# Amicus Curiae Brief — Ernst & Young, LLP v. Morris, 138 S. Ct. 51 (2017) (No. 16-300)

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Amicus Curiae Brief
- **Published:** January 1, 2017

## Text

XE CORD =
- No. 16-800 OCT -7 206

OFFICE OF THE CLERK

In The
Supreme Court of the United States

an cam

ERNST & YOUNG LLP AND
ERNST & YOUNG US. LLP,

Petitioners,
Vv.

STEPHEN MORRIS AND
KELLEY MCDANIEL,

Respondents.

-

On Petition For Writ Of Certiorari
To The United States Court Of Appeals
For The Ninth Circuit

+

BRIEF FOR AMICUS CURIAE
INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF DEFENSE
COUNSEL IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONERS

¢

MARY-CHRISTINE SUNGAILA ALEX R. STEVENS

Counsel of Record HAYNES AND BOONE, LLP
HAYNES AND BOonE, LLP 2323 Victory Ave., Suite 700
600 Anton Blvd., Suite 700 Dallas, TX 75219

Costa Mesa, CA 92626 (214) 651-5475
(949) 202-3062 Alex.Stevens@
MC.Sungaila@ haynesboone.com
haynesboone.com
Attorneys for Amicus Curiae
International Association of Defense Counsel
October 7, 2016

COCKLE LEGAL BRIEFS (800) 225-6964 oh
WWW COCKLELEGALBRIEFS.COM

i

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page
INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE....................... 1
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT ..................... 2
iii inet sititaneleheeiniheinacintiatinabihenibiad 4

I. The Ninth Circuit’s Analysis Incorrectly
Burdens the Proponent of Arbitration in
Contravention of this Court’s Analysis in
CompuCredit Corp. v. Greenwood..............

Il. The NLRA’s Broad Appellate Jurisdiction
Provisions Ensure that the Split of Au-
thority Concerning the Enforceability of
Employment Arbitration Class or Collec-
tive Action Waivers Will Reverberate
I diinictenimitnccenisanninaiatiinndnans

EIT incainiicctidaswsniiusiidcieniisinebesibdihineddenisibene

il

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page
CASES
American Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest. , 133
cco icnccnticncheieanbbbinienenibehaanivasibaaenes 1,5
AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333
SUN atici:ddinib dideicsbheiuligibetiendigaaddmandebelalianestinieiibedadvaddnettas 4,5
Bloomingdale’s, Inc., 363 NLRB No. 172, 2016
NLRB LEXIS 314 (Apr. 29, 2016)..................0...-. aa
Cellular Sales of Mo., LLC v. NLRB, 824 F.3d
SI ences ichclaeltinaltsacebcnibpideaiansnenin 7
CompuCredit Corp. v. Greenwood, 132 S. Ct. 665
SII ciniiniineiienctinaanendanduitgeiiindiaidoniecenbiiaainmstabonia passim
D.R. Horton, Inc., 357 NLRB 2277 (2012).......... passim
D.R. Horton, Inc. v. Nat'l Labor Relations Bd.,
TARE ee Oe Ce CE Bi rccnccccecccccccocescoesccceccessceses 7
DIRECTV, Inc. v. Imburgia, 136 S.Ct. 463
TI Aiieicapiistclicbesdaaanbe hth atd gaitaieai bialaieitaaildlasanitiidasniasepiguinnietesens 1
Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500
RRL ARTE A ee Ieee Ne 5
Iskanian v. CLS Transp. L.A., LLC, 327 P.3d 129
SESE IE SR ey ales NN ea Ce 8
Johnmohammadi v. Bloomingdale’s, 755 F.3d
I a ic dinlanidabetindinndcemes 11

Labor Ready Sw., Inc., and Jason Kuller, Esq. of
Thierman Law Firm, P.C., 363 NLRB No. 138,
2016 NLRB LEXIS 159 (Feb. 26, 2016).................. 11

i

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES — Continued

Page
Lewis v. Epic Systems, 823 F.3d 1147 (7th Cir.
May 26, 2016), petition for cert. pending, Case
TT nist cides sd sala bihnacatieneiaensiintbateitieninesoorteroets 2
Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth,
Se EE II cccnecesensesnenteesevcnnrevestnceneesseccses: 3
Owen v. Bristol Care, Inc. , 702 F.3d 1050 (8th Cir.
Tlie cntemtions 7
Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc. v. NLRB, No. 16-60089
(5th Cir. 2016), consolidated sub nom. Jorgie
Franks v. NLRB, No. 16-10644 (11th Cir. 2016) ....... 12
Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon,
seca epsibntennnunins 4
Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int'l Corp. , 559
SERRE iat a RR MRE Re ALC 5
Sutherland v. Ernst & Young LLP, 726 F.3d 290
(BG Ci, SOLS) CSP CUFIAM)......0cercecccsesccscesccesccevenes 2,7
Tallman v. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 359 P.3d 113
a inbussiinnwounes 8
Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stan-
ford Jr. Univ., 489 U.S. 468 (1989)..................ce eee ee 5
STATUTES
EE IEEE EAL SAIS a a vee ee eS passim
I lelsdiompabeeniailintns 12
SE ER ce Ce 6

EEL SL a a ERNE passim

iv

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES — Continued

Page
BO ULB.C. © RGD) 0. cccevecovcecevcscosecesccessnecesneseesessseeenananal 6
, hit Fae & | 5 Een ee te 7,12
RULES
BD Gs B BID wns ccsvecvccececssesessccerscessocesosonsssnianneianiins 11

ieee, CO. BE OT scx ences ncsssenersscesmiconionc 1

1

INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE'

The International Association of Defense Counsel
(LADC), established in 1920, is an association of ap-
proximately 2,500 corporate and insurance attorneys
from the United States and around the globe whose
practice is concentrated on the defense of civil law-
suits. The IADC is dedicated to the just and efficient
administration of civil justice and continual improve-
ment of the civil justice system. The IADC supports a
justice system in which plaintiffs are fairly compen-
sated for genuine injuries, culpable defendants are
held liable for appropriate damages, and non-culpable
defendants are exonerated and can defend themselves
without unreasonable cost. In particular, the LADC has
a strong interest in the fair and efficient administra-
tion of class actions as well as arbitrations, both of
which are increasingly global in reach.

The abiding interest of the LADC in the benefits of
arbitration is exemplified by its participation as ami-
cus before this Court in several cases concerning fed-
eral arbitration law, including, inter alia, American
Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304
(2013); DIRECTV, Inc. v. Imburgia, 136 S.Ct. 463

* No counsel for a party authored this brief in whole or in
part. Neither a party, nor its counsel, nor any other entity other
than amicus curiae and counsel has made a monetary contribu-
tion intended to fund the preparation or submission of this brief.
Counsel for the parties were timely notified of the amicus’ intent
to file this brief under Sup. Ct. R. 37.2(a), and all parties have filed
general letters with the Clerk’s office consenting to the filing of
amicus briefs or have separately consented to the filing of this
brief.

2

(2015); and Lewis v. Epic Systems, 823 F.3d 1147 (7th
Cir. May 26, 2016), petition for cert. pending, Case No.
16-285.

+

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

The petition for writ of certiorari arises from an
undisputed, deepening circuit split — originating with
the Seventh Circuit’s opinion in Lewis v. Epic Systems
and deepening with the Ninth Circuit’s opinion in this
case — concerning an issue of federal statutory inter-
pretation and the enforceability of arbitration agree-
ments with class action or collective action waivers in
the employment context. In this amicus brief, we pro-
vide additional reasons why this Court’s guidance con-
cerning the impact of the National Labor Relations Act
(NLRA) on the enforceability of such arbitration agree-
ments under the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) is
needed now, and not later.

In the decision below, the Ninth Circuit departed
from the Second, Fifth and Eighth Circuits and joined
the Seventh Circuit in holding that employer-employee
agreements to arbitrate employment disputes on an
individual basis are impermissible restrictions on em-
ployees’ rights to act in concert under the NLRA and
therefore unenforceable under the FAA. Notably, the
Ninth Circuit’s ruling directly contravenes the Second
Circuit’s ruling in Sutherland v. Ernst & Young LLP,
726 F.3d 290 (2013) (per curiam), in which the Second
Circuit found the same arbitration agreement to be

3

valid and enforceable and reversed the district court’s
denial of Petitioner's motion to compel arbitration.
Like the Seventh Circuit, the Ninth Circuit reached
this conclusion by improperly beginning its analysis
with a determination that such agreements could be
deemed unlawful under the NLRA and then looking to
whether the FAA changed this result. Instead, both
courts should have begun with the presumption of en-
forceability required by the FAA and this Court’s prior
decisions.

This Court should grant review now because the
Ninth Circuit’s holding increases the potential for col-
lateral unfair labor practice litigation before the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board (NLRB) for employers
across the country. Where employers seek to compel! in-
dividual arbitration of employment disputes pursuant
to a lawful arbitration agreement, they may face unfair
labor practice charges from the NLRB asserting that,
by seeking to compel arbitration, they committed an
unfair labor practice? — even if they successfully com-
pelled arbitration in a jurisdiction that enforces arbi-
tration agreements with class action waivers. And
because the NLRA’s broad appellate venue provisions
preclude any certainty regarding where such NLRB
decisions may be heard on appeal, there is no guaran-
tee that an appeal of an NLRB order invalidating an

* This approach amounts to punishing an employer for in-
voking its arbitration rights and improperly threatens the “em-
phatic federal policy in favor of arbitral dispute resolution”
underlying the FAA, which this Court has reaffirmed multiple
times. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, 105
S. Ct. 3346, 3356 (1985).

4

arbitration agreement and declaring an employer to
have engaged in an unfair labor practice will be heard
in the same jurisdiction as the one that heard the mo-
tion to compel arbitration.

Thus, the uncertainty created by the circuit split
concerning the enforceability of employment arbitra-
tion agreements has repercussions across the country.
As a result, this Court should not wait for the circuit
split to deepen even further before taking up the issue.

—_____—¢

ARGUMENT

I. The Ninth Circuit’s Analysis Incorrectly
Burdens the Proponent of Arbitration in
Contravention of this Court’s Analysis in
CompuCredit Corp. v. Greenwood.

The FAA declares that arbitration agreements
“shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon
such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revo-
cation of any contract.” 9 U.S.C. § 2. The FAA, and FAA
section 2 in particular, was intended to “‘revers[e] cen-
turies of judicial hostility to arbitration agreements,’
by ‘placling] arbitration agreements upon the same
footing as other contracts.’” Shearson/American Ex-
press, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 226 (1987) (citing
Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 510-11
(1974)). The FAA reflects “a ‘liberal federal policy fa-
voring arbitration.’” AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concep-
cion, 563 U.S. 333, 340 (2011) (quoting Moses H. Cone
Mem 'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24

5

(1983); Buckeye Check Cashing Inc. v. Cardegna, 546
U.S. 440, 443 (2006)). This Court has repeatedly held
that the “fundamental principle [is] that arbitration is
a matter of contract,” Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 339
(quoting Rent-A-Center, West, Inc. v. Jackson, 561 US.
63, 67 (2010)); see also Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. Animal-
Feeds Int'l Corp., 559 U.S. 662, 681 (2010); Volt Info.
Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Jr. Univ., 489
U.S. 468, 479 (1989), and that courts must enforce ar-
bitration agreements according to their terms, Volt,
489 US. at 478; Stolt-Nielsen, 559 U.S. at 682; Concep-
cion, 563 U.S. at 339.

This Court has repeatedly upheld agreements re-
quiring the parties to arbitrate disputes individually,
rather than on a class or collective basis. See, e.g.,
American Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct.
2304, 2308-10 (2013); Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 352.
And this Court has further explained that these prin-
ciples apply “even when the claims at issue are federal
statutory claims, unless the FAA’s mandate has been
overridden by a contrary congressional command.”
CompuCredit Corp. v. Greenwood, 132 S. Ct. 665, 669
(2012). These principles have been applied equally to
employment disputes, even where the claims at issue
implicated federal statutes that expressly provide for
class or collective action litigation. See, e.g., Gilmer v.
Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 32 (1991)
(employee’s claims under the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act must be arbitrated “even if the arbi-
tration could not go forward as a class action”).

6

In contravention of this Court’s precedent, the
NLRB determined in 2012 that agreements requiring
individual arbitration of employment disputes un-
lawfully interfere with employees’ rights to engage in
“concerted activities for the purpose of collective bar-
gaining or other mutual aid or protection” under NLRA
Section 7. D.R. Horton, Inc., 357 NLRB 2277, 2279
(2012); see also 29 U.S.C. § 157. The NLRB further con-
cluded that such agreements violate NLRA Section
8(a)(1), which makes it an unfair labor practice to “in-
terfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exer-
cise of rights guaranteed in [Section 7].” Id. at 2280; see
also 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1). The NLRB accordingly or-
dered the employer-respondent to cease and desist
from invoking a mandatory arbitration agreement
with class and collective action waivers, and to rescind
or revise its existing arbitration agreement to clarify
that it did not constitute a waiver of the right to main-
tain employment-related class or collective actions. Jd.
at 2289.

NLRB orders are not self-enforcing. Rather, if an
employer does not voluntarily comply with a remedial
order issued by the NLRB, the NLRB may file a peti-
tion for enforcement with a United States circuit court
of appeals within any circuit where the unfair labor
practice in question occurred or where the person al-
leged to have committed an unfair labor practice
resides or transacts business. 29 U.S.C. § 160(e). Simi-
larly, “any person aggrieved by a final order of the
[NLRB]” may obtain judicial review and seek to have
the order modified or set aside by “any United States

7

court of appeals in the circuit in which the unfair labor
practice in question was alleged to have been engaged
in or wherein such person resides or transacts busi-
ness,” or in the D.C. Circuit. 29 U.S.C. § 160(f). The em-
ployer-respondent in D.R. Horton filed a petition for
review in the Fifth Circuit, and the NLRB filed a cross-
application for enforcement. The Fifth Circuit ulti-
mately refused to enforce the portion of the NLRB’s or-
der invalidating the employer’s arbitration agreement
on the basis of its class and collective action waivers,
finding the NLRB’s hostility to such waivers in em-
ployee arbitration agreements to be incompatible with
the FAA. D.R. Horton, Inc. v. Nat’l Labor Relations Bd.,
737 F.3d 344, 364 (5th Cir. 2013).

Despite the Fifth Circuit’s refusal to enforce the
NLRB’s order in D.R. Horton, employee-plaintiffs have
begun citing the NLRA in opposition to employer-de-
fendants’ attempts to enforce agreements to arbitrate
employment disputes on an individual basis. Until re-
cently, this argument met little success. The Second
Circuit affirmed the validity of the same arbitration
agreement that the Ninth Circuit rejected here (Suth-
erland, 726 at 297 & n.8), and the Fifth and Eighth
Circuits and the Supreme Courts of California and Ne-
vada also rejected the argument that the NLRA ren-
ders unenforceable employee-employer agreements to
resolve employment disputes in individual arbitration.
See Cellular Sales of Mo., LLC v. NLRB, 824 F.3d 772,
776 (8th Cir. 2016); Owen v. Bristol Care, Inc., 702 F.3d
1050, 1052, 1054-55 (8th Cir. 2013); D.R. Horton, Inc. v.
Nat'l Labor Relations Bd. , 737 F.3d 344 (5th Cir. 2013);

8

Iskanian v. CLS Transp. L.A., LLC, 327 P.3d 129, 141
(Cal. 2014); Tallman v. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 359 P.3d
113, 122-23 (Nev. 2015).

But the Ninth Circuit in this case, like the Seventh
Circuit, reached the opposite conclusion in employ-
ment cases involving motions to compel arbitration,
concluding that arbitration agreements with class or
collective action waivers were unenforceable under the
NLRA. Both decisions relied on the FAA’s savings
clause, which creates an exception to the FAA’s pre-
sumption of enforceability “upon such grounds as exist
at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract” 9
U.S.C. § 2, and rejected this Court’s prescribed analysis
in CompuCredit, under which courts are required to
determine whether another federal statute like the
NLRA contains a “contrary congressional command” to
that of the FAA. 132 S. Ct. at 669. Rather, the Ninth
Circuit began with the conclusion that NLRA Section
7 creates a “substantive right” to the collective pursuit
of “work-related legal claims” and that an employment
arbitration agreement with a class or collective action
waiver “interferes with” concerted legal action, and
“cannot be enforced.” Pet. App. at la. Like the Seventh
Circuit, the Ninth Circuit relied on the FAA’s savings
clause to conclude that the FAA “does not dictate a con-

trary result.” Jd. at 12a.

Judge Ikuta dissented from the majority opinion
below, taking issue with virtually every step of the ma-
jority’s reasoning. (See id. at 25a-42a). As Judge Ikuta
explained, the relevant inquiry under CompuCredit is
whether an express “contrary congressional command”

9

appears in the statute at issue. Jd. (citing Compu-
Credit, 132 S. Ct. at 669). If not, the statute can and
should be harmonized with the FAA, which furthers
the strong federal policy in favor of arbitration. Jd. But
the Ninth Circuit majority inverted this analysis by
beginning with the NLRA and requiring the proponent
of arbitration to show that the FAA overrides the
NLRA, rather than beginning with the FAA’s pre-
sumption that arbitration agreements are enforceable
as written and requiring the party opposing arbitra-
tion to identify a “contrary congressional command”
overriding the FAA. See 9 U.S.C. § 2; CompuCredit, 132
S. Ct. at 669. As the dissent concluded, this “erroneous
reasoning leads to a result that is directly contrary to
Congress’s goals in enacting the FAA.” (See id. at p.

40a).

Il. The NLRA’s Broad Appellate Jurisdiction
Provisions Ensure that the Split of Author-
ity Concerning the Enforceability of Em-
ployment Arbitration Class or Collective
Action Waivers Will Reverberate Across

the Country.

The Seventh and Ninth Circuits’ hostility to arbi-
tration agreements with class action waivers affects
employers outside those circuits. This is because both
courts’ decisions pave the way for employee-plaintiffs
opposing arbitration to file collateral unfair labor prac-
tice charges against employers who seek to assert their
rights under the FAA.

10

As Petitioners’ brief notes (see p. 23), an employer's
“ability to enforce its uniform nationwide arbitration
provision depends on where a given employee is lo-
cated (or where the employee files suit).” But even if
an employer may have a modicum of certainty regard-
ing its ability to successfully compel arbitration in the
Second, Fifth, or Eighth Circuits, that does not pre-
clude collateral unfair labor practice litigation before
the NLRB. This is because the logical consequence of
the position that class and collective litigation is a pro-
tected “substantive” right is that any employer opposi-
tion to class or collective actions via efforts to enforce
a provision requiring individual arbitration unlawfully
“interferes with” this putative “right” in violation of
NLRA Section 8(a)(1). See 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1). In ac-
cordance with this interpretation, the NLRB has not
limited itself to ordering employers to rescind or revise
arbitration agreements with class or collective action
waivers, as it did in D.R. Horton. Instead, the NLRB
has taken its hostility to such agreements to its logical
conclusion, ordering employers to reimburse employee-
plaintiffs for fees spent opposing motions to compel in-
dividual arbitration. See, e.g., Bloomingdale’s, Inc. , 363
NLRB No. 172, 2016 NLRB LEXIS 314 at *26 (Apr. 29,
2016).

Neither the FAA nor this Court’s prior decisions
support treating efforts to enforce lawful, valid arbitra-
tion agreements like a poison pill that invites signifi-
cant litigation costs and collateral litigation.

11

Nevertheless, attorneys representing plaintiffs*® in em-
ployment class actions have already seized on the in-
creased leverage that a tactical unfair labor practice
charge may confer; so long as the circuit split remains,
this practice will be encouraged. Thus, an employer
facing an employment class action may successfully
compel arbitration in a state or federal district court,
and further successfully defend on appeal the court’s
order compelling the parties to arbitration. But the
NLRB may still pursue that employer in collateral un-
fair labor practice litigation. See id. at ** 15-26 (Apr. 29,
2016) (ordering employer to reimburse all fees ex-
pended by plaintiffs incurred in unsuccessfully oppos-
ing employer's motion to compel arbitration, even
though the Ninth Circuit affirmed the agreement’s en-
forceability, and that its opt-out provision rendered it
voluntary and not unlawful under the NLRA); see also
Johnmohammadi v. Bloomingdale’s, 755 F.3d 1072
(9th Cir. 2014).

Moreover, because an appeal of an NLRB decision
ordering the reimbursement of attorneys’ fees incurred
in opposition to a successful motion to compel arbitra-
tion may be heard in nearly any circuit, an employer
may face inconsistent rulings and punishment for en-
forcing an arbitration provision that was already found

* Because the NLRB’s rules permit charges to be filed by
“any person,” 29 C.F.R. § 102.9, an attorney representing a group
of employees may file such a charge, even if no class members file
a charge themselves. See Labor Ready Sw., Inc., and Jason Kuller,
Esq. of Thierman Law Firm, P.C., 363 NLRB No. 138, 2016 NLRB
LEXIS 159 (Feb. 26, 2016).

12

to be enforceable by a different federal circuit court or
a state supreme court.

There is no certainty at the outset of unfair labor
practice litigation that an appeal of an NLRB order in-
validating such an agreement will land in a specific
venue. “[A]ny person” who is “aggrieved” by an NLRB
order may obtain review of the order in either the cir-
cuit in which the unfair labor practice was aileged to
have been committed, the circuit wherein such person
resides or transacts business, or the Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia. 29 U.S.C. § 160(f). Fur-
ther, even if an employer timely files a petition for re-
view in its home circuit, another petition may be filed
in another circuit by another person “aggrieved” by
that NLRB order. When these competing petitions for
review are filed in different circuits on the same day,
the conflict is resolved by the judicial panel on multi-
district litigation selecting a circuit “by means of ran-
dom selection” and consolidating all other petitions
for review of the NLRB’s order there. 28 U.S.C.
§ 2112(aX(3); see also Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc. v.
NLRB, No. 16-60089 (5th Cir. 2016), consolidated sub
nom. Jorgie Franks v. NLRB, No. 16-10644 (11th Cir.
2016). Such consolidated appeals could easily end up
in the Seventh or Ninth Circuits.

As a result, employers across the country — even
those who “reside or transact business” outside the
Seventh or Ninth Circuits — cannot know whether the
lawfulness of their arbitration agreements will be as-
sessed in a jurisdiction that is faithful, or hostile, to

13

such agreements. This uncertainty may well lead em-
ployers to assess whether to promulgate, maintain, or
enforce arbitration agreements in light of the least-
protective jurisdictions, which would further under-
mine the Congressional policy expressed in the FAA.

We urge this Court to remedy the perverse incen-
tives for gamesmanship and tactical unfair labor prac-
tice litigation created by the Ninth Circuit’s decision
and the attendant deepening circuit split.

¢

14

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons and for the reasons ex-
pressed in the Petition for Writ of Certiorari, the Peti-

tion should be granted.
Respectfully submitted,

MARY-CHRISTINE SUNGAILA
Counsel of Record

HAYNES AND BOONE, LLP

600 Anton Blvd., Suite 700
Costa Mesa, CA 92626

(949) 202-3062
MC.Sungaila@haynesboone.com

ALEX R. STEVENS

HAYNES AND BooNngE, LLP

2323 Victory Ave., Suite 700
Dallas, TX 75219

(214) 651-5475
Alex.Stevens@haynesboone.com

Attorneys for Amicus Curiae
International Association of
Defense Counsel

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385016_0701%3A08. Public record. Not legal advice.