# Petitioners Brief — Nat'l Ass'n of Mfrs. v. Dep't of Def., 137 S. Ct. 811 (2017) (No. 16-299)

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URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385016_0700%3A05

## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Petitioners Brief
- **Published:** January 1, 2017

## Text

{ APR 27 2017

BRIEFS | No. 16-299 | eres of

Hn the Supreme Court of the GAnited States

NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF MANUFACTURERS,

Petitioner,
v.

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE,
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS, AND
U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, ET AL.,

Respondents.
On Writ of Certiorari to the
United States Court of Appeals
for the Sixth Circuit
BRIEF FOR PETITIONER
MICHAEL B. KIMBERLY TIMOTHY S. BISHOP
Mayer Brown LLP Counsel of Record
1999 K Street, NW CHAD M. CLAMAGE
Washington, DC 20006 JED GLICKSTEIN
(202) 263-3127 Mayer Brown LLP
71 South Wacker Drive
LINDA E. KELLY Chicago, Illinois 60606
QUENTIN RIEGEL (312) 782-0600
LELAND P. FROST tbishop@mayerbrown.com
Manufacturers’ Center
for Legal Action
733 10th Street, NW, Ste 700
Washington, DC 20001
(202) 637-3000

Counsel for Petitioner

QUESTION PRESENTED

Whether the court of appeals has original
jurisdiction under 33 U.S.C. § 1369(b)(1) over a petition
for review challenging a regulation that defines the
scope of the term “waters of the United States” in the
Clean Water Act.”

* This is the Question Presented by the Solicitor General in his
brief in opposition. The Question Presented in the petition for
certiorari asked whether the Sixth Circuit erred in holding that it
had jurisdiction under 33 U.S.C. § 1369(b)(1)(F). In the brief in
opposition, the Solicitor General also defended the judgment on
the alternative ground— presented below but rejected by the court
of appeals—that the court of appeals had original jurisdiction
under 33 U.S.C. § 1369(b)(1)(E). Petitioner therefore has
rephrased the question pursuant to this Court’s Rule 24.1(a) to
more accurately reflect the procedural posture of the case.
Jurisdiction under both Subsections was briefed and decided
below, briefed by the parties at the certiorari stage, and petitioner
addresses both in this brief.

11

PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDINGS BELOW

After the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation
consolidated the petitions for review in the Sixth
Circuit (Consolidation Order, Dkt. No. 3, MCP No. 135
(JPML July 28, 2015)), the Sixth Circuit permitted
petitioner here, the National Association of Manufac-
turers, to intervene as a respondent. Order, No. 15-
3751 cons. (Sept. 16, 2015).

Respondents below—the federal agency respon-
dents here—are the U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency; E. Scott Pruitt, in his official capacity as EPA
Administrator; the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers;
Lieutenant General Todd T. Semonite, in his official
capacity as the Corps’ Chief of Engineers and Com-
manding General; the Acting Assistant Secretary of
the Army (Civil Works) in his or her official capacity;
and Robert M. Speer, in his official capacity as Acting
Secretary of the Army.

State intervenor-respondents below and respon-
dents here are the States of New York, Connecticut,
Hawaii, Massachusetts, Oregon, Vermont, Washing-
ton, and the Districi of Columbia.

Over 100 other parties filed 22 petitions for review
below, and intervened in other petitions, and many of
those petitioners moved to dismiss their own and other
petitions for review for want of jurisdiction. Those
petitioners below, respondents here, are as follows:

No. 15-3751: Murray Energy Corporation.

No. 15-3799: States of Ohio, Michigan, and Ten-
nessee.

No. 15-3817: National Wildlife Federation.

No. 15-3820: Natural Resources Defense Council,
Inc.

No. 15-3822: State of Oklahoma.

1V
No. 15-3823: Chamber of Commerce of the United
States; National Federation of Independent Business;

State Chamber of Oklahoma; Tulsa Regional Chamber;
and Portland Cement Association.

No. 15-3831: States of North Dakota, Alaska,
Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, Idaho, Missouri, Mon-
tana, Nebraska, Nevada, South Dakota, Wyoming,
New Mexico Environment Department, New Mexico
State Engineer.

No. 15-3837: Waterkeeper Alliance; Center for
Biological Diversity; Center for Food Safety; Humboldt
Baykeeper; Russian Riverkeeper; Monterey Coast-
keeper; Upper Missouri Waterkeeper, Inc.; Snake
River Waterkeeper, Inc.; Turtle Island Restoration
Network, Inc.

No. 15-3839: Puget SoundKeeper; Sierra Club.

No. 15-3850: American Farm Bureau Federation;
American Forest & Paper Association; American Pet-
roleum Institute; American Road and Transportation
Builders Association; Greater Houston Builders
Association; Leading Builders of America; Matagorda
County Farm Bureau; National Alliance of Forest
Owners; National Association of Home Builders;
National Association of Realtors; National Cattlemen’s
Beef Association; National Corn Growers Association;
National Mining Association; National Pork Producers
Council; National Stone, Sand, and Gravel Association;
Public Lands Council; Texas Farm Bureau; and U.S.
Poultry & Egg Association.

No. 15-3853: States of Texas, Louisiana, and
Mississippi; Texas Department of Agriculture; Texas
Commission on Environmental Quality; Texas Depart-
ment of Transportation; Texas General Land Office;
Railroad Commission of Texas; Texas Water Develop-

ment Board.

Vv

No. 15-3858: Utility Water Act Group.

No. 15-3885: Southeastern Legal Foundation, Inc.;
Georgia Agribusiness Council, Inc.; Greater Atlanta
Homebuilders Association, Inc.

No. 15-3887: States of Georgia, West Virginia,
Alabama, Florida, Indiana, Kansas; Commonwealth of
Kentucky; North Carolina Department of Environment
and Natural Resources; States of South Carolina,

Utah, and Wisconsin.

No. 15-3948: One Hundred Miles; South Carolina
Coastal Conservation League.

No. 15-4159: Southeast Stormwater Association,
Inc.; Florida Stormwater Association, Inc.; Florida
Rural Water Association, Inc., and Florida League of
Cities, Inc.

No. 15-4162: Michigan Farm Bureau.

No. 15-4188: Washington Cattlemen’s Association;
California Cattlemen’s Association; Oregon Cattle-
men’s Association; New Mexico Cattle Growers As-
sociation; New Mexico Wool Growers, Inc.; New Mexico
Federal Lands Council; Coalition of Arizona/New
Mexico Counties for Stable Economic Growth; Duarte
Nursery, Inc.; Pierce Investment Company; LPF
Properties, LLC; Hawkes Company, Inc.

No. 15-4211: Association of American Railroads;
Port Terminal Railroad Association.

No. 15-4234: Texas Alliance for Responsible
Growth, Environment and Transportation.

No. 15-4305: American Exploration & Mining
Association.

No. 15-4404: Arizona Mining Association; Arizona
Farm Bureau; Association of Commerce and Industry;
New Mexico Mining Association; Arizona Chamber of

vi
Commerce & Industry; Arizona Rock Products Associa-
tion; and New Mexico Farm & Livestock Bureau.

Many of these petitioners in the court of appeals
also filed complaints in district courts. Those actions
are North Dakota v. EPA, No. 3:15-cv-59 (D.N.D.);
Murray Energy Corp. v. EPA, No. 1:15-cv-110 (N.D. W.
Va.); Ohio v. EPA, 2:15-cv-2467 (S.D. Ohio); Am. Farm
Bureau Fed’n v. EPA, No. 3:15-cv-165 (S.D. Tex.);
Texas v. EPA, No. 3:15-cv-162 (S.D. Tex.); Ass’n of Am.
Railroads vy. EPA, No. 3:15-cv-266 (S.D. Tex.); Georgia
v. McCarthy, No. 2:15-cv-79 (S.D. Ga.); Oklahoma ex
rel. Pruitt v. EPA, No. 4:15-cv-381 (N.D. Okla.);
Chamber of Commerce v. EPA, No. 4:15-cv-386 (N.D.
Okla.); Southeastern Legal Foundation v. EPA, No.
1:15-cv-2488-TCB (N.D. Ga.); Washington Cattlemen’s
Association v. EPA, No. 0:15-cv-3058 (D. Minn.); Puget
Soundkeeper Alliance v. McCarthy, No. 2:15-cv-1342
(W.D. Wash.); Waterkeeper Alliance v. EPA, No. 3:15-
cv-3927 (N.D. Cal.); Natural Resources Defense Council
v. EPA, No. 1:15-cv-1324 (D.D.C.); Am. Exploration &
Mining Ass’n v. EPA, No. 1:15-cv-1323 (D.D.C.); and
Arizona Mining Ass’n v. EPA, No. 2:15-cv-1752 (D.
Az.).

CORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT

Petitioner National Association of Manufacturers is
a not-for-profit public advocacy group. It has no parent
corporation and does not issue stock.

es

TABLE OF CONTENTS
a csnesmninmienenenineieneins i
Parties to the Proceedings Below ............................. ill
Corporate Disclosure Statement ........................2..... v1
ESE RET eee 1
SSSR NINE SEE SS a RS TE 1
Statutes and Regulation Involved .....................0..0.0... 2
ESSE SSS Ae Ee ee 2

EET EAC OA AR a ERR ONT 2

EE SEO 6

C. The Waters of the United States Rule........... 10

D. Judicial Review of the Rule..................0......... 12

E. The Sixth Circuit’s Decision........................... 14
Summary of the Argument ..................2......-.ccceeeee eee 16
aah acehetaiielieiiiiiisbitatntaccitimishiiiiuntnichiainiirinibpaeenidinimndsmaseienie 19
I. The Sixth Circuit Lacks Jurisdiction Under

The Plain Language Of Section 1369(b). ............ 20

A. The Sixth Circuit Erroneously
Exercised Jurisdiction Under Section

i cdesnonin 20

1. The WOTUS Rule Falls Outside The
Unambiguous Language Of
RI EE ER 20

2. Subsection (F) Does Not Extend To
EPA Actions That Merely Affect The

Issuing Or Denying Of Permits. ............... 22
B. The Sixth Circuit Correctly Held That It
Lacks Jurisdiction Under
ee 28

1. The WOTUS Rule Falls Outside The
Plain Language Of Subsection (E)............ 28

2. Subsection (E) Does Not Extend To
EPA. Actions That Merely Impact
Point Source Operators Or

C. Congress’s Specific And Narrow Focus
In Section 1369(b) Confirms That The
Sixth Circuit Lacks Jurisdiction. ................... 40
D. The Legislative History Suggests That
Congress Did Not Intend The Courts Of
Appeals To Review All Nationwide

Il. Policy Considerations Favor Interpreting
Section 1369(b) Textually To Exclude The

REAR IRAE IN E A 43

A. Interpreting Section 1369(b) Textually
Promotes Jurisdictional Clarity..................... 44

B. A Narrow Reading Is Necessary Due To
Section 1369(b)’s Preclusion Provision. ......... 48

C. A Narrow Reading Offers Parties,
Agencies, And Courts The Benefits Of

Multilateral Review Of Agency

en csintcemitonnntind 50
D. Judge McKeague’s Efficiency

Arguments Are Unpersuasive........................ 52

ES IEA Sr ae ARS PT I I 55

ix

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Page(s)

Cases
Adamo Wrecking Co. v. United States,

TL a 34, 49
Alaska Eskimo Whaling Comm'n v. EPA,

791 F.3d 1088 (9th Cir. 2015)...........................00. 21
Am. Paper Inst., Inc. v. EPA,

890 F.2d 869 (7th Cir. 1989)........0...00..00.000.. passim
Arkansas v. Oklahoma,

I eieedioline 7
Atchison, Topeka & San‘a Fe Ry. Co. v.

Pena,

44 F.3d 437 (7th Cir. 1994), affd, 516

a | cauiebininseibameseiebndeidlionl 51
Barnhart v. Peabody Coal Co.,

EE EE ES 40
Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. EPA,

538 F.2d 513 (2d Cir. 1976) .......... sannsiiiindis 32, 38, 40
Bowen v. Massachusetts,

TTT EI OEE RT a 52

California v. Carney,
iri esdiuicincenninieteingsnsiinnnsimninhenes 50

x

Catskill Mountains Chapter of Trout
Unlimited v. EPA,
8 F. Supp. 3d 500 (S.D.N.Y. 2014), rev’d,
846 F.3d 492 (2d Cir. 2017) ................ccccceeeees 33, 53

Circuit City Stores, Inc. vy. Adams,
Pe ee i circceindccccksinsscercevticussentianmasnaiael 30

Clark v. Rameker,
pe ee err 27

In re Clean Water Rule,
MDL No. 2663, Dkt. 163 (JPML Oct. 13,

Coeur Alaska, Inc. v. Southeast Alaska
Conservation Council,

ae Cs ee i tesicsannrenscucinicsosntiinsctatunadosaioamiiania 8
Crown Simpson Pulp Co. v. Costle,

OE Ces Se idetiienescnsastninssntinnsumsapabanih passim
Decker v. Nw. Envtl. Def. Ctr.,

Ae He Py SEE I ircecincnsvecinctontner medicines passim
E.I. du Pont de Nemours Co. v. Train,

Gr Cr Be iiiticcksviccccctadinssiniacickiciaenia passim
Elgin v. Dep’t of the Treasury,

Oe ee Se cccnneecdnsecenssnensmecsunnauaiadl 44, 45
Fla. Power & Light Co. v. Lorion,

SF ee. Ce ccdrtcntnitticitrsanctisestssnsiaittnindenian 54
Friends of Earth v. EPA,

333 F.3d 184 (D.C. Cir. 2008) ........ccccccccceeeeee 38, 39

xi

Friends of the Everglades v. EPA,
699 F.3d 1280 (11th Cir. 2012).................... passim

Georgia v. McCarthy,
2015 WL 5092568 (S.D. Ga. Aug. 27,
SuIIIIIAll iat aliiddhnhedbcdedimeseotdencuscssececcesece savecseess 13

Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc.,
Nee esusbenti 43

Grupo Dataflux v. Atlas Global Group, L.P.,
EE 44

Gustafson v. Alloyd Co.,
EE ee 30

Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake
Bay Found., Inc.,
EET 20

Hertz Corp. v. Friend,
ee 5, 44, 45, 47

Inv. Co. Inst. v. Bd. of Governors of Fed.
Reserve Sys.,
661 F.2d 1270 (D.C. Cir. 1977)............................ 13

Jimenez v. Quarterman,
I, In... scnescsesncsctonsees Dae 22

Kloeckner v. Solis,
a cstuabecionnsounen 43

Kucana v. Holder,
Se 20, 54

xll

Lapides v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. Sys. of Ga.,
ER RS SS een 5, 44

Leocal v. Ashcroft,
EA ee eee Mee 49

Lockhart v. United States,
a 25

Longview Fibre Co. v. Rasmussen,
980 F.2d 1307 (9th Cir. 1992).................. 38, 40, 48

Mathis v. United States,
136 S. Ct. 2243 (2016)................-cecceeesevees ssecbionind 40

McDonnell v. United States,
| ———_—_—_— ENCEEE TTT ETT EE 38

Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc.

v. Manning,
ee Se cncnsinnincescnunsdibicininbesnenneniinnans 45

Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. Nat’
Sea Clammers Ass'n,
a cuiaas 2

Murray Energy Corp. v. EPA,
2015 WL 5062506 (N.D. W. Va. Aug. 26,

Bee iledeiectaivtsichy tchasnctsenanteiphseminpiiniiaaieanbiaiinineniiin 13

Nader v. EPA,
850 F.2d 747 (Oth Cir. 1968)..............00..0...000000000 54

Nat. Res. Def. Council v. EPA,
808 F.3d 556 (2d Cir. 2015) ....................c.cceeeeeees 21

xii

National Cotton Council of America v. EPA,

553 F.3d 927 (6th Cir. 2009).......................... 15, 16
NLRB v. SW Gen., Inc.,

187 S. Ct. GBD CBOIT)..........-.0.2.-.0.0.c0ceces0ce-eees 24, 27
North Dakota vy. EPA,

127 F. Supp. 3d 1047 (D.N.D. 2015).............. 13, 25
NRDC v. EPA,

673 F.2d 400 (D.C. Cir. 1982)........................ 39, 45
Nw. Envtl. Advocates v. EPA,

537 F.3d 1006 (Sth Cir. 2008)....................000000000 23
Obergefell v. Hodges,

a ceescnamanion = eaten 50
Puerto Rico v. Franklin Cal. Tax-Free Trust,

a nineicineiebinaindiied 22
Rapanos v. United States,

4 EA 7, 8, 10, 34
Roll Coater, Inc. v. Reilly,

932 F.2d 668 (7th Cir. 1991).......................... 13, 50
Sackett v. EPA,

ET eae ae 38, 48, 55
Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook

County v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers,

ee RRR EE 10, 49

South Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist. v. Miccosukee
Tribe,
A ee Oe 6

XiV

U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs v. Hawkes Co.,

a clttpemiesinsemunnnebs 48
United States v. Bean,

I eeieinmetelll 41
United States v. Mendoza,

a cpceisealanngd 50
United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes,

pe 10
Universal Health Servs., Inc. v. United States,

Le ace 54
Upper Blackstone Water Pollution

Abatement Dist. v. EPA,

ED SE, BIE cccccccatodocsecunsecconsseascsonses 21
VEPCO v. Costle,

566 F.2d 446 (4th Cir. 1977).................00..cccccceee0 39
Statutes and Regulations
5 U.S.C.

SI saints taicapeisieaaidiensnaniinaninnaincteanienmneabliniin, devine 3

iach dinthabiens Genbednicinseihnbininniiidibilesteiniiepianinieatiaiiakan 3, 52

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EERE EEE SE ce aT ee Semen NESE 3

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28 U.S.C.

ST issiccisiitpstnsiervteniertiiieripainnntiancaeciaidaiimiieinienaiaiiiiidl 2

IIIT ihacriciaitateciaaiienbeianeteiieldaieigattmenabtnntiinideinail 4, 52

SII Lis npcinchtatacadnitndalonsniteeneencdgannasiesinemamannia 52

ESD at ert LAT ioe Ate oer TE 13
| ERS EE eR ARS 3
33 U.S.C.
aia aise dail ied iene ae 2, 34
%SGZ isos 6
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EEE 9
SIT Diciendeksnceinontaneiinapealodeuconitiuininteiieniniasniiinindl 34
TEESE a 34
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STITT riidsiictiasehinnaieaithdatandsiiibbaisnudiieanenaanetebadiiad 34
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SIT tii nccendinuthsiiidententigemeaninitemntentnsiincgammnbiailll passim
SEF SEERA CESSES ote euranmoe 6, 32, 33, 34
STITT ns iienrscsiidaeintheiieiihnaiiiniinebeianacmetdaielteaa 7, 27, 31
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ETE Te ME passim
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SIT iiistsciriesneptntisdiininsiiimalitt eonpcaianipiesmasiiial 38
I ee 38
tsi ceeteaihdcianipaicipssiaiieh autem phaieaicbdenlil 8, 38
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ETS e ae eee te RECT 3, 8, 27
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ARE De ene ree RANT A 27, 46

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| EEE nen een ten EES. 34
REESE Sr Cer SASL 5 eM a 9
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al aaa lati ellnti aa ae 15, 32, 33
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SERS A EH ae ctre ee MEN ee ae 4

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SI isiiciscecasscucsahilsibichinandiiianbiiihiihaieissbiaiadibepiiadiencntenias 34
42 U.S.C

I a all 41
Clean Air Act Amendments, Pub. L. No. 95-

95, 91 Stat. 685 (Aug. 7, 1977) ..................000000000 43
Clean Water Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-

217, 91 Stat. 1566 (Dec. 27, 1977)...................00.- 42
Federal Water Pollution Control Act

Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-500........... 41
33 C.F.R.

i a a cea cel Lal 11

a 11, 12
40 C.F.R.

CSE NR eo ee sais oeas 6, 33, 53

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ARTE SN een aEmn NNR REIEE EE Pay 6

aa inal eel 27

TTL inti tinea hate cia aabiddintnadalinegneieedeiaiaimed 7

al 26, 31

Clean Water Rule: Definition of “Waters of
the United States,” 80 Fed. Reg. 37,054
RIESE PERS Far EE are a passim

Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 82 Fed.
es I IS Gl i cincccccsecstesesscussenevescneies 12

xVl1ll

Miscellaneous

Benjamin Cardozo, THE NATURE OF THE
DUE, Fe CED cece ceccccscacccccccccsesccceccesses 50

123 Cong. Rec. S. 26,754 (Aug. 4, 1977)................... 42

EPA & U.S. Army Corps of Engineers,
Economic Analysis of the EPA-Army
Clean Water Rule (May 2015)..........................040- 11

EPA, NPDES PERMIT WRITER’S GUIDE
is ccieaabaenanaih 26, 31

The Fiscal Year 2016 EPA Budget: Joint
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Energy
& Power & the Subcomm. on
Environment & Economy of the House
Comm. on Energy & Commerce, 114th
RE RC SE 22

H.R Rep. No. 92-911 (1972), reprinted in 1
Leg. Hist. of the Water Pollution Control
Act of 1972 (Comm. Print 1973).......................... 42

Allison LaPlante et al., On Judicial Review
Under the Clean Water Act in the Wake
of Decker v. Northwest Environmental
Defense Center: What We Know Now
and What We Have Yet to Find Out, 43
Re EE a 41

Joseph W. Mead & Nicholas A. Fromherz,
Choosing a Court to Review the
Executive, 67 ADMIN. L. REV. 1 (2015).....47, 53, 54

xix

Richard L. Revesz, Specialized Courts and
the Administrative Lawmaking System,
138 U. PA. L. REV. 1111 (1990) ............................ 50

Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner,
READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF

Ie II vicdccnacnecccsvnsincetecesensisonccncscseces 30
S. Conf. Rep. 92-1236 (1972), reprinted in
kk SS 28

THE CLEAN WATER ACT HANDBOOK (Mark A.
ics, GENS BENNIE Mi cnceceneccntenecenescneensecenesenensonss 21

Webster's Third New International
RR A 29

BRIEF FOR PETITIONER!

OPINIONS BELOW

The decision of the court of appeals (Pet. App. 1la-
47a) is reported at 817 F.3d 261. The court of appeals’
denial of rehearing en banc, which is unreported, is re-
produced at Pet. App. 51a-52a.

JURISDICTION

The judgment of the court of appeals denying all
motions to dismiss the petitions for review for lack of
jurisdiction was entered on February 22, 2016. Pet.
App. 48a-50a. The court of appeals’ order denying
rehearing en banc was entered on April 21, 2016. Id. at

| Petitioner the National Association of Manufacturers (“the
NAM”) filed suit challenging the waters of the United States Rule
in district court as part of a broad-based coalition of 18 industry
groups. Am. Farm Bureau Fed'n, et al. v. EPA, No. 3:15-cv-165
(S.D. Tex.). When that coalition also filed a protective petition for
review in the Sixth Circuit, it agreed that the NAM would not join
the petition, so as to ensure that the NAM could challenge the
Sixth Circuit’s jurisdiction.

The NAM’s fellow coalition members, petitioners in No. 15-3850,
filed a brief as respondents in support of the NAM’s certiorari
petition. These respondents—the American Farm Bureau
Federation; American Forest & Paper Association; American Pet-
roleum Institute; American Road and Transportation Builders
Association; Greater Houston Builders Association; Leading
Builders of America; Matagorda County Farm Bureau; National
Alliance of Forest Owners; National Association of Home Builders;
National Association of Realtors; National Cattlemen’s Beef
Association; National Corn Growers Association; National Mining
Association; National Pork Producers Council; National Stone,
Sand, and Gravel Association; Public Lands Council; Texas Farm
Bureau; and U.S. Poultry & Egg Association—each fully supports
and joins in the arguments made in this brief and will not be filing
a separate brief.

2

5la. On July 1, 2016, Justice Kagan extended the time
to file a petition for certiorari to September 2, 2016.
This Court granted a timely filed petition for certiorari
on January 13, 2017. Jurisdiction rests on 28 U.S.C.

§ 1254(1).
STATUTES AND REGULATION INVOLVED

Relevant portions of the Clean Water Act, 33
U.S.C. §§ 1251 et seq., are reproduced in an Addendum.
The Waters of the United States Rule (““WOTUS Rule”
or “Rule”) is published at Clean Water Rule: Definition
of “Waters of the United States,” 80 Fed. Reg. 37,054
(June 29, 2015). =

STATEMENT

A. Introduction

Section 509(b) of the Clean Water Act (“CWA” or
“Act”), 33 U.S.C. § 1369(b), provides for “judicial review
in the United States courts of appeals of various
particular actions by the [EPA] Administrator.”
Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. Natl Sea
Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1, 13-14 (1981). The seven
categories of action specified in Section 1369(b)(1) are
EPA Administrator action

(A) in promulgating any standard of perform-

ance under section 1316 of this title [for new

sources of discharges],

(B) in making any determination pursuant to
section 1316(b)(1)(C) of this title,

(C) in promulgating any effluent standard,
prohibition, or pretreatment standard under
section 1317 of this title [for toxic pollutants or
pollutants introduced into treatment works],

3

(D) in making any determination as to a State
permit program submitted under section
1342(b) of this title,

(E) in approving or promulgating any effluent
limitation or other limitation under section
1311, 1312, 1316, or 1345 of this title,

(F) in issuing or denying any permit under
section 1342 of this title, and

(G) in promulgating any individual control
strategy under section 1314(J) of this title [to
address toxic pollutant discharges] * * *.

Jurisdiction in the courts of appeals over challenges to
those EPA actions is not only original, but also
“exclusive.” Decker v. Nw. Envtl. Def. Ctr., 133 S. Ct.
1326, 1334 (2013). And “an application for review must
be lodged in the court of appeals within 120 days of the
Administrator's action, §1369(b)(1).” Ibid.

Challenges to final agency action under the CWA
not covered by Section 1369(b)—including all actions
by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (“Corps”) in
administering permits for discharges of dredged and
fill material under Section 1344—are governed by the
Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 701 et seq.
(“APA”). The APA provides that “[a] person suffering
legal wrong” or “adversely affected or aggrieved by
agency action” may bring suit in district court for
judicial review of any “final agency action for which
there is no other adequate remedy in a court.” 5 U.S.C.
§§ 702, 704. An APA suit may be brought within six
years of the challenged agency action. 28 U.S.C.
§ 2401(a).

Section 1369(b) thus “extends only to certain suits
challenging some agency actions” taken by one of the
federal agencies that, along with the States, are

4

responsible for implementing the CWA. Decker, 133 S.
Ct. at 13834 (emphasis added). Litigants whose claims
fall outside those narrow confines may invoke the
jurisdiction of the district court under the APA and 28
U.S.C. § 1331.2

In this case, challengers filed numerous petitions
for review of the final WOTUS Rule promulgated
jointly by EPA and the Corps. 80 Fed. Reg. 37,054
(June 29, 2015). That Rule significantly revised the
scope of the Clean Water Act by redefining the phrase
“the waters of the United States.” Rejecting intervenor
the NAM’s and other motions to dismiss the petitions
for lack of jurisdiction, the Sixth Circuit held that it
had original jurisdiction over the rule challenges by
virtue of Section 1369(b)(1)(F). Following circuit
precedent that the judge who supplied the controlling
vote deemed “incorrect” (Pet. App. 44a), the majority
held that the petitions for review fell under Subsection
(F) because they challenged an EPA “regulation
‘governing” permitting pursuant to the National
Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (“NPDES”)
established in 33 U.S.C. § 1342. Pet. App. 44a.

The agencies, in their brief in opposition to
certiorari, defended the Sixth Circuit’s judgment on the
additional ground—rejected by the majority below—
that the WOTUS Rule falls under Section 1369(b)(1)(E)
because it “approvies] or promulgaties] any effluent
limitation or other limitation under section 1311, 1312,
1316, or 1345.” See Br. for Fed. Resps. in Opp. 11, 13-
14 (“Fed. BIO”). Accordingly, the applicability of both

2 Section 1365 governs citizen enforcement actions, including
claims that the Administrator failed to perform a non-
discretionary duty. Congress provided that “[t]he district courts
shall have jurisdiction” over such claims. 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a).

5

Subsections (E) and (F) to the petitions for review is
before this Court.

A majority of the Sixth Circuit panel correctly
recognized that it is “illogical and unreasonable” to
conclude that either Subsection (E) or (F) governs
challenges to the WOTUS Rule. Pet. App. 29a (Griffin,
J., concurring in judgment); see id. at 45a (Keith, J.,
dissenting). The Rule does not fit within the plain and
unambiguous language of either subsection. The Rule
defines a basic jurisdictional term used throughout the
CWA; it does not approve or promulgate an effluent or
other limitation under any of the specified provisions of
the Act, or issue or deny any permit under the NPDES
program. A plain reading of statutory text is enough to
require reversal. And it is the only approach that
produces a “[s]imple jurisdictional rule” that promotes
“predictability” and under which courts “can readily
assure themselves of their power to hear a case.” Hertz
Corp. v. Friend, 559 U.S. 77, 94 (2010).

Other considerations confirm that conclusion.
Canons of statutory interpretation, statutory structure,
legislative history, the principle that “jurisdictional
rules should be clear” (Lapides v. Bd. of Regents of
Univ. Sys. of Ga., 535 U.S. 613, 621 (2002)), and the
presumption that agency action is reviewable all
contradict the agencies’ position and support reversal.
And contrary to the agencies’ contention, this Court’s
decisions in E.J. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Train,
430 U.S. 112 (1977), and Crown Simpson Pulp Co. v.
Costle, 445 U.S. 193 (1980), are readily distinguishable
and in any event cast no doubt on that analysis.

This Court should reverse the judgment of the
court of appeals and order dismissal! of the petitions for
review for want of jurisdiction.

6

B. The Clean Water Act

Congress enacted the Clean Water Act to eliminate
“the discharge of pollutants into the navigable waters.”
33 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(1). Section 1311(a) of the Act
generally prohibits “the discharge of any pollutant by
any person” without a permit. A “discharge of a
pollutant” means “any addition of any pollutant to
navigable waters from any point source,” such as a
pipe, ditch or other “confined and discrete conveyance.”
Id. § 1362(12), (14). “Navigable waters,” in turn, are
defined as “the waters of the United States.” Id.
§ 1362(7).

Accordingly, whether a feature qualifies as a
“water of the United States” is only one factor, along
with other complex inquiries—such as whether an
activity involves an “addition” of a “pollutant” from a
“point source”’—that determines whether a CWA
permit is required for an activity. That determination
depends too on whether exclusions to permitting
requirements apply, such as those for certain water
transfers,’ stormwater discharges from most logging
operations,* agricultural return flows,® certain
discharges from mining, oil, or gas operations,® and
others. By itself, determining that a feature is a “water
of the United States” tells one nothing about how land
may be used or whether an activity requires or
qualifies for a permit; instead it leads to a further
inquiry focused on other statutory and regulatory

3 See 40 C.F.R. § 122.30); South Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist. v.
Miccosukee Tribe, 541 U.S. 95 (2004)

4 See 40 C.F.R. § 122.26(a)(1)(ii), (b)(14)(ii); Decker, 133 S. Ct.
1326.

5 See 33 U.S.C. § 1342(2)(1).
6 See 33 U.S.C. § 1342(1)(2), § 1362(6)(b), (24).

7

factors that, together, determine what and how
substantive rules apply.

The CWA permitting programs. The Act establishes
two permitting programs to regulate discharges of
pollutants into the waters of the United States. The
NPDES program established in 33 U.S.C. § 1342
authorizes EPA to issue permits for discharges that do
not involve fill material—generally, effluent
discharges. An NPDES permit imposes effluent limits
based on the technology available to treat the
pollutants. It restricts “the quantities, rates, and
concentrations of specified [pollutants] which are
discharged from point sources.” Arkansas v. Oklahoma,
503 U.S. 91, 101 (1992); see 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311(b)(1)(A)-
(B), 1317(a), 1342(a)(3), (b)(1)(A).

Sometimes technology-based limits are insufficient
to achieve water quality standards “promulgated by
the States [to] establish the desired condition of a
waterway.” Arkansas, 503 U.S. at 101. In that event,
permits also impose any more stringent limits or
strategies necessary to achieve water quality
standards. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311(b)(1)(C), 1312(a). Most
States administer the Section 1342 permit program
within their own borders, as authorized under Section
1342(b).

Section 1344 establishes a separate permit
program, administered by the Corps of Engineers, for
“the discharge of dredged or fill material into the
navigable waters.” That program applies to discharges
of “solids that do not readily wash downstream”
(Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 723 (2006)
(plurality)) and so “changfe] the bottom elevation” of
water. 40 C.F.R. § 232.2. In determining whether to
issue a Section 1344 permit, the Corps applies criteria
developed by both EPA and the Corps pursuant to

8

Section 1344(b)(1). EPA also has the authority to veto
the specification of a site for discharge of fill material.
33 U.S.C. § 1344(c); see Coeur Alaska, Inc. v. Southeast
Alaska Conservation Council, 557 U.S. 261, 266-269
(2009). Two States operate the Section 1344 program
under Section 1344(g).

The CWA’s jurisdictional terms define the
geographic scope of the entire statute. The terms
“navigable waters” and “waters of the United States”
define the geographic reach of the Act’s two permitting
schemes, but also that of “the entire statute.” Rapanos,
547 U.S. at 742. Those terms appear repeatedly
throughout the 1972 Act and its later amendments to
establish the geographic scope of regulatory programs
and actions. For example:

e Section 1313(c)(2)(A) requires each State to
establish water quality standards based on “the
designated uses of the navigable waters” within
its borders, subject to EPA oversight and EPA’s
authority to promulgate water quality standards
if the State does not adequately do so. See 33
U.S.C. § 1313(c)(3).

e Section 1314(J requires each State to identify
“all navigable waters in such State” that cannot
meet State water quality standards due to point-
source discharges of toxic pollutants, and to
develop “an individual control strategy” to
address those discharges, which EPA must
approve or reject and which EPA may
promulgate itself if the State fails to do so. See
33 U.S.C. § 1314()(2), (3).

e Section 1329 requires each State to identify
“navigable waters within the state” that cannot
meet State water quality standards “without
additional action to control nonpoint sources of

9

pollution,” and to establish a program of best
management practices and other measures for
controlling such pollution, which EPA may
approve, disapprove, modify, or implement itself
if the State fails to do so. See 33 U.S.C.
§ 1329(d).

e Section 1252(a) requires the Administrator to
“develop comprehensive programs for prevent-
ing, reducing, or eliminating the pollution of the
navigable waters * * *.”

e Section 1256(e) conditions certain federal grants
to the States on the adequacy of their
monitoring of “the quality of navigable waters.”

e Section 1288(b)(4) provides for State areawide
waste treatment management plans to include
best management practices to control discharges
of “dredged or fill material which adversely
affects navigable waters,” in lieu of obtaining a
Section 1344 permit.

e Section 1315(b) requires each State to provide
regular, detailed reports to EPA on “the water
quality of all navigable waters in such State.”

e Section 1341(a)(1) conditions receipt of any
federal license or permit for any activity “which
may result in any discharge into the navigable
waters” on obtaining “a certification from the
State in which the discharge originates” that the
discharge complies with specified requirements.

Accordingly, the term “waters of the United States”
is one element, albeit an important one, of a reticulated
statutory scheme with many components that work
together. It defines the geographic reach of most of the
CWA’s requirements, but by itself requires no action. It
imposes no obligation except when applied in
conjunction with other, separate statutory concepts.

10

This Court has previously addressed the term
“waters of the United States.” This Court considered
the meaning of the term “waters of the United States”
in the CWA in three cases. In United States v.
Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 135
(1985), this Court concluded that the agencies
permissibly interpreted “waters of the United States”
to encompass wetlands that abut traditional navigable
waters. In Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook
County v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 531 U.S. 159
(2001) “SWANCC”), it struck down the agencies’
“Migratory Bird Rule,” which purported to extend
agency jurisdiction to any waters that are or might be
used as habitat for migratory birds, no matter how
isolated or remote from navigable waters. And in
Rapanos, the Court reversed the agencies’ determin-
ation that they had jurisdiction over wetlands that “lie
near ditches or man-made drains that eventually
empty into traditional navigable waters,” which swept
in “virtually any parcel of land containing a channel or
conduit * * * through which rainwater or drainage may
occasionally or intermittently flow.” 547 U.S. at 722,
729 (plurality); see id. at 759 (Kennedy, J., concurring)
(applying a “significant nexus” test).

C. The Waters of the United States Rule

The WOTUS Rule purports to define “waters of the
United States” within the meaning of the CWA and
Rapanos, SWANCC, and Riverside Bayview. 80 Fed.
Reg. at 37,054. The agencies describe their WOTUS
Rule as “a definitional rule that clarifies the scope of
the Clean Water Act.” 80 Fed. Reg. at 37,104. They say
that it “does not establish any regulatory
requirements.” Jd. at 37,054. And they claim it
“imposes no enforceable duty on any state, local, or
tribal governments, or the private sector.” Id. at
37,102; see also EPA & Corps, Economic Analysis of the

11

EPA-Army Clean Water Rule 61 (May 2015) (“The final
rule is not designed to ‘subject’ any entities of any size
to any specific regulatory burden” but “to clarify the
statutory scope of ‘the waters of the United States”);
id. at vii (“This rule does not result in any direct costs
or benefits * * *. A finding of jurisdiction regarding a
particular water does not incur any direct costs”).
The WOTUS Rule separates waters into three
jurisdictional groups. In the first group are waters that
are categorically jurisdictional: (1) traditional
navigable waters, (2) interstate waters, (3) territorial
seas, (4) impoundments of any water deemed to be a
“water of the United States,” (5) certain tributaries,
and (6) certain waters that are “adjacent” to the
foregoing five categories of waters. 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(a).

In the second group are waters “that require a
case-specific significant nexus evaluation” to determine
if they are jurisdictional. 80 Fed. Reg. at 37,073.
Waters that are subject to jurisdiction based on a case-
specific significant nexus determination include:
(A) waters, any part of which are within the 100-year
floodplain of a traditional navigable water, interstate
water, or territorial sea; or (B) waters, any part of
which are within 4,000 feet of the ordinary high water
mark of any of those jurisdictional waters, any
impoundment of those jurisdictional waters, or any
covered tributary. 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(a)(8).

In the third group are waters excluded from
jurisdiction. These include: swimming pools, puddles,
ornamental waters, prior converted cropland, waste
treatment systems, some drainage ditches, farm and
stock watering ponds, settling basins, water-filled
depressions incidental to mining or construction
activity, subsurface drainage systems, and certain
wastewater recycling structures. 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(b).

12

Petitioners challenging the WOTUS Rule have
shown that it is deeply flawed both in substance and
procedure and that the breadth and uncertainty of its
definitions violate this Court’s precedents and the Act.
The Rule is arbitrary and capricious and not in
accordance with law and consequently violates the
APA, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A)-(D). See Br. for the Business
and Municipal Ptrs., In re Clean Water Rule, No. 15-
3751 cons., Dkt. 129-1 (6th Cir. Nov. 1, 2016).7 The
merits of the Rule, however, are not at issue here.
Merits litigation has been held in abeyance pending
this Court’s ruling on which court has jurisdiction.

The agencies issued a notice of proposed rule-
making announcing their “intention to review and
rescind or revise” the WOTUS Rule. 82 Fed. Reg.
12497 (Mar. 3, 2017). This Court denied the agencies’
motion to hold this case in abeyance pending that
review. Order (Apr. 3, 2017).

D. Judicial Review Of The Rule

Scores of state, municipal, industry, and environ-
mental plaintiffs filed suits challenging the WOTUS
Rule in district courts. See supra p. v. The NAM filed
suit, as part of a coalition of industry groups, in the
Southern District of Texas. See supra n.1.

The Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation
denied the agencies’ request to consolidate the district
court actions and to transfer them to the District Court
for the District of Columbia. See In re Clean Water
Rule, MDL No. 2663, Dkt. 163 (JPML Oct. 13, 2015).
The Judicial Panel held that transfer was
inappropriate under 28 U.S.C. § 1407 because the
complaints turn on issues of law and “different

7 Except where otherwise indicated, docket references throughout
this brief (“Dkt.”) are to this Sixth Circuit docket.

13

jurisdictional rulings by the involved courts” counseled
against consolidation. Jd. at 2.

Reflecting the uncertainty surrounding the scope of
Section 1369(b) and the exclusivity of its grant of
jurisdiction, many plaintiffs who filed district court
actions (but not petitioner the NAM) also filed
“protective” petitions for review in various courts of
appeals, as courts have acknowledged is appropriate.
E.g., Inv. Co. Inst. v. Bd. of Governors of Fed. Reserve
Sys., 551 F.2d 1270, 1280 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (If any
doubt as to the proper forum exists, careful counsel
should file suit in both the court of appeals and the
district court”); Roll Coater, inc. v. Reilly, 932 F.2d 668,
671 (7th Cir. 1991) (“careful counsel must respond to
the combination of uncertain opportunities for review
and § [1369(b)(2)] by filing buckshot petitions”). Those
petitions were consolidated and transferred to the
Sixth Circuit pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2112(a). Cons.
Order, MCP No. 135 (JPML July 28, 2015).8

The agencies movec to stay or dismiss cases in the
district courts in favor of the circuit court litigation.
Some district courts held that the Sixth Circuit had
exclusive jurisdiction. E.g., Murray Energy Corp. v.
EPA, 2015 WL 5062506 (N.D. W. Va. Aug. 26, 2015);
Georgia v. McCarthy, 2015 WL 5092568 (S.D. Ga. Aug.
27, 2015), case stayed on appeal, 833 F.3d 1317 (11th
Cir. 2016). The District Court for the District of North
Dakota, by contrast, held it had jurisdiction. North
Dakota v. EPA, 127 F. Supp. 3d 1047, 1053 (D.N.D.
2015) (“If the exceptionally expansive view” of Section
1369(b) “advocated by the government is adopted, it
would encompass virtually all EPA actions under the

8 The 22 petitions for review and more than 100 petitioners are
identified supra pp. ii-v.

14

Clean Water Act”); id., 3:15-cv-59, Dkt. 156 (D.N.D.
May 24, 2016) (staying case “pending further decision
by the Courts of Appeals or Supreme Court”).

E. The Sixth Circuit’s Decision

The NAM successfully moved to intervene as a
respondent in the Sixth Circuit. Dkt. 8 (Sept. 16, 2015).
It then moved to dismiss the petitions for want of
jurisdiction (Dkt. 39 (Oct. 2, 2015)), as did many
parties that had filed protective petitions or
intervened.

The Sixth Circuit concluded, in a fractured 1-1-1
decision, that it and not the district courts had
jurisdiction to hear the rule challenges. The panel
agreed that Subsections (E) and (F’) were the “only two
provisions of § 1369(b)(1)” that “potentially apply” (Pet.
App. 8a), but otherwise splintered.

Judge McKeague’s opinion. Judge McKeague
recognized that the agencies’ textual arguments as to
Subsection (E) were “not compelling.” Pet. App. 9a.
“[T]he Rule’s clarified definition,” he wrote, does not
“approve or promulgate any limitation that imposes
ipso facto any restriction or requirement on point
source operators or permit issuers.” Jbid. (emphasis
added). “Rather,” it is “a definitional rule that, operat-
ing in conjunction with other regulations, will result in
imposition of such limitations.” Ibid.

Judge McKeague nevertheless concluded that
jurisdiction lies in the court of appeals under Sub-
section (E), citing this Court’s decision in E.J. du Pont
de Nemours & Co. v. Train, supra. He believed that du
Pont “eschewed” a “literal reading” of Section 1369-
(b)(1) in favor of a “more generou[s]” interpretation
that “further[ed] Congress’s evident purposes.” Pet.
App. 10a, 13a, 26a. Judge McKeague believed this
interpretation encompasses the WOTUS Rule because

15

the Rule’s “practical effect will be to indirectly produce
various limitations on point-source operators and
permit issuing authorities.” Id. at 17a.

Turning to Subsection (F), Judge McKeague
recognized that the Rule does not “issue” or “deny” any
permits, but declined to give the provision “a strict
literal application.” Pet. App. 17a. He pointed to this
Court’s opinion in Crown Simpson Pulp Co. v. Costle,
supra, and the Sixth Circuit’s decision in National
Cotton Council of America v. EPA, 653 F.3d 927 (6th
Cir. 2009), as supporting direct review in the circuit
courts of any regulation that “affects permitting
requirements.” Pet. App. 19a (emphasis added).

Judge Griffin’s concurrence. Judge Griffin
concurred in the judgment only. He concluded that the
Sixth Circuit lacked jurisdiction under the “plain text”
of Subsection (E) because the Rule is not an “effluent
limitation or other limitation,” and also “does not
emanate from” Sections 1311, 1312, 1316, or 1345, but
“is 2 phrase used in the Act’s definitional section,
§ 1362,” which “is not mentioned in § 1369.” Pet. App.
30a-31a. He read du Pont to authorize review under
Subsection (E) of EPA regulations that “promulgate
effluent limitations,” no more. Id. at 34a.

Judge Griffin further concluded that “[o]n its face,
subsection (F) clearly does not apply” because the Rule
“neither issues nor denies a permit under the NPDES.”
Pet. App. 39a. But he concurred in the judgment
because, in his view, the Sixth Circuit’s earlier (and
“incorrect’) decision in “National Cotton dictates [the]
conclusion” that Subsection (F) encompasses the
WOTUS Rule. Id. at 42a, 44a. Judge Griffin
nevertheless criticized that conclusion because it
means that Subsection (F)’s “jurisdictional reach” has

16

“no end,” catching “anything relating to permitting.”
Id. at 42a.

Judge Keith’s dissent. Judge Keith dissented. He
joined Judge Griffin in holding Subsection (E£)
inapplicable on its face. Pet. App. 45a. Turning to
Subsection (F), he refused to read National Cotton to
authorize original jurisdiction over “all rules ‘relating’
to [permitting] procedures, such as the one at issue
here,” which “merely defines the scope of the term
‘waters of the United States.” Id. at 46a.

The Sixth Circuit denied rehearing. Pet. App. 51a-
52a. It held merits briefing in abeyance after this
Court granted certiorari. Dkt. 171-2 (Jan. 25, 2017).

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

I. The Sixth Circuit’s erroneous exercise of
jurisdiction under Section 1369(b) violates the statute’s
plain language and structure.

A. Contrary to the Sixth Circuit’s ruling, it lacks
jurisdiction under Section 1369(b)(1)(F). It is
undisputed that the WOTUS Rule does not “issu[e] or
den[y] any permit under section 1342.” It therefore lies
outside Subsection (F)’s unambiguous text. That fact
should end the analysis.

In stretching Subsection (F) to reach all EPA
actions that affect the granting or denying of Section
1342 permits, Judge McKeague misread this Court’s
decision in Crown Simpson Pulp Co. v. Costle, supra,
which did involve EPA’s denial of a permit. His
rewriting of Subsection (F) would cover most agency
action under the CWA and render superfluous
Subsections (A), (C), (D), (E), and (G) of Section

1369(b)(1).
B. A majority of the panel correctly determined
that Section 1369(b)(1)(E) does not confer jurisdiction

17

on the court of appeals. The Rule falls outside
Subsection (E)’s plain language because it is not a
“limitation,” it is not an “other limitation” within the
meaning of Subsection (E), and it was not issued
“ynder section 1311.” To the contrary, the Rule
addresses a phrase in Section 1362(7) that defines the
geographic scope of the Act as a whole and thus
impacts dozens of CWA provisions just as or more
directly than Section 1311. And it limits no action: any
limitation arises only when multiple additional
statutory terms, like “addition,” “pollutant,” and “point

source,” also apply, and when exclusions from
permitting requirements are ruled out.

In eschewing a literal reading, Judge McKeague
misinterpreted Subsection (E) to extend to any EPA
action that merely affects point source operators or
permit issuers. In doing so he misread this Court’s
decision in E.J. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Train,
supra, which involved industry-wide effluent
limitations issued under Section 1311. His analysis has
no stopping point, conflicts with this Court’s recent
holdings, and would render other provisions
redundant.

C. Section 1369(b)’s structure confirms the Sixth
Circuit’s lack of jurisdiction. Congress enacted seven
narrow bases for original jurisdiction in the courts of
appeals. Its specific focus shows that Congress did not
intend Section 1369(b) to provide courts of appeals
with original jurisdiction to review all nationwide rule-
making under the CWA. Congress's markedly different
language in the Clean Air Act’s judicial review
provisions reinforces this conclusion. There, Congress
granted courts of appeals jurisdiction to review all
nationally, regionally, or locally applicable regulations.
Congress’s omission of similarly broad language from
the CWA must be given meaning.

18

D. Legislative history bolsters this conclusion.
Although there is scant legislative history surrounding
the enactment of Section 1369(b) in 1972, in 1977,
Senator Kennedy attempted, with EPA support, to
expand Section 1369(b) to cover nationwide
rulemaking. He was unsuccessful, yet that same
Congress expanded the Clean Air Act’s direct judicial-
review provisions to include nationwide rulemaking.
The negative implication raised by Congress’s
disparate actions is compelling.

II. Because Section 1369(b)’s plain language
resolves this case, there is no need to consider the
policy implications of Congress’s allocation of
jurisdiction. There are, nevertheless, strong policy
reasons that support Congress’s choice.

A. This Court has emphasized that jurisdictional
rules must be clear and administrable. Reading Section
1369(b) textually produces a_e straightforward
jurisdictional standard. Judge McKeague’s approach,
by contrast, fosters uncertainty over jurisdiction that
leads to wasteful litigation. By limiting Section 1369(b)
to its text, this Court can put an end to the wasteful
practice of duplicative district court and circuit court
challenges to agency action under the CWA.

B. Section 1369(b)’s preclusion provision compels a
narrow interpretation of the statute. Section 1369(b)(2)
prohibits parties in criminal and civil enforcement
proceedings from challenging agency action that could
have been reviewed under Section 1369(b)(1). A broad
interpretation of Section 1369(b)(1) exacerbates the
CWA’s crushing penalties and creates due process
concerns by foreclosing judicial review of unlawful
agency action. A broad reading also increases Section
1369(b)(2)’s perverse incentive for parties to petition

19

for review of all agency action that conceivably falls
within Section 1369(b)(1).

C. A plain-language reading of Section 1369(b)
allows district courts and multiple courts of appeals to
review agency action and thereby improves the quality
of judicial decision-making. Disagreement among lower
courts increases the probability of correct decisions.
And having multiple courts review agency action will
ensure full percolation of issues in the lower courts and
improve this Court’s ability to decide which cases to
review. There is no reason to think that multi-court
review is less appropriate for agency action than for
other cases, such as those involving the meaning or
constitutionality of federal statutes.

D. Judge McKeague greatly overstated efficiency
gains under his atextual reading of Section 1369(b).
Whether review lies under Section 1369(b) or the APA,
challenges to important agency action typically will be
filed quickly. And parties often coordinate their rule
challenges to avoid duplicative litigation. District
courts are efficient in reviewing agency action and
adept at finding any facts relevant to such review. In
any event, efficiency concerns cannot override the plain
language of Section 1369(b). This Court should reverse
the Sixth Circuit's judgment and remand with
instructions to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction.

ARGUMENT

The Sixth Circuit erred in ruling that it had
jurisdiction under Section 1369(b). “Section 1369(b)
extends only to certain suits challenging some agency
actions,” which the provision clearly identifies. Decker,
133 S. Ct. at 1334. It does not extend to suits
challenging the WOTUS Rule.

20

I. The Sixth Circuit Lacks Jurisdiction Under

The Plain Language Of Section 1369(b).

“A statute affecting federal jurisdiction ‘must be
construed both with , recision and with fidelity to the
terms by which Congress has expressed its wishes.”
Kucana v. Holder, 558 U.S. 233, 252 (2010). That
simple principle resolves this case. As Judges Griffin
and Keith explained, the Sixth Circuit lacks
jurisdiction under the unambiguous language of
Subsections 1369(b)(1)(E) and (F). See Pet. App. 29a
(Griffin, J.) (“it is illogical and unreasonable to read the
text of either subsection (E) or (F) as creating
jurisdiction in the courts of appeals”), 45a (Keith, J.)
(“under the plain meaning of the statute, neither
subsection (E) nor (F) * * * confers original jurisdiction
on the appellate courts”). The Sixth Circuit should
have dismissed the petitions for lack of jurisdiction.

A. The Sixth Circuit Erroneously Exercised
Jurisdiction Under Section 1369(b)(1)(F).

We begin with Section 1369(b)(1)(F), under which
the Sixth Circuit took jurisdiction. Subsection (F)
grants courts of appeals original jurisdiction to review
“the Administrator’s action * * * in issuing or denying
any permit under section 1342.” As a matter of plain
statutory language and precedent, the Sixth Circuit
lacks jurisdiction under Subsection (F).

I. The WOTUS Rule Falls Outside The
Unambiguous Language Of Subsection
(F).

The WOTUS Rule is not an EPA action “issuing or
denying any permit under section 1342.” Permits
under Section 1342 “authoriz[e] the discharge of
pollutants” into jurisdictional waters “in accordance
with specified conditions.” Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd.
v. Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc., 484 U.S. 49, 52 (1987).

21

Section 1342 permits contain “five general types of
provisions: technology-based effluent limitations,
water-quality-based effluent limitations, monitoring
and reporting requirements, standard conditions, and
special conditions.” THE CLEAN WATER ACT HANDBOOK
33 (Mark A. Ryan ed., 3d ed. 2011). They are
enforceable by administrative actions and citizen suits.
33 U.S.C. §§ 1319, 1365.

There are plenty of examples in which EPA
actually issues or denies a permit under Section 1342;
those EPA actions may be directly reviewed by the
courts of appeals.®

Here, however, it is undisputed that the WOTUS
Rule does not issue or deny a Section 1342 permit. The
panel was unanimous on this point. Judge Griffin
observed that the WOTUS Rule “neither issues nor
denies a permit” and thus, “[{o]n its face, subsection (F)
clearly does not apply.” Pet. App. 39a. Judge Keith
agreed, writing that the Sixth Circuit lacks jurisdiction

“under the plain meaning” of Subsection (F). Jd. at 45a.
Even Judge McKeague conceded the point, admitting
that our reading is “consonant with the plain
language” of Subsection (F). Id. at 23a-24a.

The agencies have never claimed that the WOTUS
Rule issues or denies a Section 1342 permit. EPA’s
then-Administrator Gina McCarthy admitted that the
Rule does not do so: “[T]he Clean Water Rule is a

® See, e.g., Nat. Res. Def. Council v. EPA, 808 F.3d 566, 562 & n.4
(2d Cir. 2015) (challenging grant of Section 1342 permit to
vessels); Alaska Eskimo Whaling Comm'n v. EPA, 791 F.3d 1088,
1090-1091 (9th Cir. 2015) (challenging grant of Section 1342
permit to oil and gas exploration facilities); Upper Blackstone
Water Pollution Abatement Dist. v. EPA, 690 F.3d 9, 11, 20 (ist
Cir. 2012) (challenging grant of Section 1342 permit to sewage
treatment plant).

22

jurisdictional rule. It doesn’t result in automatic
permit decisions.” The Fiscal Year 2016 EPA Budget:
Joint Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Energy & Power
& the Subcomm. on Environment & Economy of the
House Comm. on Energy & Commerce, 114th Cong. 70
(Feb. 25, 2015).

The fact that the WOTUS Rule does not issue or
deny permits “should end the analysis.” Pet. App. 39a
(Griffin, J.). Statutory interpretation “begins ‘with the
language of the statute itself,’ and that ‘is also where
the inquiry should end,’ for ‘the statute’s language is
plain.” Puerto Rico v. Franklin Cal. Tax-Free Trust,
136 S. Ct. 1938, 1946 (2016); accord Jimenez v.
Quarterman, 555 U.S. 113, 118 (2009) (‘when the

statutory language is plain, we must enforce it
according to its terms”). Because the WOTUS Rule is

not an EPA action “issuing or denying any permit
under section 1342,” jurisdiction is lacking under
Section 1369(b)(1)(F).
2. Subsection (F) Does Not Extend To EPA
Actions That Merely Affect The Issuing
Or Denying Of Permits.

a. Despite conceding a lack of textual support,
Judge McKeague interpreted Section 1369(b)(1)(F) to
encompass any EPA action that “impacts the granting
and denying of permits.” Pet. App. 2la (emphasis
added). He believed that this Court’s decision in Crown
Simpson Pulp Co. v. Costle “opened the door to
constructions other than a strict literal application”
and had allowed “the scope of direct circuit court
review [to] gradually expan[d]” over the decades. Id. at
17a, 26a. Judge McKeague misread Crown Simpson.

In Crown Simpson, EPA vetoed Section 1342
permits that a California agency had issued to pulp
mills in Eureka, California after EPA had delegated

23

permitting authority to the State. 445 U.S. at 194-195
& n.3. This Court held that the Ninth Circuit had
jurisdiction under Section 1369(b)(1)(F) to review the
mills’ challenges to EPA’s vetoes because the vetoes
were “functionally similar to [EPA’s] denial of a permit
in States which do not administer an approved permit-
issuing program” and had “the precise effect” of denying
the permits. Id. at 196 (emphasis added). The Court
explained that the CWA did not create “a seemingly
irrational bifurcated system” in which “denials of
NPDES permits would be reviewable at different levels
of the federal-court system depending on the fortuitous
circumstance of whether the State in which the case
arose was or was not authorized to issue permits.” Jd.
at 196-197.

EPA has successfully argued in other cases that
Crown Simpson was superseded by the 1977
amendments to the CWA.!° Regardless, “[t}]he facts of
[Crown Simpson] make clear that the Court
understood functional similarity in a narrow sense.”
Pet. App. 40a (Griffin, J.) (quoting Nw. Envil.
Advocates v. EPA, 537 F.3d 1006, 1016 (9th Cir. 2008)).

‘© The 1977 amendments gave EPA the power to iasue Section
1342 permits directly when States failed to revise State-proposed
permits to meet EPA's objections. See Crown Simpson, 445 U.S. at
194 n.2. The challenge in Crown Simpson preceded the
amendments, the impact of which this Court expressly “d[id] not
consider.” Ibid. Courts of appeals have since agreed with EPA that
the 1977 amendments supersede Crown Simpson's holding. As the
Seventh Circuit explained in Am. Paper Inst., Inc. v. EPA, 890
F.2d 869, 874 (7th Cir. 1989), the amendments “fundamentally
altered the underpinnings of’ Crown Simpson. “Under the old
system, an EPA objection effectively denied a permit.” Ibid. The
1977 amendments “allowjed] the EPA to issue a permit” on
revised terms “if the state refuses to modify its proposed permit,”
so that “an EPA objection to a proposed state permit is no longer
‘functionally similar’ to denying a permit.” Ibid.

24

In Crown Simpson, EPA denied Section 1342 permits:
EPA decided that specific permits proposed by a state
agency would not issue.

Crown Simpson thus merely held that EPA’s veto
of a state-issued permit is the denial of a Section 1342
permit covered by Subsection (F). That unexceptional
ruling cannot plausibly be read to authorize a vast
expansion of Subsection (F) to “apply to any
‘regulations relating to permitting” (Pet. App. 43a), as
Judge McKeague held here. Pet. App. 18a-24a.

Unlike the permit veto at issue in Crown Simpson,
the WOTUS Rule does not deny permits. The Rule
instead purports to define one aspect of the scope of the
CWA—its geographical reach. Nothing in Crown
Simpson suggests that a jurisdictional rule affecting
one factor that goes into a determination whether
permits are or are not required—along with other
factors such as whether there is an “addition” of a
“pollutant” from a “point source,” or whether any
statutory or regulatory exclusion from the permitting
requirement applies—is itself a permit denial or
issuance covered by Subsection (F).

Reading Crown Simpson expansively, as the
Eleventh Circuit concluded, “is contrary to the
statutory text.” Friends of the Everglades v. EPA, 699
F.3d 1280, 1288 (11th Cir. 2012). Congress could have
written Subsection (F) to apply to any EPA action
“relating to permitting” or “affecting when permits may
be required under Section 1342.” Its failure to “adopt
[that] readily available and apparent alternative
strongly supports’ the conclusion” that Section 1369(b)
does not authorize such broad court of appeals
jurisdiction. NLRB v. SW Gen., Inc., 1378. Ct. 929, 939

(2017).

25

b. As Judges Griffin and Keith recognized, it is
difficult to imagine any case in which Judge
McKeague’s expansive rewriting of Subsection (F)
would not confer jurisdiction. See Pet. App. 42a
(Griffin, J.) (Subsection (F)’s “jurisdictional reach”
would have “no end”); id. at 47a (Keith, J.) (ruling
“expands the jurisdictional reach of subsection (F) in
an all-encompassing, limitless fashion”).

Most provisions of the CWA have some impact on
permitting. Definitions of “pollutant,” “person,” and
“point source,” the term “addition,” lists of toxic
pollutants or new sources, rules about best
management practices, definitions of various
exclusions to permitting requirements, and countless
other regulatory pronouncements would be
encompassed by an “impacts-the-granting-or-denying-
of-permits” test for Subsection (F) jurisdiction. Any
EPA action regarding any of those provisions concerns
either the scope of permitting authority or the terms on
which permits are issued.

If Subsection (F) were expanded beyond the
issuance or denial of NPDES permits to cover any EPA
action affecting permitting, the “foreseeable
consequence” would be that the courts of appeals
“would exercise original subject-matter jurisdiction
over all things related to the Clean Water Act.” Pet.
App. 47a (Keith, J.). That “exceptionally expansive
view” is “precisely contrary to Section 1369(b)(1)(F)’s
grant of jurisdiction.” North Dakota, 127 F. Supp. 3d at
1051.

c. Because most other CWA provisions relate in
some way to permit issuance or denial, Judge
McKeague’s interpretation also “run[s] headlong into
the rule against superfluity.” Lockhart v. United
States, 136 S. Ct. 958, 966 (2016). Under his approach,

26

most of the other designations Congress made in
Section 1369(b) would be unnecessary because they
would be covered by Subsection (F).

Section 1369(b)(1)(D), for example, grants the
courts of appeals jurisdiction to review EPA actions “in
making any determination as to a State permit
program submitted under section 1342(b).” By its very
nature, EPA’s determinatiun about the authority of a
State to run the NPDES permitting program will
“impact the granting and denying of permits” (Pet.
App. 21la) and thus satisfy Judge McKeague’s
standard. If that impact were enough to trigger
jurisdiction under Section 1369(b)(1)(F), there would be
no need for Section 1369(b)(1)(D).

Other superfluities abound. The “standards of
performance,” “pretreatment standards” and “effluent
limitations” referred to in Subsections (A), (C) and (E)
are incorporated into, and therefore plainly “impac[t]
the granting and denying of,” Section 1342 permits.
Pet. App. 2la. Satisfying Section 1316’s new source
performance standards, referenced in Section
1369(b)(1)(A), is a condition of any NPDES permit. 40
C.F.R. § 401.12(i). “(T]he requirements to develop and
implement a [Publicly Owned Treatment Works]
pretreatment program” under Section 1317, referenced
in Section 1369(b)(1)(C), likewise “are included as
enforceable conditions in the POTW’s NPDES permit.”
EPA, PERMIT WRITER’S GUIDE at 9-10 (Sept. 2010).11
“Effluent standards” and “limitations” referred to in
Subsections (C) and (E) likewise are written into
permits. Jd. at 5-1 (“NPDES permit writers [are
required] to develop technology-based treatment

11 https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/20 15-09/documents/
pwm_chapt_09.pdf.

27

requirements, consistent with CWA section [1311(b)],
that represent the minimum level of control that must
be imposed in a permit. * * * [Plermit writers [also]
must include in permits additional or more stringent
effluent limitations and conditions, including those
necessary to protect water quality”).!”

As if that were not enough, the State-developed
“individual control strategies” for toxic pollutants that
EPA approves or disapproves pursuant to Section
1314()—referred to in Section 1369(b)(1)(G)—also are
integrated into NPDES permits. Indeed, EPA
regulations specify that “the term individual control
strategy, as set forth in section [1314()] of the CWA,
means a final NPDES permit with supporting
documentation” showing “that applicable water quality
standards will be met ***.” 40 C.F.R. § 123.46(c)
(emphasis added).

Accordingly, if Subsection (F) covers all EPA action
that impacts permitting, Subsections (A), (C), (E) and
(G) are unnecessary because they each concern EPA
action on requirements that become NPDES permit
conditions. Judge McKeague’s interpretation flatly
violates the principle that “a statute should be
construed so that effect is given to all its provisions, so
that no part will be inoperative or superfluous.” Clark
v. Rameker, 134 S. Ct. 2242, 2248 (2014). This Court
should “avoid” an interpretation that “makes a mess
of” Section 1369(b) in this way. SW Gen., 137 S. Ct. at
941.13

12 https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/20 1 5-09/documents/
pwm_chapt_05.pdf

18 Section 1369(b)(1)(B) is not included in our list of subsections
rendered superfluous by an “affects permitting” test because the
CWA provision referred to there, 33 U.S.C. § 1316(b)(1)(C), never
became law. That provision would have given EPA authority to

28

This Court should hold that the Sixth Circuit erred
in exercising jurisdiction under Section 1369(b)(1)(F).

B. The Sixth Circuit Correctly Held That It
Lacks Jurisdiction Under Subsection (E).

The Sixth Circuit correctly concluded that Section
1369(b)(1)(E) does not confer jurisdiction. The agencies
nonetheless invoke Subsection (E) as an alternative
ground for affirmance. Fed. BIO 11. They misread that
provision.

I. The WOTUS Rule Falls Outside The
Plain Language Of Subsection (E).

Subsection (E) grants jurisdiction to courts of
appeals to review “the Administrator’s action” in
“approving or promulgating any effluent limitation or
other limitation under section 1311, 1312, 1316,
or 1346.” It is undisputed that the WOTUS Rule is not
an “effluent limitation,” which is a “restriction * * * on
quantities, rates, and concentrations” of pollutants
discharged into navigable waters. 33 U.S.C. § 1362(11);
see Pet. App. 8a-9a. It also is undisputed that the Rule
was not issued under Sections 1312, 1316, or 1345. 80
Fed. Reg. at 37,055; Fed. BIO 13-14. The agencies’ sole
argument has been that the WOTUS Rule is an “other
limitation under section 1311.” Gov't Opp. to Mots. to
Dismiss 15, Dkt. 58 (Oct. 23, 2015). That argument
fails under the “plain and unambiguous text” of
Subsection (E). Pet. App. 33a (Griffin, J.).

a. The WOTUS Rule is not a “limitation” in any
ordinary sense of the word. Limitation is most
naturally defined in Section 1369(b)(1)(E) to mean “a

make a determination exempting sources from new source
standards of performance, and thus would have impacted
permitting had it been adopted. It was “elminated,” however,
before enactment. S. Conf. Rep. 92-1236, at 3805 (1972), reprinted
in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3776.

29

restriction or restraint imposed” by EPA. Webster's
Third New International Dictionary 1312 (1971);
accord Friends of the Everglades, 699 F.3d at 1286
(“Black’s Law Dictionary defines a ‘limitation’ as a
‘restriction”). That definition does not capture the
WOTHUS Rule. The agencies admitted in promulgating
the Rule that it “does not establish any regulatory
requirements” and “imposes no enforceable duty” on
“the private sector.” 80 Fed. Reg. at 37,054, 37,102. It
“is definitional only and does not directly impose any
restriction or limitation.” Pet. App. 15a (McKeague, J.);
see 80 Fed. Reg. at 37,104 (it is “a definitional rule that
clarifies the scope of the Clean Water Act”).

The Rule also “is not self-executing.” Pet. App. 31a
(Griffin, J.). It “operates in conjunction with other
sections scattered throughout the Act to define when
[the Act’s other] restrictions * * * apply.” Ibid.; accord
id. at 9a (McKeague, J.) (only “operating in conjunction
with other regulations [will the Rule] result in
imposition of such limitations”).

Furthermore, Judge Griffin recognized, the Rule “is
not a ‘limitation’ on the discharge of pollutants into
waters of the United States; rather, it sets the
jurisdictional reach for whether the discharge
limitations even apply in the first place.” Pet. App. 32a.
It would be “circular” to read a rule establishing the
Act’s geographical boundaries as a “limitatio[n]’ under”
the Act. Ibid.

b. The Rule also is not an “other limitation” within
the meaning of Subsection (E). Congress’s use of the
phrase “any effluent limitation or other limitation”
makes clear that it intended “other limitation” to have
a similar meaning to “effluent limitation.” That is true
under the ejusdem generis canon, which reads a
general term following a specific term as “embrac{ing]

30

only objects similar in nature to those objects
enumerated by the preceding specific words.” Circuit
City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 114-115
(2001). It is equally true under the noscitur a sociis
canon, which “avoid[s] ascribing to one word a meaning
so broad that it is inconsistent with its accompanying
words.” Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 513 U.S. 561, 575
(1995). Both canons reflect the common-sense notion
that Congress would not have said “any effluent
limitation or other li. 1itation” if what it meant was
“any limitation.” A contrary reading would render
“superfluous” the “specific word|[s]” effluent limitation.
Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, READING LAW: THE
INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS 206 (2012). The
Seventh Circuit thus got it right when it “interpret[ed]
the ‘other limitation’ language of subsection
1369(b)(1)(E) as restricted to limitations directly
related to effluent limitations.” Am. Paper Inst., Inc. v.
EPA, 890 F.2d 869, 877 (7th Cir. 1989).

Effluent limitations “dictate in specific and
technical terms the amount of each pollutant that a
point source may emit.” Am. Paper Inst., 890 F.2d at
876. Other limitations like effluent limitations include,
for example, non-numerical operational practices or
equipment specifications. See infra p. 31. But the Rule,
a regulatory definition of “waters of the United States,”
is not remotely simular in nature to an effluent limita-
tion.

The WOTUS Rule is not an “other limitation” for a
second reason. As Judge Griffin explained, “the
‘limitations’ set forth in §§ 1311, 1312, 1316, and 1345
provide the boundaries for what constitutes an effluent
or other limitation.” Pet. App. 30a. Each of those sec-
tions addresses effluent limitations or effluent limita-
tion-like rules. Section 1311 governs “effluent limita-
tions.” Section 1312 governs “water quality related

31

effluent limitations,” which are additional effluent
limitations that may be imposed where other limita-
tions fail to achieve water quality standards. Section
1316 governs effluent controls for new sources of
discharges. And Section 13465 restricts the discharge of
sewage sludge. Confirming that these are all effluent
limitations or similar to them, all are incorporated into
NPDES permits. See 40 C.F.R. § 401.12(i) (permits are
conditioned on satisfying requirements of Sections
1311, 1312, and 1316); NPDES PERMIT WRITER'S
MANUAL 9-1 (Sept. 2010) (“special conditions” in
permits include “NPDES programmatic requirements”
such as those concerning “sewage sludge” under
Section 1345).

And there are “other limitations” within these
sections—limitations that the statute does not describe
as “effluent limitations.” Section 1311(b)(1)(C) allows
EPA to issue “any more stringent limitation({s]” if
technology-based effluent limitations cannot “meet
water quality standards, treatment standards, or
schedules of compliance.” Section 1316(a)(1) permits
EPA to use “alternatives” to achieve effluent reductions
for new sources if “control technology, processes, [and]
operating methods” are insufficient. Section 1345(d)(3)
provides that, if “it is not feasible to prescribe or
enforce a numerical limitation” on pollutants in sewage
sludge, EPA may “promulgate a design, equipment,
management practice, or operational standard.”

Using “other limitation[s],” EPA may issue “highly
specific and detailed provisions that direc[t] the point
sources to engage in specific types of activity.” Am.
Paper Inst., 890 F.2d at 877. But those “limitations”
are nothing like the WOTUS Rule, which attempts to
define where the CWA does and does not apply.

32

c. The WOTUS Rule does not properly fall “under
section 1311.” Section 1311, titled “Effluent limita-
tions,” sets standards for effluent and other limitations
on many subjects, including existing point sources;
publicly owned treatment works; toxic pollutants;
radiological, chemical, or biological warfare agents; and
innovative technologies. This Court held in du Pont
that Section 1311 “unambiguously provides” EPA with
authority to establish “effluent limitations.” 430 U.S. at
127. Because Section 1311 plainly “authorizes EPA to
issue effluent limitations, the reference in section
[1369](b)(1)(E)” to Section 1311 “is readily under-
standable.” Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. EPA, 538 F.2d
513, 516 (2d Cir. 1976).

The WOTUS Rule falls outside that readily
understandable reference. The phrase “waters of the
United States” does not appear in Section 1311. “It isa
phrase used in the Act’s definitional section, § 1362.”
Pet. App. 31a (Griffin, J.). Judge Griffin thus reached
the unassailable conclusion that WOTUS Rule “does
not emanate from” Section 1311. Ibid.

Indeed, it is inconceivable that Congress intended
a regulatory definition of one phrase in Section 1362 to
constitute an EPA action “under section 1311.” It takes
multiple steps to get from Section 1311 to the phrase
“waters of the United States.” Section 131 1(a) provides
that, “[e])xcept as in compliance with this section and
sections 1312, 1316, 1317, 1328, 1342, and 1344 of this
title, the discharge of any pollutant by any person shall
be unlawful.” Section 1362(12), in turn, defines the
phrase “discharge of a pollutant” to include “any
addition of any pollutant to navigable waters from any
point source.” Next, Section 1362(7) states that “[t]he
term ‘navigable waters’ means the waters of the United
States, including the territorial seas.” The WOTUS
Rule defines a portion of that last sentence, and but

33

one factor among many that feeds into the Section
1311(a) prohibition.

If that chain of references were enough to make the
WOTUS Rule an “other limitation” “under” Section
1311(a), then any regulation addressing the other key
terms that appear in Section 1311(a)—‘“discharge,”
“pollutant,” and “person”—would equally be an “other
limitation.” And so would EPA action addressing the
meaning of the concepts used in Section 1362 in
defining those terms. See 33 U.S.C. § 1362(5) (defining
“person”); § 1362(6) (defining “pollutant”); § 1362(12)
(defining “discharge” as an “addition of any pollutant to
navigable waters from any point source”); § 1362(14)
(defining “point source”).

For example, EPA’s Water Transfers Rule, 40
C.F.R. § 122.3G), clarifies that a water transfer that
“conveys or connects waters of the United States” does
not involve an “addition” of pollutants to navigable
waters and so is not a “discharge” that requires a
permit, unless the transfer “subject[s] the transferred
water to intervening industrial, municipal, or
commercial use.” The Eleventh Circuit held that the
Water Transfers Rule is not an “other limitation”
covered by Section 1369(b)(1)(E) and dismissed
petitions for review for want of jurisdiction. Friends of
the Everglades, 699 F.3d 1280. Challenges to the rule
were then litigated in district court in New York.
Catskill Mountains Chapter of Trout Unlimited v. EPA,
8 F. Supp. 3d 500 (S.D.N.Y. 2014), rev’d, 846 F.3d 492
(2d Cir. 2017). Under the agencies’ theory, that case
was litigated in the wrong court: any rule defining
what is and is not an “addition” or “discharge” is a
limitation under Section 1311 because it governs the
meaning of terms central to that provision. The
breathtaking scope of that expansion would surely
shock the drafters of Section 1369(b). Definitions of the

34

many individual constituent elements directly or
indirectly referred to in Section 1311 are not plausibly
“limitations” “under” that provision.

d. Finally, the WOTUS Rule is not an “other
limitation under section 1311, 1312, 1316, or 1345”
because it is a definitional rule that “applies across the
entire Act.” Pet. App. 41a (Griffin, J.); see Rapanos,
547 U.S. at 742 (“the same definition of ‘navigable
waters’ applies to the entire statute”) (plurality).

The phrases “waters of the United States” and
“navigable water” are used throughout the CWA. And
they have no special relationship to the sections
identified in Subsection (E). See supra pp. 8-9 (listing
examples). “Waters of the United States” does not
appear in Section 1311, but it is used in Sections 1272,
1293a, 1321, 1322, and 1342. And while Section
1311(a) does not contain the term “navigable waters,”
that term is used in Sections 1251, 1252, 1256, 1272,
1288, 1293a, 1312, 1313, 1314, 1315, 1321, 1322, 1329,
1341, 1342, 1344, 1345, and 1371. The phrase
“discharge of any pollutant” in Section 1311(a) appears,
with slight variants, in Sections 1251, 1254, 1255,
1281, 1312, 1314, 1315, 1316, 1317, 1342, 1344, 1364,
1370, 1371, and 1375. Thus, the WOTUS Rule affects
dozens of CWA provisions as or more directly than it

affects Section 1311(a).'4

4 For all these reasons, it is immaterial that the agencies cited
Section 1311 among the provisions under which they purported to
have issued the Rule. 80 Fed. Reg. at 37,055 (asserting that “[t}he
authority for this rule is the [CWA]” in its entirety, “including”
Sections 1311, 1314, 1921, 1341, 1342, 1344, and 1361); cf. Adamo
Wrecking Co. v. United States, 434 U.S. 275, 283 (1978)
(“[Congress] did not empower the [EPA] Administrator, after the
manner of Humpty Dumpty in Through the Looking-Glass, to
make a regulation an ‘emission standard’ by his mere
designation”).

35

Congress could have listed Section 1362(7) within
Section 1369(b)’s grant of jurisdiction to the courts of
appeals—an omission that “counsels heavily against a
finding of jurisdiction.” Pet. App. 3la (Griffin, J.). Or
Congress could have said that any EPA action “directly
or indirectly affecting section 1311” is reviewable in the
courts of appeals—in which case all EPA actions likely
would be reviewable by the courts of appeals. But the
language that Congress actually used—-EPA actions “in
approving or promulgating any effluent limitation or
other limitation under section 1311, 1312, 1316, or
1345”—does not extend to a regulation that defines a
phrase in Section 1362(7) which underlies the entire
Act and imposes no limitation unless a slew of other
statutory and regulatory provisions also apply. The
Sixth Circuit correctly held that it lacks jurisdiction
under Section 1369(b)(1)(E).

2. Subsection (E) Does Not Extend To EPA
Actions That Merely Impact Point
Source Operators Or Regulators.

a. In casting the sole vote to exercise jurisdiction
under Section 1369(b)(1)(E), Judge McKeague con-
strued that provision “not in a strict literal sense,” but
instead to cover any EPA action “whose practical effect
will be to indirectly produce various limitations on
point-source operators and permit issuing authorities.”
Pet. App. 17a, 26a. Judge McKeague claimed support
for this atextual interpretation in this Court’s du Pont
decision, which he said “eschewed a strict, literal
reading” and granted courts “a license to construe
Congress’s purposes in § 1369(b)(1) more generously
than its language would indicate.” Id. at 10a, 13a. That
view of du Pont is incorrect.

Du Pont is a straightforward application of Section
1369(b)(1)(E)’s plain language. Petitioners there

36

challenged industry-wide effluent limitations issued
under Section 1311. 430 U.S. at 124. They argued that
EPA lacked authority to impose binding industry-wide
effluent limitations by regulation under Section 1311,
that EPA could only issue “guidelines” under Section
1314, and that court of appeals jurisdiction was
therefore lacking under Subsection (E). Jd. at 124-125.
The jurisdictional issue was thus “subsidiary” to and
“intertwined with the issue of EPA’s power to issue”
binding industry-wide regulations under Section 1311.
Ibid. This Court first held that Section 1311
empowered EPA to impose industry-wide effluent
limitations by regulation. Jd. at 126-136. And that
holding “necessarily resolve[d] the jurisdictional issue”
because Section 1369(b)(1)(E) “unambiguously
authorizfes]” the court of appeals to review Section
1311 effluent limitations. Jd. at 136.

This Court in du Pont also rejected petitioners’
fallback jurisdictional argument that Section
1369(b)(1)(E)’s reference to “section 1311” should be
understood to refer only to Section 1311(c), which
allows for individual variances from effluent
limitations. 430 U.S. at 136. The Court explained that,
“in other portions of [Section 1369], Congress referred
to specific subsections” and “presumably would have
specifically mentioned” Section 1311(c) if petitioners’
reading were correct. Ibid. The Court also noted that
its holding avoided “the truly perverse situation in
which” courts of appeals could review NPDES
permitting decisions under Section 1342 “but would
have no power of direct review of the basic regulations”
under Section 1311 that “govern[ed] those individual
actions.” Ibid. And the Court had “no doubt that
Congress intended review of’ effluent limitations on
existing sources under Section 1311 “to be had in the
same forum” as review of effluent limitations on new

37

sources under Section 1316 (id. at 136-137)—an
obvious conclusion because Section 1369(b)(1)(E)
expressly applies to “effluent limitations” issued “under
section 1311” and “1316.”

Judge McKeague misread du Pont. He believed
that “the challenged regulation fin du Pont] was
promulgated under” a provision that was not one of the
“enumerated sections” listed in Subsection (E). Pet.
App. 10a. But that was petitioners’ argument in du
Pont, which this Court rejected. This Court held
instead that EPA had issued the challenged
regulations establishing effluent limitations under
Section 1311. 430 U.S. at 126-136. Judge McKeague
also mistakenly claimed that this Court “eschewed a
strict, literal reading” of Section 1369(b)(1)(E). Pet.
App. 10a. In fact, this Court applied Subsection (E)’s
“unambiguou[s]” text. 430 U.S. at 136. To be sure, this
Court mentioned policy, but the “policy reason came
after a plain textual rejection of the industry’s
position.” Pet. App. 35a (Griffin, J.).

As Judge Griffin explained, it is “a far stretch to
take [du Pont’s] dicta and expand it” to “find
jurisdiction proper when a regulation’s ‘practical effect’
only sets forth ‘indirect’ limits.” Pet. App. 35a.
“(Ujnlike” du Pont, the agencies here “admit they have
not promulgated an effluent limitation.” Jbid. Du Pont
does not authorize Sixth Circuit jurisdiction under
Subsection (E)’s “other limitation” provision.

b. There is no stopping point to Judge McKeague’s
logic. Nearly any EPA action under the CWA can be
said to “indirectly produce various limitations on point-
source operators and permit issuing authorities.” Pet.
App. 17a. For example, an EPA administrative
enforcement order under Section 1319{a){1) certainly
will impact the permit holder and the permitting

38

authority and has no more tenuous a connection to
Section 1311 than the WOTUS Rule. Judge
McKeague’s ruling therefore would vest the courts of
appeals with exclusive jurisdiction to review the order.
Yet that result contradicts this Court’s holding in
Sackett v. EPA, 566 U.S. 120 (2012), that landowners
may challenge EPA’s administrative enforcement
orders in the district courts under the APA.

Similarly, Section 1313 authorizes EPA to approve
or promulgate water quality standards. 33 U.S.C.
§ 1313(b), (c)(3). Those standards impact point source
operators and permitting authorities indirectly under
Section 1311, because effluent limitations must be
designed to meet water quality standards. Id.
§ 1311(b)(1)(C). Yet the courts of appeals have
uniformly agreed with EPA that Section 1313
standards do not fall within Section 1369(b)(1)(E). See
Friends of Earth v. EPA, 333 F.3d 184, 186 (D.C. Cir.
2003); Longview Fibre Co. v. Rasmussen, 980 F.2d
1307, 1311 (9th Cir. 1992); Bethlehem Steel, 538 F.2d

at 514.

c. Judge McKeague’s reading also renders super-
fluous parts of Subsection (E). Section 1312 water-
quality-based effluent limitations impact point source
operators and regulators indirectly under Section 1311
“because [Section 1312 limitations] are limitations
‘necessary to meet water quality standards” under
Section 1311(b)(1)(C). Friends of Earth, 333 F.3d at
190. Yet “section 1369(b)(1) expressly provides for
original appellate court review of section 1312 actions,”
with the result that Judge McKeague’s reading renders
that Subsection’s “specific reference to section 1312
duplicative and unnecessary.” Ibid. Judge McKeague’s
reading fails to “compor|t] with the presumption ‘that
statutory language is not superfluous.” McDonnell v.
United States, 136 S. Ct. 2355, 2369 (2016).

39

d. To be sure, some courts, like Judge McKeague,
have read Crown Simpson and du Pont to authorize “a
practical rather than a cramped construction” of
Section 1369(b)(1) that expands courts of appeals’
jurisdiction beyond EPA’s issuance or denial of permits
or imposition of effluent-like limitations. NRDC v.
EPA, 673 F.2d 400, 405 (D.C. Cir. 1982). In NRDC, the
court held that a challenge to Consolidated Permit
Regulations that established “procedures for issuing or
denying NPDES permits” fell under Subsection (F)
because they were “a limitation on point sources and
permit issuers” and “a restriction on the untrammeled
discretion of the industry.” Id. at 402, 405. Similarly,
in VEPCO v. Costle, 566 F.2d 446, 450 (4th Cir. 1977),
the court held that standards regulating the
construction of cooling water intakes were an “other
limitation” because they set forth “information that
must be considered in determining the type of intake
structures that individual point sources may employ.”

These influential decisions—from a period when
courts claimed more authority to deviate from plain
statutory language than is now the case—can be
parsed, explained, and distinguished. See, e.g., Friends
of the Earth v. EPA, 333 F.3d 184, 191 n.15 (D.C. Cir.
2003). But it is soundest instead to reject their
approach. Straying from the plain terms Congress used
has only led to uncertainty over jurisdiction, duplicate
filings and wasteful litigation, and judicial contortions
in which appeals to “policy” are necessary to override
the “technical criteria” specified in Section 1369(b)(1).
NRDC, 673 F.2d at 405 n.15. More recent decisions
rely on the “plain language,” canons of construction,
and “structural” guides to meaning that we advocate
here. Friends of the Earth, 333 F.3d at 189-192
(holding that a Section 1313(d) total maximum daily
load was not an “other limitation” within Subsection

40

(E)); Friends of the Everglades, 699 F.3d at 1286-1288
(rejecting EPA contention that water transfers rule fell
under Subsections (E) and (F) as “contrary to the
statutory text”).
C. Congress’s Specific And Narrow Focus In
Section 1369(b) Confirms That The Sixth
Circuit Lacks Jurisdiction.

Congress “drafted seven carefully defined bases for
original jurisdiction in the appellate courts” (Pet. App.
46a (Keith, J.)), which embody “fine” “distinctions.”
Longview Fibre, 980 F.2d at 1313. Its use of this
structure “justiffies] the inference” that a general grant
of jurisdiction to courts of appeals over all agency
action under the CWA was “excluded by deliberate
choice, not inadvertence.” Barnhart v. Peabody Coal
Co., 537 U.S. 149, 168 (2003). As the Second Circuit
put it, “the complexity and specificity” of Section
1369(b) “suggests that not all [EPA] actions” are
reviewable in the courts of appeals; Congress’s
“specifying particular actions and leaving out others” is
incompatible with cramming most EPA action under
the CWA into Section 1369(b). Bethlehem Steel, 538
F.2d at 517; see also Longview Fibre, 980 F.2d at 1313
(“No sensible person accustomed to the use of words in
laws would speak so narrowly and precisely of
particular statutory provisions, while meaning to imply
a more general and broad coverage than the statutes
designated”).

The need to interpret Section 1369(b) narrowly
according to its plain terms takes on special force
because “Congress well knows how to” grant the courts
of appeals broad jurisdiction to review EPA’s actions:
“In [anJother statut/e], using different language, it has
done just that.” Mathis v. United States, 136 S. Ct.
2243, 2252 (2016).

41

In the CWA’s sister statute, the Clean Air Act,
Congress authorized the courts of appeals to review
specific categones of agency action—some that must be
reviewed by the D.C. Circuit and others that must be
reviewed hy the regional circuits. 42 U.S.C.
§ 7607(b)(1). Congress then went further by granting
the D.C. Circwt original! jurisdiction to review “any
other nationally applicable regulations promulgated, or
final action taken, by the Administrator under this
chapter” and granted regional! circuits jurisdiction to
review “any other final action of the Administrator
under this chapter * * * which is locally or regionally
applicable.” Ibid. (emphases added). Similarly broad
jurisdictional language is conspicuously absent from
the CWA.

Congress’s decision to use different “judicial
review” language in the Clean Air Act is yet another
reason “counseling against construing” Section 1369(b)
as embracing all nationally applicable rulemaking
under the CWA. United States v. Bean, 537 U.S. 71, 76
n.4 (2002) (“The use of different terms within related
statutes generally implies that different meanings
were intended”).

D. The Legislative History Suggests That
Congress Did Not Intend The Courts Of
Appeals To Review All Nationwide Rules.

Section 1369(b) was originally enacted as part of
the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments
of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-500. “The legislative history for
the 1972 amendments reveals little about Congress's
intent behind the CWA’s judicial review provisions.”
Allison LaPlante et al., On Judicial Review Under the
Clean Water Act in the Wake of Decker v. Northwest
Environmeutal Defense Center: What We Now Know

42

and What We Have Yet to Find Out, 43 ENVTL. L. 767,
776 (2013).

The agencies have repeatedly cited a fragment of
an early House Report stating that the purpose of
Section 1369(b) was “to establish a clear and orderly
process for judicial review.” H.R Rep. No. 92-911, at
136 (1972), reprinted in 1 Leg. Hist. of the Water
Pollution Control Act of 1972 at 823 (Comm. Print
1973); e.g., Fed. BIO 4-5, 19. That phrase by itself says
nothing about what process is clear and orderly. And
the agencies failed to acknowledge that the House at
that time had proposed placing judicial review “in the
district court[s]," and had emphasized that “the
inclusion of section [1369] is not intended to exclude
judicial review” that is “otherwise permitted by law,”
including under the APA. H.R. Rep. No. 92-911, at 136
(1972), 1 Leg. Hist. at 823. The House Report does not
suggest that Congress intended that the courts of
appeals would review nationwide regulations other
than those it narrowly specified in Section 1369(b).

More illuminating are Congress’s actions in
passing the 1977 amendments to the CWA, which
modified many parts of the Act. See Clean Water Act of
1977, Pub. L. No. 95-217, 91 Stat. 1566 (Dec. 27, 1977).
Congress did not amend Section 1369. And it was not
for lack of trying. With the EPA Administrator's
“strong support,” Senator Kennedy introduced an
amendment that would have broadened Section
1369(b) to cover “national regulations promulgated
under the [CWA]” and would have required those
regulations to be challenged in the D.C. Circuit. 123
Cong. Rec. S. 26,754, 26,756 (Aug. 4, 1977). Senator
Kennedy emphasized several times during the debate
that his proposed amendment was similar to the Clean
Air Act’s judicial review provision. Jd. at 26,755-56,
26,759, 26,761. He encountered strong opposition,

43

including concern about trying to “nickel and dime the
district courts of the United States out of business.” Jd.
at 26,759. The amendment was tabled and never
enacted. Id. at 26,761.

Three days later, the Clean Air Act Amendments of
1977 became law, with modified judicial review
language. See supra p. 41; Pub. L. No. 95-95, 91 Stat.
685, 776 (Aug. 7, 1977). This Court “cannot ignore
Congress’ decision to amend [the Clean Air Act's}
relevant provisions but not make similar changes to
the [CWA].” Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S.
167, 174 (2009). “When Congress amends one statutory
provision but not another, it is presumed to have acted
intentionally.” Ibid. Indeed, “negative implications
raised by disparate provisions are strongest’ when the
provisions were ‘considered simultaneously when the
language raising the implication was inserted,” as they
were here. Id. at 175.

In short, all considerations based on the text,
structure, related statutes, and legislative history lead
to the same place: the WOTUS Rule falls outside of
Section 1369(b)(1)" $ provisions, and the Sixth Circuit
erred in exercising jurisdiction.

II. Policy Considerations Favor Interpreting
Section 1369(b) Textually To Exclude The
WOTHUS Rule.

The agencies contend that rules that are national
in scope “are best reviewed directly in the courts of
appeals.” Dkt. 58, at 57 (Oct. 23, 2015). They also say
they prefer to avoid having to defend rules in more
than one forum, to husband their resources and avoid
the risk that different courts will reach different
conclusions. Jd. at 58-59. Even if these policy
considerations were valid, they “could not overcome the
clarity [evident] in the statute’s text.” Kloeckner v.

44

Solis, 133 S. Ct. 596, 607 n.4 (2012). But there are
stronger policy reasons for interpreting Section 1369(b)
according to its plain text.
A. Interpreting Section 1369(b) Textually
Promotes Jurisdictional Clarity.

1. This Court has emphasized countless times that
“jurisdictional rules should be clear.” Lapides, 535 U.S.
at 621. “[A]dministrative simplicity is a major virtue in
a jurisdictional statute.” Hertz, 559 U.S. at 94.
“[Cjourts benefit from straightforward rules under
which they can readily assure themselves of their
power to hear a case.” Ibid. Litigants benefit because
clearer jurisdictional lines “promote greater predict-
ability.” Ibid. “[J]urisdictional rule[s]” should be
interpreted in such a way as to provide litigants and
courts with “clear guidance about the proper forum for
[a particular claim] at the outset of the case.” Elgin v.
Dep’t of the Treasury, 132 S. Ct. 2126, 2135 (2012).

Nebulous standards, by contrast, “invit[e] greater
litigation"—as WOTUS Rule litigation illustrates.
Hertz, 559 U.S. at 94. They “complicate a case, eating
up time and money as the parties litigate, not the
merits of their claims, but which court is the right
court to decide those claims.” Ibid. “Uncertainty
regarding the question of jurisdiction is particularly
undesirable, and collateral litigation on the point
particularly wasteful.” Grupo Dataflux v. Atlas Global
Group, L.P., 541 U.S. 567, 582 (2004).

In light of those concerns, this Court “place[s]
primary weight upon the need for judicial admin-
istration of a jurisdictional statute to remain as simple
as possible.” Hertz, 559 U.S. at 80. A standard that is
“more straightforward and administrable than the
alternative” best “serves the goals [that this Court has]
consistently underscored in interpreting jurisdictional

45

statutes.” Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc. v.
Manning, 136 S. Ct. 1562, 1573 (2016).

Our textual reading of Section 1369(b) offers a
straightforward standard to determine whether
jurisdiction exists under Section 1369(b)(1)(F). A court
need ask only whether EPA has issued or denied a
Section 1342 permit. If, as in this case, EPA has made
no determination regarding a specific permit, then
there is no jurisdiction under Section 1369(b)(1)(F). It
is similarly straightforward to decide jurisdiction
under Section 1369(b)(1)(E). A court need ask only
whether EPA has issued an effluent or effluent-like
limitation under Sections 1311, 1312, 1316, or 1345. If
EPA has not issued an effluent or similar limitation, or
if its action arises out of another section of the CWA or
out of the statute as a whole (see 80 Fed. Reg. at
37,055), then the courts of appeals lack jurisdiction
under Section 1369(b)(1)(E).

By contrast, Judge McKeague’s “‘functional’ ap-
proach,” which attempts to divine how “Congress’s
manifest purposes are best fulfilled” (Pet. App. 4a), or
the NRDC court's “practical rather than a cramped”
construction, produce uncertainty and endless
litigation. Courts and parties will puzzle over whether
“Congress must have intended” for review by “the
circuit courts” based on “the indirect effect” of EPA
action (Pet. App. 15a), and over what result is
“practical.” Those “approach[es are] at war with
administrative simplicity” (Hertz, 559 U.S. at 92),
leading to a jurisdictional “line [that] is hazy at best
and incoherent at worst.” Elgin, 132 S. Ct. at 2135.

2. To say that the meaning of each subsection in
Section 1369(b) is plain on its face is not to say that the

list is coherent or readily explicable by some over-
arching theory about what issues are best resolved at

46

which level of the court system. The list can be
criticized as odd or arbitrary.

For example, the reference in Subsection (B) to
Section 1316(b)(1)(C), though that provision was
dropped in conference, suggests a lack of care in
drafting.

Another example. It is unclear why review of EPA’s
issuance or denial of NPDES permits should belong in
the courts of appeals under Subsection (F), but review
of agency action in issuing or denying dredged or fill
permits under Section 1344 remains in the district
courts. As the agencies have pointed out (Dkt. 58 at
45), though the Corps generally processes dredge or fill
permits, nevertheless “EPA plays a substantial role.”
Yet even EPA actions under Section 1344 that are
parallel to NPDES program actions covered by Section
1369(b) are left to the district courts. See 33 U.S.C.
§ 1344(h) (EPA determination as to adequacy of State
program), § 1344(i) (EPA authority to issue permit
after disapproval of proposed State permit), § 1344(c)
(EPA may determine in advance of permit application
to prohibit or restrict use of a location for discharges).

Section 1369(b) draws other distinctions that are
hard to fathom. Review of EPA’s promulgation of a
standard of performance under Section 1316 goes to
the courts of appeals (Subsection (A)), as does its
determination as to the adequacy of a State NPDES
program (Subsection (D)). Yet an EPA determination
under Section 1316(c) to approve a State procedure for
applying and enforcing standards of performanc. .s not
listed in Section 1369(b) and hence is reviewed by the
district courts.

But Section 1369(b) is not unusual in this regard.
“(T]he United States Code is replete with thousands of
compromises dividing initial review of agency decisions

47

between district and circuit courts.” Joseph W. Mead &
Nicholas A. Fromherz, Choosing a Court to Review the
Executwe, 67 ADMIN. L. REv. 1, 2 (2015). Congress
generally “declines to explain its choice of forum,” and
“Congress's choices have varied dramatically—without
apparent rhyme or reason-—from statute to statute,
year to year, and even within particular legislation.”
Id. at 15-16. “Horse Protection Act regulations can be
challenged in district court, but adjudications go to the
circuit court.” Id. at 17. Department of Health and
Human Services decisions regarding the approval of
Medicaid state plans are challenged in district court,
except that a state may challenge an adverse decision
in the court of appeals. Jbid. Bizarre examples pepper
the U.S. Code. See id. at 15-19. The sorts of
“anomall[ies]” that the agencies want to try to eradicate
by adoption of a “pragmatic construction” that looks to
a statute’s “objectives” (Fed. BIO 11) would lead to
judicial rewriting of thousands of jurisdictional
statutes. It would be an endless and ultimately
arbitrary task for the courts to try to impose
rationality by deducing how “Congress’s manifest
purposes are best fulfilled.” Pet. App. 4a. The only way
to make sense of jurisdictional provisions, and give
parties and courts predictability, is to apply the
language as written.

“[T]he necessity of having aclea[r] rule” governing
the CWA is compelling. Hertz, 559 U.S. at 96. As this
Court observed in du Pont, parties have been filing
duplicative district and circuit court challenges to EPA
actions since 1974. 430 U.S. at 123 n.11. Far too much
ink has been spilled, and far too many public and
private resources wasted, in attempting to infer
whether Congress would have wanted the courts of
appeals to review EPA actions that fall outside Section
1369(b)’s plain language. The Court should put an end

48

to this misguided practice by limiting Section 1369(b)
to its text.

B. A Narrow Reading Is Necessary Due To
Section 1369(b)’s Preclusion Provision.

The Court should reject the agencies’ invitation to
read Section 1369(b) broadly because “[rjeviewability
under section 1369 carries a peculiar sting.” Longview
Fibre, 980 F.2d at 1313. Parties have “120 days” to
challenge EPA actions that fall within Section
1369(b)(1) unless the challenge is “based solely on
grounds which arose after such 120th day.” Actions
that could have been challenged “shall not be subject to
judicial review in any civil or criminal proceeding for
enforcement.” Id. § 1369(b)(2); Decker, 133 S. Ct. at
1334 (if “available,” review under Section 1369(b) is
“exclusive”).

Armed with Section 1369(b)’s preclusion provision,
the Government might criminally prosecute someone
for violating an unlawful EPA regulation while
attempting to bar that person from challenging the
regulation’s lawfulness. And a conviction could result
in “substantial” penalties. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs v.
Hawkes Co., 136 S. Ct. 1807, 1812 (2016). Negligent
violations of the Act are punishable by up to 2 years’
imprisonment, and knowing violations are punishable
by fine> up to $50,000 per day and up to 3 years in
prison. 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(1)-(2). “[T] he consequences
to landowners even for inadvertent violations can be
crushing.” Hawkes, 136 S. Ct. at 1816 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring).

Accepting the Sixth Circuit’s judgment would “have
a significant bearing on whether the Clean Water Act
comports with due process.” Hawkes, 136 S. Ct. at 1817
(Kennedy, J., concurring); see also Sackett, 132 S. Ct.
at 1375 (Alito, J., concurring) (noting “due process”

49

concerns if the CWA barred landowners from
challenging enforcement orders). It is “totally
unrealistic to assume that more than a fraction of the
persons and entities affected by a regulation” would
“have knowledge of its promulgation or familiarity
with or access to the Federal Register.” Adamo
Wrecking Co. v. United States, 434 U.S. 275, 290 (1978)
(Powell, J., concurring). It is even more unrealistic to
assume that these persons and entities will monitor
and then challenge within 120 days all CWA
regulations that, years or decades later, might result in
a “civil or criminal proceeding for enforcement” against
them. 33 U.S.C. § 1369(b)(2). The Court accordingly
should interpret Subsections (E) and (F) “as written to
avoid the significant constitutional * * * questions
raised by [Judge McKeague’s] interpretation.”
SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 174.

The rule of lenity also requires a narrow reading of
Section 1369(b) because its preclusion provision
explicitly applies in a “criminal prosecution.” See
Adamo Wrecking, 434 U.S. at 285 (applying rule of
lenity in interpreting Clean Air Act’s preclusion
provision); Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1, 11.8 (2004)
(applying rule of lenity in a civil case “[blecause we
must interpret the statute consistently” in both a
“criminal or noncriminal context”). Thus, if there is
even “some doubt” as to the meaning of Subsections (E)
and (F), that doubt must be resolved in favor of a
narrow interpretation to avoid prejudicing criminal
defendants. Adamo Wrecking, 434 U.S. at 285.

For pragmatic reasons as well, Section 1369(b)’s
preclusion provision should “dissuad[e] [the Court]
from reading § [1369](b)(1) broadly.” Am. Paper Inst.,
882 F.2d at 289. As Judge Easterbrook explained, “the
more [a court] pull[s} within § [1369](b)(1), the more
arguments will be knocked out by inadvertence later

50

on—and the more reason firms will have to petition for
review of everything in sight.” Ibid. This Court should
“express great reluctance to multiply the occasions for
review [under Section 1369(b)(1)], especially when
careful counsel must respond to the combination of
uncertain opportunities for review and § [1369](b)(2) by
filing buckshot petitions.” Roll Coaier, 932 F.2d at 671.
The best way to do so is by reading Section 1369(b)
textually.

C. A Narrow Reading Offers Parties, Agencies,
And Courts The Benefits Of Multilateral

Review Of Agency Rulemaking.

Under the Sixth Circuit’s ruling, challenges to
important CWA regulations would be funneled to a
single court of appeals, without the benefit of initial
consideration by the district courts or the opinions of
other federal courts of appeals on the same issues. On
some of the most critical issues under the CWA—like
the regulation here—the quality of legal decision-
making, and of this Court’s ability to decide which
cases to review, would be diminished.

Percolation among lower courts “helps to explain
and formulate the underlying principles” this Court
“must consider.” Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584,
2597 (2015). It also “winnows out the unnecessary and
discordant elements of doctrine.” California v. Carney,
471 U.S. 386, 400-401 (1985) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(citing Benjamin Cardozo, THE NATURE OF THE
JUDICIAL PROCESS 179 (1921)). Accordingly, this Court
typically “permit[s] several courts of appeals to explore
a difficult question before [it] grants certiorari.” United
States v. Mendoza, 464 U.S. 154, 160 (1984).

The benefits of multi-court review accrue as clearly
in the review of administrative rules as in other types
of cases. See Richard L. Revesz, Specialized Courts and

51

the Administrative Lawmaking System, 138 U. PA. L.
REV. 1111, 1155 (1990) (explaining “[w]hy [we] should
* * * take uniform administrative decisions and subject
them to review in the various regional circuit courts
under a system that makes it possible for these courts
to disagree with one another”). These benefits include
that “the possibility of intercircuit disagreement
provides a simple device for signaling that certain bard
cases are worthy of additional judicial resources”; that
“the doctrinal dialogue that occurs when a court of
appeals addresses the legal reasoning of another and
reaches a contrary conclusion *** improves the
quality of legal decisions”; and that exploration of an
issue by multiple courts aids this Court “both in its
consideration of the legal merits of an issue and in its
case selection decisions.” Jd. at 1156-1157.

Thus, any judicial disagreements that may arise
from initial consideration in multiple district courts
“increase the probability of a correct disposition”
(Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Pena, 44 F.3d
437, 447 (7th Cir. 1994) (Easterbrook, J., concurring)),
and tee up issues more thoroughly for this Court’s
consideration. There is nothing about agency regula-
tions that makes this process less appropriate for rule
challenges than for other types of cases, like those
involving the meaning or constitutionality of federal
statutes. The benefits of multi-court consideration
would be lost if Section 1369(b) were stretched beyond
the defined categories of agency action that Congress
designated for original court of appeals review.

Furthermore, Section 1369(b) must be read in light
of the default rule that Congress established in the
APA, which is that agency action is subject to
multilateral judicial review. “[I]n the absence or in-
adequacy” o/ a “special statutory review proceeding,”
any “person suffering legal wrong because of agency

52

action” is “entitled to judicial review” “in a court of
competent jurisdiction.” 5 U.S.C. §§ 702-703. A plaintiff
generally may file suit where it resides. See 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1331, 1391(e); see also Bowen v. Massachusetts, 487
U.S. 879, 904 (1988) (Congress “inten[ded] that [the
APA] cover a broad spectrum of administrative actions,
and this Court has echoed that theme by noting that
the [APA’s] ‘generous review provisions’ must be given
a ‘hospitable’ interpretation”).

In the absence of a clear statement from Congress
in Section 1369(b), the Sixth Circuit should not have
upended the APA judicial review process. This Court
should restore APA review to CWA rulemaking outside
the specific categories that Congress identified in
Section 1369(b).

D. Judge McKeague’s Efficiency Arguments
Are Unpersuasive.

Judge McKeague believed that review of the
WOTHUS Rule under Section 1369(b) was necessary for
“efficiency, judicial economy, clarity, uniformity and
finality” (Pet. App. 23a), considerations urged too by
the agencies. Fed. BIO 15-16. Those policy arguments
carry little weight in practice.

Despite the APA’s lengthier statute of limitations,
in most cases rule challenges will be initiated very soon
after the rule’s promulgation. The most likely
challengers are often closely involved in the notice and
comment process and eager to mount challenges
quickly, before a harmful rule takes effect. As a
practical matter, an APA challenge is likely to come
within days or weeks, not years. That is especially true
for rules that have sweeping nationwide impacts, like
the WOTUS Rule. The agencies issued the Rule in
June 2015, and within that same year 16 district court

53

challenges were filed, most of them very quickly after
the Rule’s issuance. See supra p. v.

Parties may coordinate their challenges to EPA
actions to avoid litigation in many different forums.
For example, in litigation over EPA’s Water Transfers
Rule, 40 C.F.R. § 122.30), some environmental
organizations quickly filed an APA challenge in the
Southern District of New York. Nine States and a
Canadian province filed a second challenge in the same
court, which consolidated the actions. Eleven States,
New York City, many Western water districts, and
others intervened as defendants in support of the rule.
See Catskill Mountains, 846 F.3d at 500-501 & n.6,
505-506. Environmental groups that had filed APA
actions in the Southern District of Florida voluntarily
dismissed those suits and intervened as plaintiffs in
the New York suits. See Joint Notice of Voluntary
Dismissal, Friends of the Everglades v. EPA, No. 1:08-
cv-21785 consol. (S.D. Fla. Nov. 13, 2012). Thus,
although multiple parties from across the country
challenged the same EPA regulation, only one district
court ruled on the merits of their challenges. There is
reason to expect that, where CWA rule challenges
proceed in district court, there will be some degree of
voluntary consolidation.

It is in any event hardly certain that Judge
McKeague’s ruling i increases efficiency. “[T]he case for
direct review in circuit courts has little in the way of
theoretical or empirical heft.” Mead & Fromherz,
supra, 67 ADMIN. L. REV. at 5. And “district courts are
generally as capable—and usually more efficient—than
their counterparts at the circuit level.” Jbid. It is also
more efficient to have the district court rather than the
appellate court resolve factual disputes, such as
whether the challenger has Article III standing and
whether the agency has prepared a complete record.

54

Id. at 29, 55. In this case, the parties spent months
litigating whether the agencies had provided a
complete record, which caused the Sixth Circuit to hold
the briefing deadlines in abeyance. See Motions to
Supplement Certified Record, Dkts. 103-105 (July 8,
2016); Opinion & Order on Administrative Record, Dkt
119 (Oct. 4, 2016); see also Order, Dkt. 116 (Sept. 22,
2016); see also Mead & Fromherz, supra, 67 ADMIN. L.
REV. at 29-30. For these and other reasons,
commentators have concluded that, all things
considered, district courts generally should undertake
original review of agency actions. Jd. at 22-59.

Regardless, efficiency concerns carry no weight in
this case because “policy arguments cannot supersede
the clear statutory text.” Universal Health Servs., Inc.
v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1989, 2002 (2016). “[N]o
law pursues its purpose at all costs, and ... the textual
limitations upon a law’s scope are no less a part of its
‘purpose’ than its substantive authorizations.” Kucana,
558 U.S. at 252. Jurisdiction is “governed by the intent
of Congress” as expressed in the statutory text, “and
not by any views [courts] may have about sound
policy.” Fla. Power & Light Co. v. Lorion, 470 U.S. 729,
746 (1985).'5 Stretching the text of Section 1369(b) past
its breaking point to increase efficiency undermines
the very purpose of the APA. “The APA’s presumption

'§s Judge McKeague erroneously read this Court's decision in
Florida Power to establish in all cases a “strong preference” in
favor of “direct circuit court review of agency action.” Pet. App.
23a. His reliance on that “non-Clean Water Act case” is
“unavailing,” as Judge Griffin explained. Jd at 43a. Florida Power
found the relevant “statute ambiguous on its face” 470 U.S. at
737. And its “holding depended on its lengthy exegesis of those
specific statutes; nowhere did the Court intimate that it was
ruling as a matter of general administrative procedure ” Nader v.
EPA, 859 F.2d 747, 764 (9th Cir. 1988).

55

of judicial review is a repudiation of the principle that
efficiency of regulation conquers all.” Sackett, 132 S.
Ct. at 1374. Section 1369(b)’s plain language controls,
and that language does not vest the Sixth Circuit with
jurisdiction to review the WOTUS Rule.

CONCLUSION

The judgment should be reversed and the case
remanded with instructions to dismiss for lack of

jurisdiction.

Respectfully submitted.

MICHAEL B. KIMBERLY TIMOTHY 8S. BISHOP
Mayer Brown LLP Counsel of Record
1999 K Street, NW CHAD M. CLAMAGE
Washington, DC 20006 JED GLICKSTEIN
(202) 263-3127 Mayer Brown LLP

71 South Wacker Drive
Chicago, Illinois 60606
(312) 782-0600
thishop@mayerbrown.com

LINDA E. KELLY
QUENTIN RIEGEL
LELAND P. FROST
Manufacturers’ Center
for Legal Action
733 10th Street, NW, Ste 700
Washington, DC 20001
(202) 637-3000
Counsel for Petitioner

APRIL 2017

ADDENDUM OF
STATUTORY PROVISIONS

la

33 U.S.C. § 1311. Effluent Limitations

(a) Illegality of pollutant discharges except in
compliance with law

Except as in compliance with this section and sec-
tions 1312, 1316, 1317, 1328, 1342, and 1344 of this
title, the discharge of any pollutant by any person
shall be unlawful.

(b) Timetable for achievement of objectives

In order to carry out the objective of this chapter
there shall be achieved—

(1){A) not later than July 1, 1977, effluent limita-
tions for point sources, other than publicly owned
treatment works, (i) which shall require the ap-
plication of the best practicable control technology
currently available as defined by the Admunistra-
tor pursuant to section 1314(b) of this title, or (ii)
in the case of a discharge into a publicly owned
treatment works which meets the requirements of
subparagraph (B) of this paragraph, which shall
require compliance with any applicable pretreat-
ment requirements and any requirements under
section 1317 of this title; and

(B) for publicly owned treatment works in ex-
istence on July 1, 1977, or approved pursuant
to section 1283 of this title prior to June 30,
1974 (for which construction must be complet-
ed within four years of approval), effluent lim-
itations based upon secondary treatment as
defined by the Administrator pursuant to sec-
tion 1314(d)(1) of this title; or,

(C) not later than July 1, 1977, any more
stringent limitation, including those necessary
to meet water quality standards, treatment

2a

standards, or schedules of compliance, estab-
lished pursuant to any State law or regula-
tions (under authority preserved by section
1370 of this title) or any other Federal law or
regulation, or required to implement any ap-
plicable water quality standard established
pursuant to this chapter.

(2)(A) for pollutants identified in subparagraphs
(C), (D), and (F) of this paragraph, effluent limita-
tions for categories and classes of point sources,
other than publicly owned treatment works,
which (i) shall require application of the best
available technology economically achievable for
such category or class, which will result in rea-
sonable further progress toward the national goal
of eliminating the discharge of all pollutants, as
determined in accordance with regulations issued
by the Administrator pursuant to section
1314(b)(2) of this title, which such effluent limita-
tions shall require the elimination of discharges
of all pollutants if the Administrator finds, on the
basis of information available to him (including
information developed pursuant to section 1325 of
this title), that such elimination is technologically
and economically achievable for a category or
class of point sources as determined in accordance
with regul

[Text truncated at 120,000 characters. The full text is on the page linked above.]

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385016_0700%3A05. Public record. Not legal advice.
