# Amicus Curiae Brief — Esquivel-Quintana v. Lynch, 137 S. Ct. 368 (2016) (No. 16-54)

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Amicus Curiae Brief
- **Published:** January 1, 2016

## Text

No. 16-64

IN THE
Supreme Court of the United States
JUAN ESQUIVEL-QUINTANA,
Petitioner,
Vv.
LORETTA E. LYNCH,

Respondent.

On Writ of Certiorari

to the United States Court of Appeals
for the Sixth Circuit

BRIEF OF THE NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF
CRIMINAL DEFENSE LAWYERS AS AMICUS
CURIAE IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONER

DAVID MARKUS BENJAMIN J. HORWICH
Co-CHAIR, NACDL Counsel of Record
AMICUS COMMITTEE JOSHUA PATASHNIK

40 NW Third Street, PHI DAVID J. FEDER

Miami, FL 33128 MUNGER, TOLLES & OLSON LLP

(305) 379-6667 560 Mission Street, 27th Floor
San Francisco, CA 94195
ben.horwich@mto.com
(415) 512-4000

i

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE............................. 1
SERRE NEI ERTL a Ne eee meme 2
FREE SERIE BR a nn EN ee OE OE Re 5
I. BIA INTERPRETATIONS OF
“AGGRAVATED FELONY” DO NOT
QUALIFY FOR CHEVRON
a cdnotinle 6
A. Section 1101(a)(43) Has
Extensive Criminal Applications,
with Substantial Penal
a ieecnaneene 7
B. Because Section 1101(a)(43) Has
Criminal Law Consequences, the
Rule of Lenity Rather than
Chevron Must Be Applied to
Resolve Statutory Ambiguities.............. i]
1. This Court’s Precedent
Dictates that the Rule of
Lenity Applies, Requiring
“Aggravated Felony” to Be
Construed Narrowly and in

Favor of Petitioner ...................... 9

II.

‘3

2. Applying the Rule of
Lenity Rather than
Chevron to Statutes with
Applications Fulfills the
Rule’s Purposes and
Protects Core
Constitutional Values ............... 12

Babbitt’s Footnote Does Not
Command a Contrary Result............... 16

EVEN IF THE CHEVRON
FRAMEWORK APPLIES,
DEFERENCE TO THE BIA’S
INTERPRETATION IS NOT

A. The BIA Does Not Administer

Criminal Laws and Lacks
Relevant Criminal Law Expertise

B. Affording Chevron Deference to
the BIA’s Interpretation Would
Create Significant Practical
Difficulties for Criminal Defense

Lawyers and Their Clients..................
CONCLUSION

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases

Abramski v. United States,

194 S. Ct. 2259 (2014)..............0.0..00.0.00-0.

Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of
Communities for a Great Oregon,

Re Se Ge CIE ccevincnnineincisiinenccsconsenses

Carter v. Welles-Bowen Realty, Inc.,

736 F.3d 722 (6th Cir. 2013)...............-...

Chevron, U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural
Resources Defense Council, Inc.,

Re Ws Ie Ce stctttenivtnctereseverssscenses

City of Arlington v. FCC,

133 S. Ct. 1863 (2013).................... isnimtiies

Clark v. Martinez,

eee

Crandon v. United States,

re Se rttitcnteccninivensettonncesnsnten

Descamps v. United States,

133 S. Ct. 2276 (2O1B)..........2.0...cs0cesesesee-

Efstathiadis v. Holder,

752 F.3d 591 (2d Cir. 2014) .........-..2.:.00

Page

-.++e passim

iv

FCC v. ABC,

SO I, it 3, 6, 10
Francis v. Reno,

269 F.3d 162 (3d Cir. 2001) .............ccccccceceooeecess. 21
Gutierrez-Brizuela v. Lynch,

834 F.3d 1142 (10th Cir. RE 24
Judulang v. Holder,

Ss Ws I vcricitncntntesomsisieses coececesnc: cece cco. 13
Kasten v. Saint-Gobain Performance

Plastics Corp., 563 U.S. 1 (2011)......................... 10
Leocal v. Ashcroft,

In i 3, 6, 10, 17
Lynce v. Mathis,

EES aor a ey 13
Maracich v. Spears,

| en nS 12
Marmolejo-Campos v. Holder,

558 F.3d 903 (9th Cir. 2009) 0.00... ccccccecccceeeee 21
McBoyle v. United States,

SR I TO I oir cc schcenrcenisssenesnasceneetesesasscon. 12
Mellouli v. Lynch,

Be i Gree, BI Oo vccccsccevexconceoenesneiensseneses.c: 23
Moncrieffe v. Holder,

8 are ae 22

v

National Cable & Telecommunications
Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Services,

eS Se I iattctnccntenccscestnneesencese

Nijhawan v. Holder,

er Se aiiescnineninnecenamnecicenianss

Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Co. v.

Haslp, 499 U.S. 1 (1991)...........2..+----+.-

Padilla v. Kentucky,

Ey I, ME EE ncecansccesivecsestssnnsecanse

Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp. v.

LTV Corp., 496 U.S. 633 (1990)............

Peugh v. United States,

188 SB. Ce. BOTZ GAO1B).......2.2.2200cc0v0e-00 20000

Scheidler v. National Organization for

Women, Inc., 537 U.S. 393 (2003).........

Shalala v. Illinois Council on Long

Term Care, Inc., 529 U.S. 1 (2000).......

Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook
County v. U.S. Army Corps of

Engineers, 531 U.S. 159 (2001) ............

Touby v. United States,

ee Oe Be IE crecccccesstssccevsscssnesaanss

United States v. Apel,

Be Oy Se BN SE creer crecenensntsnstceeees

United States v. Bass,

I CI oo. ccsncnasitriniacmniiananiseimasiie passim
United States v. Eaton,

i cisiincindsinssineinmadeoninnmenicininaiadians 15
United States v. Gamboa-Garcia,

620 F.3d 646 (GE Cir. BO10)......0c.cccccscccccccccescscccees 9
United States v. Grimaud,

I caclepasalaniainn 15
United States v. Kozminski,

en i stetenmennin 4,10, 14
United States v. Londono-Quintero,

I Be Ge I SII dcicecccssiccncsensascoccentaconsen i)
United States v. Martinez,

rj} 8 .¢ Lo || \ Renee 9
United States v. Pacheco,

, Fe bf. fe RE EeCsErEEED 9

United States v. Thompson/Center
Arms Co., 504 U.S. 505 (1992)...................+ passim

United States v. Wiltberger,
pe BS ee 9

Whitman v. American Trucking Ass‘ns,
a Ts ssencineoneanel 16

Whitman v. United States,
i is ccnnremsenrinennninbinde 15, 17

Yakus v. United States,

Se ee iia cediiccaiiininisidisidedeincad ERR ae 16
Statutes
es Oy IU ivesiicncteciicntinccenesccnentadeni passim
i ici sasinstinsiunioinesabunibeaaiions 7
ts Oe II ilsitedisccenecacconinesnnittenieniniieenemeinimnaninenitiiin 7,8
ee titi tesinennitenseesnatpcnscyentinteheaibnteiennaian 7
OE oe I sce sctccesnicensssonsdnenicsrs<onsssenptniaeian 7,8
Bee ie Se ert scintistecsavtennnsusccoveinentavsntinnbuanitoationsin 7
ae Be cccctcccnvscssanstcssicntndebinnatatsiinvaauimnmminesinas 7
ee Oe ein skciiccethertlsneaccesclicemtiseonnicenitintimaieeiidints 7,8
ee I sels ics sietsictckaclnsdrbaictentphancsicivie tnloraeantiobhabeia 7
ee I i ehlissinncrncstipstenpandemnichdeunntindaebaniatanniie 7
re ae ED viririeeen te seitnnacstteensenictnianvinmincutanton 19
Cal. Penal Code § 361.5(C)...........0.c.s.ccceeeeeeeees 2, 12, 22

Or. Rev. Stat. § 163.415 ...........ccscsccsescsessessesesseseeeeees 18

Other Authorities

JOHN S. BAKER, JR., THE FEDERALIST
Soc’y FOR LAW & PUB. POLICY
STUDIES, MEASURING THE EXPLOSIVE
GROWTH OF FEDERAL CRIME

LEGISLATION (2004)..............0::cc0000000.

1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES

ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND..................-

Brief for Respondent, Leocal v. Ashcroft,
No. 03-583, 2004 WL 1617398 (July

a ...

William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P.
Frickey, Foreword: Law As Equilib-

rium, 108 Harv. L. Rev. 26 (1994)......

Neil M. Gorsuch, Law’s Irony,
37 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 743 (2014)

Dan M. Kahan, Lenity and Federal
Common Law Crimes,

1904 Sup. Ct. Bev. BAB........ccccccoossse:..

R. MCWHIRTER, ABA, THE CRIMINAL
LAWYER’S GUIDE TO IMMIGRATION

Zachary Price, The Rule of Lenity as a
Rule of Structure,

72 Fordham L. Rev. 885 (2004)..........

iainiibdinitiiis .14

ix

Carol S. Steiker, Punishment and
Procedure: Punishment Theory and
the Criminal-Civil Procedural
Divide, 85 GEO. Ld. 775 (1997) ......-..-..----ceceeeeeees 13

WILLIAM J. STUNTZ, THE COLLAPSE OF
AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE (2011) ................... 14

TRANSACTIONAL RECORDS ACCESS
CLEARINGHOUSE, TRAC REPORTS,
PROSECUTIONS FOR 2014 (Dec. 5,
2014), http://tracfed.syr.edu/
results/9x20548211252a. html .............--.......... aves

U.S. SENTENCING COMMISSION, ILLEGAL
REENTRY OFFENSES (April 2015),
http://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/
files/pdf/research-and-publications/
research-projects-and-surveys/
immigration/2015_Illegal- austin

INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE!

The National Association of Criminal Defense Law-
yers (NACDL) is the preeminent organization in the
United States representing attorneys practicing in the
field of criminal defense—including private criminal-
defense lawyers, public defenders, active U.S. military
defense counsel, law professors, and judges committed
to preserving fairness within America’s criminal justice
system. NACDL files numerous amicus curiae briefs
each year in this Court and other courts. This Court
has often cited NACDL amicus curiae briefs that ad-
dress the everyday workings of the criminal-justice
system and the implications of the Court’s decisions in
criminal justice and immigration cases.

NACDL and its members have a longstanding in-
terest in the question whether the rule of lenity applies
when a court confronts an ambiguous statutory provi-
sion that has both civil and criminal applications and
that an administrative agency has interpreted.
NACDL filed an amicus brief in this Court on that
subject last Term in Luna Torres v. Lynch, No. 14
1096. Given NACDL’s expertise on this issue, NACDL
respectfully submits that its perspective would be
helpful to the Court in deciding this case.

1 Pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 37.3(a), Petitioner and
Respondent have consented to the filing of this brief. Petitioner
has filed a blanket consent to the filing of amicus curiae briefs.
A letter of consent from Respondent has been filed with the
Clerk. Pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 37.6, amicus repre-
sents that no party authored this brief in whole or in part, and
no person or entity, other than amicus curiae, its members, or
its counsel, has made a monetary contribution to the prepara-
tion or submission of this brief.

INTRODUCTION

This case concerns the meaning of the statutory
term “sexual abuse of a minor,” an “aggravated felony”
under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA).
8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(A) (defining “aggravated felony”
to include “murder, rape, or sexual abuse of a minor”).
The Sixth Circuit held that petitioner's conviction
under California Penal Code section 261.5(c)}—which
criminalizes consensual sexual conduct that is not even
criminal in 43 states and is punishable as a felony in
just three—constituted an “aggravated felony.” In so
holding, the Sixth Circuit did not determine that the
Board of Immigration Appeals’ (BIA’s) interpretation of
section 1101(a)(43) was the best reading of the statute.
Rather, it deferred to the BIA’s reading as a reasonable
interpretation under Chevron, U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural
Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
This was error.

The Sixth Circuit misconceived the role of Chevron
deference in a case, such as this one, calling for an
interpretation of a “hybrid” statute—one carrying both
civil and criminal applications. When a court confronts
such a statute and identifies an ambiguity in it, rather
than deferring to the agency's interpretation under
Chevron, the court should apply all relevant principles
of statutory interpretation, including (as relevant here)
the rule of lenity. “All manner of presumptions, sub-
stantive canons and clear-statement rules take prece-
dence over conflicting agency views.” Carter v. Welles-
Bowen Realty, Inc., 736 F.3d 722, 731 (6th Cir. 2013)

3

(Sutton, J., concurring) (citing numerous examples
from this Court's rulings).

The reason for this is straightforward. It is a prin-
ciple nearly as old as the common law itself that crimi-
nal statutes must be interpreted according to the rule
of lenity, which requires ambiguities to be resolved in
the defendant's favor and narrows a statute’s potential
punitive reach. United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336,
347 (1971). This Court has also recognized a unitary-
meaning principle: a statutory provision that has both
civil and criminal applications carries a single, unitary
meaning. Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1, 11 n.8 (2004).

Put together, these two principles compel the con-
clusion that the rule of lenity must be applied to hybrid
statutes even when the question of the statute’s reach
arises in a civil case. The Court’s opinions recognize as
much. See, e.g., id.; United States v. Thompson /Center
Arms Co., 504 U.S. 505, 518 n.10 (1992) (plurality
opinion); FCC v. ABC, 347 U.S. 284, 296 (1954) (ex-
plaining that lenity must be applied even in a civil case
because “[t]here cannot be one construction for the
Federal Communications Commission and another for
the Department of Justice”). Application of the rule of
lenity leaves no room for Chevron deference: Chevron
comes into play only after applying traditional tools of
statutory interpretation, and the rule of lenity is one
such tool.

Not only does doctrinal reasoning point toward this
result; so too do the functional policy rationales under-
lying the rule of lenity. The rule of lenity serves “to
promote fair notice to those subject to the criminal
laws, to minimize the risk of selective or arbitrary
enforcement, and to maintain the proper balance be-

4

tween Congress, prosecutors, and courts.” United
States v. Kozminski, 487 U.S. 931, 952 (1988). Given
the proliferation of hybrid statutes, many with far-
reaching criminal provisions, applying the rule of leni-
ty rather than Chevron helps to protect the public from
arbitrary or unfair criminal prosecutions based on
obscure administrative interpretations of ambiguous
statutes.

Against all this, the Court of Appeals in this case
believed that a footnote in Babbitt v. Sweet Home
Chapter of Communities for a Great Oregon, 515 U.S.
687, 704 n.18 (1995), required deference to the BIA’s
interpretation of section 1101(a)(43), notwithstanding
that provision’s criminal applications. Pet. App. 10a.
But Babbitt’s footnote cannot bear the weight the Sixth
Circuit placed on it. Accepting the Sixth Circuit's
reading of Babbitt means accepting (implausibly) that
this Court overruled longstanding precedent without
expressly saying so. Moreover, Babbitt is distinguish-
able in key respects: it involved a facial challenge to a
20-year-old regulation, not (as here) a challenge to an
agency interpretation made through case-by-case ad-
judication years after the relevant conduct.

Even if the Chevron framework applies to agency
interpretations of hybrid statutes, the BIA’s interpre-
tation here deserves no deference. As discussed in
petitioner's brief, the BIA’s reading of the statute is not
a reasonable one. Two additional considerations make
deference inappropriate in this case.

First, the BIA’s lack of expertise in applying or in-
terpreting criminal laws further counsels against
Chevron deference here, since “practical agency exper-
tise” is one of Chevron’s main rationales. Pension

5

Benefit Guaranty Corp. v. LTV Corp., 496 U.S. 633,
651-52 (1990). Courts, not government agencies, are
best suited to apply the categorical approach to deter-
mine what crimes constitute “aggravated felonies.”

Second, affording Chevron deference to the BIA’s in-
terpretation would create significant practical difficul-
ties for criminal-defense lawyers and their oats.
Under Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356 (2010), de
fense counsel must advise their clients of the immigra-
tion consequences of any plea agreement. Deference to
the BIA’s interpretations of the INA would charge
criminal defense attorneys with awareness of ever-
shifting immigration law, at the administrative level,
in order to meet their constitutional obligations. Not
only that, criminal defense attorneys would be obligat-
ed to try to predict whether the BIA might rely (as it
did here, see Petr. Br. 28-29) on a wide variety non-
criminal sources, such as periodicals and scientific
journals, to determine the immigration consequences
of criminal convictions. The practical impossibility of
that task confirms that Chevron deference is unwar-
ranted here.

ARGUMENT

NACDL agrees with petitioner that the Sixth Cir-
cuit misapplied the categorical approach in determin-
ing the meaning of the statutory term “sexual abuse of
a minor,” 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(A). See Petr. Br. 14-
35. It submits this brief not to rehash those arguments
but to elaborate on an additional error committed by
the Court of Appeals: affording Chevron deference to
the BIA’s interpretation of “sexual abuse of a minor”

6

without resort to the rule of lenity, notwithstanding
the many criminal applications of section 1101(a)(43).

I. BIA INTERPRETATIONS OF
“AGGRAVATED FELONY” DO NOT
QUALIFY FOR CHEVRON DEFERENCE

Two established principles, taken together, compel
the conclusion that the Sixth Circuit erred in affording
Chevron deference to the BIA’s statutory interpreta-
tion rather than applying the rule of lenity to resolve
the statutory ambiguity. First, the rule of lenity has
long directed courts to interpret ambiguity in a crimi-
nal statute narrowly, in favor of the defendant. E.g.,
Bass, 404 U.S. at 347. Second, “hybrid” statutory
provisions—those with both civil and criminal applica-
tions—have a single, unitary meaning that does not
shift depending on context. E.g., Leocal, 543 U.S. at 11
n.8.

In multiple cases, this Court has already recognized
that these principles, when combined, require applica-
tion of the rule of lenity to hybrid statutory provisions.
E.g., Thompson/Center Arms Co., 504 U.S. at 518 n.10
(plurality opinion); id. at 519 (Scalia, J., concurring in
the judgment) (agreeing that the rule of lenity applies);
FCC v. ABC, 347 U.S. at 296. That approach is in full
accord with the rationales underlying the rule of lenity.
It would also protect, rather than undermine, the sepa-
ration of powers.

In reaching a contrary result, the Sixth Circuit re-
lied entirely on a single footnote in Babbitt, 515 U.S. at
704 n.18. But Babbitt cannot support the great weight
the Court of Appeals put on it—it would require ac-
cepting that this Court overruled longstanding prece-
dent and did so without expressly saying so. If the

7

Babbitt footnote is not simply overruled itself, it should
at the least be given a narrower reading that would
accommodate rather than contradict these precedents.

A. Section 1101(a)(43) Has Extensive
Criminal Applications, with
Substantial Penal Consequences

The INA, like numerous other statutes, has both
civil and criminal applications. It criminalizes, among
other things, (1) an immigrant’s failure to leave the
country after an order of removal, 8 U.S.C. § 1253; (2)
the harboring of certain immigrants, id. § 1324; (3) an
immigrant’s improper entry, or reentry, into this coun-
try, id. §§ 1325, 1326; (4) providing assistance to immi-
grants who are improperly entering the country, id.
§ 1327; and (5) the importation of immigrants for im-
moral purposes, id. § 1328.

Section 1101(a)(43), the INA provision at issue in
this case, itself has numerous and significant criminal
applications. For example, it is a felony to aid or assist
“any alien inadmissible under section 1182(a)(2) (inso-
far as an alien inadmissible under such section has
been convicted of an aggravated felony).” 8 U.S.C.
§ 1327. Likewise, the federal failure-to-depart statute
makes it a felony for immigrants convicted of an ag-
gravated felony to remain in the country. See id.
§§ 1253(a)(1), 1227(a)(2)(A) Gin).

Section 1101(a)(43) also substantially increases the
sentencing exposure of those convicted of certain fed-
eral criminal offenses. For example, the maximum
penalty authorized by statute for illegal reentry under
8 U.S.C. § 1326 is 2 years for a “simple” offense, mean-
ing no enhancements based on predicate convictions,
but 20 years if the defendant has been previously con-

8

victed of an aggravated felony. See id. § 1326(b)(2)
(also identifying an intermediate penalty for those with
prior non-aggravated-felony convictions). Similarly, a
federal criminal defendant faces a maximum prison
term of 4 years for “simple” failure to depart under
8 U.S.C. § 1253(a)(1), but he or she faces a maximum
10-year prison term if previously convicted of an ag-
gravated felony. See id.; id. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii).

These criminal law consequences under section
1101(a)(43) are widespread. The illegal reentry statute
is the second-most prosecuted felony (after illegal en-
try) in the federal courts. TRANSACTIONAL RECORDS
ACCESS CLEARINGHOUSE, TRAC REPORTS, PROSECU-
TIONS FOR 2014 (Dec. 5, 2014).? In 2013, illegal reentry
cases accounted for more than a quarter of all federal
criminal sentencings and five out of every six sen-
tencings involving immigration offenses. U.S. SEN-
TENCING COMMISSION, ILLEGAL REENTRY OFFENSES 9-
10 (April 2015).2 Moreover, of the 18,498 illegal
reentry defendants sentenced in 2013, “slightly more
than 40 percent faced a statutory maximum of 20
years under § 1326(b)(2)” because of an aggravated
felony conviction, instead of a two- or ten-year statuto-
ry maximum that otherwise would apply. Jd.

Not surprisingly, then, federal courts routinely are
called upon in criminal cases to determine what crimes
rank as “aggravated felon[ies]” within the meaning of
section 1101(a)(43), including under the “sexual abuse
of a minor” provision at issue in this case. See, e.g.,

2 http://tracfed.syr.edu/results/9x20648211262a. html.

3 http://www .ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-and-
publications/research-projects-and-surveys/immigration/
2015 Ilegal-Reentry-Report.pdf.

9

United States v. Londono-Quintero, 289 F.3d 147, 151
(ist Cir. 2002) (interpreting the aggravated felony of
“sexual abuse of a minor,” § 1101(a)(43)(A)); United
States v. Martinez, 786 F.3d 1227, 1230-33 (9th Cir.
2015) (same); United States v. Pacheco, 225 F.3d 148,
153-55 (2d Cir. 2000) (interpreting the aggravated
felony of “theft offense,” § 1101(a)(43)(G)); United
States v. Gamboa-Garcia, 620 F.3d 546, 548-50 (5th
Cir. 2010) Gnterpreting the aggravated felony of “an
offense relating to obstruction of justice,”
§ 1101(a)(43)(S)).

B. Because Section 1101(a)(43) Has
Criminal Law Consequences, the
Rule of Lenity Rather than Chevron

Must Be Applied to Resolve

Statutory Ambiguities

1, This Court’s Precedent
Dictates that the Rule of
Lenity Applies, Requiring
“Aggravated Felony” to Be

Construed Narrowly and in
Favor of Petitioner

It is a fundamental rule of statutory interpretation,
“perhaps not much less old than construction itself,”
United States v. Wiltberger, 18 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 76, 95
(1820) (Marshall, C.J.), that in construing a criminal
statute, the rule of lenity requires that ambiguities be
resolved in the defendant's favor. Bass, 404 U.S. at
347; see also, e.g., Crandon v. United States, 494 U.S.
152, 158 (1990) (describing lenity as a “time-honored
interpretive guideline”); 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND *88 (describ-
ing lenity as a rule of strict construction); Zachary

10

Price, The Rule of Lenity as a Rule of Structure, 72
Fordham L. Rev. 885, 897 (2004) (discussing the rule of
lenity’s “origins in the efforts of common law courts in
the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries”). The rule
has its roots in several foundational principles of
American law: “to promote fair notice to those subject
to the criminal laws, to minimize the risk of selective
and arbitrary enforcement, and to maintain the proper
balance between Congress, prosecutors, and courts.”
Kozminskhi, 487 U.S. at 952.

It is also well established that, where a single stat-
ute has both civil and criminal applications, courts
“must interpret the statute consistently, whether
[they] encounter its application in a criminal or non-
criminal context.” Leocal, 543 U.S. at 11 n.8; see also,
e.g., Kasten v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics
Corp., 563 U.S. 1, 16 (2011); Clark v. Martinez, 543
U.S. 371, 380 (2005); Scheidler v. Nat? Org. for Wom-
en, Inc., 537 U.S. 393, 408-09 (2003); FCC v. ABC, 347
U.S. at 296 (“There cannot be one construction for the
Federal Communications Commission and another for
the Department of Justice.”). Disregarding this uni-
tary-meaning principle “would render every statute a
chameleon, its meaning subject to change” depending
on the circumstances. Clark, 543 U.S. at 382.

Putting these two rules together leads to the conclu-
sion that the rule of lenity must be applied to “hybrid”
statutes with both civil and criminal applications. This
Court’s opinions say as much. See Leocal, 643 U.S. at
11 n.8; Kasten, 563 U.S. at 16; FCC v. ABC, 347 U.S. at
296; Thompson/Center Arms Co., 504 U.S. at 518 n.10
(plurality opinion) (rule of lenity applied to interpreta-
tion of civil tax provision with criminal applications);
id. at 519 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment)

11

(agreeing that the rule of lenity applies); cf. Clark, 543
U.S. at 380 (‘It is not at all unusual to give a statute’s
ambiguous language a limiting construction called for
by one of the statute’s applications, even though other
of the statute’s applications, standing alone, would not
support the same limitation. The lowest common de-
nominator, as it were, must govern.”). Indeed, in
Leocal, the government itself acknowledged that defer-
ence to agency interpretation of a criminal statute is
unwarranted even where that statute also has civil
applications. See Brief for Respondent, Leocal v. Ash-
croft, No. 03-583, 2004 WL 1617398, at *32-33 (U.S.
July 14, 2004).

Application of the rule of lenity leaves no place for
Chevron deference. Even if the Chevron framework
were theoretically applicable to hybrid statutes, courts
must apply the “traditional tools of statutory construc-
tion” before deeming a statute ambiguous and defer-
ring to an agency’s interpretation. Chevron, 467 U.S.
at 843 n.9. This includes the rule of lenity. See Nat?
Cable & Telecomm. Ass'n v. Brand X Internet Servs.,
545 U.S. 967, 985 (2005) (noting that lower court had
“invoked no other rule of construction (such as the rule
of lenity) requiring it to conclude that the statute was
unambiguous” (emphasis added)); Carter, 736 F.3d at
732 (Sutton, J., concurring) (noting that “Chevron
accommodates rather than trumps the lenity princi-
ple”); William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey,
Foreword: Law As Equilibrium, 108 Harv. L. Rev. 26,
68-69, 104 (1994) (explaining that lenity is a “substan-
tive canon” of statutory construction).

At the very least, the rule of lenity must take prece-
dence over Chevron in cases involving “grievous” ambi-
guities—the standard this Court has set for application

12

of the rule. E.g., Maracich v. Spears, 133 S. Ct. 2191,
2209 (2013). This is such a case: as Judge Sutton
recognized, it is a “classic occasion for applying the rule
of lenity.” Pet. App. 21a. The key statutory phrase at
issue in this case—“sexual abuse of a minor’—contains
just five words and provides virtually no contextual
guidance to courts, agencies, or lawyers. And the ordi-
nary approach one would use to determine whether
“sexual abuse of a minor” categorically encompasses
the conduct criminalized by Penal Code section
261.5(c)—looking to the laws of the 50 States, the fed-
eral government, and the Model Penal Code—strungly
suggests the answer is no. See Petr. Br. 15-21. Ata
minimum, under the rule of lenity, the statutory text is
not sufficiently clear to permit a holding that Penal
Code section 261.5(c) categorically defines an aggra-
vated felony.

2B. Applying the Rule of Lenity
Rather than Chevron to
Statutes with Both Civil and
Criminal Applications Fulfills
the Rule’s Purposes and
Protects Core Constitutional
Values

Applying the rule of lenity in cases like this one
dovetails with the rule’s central purpose of requiring
the government to provide “fair warning” of what the
criminal laws prohibit. Bass, 404 U.S. at 348; McBoyle
v. United States, 283 U.S. 25, 27 (1931). Deferring to
an agency’s interpretation of a hybrid statute threat-
ens to deprive the public of fair notice. The citizen
must guess, among other things, whether a statute will
be deemed ambiguous (courts often disagree) and

13

whether an agency’s interpretation will be deemed
reasonable (courts often disagree about this, too).

Exacerbating this problem, agencies routinely
change their interpretation of statutory provisions.
Deference thus would “allow one administration to
criminalize conduct within the scope of the ambiguity,
the next administration to decriminalize it, and the
third to recriminalize it.” Carter, 736 F.3d at 729 (Sut-
ton, J., concurring). If the meaning of hybrid statutes
could shift with the political winds, individuals could
find themselves facing criminal prosecution (or en-
hanced punishment) based on new agency pronounce-
ments for actions that were perfectly legal (or were
punished less harshly) just weeks or months earlier.
As applied in criminal cases, that would violate the Ex
Post Facto Clause. See Peugh v. United States, 133
S. Ct. 2072, 2081 (2013). And the problem of “lack of
fair notice,” which is one of the “central concerns of the
Ex Post Facto Clause,” Lynce v. Mathis, 519 U.S. 433,
441 (1997), is a serious one in the immigration context
as well, given instabilities in the BIA’s interpretations
of many statutory provisions. See, e.g., Judulang v.
Holder, 132 S. Ct. 476, 488 (2011) (unanimously reject-
ing the BIA’s interpretation while noting that the “BIA
repeatedly vacillated” in determining whether § 212(c)
of the INA permits the Attorney General to grant dis-
cretionary relief to a deportable non-citizen).

This fair-notice problem, moreover, must also be
viewed in the context of the increasing number and
reach of criminal laws since the middle of the twenti-
eth century. See Carol S. Steiker, Punishment and
Procedure: Punishment Theory and the Criminal-Civil
Procedural Divide, 85 Gro. L.J. 775, 783-84 (1997).
There are so many federal crimes now that it is diffi-

14

cult to count them, but there are at least several thou-
sand. See, e.g., JOHN S. BAKER, JR. ET AL., THE FEDER-
ALIST SoC’Y FOR LAW & PUB. POLICY STUDIES, MEASUR-
ING THE EXPLOSIVE GROWTH OF FEDERAL CRIME LEGIS-
LATION 3 (2004) (estimating that the U.S. Code con-
tains over 4,000 criminal statutes).

In this setting, the rule of lenity helps “minimize
the risk of selective or arbitrary enforcement.”
Kozminski, 487 U.S. at 952; see also Dan M. Kahan,
Lenity and Federal Common Law Crimes, 1994 Sup.
Ct. Rev. 345, 406 (noting that the rule of lenity “re-
duce[s] the opportunities for prosecutorial abuse”). By
contrast, layering Chevron deference atop the increas-
ingly broad array of federal criminal laws would give
the government substantial power to engage in selec-
tive prosecution based on obscure administrative pro-
nouncements. “[W]hen the criminal code comes to
cover so many facets of daily life, ... prosecutors can
almost choose their targets with impunity,” Neil M.
Gorsuch, Law’s Irony, 37 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 743,
748 (2014), a problem compounded when Chevron
deference is afforded to the government's interpreta-
tions of expansive hybrid laws. Individuals disfavored
by the government for one reason or another could well
become the target of prosecutions based on ambiguous
statutes. See WILLIAM J. STUNTZ, THE COLLAPSE OF
AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE 2-5 (2011).

Applying the rule of lenity rather than Chevron def-
erence also accords with another main purpose of the
rule: protection of the separation of powers. This
Court has recognized that “because of the seriousness
of criminal penalties, and because criminal punish-
ment usually represents the moral condemnation of

15

the community, legislatures and not courts should
define criminal activity.” Bass, 404 U.S. at 348.

That principle would ring hollow if courts deferred
to agency interpretations of hybrid statutes. Doing so
would give Executive Branch officials the power to “in
effect create (and uncreate) new crimes at will, so long
as they do not roam beyond ambiguities that the laws
contain.” Whitman v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 352,
353 (2014) (Scalia, J., statement respecting denial of
certiorari); see also Carter, 736 F.3d at 731 (Sutton, J.,
concurring) (noting that deference would “giv[e] une-
lected commissioners and directors and administrators
carte blanche to decide when an ambiguous statute
justifies sending people to prison”). It would also “turn
the normal construction of criminal statutes upside-
down, replacing the doctrine of lenity with a doctrine of
severity.” Crandon, 494 U.S. at 178 (Scalia, J., concur-
ring in the judgment).

Indeed, applying Chevron deference rather than the
rule of lenity would contravene two related lines of this
Court’s precedent pertaining to the separation of pow-
ers. For over one hundred years, the Court has con-
sistently explained that the Constitution allows Con-
gress to delegate authority to the Executive to define
crimes only when it speaks clearly. See, e.g., United
States v. Grimaud, 220 U.S. 506 (1911); United States
v. Eaton, 144 U.S. 677, 688 (1892). While unclear
delegation by Congress is no obstacle to agency rule-
making (or to Chevron deference) in the ordinary civil
context, see City of Arlington v. FCC, 133 S. Ct. 1863,
1874-75 (2013), the clear-statement rule “compels
Congress to legislate deliberately and explicitly before
departing from the Constitution’s traditional distribu-
tion of authority” in the criminal law context. Carter,

16

736 F.3d at 733 (Sutton, J., concurring). Deferring to
agency interpretations of ambiguous statutes with
criminal applications would impermissibly allow agen-
cies to make conduct criminal without a clear state-
ment from Congress giving the agency that authority.

Similarly, while delegation to agencies requires only
an “intelligible principle” in the ordinary civil context,
Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 472
(2001), this Court has suggested that the Constitution
may require “something more than an ‘intelligible
principle” when it comes to a delegation of authority to
criminalize conduct—something that “meaningfully
constrains” the Executive may be needed. Touby v.
United States, 500 U.S. 160, 165-66 (1991); Yakus v.
United States, 321 U.S. 414, 423-27 (1944). But under
the Sixth Circuit’s approach here, “an agency could fill
a gap in a criminal statute even where Congress pro-
vides no specific guidance about how to fill it.” See
Carter, 736 F.3d at 734 (Sutton, J., concurring).

C. Babbitt’s Footnote Does Not
Command a Contrary Result

Contrary to what the Court of Appeals believed (see
Pet. App. 9a), this Court’s opinion in Babbitt provides
no basis to depart from the well-established principles
discussed above. In Babbitt, the Court rejected the

argu[{ment] that the rule of lenity should foreclose any
deference to the Secretary [of the Interior]’s interpreta-
tion” of the statutory term “take” in the Endangered
Species Act. 515 U.S. at 704 n.18. The Court stated
that it had “never suggested that the rule of lenity
should provide the standard for reviewing facial chal-
lenges to administrative regulations whenever the
governing statute authorizes criminal enforcement.”

17

Id. For several reasons, this “drive-by” footnote “de-
serves little weight,” Whitman, 135 S. Ct. at 354 (Scal-
ia, J., statement respecting the denial of certiorari),
and should not guide this Court’s analysis.

Most importantly, reading the Babbitt footnote
broadly “contradicts the many cases before and since
holding that, if a law has both criminal and civil appli-
cations, the rule of lenity governs its interpretation in
both settings.” Id. at 353-54 (citing Leocal, 543 U.S. at
11-12 n.8 and Thompson/Center Arms Co., 505 U.S. at
518 n.10 (plurality opinion)). And this “Court does not
normally overturn, or ... dramatically limit, earlier
authority sub silentio.” Shalala v. Ill. Council on Long
Term Care, Inc., 529 U.S. 1, 18 (2000). To the extent
the Babbitt footnote may be considered to have done
so, it can and should be overruled. See Pacific Mut.
Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 37-38 (1991) (Scalia,
J., concurring in the judgment) (in such a situation,
there is “no valid stare decisis claim”).

Indeed, this Court itself has evinced uncertainty
about whether—even in the context of environmental
regulation—the Babbitt footnote should be taken at
face value. Six years after Babbitt, in Solid Waste
Agency of Northern Cook County v. U.S. Army Corps of
Engineers, 531 U.S. 159 (2001), the petitioner argued
that “[blecause violations of the [Clean Water Act]
carry criminal penalties, ... the rule of lenity” provided
“another basis for rejecting the [government’s] inter-
pretation of the [Act].” Jd. at 174 n.8. The Court opted
to “not address this alternative argument” in light of
its ruling in the petitioner's favor on other grounds. Id.
If Babbitt had resolved the issue, the Court could simp-
ly have said as much, rather than declining to address
it.

18

Alternatively, the Babbitt footnote should be limited
in any of several ways that would help restore the
proper relationship between Chevron and the rule of
lenity in this case and others like it.

First, the Babbitt footnote emphasized that the reg-
ulation at issue in that case had “existed for two dec-
ades,” giving a “fair warning of its consequences.” 515
U.S. at 704 n.18. Babbitt also distinguished Thomp-
son /Center Arms Co. on the ground that “no regulation
was present” in that case. Jd. Here, as in Thomp-
son/Center Arms Co. and unlike in Babbitt, there is no
regulation and no fair warning. The agency interpre-
tation here arises from “case-by-case adjudication,”
Pet. App. 15a, and was not issued until 2015, postdat-
ing petitioner's crime by nearly six years, id. at 27a-
28a. Given that the conduct at issue is entirely legal in
43 states, is a felony in just three, and is deemed “sex-
ual abuse” in just one (Oregon, where it is punishable
only as a misdemeanor), see Petr. Br. 20-21; Pet. 25-27
& n.7; Or. Rev. Stat. § 163.415, it was hardly foreseea-
ble that the BIA would later by adjudication deem the
crime to be “sexual abuse of a minor” constituting an
“aggravated felony.”

Second, the Babbitt footnote emphasized that that
case involved a “facial challenge[]” to the agency's
regulation, not any “specific factual dispute” in a par-
ticular case. 515 U.S. at 704 n.18. As Judge Sutton
has noted, that is not the sort of setting in which one
would expect the rule of lenity to come into play to
begin with. Facial challenges are “the sorts of claims
that raise arguments—say that the regulation exceed-
ed the agency’s authority and thus was unenforceable
in all its applications—that have no connection to the
rule of lenity.” Pet. App. 23a-24a; see also Carter, 736

19

F.3d at 735 (Sutton, J., concurring) (similar). This case
does not involve a facial challenge.

Third, in Babbitt, Congress had expressly made it a
crime to violate any “regulation issued in order to im-
plement” the various statutory provisions at issue. See
16 U.S.C. § 1540(b)(1). As a result, two of the main
concerns stemming from deference to agency interpre-
tation of hybrid statutes—the clear-statement rule and
the nondelegation doctrine, see supra pp. 15-16—were
not implicated, and the separation-of-powers concern
carried far less weight. Here, by contrast, no statute
contemplates that the BIA’s pronouncements will carry
criminal consequences. See Petr. Br. 43-44.

Il. EVEN IF THE CHEVRON FRAMEWORK
APPLIES, DEFERENCE TO THE BIA’S
INTERPRETATION IS NOT
WARRANTED HERE

Even if the Chevron framework may apply to agen-
cy interpretations of some hybrid statutes, deference is
not appropriate in this case. This is so, above all, be-
cause the BIA’s interpretation is not a reasonable one
and reflects a fundamental misapplication of the cate-
gorical approach. See Petr. Br. 14-34, 44-47. Amicus
highlights two additional reasons why, even under the
Chevron framework, no deference is warranted here.

A. The BIA Does Not Administer
Criminal Laws and Lacks Relevant
Criminal Law Expertise

Chevron deference rests, in significant part, on re-
spect for “practical agency expertise” in the subject
matter of the statute the agency it administers. Pen-
sion Benefit Guaranty Corp., 496 U.S. at 651-52; see

20

also Chevron, 467 U.S. at 863-65. Considerations of
agency expertise in this case, however, confirm that no
deference is warranted.

Under Chevron, courts may afford deference to an
agency’s interpretation of a “statute which it adminis-
ters.” 467 U.S. at 842. But agencies do not “adminis-
ter” criminal laws. Courts alone are charged with that
responsibility. Abramski v. United States, 134 S. Ct.
2259, 2274 (2014) (“[C]riminal laws are for courts, not
for the Government, to construe.”). Indeed, this Court
has “never held that the Government's reading of a
criminal statute is entitled to any deference.” United
States v. Apel, 134 S. Ct. 1144, 1151 (2014) (emphasis
added). The same is true of hybrid statutes with civil
and criminal applications. See, e.g., Crandon, 494 U.S.
at 177 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) (“The
law in question, a criminal statute, is not administered
by any agency but by the courts.”). To be sure, the BIA
administers the civil provisions of the LNA, but it does
not (and cannot) administer those laws in their crimi-
nal settings. See, e.g., id. (explaining that administra-
tive necessity is “not the sort of specific responsibility
for administering the law that triggers Chevron”).

Chevron itself shows why courts should not defer to
the BIA’s interpretation here. This Court explained in
Chevron that, in administering the Clean Air Act, the
Environmental Protection Agency is charged with
“implementing policy decisions in a technical and com-
plex arena.” 467 U.S. at 863. The Court observed that
“[plerhaps” Congress left to the agency the ability to
“strike the balance” between competing interests in
this area because “those with great expertise and
charged with responsibility for administering [the law]

21

would be in a better position to do so.” Id. at 865. By
contrast, “[j]udges” were “not experts in the field.” /d.

The situation here is far different. As several courts
of appeals have recognized, “[t]he BIA has no special
expertise by virtue of its statutory responsibilities in
construing state or federal criminal statutes.” Mar-
molejo-Campos v. Holder, 558 F.3d 903, 907 (9th Cir.
2009); see also, e.g., Efstathiadis v. Holder, 752 F.3d
591, 594 (2d Cir. 2014); Francis v. Reno, 269 F.3d 162,
168 (3d Cir. 2001). That is especially true here. The
phrase “sexual abuse of a minor” is not an immigration
term of art. Rather, as this Court has recognized, it is
a “generic crime[]” that calls for application of the
categorical approach. Nijhawan v. Holder, 557 U.S.
29, 37 (2009).

The categorical approach is difficult enough for
courts to apply. See, e.g., Descamps v. United States,
133 S. Ct. 2276, 2287 (2013) (noting that lower court's
“new way’ of applying the categorical approach “has no
roots in our precedents”). But it is at least the sort of
legal-reasoning task in which courts have expertise.
By contrast, there is no reason to believe executive
agencies have any such expertise, and every reason to
doubt whether they do, as this case illustrates.

The BIA’s application of the categorical approach
here would have earned it an “F” in law school. The
BIA relied on non-legal sources and its own policy
beliefs rather than consulting state and federal crimi-
nal laws and the Model Penal Code. See Petr. Br. 9-10.
The BIA also considered it “noteworthy” that “[i]f we
were to conclude that the offense at issue here is not
categorically ‘sexual abuse of a minor,’ sexual offenders
who were prosecuted under this statute for victimizing

22

children under the age of 16 would not be removable
for having committed a ‘sexual abuse of a minor’ ag-
gravated felony under the Act.” Pet. App. 39a n.7.
That flawed reasoning turns the categorical approach
on its head. Rather than considering “the least of the
acts’ criminalized” under Penal Code section 261.5(c),”
Moncrieffe v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 1678, 1684 (2013), and
comparing that conduct to the generic offense, the BIA
identified the most culpable conduct and justified its
categorical treatment of section 261.5(c) on that basis.

Such errors show why the BIA has not offered a
permissible construction of the statute—and why its
constructions of section 1101(a)(43) are not proper
candidates for Chevron deference in the first place.

B. Affording Chevron Deference to the
BIA’s Interpretation Would Create
Significant Practical Difficulties for
Criminal Defense Lawyers and
Their Clients

One final reason for not deferring to the BIA’s in-
terpretation of section 1101(a)(43) is to ensure that the
provision is interpreted consistently over time, espe-
cially in its criminal applications. Because of the
unique constitutional obligations placed on criminal
defense counsel, affording Chevron deference to the
BIA’s interpretation of criminal laws will place an
immense burden on attorneys, to the detriment of their
clients.

Under Padilla, 559 U.S. at 367, defense attorneys
are required to advise their clients of the immigration
consequences of plea agreements. The categorical
approach facilitates the performance of this duty: it

23

“works to promote efficiency, fairness, and predictabil-
ity in the administration of immigration law” by ena-
bling noncitizens and their attorneys “to anticipate the
immigration consequences of guilty pleas in criminal
court, and to enter safe harbor guilty pleas that do not
expose the alien defendant to the risk of immigration
sanctions.” Mellouli v. Lynch, 135 S. Ct. 1980, 1987
(2015) (alterations and internal quotation marks omit-

ted).

Affording Chevron deference to the BIA’s interpre-
tation would eliminate those benefits and would in-
crease exponentially the difficulties criminal defense
attorneys would face in advising their clients of the
immigration consequences of criminal convictions.
Immigration law is “quite complex” to begin with, and
that is particularly true with respect to “the determi-
nation of whether a crime is an ‘aggravated felony.”
Padilla, 559 U.S. at 377-78 (Alito, J., concurring in the
judgment); see also id. at 378 (“[NJothing is ever sim-
ple with immigration law” (quoting R. MCWHIRTER,
ABA, THE CRIMINAL LAWYER'S GUIDE TO IMMIGRATION
LAW: QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS 130 (2d ed. 2006))).
The difficulties criminal defense attorneys face would
be magnified tenfold if the BIA’s criminal law pro-
nouncements received Chevron deference. Defense
attorneys would be required to be aware of ever-
shifting immigration law at the administrative level in
order to provide effective assistance of counsel to their

clients.

Indeed, the task is still more onerous: attorneys
would have an obligation to try to predict the BIA’s
future rulings that might receive Chevron deference.
In petitioner's case, for instance, his California convic-
tion came nearly six years before the BIA’s ruling. See

24

Pet. App. 27a-28a. Given the BIA’s approach here—in
which it relied upon an article in tiie Journal of Family
Planning Perspectives in determining that petitioner’s
conviction constituted “sexual abuse of a minor,” Pet.
App. 36a-36a—attorneys could well be forced to consult
far-flung, non-legal sources in trying to predict the
BIA’s future treatment of crimes. And that difficulty is
only exacerbated by the BIA’s frequent efforts ‘7 apply
its administrative rulings retroactively in other cases.
See generally Gutierrez-Brizuela v. Lynch, 834 F.3d
1142, 1144-45 (10th Cir. 2016).

CONCLUSION

The judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit should be reversed.

Respectfully submitted,
DAVID MARKUS BENJAMIN J. HORWICH
Co-CHAIR, NACDL Counsel of Record

AMICUS COMMITTEE JOSHUA PATASHNIK
40 NW Third Street, PH1 DAVID Jd. FEDER
Miami, FL 33128 MUNGER, TOLLES & OLSON LLP
(205) 379-6667 560 Mission Street, 27th Floor

San Francisco, CA 94105
ben. horwich@mio.com
(415) 512-4000

DECEMBER 22, 2016

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385016_0689%3A10. Public record. Not legal advice.