont's action in requiring
such payment was preempted (and could have been
successfully challenged). Jd. at 1346-47. As the
Federal Circuit explained: “The imposed fees bear no
relationship to any costs incurred by the state or its
citizens as a result of the construction of the dry
storage facility. It would not be inaccurate to
characterize the fee as a form of blackmail for the
state approval of the construction.” /d. at 1346. The
Federal Circuit concluded that, while ENVY’s choice
to acquiesce to the State’s demand for money may
have been reasonable from a business perspective, the
costs could not be recovered because these fees were
preempted, and therefore not foreseeable as damages
for the Department of Energy's breach of contract. /d.
at 1348 (‘Just because it may have been in ENVY’s
best interest to maintain good relations with the state
and to agree to pay a fee that was likely preempted by
federal law does not render the fee recoverable.”).

In its efforts to secure continued operation of the
Vermont Yankee plant, ENVY resisted entering into
a below-market agreement with Vermont for the
purchase of the power the plant generated, opting to
sue instead. But by that point, ENOI and ENVY
already had complied with the years-long “reliability”
study—the fees for which were all billed back to
ENVY. See 838 F. Supp. 2d at 233-234.

In the case of Shoreham, LILCO had to defend
against numerous lawsuits from Suffolk County and
public interest groups and then was forced to bring its
own lawsuit. See Long Island Lighting Co., 728 F.2d
at 55. Asa resul! «° the myriad ways in which Suffolk

26

County (along with other opponents of the plant)
sought to prevent the operation of the Shoreham
plant, the plant never commenced commercial
operation.®

The substantial burden Utah attempted to impose
on Skull Valley Band in establishing an SNF facility
was not only a regulatory headache, it was also
exorbitantly expensive. For example, the application
fee of $5 million likely would have been cost
prohibitive, and dissuaded any such potential
applicant. Skull Valley, 376 F.3d at 1228-29. Utah
sought to extract from a potential licensee outsized
funds that were likely to be unavailable and thus
render the project's actual ability to operate in Utah
moot. Indeed, even if a storage facility had been able
to withstand the application process, disallowing
municipal services to any SNF facility would have
greatly increased costs for operators, likely rendering
such a facility cost prohibitive to operate.

The fact that courts have held such laws
preempted has not always dissuaded certain States in
their efforts to exceed the bounds of their authority.
Despite decades of decisions holding safety-motivated
regulation preempted, Massachusetts’s legislators
have attempted multiple times in recent years to
enact laws that would encumber the decommissioning
process. For instance, Massachusetts lawmakers
sought to require a post-closure fee of $25 million for
every year decommissioning is not completed after a
plant has been closed for five years. Mass. Bill S. 1837
(2017), Mass. Bill H. 1765 (2017). A state

® Carl MacGowan, 38 Years After Massive Protest, Shoreham
Nuke Plant Sits Empty, Newsday (June 3, 2017),
https://nwaedy li/2mJfZUQ.

27

representative explained that “|e]stablishing the
trust fund would also ensure that the spent fuel rods
still on site are properly handled post-closure.”’
Another bill would have allowed assessments against
the owners and operators of nuclear power plants that
“could pose potential health risks to the
commonwealth’s residents in the event of an incident”
of up to $250,000 per year. Mass. Bill S. 1836 (2017).
Yet another bill sought to require each licensee to
fund emergency response expenditures by the State
or local governments prior to the transfer of SNF t
dry cask storage. Mass. Bill H. 1147 (2017).

Judicial inquiry into the purposes behind such
laws is necessary to prevent the use of facially
legitimate state regulation for preempted ends.
Absent judicial review, States would be free, using
non-safety language, to frustrate federal policy,
federal regulations, and federal law entrusting
nuclear safety exclusively to the NRC and preventing
the industry from being saddled with unnecessary
state-imposed costs. Because the federal government
occupies the entire field of nuclear safety,
promulgates detailed and wide-ranging regulations to
enforce such safety, and provides for the security of
nuclear materials and the Nation’s power grid, any
additional costs impermissibly imposed by the States
hobble the Nation’s ability to meet and to maintain its
energy generation needs.

’ Matthew Muratore, Should the Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station
Be Required to Pay an Annual $25 Million Decommissioning Fee,
Bos. Globe (Nov. 22, 2017), httpe://bit. ly/2NMrab7.

28
CONCLUSION

The Court should reverse the judgment of the
Fourth Circuit.

Respectfully submitted,
MARCUS V. BROWN KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN
WILLIAM B. GLEwW, JR. Counsel of Record
ENTERGY SERVICES, INC. SANFORD |. WEISBURST
639 Loyola Avenue ELLYDE R. THOMPSON

New Orleans, LA 70113 QUINN EMANUEL URQUHART

TrimoTuy A. NGAU 51 Madison Ave., 22nd FL.

ENTERGY SERVICES, INC. New York, NY 10010

1340 Echelon Parkway (212) 849-7000

Jackson, MS 39213 kathleensullivan@
quinnemanuel.com

Counsel for Amici Curiae Entergy Operations, Inc.,
and Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc.

No. 16-1275

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

VIRGINIA URANIUM, et ai,

v.

JOHN WARREN, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS
DIRECTOR OF THE VIRGINIA DEPARTMENT OF
MINES, MINERALS, AND ENERGY, et ai,

Respondents.

On Warr or Certiorari To THe Unrrep States
Court or APPEALS FoR THE Fourtsa Cracurr

BRIEF OF AMICI CURIAE FORMER NUCLEAR
REGULATORS IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONERS

Jay E. SuLperc

Counsel of Record
Suer_a Harvey
MiIcHAkEL LEPRE
Cyntuia Cook RoBeRTSON
Prtuspury Winturop Saaw Prrrvan LLP
1200 Seventeenth Street NW
Washington, DC 20036
(202) 663-8000
jay.silberg@pillsburylaw.com

Counsel for Amici Curiae

COUNSEL PRESS
(800) 274 3321 + (800) 369 6859

i

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
ee er CR ra scecctoscceevéscccecacé i
TABLE OF CITED AUTHORITIES ............... v
INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE .................- 1
BACKGROUND: THE ATOMIC ENERGY ACT
AND NRC’S MISSION AND AUTHORITY
TO PROTECT PUBLIC HEALTH &
PEED ccbevsesecrecieccncoeccencesest 3
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT..................... 4
SE endvhsdescudesisandeccucssdosasesed 5
I. The Uranium Recovery Process and the
Commission's Regulatory Authority .......... 6
A. Uranium in the Natural Environment ... .6
B. Uranium Mining, Milling, and Tailings
SED edcendceccccccecevesscoccs 7
C. NRC’s Regulatory Authority and
Obligation to Ensure Safety of Uranium
Milling and Tailings Management ....... . 9
Il. NRC Regulation of Uranium Milling and
CE cadéncccescccoccseces 10

uu

Table of Contents

Page

A. NRC’s Regulatory Standards for
Protection Against Radiation Establish
a Substantial Margin of Safety for
Workers and the Public ................

1. Maximum Radiation Dose Levels

B. NRC’s Licensing, Regulation, and
Oversight of Uranium Milling and Mill
Tailings Disposal Protects Workers,
the Public, and the Environment
from Potential Hazards ................

i. Planning, Siting, and
Design of Mill Tailings

Table of Contents
Page
ii. Durability and Effectiveness of
Containment System .......... 22

i. Technical Report Assessment. . . .26

ii. Environmental Assessment
and NRC’s Environmental!

Impact Statement .............. 27
Oversight of Active Uranium Milling
and Mill Tailings Facilities......... 28
i. Regulatory Guidance .......... 28

ii. Routine Monitoring, Self-
inspection, and Reporting

REED ce svsccicuscocces 29
iii. Facilities Inspections .......... 30

iv. Corrective and Enforcement
Ds tiiteddieniedasudessasd 31

and Long-Term Site Surveillance. . . . .32

Table of Contents

Page

IIL The NRC’s Regulation and Oversight

Program Prevents Contamination

and Protects Public Health and the
EE nb bub bt bs pnecdeces ts 6¥cesevked 33
EEE vidcvcessasiatecedvvonbdancdankes 36
Re ko hdndvcentesnkeuedcisesounvseseads la

w

v

TABLE OF CITED AUTHORITIES

Page
CASES
English v. General Elec. Co.
ee Cc dates dagéeheetass sued 3
Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Res.
Conservation & Dev. Comm'n,
Se A cee ciceiinddéeenesecaceees 3
Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural
Resources Defense Council, Inc.,
ei iene cas cevesce casveweeae 3
STATUTES AND OTHER AUTHORITIES
Atomic Energy Act, 42 U.S.C. 3 2011 et seq.,
Ph icrele cl avetesy eee tedbeees teens een 3
is cecaue tdveernbnnncdeuassuses$scee i)
fs nieh addedawestade shcecinesewcueed 9
De idcds yr uedegeeeedwaseéceeunkenenacel 9
nes de vueddnddevecddtasddsekdonadiansel 9
is cei ecneu dhe dkhets tiabuneeteueeael 9
Ma ctndadedawenesvan¢abdeseaseueehesnsin 10
Dt ti. peuedbadudedenddeiedees ones keaue 10
ht vicubieseedddddesheneeedsaduesewns 10

National Environmental Policy Act,
cts vu nncnscadeeees ct-00 de 3

Energy Reorganization Act, 42 U.S.C. § 5801 et seg. ...... 3

vw
Cited Authorities

Page
Uranium Mill Tailings Radiation Control
Act (“UMTRCA”), Pub. L. No. 95-604,

42 U.S. § TOO of. 969.... 2.6.02. cccccceccccccse 4
10 CER.
EL IGT aah SE gr a payee re 32
SARS ata Sano 31
GE SR eee a 26
No os os odbnbaaemaed 15
Tn cece acim 12
RCI ree Ae - 16
ATER LEE RADA SEED. 13
a vaucatan 14
ECR aE | 16
iad 14
EERE CIR e ae. 15
| EES RD eC 24
RSE Hag 15
ENE RTT TENS ART Te 30
eee eae 14
ne eee s scdameetneswtiveal ous 30
eR Re aes. 25
nn see nawdcawsnde 25
EITC | 25
RE RENEE. 25
NS ds ieee id saawddennecenal 31
a are ot ee 28
EE I ES RC a. 27
BN iia Gs os ee 25
TRE APIS ree RS AR 11, 29
RR ERO or.” 19, 29

Cited Authorities

Page

40 C.F_R.
DG cdnekeanedtswkchecsécuncecaerin 24
AS cohen aibschunbadiesieeliuuhaciel 24
SENSES PEE RN aera ee pa A: .20
ENN cdb audi dgulendueadiles coCccrsct ae 24
Ed ie ie es uc eau suuac cz 11
I a 11, 12
RIES ee SO ay amen WT: BS 33
EE gD dec nin a wey deel eeucne .20
SE ES Se prea ar 25
i .20
| SI Sh ee See © 23
ERE Re ee ea ee 12, 13
ik i onghadawasedendccatods 12, 13
EE ncuclcacceacedadcchcuveuseunde 13
SE ten EA EER EE ae 13

Cited Authorities
Page
ee eee cena wenwemeet 12
ED oc ccsccceccccvenccweueaundes’ 12
I cs cate cccniannbaeenennekess eu 13
so pcttecnccusctatcnebeuueel 13, 14
Canadian Nuclear Association, How Radioactive
Cords beach WAndwsaueudeeocceed 6
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention,
SAE WIS ceccceccccccesecccces 18
H.R. REP. No. 1480, pt. 1, 95th Cong., 2d Sess ........ 9
Mill Tailings Dam Break at Church Rock,
New Mezico: Hearing Before the Subcomm.
on Energy and the Environment, H.
Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs,
96th Cong, Ist Sess. (October 22, 1979)........... 33
National Research Council, Health
Effects of Exposure to Low Levels of
Ionizing Radiation (“BEIR V”), The
National Academies Press (1990)................ 18

NRC, Cost Projections for Uranium Licensing

ix

Cited Authorities

NRC, ALARA Levels for Effluents from
Materials Facilities, Regulatory Guide 8.37
A eccedansséebnusmedadcevedecccas 12, 15

NRC, Calculation of Radon Flux Attenuation
by Earthen Uranium Mill Tailings Covers,
Regulatory Guide 3.64 (June 1989) .............. 22

NRC, Design, Construction, and Inspection of
Embankment Retention Systems at Uranium
Recovery Facilities, Regulatory Guide 3.11

Pe aE a daddccanensscccetcceccccced 21
NRC, Doses in Our Daily Lives .............. 7, 17, 18
NRC, Enforcement Policy (May 15, 2018)........... 31
NRC, Enforcement Guidance ..................... 31

NRC, Final Generic Environmental Impact
Statement, NUREG-0706 (Sept. 1980). 18, 20, 22, 23

NRC, Health Physics Surveys in Uranium
Recovery Facilities, Regulatory Guide 8.30
Se EE ccc ca Uesccurecnesuaduncces 14

zx

Cited Authorities

NRC, Information Relevant to Ensuring that
Occupational Radiation Exposures at
Uranium Recovery Facilities Will be ALARA,
Regulatory Guide 8.31 (Rev. 1, May 2002) ........ 16

NRC, License Applications for New Uranium
Recovery Facilities, Expansions, Restarts,
SP cddicctcconusushesescettesbesved 26

NRC, Methods for Estimating Radioactive and
Toxic Airborne Source Terms for Uranium
Milling Operations, Regulatory Guide 3.59

NRC, Minimization of Contamination and
Radioactive Waste Generation: Life Cycle
Planning, Regulatory Guide 4.21 (June 2008). . . . . 24

NRC, Natural Background Sources of
Divcdweeseces Gudbesaedecbuweatae? 7, 16, 17

NRC, Operating Philosophy for Maintaining
Occupational and Public Radiation Exposures
as Low as Is Reasonably Achievable,

Regulatory Guide 8.10 (Rev. 2, Aug. 2016) ........ 16

NRC, Operational Inspection and
Surveillance of Embankment Retention
Systems for Uranium Miil Tailings,
Regulatory Guide 3.11.1 (Rev. 1, Oct. 1980) ....... 34

xi

Cited Authorities
Page
NRC, Preparation of Environmental Reports
for Uranium Mills, Regulatory Guide 3.8
Se Ee Ss G64 66606 chvsevoecenvasixcées 27
NRC, Review Guidance for Licensing
Actions Associated with NMSS Programs
(NUREG-1748) (Aug. 2003) ................... 28
NRC, Sources of Radiation ....................45: 17
NRC, Standard Review Plan for Conventional
Uranium Mill and Heap Leach Facilities
(NUREG-2126) (Nov. 2014) .................24. 27
ee 7
Se HR SR vc csndecvonseseseccecedés 7
NRC, Uranium Recovery Regulations, Guidance,
SG 6 oo bd ove cntvpcevessisvcic 29

OECD, National Energy Agency, Managing
Environmental and Health Impacts of
Uranium Mining, NEA-7602 (2014)......... BA, 35

S. Cohen & Assoc. (for EPA Office of
Radiation and Indoor Air), Assessment
of Variations in Radiation Exposure in
the United States, (July 15, 2005). ............... 17

xii
Cited Authorities
Page

United Nations Scientific Committee on the
Effects of Atomic Radiation (UNSCEAR),

Frequently Asked Questions ..................- 19

World Nuclear Association, Nuclear Radiation
i ndtnniad Recodugecdéeeete ee 7, 16, 19

World Nuclear Association, Radioactive

1
INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE'

Amici curiae are fourteen former senior nuclear
regulators for the United States Nuclear Regulatory
Commission (“NRC” or “Commission”). Collectively,
amici curiae have over 350 years of knowledge of and
experience with the regulation of radiological health,
safety, and environmental issues, including those
associated with uranium milling and long-term tailings
management.

as former NRC regulators to address the concerns and
common misconceptions about uranium and its byproducts
that appear to have led to Virginia’s continued moratorium
on uranium mining’, and to explain how NRC’s current
licensing requirements, dose limits, and regulatory
oversight and enforcement authority ensure that there
will be no significant harm to health, safety, or the
environment from a licensed uranium milling operation
or tailings disposal and management.

1. Nocounsel for a party authored this brief in whole or in part.
Amici curiae advise that amicus Dr. Malcolm Knapp was engaged
as an expert witness on behalf of Petitioner Virginia Uranium in a
Virginia state court action against the Commonwealth of Virginia
related to the Coles Hill project, in which Virginia Uranium was
represented by counsel for Petitioners here. Dr. Knapp was not
compensated by Petitioners (or anyone else) for his participation in
this brief. No person made a monetary contribution to or intended
to fund the preparation or submission of this brief, other than the
amici, or their attorneys.

By filing statements of consent with the Court, the parties
have consented to the filing of this amicus curiae brief.

2. See Pet.Br. at 15-19.

2

Amici curiae include former N RC officials L. Joseph
Callan, former Executive Director for Operations’;
Francis X. “Chip” Cameron, former Assistant Genera!
Counsel; Dr. Nils J. Diaz, former NRC Commissioner and
Chairman; John T. Greeves, former Director, Division of
Waste Management; Joseph R. Gray, former Associate
General Counsel for Licensing and Regulation; Dr.
Malcolm R. Knapp, former Deputy Executive Director
for Regulatory Effectiveness; James Lieberman,
former Director of Enforcement; Jeffrey S. Merrifield,
former NRC Commissioner; Ellis W. Merschoff, former
Deputy Executive Director for Operations; C. William
Reamer, former Director, High-Level Waste Repository
Safety Division, Office of Nuclear Materials Safety and
Safeguards; Luis Reyes, former Executive Director for
Operations; Hugh L. Thompson, Jr., former Deputy
Executive Director for Regulatory Programs; Dr. William
D. Travers, former Executive Director for Operations; and
Martin Virgilio, former Deputy Executive Director for
Operations.

Summaries of the amici curiae’s relevant background
and experience are in the Appendix to this brief.

3. The Executive Director for Operations is NRC's chief

I
|

deveiopment, managing

policy directives. Program offices reporting to the Executive
Director of Operations ensure the safe commercial production,
use, and disposal of nuclear materials; one of these, the Office
of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards, regulates activities
related to uranium recovery, including waste disposal and
management. NRC's four regional offices conduct the inspection,

3

BACKGROUND: THE ATOMIC ENERGY ACT AND
NRC’S MISSION AND AUTHORITY TO PROTECT
PUBLIC HEALTH & ENVIRONMENT

Congress adopted the Atomic Energy Act of 1954
(“AEA”), 42 U.S.C. § 2011 et seq., “to encourage widespread
participation in the development and utilization of atomic
energy for peaceful purposes to the maximum extent
consistent with the common defense and security and with
the health and safety of the public{.J” 42 U.S.C. § 2013(@).
Because nuclear safety is critical to the development of
the civilian nuclear industry, Congress designed the AEA
“to insure that nuclear technology be safe enough for
widespread development and use[.|” Pacific Gas & Elec.
Co. v. State Energy Res. Conservation & Dev. Comm'n,
461 U.S. 190, 213 (1983).

With the enactment of the National Environmental
Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. § 4321 et seq., the Atomic
Energy Commission’s regulatory mandate was explicitly
expanded to cover the environmental impact of the
activities regulated by the Commission. Vermont Yankee
Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519 (1978).

The Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, 42 U.S.C.
§ 5801 et seg., established the NRC as an independent
agency responsible for nuclear licensing and related
regulatory functions, and increased the number and
range of NRC’s safety responsibilities over those of its
predecessor, the Atomic Energy Commission. English v.
General Elec. Co. 496 U.S. 72, 81 (1990).

4

Congress further expanded the N RC’s jurisdiction,
with specific attention to uranium milling and tailings
management, with the passage in 1978 of the Uranium
Mill Tailings Radiation Control Act (“UMTRCA”), Pub.
L. No. 95-604, 42 U.S.C. § 7901 et. seq.

NRC protects the health and safety of the public
and the environment by licensing and regulating civilian
use of radioactive materials, including source material
(uranium and thorium), enriched uranium and plutonium,
and byproduct material, including mill tailings. NRC
employs over 3,000 people at five primary locations, and
has an annual budget of about $1 billion. Approximately
90% of NRC’s budget authority is recovered from licensees
and license applicants.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

The Virginia legislature’s “radiological safety
concerns” about “uranium milling and uranium tailings
management,” Pet. App.26a-27a (Traxler, J., dissenting),
such as possible contamination of the drinking water supply
by tailings piles, are based on common misconceptions
about uranium, radiation, and the federal regulatory
process. While radioactive materials must be managed
with due care, the NRC is chartered, funded, and staffed
to ensure that all aspects of the nuclear fuel cycle are
executed safely, and are protective of public health and
the environment.

Uranium milling and tailings management, as
licensed and regulated by NRC today, do not pose any
significant risk to public health or the environment. NRC

5

NRC’s layered approach to protect public health and
safety and the environment employs carefully crafted
regulations incorporating a conservative margin of
safety, comprehensive review of license applications and
renewals to ensure licensees meet all regulatory criteria,

action by NRC if necessary to assure compliance.
ARGUMENT

NRC’s regulations and oversight of the uranium
milling and tailings management processes provide a
high margin of safety for workers, the public, and the
environment—both during the operational life of the
facility and afterward. NRC’s regulations and oversight
program have developed through the agency’s expertise
and experience, and are in line with modern international
standards and practices for conventional uranium mining

NRC’s radiological safety standards require licensed
uranium milling and tailings disposal facilities—like all
NRC-licensed facilities—to maintain radiation dose levels
as low as reasonably achievable, and in no case higher than
NRC’s numerical standards, which are set far below levels
likely to cause harm.

Before construction of uranium milling facilities and
mill tailings impoundments can even begin, prospective
licensees must demonstrate to NRC that the planned
facilities will meet regulatory requirements designed
to ensure the operational safety of the mill and the safe
disposal and effective containment of mill tailings for the

6

long term without the need for active maintenance. NRC
inspects and monitors licensees throughout construction
and active operations, and at decommissioning, the licensee
must return the site and the tailings impoundments to
levels similar to the natural surroundings. Ownership of

the land on which tailings impoundments are located is
then transferred to the Federal or state government for
long-term surveillance.

I. The Uranium Recovery Process and the
Commission’s Regulatory Authority

A. Uranium in the Natural Environment

Uranium is a naturally-occurring element with an
average concentration of 2.8 parts per million in the
Earth’s crust. While large deposits like the Coles Hill
orebody are rare, traces of uranium are found almost
everywhere on Earth—it is about 500 times more
abundant than gold, and about as common as tin. Uranium
is commonly found in bedrock materials such as granite
and limestone, and trace amounts from natural sources
are commonly found in air and water. Vast amounts of
uranium are in the world’s oceans, although in very low
concentrations.

Uranium, whether before or after it is mined
and milled, emits radiation, but at levels that are not

considered hazardous. For example, a handful of natural
uranium ore emits about as much radiation as 10 bananas.‘

4. Canadian Nuclear Association, How Radioactive Is
Uranium Ore?, http-//talknuclear.ca/2014/08/just-how-radioactive-
is-uranium-ore/ (last visited July 24, 2018). Bananas contain the
naturally-occurring radioactive isotope potassium-40.

7

Natural uranium is primarily (>99%) composed of U-238,
an isotope with very low radioactivity and a half-life
of over 4 billion years, m

VIRGINIA URANIUM, INC., ET AL.,
Petitioners,

Vv.

JOHN WARREN, ET AL.,
Respondents.

ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

BRIEF OF NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF
STATE LEGISLATORS, NATIONAL LEAGUE OF CITIES,
AND INTERNATIONAL CITY/COUNTY
MANAGEMENT ASSOCIATION AS
AMICI CURIAE IN SUPPORT OF RESPONDENTS

Lisa Soronen John J. Korzen
STATE AND LOCAL Counsel of Record
LEGAL CENTER WAKE FOREST UNIVERSITY

123 N. Capitol St. N.W. SCHOOL OF LAW
Washington, DC 20001 APPELLATE ADVOCACY
(202) 434-4845 CLINIC
Post Office Box 7206
Winston-Salem, NC 27109
(336) 758-5832
korzenjj@wfu.edu

GibsoaMoore Appellate Services, LLC
306 Beast Cary Street® Richmond, VA 88318
204-2349-7T770 © wwe gibsonmeoere set

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page:
TABLE OF AUTHORITIBG............................s0eeeeeeeees ii
INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE ....000.00..... eee 1
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT .......000000000........... I
IEE .stiitasienibineiiditnatetilihiatetnieneidiitanipbitenntintieinantnivamens 3

|. Petitioners seek extraordinary relief
that is not subject to any limiting
SR ckisstvidicsieseseeciebigintrlenmcsaingiceahidineuiewneerens 3

Il. Preemption analysis should not turn on
the subjective intentions of state

i

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Page(s):

Cases:
Booth v. Indiana,

a i vciitinicccocccevoctnsinninmaiiiinaiieaiiansines 3
Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co.,

556 U.S. 868 (2O009)...................c..ecececceesseeeeeees 10, 11
Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Services,

es ee crnititnivcsnnstininesintennicanmnenrninnhinnnetion 11
Greenburg v. Collier,

482 F. Supp. 200 (E.D. Va. 1979).......................... 7
Lexington Insurance Co. v.
Precision Drilling Co.,

830 F.3d 1219 (10th Cir. 2016)..................0......... 12
Philip Morris USA v. Williams,

ED UF, BE Gi iiceccecvccsececccccscccvesccccescssonccoesaves 10
Rodriguez v. United States,

Ee ccitesiccintntincnienenecesinticmetntinaunauinbiatin 4
Shady Grove Orthopedic A‘. ciates, P_A. v
Allstate Insurance Co.,

ee Ee SI cccisincsscncnsecsevesecthastecteneeneunsnenes 10
Sibbach v. Wilson & Co.,

ean eee 10

Simpson v. Commonwealth of Kentucky,
No. 88-5065 (L), 1989 WL, 20625

(Gth Cir. Feb. 28, 1989).................c.cccceceeeeeeeeeceeeeeees 3
Tenney v. Brandhove,
OR Eee 6

United States v. Ursery,
gt SE 10

“**

Wilmington Star Mining Co. v. Fulton,
EE 3

Constitutional Provisions:

Bart M. Davis, Kate Kelly, & Kristin Ford,
Use of Legislative History:
Willow Witching for Legislative Intent,
43 Idaho L. Rev. 585 (2007) ....00000000.....0.ccccccecee. 8

Joyce W. Lacy & Craig E. L. Stark,
The Neuroscience of Memory:
Implications for the Courtroom,
Nat'l Inst. Health,
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articies/?M
C4183265/pdf/nihms-624859. pdf

(last visited Aug. 28, 2018) ..............0...0.-.000000000---. 7
Legislative Reference Library of Texas:
Typical Materials, https://Irl.texas.gov/legis/
legintent/typicalMaterials.cfm#minutes

(last visited Aug. 27, 2018)....................0---0--00.. 9
Legislative Reference Center:
Legislative History, Va. Division Legis. Servs.,
http://dls.virginia.gov/Irc/leghist. htm

(last visited Aug. 27, 2018) ............0-...00000000000000---. 9
Missouri Legislative History:
Legislative History, U. Mo. Sch. L..,
http:/Mibraryguides. missouri.edu/c.php?g=286
32&p=175352

(last visited Aug. 27, 2018) .......................ccccceeeeeee 8

iv

Peggy Lewis & Matt Dawkins,
Researching Legislative History,
ee ae 3)

Richard A. Danner,
Justice Jackson’s Lament: Historical and
Comparative Perspectives on the
Availability of Legislative Hi '

13 Duke J. Comp. & Int'l L. 151 (2003) ............... 8
Steven F. Huefner,
The Neglected Value of the Legislative
Privilege in State Legislatures,

45 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 221 (2003)...................... 7

Torres & Windsor,

State Legislative Histories:

A Select, Annotated Bibliography,
Fe omen 10

INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE'

The National Conference of State Legislatures
(NCSL) is a bipartisan organization that serves the
legislators and staffs of the Nation’s 50 States, its
Commonwealths, and Territories. NCSL provides
research, technical assistance, and opportunities for
policymakers to exchange ideas on the most pressing
state issues. NCSL advocates for the interests of state
governments before Congress and federal agencies
and regularly submits amicus briefs to this Court in
cases, like this one, that raise issues of vital state
concern.

The National League of Cities (NLC) is dedicated
to helping city leaders build better communities. NLC
is a resource and advocate for 19,000 cities, towns,
and villages, representing more than 218 million
Americans.

The International City/County Management
Association (ICMA) is a non-profit professional and
educational organization consisting of more than
11,000 appointed chief executives and assistants
serving cities, counties, towns, and regional entities.
ICMA’s mission is to create excellence in local
governance by advocating and developing the
professional management of local governments
throughout the world.

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

Petitioners seek to compel a state to allow
uranium minimum on nonfederal land based on

' This brief was prepared by counsel for amici and not by
counsel for any party. No outside contributions were made to
the preparation or submission of this brief Both parties have
given written consent to the filing of this brief.

federal preemption, even though the federal act in
question is silent as to uranium mining on nonfederal
land, mining is historically subject to state police
power, and a statute in the state in question bans
uranium mining. Such extraordinary relief would not
be subject to a limiting principle. The Court should
affirm the dismissal of such an unwonted claim.

Petitioners’ implied preemption argument is also
extraordinary, because it depends on divining the
subjective intent of a state legislature rather than
relying on the plain text of the state’s legislation.
Respondents persuasively contend that peering
behind statutory text in search of some unexpressed
actual motive is a fruitless endeavor.

For one thing, if legislative motive is a factual
inquiry, then depositions and other discovery of
sitting legislators might follow. Discovery of
legislators and legislative staffers would be high'y
intrusive and also run afoul of the states’ analogs to
the federal Speech or Debate Clause, which are found
in more than forty states. Determinations of the
subjective intent behind legislation are also
unreliable due to the mix of motives animating
legislation and the passage of time.

Furthermore, states lack the resources to produce
the types of legislative history available to courts
construing federal statutes. The available legislative
history documentation therefore varies greatly from
state to state, making consistent preemption analysis
based on legislative history impossible.

Finally, there is no workable rule for determining
the subjective intent of state legislators. Allowing
Petitioners’ preemption claim to proceed would raise
many unanswerable questions about when federal-

state conflicts can be resolved based on matters
outside the statutory text.
ARGUMENT
Amici agree fully with the contentions in the Brief
for Respondents. Amici write separately to oppose the
extraordinary relief sought by Petitioners and to
address further the problems inherent in determining

a state legislature’s subjective intent. See Resp. Br. at
38-43.

I. Petitioners seek extraordinary relief that is
not subject to any limiting principle.

Petitioners seek extraordinary relief—a federal
court injunction compelling a state sovereign, the
Commonwealth of Virginia, to grant uranium mining
permits on nonfederal land. They seek this relief even
though the federal act in question never mentions
uranium mining on nonfederal land, a Virginia
statute does not permit uranium mining, and “the
regulation of mining has long been recognized as a
legitimate exercise of a state’s police powers.”
Simpson v. Commonwealth of Kentucky, No. 88-5065
(L), 1989 WL 20625 (6th Cir. Feb. 28, 1989) (citing
Booth v. Indiana, 237 U.S. 391, 396 (1915);
Wilmington Star Mining Co. v. Fulton, 205 U.S. 60,
73 (1907) (“The use and enjoyment of mining property
being subject to the reasonable exercise of the police
power of the state. . . .”)).

Amici fear the lack of any limiting principle on
such relief. For example, imagine a_ three-step
process, with the steps in chronological order dubbed
A, B, and C. Might federal courts enjoin a state to
require step A even though the state bans step A, step
A has historically been subject to the state’s police

power, and the federal act in question only regulates
steps B and C? That is the relief Petitioners seek here.

Or imagine a federal Paper Production Act, the
purpose of which includes encouraging the production
of paper, overseen by a Federal Paper Agency (FPA).
The Act is silent as to the clear cutting of trees on
nonfederal land while allowing the clear cutting of
trees on federal land. The Act and the FPA regulate
safe practices only for the milling of trees into paper
and the safe handling of pulp waste. A state does not
allow clear cutting of trees. After the price of paper
goes up, landowners seek an injunction requiring the
state to allow them to clear cut trees on nonfederal
land. Can a federal court so enjoin the state?

The dissent below would seemingly say “Yes, bring
on the chainsaws.” See Pet. 47a-48a (stating that the
Act’s purpose is to unleash “the power of the private
sector” to develop nuclear energy). Amici contend that
“No,” federal silence as to step A while regulating only
steps B and C does not preempt a state’s ability to
regulate step A, particularly where regulating step A
has historically been a legitimate exercise of state
police power. To force states to allow some
preliminary step, in a process for which Congress has
regulated only later steps, is wrong because “it
frustrates rather than effectuates legislative intent
simplistically to assume that whatever furthers the
statute’s primary objective must be the law.”
Rodriguez v. United States, 480 U.S. 522, 526 (1987)
(per curiam).

Again, how the rule sought by Petitioners might
be limited is unclear. What if a federal act regulates
only step C and neither step A nor step B, which have
both historically been subject to state police power?

5

Might a federal court enjoin a state that prohibits
steps A and B so as to require the state to permit both
of them? Truly Petitioners’ claim would lead to such
slippery slopes. A ruling for Petitioners would inject
mischief and uncertainty into preemption analysis.
Amici ask the Court for this reason to affirm the lower
court.

II. Preemption analysis should not turn on the
subjective intentions of state legislators.

Petitioners also make an extraordinary implied
preemption argume*: They would require courts to
look past the plain language of decades-old state
statutes and attempt to divine a single “true purpose”
of state legislators at the time of enactment. They
argue that Virginia’s ban on uranium mining should
be preempted because Virginia intended also to ban
uranium millings and tailings storage. But the
Virginia legislature did not actually ban uranium
milling or tailings storage; it only banned mining.
Who knows what the Virginia legislature intended in
the early 1980s when it passed the ban? It should not
even matter when the federal statute only addresses
uranium milling or tailings storage.

Preemption should not be based on an exploration
for the subjective intent of state legislators, for
numerous reasons, including that: (1) discovery of
state legislators’ subjective intentions would be
intrusive and inconclusive; (2) the availability of state
legislative history varies widely from state to state;
and (3) there is no workable rule for determining the
subjective intent of state legislators.

1. If determining the purpose of a challenged
state law involves an issue of historical fact, as
Petitioners and the Federal Government assume, see

6

Resp. Br. at 34, then plaintiffs may seek to discover
the purposes of state legislators in enacting
legislation, including by depositions, interrogatories,
and more. Such discovery would be improper,
however, because it is “not consonant with our scheme
of government for a court to inquire into the motives
of legislators.” Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367,
377 (1951). The Speech or Debate Clause of the
United States Constitution explicitly protects
Senators and Representatives from legal inquiries
based on their speech during sessions of their
respective houses. U.S. Const. art. I, § 6, cl. 1 (“for any
speech or debate in either House, they shall not be
questioned in any other place”).

The Constitution included the Speech or Debate
Clause because “[i]n order to enable and encourage a
representative of the public to discharge his public
trust with firmness and success, it is indispensably
necessary, that he should enjoy the fullest liberty of
speech, and that he should be protected from the
resentment of every one.” Tenney, 341 U.S. at 373
(quoting I] Works of Jams Wilson 38 (Andrews ed.
1896)). The clause means that “[ljegislators are
immune from deterrents to the uninhibited discharge
of their legislative duty, not for their private
indulgence but for the public good.” Tenney, 341 U.S.
at 377.

The Constitution of Virginia contains a similar
provision that grants immunity to legislators “for any
speech or debate in either house.” Va. Const. art. IV,
§ 9. The clause also exempts members of the Virginia
General Assembly from being subject to civil process
during sessions. Jd. The Eastern District of Virginia
has held that the Virginia Speech or Debate Clause
and the United States Constitution’s Speech or

Debate Clause prohibit a plaintiff from subpoenaing
and deposing a Virginia state legislator to inquire into
his legislative activity or his motives for the activity.
Greenburg v. Collier, 482 F. Supp. 200, 204 (E.D. Va.
1979).

Forty-three other state constitutions contain a
section similar to the Speech or Debate Clause.
Steven F. Huefner, The Neglected Value of the
Legislative Privilege in State Legislatures, 45 Wm. &
Mary L. Rev. 221, 224 (2003). This protection is
critical because “society's increasing propensity to
litigate and contemporary distrust of government
almost ruarantee that disaffected individuals—and
even some political opportunists—will seek creative
ways to gain relief through, extract information from,
or merely harass or burden, elected state
representatives.” Id. at 226-27. Thus, discovery of
state legislators’ subjective intent might not even be
allowed.

Discovery of state legislators’ subjective intent, if
even allowed, would put a burden on legislative
resources, including the time of legislators and their
staffers. And to what end would such fact discovery
lead? Legislators should not be expected to recollect
their intentions years after the fact. According to the
“forgetting curve,” people are typically unable to
retrieve roughly 50% of information one hour after
receiving it. Joyce W. Lacy & Craig E. L. Stark, The
Neuroscience of Memory: Implications for the
Courtroom, Nat'l Inst. Health,
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4183
265/pdf/nihms-624859.pdf (last visited Aug. 28, 2018).
Memory is especially malleable, and legislators’
might understandably recall motivations that did not
exist at the time or forget ones that did. See id.

Eyewitness testimony is considered most reliable
when recorded immediately after an event, certainly

not thirty-five years later. /d.

2. Moreover, states do not have the resources of
the Federal Government and its ability to create
extensive legislative history. The resources for
creating and the availability of different types of
legislative history varies significantly from state to
state. See Bart M. Davis, Kate Kelly, & Kristin Ford,
Use of Legislative History: Willow Witching for
Legislative Intent, 43 Idaho L. Rev. 585, 586 (2007).
Searching for legislative intent can be a “perilous
quest” due to “the nature of the legislative process and
the unreliability of the records as consensus
documents.” Jd. at 600. For the intent of Congress,
courts at least have the reliable recordation of
Congressional debates on the floor and in committees.
Richard A. Danner, Justice Jackson’s Lament:
Historical and Comparative Perspectives on the
Availability of Legislative History, 13 Duke J. Comp.
& Int'l L. 151, 165-70 (2003). At the state level,
however, there is no guarantee of finding legislative
history as extensive as the Congressional records.

Some states are able to create significantly more
or less legislative history than others. Rhode Island,
for example, has no floor or committee debate records
available. Id. The only legislative history in Missouri
is official copies of bills, without support
documentation of legislative comments or debate.
Missouri Legislative History: Legislative History, U.
Mo. Sch. L., _ http://libraryguides.missouri.edu/
c.php?g=28632&p=175352 (last visited Aug. 27,
2018). Idaho does not make drafting records of bills
available to the public and does not record legislative
floor debate. Davis, supra, at 586. It does make

9

available committee minutes and attachments and
some statements of lerislative intent from state
House and Senate Reports. Jd. Colorado researchers
can find procedural history, audio records of
legislative hearings and floor debates, summaries of
committee meetings, and different versions of the bill.
Peggy Lewis & Matt Dawkins, Researching
Legislative History, 44 Colo. L. 33 (2015). North
Carolina provides the chronological bill history,
committee minutes, and possibly floor debate audio
records for some laws. North Carolina General
Assembly Legislative Library, North Carolina
Legislative History Step by Step.

On the other hand, Texas provides audio and video
of legislative floor debates, bill files with committee
reports and analyses, house and senate journals,
statements of legislative intent, committee meeting
minutes, and session summaries. Davis, supra, at
586; Legislative Reference Library of Texas:
Typical Materials, https://Irl. texas. gov/legis/
legintent/typicalMaterials.cfm#minutes (last visited
Aug. 27, 2018).

Virginia has little legislative history. Virginia does
not officially record legislative intent through any
means. Legislative Reference Center: Legislative
History, Va. Division Legis. Servs.,
http://dls.virginia.gov/Irc/leghist.htm (last visited
Aug. 27, 2018). The only tools to search for legislative
intent are drafts of bills, fiscal impact statements, and
video archives of floor sessions. Jd. Transcripts are
not provided for the videos. Id.

The varying availability of legislutive history
materials at the state level confirms this Court's
statement that “determining whether state and

10

federal rules conflict based on the subjective
intentions of the state legislature is an enterprise
destined to produce ‘confusion worse confounded,”
Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins.
Co., 559 U.S. 393, 404 (2010) (quoting Sibbach v.
Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1, 14 (1941)). The same law
might survive preemption in one state and be
preempted in another simply due to the differences in
available legislative history materials. Jd. Because
laws are often passed for multiple purposes,
determining the different purposes “may be
impossible to discern.” Id. Federal judges asked to
preempt state law “would be condemned to poring
through state legislative history—which may be less
easily obtained, less thorough, and less familiar than
its federal counterpart.” Jd. at 405 (citing R. Mersky
& D. Dunn, Fundamentals of Legal Research 233 (8th
ed. 2002); Torres & Windsor, State Legislative
Histories: A Select, Annotated Bibliography, 85 L. Lib.
J. 545, 547 (1993)). This Court has rejected the
approach required by Petitioners’ preemption theory
before and should do so again here.

3. Finally, without a workable rule for
determining the subjective intent of state legislators,
Petitioners’ claim should not go forward. See Philip
Morris USA v. Williams, 549 U.S. 346, 354 (2007)
(declining to permit punitive damages for injuries to
nonparty victims because it “would add a near
standardless dimension to the punitive damages
equation. How many such victims are there? How
seriously were they injured? Under what
circumstances did injury occur?’); United States v.
Ursery, 518 U.S. 267, 284 n.2 (1997) (rejecting
proposed rule as “unworkable”); Caperton v. A.T.
Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868, 893 (2009) (Roberts,

11]

C.J., dissenting).(a standard is problematic when it
“fails to provide clear, workable guidance for future
cases”). Any test for seeking the subjective intent of a
state legislature would raise more questions than it
could possibly answer. See Caperton, 556 U.S. at 893-
98 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (listing forty questions
created by the majority’s test for judicial recusal).

There is no workable rule for determining the
subjective intent of state legislators. How exactly
could a federal court determine the subjective intent
of a state legislature that passed a statute? Would the
statements of a majority of then-serving legislators as
to their intent be sufficient? How about language
regarding legislative intent in a unanimous
committee report? But what if that language was left
out of the final legislation or modified? What about
the statement of a bill’s sponsor? What about
legislators’ statements made during consideration of
a prior version of a statute? And how to determine the
subjective intent of a legislature in a state without
resources to produce much in the way of legislative
history? In short, there is no workable rule for the
divining of subjective legislative intent.

This lack of a workable standard suggests a
possible reason why Petitioners argue so repeatedly
that Virginia has “conceded” that the 1983 Virginia
law in question has a purpose bringing it within the
preempted field.

In conclusion, whether state legislation may be
preempted should be assessed based on the plain
language that the state legislature carefully arrived
at. Legislative history is “often murky, ambiguous,
and contradictory,” and it can be cherry-picked to
support a desired outcome. Exxon Mobil Corp. v.

12

Allapattah Servs., 545 U.S. 546, 568 (2005). Courts
should not disregard the plain language of a state
statute based on speculation of legislative intent not
contained in the text. Lexington Ins. Co. v. Precision
Drilling Co., 830 F.3d 1219, 1221 (10th Cir. 2016)
(opinion of then-Judge Gorsuch). In Lexington, the
Tenth Circuit reasoned that “the task of trying to
discern the textually unexpressed intentions of (or
really attribute such intentions to) a legislative body
composed of scores or often hundreds of individuals is
a notoriously doubtful business.” /d. Petitioners’
preemption case depends on that “notoriously
doubtful business” and invites unwarranted second-
guessing of the enactments of separate sovereigns.
Amici urge this Court to affirm the dismissal of
Petitioners’ complaint.

CONCLUSION

The judgment of the Fourth Circuit should be
affirmed.

Respectfully submitted,
LISA SORONEN JOHN J. KORZEN
STATE AND LOCAL Counsel of Record
LEGAL CENTER WAKE FOREST UNIVERSITY

123 N. Capitol St. N.W. SCHOOL OF LAW
Washington, DC 20001 APPELLATE ADVOCACY
(202) 434-4845 CLINIC
Post Office Box 7206
Winston-Salem, NC 27109
(336) 758-5832
korzenjj@wfu.edu

SEPTEMBER 2018 Counsel for Amici Curiae

No. 16-1275

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

VIRGINIA URANIUM, INC., et al.,
Petitioners,
Vv.

JOHN WARREN, et al.
Respondents.

ON A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH
CIRCUIT

BRIEF OF NUCLEAR ENERGY INSTITUTE AS
AMICUS CURIAE IN SUPPORT OF

PETITIONERS
ELLEN C. GINSBERG PeTER C. MEIER
ANNE W. COTTINGHAM Counsel of Record
JONATHAN M. RUND STEPHEN B. KINNAIRD
NUCLEAR ENERGY SEAN D. UNGER
INSTITUTE PAUL HASTINGS LLP
1201 F Street, NW, Suite 875 15th Street, N.W.
1100 Washington, D.C. 20005

Washington, DC 20004 Telephone: (202) 551-1700
Telephone: (202) 739-8140 petermeier@paulhastings.com

Counsel for Amicus Curiae Nuclear Energy
Institute

TABLE OF CONTENTS

STATEMENT OF INTEREST OF AMICUS

IV.

The Federal Government Occupies the
Field of Nuclear Safety, Regulating the

Entire Lifecycle of Radiological
Materials from Uranium Processing to

the Disposition of Spent Fuel. ...................

In Deciding Federal Preemption Issues,
the Atomic Energy Act Directs Courts
To Examine Whether the State Acted for

The Decision Below Conflicts With the
Federal Government's Exclusive
Regulatory Authority over the
Radiological Risk of Nuclear Materials,
on which the Nuclear Industry Has Long

BENE consecensccesswssscnsteseqnenvastennionsennipannagecenene

A Healthy Nuclear Industry Is Vital for

National Bocwurity. ................ccccssocscesseesseees
CONCLUSION

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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases

Am. Ins. Ass'n v. Garamendi,

English v. Gen. Elec. Co.,

eM ateicnsnrcssitetiincsneesianinicit

Entergy Nuclear Vit. Yankee, LLC v.
Shumlin,

733 F.3d 393 (2d Cir. 2013)......................

Greater N.Y. Metro Food Council, Inc. v.
Giuliani.

195 F.3d 100 (2d Cir. 1999).......................

In re Hanford Nuclear Reservation Litig.,

534 F.3d 986 (9th Cir. 2008) ....................

In the Matter of Hydro Res., Inc. (P.O. Box
777 Crownpoint, Nm 87313),

63 N.R.C. 510 (May 16, 2006)...

Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, Local 97 v.
Niagara Mohawk Power Corp.,

143 F.3d 704 (2d Cir. 1998)......................

Mousesian v. Victoria Versicherung AG,

670 F.3d 1067 (9th Cir. 2012) -................

O'Conner v. Commonwealth Edison Co.,

13 F.3d 1090 (7th Cir. 1994)...

Page(s)

sonal passim

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

(continued)
Page(s)

Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy

Resources Conservation & Dev. Comm'n,

ee er iticeiceninsiieesieeneeciinstentamaniaes passim
Roberts v. Florida Power & Light Co.,

146 F.3d 1305 (11th Cir. 1998) .......................00..... 5
Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp.,

I tlie 9, 11
Skull Valley Band of Goshute Indians v.

Nielson,

376 F.5d 1223 (10th Cir. 2004) ..........0000000.... passim
Suffolk Cty. v. Long Island Lighting Co.,

i 11
United States v. Commonwealth of Kentucky,

252 F.3d 816 (Gth Cir. 2001)................................ 13
United States v. Manning,

527 F.3d 828 (Oth Cir. 2008) .........................00000- 13
Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v.

Entergy Nuclear Vermont Yankee, LLC,

683 F.3d 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2012).........00..0.0000000cco 13
Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Nat.

Res. Def. Council, Inc.,

EE eee a ee 9

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

(continued)
Page(s)
Statutes
42 U.S.C.
ST IID «.s sacrsereeininisineneiiesemiainiamitndeeiials _passim
TTT taeechaciansihicinbine memeanieaeteiatilis 16
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State Statutes
I a eelainaria 14
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Regulations
10 C.F.R.
(SN NES AEG S Cae aE ne 6
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iv

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

(continued)
Page(s)
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IIIT ion esha eariereeaeariatetiriincethineatraianeteaeniciciae isi ddlaad tl 6
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Other Authorities
Brief of Senator Tom Cotton, Senator Jim
Inhofe, and Senator Ted Cruz as Amicus
Curiae in Support of Petitioner (“Cotton
Amicus”) Case No. 16-1275 (May 25,
CERNE ER 19

Energy Futures Initiative, The U.S. Nuclear

Energy Enterprise: A Key National
Security Enabler (Aug. 2017)..............

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385016_0744%3A12. Public record. Not legal advice.
