# Amicus Curiae Brief — Gill v. Whitford, 138 S. Ct. 52 (2017) (No. 16-1161)

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Amicus Curiae Brief
- **Published:** January 1, 2017

## Text

No. 16-1161
Dn the Supreme Court of the Gnited States

—-—-@-

BEVERLY R. GILL, et al.,

Appellants,
Vv.
WILLIAM WHITFORD, et al.,
Agpemes.

i a ——— — ~ 6 ttl.

On PO from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Wisconsin
a
BRIEF OF CALIFORNIA CITIZENS REDISTRICTING
COMMISSION AND FAIRDISTRICTS NOw, INC. AS AMICI
CURIAE IN SUPPORT OF APPELLEES
.

Benjamin R. Fliegel
REED SMITH LLP

355 S. Grand Avenue
Los Angeles, CA 90071
(213) 457-8000
bfliegel@reedsmith.com

Brian A. Sutherland
Counsel of Record
REED SMITH LLP
101 2nd Street
San Francisco, CA 94105
(415) 543-8700
September 5, 2017 bsutherland@reedsmith.com

Table of Contents

Page
Interest of Amici Curiae................. Saliba asiauscaaaiaasiialasumaesinnaie 1
Summary of Argument........... Gubbeleaddacn sd saki diletaane tudes 2
ERAT AIRE Sele PSE Se AR OED asapaainid Aatahaacivesinian 3
I. Amici Curiae’s Experiences Show That
Neutral Decision-Makers Can Implement
Non-Partisan Standards for Drawing
BROCtOral DIBETICES...............cccccccreccccesccees Nearer 3
A. California’s Citizens Redistricting
Nee abreast 4
3 California’s Standards for
Drawing Electoral Districts ........5
2. California’s Experience ............... 6
B. FairDistricts Now, Inc. ................c.ce00000 i)
1. Florida’s Standards for
Drawing Electoral Districts ...... 10
2. Florida’s Experience.................. 10
LI. Upon a Finding That a Redistricting Plan

Violates Voters’ Rights Through Partisan
Gerrymandering, Neutral Redistricting
Standards Are a Permissible Remedy ........... 14

CINE on ceccccceccses ot ee Lay ahs RO de Thea a 16

i

Table of Authorities

Cases

Brown v. Secretary of State,

668 F.3d 1271 (11th Cir. 2012).............

Davis v. Bandemer,

478 U.S. 109 (1986) ...ccccccccccccseceeeeeeeeseees

In re Senate Joint Resolution of
Legislative Apportionment 1176,

83 So. 3d 597 (Fla. 2012)..........cccccceeees ,

League of United Latin American
Citizens v. Perry,

Ee ie ID vcesccccesssccesesoceesossvores

League of Women Voters of Florida v.
Florida House of Representatives,

132 So. 3d 135 (Fla. 2013).....................

League of Women Voters of Florida v.
Detzner,

172 So. 3d 363 (Fla. 2015)...

League of Women Voters of Florida v.
Detzner,

179 So. 3d 258 (Fla. 2015)................0000

Radanovich v. Bowen,
No. 11-cv-09786 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 9,

PE Adetiniedacusipecinensssentideveednsisabeiesvubececes

Page(s)

iil

Vandermost v. Bowen,

_ fA FY. . | ewes 4, 5, 6, 8
Vieth v. Jubelirer,
oR it Bf RRP 1, 14, 15

Constitutions and Statutes

ees Fe Ue OS | Se er 4, 5, 6
Cal. Gov't Code $6 GBB1 66 6007. ....0.cccocscccccesececssscccssssees 5
Cal, Gaw't Cardin © iB ccecccccoseccstenciseenssssugapeseniniannnan 5
Cah, Gev't Carte © GIBB, cscccvccccscssssscsseasercsoniatbasmnenanianne 6
yy Be Fe! re 11
Wem. Comet. G6: Tile BD BP cevecsceccssctesetecesrechuenianal 9,10
2 ee. UY US) ere 9,10
Other Authorities

Barry Edwards et al., Jnstitutional
Control of Redistricting and the
Geography of Representation, 79
B. FORD Fe IG UP ccvesntisdctidecicstsastaaae 8

Eric McGhee & Daniel Krimm,
California’s New Electoral Reforms:
The Fall Election (Nov. 2012),
ORE OP IIEED ccsesvescsssseserssestestecsansentenuaen 8-9

iv

Jowei Chen & Jonathan Rodden,
Cutting Through the Thicket:
Redistricting Simulations and the
Detection of Partisan Gerrymanders,

14 Election L.J. 331 (2015) ..............2.-000000-0-0-ssee0s

Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos, Arizona
and Anti-Reform, 2015 University of

Chicago Legal Forum 477 (2015).................

Raphael J. Sonenshein, When the People
Draw the Lines (League of Women
Voters of Cal. 2012),

|). ae

Viadimir Kogan & Eric McGhee,
Redistricting California: An
Evaluation of the Citizens
Commission Final Plans, 4 Cal. J.

Politics & Policy 1 (2012) .............-.0....002c2 000

15

INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE!

Since this Court issued its decision in Vieth v.
Jubelirer, the States of California and Florida, which
together account for more than one sixth of the
population of the United States, have amended their
state constitutions to prohibit partisan
gerrymandering. California granted authority to an
independent commission to draw district boundaries
while Florida entrusted its Legislature with that
task. The citizens of both States enacted a
constitutional rule that districts may not be drawn
for the purpose of favoring or disfavoring political
parties. A fundamental premise underlying this rule
is that neutral decision-makers are able to apply it,
in the case of line drawers, or enforce it, in the case of
courts, in a non-partisan manner.

The mission of California’s Citizens Redistricting
Commission and FairDistricts Now, Inc. is to ensure
that electoral districts are drawn in a non-partisan
manner in California and Florida, respectively. Amici
curiae have a strong interest in the outcome of this
case because public confidence in their work depends
on the proposition that rules requiring non-partisan
redistricting can be respected and applied. If this
Court were to conclude that no neutral principles for

1 Pursuant to Rule 37.6, amici curiae state that no
counsel for a party authored this brief in whole or in
part and that no person other than amici and their
counsel made a monetary contribution to its
preparation or submission. The parties’ letters
consenting to the filing of amicus curiae briefs have
been filed with the Clerk’s office.

2

drawing electoral boundaries’ exist—that the
redistricting process raises little besides “political
questions”—that conclusion might undercut amici
curiae’s institutional mission. Accordingly, while
amici curiae take no position on the ultimate outcome
of this case, they urge the Court to conclude that
neutral arbiters, including commissions and courts,
can implement redistricting standards in a non-
partisan manner, thereby protecting’ voters’
constitutional rights.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

Neutral, non-partisan principles for drawing
electoral boundaries exist. They can be found in the
constitutions of the States of California and Florida,
which expressly prohibit line-drawing for the purpose
of favoring or discriminating against an incumbent or
political party. Instead, in these States, map drawers
must follow traditional redistricting principles such
as contiguity, compactness, and respect for existing
political boundaries. In the experience of amici
curiae, when those who prepare an apportionment
plan seek to avoid partisan considerations, they can
produce a plan that is free from invidious
discrimination based on voters’ political views and
associations.

The decisions of California and Florida voters to
amend their state constitutions to prohibit partisan
gerrymandering strongly suggest that these voters
concluded that, absent legal constraints, redistricting
to favor or disfavor political parties poses a serious
risk of burdening voters’ rights. Amici curiae do not,
however, propose a standard for determining

3

whether a State’s redistricting plan imposes an
unconstitutional burden. Their limited aim is to
assist the Court by providing assurance that neutral
decision-makers proceeding in good faith can apply
redistricting principles in a non-partisan manner.

Thus, while a federal court should intervene in
the States’ redistricting processes only as a last
resort, if it finds that a State’s redistricting plan
violates voters’ constitutional rights, it may provide
redress appropriate to that injury: a plan drawn
without discriminatory partisan intent, using
traditional redistricting principles.

ARGUMENT

I. Amici Curiae’s Experiences Show That
Neutral Decision-Makers Can Implement
Non-Partisan Standards for Drawing
Electoral Districts

The constitutions of California and Florida
prohibit the drawing of electoral maps with an intent
to favor or disfavor a political party. These rules
matter. Amici curiae’s experiences demonstrate that
while applying mandatory redistricting criteria in a
non-partisan manner is not a simple task, neutral
decision-makers can create apportionment plans in
accordance with applicable law and _ without
discriminating against voters based on their political
views or associations.

4

A. California’s Citizens Redistricting
Commission

In 2008 and 2010, California voters exercised
their legislative initiative authority to approve ballot
propositions 11 and 20, respectively, which amended
their state constitution and statutes. As amended,
California’s constitution establishes an independent
commission—the Citizens Redistricting Commission
(“CRC”)}—to draw state legislative districts and
congressional districts. See Vandermost v. Bowen,
269 P.3d 446, 455 (Cal. 2012).

California’s constitution provides that the CRC
shall have fourteen members, composed of five
members of the State’s largest political party
(Democratic), five members of the next largest
political party (Republican), and four members from
neither of these parties. Cal. Const. art. XXI,
§ 2(c)(2). To approve a district map, at least three
members from each of the three groups (i.e., the two
largest political parties in California based on
registration and three votes from members who are
not registered with either of these two political
parties) must vote in favor of it. See id. § 2(c)(5).

California law imposes numerous requirements
designed to prevent political partisans from
“hacking” or infiltrating the Commission. California
citizens may apply to serve as commissioners. To be
eligible, the applicant must have voted in two out of
the last three statewide elections and must have
been registered to vote as a member of the same
political party, or unaffiliated with any party, for the
last five years. Cal. Const. art. XXI, § 2(c)(3). In

5

addition, an applicant is disqualified if, during the
ten years prior to applying, he or she or an
immediate family member was elected or appointed
to or a candidate for state office; or an employee or
consultant to a political party, campaign, or
legislative body; or a registered lobbyist; or a
contributor of $2,000 or more to a congressional,
state, or local campaign. Cal. Gov’t Code § 8252(a)(2).
These requirements guard against partisan attempts
to conceal party affiliation.

An applicant review panel consisting of one
Democrat, one Republican, and one non-partisan
member screens applicants to reduce the pool to sixty
individuals. Certain designated legislative leaders
may thereafter strike, collectively, up to 24 members
of the pool. Three Democrats, three Republicans, and
two from neither party are then chosen by lottery,
and these eight select the remaining six to form the
full fourteen-member CRC. Cal. Gov’t Code § 8252.

1. California’s Standards for
Drawing Electoral Districts

The stated purpose of the ballot proposition
creating the CRC was to “draw districts based on
strict, nonpartisan rules designed to ensure fair
representation.” Prop. 11, as approved by voters,
General Election (Nov. 4, 2008), § 2(d),
https://goo.gl/b6TiJW. As California’s constitution
declares, the CRC is designed to be “independent
from legislative influence ....” Cal. Const. art. XXI,
§ 2(c)(1); see id. § 2(c)(2); Cal. Gov't Code §§ 8251 et
seq.; Vandermost, 269 P.3d at 455-56.

6

California’s constitution provides that “[d]istricts
shall not be drawn for the purpose of favoring or
discriminating against an incumbent, political
candidate, or political party.” Cal. Const. art. XXI,
§ 2(e). On the flip side of the same coin, producing
competitive elections or partisan symmetry is not a
permissible CRC goal. Instead, the CRC must apply
non-partisan criteria in drawing electoral districts,
including compliance with the United States
Constitution and Voting Rights Act, geographic
contiguity and compactness, and respect for existing
municipal and county boundaries. See id. § 2(d);
Vandermost, 269 P.3d at 457-58. The CRC must
consider the geographic integrit of any local
“community of interest,” exc that such
communities shall not include any relationship with
political parties, incumbents, or candidates. Cal.
Const. art. XXI, § 2(d)(4).

The CRC’s redistricting process is open to public
review and comment. Cal. Const. art. XX1, § 2(b)(1).
The CRC engages in outreach seeking to increase
public participation in the process. With limited
exceptions, CRC records are public and available for
inspection, and all proposed maps must be publicly
displayed and available for public comment before
final adoption by the CRC. Cal. Govt Code
§ 8253(a)(7); see also Vandermost, 269 P.3d at 484
(describing the process as “open, transparent and
nonpartisan”).

2. California’s Experience

The process to select the fourteen members of the
CRC took two years to complete. The applicant

7

review panel initially received 36,000 applications. It
required potential candidates to submit a
supplemental application that included ' essay
questions, reference letters, and financial disclosure
statements. [t received and reviewed more than
4,000 supplemental applications, which it narrowed
down to 120 candidates who were invited to
interviews with the panel and legal counsel. After
interviews, the panel reduced the pool to 60
candidates and the Legislature exercised its right to
strike 24 of them. Eight were selected by lottery and
those eight chose the remaining six. This lengthy
selection process produced a commission that reflects
California’s diversity and is well-qualified to handle
its assigned constitutional role.

The two-year selection process was, of course, only
the beginning. The CRC held 34 public hearings in 32
cities throughout California, during which more than
2,700 speakers provided comments. More than
20,000 individuals and groups submitted written
comments or proposed maps. The CRC and its
committees conducted more than 70 meetings that
were open to the public, live-streamed over the
Internet, recorded, and transcribed. Although the
CRC gathered and processed more information and
public input than expected, it published its final
maps on schedule, approving the state maps by a
vote of 13-1 and the congressional map by a vote of
12-2.

The CRC’s final Senate and congressional maps
were the subject of legal challenges in the California
Supreme Court and federal district court. The courts
rejected these challenges to the CRC’s maps. See

8

Vandermost, 269 P.3d at 484; Radanovich v. Bowen,
No. 11-cv-09786 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 9, 2012) (ECF No.

15).

Scholars who have studied the CRC’s maps have
concluded that the CRC succeeded in adhering to
constitutionally-mandated redistricting standards.
Vladimir Kogan & Eric McGhee, Redistricting
California: An Evaluation of the Citizens Commission
Final Plans, 4 Cal. J. Politics & Policy 1 (2012); see
also Barry Edwards et al., Institutional Control of
Redistricting and the Geography of Representation,
79 J. Politics 722, 724-25 (2017). Kogan and McGhee
found that the CRC drew compact districts, respected
municipal and county boundaries, and succeeded in
“nesting” Assembly districts within Senate districts—
all while complying with the Voting Rights Act. See 4
Cal. J. Politics & Policy at 5-16. A contemporaneous
opinion poll found that of those members of the
public who were aware of the CRC’s work, those who
approved of it outweighed those who did not by a
margin of nearly two to one. Raphael J. Sonenshein,
When the People Draw the Lines, at 71 (League of
Women Voters of Cal. 2012), https://goo.gl/ER4RixX.

Although increasing the competitiveness of
electoral districts was not a permissible CRC goal, it
may not be surprising that increased competition can
be a byproduct of following rules that require the
line-drawing entity to disregard incumbency and
partisan advantage. And observers have found that
California districts became more competitive under
the CRC’s non-partisan plans, i.e., the CRC’s districts
included more open seats and closer races as
compared with prior election years. See Eric McGhee

9

& Daniel Krimm, California’s New Electoral Reforms:
The Fall Election (Nov. 2012), https://goo.gl//Whm3iS.
These observations are congruent with studies
showing a statistically significant relationship
between commission redistricting and one measure of
partisan symmetry—the efficiency gap. See Nicholas
O. Stephanopoulos, Arizona and Anti-Reform, 2015
University of Chicago Legal Forum 477, 496-500
(2015).

In sum, although the CRC does not claim to have
produced district maps that are immune from
critique, it has discharged its constitutional and
statutory duties to draw districts in accordance with
the specified criteria and without a purpose to favor
or disfavor any political party, incumbent, or
candidate.

B. FairDistricts Now, Inc.

In 2010, Florida voters approved Amendments 5
and 6, known as the “Fair Districts” amendments,
which are codified as sections 20 and 21 of article [II
of the Florida constitution. League of Women Voters
of Fla. v. Fla. House of Representatives, 132 So. 3d
135, 189 & n.1 (Fla. 2013). The Fair Districts
amendments did not transfer authority to draw
districts from the Legislature to an independent
commission. Instead, Florida voters enacted
redistricting rules for their Legislature to follow.
Amicus FairDistricts Now, Inc. was formed as a
501(c)(3) organization to monitor the redistricting
process, educate the public about redistricting, and, if
necessary, defend and enforce the Fair Districts
amendments in court.

10

1. Florida’s Standards for
Drawing Electoral Districts

Florida’s constitution provides that, in
establishing congressional and legislative district
boundaries, “[n]o apportionment plan or district shall
be drawn with the intent to favor or disfavor a
political party or an incumbent/[.]” Fla. Const. art. III,
§§ 20(a), 21(a). This provision does not require the
Legislature to create a “fair plan” or competitive
districts; rather, it requires a “neutral” plan drawn
without the constitutionally-prohibited partisan
intent. In re Senate Joint Resolution of Legisiative
Apportionment 1176, 83 So. 3d 597, 643 (Fla. 2012).
Under the Florida constitution, “there is no
acceptable level of improper intent.” Jd. at 617; see
also League of Women Voters of Fla., 132 So. 3d at
138.

The Florida Legislature must apply non-partisan
criteria in drawing electoral districts, including
compliance with federal law, contiguity and
compactness, and respect for existing political and
geographic boundaries. Fla. Const. art. ITI, §§ 20, 21.
Moreover, districts cannot be drawn to deny or
abridge “the equal opportunity of racial or language
minorities to participate in the political process.” Id.

4 Florida’s Experience

In 2012, after the Eleventh Circuit rejected a
litigation challenge to one of the Fair Districts
amendments (Brown v. Secretary of State, 668 F.3d
1271 (11th Cir. 2012)), the Legislature adopted
legislative and congressional districts. As Florida’s

11

constitution required, the Florida Supreme Court
reviewed the Legislature’s districts for the State
House of Representatives and Senate. Fla. Const. art.
Ill, § 16. The Court approved the House plan. It
rejected the Senate plan as unconstitutional and
directed the Legislature to re-draw it. Jn re Senate
Joint Resolution of Legislative Apportionment 1176,
83 So. 3d at 684-85.

The League of Women Voters of Florida and other
plaintiffs filed separate actions asserting that the
Legislature drew its congressional and Senate
districts with improper intent to disfavor a political
party, thereby discriminating against voters who
associate with that party based on their political
views. The congressional-districts action proceeded to
trial, after which the trial court found that certain
members of the Legislature had secretly collaborated
with partisan consultants to draw maps with an
intent to favor one political party and disfavor
another. See League of Women Voters of Fla. v.
Detzner, 172 So. 3d 363, 376-77 (Fla. 2015).

The trial court found that, in cooperation and
collaboration with the Legislature, partisan
consultants arranged for intermediaries to submit, as
their own, maps through the public-participation
process that the consultants had drawn. The trial
court found that this undisclosed arrangement—
consultants using shills to submit highly partisan
maps in collusion with the Legislature—“made a
mockery of the Legislature’s proclaimed transparent
and open process redistricting ....” Jd. at 377 (italics
omitted). The Florida Supreme Court affirmed and
remanded for the re-drawing of a remedial map.

12

After the remand, the Legislature failed to agree
on and enact a remedial plan for congressional
districts and the trial court directed the parties to
submit proposed plans to carry out the voters’ intent
in approving the Fair Districts amendments. The
House, Senate, and plaintiffs each submitted
competing plans. Following hearings on the remedial
plans, the trial court recommended that the Florida
Supreme Court approve the plaintiffs’ proposed plan
and the Court adopted that recommendation, ruling
that the plan would be used for the 2016 elections
and congressional elections thereafter until the next
decennial redistricting. League of Women Voters of
Fla. v. Detzner, 179 So. 3d 258, 297-98 (Fla. 2015).

Around the same time, in 2015, the parties to
the Senate-district litigation entered into a
stipulation and consent judgment. The Senate
conceded in the stipulation that the apportionment
plan adopted to establish Senate districts violated
Florida’s prohibition against drawing districts with
intent to favor or disfavor a political party. In
accordance with the consent judgment, the
Legislature convened a special session to re-draw the
Senate districts. Once again, however,’ the
Legislature could not agree on and enact a remedial
plan—this time for the Senate districts. In the
absence of legislatively-enacted plans, the trial court
considered plans submitted by the parties. It selected
plaintiffs’ proposed plan as the one that best
complied with Florida’s constitutional redistricting
standards. The Senate did not appeal that ruling.

The final Senate and congressional districts are
compact, contiguous, and follow recognizable

13

boundary lines. For example, whereas’ the
congressional map from 2002 split 110 cities and 30
counties into more than one district, the remedial
map splits only 13 cities and 18 counties into more
than one district. The enacted 2012 map, which the
Florida Supreme Court invalidated, would have split
more cities and counties into more than one district
than does the remedial map. In addition, typical
measures of district compactness (Reock, Convex-
Hull, Polsby-Popper) indicate that the remedial
map’s districts are more compact, on average, than
the districts from the invalidated 2012 plan.

In 2016, Florida held its first elections using these
final districts. More candidates ran for election to
Congress and the Senate than ever before. And
congressional and legislative elections were more
competitive in 2016, as compared with prior election
years. For instance, Florida rarely saw serious
competition in congressional races before 2016. But
that year saw five close congressional races, each of
which resulted in a change of party for the district—
three districts previously held by Republicans were
won by Democrats and two previously held by
Democrats went to Republicans. While the districts
were not drawn to create partisan symmetry or
competition, it is not surprising to find that districts
drawn without intent to favor incumbents or political
parties have become more competitive.

14

Il. Upona Finding That a Redistricting Plan
Violates Voters’ Rights Through Partisan
Gerrymandering, Neutral Redistricting
Standards Are a Permissible Remedy

The Constitution does not require proportional
representation. League of United Latin American
Citizens v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399, 419 (2006). But it
does prohibit redistricting plans that infringe voters’
opportunity for equal participation in elections based
on their membership in a political party. Davis v.
Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 123-25 (1986); see also Vieth
vu. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 314-16 (2004) (Kennedy,
J., concurring). And no member of this Court has
suggested that a State has a compelling interest in—
or even a rational basis for—drawing districts for the
purpose of entrenching one political party’s hold on
power. The question, then, is whether a State has
indeed burdened voters’ constitutional rights and, if
so, whether courts can provide a remedy without
becoming unduly entangled in political questions. As
noted, amici curiae address the second of these
questions.

Amici curiae can well understand why courts
would and should be reticent to undertake the
“unwelcome obligation” to devise and impose
redistricting plans. League of United Latin American
Citizens, 548 U.S. at 415 (quotation marks omitted).
To say that neutral decision-makers can apply
manageable non-partisan standards is not to say that
partisans will not try to influence proceedings.
Moreover, courts and commissions can offer no
assurance that their application of non-partisan

15

redistricting standards will not lead to a redistricting
plan that benefits one political party over another.
Vieth, 541 U.S. at 308-09 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
In fact, redistricting unavoidably has political
consequences.

None of this is a reason to conclude that federal
courts cannot provide a remedy, as a last resort,
when a state legislature acts with the intent and
effect of burdening voters’ representational rights
because of their political-party affiliation. There is a
world of difference between drawing districts with an
intent to crush one’s political opponents and drawing
districts with an intent to avoid political
considerations. Much depends on whether the
political consequences that flow from a redistricting
plan are “intended or not.” Ibid.; see also Jowei Chen
& Jonathan Rodden, Cutting Through the Thicket:
Redistricting Simulations and the Detection of
Partisan Gerrymanders, 14 Election L.J. 331, 332
(2015) (making a “crucial distinction between
intentional and unintentional asymmetries in the
transformation of votes to seats”). Drawing districts
with an intent to subject one party's voters to
unequal representation is incompatible with
democratic principles, decreases public confidence in
government, and is likely to burden representational
rights, no matter how courts measure that burden.
The converse is true for drawing districts with an
intent to avoid favoring or disfavoring political
parties.

Thus, after a court concludes that a redistricting
plan violates voters’ rights, it need not identify an
alternative remedial plan that is substantively “fair”

16

to all political parties or one that produces partisan
symmetry. Rather, amici curiae respectfully submit,
it should ensure that districts are drawn without
taking political party, incumbency, or candidacy into
account. In amici curiaes experience, while
application of non-partisan redistricting standards
cannot fully eliminate any and all possibility of
partisan influence, neutral decision-makers can
ensure that they do not act with an intent to burden
voters’ representational rights because of their
political party. Rather than engage in a balancing of
political interests, this approach endeavors to avoid
political questions at the remedial stage altogether.

CONCLUSION

The experiences of amici curiae demonstrate that
neutral redistricting is possible and this Court should
refrain from ruling that no neutral redistricting
principles exist or that redistricting is inevitably
tainted by partisanship.

Courts can provide appropriate redress for
injuries caused by a cognizable partisan gerrymander
through rules which disallow the drawing of districts
for the purpose of favoring or disfavoring political
parties.

17

Dated: September 5, 2017.
Respectfully submitted,

Benjamin R. Fliegel
REED SMITH LLP

355 S. Grand Avenue
Los Angeles, CA 90071
(213) 457-8000
bfliegel@reedsmith.com

Brian A. Sutherland
Counsel of Record

REED SMITH LLP

101 2nd Street

San Francisco, CA 94105

(415) 543-8700

bsutherland@reedsmith.com

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385016_0740%3A25. Public record. Not legal advice.