# Reply Brief — Nat'l Ass'n of Mfrs. v. Dep't of Def., 137 S. Ct. 811 (2017) (No. 16-299)

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Reply Brief
- **Published:** January 1, 2017

## Text

SECO FILED
iD { SEP -8 2017
AUEFS , a
No. 16-299 |

Iu the Supreme Court of the Cinited States

NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF MANUFACTURERS,
Petitioner,
Vv.

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE,
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS, AND
U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, ET AL.,

Respondents.

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES
COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

REPLY BRIEF OF STATE RESPONDENTS OHIO,
ALABAMA, ALASKA, ARIZONA, ARKANSAS, COLORADO,
FLORIDA, GEORGIA, IDAHO, INDIANA, KANSAS,
KENTUCKY, LOUISIANA, MICHIGAN, MISSISSIPPI,
MISSOURI, MONTANA, NEBRASKA, NEVADA, THE NEW
MEXICO STATE ENGINEER, THE NEW MEXICO ENVI-
RONMENT DEPARTMENT, NORTH DAKOTA, OKLAHOMA,
SOUTH CAROLINA, SOUTH DAKOTA, TENNESSEE, TEXAS,
UTAH, WEST VIRGINIA, WISCONSIN, AND WYOMING
IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONER

ee

MICHAEL DEWINE
Attorney General of Ohio

ERIC E. MURPHY*
State Solicitor
*Counsel of Record
PETER T. REED
Deputy Solicitor
30 East Broad St., 17th Floor
Columbus, Ohio 43215
614-466-8980
eric.murphy@
ohioattorneygeneral.gov
Counsel for Respondent
State of Ohio

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page
_ | TSR DRE mR maT Hes i
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A. The Agencies Cannot Show That The Rule

Fits Within Any Reasonable Reading Of
NE I dcrcnescctnscccsensessestnesnincenine

1. The Agencies read the word
“limitation” in isolation, not in the
context of the entire Subsection (E).........

2. The Agencies make no attempt to fit
the Rule within Subsection (F)’s text.......

. The Agencies’ Purpose Arguments Do Not
Permit Departure From The Text.................

. The Agencies’ Legislative-History
Arguments Also Do Not Permit Departure
EALERTS ES Seta

. The Agencies Wrongly Favor A
Presumption Of Circuit Review Over
Established Interpretive Canons ..................

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ss

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases Page(s)
Ali v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons,

r,s cmnmuopnsionenanaies 7,8
Am. Mining Congress v. EPA,

GD Be Fe Gee Cae, BGT ........cs.ccccccccccceccocccese 12
Am. Paper Inst., Inc. v. EPA,

860 F.2d 860 (7th Cir. 1989) .............ccccseoeescocceeeees 7
Cent. Bank, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank, N.A.,

ee es BI a vccisckantenincsssonseuesatboesncedanvestenss 19
Chrysler Corp. v. EPA,

600 F.2d 904 (D.C. Cir. 1979) ..............ccceeeeeeeeeees 21
Clark v. Martinez,

I I cane ccctensastecsecnetcnen 11, 21
Crown Simpson Pulp Co. v. Costle,

IE erirrctintenceccensctocscons 11, 12, 16, 18
Direct Mktg. Ass’n v. Brol.!,

I eines 14
EI. du Pont de Nemours and Co. v. Train,

cg, EE 9, 15, 16, 18
Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs.,

EE a 17
Fla. Power & Light Co. v. Lorion,

RE SE eR 20
Freeman v. Quicken Loans, Inc.,

ET SI a eT ee 4
Friends of the Earth v. EPA,

333 F.3d 184 (D.C. Cir. 20038) ..............ccceeees 10, 11

il

Friends of the Everglades v. EPA,

680 F.3d 12860 (1 ith Cir. 2012) ............c0cccs0.0.2000- 12
Gutierrez v. Ada,

| TT en eee 7
Harrison v. PPG Indus.,

8 Ee 21, 22

Henson v. Santander Consumer USA Inc.,
4 |

Hertz Corp. v. Friend,

I mimenniiiod 5, 13, 14
Holy Trinity Church v. United States,

EE EEE SEED 22
Inv. Co. Inst. v. Bd. of Governors of Fed. Reserve

Sys., 551 F.2d 1270 (D.C. Cir. 1977) ....c.cccceceeceee: 14
Kucana v. Holder,

TREAT eee ene aE 8
Longview Fibre Co. v. Rasmussen,

980 F.2d 1307 (9th Cir. 1992) .......ccccccececceeee 19, 21
Maslenjak v. United States,

eT ene 11
MBIA Ins. Corp. v. FDIC,

Fe ee te Es GIs GD ccccctces sss cccsecesescncnsess 7
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, kenner & Smith Inc.

v. Manning, 136 S. Ct. 1562 (2016) .................... 14
Milner v. Dep't of the Navy,

I casicechinioglielel 18

Mohamad v. Palestinian Auth..,
LE ee 17

lv

Montanile v. Bd. of Trs. of the Natl Elevator Indus.

Health Ben. Plan, 136 S. Ct. 651 (2016)............. 13
Nat’? Cotton Council of Am. v. EPA,

553 F.3d 927 (6th Cir. 2009) .................cccccceeceeees 12
Nichols v. United States,

I a eciiercinicediin 14

NRDC, Inc. v. EPA,
656 F.2d 768 (D.C. Cir. 1981) .....................00200ee 12

NRDC, Inc. v. EPA,

966 F.2d 1292 (9th Cir. 1992) ..............0.0.. cece 12
Nw. Envtl. Advocates v. EPA,

537 F.3d 1006 (9th Cir. 2008) ..............cc cee eceeeee es 12
Rapanos v. United States,

A i asc caascensnencnnennteiee 16
RJR Nabisco Inc. v. European Cmty.,

Ss a I i ccccdnenpnannpnsctoonssestensceisse 5

Roll Coater, Inc. v. Reilly,
932 F.2d 668 (7th Cir. 1991) ......................2.. 4, 16

Rumsfeld v. Forum for Acad. & Inst’l

Rights, Inc., 547 U.S. 47 (2006) ....................0008. 19
Sackett v. EPA,

I TN i ceceisresiinemnen 10, 14, 16, 20
Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook Cty. v. U.S. Army

Corps of Eng’rs, 531 U.S. 159 (2001) ........ 6, 16, 19
U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs v. Hawkes Co.,

I os cc enincenencenasuncneneenedeis 16

United States v. Alvarez-Sanchez,
4) 2 cena mereen 4

United States v. Cra/t,

crate anes ea cpennnaeediinennantiie 19
United States v. Williams,

I a ccrreicincnnmnnscsponareiineteteeceseatons 7
W. Va. Univ. Hosps. v. Casey,

I IE iiinicrtiterinntntancniceneienedaccsdnbadminmneniie 15
Statutes, Rules, and Constitutional Provisions
I Is siincsrinscnieusétnnuinatbiatonnntieemaiedmalbacbuiienn 9
Se I nso esc inncenddnbelatiagieyieinnimmeednatendanenidniel 9
I I iste scclaicieneilnieiniesnicamigmensineniienabisaaddl 9
CI EI divs sceniniigiineoneigibieen caches snemiabieeipinaeeeeaainl 9
I I i sinical nig cota adeesionmmaninemiadiniiaa passim
a a ine iertpnencinimpcienindiatnmabaeiiildentia 3, 10
le ee I ccniincrsecoccosesuniidusbinneotsnmmeiedie 9
Se i 02, ss sensianintineeidnibneaniadiinianiinieniii 9
ee ee Oe Fe ccvocecscssnnicsnssnatucnnscnensianbias 10
eo nncranesnicanisnsiedasesenmbinntetiiial 9
Be Oe eI os icccintincqescestinnnassccnseimtensivevesans 9
i cnc oncinstnishhnsndnntinnnuiisnanpbiiiaduentsainetin 9
I aon stan nd celnendetahnsnciunannnianionsianlin 9
ELLE LL ATE 9
I id encinisessaceqdguncmensaneneadnensiynninanntiints 1,9
I ii snitch neuigniiaaawibiansmnnints 9, 10
ae Oe 9, 15
ia i acca heedeitpeneinaeneniinnil 16

Be Ss Se Re iccrcescetccesecvvecsescotnsncanneeescioess 19

ad sciclenmilsanaieetin 1,9
se IEE D dcnciccccsonccosccsnsnetncses sss cesoseiereressnntbenetoiien 9
I ediec euler emmumanbedmenelales 15
ID I. aeealiesscnpadenabeiainpebinnionnaniéan 15
SE TSE erae Meese espana CPF 9
indi ndendaebvnasienstiseresenindicenimneenborien 9
Cee ceslilaelen 1, 9, 11
ls Oe ID cecsiccccovscecescesscascunvectocenscosconsones 6, 13
CE NL IE mine Ue Ce tT 9
I Hsia cnscccinsontrneeiseouduiionsibendinhibahdeniessii 9
ada raelamabanesipennassiipnans 1, 19
BD es Oe I secciccesscescccenseverastecotninsetenionnteneeeiion 19
ie IE dice cniscicninnscstencosesncassconiesemintenennt 19
Ne Be II i ccirccuiicstibasercscnceisneanecdibisesienbeinetinnd 2
Se ls Oe EE witevenseccssecnsscbenteniosesacessenenions 2, 3, 10
a camomsmniaiienneane 3, 10
Ry te ii cccisnacsensesesqienseensetessonsdeninnsmenngins 6
I ois cckcnndenscacadinossoordeisessiocomneceteen 6
i Oe I oiecccccecscccecenscasseccosssnsacscesst passim
ee I steiinceccvscescevecesonssnssutessnnsetite 13
5 8 te 2 = Enns 13
BS UB... S LED cco cc cccese ess cccessssssccscceceses passim
Bik To Bt, i eneemeere passim
83 U.S.C. § LSB IUNG) .......c0rrccrcserecsescceceees 15, 16, 19

83 U.S.C. § LBGBD)C) ............cccccccerserecscevserersceees 20, 21

ISR EE epee NCE RACH SAREE UTS CNET Soe om 9

cutie 15, 21

Water Quality Act of 1987, Pub. Law No.
RE CERT oe a 18, 19

Other Authorities

Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law:
The Interpretation of Legal Texts (2012) ........ 7,15

Black’s Law Dictionary (5th ed. 1979) .......2--......0000008 8

Clean Water Rule: Definition of “Waters of
the United States,” 80 Fed. Reg. 37,054
a ciesanisouds passim

I hs cescsceonwiceesennzenune 18
ee an, :nsscssrisshemvonancueananes 18

The State Respondents’ opening brief showed that
Subsections (E) and (F) of 33 U.S.C. § 1369(b)(1) do
not grant circuit jurisdiction over the rule adopting
an expansive definition of “waters of the United
States” for the Clean Water Act. Clean Water Rule:
Definition of “Waters of the United States,” 80 Fed.
Reg. 37,054 (June 29, 2015) (“the Rule”). First, this
case should begin and end with the plain text. The
Rule does not promulgate an effluent limitation or
other limitation under § 1311, 1312, 1316, or 13465, or
issue or deny a permit under § 1342. State Resp. Br.
19-33. Second, § 1369(b)(1)’s structure confirms this
reading. The provision precisely identifies seven ac-
tions subject to circuit review, so a broad reading of
Subsections (E) and (F) would render other subsec-
tions superfluous and cover actions that Congress
excluded from its reach. Jd. at 34-38. Third, two in-
terpretive presumptions support this reading. The
Court presumes that Congress means for clear juris-
dictional rules, and the plain text provides the clear-
er rule. The Court also presumes that Congress
means to authorize judicial review of agency actions,
but a broad reading of the subsections would in-
crease restrictions on that review. Id. at 38-49.

In response, the Environmental Protection Agen-
cy (“EPA”) and the Army Corps of Engineers
(“Corps”) (collectively, “the Agencies”) seek to muddy
the clear statutory language by emphasizing policy
concerns and legislative history that, in the end, do
not even support their reading. The Court should
reject their arguments, follow § 1369(b)(1)’s plain
text, and hold that district courts have jurisdiction
over suits challenging the Rule.

2

A. The Agencies Cannot Show That The
Rule Fits Within Any Reasonable Read-
ing Of Subsection (E) Or (F)

The Agencies begin by mistakenly arguing that
Subsections (E) and (F) can be interpreted to cover
the Rule. U.S. Br. 17-34.

1. The Agencies read the word “limita-
tion” in isolation, not in the context of
the entire Subsection (E)

As the State Respondents showed (at 19-29), the
Rule does not fall within Subsection (EK) because it
does not “promulgatie]” any “effluent limitation or
other limitation” “under section 1311.” The Rule
does not announce the technology-based restrictions
that § 1311 directs the EPA to promulgate. Instead,
it defines a phrase that is referenced only in
§ 1362(7) pursuant to, if anything, the EPA’s general
rulemaking authority in § 1361(a).

In response, the Agencies argue that Subsection
(E) covers EPA actions that “impose limitations of
any sort under Section 1311.” U.S. Br. 17. The Rule
satisfies that test, they continue, because “[a] rule
that specifies which sites are ‘waters of the United
States’ imposes on persons who discharge pollutants
to those waters the full panoply of effluent and other
limitations under Section 1311.” Jd. at 19. This
reading suffers from three distinct problems: (a) it
asks whether an EPA action has the practical effect
of triggering limitations found elsewhere, rather
than whether the action itself promulgates a limita-
tion; (b) it reads “any effluent limitation or other lim-
itation” to mean “any limitation”; and (c) it treats all
actions that affect § 1311 as issued under § 1311.

3

a. Promulgate Limitations v. Affect Limitations.
The Agencies argue that Subsection (E) reaches
regulations that have a “practical effect” of “im-
pos[ing]” the limitations found in other provisions,
such as the _ pollutant-discharge limitation in
§ 1311(a). U.S. Br. 19. They are mistaken.

Subsection (E)’s language does not permit this
practical-effect test. Even if the Agencies correctly
read “any effluent limitation or other limitation” to
mean “any limitation,” but see infra Part A.1.b, the
Rule still cannot be said to have promulgated the
“panoply of effluent and other limitations under Sec-
tion 1311” on which the Agencies rely. U.S. Br. 19.
Congress promulgated § 1311(a), and other rules
promulgate the limitations that § 1311 directs the
EPA to issue. As the Rule admits, it does not “estab-
lish” (i.e., promulgate) “any regulatory requirements”
(i.e., any limitations). 80 Fed. Reg. at 37,054.

The Agencies’ own statements prove that their
test does not fit the text. They studiously avoid the
word “promulgate,” saying instead that Subsection
(E) covers actions that “impose[]” limitations. U.S.
Br. 16; id. at 17-19. They do so because “impose” has
a wider range of meanings than “promulgate.” The
Agencies’ Rule uses the word in a narrower sense,
saying that the Rule “imposes no enforceable duty.”
80 Fed. Reg. at 37,102 (emphasis added). The Agen-
cies’ Brief now uses the word in a broader sense, say-
ing that the Rule “imposes .. . the full panoply of ef-
fluent and other limitations under Section 1311.”
U.S. Br. 19 (emphasis added). Only the former re-
spects Subsection (E)’s text. Because the rule does
not issue “regulatory requirements” or “enforceable

4

dutfies],” 80 Fed. Reg. at 37,054, 37,102, it does not
promulgate limitations.

The Agencies’ practical-effect test also reads out
Subsection (E)’s other verb. That subsection covers
state-issued limitations that are “approv[ed]” by the
EPA, and limitations that are “promulgat/ed]” by the
EPA. Thus, promulgate must have a precise mean-
ing reaching actions directly issuing limitations; a
broader meaning would leave approve without inde-
pendent force. Roll Coater, Inc. v. Reilly, 932 F.2d
668, 670-71 (7th Cir. 1991). The Agencies’ reading
proves this point: An approval of a state limitation
has the “practical effect” of imposing that limitation,
so it would qualify as “promulgating” a limitation
under the Agencies’ boundless reading.

Given that the practical-effect test does not fit
Subsection (E), the Agencies cannot justify that test
by noting that the adjective “any” precedes “effluent
limitation or other limitation.” U.S. Br. 18. That ad-
jective cannot change the meaning of the verb
“promulgate,” the noun “limitation,” or the preposi-
tional phrase “under section 1311.” In that respect,
the Agencies “err[] in placing dispositive weight on
the broad statutory reference to ‘any’ ... without
considering the rest of the statute.” United States v.
Alvarez-Sanchez, 511 U.S. 350, 357 (1994). While
“any” can broaden an object, it cannot “transform[]”
the “clear meaning” of the clause as a whole. Free-
man v. Quicken Loans, Inc., 566 U.S. 624, 635 (2012).
Subsection (E)’s text means something different from
the language that the Agencies need for their reading
(“affecting any limitation within section 1311”).

For the same reason, the Agencies get nowhere by
extensively quoting statements by the Rule’s chal-

5

lengers protesting its expansive scope. U.S. Br. 19-
22. That the Rule would require landowners to seek
more permits (and States to process more) might be
relevant under a test tied to a regulation’s practical
consequences. But Subsection (E) reaches rules that
issue restrictions, not rules that affect restrictions.
In fact, the Agencies’ reliance on these quoted state-
ments shows how unworkable their test would be.
Jurisdiction should not turn on whether a rule ex-
pands the covered waters (subjecting more lands to
§ 1311’s limits) or contracts the covered waters (ex-
empting more lands from § 1311’s limits). Hertz
Corp. v. Friend, 559 U.S. 77, 94-95 (2010). The
Agencies concede this point in a footnote, one that
conflicts with their repeated reliance on the Rule’s
breadth. U.S. Br. 21 n.4. As their footnote explains,
an EPA-issued “effluent limitation” falls within Sub-
section (E) even if it lessens discharge restrictions as
compared to earlier restrictions. That is because the
subsection does not adopt a practical-effect test; it
“turns on the nature of the challenged EPA action.”
Id. The action itself must promulgate restrictions.

Comparing statewide and county-wide “blue
laws,” the Agencies also mistakenly argue that the
Rule’s “effort to identify’ where § 1311’s limitations
apply qualifies as a limitation under “common us-
age.” U.S. Br. 20-21. But it is not common to say
that an action interpreting a phrase has promulgated
a limitation. This Court would not commonly say, for
example, that it “promulgated” a “limitation” “under”
the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations
Act when it read that law to apply extraterritorially.
RJR Nabisco Inc. v. European Cmty., 136 S. Ct.
2090, 2101-06 (2016). Nor would it say that it prom-
ulgated a limitation under § 1311 when it interpret-

6

ed the Clean Water Act not to reach “an abandoned
sand and gravel pit.” Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook
Cty. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 531 U.S. 159, 162
(2001) (““SWANCC”).

The Agencies next wrongly compare the Rule to a
general effluent limitation on a point-source class,
noting that neither action is “self-executing.” U.S.
Br. 22-24. Whether or not an EPA action must
promulgate a “self-executing” limitation, it still must
promulgate a limitation. And general effluent limi-
tations issue restrictions because dischargers gener-
ally must follow them to obtain permits. 33 U.S.C.
§ 1342(a). The Rule does not issue restrictions. 80
Fed. Reg. at 37,054. In this respect, the Agencies ig-
nore the State Respondents’ argument (at 25-26) that
the Act’s other uses of “effluent limitation or other
limitation” treat the promulgated action as some-
thing that itself can be violated. E.g., 33 U.S.C.
§ 1365(a), (f. Effluent limitations satisfy this crite-
rion in a way that the definitional Rule does not.

b. Effluent or Other Limitation v. Any Limitation.
The Agencies suggest that “any effluent limitation or
other limitation” means “any limitation.” U.S. Br.
24-28. This debate is an academic one in this case.
Even if Subsection (E) reached “any limitation,” it
would not cover the Rule for the reasons explained
above and below. The EPA action must be the re-
striction, and it must be of a kind that § 1311 directs
the EPA to impose. Yet the Agencies rely on re-
strictions found outside the Rule, and identify noth-
ing in § 1311 giving them the authority to adopt it.

Regardless, as the State Respondents noted (at
21-22), “other limitation” is best read to reach only
restrictions that are “directly related to effluent limi-

7

tations” in that they “direct[]” the regulated commu-
nity “to engage in specific types of activity.” Am. Pa-
per Inst., Inc. v. EPA, 890 F.2d 869, 877 (7th Cir.
1989). This phrase at least excludes the alleged
practical limitations on permitting authorities on
which the Agencies rely. U.S. Br. 21-22. The Agen-

cies’ responses lack merit.

They initially reject both ejusdem generis and
noscitur a sociis, suggesting that neither can apply to
a list that includes only two items (like “effluent lim-
itation or other limitation”). U.S. Br. 24-27. They
mistake “the fairly technical ejusdem generis canon
for the somewhat less technical associated-words
canon” (noscitur a sociis). Antonin Scalia & Bryan A.
Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal
Texts 206 (2012). While “most associated-words cas-
es involve listings,” a listing is not a “prerequisite.”
Id. at 197; Gutierrez v. Ada, 528 U.S. 250, 254-55
(2000); MBIA Ins. Corp. v. FDIC, 708 F.3d 234, 242
(D.C. Cir. 2013). That is because noscitur a sociis is
not a technical canon; it is a “commonsense canon.”
United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 294 (2008).
It is “an interpretive rule as familiar outside the law
as it is within, for words and people are known by
their companion.” Gutierrez, 528 U.S. at 255. Here,
commonsense suggests that Congress would not have
said “any effluent limitation or other limitation” if it
meant “any limitation.” Cf. MBIA, 708 F.3d at 242.

The Agencies retort that Congress often places a
specific phrase before a general one “for emphasis or
clarity.” U.S. Br. 27. In the cases that they cite,
however, the Court recognized a reason for Congress
to have done so. Ali v. Federal Bureau of Prisons,
552 U.S. 214 (2008), illustrates this point. That case

8

considered an exception to the federal government's
waiver of sovereign immunity for the detention of
property by “any officer of customs or excise or any
other law enforcement officer.” Jd. at 216 (citation
omitted). The Court read “any other law enforce-
ment officer” broadly to reach law-enforcement offic-
ers “of whatever kind.” I/d. at 220. This reading did
not render the specific phrase (“any officer of customs
or excise”) superfluous, the Court added, because
“Congress may have simply intended to remove any
doubt that officers of customs or excise were included
in ‘law enforcement officers.” Id.

In this case, by contrast, the Agencies offer no ex-
planation why Congress would say “effluent limita-
tion” apart from “other limitation” if it meant “any
limitation.” Unlike in Ali, they cannot argue that
“any limitation” could be read to exclude effluent lim-
itations. Section 1311’s title is “effluent limitations.”
There is no reason for Congress to have said “effluent
limitation or other limitation” (a phrase suggesting
that Congress had specific restrictions in mind) if it
intended the breadth that the Agencies seek.

c. Under § 1311 v. Affecting § 1311. The Agencies
claim that they issued the Rule “under section 1311”
because its “effect is to make effluent and other limi-
tations under Section 1311 applicable to” covered wa-
ters. U.S. Br. 28. While the meaning of the word
“under” depends on context, Kucana v. Holder, 558
U.S. 233, 245 (2010), the Agencies do not fit their
practical-effect test within any definition of “under
section 1311.” That phrase naturally reaches limita-
tions issued “according to” the authority of § 1311.
Black’s Law Dictionary 1368 (5th ed. 1979). Section
1311, for example, lists restrictions set “by the Ad-

9

ministrator.”. See 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b)(1)(A)-(B),
(b)(2)(A), (b)(2)(E), (m), (mn), (p); #.L du Pont de
Nemours and Co. v. Train, 430 U.S. 112, 126-36
(1977). That § 1311 directs the EPA to issue many
lhimitations—but contains no authorization for the
EPA to clarify the boundaries of “waters of the Unit-
ed States”—shows that the EPA did not issue the
Rule “under section 1311.”

The Agencies also do not adequately respond to
the Rule’s universal scope. If a regulation affects
§ 1311, they argue, it issues under § 1311 even if it
affects every other section. U.S. Br. 28-29. This con-
firms that the Agencies’ test lacks a limiting princi-
ple. They recognize that nearly the entire Act relates
to § 1311, describing that section as “central to the
Act” and as its “first principle.” U.S. Br. 2 (citation
omitted). The Agencies’ test thus could sweep in
nearly all actions into Subsection (E). Looking only
at § 1311’s cross-references as a barometer of items
that might “affect” the section, the Agencies’ reading
could apply to rules about §§ 1251, 1281, 1283, 1284,
1312, 1313, 1314, 1316, 1317, 1325, 1328, 1342, 1343,
1344, and 1370. That reading does not comport with
Subsection (E)’s demarcation of four specific sections.

Indeed, the Agencies next agree that the Court
cannot read Subsection (E) broadly to encompass all
EPA actions, identifying some that, they say, do not
fall within the subsection. U.S. Br. 29-30. But the
Agencies merely list these actions; they do not ex-
plain how the actions fall outside their broad reading
of Subsection (E). Two of their examples show that
the Agencies must switch to an altogether different
reading of Subsection (E) to exclude these actions.

10

Example One: The Agencies claim that the Rule
qualifies as a limitation “under section 1311” because
it “imposes .. . the full panoply of effluent and other
limitations under Section 1311.” U.S. Br. 19. They
later claim that the compliance order in Sackett v.
EPA, 566 U.S. 120 (2012)—-which determined that
specific lands were subject to the Act and so imposed
§ 1311’s limits, id. at 124-25—does not qualify as a
limitation “under section 1311” because the order
“does not itself approve or promulgate effluent or
other limitations under Section 1311.” U.S. Br. 30
(emphasis added). Instead of distinguishing the Rule
from the order under a uniform reading of Subsec-
tion (E), the Agencies adopt different readings for the
two actions. They invoke a broad reading of Subsec-
tion (E) to reach the Rule (asking whether the Rule
affects § 1311 limits), and a narrower reading of Sub-
section (E) to exclude the order (asking whether the
order itself promulgates § 1311 limits).

Example Two: The Agencies claim—consistent
with their traditional view—that Subsection (E) does
not “reach EPA’s decisions approving state water-
quality standards” under § 1313. U.S. Br. 29. Yet
their current position contradicts the interpretive
principles on which they have relied for their tradi-
tional position. Here, the Agencies claim that they
issued the Rule “under section 1311” because § 1311
references the phrase “waters of the United States”
in a roundabout way: That phrase is the definition of
another phrase (“navigable waters”) that is in the
definition of a third phrase (“discharge of any pollu-
tant”) that is used in § 1311(a). 33 U.S.C. §§ 1362(7),
(12). There, the EPA argued that water-quality
standards are not issued “under Section 1311” even
though they are referenced in § 1311(b)(1)(C).

11

Friends of the Earth v. EPA, 333 F.3d 184, 188-89
(D.C. Cir. 2003). To reach that position, it invoked
arguments that the Agencies now disregard, such as
the requirement to read § 1369(b)(1) as a whole, id.
at 189, and the rule against superfluity, id. at 190.

In sum, the Court should reject the Agencies’
“chameleon”-like reading of § 1369(b)(1), whose
meaning depends on the action under review. (Cf.
Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S. 371, 382 (2005).

2. The Agencies make no attempt to fit
the Rule within Subsection (F)’s text

As the State Respondents showed (at 30-33), the
Rule does not fall within Subsection (F) because it
does not issue or deny a permit under § 1342. In re-
sponse, the Agencies spend no effort on Subsection
(F)’s text, identifying no meaning of “issuing” or
“denying” a “permit” that covers the Rule. U.S. Br.
30-34. That omission violates basic principles. In-
terpretation “begin[s], as [it] must, with a careful ex-
amination of the statutory text.” Henson v. Santan-
der Consumer USA Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1718, 1721 (2017);
Maslenjak v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 1918, 1924
(2017). The Agencies do not do so here.

Instead, they begin with Crown Simpson Puip Co.
v. Costle, 445 U.S. 193 (1980), which held that the
EPA veto of a state-issued permit was the denial of a
permit. They read that case as adopting a “function-
al interpretive approach” unmoored from the text.
U.S. Br. 31. Yet Crown Simpson tied its holding to a
reasonable reading of Subsection (F) before consider-
ing the functional concerns that the Agencies ad-
vance. It noted: “When EPA, as here, objects to ef-
fluent limitations contained in a state-issued permit,

12

the precise effect of its action is to ‘den[y]’ a permit
within the meaning of” Subsection (F). 445 U.S. at
196. The Agencies disregard this portion of the opin-
ion by highlighting only the portion that discusses
pragmatic concerns. It is thus the Agencies that de-
part from Crown Simpson’s “rationale” and “abro-
gate” its “framework.” U.S. Br. 32-33 (citation omit-
ted). A case’s rationale consists of all of its reason-
ing, not half of it.

The Agencies next portray the circuit courts as
“generally” supporting their reading of Subsection
(F). U.S. Br. 32. But NRDC, Inc. v. EPA, 656 F.2d
768, 776 (D.C. Cir. 1981), did not find jurisdiction
under Subsection (F); it relied on Subsection (EF).
Then, in opinions with little reasoning, American
Mining Congress v. EPA, 965 F.2d 759, 763 (9th Cir.
1992), and NRDC, Inc. v. EPA, 966 F.2d 1292, 1296-
97 (9th Cir. 1992), misread that opinion as holding
that Subsection (F) covers rules affecting permitting.
The Ninth Circuit has narrowed those opinions. Nw.
Envtl. Advocates v. EPA, 537 F.3d 1006, 1016-18 (9th
Cir. 2008). Yet National Cotton Council of America
uv. EPA, 553 F.3d 927, 933 (6th Cir. 2009), simply
cited the Ninth Circuit cases with “no analysis” on
Subsection (F)’s text. Friends of the Everglades v.
EPA, 699 F.3d 1280, 1288 (11th Cir. 2012). That
case was then rejected by Friends of the Everglades.
In short, the Agencies’ view of Crown Simpson has
not “shaped lower-court case law.” U.S. Br. 34.

The Agencies lastly claim that their reading of
Subsection (F) does not render other subsections in
§ 1369(b)(1) superfluous. U.S. Br. 33-34. Congress
would not have felt the need to adopt a separate sub-
section for regulations like the Rule, they argue, be-

13

cause Subsection (F) “naturally” covers a rule defin-
ing “waters of the United States.” Jd. at 33. In con-
trast, they say, Subsection (F) does not “clearly”
reach the standards of performance referenced in
Subsection (A) or the pretreatment standards refer-
enced in Subsection (C) because those actions “do not
dictate whether a permit may be issued at all.” Jd. at
34. This distinction requires the Agencies to charac-
terize as “natural[]” an interpretation that has been
described as “illogical and unreasonable.” Pet. App.
29a (Griffin, J., concurring in judgment). The dis-
tinction also does not work because § 1342(a) makes
compliance with the referenced standards a “condi-
tion” for the “issu[ance]” of a permit, so these stand-
ards do dictate whether a permit may issue. And the
distinction’s nebulous nature creates an enigmatic
jurisdictional test for Subsection (F). Cf. Hertz, 559
U.S. at 94-95. There is nothing “natural” about it.

B. The Agencies’ Purpose Arguments Do Not
Permit Departure From The Text

The Agencies argue that their view comports with
three purposes that they glean from § 1369(b)(1):
(1) facilitating expedited review; (2) promoting uni-
formity for national rules; and (3) preventing irra-
tional bifurcation of the review of related actions.
U.S. Br. 35-40. These arguments fail.

As a general matter, “[vjague notions of a stat-
ute’s ‘basic purpose’ are ... inadequate to overcome
the words of its text regarding the specific issue un-
der consideration.” Montanile v. Bd. of Trs. of the
Nat’ Elevator Indus. Health Ben. Plan, 136 S. Ct.
651, 661 (2016) (citation omitted). In this case,
“even the most formidable argument concerning the
statute’s purposes could not overcome the clarity” of

14

§ 1369(b)(1)’s text. Nichols v. United States, 136
S. Ct. 1113, 1119 (2016) (citation omitted).

As a specific matter, the Agencies’ purpose argu-
ments are not “formidable.” Their first “purpose”
undermines their reading of § 1369(b)(1), and the
other two do not qualify as “purposes.”

1. Expedited Review. The Agencies note that
§ 1369(b)(1) is designed to “facilitate[] quick and or-
derly resolution of disputes.” U.S. Br. 35. True
enough. But this purpose cuts against them. Their
reading “produces a ‘vague and obscure” jurisdic-
tional boundary. Direct Mktg. Ass’n v. Brohl, 135
S. Ct. 1124, 1133 (2015) (citation omitted). The
Agencies’ failed attempts to distinguish the Rule
from actions like the compliance order in Sackett
show this lack of clarity. If this Court accepts their
reading, “careful counsel” would indefinitely have to
bring duplicative challenges. Inv. Co. Inst. v. Bd. of
Governors of Fed. Reserve Sys., 551 F.2d 1270, 1280
(D.C. Cir. 1977). That would harm the statute’s effi-

ciency purpose.

As the State Respondents noted (at 38-43), this
purpose instead supports the plain text. It repre-
sents one application of the Court’s general presump-
tion that Congress means to set “straightforward”
jurisdictional rules. Hertz, 559 U.S. at 94. It speaks
volumes that the Agencies do not cite cases like
Hertz or discuss the Court’s “practice of reading ju-
risdictional laws, so long as consistent with their
language, ...to establish clear and administrable
rules.” Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc. v.
Manning, 136 S. Ct. 1562, 1567-68 (2016).

15

2. National Uniformity. The Agencies suggest
that Congress designed § 1369(b)(1) to send broad
EPA actions to the circuit courts because of the need
for “national uniformity,” while relegating local EPA
actions to the district courts given the lack of such a
need. U.S. Br. 35, 38 (citation omitted). This alleged
purpose cannot guide the reading of § 1369(b)(1). To
identify a “purpose” of a statute, a party must ground
that purpose in the statute’s text. After all, “the best
evidence of that purpose is the statutory text adopted
by both Houses of Congress and submitted to the
President.” W. Va. Univ. Hosps. v. Casey, 499 U.S.
83, 98 (1991); Scalia & Garner, supra, at 56.

The Agencies do not derive this purpose from
§ 1369(b)(1). Its text both includes and excludes na-
tional and local actions. On one hand, § 1369(b)(1)
sends many local actions to circuit courts. Subsec-
tion (F) requires an applicant to seek circuit review
of an individual permit decision. And Subsection (G)
requires circuit review of individual control strate-
gies. On the other hand, § 1369(b)(1) does not cover
all national rules. It does not “provide for judicial
review of’ general guidelines that § 1314 directs the
EPA to issue. E.J. du Pont, 430 U.S. at 124-25. And
it does not provide for review over national rules
about the hazardous-substance provisions in § 1321
or vessel-waste provisions in § 1322. U.S. Br. 29. If
Congress had intended for circuit review over all na-
tional actions, it would have enacted a provision like
the Clean Air Act’s jurisdictional provision, which
directs national actions to the D.C. Circuit and local
actions to regional circuits. 42 U.S.C. § 7607(b)(1).
But § 1369(b)(1) does not resemble that provision.

16

3. Irrational Bifurcation. Citing EJ. du Pont and
Crown Simpson, the Agencies argue that § 1369(b)(1)
should be read “so that intertwined agency actions
are routed through the same channels.” U.S. Br. 35.
They argue that it would be irrational for district
courts to review the Rule because circuit courts re-
view effluent limitations and permits. Jd. at 38.
This argument misreads E.J. du Pont and Crown
Simpson as allowing practical concerns to trump
text. As noted, both held that the challenged EPA
actions fell within the text before invoking practical
concerns. Crown Simpson, 445 U.S. at 196; EI. du
Pont, 430 U.S. at 136. The Agencies elsewhere con-
cede that the text must control such concerns. They
note that the EPA’s approval of a state-promulgated
individual control strategy under § 1314(]) does not
fall within Subsection (G), even though the EPA’s
promulgation of an individual control strategy does.
U.S. Br. 29. These actions are as “intertwined” as
they come, but review takes place across separate
courts because the text requires that result. Cf. Roll
Coater, 932 F.2d at 671.

Regardless, district-court review of the Rule does
not create “irrational bifurcation.” U.S. Br. 38. The
Agencies claim that challenges to their determina-
tions that certain lands are “waters of the United
States” invariably originate in circuit court after a
permit ruling under Subsection (F). /d. To the con-
trary, this Court’s recent cases implicating those de-
cisions have all originated in district courts. U.S.
Army Corps of Eng’rs v. Hawkes Co., 136 S. Ct. 1807,
1812-13 (2016); Sackett, 566 U.S. at 123-25; Rapanos
v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 729 (2006) (plurality
op.); SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 165. Thus, even if a chal-
lenge to a “categorical” agency resolution should

17

begin in the same court as a challenge to a landown-
er-specific agency resolution, challenges to the Rule
belong in district court. U.S. Br. 31.

C. The Agencies’ Legislative-History Argu-
ments Also Do Not Permit Departure
From The Text

The Agencies argue that the legislative history
from three different periods supports their argument
that Subsections (E) and (F) cover the Rule. U.S. Br.
40-48. This argument fails for the same reasons that
their purpose arguments fail.

To begin with, “reliance on legislative history is
unnecessary in light of the statute’s unambiguous
language.” Mohamad v. Palestinian Auth., 566 U.S.
449, 458 (2012) (citation omitted). “As [the Court
has] repeatedly held, the authoritative statement is
the statutory text, not the legislative history or any
other extrinsic material.” Exxon Mobil Corp. v. AIl-
lapattah Servs., 545 U.S. 546, 568 (2005). Because
Subsections (E) and (F) are clear, the Court has no
need to invoke legislative history.

In all events, the Agencies’ legislative history of-
fers no significant insights into the meaning of Sub-
sections (E) and (F).

1. 1971-72 Reports. The Agencies argue that the
Clean Water Act’s committee and conference reports
“suggested that Section 1369(b)(1) encompasses every
nationwide regulation that the [EPA] issues under
the” Act. U.S. Br. 42. The quoted statements sug-
gest no such thing. The Senate Report indicated that
“fo|ne of the uncertainties in the existing [law] is the
availability or opportunity for judicial review of ad-
ministratively developed and promulgated require-

18

ments, standards and regulations.” S. Rep. 92-414,
at 84-85 (1971). This passage did not identify the
regulations that the new provision would cover, let
alone indicate that it would cover them all. In fact,
the Senate Report described § 1369(b)(1) as
“specif[ying] the courts in which certain appeals may
be prosecuted.” Jd. at 84 (emphasis added). The
House Report was even clearer. It spelled out each
action covered by § 1369(b)(1), and added that the
section does not “exclude judicial review under other
provisions of the legislation that are otherwise per-
mitted by law,” such as through the Administrative
Procedure Act. H.R. Rep. 92-911, at 136 (1972).

Even if these reports suggested that § 1369(b)(1)
covered all national rules, they would contain, as the
Agencies concede, an “imprecise” summary of the
section. U.S. Br. 42-43. It is hard to see why such an
inaccuracy should say anything about § 1369(b)(1).
Justices “who make use of legislative history believe
that clear evidence of congressional intent may ilu-
minate ambiguous text.” Milner v. Dep't of the Navy,
562 U.S. 562, 572 (2011). They do “not take the op-
posite tack of allowing ambiguous legislative history
to muddy clear statutory language.” Jd. That is
what the Agencies seek to do here with their reliance
on “imprecise” (i.e., ambiguous) history.

2. 1987 Change. The Agencies next suggest that
Congress, in 1987, acquiesced in their broad reading
of Subsections (E) and (F) by passing amendments to
§ 1369(b)(1) “without narrowing its scope.” U.S. Br.
44 (citing Water Quality Act of 1987, Pub. Law No.
100-4, 101 Stat. 7). Even if Congress acquiesced in
EI. du Pont and Crown Simpson, it did not agree to
the Agencies’ misreading of them. If anything, these

19

amendments show that the Agencies do not read
those cases correctly because the amendments would
serve no purpose under the Agencies’ view. Congress
made two changes: It added sewage-sludge limita-
tions under § 1345 to Subsection (E), and it adopted
Subsection (G) for the promulgation of individual
control strategies. 101 Stat. at 39, 73. If rules affect-
ing the “permitting process” were already covered,
however, Congress had no reason to add these provi-
sions. After all, the sewage-sludge regulations and
individual control strategies establish permit condi-
tions. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1314()(1)(D), 1345(a)-(b). So the
EPA’s reading of Subsections (E) and (F)—which
would cover these permit-affecting actions—renders
these amendments “a largely meaningless exercise.”
Rumsfeld v. Forum for Acad. & Instl Rights, Inc.,
547 U.S. 47, 58 (2006).

3. 1977 Debate. The Agencies lastly argue that a
floor debate about an unenacted amendment to
§ 1369(b)(1) during the 95th Congress supports their
broad reading of the enacted section passed by the
92nd Congress. U.S. Br. 44-48. The Court should
reject their pages of “1977 ‘history’ about a 1972
law.” Longview Fibre Co. v. Rasmussen, 980 F.2d
1307, 1312 (9th Cir. 1992). The Court has “observed
on more than one occasion that the interpretation
given by one Congress (or a committee or Member
thereof) to an earlier statute is of little assistance in
discerning the meaning of that statute.” Cent. Bank,
N.A. v. First Interstate Bank, N.A., 511 U.S. 164, 185
(1994) (citation omitted). It has added that “[flailed
legislative proposals are ‘a particularly dangerous
ground on which to rest an interpretation of a prior
statute.” United States v. Craft, 535 U.S. 274, 287
(2002) (citation omitted)); SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 169-

20

70. The Agencies’ arguments join both problematic
methods. An after-the-fact debate about § 1369(b)(1)
generally does not help discern the specific meaning
of the text in Subsections (E) and (F).

D. The Agencies Wrongly Favor A Presump-
tion Of Circuit Review Over Established

Interpretive Canons

The Agencies claim that Florida Power & Light
Co. v. Lorion, 470 U.S. 729 (1985), created a pre-
sumption favoring circuit review for statutes that di-
vide jurisdiction between circuit and district courts.
U.S. Br. 48-49. They overread that case.

To begin with, Florida Power confirms that the
Agencies’ presumption provides no basis to depart
from § 1369(b)(1)’s text. While the Court stated that
it “will not presume that Congress intended to depart
from the sound policy of placing initial APA review in
the courts of appeals,” it added that “|w]hether initial
subject-matter jurisdiction lies initially in the courts
of appeals must of course be governed by the intent
of Congress and not by any views we may have about
sound policy.” 470 U.S. at 745-46. That is, policy ra-
tionales cannot override § 1369(b)(1)’s language.

Even if § 1369(b)(1) were ambiguous, the canons
that the State Respondents invoked (at 38-49) would
prevail over this presumption. Florida Power relied
on efficiency concerns to describe the “sound policy”
of circuit review. 470 U.S. at 745. Yet the statute
there contained no provision like § 1369(b)(2), which
forecloses later judicial review over actions falling
within § 1369(b)(1). And the “presumption of judicial
review is a repudiation of the principle that efficiency
of regulation conquers all.” Sackett, 566 U.S. at 130.

21

Indeed, the D.C. Circuit, which the Agencies cite as
having adopted their circuit-favoring presumption,
U.S. Br. 48, rejected it in a case involving the Noise
Control Act precisely because of that law’s similar
review-preclusion provision. Chrysler Corp. v. EPA,
600 F.2d 904, 911-13 (D.C. Cir. 1979).

The Agencies respond that challengers who later
confront § 1369(b)(2)’s judicial-review restriction may
assert constitutional challenges at that time, so the
presumption favoring judicial review (and the canon
of constitutional avoidance) should not affect the
Court's reading now. U.S. Br. 49. Not so. If an am-
biguous statute could be read to restrict judicial re-
view in a way that raises constitutional concerns, the
Court should choose an alternative reading that ex-
pands that review and lessens those concerns. “In
other words, when deciding which of two plausible
statutory constructions to adopt, a court must con-
sider the necessary consequences of its choice.”
Clark, 543 U.S. at 380. “If one of them would raise a
multitude of constitutional problems, the other
should prevail—whether or not those constitutional
problems pertain to the particular litigant before the
Court.” Jd. at 380-81. Thus, because § 1369(b)(2) re-
stricts judicial review and raises constitutional con-
cerns, § 1369(b)({1) should be interpreted to lessen
those concerns. Longview, 980 F.2d at 1313.

The Agencies respond with a footnote from Harri-
son v. PPG Industries, 446 U.S. 578 (1980), which
addressed the Clean Air Act’s jurisdictional provi-
sion. U.S. Br. 49. The challengers there asserted
that “a literal construction” of that section—which
grants broad review over all final action, 42 U.S.C.
§ 7607(b)(1)—“would violate due process of law” be-

22

cause of its similar judicial-review restriction. Har-
rison, 446 U.S. at 592 n.9. The footnote stated that
the judicial-review restriction was “not at issue here”
and that any constitutional challenge would have to
“await another day.” /d. This statement should not
be read to reject the canon of constitutional avoid-
ance. Instead, Harrison held only that the Clean Air
Act’s jurisdictional grant unambiguously applied to
the EPA action at issue, leaving no ambiguity to re-
solve. Jd. at 588-89. As Justice Powell noted, “con-
stitutional difficulties well may counsel a narrow
construction” of that section, but “no such construc-
tion [was] possible in this case.” Id. at 594-95 (Pow-
ell, J., concurring). Section 1369(b)(1), however, is
far narrower than the Clean Air Act’s similar provi-
sion. Whether it reaches the Rule is—at the least—
debatable. So the avoidance canon and presumption
favoring judicial review counsel a narrow reading.

The Agencies’ reliance on Harrison is ironic in a
final respect. Harrison rejected reliance on policy
arguments about the best forum for resolving dis-
putes, noting that “this is an argument to be ad-
dressed to Congress, not to this Court.” 446 U.S. at
593. The same can be said for the Agencies’ position.
As the State Respondents noted (at 1-2), the Court
should reject their efforts to bring back the policy-
based interpretive approach from Holy Trinity
Church v. United States, 143 U.S. 457 (1892).

23

CONCLUSION

This Court should reverse the Sixth Circuit’s
holding that it has subject-matter jurisdiction under
33 U.S.C. § 1369(b)(1) over the petitions for review.

Respectfully submitted,

MICHAEL DEWINE
Attorney General of Ohio

ERIC E. MURPHY*
State Solicitor
*Counsel of Record
PETER T. REED
Deputy Solicitor
30 East Broad St., 17th Floor
Columbus, Ohio 43215
614-466-8980
eric.murphy@
ohioattorneygeneral.gov

Counsel for Respondent
State of Ohio

SEPTEMBER 2017

ADDITIONAL COUNSEL

STEVEN T. MARSHALL
Attorney General
State of Alabama

JAHNA LINDEMUTH
Attorney General
State of Alaska

MARK BRNOVICH
Attorney General
State of Arizona

LESLIE RUTLEDGE
Attorney General
State of Arkansas

CYNTHIA H. COFFMAN
Attorney General
State of Colorado

PAMELA JO BONDI
Attorney General
State of Florida

CHRISTOPHER M. CARR
Attorney General
State of Georgia

LAWRENCE G. WASDEN
Attorney General
State of Idaho

CurRTIs T. HILL, JR.
Attorney General
State of Indiana

DEREK SCHMIDT
Attorney General
State of Kansas

ANDY BESHEAR
Attorney General
State of Kentucky

JEFF LANDRY
Attorney General
State of Louisiana

BILL SCHUETTE
Attorney Genera!
State of Michigan

JIM Hoop
Attorney General
State of Mississippi

JOSHUA D. HAWLEY
Attorney General
State of Missouri

TIM Fox
Attorney General
State of Montana

DOUGLAS J. PETERSON
Attorney General
State of Nebraska

ADAM PAUL LAXALT
Attorney General
State of Nevada

LARA KATZ
Assistant General
Counsel

New Mexico
Environment
Department

GREGORY C. RIDGLEY
General Counsel
MATTHIAS SAYER
Special Counsel

New Mexico State
Engineer

WAYNE STENEHJEM
Attorney General
State of North Dakota

MIKE HUNTER
Attorney General
State of Oklahoma

ALAN WILSON
Attorney General

State of South Carolina

MARTY J. JACKLEY
Attorney General
State of South Dakota

HERBERT H. SLATERY III

Attorney General
and Reporter
State of Tennessee

KEN PAXTON
Attorney General
State of Texas

SEAN D. REYES
Attorney General
State of Utah

PATRICK MORRISEY
Attorney General
State of West Virginia

BRAD D. SCHIMEL
Attorney General
State of Wisconsin

PETER K. MICHAEL
Attorney General
State of Wyoming

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385016_0700%3A17. Public record. Not legal advice.