# Reply Brief — Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court of Cal., 137 S. Ct. 827 (2017) (No. 16-466)

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URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385016_0715%3A04

## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Reply Brief
- **Published:** January 1, 2017

## Text

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| Stipreme Cout Us)
FILED
DEC 20 2016
No. 16-466 L_ OFFICE OF THE CLEMx
IN THE
Supreme Court of the Anited States
BRISTOL-MYERS SQUIBB COMPANY,
Petitioner,
Vv.
SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA FOR THE COUNTY
OF SAN FRANCISCO, et al.,
Respondents.
On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the
California Supreme Court
REPLY BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF CERTIORARI
ANAND AGNESHWAR NEAL KUMAR KATYAL
ARNOLD & PORTER LLP Counsel of Record
399 Park Avenue JESSICA L. ELLSWORTH
New York, N.Y. 10022 FREDERICK LIU
SEAN MAROTTA
DANIEL S. PARISER MITCHELL P. REICH*
ARNOLD & PORTER LLP HOGAN LOVELLS US LLP
601 Massachusetts 555 Thirteenth Street, N.W.
Avenue, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20004
Washington, D.C. 20001 (202) 637-5600
neal. katyal@hoganlovells.com
* Admitted only in New York;
supervised by members of the firm.
Counsel for Petitioner

WILSON-EPES PRINTING CO., INC. — (202) 789-0086 — WASHINGTON, D.C. 20002

RULE 29.6 DISCLOSURE STATEMENT

The Rule 29.6 disclosure statement in the petition
for a writ of certiorari remains accurate.

(i)

li

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
RULE 29.6 DISCLOSURE STATEMENT .................. i
ee I FART Be BI on on sc ce cscccssccesscccesocessesencaee iil
i aia seach ideiniciradinidcitimsinnionuiindaniiila 1
FERS ae ata ee Ee Ce aE 2

I. RESPONDENTS’ GROUNDS ' FOR
DISTINGUISHING THE SPLIT ARE
TE cicientinsgduntinnnnstranésiitinbsbetiendinmionceuns 2

Il. RESPONDENTS’ ATTEMPT TO WAVE
AWAY THE CONFLICT WITH THIS

COURT'S CASES FALLS FLAT...................... 7
Ill. RESPONDENTS’ VEHICLE
OBJECTIONS ARE MERITLESS ................. 10

I AER elle er Or eee ACE wl 13

ill

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

CASES:
Avocent Huntsville Corp. v. Aten Intl Co.,
552 F.3d 1324 (Fed. Cir. 2008)................00...0..c0

Beydoun v. Wataniya Rests. Holding,
Q.S.C., 768 F.3d 499 (6th Cir. 2014)...........00000.....

Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz,
RE A eT

Calder v. Jones,
sc cacdiubbueaiinsine 9,10

Chew v. Dietrich,
Be re EE I ID cncccieveccccccnccccaceosatececsooses

Daimler AG v. Bauman,
I I, adi ncrncictcccsbeicndinicwvesenanicn passim

Domtar, Inc. v. Niagara Fire Ins. Co.,
533 N.W.2d 25 (Minn. 1995)....................0....cecesees

Dudnikov v. Chalk & Vermilion Fine Arts,
Inc. , 514 F.3d 1063 (10th Cir. 2008) ..........00000000...

Elonis v. United States,
a cpsnbumuseenanins 11

Glater v. Eli Lilly & Co.,
ee ee es BO ccnccsecevecccsvesscvescseecesenss

Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v.
Brown, 564 U.S. 915 (2011).............0..0..0.... 7, 8,12

Harlow v. Children’s Hosp..,
GSS FOG BO (Tat Cie. BOGS) ..........0000.ccce.c...scccceseeees

Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A.
v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408 (1984) ................ceccceceeeeeeeees

Hertz Corp. v. Friend,
I sed iebieinel 13

lv

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

Page

Intl Shoe Co. v. Washington,

es acennsnannenceenente 3,9
J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro,

RE a 10
Menken v. Emm,

503 F.3d 1050 (9th Cir. 2007)..................-.....008: 2,7
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc.

v. Manning, 136 S. Ct. 1562 (2016)..............0...... 12
O’Connor v. Sandy Lane Hotel Co..,

Ee ee Se Ge Gs BED ones icecccecccccccceccccccccevcesss 7
Oldfield v. Pueblo De Bahia Lora, S.A.,

558 F.3d 1210 (11th Cir. 2009).....................s00c0000 6
Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts,

als rune 11
Ratliff v. Cooper Labs..,

Se ee Pe I Ee BOE Bi cecsnccscccsccccccssccccscucecaee 5
Rush v. Savchuk,

444 US. 320 (1980)......................... seecinianahe tandecacots 3
Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida,

a cshenedasbunetiiin’ 8
Snowney v. Harrah’s Entm'’t, Inc.,

ee a 6
United States v. Skoien,

614 F.3d 638 (7th Cir. 2010)...............00..0. ccc cceeee. 9
Vons Cos., Inc. v. Seabest Foods, Inc.,

Be D SEE EME SEDs occcccccocscescasccnssuscccersccesese 6
Walden v. Fiore,

Es Cy Oe ED iccndassnenicccescoversanvesessnecereces 8,9

Vv

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

Page
OTHER AUTHORITIES:
5B Charles Alan Wright et al., Federal
Practice and Procedure
§ 1351 (3d ed. Apr. 2016 update)........................0.. 3

Transfer Order, In re Plavix Mkig., Sales
Practices & Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 2418
Ae 8 ES | Ree er SS 12

IN THE
Supreme Court of the United States

No. 16-466

BRISTOL-MYERS SQUIBB COMPANY,
Petitioner,
v.

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA FOR THE COUNTY
OF SAN FRANCISCO, et ail.,

Respondents.

On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the
California Supreme Court

REPLY BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF
CERTIORARI

INTRODUCTION

Respondents’ brief in opposition is more notable for
what it doesn’t say than what it does. Respondents
do not deny that there is a deep and intractable split
on what it means for a plaintiffs claims to “arise out
of or relate to” a defendant’s forum contacts. Re-
spondents do not deny that the Court’s past cases
stated that a court would not have specific jurisdic-
tion over a product-liability suit similar to respond-
ents’—where the injury occurred and the product
was manufactured and sold outside the forum. And
respondents do not deny that in every case where
this Court has found specific jurisdiction over a
defendant proper, there has been at least a but-for

(1)

2

causal connection between the defendant’s forum
contacts and the plaintiffs claims—a connection that
the California Supreme Court did not demand of
respondents’ claims.

Respondents instead resort to distraction and mis-
direction. They argue their case does not implicate
the relatedness split—but point to legal irrelevancies
and severely distort the record. They argue that the
California Supreme Court’s relatedness test is con-
sistent with this Court’s cases—but only at the
highest level of generality. And they argue that the
Court should await a better vehicle to answer the
question presented—but ignore the ongoing, real-
world harm being visited upon mass-tort defendants
by the decision below. See Pharm. Research & Mfrs.
of Am. Amicus Br. (PhRMA Br.) 7-10; Prod. Liab.
Advisory Council, Inc. Amicus Br. (PLAC Br.) 22-25;
GlaxoSmithKline Amicus Br. (GSK Br.) 6-9.

The petition should be granted.
ARGUMENT

I. RESPONDENTS’ GROUNDS FOR
DISTINGUISHING THE SPLIT ARE
MERITLESS.

1. As the petition demonstrates, courts have divid-
ed into three camps over the degree of causation
required to satisfy the “relatedness” prong of the
personal jurisdiction test. Pet. 11. Some courts
require “but for” causation. E.g. Menken v. Emm,
503 F.3d 1050, 1058 (9th Cir. 2007). Others require
“proximate cause” or foreseeability. E.g. Harlow v.
Children’s Hosp., 432 F.3d 50, 61 (1st Cir. 2005).
And still others—including the California Supreme

3

Court in its decision below—require no causal link at
all. E.g. Pet. App. 22a.

Respondents do not dispute that well-established
split. Nor do they dispute that California has chosen
one side of it. See Br. in Opp. 11. Instead, they
argue that this case does not implicate the split
based on two irrelevant facts and one mischaracteri-
zation of the record.

The first irrelevancy is respondents’ observation
that McKesson, a separate defendant, has not chal-
lenged personal jurisdiction. Respondents say (at 10)
that McKesson’s involvement justifies asserting
jurisdiction over Bristol-Myers, too. Yet the Court
held 36 years ago that “(t]he requirements of Jnter-
national Shoe |Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310
(1945)| * * * must be met as to each defendant over
whom a state court exercises jurisdiction”; the “as-
sertion of jurisdiction over [one defendant] based
solely on the activities of [another defendant] * * * is
plainly unconstitutional.” Rush v. Savchuk, 444 U.S.
320, 331-332 (1980). Whether Bristol-Myers is
subject to personal-jurisdiction does not change
because respondents also sued someone else.

The second irrelevancy is that this suit includes
both resident and non-resident plaintiffs. As re-
spondents see it, so long as Bristol-Myers must
litigate California plaintiffs’ claims, it might as well
litigate out-of-state plaintiffs’ claims, too. Br. in
Opp. 10. But “[t]here is no such thing as supple-
mental specific personal jurisdiction; if separate
claims are pled, specific personal jurisdiction must
independently exist for each claim and the existence
of personal jurisdiction for one claim will not provide
the basis for another claim.” 5B Charles Alan

4

Wright et al., Federal Practice and Procedure § 1351
n.30 (3d ed. Apr. 2016 update). Were it otherwise, a
State’s permissive-joinder rules would be the meas-
ure of due process. That illogical result is not the
law, and respondents do not cite a single authority
suggesting that it is.

And then there is the mischaracterization. Re-
spondents say, notwithstanding the California
Supreme Court’s acknowledgment to the contrary
(Pet. App. 29a), that there is a causal connection
between Bristol-Myers’ California activities and
respondents’ claims. According to respondents,
Bristol-Myers “distributed Plavix to non-residents
through McKesson,” and Bristol-Myers’ “research
and development activities in California were related
to the claims of the non-residents of flaws in [Bristol-
Myers’] drug development practices.” Br. in Opp. 13.

Tellingly, no cite follows either of those assertions.
That is because they are baseless. Respondents
“have adduced no evidence to show how or by whom
the Plavix they took was distributed to the pharma-
cies that dispensed it to them.” Pet. App. 47a-48a
(Werdegar, J., dissenting) (emphasis omitted). And
it is uncontested that “research and development of
Plavix did not take place in California.” Jd. at 5a
(majority opinion). Even the California Supreme
Court did not rely on these supposed California
connections. Respondents have simply invented
them from whole cloth.

2. Beyond these false distinctions, respondents
offer nothing to resist the inevitable conclusion: any
court that requires a causal connection between the
defendant’s forum activities and the plaintiffs claim

5

would have dismissed respondents’ claims against
Bristol-Myers.

The court below admitted as much. Even though
“the nonresident plaintiffs’ claims would be exactly
the same if [Bristol-Myers] had no contact whatsoev-
er with California,” Pet. App. 29a, the court thought
the requisite connection present because “all the
plaintiffs’ claims arise out of [Bristol-Myers’] nation-
wide marketing and distribution of Plavix.” Id.
(emphasis added). Respondents repeat this phrase
as if it is indicative of a causal connection. Br. in
Opp. 12-13. But the California Supreme Court’s
comment that respondents’ claims allegedly arose
from Bristol-Myers’ “nationwide” conduct does abso-
lutely nothing to prove that they arose from the
company’s California conduct; it simply changes the
subject.

Indeed, as the petition noted (at 16-18), essentially
the same fact pattern has arisen in courts on the
other side of the split, and in each case those courts
came out the other way. See Glater v. Eli Lilly &
Co., 744 F.2d 213, 216 (1[st Cir. 1984); Ratliff v.
Cooper Labs., 444 F.2d 745, 746-748 (4th Cir. 1971).
Respondents speculate (at 10) that these courts
might have reached different conclusions if those
defendants had engaged in “nationwide marketing
activities” like Bristol-Myers. But they did. The
defendant in Glater had “marketed [the drug] na-
tionwide since 1947,” 744 F.2d at 214, and the de-
fendant in Ratliff had run advertisements “in na-
tional medical journals,” 444 F.2d at 748. The courts
thought that conduct immaterial for a simple reason:
the particular plaintiffs claims at issue “did not arise
from” the defendant’s “contacts with the forum.”

6

Glater, 744 F.2d at 216 (emphasis added); see Ratliff,
444 F.2d at 747. Had the California Supreme Court
applied the same standard, it would have dismissed
respondents’ claims, too.

3. Last, respondents purport (at 11) to show that
the Court has often denied similar petitions. Not at
all. In both of the California cases respondents’ cite,
as well as the Second Circuit case, there was no
question that the defendants’ forum conduct was a
but-for cause of the plaintiffs’ injuries; the only
question was whether the degree of causation was
sufficient. See Snowney v. Harrah’s Entm't, Inc., 112
P.3d 28, 44 (Cal. 2005) (claims “premised on alleged
omissions during * * * transactions with California
residents and in * * * California advertisements”):
Vons Cos., Inc. v. Seabest Foods, Inc., 926 P.2d 1085,
1099 (Cal. 1996) (injuries occurred “[b]ecause of [a]
contractual relationship in California”); Chew v.
Dietrich, 143 F.3d 24, 30 (2d Cir. 1998) (individual
“recruited in [the forum state]” for fatal boat race). In
Avocent Huntsville Corp. v. Aten International Co.,
552 F.3d 1324 (Fed. Cir. 2008), the Federal Circuit
found personal jurisdiction lacking, making any
failure to require but-for causation immaterial. Id.
at 1326. And in Domtar, Inc. v. Niagara Fire Insur-
ance Co., 533 N.W.2d 25 (Minn. 1995), there was no
dispute over relatedness at all; that case turned
entirely on purposeful availment. See id at. 32-33.

The need to resolve this split has grown increasing-
ly pressing in recent years. Five courts of appeals
have taken a side in the last decade. See Beydoun v.
Wataniya Restaurants Holding, Q.S.C., 768 F.3d 499,
507-508 (6th Cir. 2014); Oldfield v. Pueblo De Bahia
Lora, S.A., 558 F.3d 1210, 1222-1223 (11th Cir.

7

2009); Avocent, 552 F.3d at 1337; Dudnikov v. Chalk
& Vermilion Fine Arts, Inc., 514 F.3d 1063, 1078
(10th Cir. 2008); O’Connor v. Sandy Lane Hotel Co.,
496 F.3d 312, 323 (8d Cir. 2007). Since Goodyear
Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S.
915, 920 (2011) and Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S.
Ct. 746, 754 n.5 (2014), plaintiffs have attempted
ever-more-creative ways of replicating the old “doing
business” test under the rubric of specific jurisdic-
tion. Pet. 26, 29. And in California, plaintiffs can
now shop suits between the federal courthouse and
the state one to select their favored jurisdictional
rule. Compare Menken, 503 F.3d at 1058, with Pet.
App. 22a; see also GSK Br. 9; Chamber of Commerce
Amicus Br. (Chamber Br.) 8-9. The Court should
grant the writ and bring clarity and uniformity to
this critical area of the law.

Il. RESPONDENTS’ ATTEMPT TO WAVE
AWAY THE CONFLICT WITH THIS
COURT’S CASES FALLS FLAT.

1. Nor can respondents wave away the conflict
between the decision below and this Court’s cases.
Respondents do not contend that they suffered any
Plavix-related injuries in California or that the
Plavix they ingested was manufactured or sold in
California. See Pet. 6. Respondents therefore do not
contest that their claims do not fit within Goodyear’s
rule that there is no specific jurisdiction in a product-
liability case when the plaintiffs injury did not occur
in the forum and the product alleged to have caused
the injury was not manufactured or sold there. See
Pet. 24. And respondents do not disagree that the
California Supreme Court’s analysis would permit
the hypothetical Polish car accident Daimler, 134 S.

8

Ct. at 754 n.5, identified as a “question * * * of
general jurisdiction” to proceed in California under a
specific-jurisdiction label. See Pet. 26-27.

Respondents instead dismiss Goodyear and Daim-
ler’s statements as “passing dictum.” Br. in Opp. 14.
But the binding “holding” of a case includes not just
its result but also its “rationale.” Seminole Tribe of
Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 66-67 (1996). Goodyear
and Daimler’s statements clarified the distinction
between general and specific jurisdiction, a distinc-
tion that the courts below had “elided.” Goodyear,
564 U.S. at 926. Indeed, Goodyear explicitly stated
that the “North Carolina courts lacked specific
jurisdiction to adjudicate” the plaintiffs’ product-
liability claims. Jd. at 919. If that is not a holding,
then not much is.

2. Respondents also argue (at 14) that there is no
conflict because the decision below—in their view—
adhered to Goodyear’s rule that specific jurisdiction
is “confined to adjudication of issues deriving from,
or connected with, the very controversy that estab-
lishes jurisdiction.” 564 U.S. at 919 (internal quota-
tion marks omitted).

But saying that this Court’s cases require a “con-
nection” between the plaintiffs claims and the de-
fendant’s forum contacts merely restates the ques-
tion presented. The question presented is how close
the connection must be. See Pet. i. As we have
demonstrated—and as respondents do not dispute—
in every case where the Court has found specific
jurisdiction, there has at least been a but-for causal
relationship between the plaintiff's claims and the
defendant’s forum contacts. Pet. 22-23.

9

Indeed, Walden v. Fiore, 134 S. Ct. 1115, 1124
(2014) used just those words. It explained that there
was specific jurisdiction in California over the defa-
mation defendants in Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783
(1984) because “the reputational injury caused by the
defendants’ story would not have occurred but for the
fact that the defendants wrote an article for publica-
tion in California that was read by a large number of
California citizens.” Walden, 134 S. Ct. at 1124
(emphasis added). The California Supreme Court’s
relatedness test, which does not require a but-for
connection (see Pet. App. 30a), conflicts with this

Court’s cases.

3. The closest respondents come to defending the
sliding-scale approach is to argue that it is consistent
with this Court’s disjunctive “aris[ing] out of or
related to” formulation of the relatedness require-
ment. Br. in Opp. 14 (quoting Burger King Corp. v.
Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 472 (1985)). But the Court
has explicitly “decline[d] to reach the question|[]” of
“whether the terms ‘arising out of and ‘related to’
describe different connections between a cause of
action and a defendant’s contacts with a forum.”
Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall,
466 U.S. 408, 415 n.10 (1984). And there is no
reason to think they do. Opinions are not statutes;
every word need not have distinct meaning. See
United States v. Skoien, 614 F.3d 638, 640 (7th Cir.
2010).

Respondents also contend that specific jurisdiction
must be boundless because the Court has said that
specific jurisdiction has “flourished” in the years
since International Shoe. Br. in Opp. 16 (quoting
Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 758 n.10). And so it has. The

10

Court has held there can be specific jurisdiction in
some circumstances over a manufacturer that sells
products into the forum through a distributor, see J.
McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873, 884-
885 (2011) (plurality opinion), or over a defendant
who targets tortious conduct at the forum, even
though he never sets foot there, see Calder, 465 U.S.
at 788-789. But the Court has never reached as far
as the decision below did.

4. Finally, respondents cannot ignore the violence
that the decision below does to Daimler. Respond-
ents block quote the California Supreme Court’s
assurances that its decision does not necessarily
subject Bristol-Myers to jurisdiction on all claims in
California. Br. in Opp. 16 (citing Pet. App. 35a). But
respondents do not deny that the decision below
subjects Bristol-Myers to jurisdiction in California on
all product-liability claims. See Pet. 27-28. The
California Supreme Court’s expansive notion of
specific jurisdiction is practically indistinguishable
from general jurisdiction. See PLAC Br. 14-17;
Chamber Br. 14-15; Wash. Legal Found. Amicus Br.
20-21. It is therefore at odds with this Court’s cases.

lil. RESPONDENTS’ VEHICLE OBJECTIONS
ARE MERITLESS.

1. Respondents are thus left to flyspeck this case’s
suitability as a vehicle to resolve the question pre-
sented. Br. in Opp. 17-20. Those efforts are unavail-
ing.

Respondents claim (at 17) that the Court should
await a case that can resolve both whether a causa-
tive link is required for relatedness, and, if so,
whether a but-for connection is sufficient. But there
is nothing that prevents the Court from laying down

11

a single standard for relatedness on these facts. And
not many plaintiffs satisfy the but-for standard but
flunk the proximate-cause test, as some courts have
recognized in declining to choose between the two.
See Pet. 12 n.2.

The essential disagreement among the lower courts
is whether a causative link is required or not. See
Pet. 11-16. The many cases arising on similar facts
counsel in favor of resolving that dispute immediate-
ly. See PhRMA Br. 7-10; GSK Br. 6-9. If the Court
wishes, it can always proceed incrementally—as it
has in other contexts—in fleshing out the precise
degree of relatedness required. See Elonis v. United
States, 135 S. Ct. 2001, 2013 (2015) (“Such prudence
is nothing new.”).

2. Respondents also worry that reversing the deci-
sion below will have consequences for nationwide
class and mass actions. Br. in Opp. 18. But class
actions are different than mass actions, and involve
different due-process principles. Cf. Phillips Petrole-
um Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 811-814 (1985). And
changing current practice in nationwide mass ac-
tions is precisely why the Court should grant the
writ. Plaintiffs’ counsel use California’s lenient
relatedness rule to shop claims that have no connec-
tion to the State, seeking what they believe are juries
more likely to return significant verdicts. See Pet.
32; PLAC Br. 23-24; Chamber Br. 18-19; GSK Br. 9,
16-17.

Respondents similarly overstate (at 18) the concern
that no one court will be able to adjudicate a mass
action involving plaintiffs from multiple States.
Plaintiffs can all file where the defendant is incorpo-
rated or headquartered. See Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at

12

760 (recognizing that these locations afford “at least
one clear and certain forum in which a corporate
defendant may be sued on any and all claims”).
Plaintiffs also may be able to sue in the State in
which their product was designed or manufactured,
depending on the nature of their claims and the
defendant’s manufacturing and design processes.
See Goodyear, 564 U.S. at 919. And in the federal
system, in appropriate cases, the multidistrict-
litigation device allows cases to be coordinated for
pre-trial purposes before being sent back to appro-
priate forums for trial. See PhRMA Br. 13-14. In
fact, respondents could have filed in federal court
and had their suits coordinated as part of the ongo-
ing multidistrict litigation taking place in New
Jersey. See Transfer Order, Jn re Plavix Mkitg., Sales
Practices & Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 2418 (J.P.M.L.
Feb. 12, 2013).

3. Respondents end with the curious claim that
this case is a poor vehicle because Bristol-Myers
conceded below the third, reasonableness prong of
specific jurisdiction. Br. in Opp. 18-19. But that
makes this case a cleaner vehicle: The correctness of
the California Supreme Court’s decision rests entire-
ly on the relatedness standard this Court will an-
nounce.

Respondents’ true argument appears to be that
notions of predictability and fairness can only be
considered as part of specific jurisdiction’s reasona-
bleness prong. See id. at 19-20. This Court, howev-
er, has always crafted jurisdictional rules in light of
“the demands of reason and coherence” and “sound
judicial policy.” Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner &
Smith Inc. v. Manning, 136 S. Ct. 1562, 1579 (2016)

13

(internal quotation marks omitted). Personal juris-
diction is no different. See, e.g., Daimler, 134 S. Ct.
at 760 (principal place of business and state of incor-
poration are the paradigm places for general juris-
diction because they “have the virtue of being unique
* * * as well as easily ascertainable”); see also Hertz
Corp. v. Friend, 559 U.S. 77, 94 (2010) (“Simple
jurisdictional rules * * * promote greater predictabil-

ity.”).

CONCLUSION
The petition should be granted.
Respectfully submitted,
ANAND AGNESHWAR NEAL KUMAR KATYAL
ARNOLD & PORTER LLP Counsel of Record
399 Park Avenue JESSICA L. ELLSWORTH
New York, N.Y. 10022 FREDERICK LIU
SEAN MAROTTA
DANIEL S. PARISER MITCHELL P. REICH*
ARNOLD & PORTER LLP HOGAN LOVELLS US LLP
601 Massachusetts 555 Thirteenth Street, N.W.
Avenue, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20004
Washington, D.C. 20001 (202) 637-5600
neal.katyal@hoganlovells.com
* Admitted only in New York;
supervised by members of the firm.

Counsel for Petitioner

DECEMBER 2016

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385016_0715%3A04. Public record. Not legal advice.