# Petitioners Brief — Kindred Nursing Ctrs. Ltd. P'ship v. Clark, 137 S. Ct. 1421 (2017) (No. 16-32)

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Petitioners Brief
- **Published:** January 1, 2017

## Text

Supreme WOurt, U5.
FILED

DEC - 7 206
LORMCE OF THE Cure |
In the Supreme Court of the Anited States

No. 16-32

KINDRED NURSING CENTERS LIMITED PARTNERSHIP,
DBA WINCHESTER CENTRE FOR HEALTH AND
REHABILITATION, NKA FOUNTAIN CIRCLE HEALTH AND
REHABILITATION, ET AL.,

Petitioners,
Vv.
JANIS E. CLARK AND BEVERLY WELLNER, ET AL.,

Respondents.

On Writ of Certiorari to the
Supreme Court of Kentucky

BRIEF FOR PETITIONERS

ANDREW J. PINCUS
Counsel of Record
ARCHIS A. PARASHARAMI
DANIEL E. JONES
Mayer Brown LLP
1999 K Street, NW
Washington, DC 20006
(202) 263-3000
apincus@mayerbrown.com

Counsel for Petitioners

2 moose of Congres

i
QUESTION PRESENTED

Whether the Federal Arbitration Act preempts a
state-law contract rule that singles out arbitration by
requiring a power of attorney to expressly refer to
arbitration agreements before the attorney-in-fact
can bind her principal to an arbitration agreement.

‘3
RULE 29.6 STATEMENT

The parent corporations of Kindred Nursing Cen-
ters Limited Partnership are Kindred Nursing Cen-
ters East, LLC and Kindred Hospital Limited Part-
nership. The parent corporation of Kindred Nursing
Centers East, LLC is Kindred Healthcare Operating,
Inc.; and the parent corporations of Kindred Hospital
Limited Partnership are Kindred Hospital West,
LLC and Kindred Nursing Centers Limited Partner-
ship. The parent corporation of Kindred Healthcare
Operating, Inc. is Kindred Healthcare, Inc.

Kindred Healthcare, Inc. is a publicly traded cor-
poration with no parent corporation. No publicly
traded company owns 10% or more of the stock of
Kindred Healthcare, Inc.

ill

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
QUESTION PRESENTED.................csssssosscscsescececeores i
RULE 29.6 STATEMENT ...................cccscccececeesereeeeees ii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES. ...............cccccccccesecereneneeee Vv
CP OY wcencccncsescsnccteecsnsiesshinniniaemineamamall 1
FEE nececcinccntsececiscsuacserttiniginiimssecsetinin as 1
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY
PROVISIONS INVOLVED ..................cc2000eeeeeeeeee 2
ERIE, drcinttcictiniennteisineiniiantnmiiaiaimnaan 2
Be, FROG TINIE. secncncncvstenssccininneinisieaccctian 4
B. Proceedings Below. .............:ssccosssscesesesecsavseceses 5
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT. .......0..............0eeeeeeeeeees 10
TERI, sccccsscsncsssscintpcininnsisiniisidimmiaausesanaean 12
I. The Decision Below Conflicts With The
FAA And Defies This Court’s Precedents. ......... 12
A. This Court Has Repeatedly Held That
State-Law Rules That Disfavor
Arbitration Are Preempted By The
IPT > svcsicctatsimesinsercisitiisiniabiitiaiailidiainiahdaiis ataleaeaiaas 13
B. The Kentucky Court’s Explicit-
Reference Rule Singles Out Arbitration
For Suspect Status. ..............cccecccccssseeeeeeeeeeeee 17
1. The Explicit-Reference Rule Is Not
Applicable To Contracts Generally.......... 19
2. The Explicit-Reference Rule Cannot
Be Salvaged By The Kentucky

Court’s Reference To “Fundamental
Constitutional Rights.” ............:2ccceceeeeeeees 24

iv
TABLE OF CONTENTS—continued
Page

C. Upholding The Decision Below Would
Enable States To Impose Numerous
Discriminatory Burdens On The
Enforcement Of Arbitration
scenes 29
Il. The FAA Applies To The Question Of
Contract Enforceability Presented Here............ 31

ESSE EE 34

v

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

CASES

14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett,

I enealll 14, 28
Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson,

I 13, 18
Am. Health Care Ass'n v. Burwell,

--- F. Supp. 3d ----, 2016 WL 6585295

ns a, i a cemsnbienael 33

Am. Heritage Life Ins. Co. v. Orr,
294 F.3d 702 (6th Cir. 2002)....................csseseeseees 27
Arthur Andersen LLP v. Carlisle,
Ee a 18
AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion,
RRS ETE SE ee es passim
Brandenburg Health Facilities, LP v.

Mattingly,
2016 WL 3448733 (W.D. Ky. June
Schade ccetieienisace aeasainiela ecticesakadsicincsdniieeaibisibditiaintiinin 29

Button v. Drake,
Be Ee le i icccncnceccsncnscsscecsasscencescosss 23

Caley v. Gulfstream Aerospace Corp.,
428 F.3d 1359 (11th Cir. 2006)............................ 27
CompuCredit Corp. v. Greenwood,
iin tnrinctsciessaeenenaniinaenangiel 13

Cooper v. MRM Inv. Co.,
367 F.3d 498 (Gth Cir. 2004)................cccccccceeceeeees 27

vi
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—continued
Page(s)

DIRECTV, Inc. v. Imburgia,
Re passim

Doctor’s Assocs., Inc. vy. Casarotto,
gs LL passim

EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc.,
Reena 13
GGNSC Louisville Hillcreek, LLC v.

Watkins,
2016 WL 815295 (W.D. Ky. Feb. 29,

Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane
Corp.,
eee 28
Howlett ex rel. Howlett v. Rose,
cae 20

IFC Credit Corp. v. United Bus. &
Indus. Fed. Credit Union,
512 F.3d 989 (7th Cir. 2008).............0000.---secereeee 27

International Shoe Co. v. Washington,
i eninnineiianmaneiaieied 26

James v. Kentucky,
ene 20

Kimble v. Marvel Enitm't, LLC,
cen 19

Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co.,
| Te ome 23
Marmet Health Care Center, Inc. v.

Brown,
132 S. Ct. 1201 (2012) (per curiam) .............. 12, 16

vi

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—continued
Page(s)

Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman

Hutton, Inc.,

EERSTE ER re eS aD ey 16
Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler

Chrysler—Plymouth, Inc.,

sk cee eee 27
Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank &

Trust Co.,

I ad ssiasciesloniiboaale 23

Nitro-Lift Techs., L.L.C. v. Howard,
133 S. Ct. 500 (2012) (per curiam) ................ 12, 14

Owensboro Health Facilities, L.P. v.
Henderson,
2016 WL 2853569 (W.D. Ky. May 13,
| EERE Se RP een ene eee ene E 29

Perry v. Thomas,
Ec eeaane passim

Pine Tree Villa, LLC v. Coulter,
2016 WL 3030185 (W.D. Ky. May 25,

Ping v. Beverly Enterprises, Inc.,

376 S.W.3d 581 (Ky. 2012)......000-.000.... 6, 21, 22
Preferred Care of Delaware, Inc. v.

Hopkins,

2016 WL 3546407 (W.D. Ky. June

ERE Re aS EEN eR 29

Preferred Care, Inc. v. Bleeker,
2016 WL 6636854 (E.D. Ky. Nov. 8,
il adiciin:NetGdcelaniinddalodonbniadnaiamadeedinhiadiinensaditeniimeenstidd 22

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—continued
Page(s)

Preferred Care, Inc. v. Howell,
2016 WL 4470746 (E.D. Ky. Aug. 19,
IG iccccteeiigdinimacstonshinnmeunnibagiahieratoniitedsduies neato 22

Preston v. Ferrer,
innate 13, 17

Rent-A-Center, West, Inc. v. Jackson,
I i cacidncinnitsiintniinils 18

Riney v. GGNSC Louisville St.

Matthews, LLC,

2016 WL 2853568 (W.D. Ky. May 13,

ERE) Sa Tit A ee 29
Saturn Distribution Corp. v. Williams,

905 F.2d 719 (4th Cir. 1990)..............2...ccccceeeeeeeee 32
Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co.,

i ceacianeiimedadle 18

Sec. Indus. Ass’n v. Connolly,

883 F.2d 1114 (1st Cir. 1989) ...........0000.0 ee. 32
Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v.

McMahon,

I erence 28

Snowden vy. CheckPoint Check Cashing,
290 F.3d 631 (4th Cir. 2002) .............ccccccccceceeeeeeee 27

Southland Corp. v. Keating,
SS 13, 16, 18, 30

Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of
Leland Stanford Junior Univ.,
|) & |, 2c aaa 18

CONSTITUTION AND STATUTES
Se aericenreshsincieeiiiuhitlpindinieiicinialeiathitindgetbhgelidasechbi passim

ix

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—continued

Page(s)
i I soso ocnccnitaiciccanionsascnbeadeaneniimanabeniieete 2
Ky. Const
I ainda cetinpentshinncepestanteninbiiabeaaioiaipadibadnheagenbatiiaaiiadl 11, 25
SOIT -scsscnisesnantisdtedigibesnaiingeeeaniginisninnambeiineniiigebadennalith 25
I insncdietaenshsnindesepatbannpasaténiibeemeiensnpnednnsienicamedadlinl 25
Et I catesiindhinnndantsdyedieddedddepnnninnenisaanateinnbnanminieaneitd 25
Ky. Rev. Stat.
SII iisient sinipiemiauaieioiaiuenienduneniannsainiiainbedenel 5
ins nce inaerereniinnieannindatiniowniieenbinesonnneeiintia 22

Mont. Code Ann. § 27-5-114(4) .0.............cccceceeceeeeeeee 29

OPINIONS BELOW

The opinion of the Supreme Court of Kentucky
(Pet. App. 3a-118a) is reported at 478 S.W.3d 306.
The order of the Supreme Court of Kentucky denying
rehearing (Pet. App. la-2a) is unreported.

The following orders in Clark are all unreported:
(1) the order of the Kentucky Court of Appeals deny-
ing interlocutory relief (Pet. App. 119a-125a); (2) the
November 15, 2012 order of the Circuit Court deny-
ing the motion to dismiss and compel arbitration
(Pet. App. 126a-127a); and (3) the January 9, 2012
order of the Clark County Circuit Court granting
dismissal and compelling arbitration (Pet. App. 128a-
130a).

The following orders in Wellner are all unreport-
ed: (1) the order of the Kentucky Court of Appeals
denying interlocutory relief (Pet. App. 131la-137a); (2)
the November 19, 2012 order of the Circuit Court
denying the motion to dismiss and compel arbitra-
tion (Pet. App. 138a-139a); and (3) the January 9,
2012 order of the Clark County Circuit Court grant-
ing dismissal and compelling arbitration (Pet. App.
140a-142a).

JURISDICTION

The judgment of the Supreme Court of Kentucky
was entered on September 24, 2015. Pet. App. 3a.
That court denied rehearing on February 18, 2016.
Pet. App. la-2a. On May 9, 2016, Justice Kagan ex-
tended the time for filing a petition for a writ of cer-
tiorari to and including July 1, 2016. The petition ior
a writ of certiorari was filed on July 1, 2016 and

2

granted on October 28, 2016. This Court’s jurisdic-
tion rests on 28 U.S.C. § 1257(a).

CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY
PROVISIONS INVOLVED

The Supremacy Clause of the Constitution, art.
VI, cl. 2, provides in pertinent part:

This Constitution, and the Laws of the Unit-
ed States which shall be made in Pursuance
thereof * * * shall be the supreme Law of the
Land; and the Judges in every State shall be
bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution
or Laws of any State to the Contrary not-
withstanding.

Section 2 of the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”),
9 U.S.C. § 2, provides in pertinent part:

A written provision in * ** a contract evi-
dencing a transaction involving commerce to
settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter
arising out of such contract or transaction,
* * * or an agreement in writing to submit to
arbitration an existing controversy arising
out of such contract, transaction, or refusal,
shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable,
save upon such grounds as exist at law or in
equity for the revocation of any contract.

STATEMENT

This Court has repeatedly held that the FAA
“preclude[s] States from singling out arbitration pro-
visions for suspect status.” Doctor’s Assocs., Inc. v.
Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 687 (1996); see also DI-
RECTYV, Inc. v. Imburgia, 136 S. Ct. 463, 468-69
(2015); AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S.

3

333, 339 (2011); Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 492
n.9 (1987).

Yet the Kentucky Supreme Court, by a divided
vote, did just that, refusing to enforce two arbitration
agreements entered into by individuals who had
been given express authority to accept “contracts” on
behalf of their principals. Specifically, the court held
that a power of attorney broadly authorizing an at-
torney-in-fact to enter into contracts extends to any
kind of contract except a dispute-resolution agree-
ment. An explicit reference to arbitration in a power-
of-attorney document is required to authorize an at-
torney-in-fact to enter into an arbitration contract,
the court said, because (in the court’s view) such an
agreement waives the principal’s “sacred,” “invio-
late,” and “God-given” right to a jury trial.

That anti-arbitration approach cannot be
squared with this Court’s precedents, which hold
that Section 2 of the FAA preempts state-law rules
that are “restricted to [the] field” of arb‘tration and
do not “place[] arbitration contracts on equal footing
with all other contracts.” Imburgia, 136 S. Ct. at 468-
69 (quotation marks omitted); see also Concepcion,
563 U.S. at 339; Casarotto, 517 U.S. at 687; Perry,
482 U.S. at 492 n.9.

Indeed, by tying its requirement of express refer-
ence to arbitration contracts to the waiver of a jury
trial—the absence of which is a key defining charac-
teristic of an arbitration proceeding—the majority
below applied a rationale that, if permitted to stand,
would open the door to numerous state-law rules
erecting obstacles to the enforcement of arbitration
agreements. As one of the dissenting Justices below
put it, the Kentucky Supreme Court’s decision makes
a “clever contribution to thfe] new genre” of state-

43

court decisions seeking to evade this Court’s prece-
dents interpreting the FAA. Pet. App. 99a (Abram-
son, J., dissenting).

The Kentucky court’s ruling defies three decades
of this Court’s settled precedent by imposing improp-
er obstacles to the enforcement of arbitration agree-
ments. The Court should reverse the decision below.

A. Factual Background.

Petitioners Kindred Nursing Centers Limited
Partnership, et al. (collectively “Kindred”) operate
nursing homes and rehabilitation centers, including
the Winchester Centre for Health and Rehabilitation
(a/k/a Fountain Circle Health and Rehabilitation).
Pet. App. 6a. Respondents Janis Clark and Beverly
Wellner represent, respectively, the estates of Olive
Clark and Joe Paul Wellner, two now-deceased resi-
dents of the Winchester Centre.!

Before the residents were admitted to the Win-
chester Centre, they had executed powers of attorney
designating respondents Clark and Wellner, respec-
tively, as their attorneys-in-fact. These powers of at-
torney conferred broad authority upon the attorneys-
in-fact to enter into transactions and agreements re-
lating to their principals’ affairs.

Janis Clark’s power of attorney, in pertinent
part, conferred the power “[t]o draw, make, and sign
in my name any and all checks, promissory notes,
contracts, deeds or agreements; * * * and Generally to
do and perform for me and in my name all that I
might do if present.” J.A. 7-8 (emphases added). Bev-

' Janis Clark is the daughter of Olive Clark, and Beverly
Wellner is the wife of Joe Wellner. See Pet. App. 16a, 20a.

5

erly Wellner’s power of attorney authorized her to
“make, execute and deliver deeds, releases, convey-
ances and contracts of every nature in relation to both
real and personal property.” J.A. 10-11 (emphases
added).

When their respective principals were admitted
to the Winchester Centre, respondents signed the
admission paperwork on their principals’ behalf. Pet.
App. 6a-7a. Each also executed a separate agreement
titled “Alternative Dispute Resolution Agreement
Between Resident and Facility (Optional).” Id. at
17a; J.A. 14-27. This arbitration agreement provided
that any disputes arising out of the “[rlesident’s stay
at the Facility” would be resolved in arbitration. J.A.
14, 21. It also explained that “execution of this [arbi-
tration] Agreement is not a precondition to the fur-
nishing of services to the Resident by the Facility.”
J.A. 19, 26.

B. Proceedings Below.

Respondents brought suit against petitioners, al-
leging state statutory and common-law claims aris-
ing out of their principals’ deaths while residing at
the Winchester Centre. Each respondent asserted
causes of action for wrongful death, personal injury,
and violations of Ky. Rev. Stat. § 216.510 et seq.,
which enumerates certain rights of long-term care
residents. Pet. App. 17a, 20a. In each case, petition-

2 Under Kentucky law, the wrongful death claims belong to the
respondents themzelves, not their principals. See Pet. App. 8a-
12a. Because respondents themselves did not agree to arbitra-
tion, the arbitrability of those wrongful death claims waa not
challenged m the Kentucky Supreme Court (Pet. App. 100a
(Noble, J., dissenting)); nor is it at issue here. This cage involves

6

ers moved to dismiss or stay the lawsuits, seeking to
enforce the arbitration agreements between petition-
ers and the residents. Jd. at 17a, 21a.

1. The state trial court initially dismissed each
lawsuit in favor of arbitration. Pet. App. 18a, 21a.
Subsequently, the Supreme Court of Kentucky held
in Ping v. Beverly Enterprises, Inc., 376 S.W.3d 581,
592-94 (Ky. 2012), that broad language in a power of
attorney authorizing the attorney-in-fact to perform
“every act and thing whatsoever requisite and neces-
sary to be done” was limited by the specific authori-
zations to manage the principal’s “financial affairs”
and “health-care decisions,” and did not include the
authority to bind the principal to an optional arbitra-
tion agreement.*

Respondents moved for reconsideration of the
dismissal orders. In each case, the trial court granted
reconsideration and reversed its prior ruling, holding
that the arbitration agreements were unenforceable
because respondents lacked authority to bind their
principals to arbitration. Jd. at 18a, 21a.

2. Petitioners sought interlocutory review of both
decisions in the Kentucky Court of Appeals. That
court denied relief in both cases, holding that under
Ping, respondents lacked authority under their pow-

the arbitrability of the remaining claims, which respondents
are asserting on behalf of their deceased principals’ estates.

’ Ping did not have occasion to consider whether the powers of
attorney at issue here—including documents that conferred ex-
press authority to make contracts—include the authority to en-
ter into an arbitration agreement. As we discuss in more below
(at 21-22), the decision in Ping thus provided no basie for the
explicit-reference rule announced by the Kentucky Supreme
Court here.

7

ers of attorney to bind their principals to arbitration.
Pet. App. 19a-21a.

Petitioners then applied to the Supreme Court of
Kentucky for interlocutory relief. Jd. at 19a-20a, 23a.
The state supreme court consolidated the two cases
with a third case presenting similar issues, but in-
volving a nursing home and rehabilitation facility
that is not one of the petitioners.

3. A divided Supreme Court of Kentucky af-
firmed the Court of Appeals’ orders denying interloc-
utory relief to compel arbitration, by a 4-3 vote.

The majority first considered whether the text of
the powers of attorney at issue appeared to authorize
the attorneys-in-fact to enter into arbitration agree-
ments on their principals’ behalf. It held that the
power of attorney in Wellner did not provide the req-
uisite authorization. Although the Wellner power of
attorney authorized the attorney-in-fact to make
“contracts” related to “personal property,” and alt-
hough the majority acknowledged that legal claims
are a form of personal property, the majority con-
cluded that an arbitration agreement does not “re-
late” to personal property, but rather solely to the
principal’s “constitutional right to access the courts
and to trial by jury.” Pet. App. 37a.

The majority held that the Clark power of attor-
ney, by contrast, did convey the necessary authority,
concluding that in light of its broad language, “it
would be impossible to say that entering into a pre-
dispute arbitration agreement was not covered.” Id.
at 39a.

The majority then proceeded to consider, in
Clark “as well as the other cases,” the “extent to
which the authority of an agent to waive his princi-

8

pal’s fundamental constitutional rights to access the
courts, to trial by jury, and to appeal to a higher
court, can be inferred from a less-than-explicit grant
of authority.” Pet. App. 40a. It held that only a grant
of authority to enter into arbitration agreements ex-
plicitly “expressed in the text of the power-of-
attorney document” is sufficient to authorize an at-
torney-in-fact to agree to arbitration. Id. at 41a.

The majority opined that it would be “strange” to
conclude that a general power of attorney authorized
an attorney-in-fact to “waive the principal’s civil
rights; or the principal’s right to worship freely; or
enter into an agreement to terminate the principal's
parental] rights; put her child up for adoption; con-
sent to abort a pregnancy; consent to an arranged
marriage; or bind the principal to personal servi-
tude.” Pet. App. 42a. Equating agreements to resolve
disputes by arbitration with the relinquishment of
fundamental rights such as freedom from slavery,
familial and reproductive rights, and religious free-
dom, the majority held that courts may not infer
from a general power of attorney the authority to
waive a principal’s right to a jury trial. Jd. at 43a.

The majority went on to say that the drafters of
the Kentucky Constitution had “deemed the right to
a jury trial to be inviolate, a right that cannot be
taken away; and, indeed, a right that is sacred, thus
denoting that right and that right alone as a divine
God-given right.” Pet. App. 43a (last emphasis add-
ed). Based on this assessment of the status of the
right to a jury trial, the majority concluded that an
express grant of authority is needed before an attor-
ney-in-fact can enter into an arbitration agreement
on behalf of her principal.

9

The majority then “reject[ed] the notion” that its
decision conflicted with the FAA or this Court’s prec-
edents. For example, it described Concepcion as hold-
ing only that state law is preempted only when it
“prohibits outright the arbitration of a particular
type of claim,” and stated that its ruling did not run
afoul of that prohibition because arbitration agree-
ments between nursing homes and residents could
still be enforced as long as they were signed by the
resident or an attorney-in-fact with explicit authority
to enter into arbitration agreements. Pet. App. 46a
(quotation marks omitted). And the majority denied
that its decision was “hostile” to arbitration, stating
that its new rule “merely reflects a long-standing and
well-established policy disfavoring the unknowing
and involuntary relinquishment of fundamental con-
stitutional rights.” Id. at 47a-48a.

Chief Justice Minton and Justices Abramson and
Noble dissented, with Justices Abramson and Noble
each authoring a dissenting opinion.

The principal dissent, written by Justice Abram-
son and joined by the other two dissenting justices,
explained that under the “clear precedent” of this
Court, the majority was “not at liberty to conclude
that in Kentucky a power of attorney that gives the
agent express authority to contract does not include
the authority to contract for arbitration * * *.” Pet.
App. 78a (Abramson, J., dissenting). Rather,
“{[w|hether one sympathizes with the majority's dis-
like of federally imposed arbitration or not, the ines-
capable fact remains that the majority has disre-
garded controlling law” under the FAA and that the
arbitration agreements must be enforced. Id. at 99a.
The dissent concluded that the majority’s holding
“flfies] in the face of federal law and [is] preempted

10

by the Supremacy Clause because it [is] clearly not
* * * 4 state-law principle applicable to ‘any contract’
but rather one that singles out arbitration agree-
ments for disfavored treatment.” Jd. at 78a.4

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

The decision below stands in stark defiance of
this Court's repeated holdings that the FAA
preempts state-law rules that disfavor arbitration
agreements. By requiring that a power of attorney
contain an explicit statement authorizing the attor-
ney-in-fact to enter into an arbitration agreement—.
even though Kentucky law does not impose that re-
quirement as to a power of attorney to enter into
other types of contracts—the Kentucky court flatly
violated the FAA’s mandate that courts must “placef]
arbitration agreements on equal footing with all oth-
er contracts.” Imburgia, 136 S. Ct. at 468; see also
Casarotto, 517 U.S. at 686-87; Perry, 482 U.S. at 492
n.9.

The Kentucky court sought to avoid FAA
preemption by describing its rule as one of general
applicability. Specifically, it claimed both that its
rule is an application of general agency law and that
Kentucky would require express authority before an
attorney-in-fact could waive any constitutional right
of the principal.

4 Justice Noble “joinfed] Justice Abramson’s dissent for its rea-
soning on the main points in these cases,” but separately dis-
sented “to begin correcting any confusion about agency Jaw by
the part of our Ping decision that was actually not determina-
tive in the result of the case.” Pet. App. 116a. Unless otherwise
noted, references to the “dissent” refer to Justice Abramson’s
dissenting opinion.

11

But these justifications are squarely precluded
by this Court’s precedents. First, there is no general
principle of Kentucky agency law (or any jurisdic-
tion’s agency law, for that matter) that would sup-
port the illogical conclusion that the authority to en-
ter into “contracts” delegates the power to enter into
any contract except a dispute-resolution agreement.
Accordingly, the state court’s interpretation is like
the one declared preempted in Jmburgia, in which
this Court explained that “nothing in the [state
court’s] reasoning suggestied]” that a court in that
State “would reach the same interpretation * * * in
any context other than arbitration.” 136 S. Ct. at 469.

Second, the only constitutional rights to which
the court’s reasoning applies are the rights to a jury
trial and access to courts—the waiver of which, not
by happenstance, are the most defining characteris-
tics of an arbitration agreement. The court’s explicit-
authorization rule does not apply, for example, even
to other constitutional rights that are relevant to
contracting—such as Kentucky’s constitutional right
“of acquiring and protecting property.” Ky. Const. § 1;
see also Pet. App. 93a (Abramson, J., dissenting).
Nor does it apply to forum-selection clauses that se-
lect a forum in which a party would not otherwise be
subject to personal jurisdiction—even though such a
choice of forum waives that partys due process
rights. Thus, the Kentucky court’s rule is a contract
defense that specifically targets arbitration agree-
ments and is accordingly preempted by the FAA.

Indeed, if the decision below were affirmed,
States would have virtual carte blanche authority to
impose discriminatory barriers to the enforcement of
arbitration agreements. For example, the Montana
statute rejected in Casarotto—requiring notice of an

12

arbitration provision to be highlighted and capital-
ized on the first page of a contract-——could be resur-
rected by simply recharacterizing it as a rule that
special notice is required for any contract waiving
the rights to a jury trial and access to courts. Along
those lines, States would be free to conjure up new
hurdles to arbitration agreements, such as requiring
that any waiver of a jury trial be signed in triplicate
form to be effective. And a State could outlaw
predispute arbitration agreements entirely by adopt-
ing the rule that, as a matter of state law, advance
waivers of the right to a jury and other constitutional
rights are invalid.

At the end of the day, the decision below is yet
another in a long line of state court decisions seeking
to evade the FAA’s prohibition against discriminato-
ry burdens on the enforcement of arbitration agree-
ments. See, e.g., Imburgia, 136 S. Ct. 463; Nitro-Lift
Techs., L.L.C. v. Howard, 133 S. Ct. 500 (2012) (per
curiam); Marmet Health Care Center, Inc. v. Brown,
132 S. Ct. 1201 (2012) (per curiam). As Justice
Abramson observed in dissent, the decision makes “a
clever contribution to this new genre” of recent cases
that have attempted “to ‘rule around’ the FAA.” Pet.
App. 99a (Abramson, J., dissenting). Such end-runs
improperly flout this Court's precedents. The Ken-
tucky court’s decision accordingly should be reversed.

ARGUMENT

I. The Decision Below Conflicts With The FAA
And Defies This Court’s Precedents.

The Kentucky Supreme Court’s rule requiring
powers of attorney to contain specific language that
expressly authorizes attorneys-in-fact to enter into

13

arbitration agreements cannot be squared with the
FAA’s mandates.

A. This Court Has Repeatedly Held That
State-Law Rules That Disfavor Arbitra-
tion Are Preempted By The FAA.

Congress enacted the FAA to “reverse the
longstanding judicial hostility to arbitration agree-
ments,” “to place [these] agreements upon the same
footing as other contracts,” and to “manifest a liberal
federal policy favoring arbitration agreements.”
EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279, 289 (2002)
(quotation marks omitted); see also CompuCredit
Corp. v. Greenwood, 132 S. Ct. 665, 668 (2012) (the
FAA was “enacted in 1925 as a response to judicial
hostility to arbitration”) (citing Concepcion, 563 U.S.
at 339); Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513
U.S. 265, 272 (1995) (explaining that the FAA “seeks
broadly to overcome judicial hostility to arbitration

agreements’).

Section 2 of the FAA therefore commands that
“[aJn agreement to arbitrate is valid, irrevocable, and
enforceable as a matter of federal law, * * * ‘save up-
on such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the
revocation of any contract.” Perry, 482 U.S. at 492
n.9 (quoting 9 U.S.C. § 2). “Section 2 ‘declare[s] a na-
tional policy favoring arbitration’ of claims that par-
ties contract to settle in that manner.” Preston v.
Ferrer, 552 U.S. 346, 353 (2008) (quoting Southland
Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 10 (1984)).

“By enacting § 2, * * * Congress precluded States
from singling out arbitration provisions for suspect
status” (Casarotto, 517 U.S. at 687) or from imvali-
dating arbitration provisions through state-law rules
that “apply only to arbitration or that derive their

14

meaning from the fact that an agreement to arbitrate
is at issue.” Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 339; see also
Imburgia, 136 S. Ct. at 469 (FAA preempts state-law
interpretation of a contract that is “restricted to th[e]
field” of arbitration); Perry, 482 U.S. at 492 n.9 (“A
state-law principle that takes its meaning precisely
from the fact that a contract to arbitrate is at issue
does not comport with * ** § 2.”). Nor may States
apply generally applicable state-law doctrines “in a
fashion that disfavors arbitration.” Concepcion, 563
U.S. at 341.

The FAA also precludes reliance on “judicial poli-
cy concern[s] as a source of authority” for refusing to
enforce arbitration agreements. 14 Penn Plaza LLC
v. Pyett, 556 U.S. 247, 270 (2009); see also Concep-
cion, 563 U.S. at 342 (explaining that the FAA was
enacted to eliminate the “great variety’ of ‘devices
and formulas’ declaring arbitration against public
policy”). Thus, it is immaterial that the discriminato-
ry rule here derives from common law rather than a
statute; the FAA preempts any “state law, whether
of legislative or judicial origin,” that disfavors arbi-
tration. Perry, 482 U.S. at 492 n.9 (emphasis added);
see Casarotto, 517 U.S. at 687 n.3.

Based on these well-established principles, this
Court repeatedly has overturned decisions by state
courts when, as here, they either have ignored or re-
fused to apply the FAA and this Court’s precedents
interpreting it. As the Court has explained, because
“[s]tate courts rather than federal courts are most
frequently called upon to apply the * * * FAA,” “[i]t is
a matter of great importance *** that state su-
preme courts adhere to a correct interpretation of the
legislation.” Nitro-Lift, 133 S. Ct. at 501.

15

Just last Term, this Court reversed a decision of
the California Court of Appeal that had adopted a
dubious interpretation of an arbitration agreement
in the course of declaring the agreement unenforcea-
ble. Imburgia, 136 S. Ct. at 468-71. This Court con-
cluded that the California courts would not have
reached the same interpretation of the contract “in
any other context other than arbitration”; instead,
the California court’s analysis was “restricted to that
field”—precisely the kind of state-law discrimination
against arbitration that the FAA flatly forbids. Id. at
469. And the Court underscored that “[t]he Federal
Arbitration Act is a law of the United States,” and,
“[cJonsequently, the judges of every State must follow
it.” Id. at 468.

Two decades ago, in Casarotto, the Court reached
the very same conclusion, holding that “threshold
limitations placed specifically and solely on arbitra-
tion provisions” are unenforceable because they are
“antithetical to” the “goals and policies’ of the FAA
to promote arbitration by treating arbitration as fa-
vorably as any other contract.” 517 U.S. at 688.
Thus, the FAA preempted a Montana statute requir-
ing special notice of an arbitration provision on the
first page of a contract, because the statute “singl[ed]
out arbitration provisions for suspect status.” Jd. at
687.

The Court refused to excuse this special notice
requirement as a particular application of a general
state policy that purportedly unexpected contract
terms must be conspicuous, and instead reiterated
that “a court may not ‘rely on the uniqueness of an
agreement to arbitrate as a basis for a state-law
holding that enforcement would be unconscionable,
for this would enable the court to effect what * * *

16

the state legislature cannot.” Casarotto, 517 U.S. at
687 n.3 (quoting Perry, 482 U.S. at 492 n.9).

Similarly, the Court has recognized that the FAA
preempts and forbids enforcement of state-law rules
categorically “prohibiting arbitration of a particular
type of claim,” because such state-law bars are “con-
trary to the terms of and coverage of the FAA.”
Marmet, 132 S. Ct. at 1204. In Marmet, this Court
vacated and remanded a decision of “the Supreme
Court of Appeals of West Virginia,” which had de-
clared “unenforceable all predispute arbitration
agreements that apply to claims alleging personal in-
jury or wrongful death against nursing homes.” 132
S. Ct. at 1202. “[Bly misreading and disregarding the
precedents of this Court interpreting the FAA,” the
West Virginia court “did not follow controlling feder-
al law implementing th[e] basic principle” that both
“[s]tate and federal courts must enforce the Federal
Arbitration Act.” Jbid.; see also id. at 1203 (“The
West Virginia court’s interpretation of the FAA was
both incorrect and inconsistent with clear instruction
in the precedents of this Court.”).

Moreover, Casarotto and Marmet are far from
alone: On several other occasions, this Court has de-
clared state law preempted when it runs afoul of the
FAA. See e.g., Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman
Hutton, Inc., 514 U.S. 52, 56 (1995) (FAA preempted
state law requiring judicial resolution of claims in-
volving punitive damages); Perry, 482 U.S. at 489-
491 (FAA preempted state law requiring that liti-
gants be provided a judicial forum for wage dis-
putes); Southland, 465 U.S. at 10 (“In enacting § 2 of
the [FAA], Congress declared a national policy favor-
ing arbitration and withdrew the power of the states
to require a judicial forum for the resolution of

17

claims which the contracting parties agreed to re-
solve by arbitration,” including for claims brought
under state franchise-investment law); cf. Preston,
552 U.S. at 358-59 (FAA preempted state law requir-
ing claims under California’s Talent Agents Act to be
submitted to the Labor Commissioner in the first in-
stance, rather than to arbitration (or litigation)).

In sum, the Court has not hesitated to strike
down the sweeping panoply of rules and devices that
States—including state supreme courts—have craft-
ed to evade the FAA. As we next explain, this Court
should reach the same conclusion here.

B. The Kentucky Court’s Explicit-
Reference Rule Singles Out Arbitration
For Suspect Status.

The Kentucky Supreme Court’s decision in this
case similarly failed to adhere to the FAA and this
Court’s precedents interpreting that statute.

In both of the individual cases consolidated be-
fore the Kentucky court (Clark and Wellner), an at-
torney-in-fact for the resident had been granted au-
thority to enter into “contracts” on the resident’s be-
half. Pet. App. 19a, 22a. The majority below nonethe-
less held that those attorneys-in-fact could not enter
into arbitration agreements—even though they did
have the power to enter into other kinds of con-
tracts—because the power of attorney did not specifi-
cally mention arbitration agreements. This explicit-
reference rule clearly “places arbitration agreements
in a class apart from ‘any contract,’ and singularly
limits their validity.” Casarotto, 517 U.S. at 688.

Indeed, it is hard to imagine a more fundamental
precept under the FAA than this Court’s repeated
admonition that arbitration provisions must “be

18

placed ‘upon the same footing as other contracts.” Id.
at 687 (quoting Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417
U.S. 506, 511 (1974)). Accord, e.g., Imburgia, 136 S.
Ct. at 468; Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 339; Rent-A-
Center, West, Inc. v. Jackson, 561 U.S. 63, 67 (2010);
Arthur Andersen LLP v. Carlisle, 556 U.S. 624, 630
(2009); Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna,
546 U.S. 440, 443 (2006); Allied-Bruce, 513 U.S. at
271; Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland
Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 478 (1989); Per-
ry, 482 U.S. at 482 n.9; Southland, 465 U.S. at 16 &

n.11.

The parallels to Casarotto are striking. The Mon-
tana statute struck down in that case required con-
tracts with arbitration clauses to provide notice of
the clauses in underlined capital letters on the first
page of the contract. The Court held that this height-
ened-notice requirement “directly conflict[ed] with
§ 2 of the FAA because the State’s law condition[ed]
the enforceability of arbitration agreements on com-
pliance with a special notice requirement not appli-
cable to contracts generally.” 517 U.S. at 687.

The Kentucky Supreme Court’s rule similarly
conditions the enforceability of arbitration agree-
ments signed by attorneys-in-fact on an explicit-
reference requirement that is not applicable to other
kinds of contracts. See also Pet. App. 78a (Abramson,
J., dissenting) (noting that the majority’s rule requir-
ing an explicit mention of arbitration “singles out ar-
bitration agreements for disfavored treatment in the
same vein as the statutes and judicially-created
rules” that this Court has previously held preempted
by the FAA).

To sustain the decision below would thus require
the Court to over more than three decades of prece-

19

dent. Yet “[o]verruling precedent is never a small
matter,” and stare decisis—“a foundation stone of the
rule of law”—‘“carries enhanced force when a decision
*** interprets a statute” such as the FAA; when
“Congress has spurned multiple opportunities to re-
verse” this Court’s precedents if it so chose; and in
“cases involving property and contract rights,” “be-
cause parties are especially likely to rely on such
precedents when ordering their affairs.” Kimble v.
Marvel Entm’t, LLC, 135 S. Ct. 2401, 2409-10 (2015)
(quotation marks omitted).

The majority below offered two principal reasons
for excusing its explicit-reference rule’s discriminato-
ry treatment of arbitration: (1) it deemed the rule to
be both a general application of Kentucky agency law
and a construction of powers of attorney in general;
and (2) it asserted that the explicit-reference rule
applies to the waiver of all fundamental constitu-
tional rights. Neither explanation for the state-law
rule saves the holding below from preemption.

1. The Explicit-Reference Rule Is Not Appli-
cable To Contracts Generally.

Like the court below here, the plaintiffs in
Imburgia pointed to the California Court of Appeal’s
purportedly neutral interpretation of the phrase “law
of your state” in a consumer contract. This Court
recognized, of course, that “California courts are the
ultimate authority on [California] law.” Imburgia,
136 S. Ct. at 468. Nonetheless, it was for this Court
to “decide whether the decision of the California
court places arbitration contracts “on equal footing
with all other contracts.” Ibid. (quoting Buckeye, 546
U.S. at 443).

20

In other words, to assess whether the FAA’s dic-
tates have been honored, the Court must determine
whether a state court would in fact “interpret con-
tracts other than arbitration contracts the same
way, rather than simply accepting the state court’s
professions of neutrality. Id. at 469; see also ibid.
(“Since the interpretation of a contract is ordinarily a
matter of state law to which we defer * * * we must
decide not whether [the state court’s] decision is a
correct statement of California law but whether (as-
suming it is) that state law is consistent with the
Federal Arbitration Act.”); Perry, 482 U.S. at 492 n.9
(explaining that, as a matter of “choice-of-law,” “the
principles of federal common law” embodied by the
FAA trump “state-law holding{s]” if those holdings
“rely on the uniqueness of an agreement to arbitrate
as a basis” for resisting enforcement).5

Applying that standard, this Court held in
Imburgia that the FAA precluded the California
Court of Appeal’s interpretation of the term “law of
your state” to exclude the preemptive force of federal
law because “nothing in the [state court’s] reasoning
suggestied]” that a court in that state “would reach

a ——

5 Im other contexts, such aa the independent-and-adequate-
state-grounds doctrine, this Court likewise is not obligated to
accept at face value a state court’s reasoning. In that context,
the Court instead inquires whether the state procedural] rule
purportedly precluding federal review has been “firmly estab-
lished and regularly followed.” James vy. Kentucky, 466 U.S.
341, 348 (1984); see also, e.g., Howlett ex rel. Howlett v. Rose,
496 U.S. 356, 369 (1990) ("A state court may not deny a federal
right, when the parties and controversy are properly before it,
in the absence of ‘valid excuse.”); id. at 369 n.16 (collecting cas-
es).

21

the same interpretation of ‘law of your state’ in any
context other than arbitration.” 136 S. Ct. at 469.

That same principle controls the outcome here.

The majority below’s description of its rule as an
application of the “general principle[{] * * * that an
attorney-in-fact may not act beyond the powers he
has been granted under the power-of-attorney in-
strument” (Pet. App. 45a) is therefore not controlling.
A rule characterized as a particular application of
generally-applicable contract doctrines is still
preempted when that rule is “applied in a fashion
that disfavors arbitration” (Concepcion, 563 U.S. at
341) or that is “restricted to that field” (mburgia,
136 S. Ct. at 469).

And there can be no doubt that the majority’s ex-
plicit-reference rule fits that description: As the dis-
sent below explained, the rule “burdens agent-
entered arbitration agreements more heavily than
either agent-entered contracts generally, or judicial
forms of agent-initiated dispute resolution.” Pet.
App. 92a (Abramson, J., dissenting). In fact, we are
not aware of—nor have been able to find—any Ken-
tucky decisions holding that any other types of con-
tracts are subject to this explicit-reference rule. In
other words, we have located no other decision draw-
ing the (illogical) conclusion that the authority to en-
ter into “contracts” really means the authority to en-
ter into all contracts except one specific kind of con-
tract.

The Kentucky Supreme Court’s earlier decision
in Ping, for example, offers no support for the explic-
it-reference rule. That case held that an attorney-in-
fact lacked authority to enter into an optional arbi-
tration agreement because “the only decisions specif-

22

ically provided for in the document” were “to make
financial and health-care decisions.” 376 S.W.3d at
591. The defendant had relied on general language
that the attorney-in-fact had “full and complete pow-
er and authority to do and perform any, all, and eve-
ry act and thing whatsoever requisite and necessary
to be done,” but the court rejected the claim that this
language provided “a sort of universal authority be-
yond thle] express provisions.” Jd. at 590-92. What-
ever the merits of that decision, it is clearly inappli-
cable here, as the powers of attorney in this case ex-
plicitly authorized the attorneys-in-fact to make or
enter into contracts. See also Pet. App. 70a-72a
(Abramson, J., dissenting) (distinguishing Ping on
this basis, and collecting cases doing the same).

It is also significant that Kentucky law erects no
similar barriers to allowing state-appointed guardi-
ans—as opposed to attorneys-in-fact—to enter into
arbitration agreements on behalf of their wards. As a
federal court in Kentucky recently explained in en-
forcing an arbitration agreement entered into by a
guardian, “a disabled person, once appointed a
guardian, is stripped of several rights—including ‘the
right * * * to enter into contractual relationships.”
Preferred Care, Inc. v. Howell, 2016 WL 4470746, at
*3 (E.D. Ky. Aug. 19, 2016) (quoting Ky. Rev. Stat.
§ 387.590(10)). “So it follows that these rights, once
taken from the ward, are vested in the guardian to
care for him”—and this right to enter into contractu-
al relationships generally includes the right to enter
into arbitration agreements, even though the Ken-
tucky guardianship statute does not explicitly refer-
ence arbitration. Jbid.; accord Preferred Care, Inc. v.
Bleeker, 2016 WL 6636854, at *4 (E.D. Ky. Nov. 8,
2016) (same).

23

Finally, in one of the two cases consolidated be-
fore the court below, Wellner, the majority identified
a second reason for refusing to enforce the arbitra-
tion agreement. Even though the Wellner power of
attorney authorized the attorney-in-fact to make con-
tracts “in relation to * * * personal property,” Pet.
App. 22a—and the majority “certainly agree[d]” that
“personal injury claim[s]” and other “choses-in-
action are personal property,” id. at 36a (quoting
Button v. Drake, 195 S.W.2d 66, 69 (Ky. 1946))—the
majority nonetheless held the power to agree to arbi-
tration outside the scope of the attorney-in-fact’s au-
thority. Instead, the majority said, an agreement to
arbitrate the principal’s legal claims somehow did
not “relat[e] to” the claims, but rather solely to the
principal’s “constitutional right” to trial by jury,
which is not “personal property.” Id. at 37a.

This conclusion not only defies common sense,
but also is preempted by the FAA, because the rea-
soning would not apply to any agreement other than
an agreement to arbitrate. In light of Kentucky's
long-standing recognition that causes of action are
personal property (see Button, 195 S.W.2¢ at 69), it
is unthinkable that Kentucky courts would interpret
the phrase “contracts * ** in relation to * * * per-
sonal property” to exclude any other kind of agrec-
ment relating to an individual's legal claims. See Pet.
App. 85a (Abramson, J., dissenting); cf. Logan vy.
Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 428 (1982)
(recognizing “that a cause of action is a species of
property protected by the Fourteenth Amendment's
Due Process Clause”) (citing Mullane v. Central
Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313
(1950)). In short, the decision below impermissibly
discriminated against arbitration in its treatment of
both the Clark and Wellner powers of attorney.

24

2. The Explicit-Reference Rule Cannot Be
Salvaged By The Kentucky Court’s Refer-
ence To “Fundamental Constitutional
Rights.”

Similarly unavailing is the majority's rationale
that its explicit-reference rule does not disfavor arbi-
tration because the rule applies to all “fundamental
constitutional rights.” Pet. App. 48a. That rationale
falters for several reasons.

First, the majority's own reasoning does not ap-
ply to all constitutional rights, but rather singles out
only those rights that are inherently affected by arbi-
tration agreements. The majority describes the right
to a jury trial as the one and only “sacred” constitu-
tional right in Kentucky. Pet. App. 43a (“[T]he draft-
ers of our Constitution deemed the right to a jury
trial * * * and that right alone as a divine God-given
right.” (emphasis added)). There is nothing in the
majority opinion to suggest that its reasoning would
apply to any waiver of a constitutional right other
than the right to a jury trial—which is “the one right
that just happens to be correlative to the right to ar-
bitrate.” Id. at 95a (Abramson, J., dissenting) (em-
phasis omitted).®

® The dissent also explained in detail that, as a matter of Ken-
tucky law and history, the majority's elevation of the right to a
Jury trial to sacrosanct status is substantially overstated in civil
cases like this one. Rather, “the ‘sacredness’ of the jury-trial
guarantee had much more to do with the protection it afforded
criminal defendants” in felony cases, not civil plaintiffs. Pet.
App. 89a-90a n.26 (Abramson, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
The dissent further noted that as a matter of Kentucky prac-
tice, the right to a jury trial in civil cases is waived by default—
a litigant must file a timely written notice demanding a jury
trial to preserve the right—further undermining the majority's

25

In Concepcion, moreover, this Court gave as an
example of a preempted state law one that would
classify as unconscionable an arbitration agreement
that “disallow[s] an ultimate disposition by a jury.”
563 U.S. at 342. The Court thus recognized that
foregoing a jury trial in favor of informal dispute res-
olution is an inherent feature of arbitration. As the
dissent below summarized, the FAA and this Court’s
precedents preclude courts from “either disfavoring
arbitration directly under state law, or disfavoring it
indirectly by favoring its correlative opposite—a ju-
dicial trial.” Pet. App. 89a (Abramson, J., dissenting).

The other rights under the Kentucky Constitu-
tion principally relied upon by the majority to justify
its explicit-reference rule also fall within the catego-
ry of such “rights” inherently affected by arbitration
agreements. According to the majority, “[t]he need
for specificity” in a power of attorney “is all the more
important when the affected fundamental rights in-
clude the right of access to the courts (Ky. Const.
§ 14) [and] the right of appeal to a higher court (Ky.
Const. § 115).” Pet. App. 41a. The absence of these
judicial procedures are—like the absence of a jury
trial—also inherent characteristics of arbitration.

By contrast, Kentucky's Constitution includes
other protections as to which an explicit authoriza-
tion is not required. For example, the Kentucky Con-
stitution confers the “inherent and alienable right{]
* * * of acquiring and protecting property” (Ky. Const.
§ 1) and guarantees that no law shall be enacted
“impairing the obligation of contracts” (id. § 19). Yet
as Justice Abramson explained, attorneys-in-fact in

elevation of that right “to a heretofore unrecognized status.” Jd.
at 98a-99a.

26

Kentucky “routinely exercise, compromise, and waive
fundamental constitutional rights on behalf of their
principals”—-such as the right to acquire and dispose
of property. Pet. App. 93a (Abramson, J., dissenting).

The majority’s opinion likewise does not indicate
that explicit authorization is necessary to confer the
authority to enter into a forum selection clause—and
we are aware of no other Kentucky decision so hold-
ing—even though such clauses may waive a party's
constitutional due process rights by selecting a forum
in which that party would otherwise not be subject to
personal jurisdiction. See, e.g., International Shoe
Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (“[D]ue
process requires” that, in order to subject a defend-
ant to personal jurisdiction in a forum, the defendant
must “have certain minimum contacts with it such
that the maintenance of the suit does not offend ‘tra-
ditional notions of fair play and substantial jus-
tice.”).

Thus, there is no evidence that generally-
applicable principles of Kentucky law require powers
of attorney to make explicit reference to the authori-
ty to affect or waive any of the principal’s constitu-
tional rights. That should “lead [this Court] to con-
clude that the [Kentucky] court’s” explicit-reference
rule “is unique” and “restricted to thfe] field” of arbi-
tration. Imburgia, 136 S. Ct. at 469.7

7 It is also telling—and entirely consistent with this Court's
precedents—-that federal circuit courts have repeatedly rejected
arguments that a heightened standard requiring a “knowing
and voluntary” waiver of the Seventh Amendment right to a ju-
ry should apply to the enforcement of an arbitration agreement.
As the Fourth Circuit put it, “[c]lommon senae dictates that we
reject” the argument that a plaintiff “could not have knowingly

27

Second, and relatedly, the majority “ma[d]e plain
the hostility to arbitration” that underlies its holding
(Pet. App. 97a (Abramson, J., dissenting)) when it
justified its explicit-reference rule by comparing ar-
bitration agreements—-favored under federal law—to
binding the principal to “personal servitude”; termi-
nating “the principal’s parental rights”; “put/ting]
her child up for adoption”; or stripping the principal
of her “right to worship freely” (Pet. App. 42a).

These inflammatory and unsupportable analo-
gies reflect precisely the type of hostility to arbitra-
tion as a means of dispute resolution that this Court
has repeatedly declared out of bounds under the
FAA. As the Court emphasized over three decades
ago, “we are well past the time when judicial suspi-
cion of the desirability of arbitration and the compe-
tence of arbitral tribunals inhibited the development
of arbitration as an alternative means of dispute res-
olution.” Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler—

and voluntarily waived her Seventh Amendment rights to a ju-
ry trial” because the “loss of the right to a jury trial ie a neces-
sary and fairly obvious consequence of an agreement to arbi-
trate.” Snowden v. CheckPoint Check Cashing, 290 F.3d 631,
638 (4th Cir, 2002) (citation omitted); see also, e.g., IFC Credit
Corp. v. United Bus. & Indus. Fed. Credit Union, 512 F.3d 989,
994 (7th Cir. 2008) (“[A]n agreement to arbitrate * * * surren-
ders not only a jury trial but also the right to a judicial forum],]
[yet] [cjourts do not impose special negotiation requirements on
arbitration clauses in form contracts.”); Caley v. Gulfstream
Aerospace Corp., 428 F.3d 1359, 1370-73 (Lith Cir. 2006) (ex-
plicitly rejecting a “knowing and voluntary” requirement for the
waiver of jury trial rights pursuant to an arbitration agree-
ment); Cooper v. MRM Inv. Co., 367 F.3d 493, 506 (6th Cir.
2004) (same); Am. Heritage Life Ins. Co. v. Orr, 294 F.3d 702,
711 (5th Cir. 2002) (“[B]ly agreeing to arbitration, Appellants
have necessarily waived * * * their right to a judicial forum;
and * * * their corresponding right to a jury trial.”).

28

Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 626-27 (1985); see also,
e.g., 14 Penn Plaza, 556 U.S. at 266-67 (“reliance on
* * * overt hostility to the enforcement of arbitration
agreements would be ill-advised”); Gilmer v. Inter-
state/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 30 (1991)
(“generalized attacks on arbitration [that] rest on
suspicion of arbitration” as a means of dispute reso-
lution are “far out of step with our current strong
endorsement of the federal statutes favoring this
method of resolving disputes”) (quotation marks and
alterations omitted); Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v.
McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 231-32 (1987) (“it is difficult
to reconcile” earlier decisions’ “mistruct of the arbi-
tral process with this Court’s subsequent decisions
involving the [Federal] Arbitration Act”).

Third, even if the majority's explicit-reference
rule genuinely did apply to such constitutional rights
as the right to “worship freely” or the right against
involuntary “personal servitude”—rather than being
a concocted, post-hoc hypothetical—the majority’s
protestations of neutrality would still rest on a false
equivalence. The majority’ fanciful examples de-
scribe “rights that an ordinary attorney-in-fact is
rarely, if ever, asked to address on the principal’s
behalf.” Jd. at 97a (Abramson, J., dissenting). By
contrast, arbitration agreements “are commonplace.”
Ibid. Thus, as Justice Abramson summarized, “the
application of [the explicit-reference] rule will clearly
have a disproportionate effect on the ability of agents
to enter arbitration agreements (as opposed to other
contracts).” Jd. at 98a. This “disproportionate impact”

29

is impermissible under the FAA. Concepcion, 563
U.S. at 342.8

C. Upholding The Decision Below Would
Enable States To Impose Numerous Dis-
criminatory Burdens On The Enforce-
ment Of Arbitration Agreements.

If invoking the right to a jury trial or access to a
court could provide sufficient grounds to subject arbi-
tration agreements to legal! rules not applicable to
other contracts, States would be free to discriminate
against arbitration in countless ways—even though
decades of this Court’s precedents hold the exact op-
posite.

For example, the Montana statute at issue in
Casarotto declared arbitration agreements unen-
forceable unless “[n]otice that [the] contract is sub-
ject to arbitration” is “typed in underlined capital let-
ters on the first page of the contract” (Mont. Code
Ann. § 27-5-114(4)). If the decision below were af-
firmed, Montana could simply revise that law to re-
place the word “arbitration” with the term “waiver of

8 For the reasons just discussed, every federal district judge in
Kentucky that has addressed the question has held that the
state-law rule announced by the decision below is wholly irrec-
oncilable with this Court’s precedents and therefore preempted
by the FAA. See Preferred Care of Delaware, Inc. v. Hopkins,
2016 WL 3646407, at *2-4 (W.D. Ky. June 23, 2016); Branden-
burg Health Facilities, LP v. Mattingly, 2016 WL 3448733, at *4
& n.3 (W.D. Ky. June 20, 2016); Pine Tree Villa, LLC v. Coulter,
2016 WL 3030185, at *3 n.1 (W.D. Ky. May 25, 2016); Owensbo-
ro Health Facilities, L.P. v. Henderson, 2016 WL 2853569, at *4
(W.D. Ky. May 13, 2016); Riney v. GGNSC Louisville St. Mat-
thews, LLC, 2016 WL 2853568, at *3 (W.D. Ky. May 13, 2016);
GGNSC Louisville Hillcreek, LLC v. Watkins, 2016 WL 815295,
at *5 n.3 (W.D. Ky. Feb. 29, 2016).

30

a jury trial” in order to invoke the constitutional
right relied upon by the Kentucky court here. Yet
that revised statute would be no different than the
special notice rule this Court held preempted two
decades ago. See 517 U.S. at 683, 687-88.

And endorsing the rationale below would open
the door to discriminatory state laws far more bur-
densome than notice requirements. For example,
without ever mentioning the word “arbitration,”
States could ban predispute waivers of a jury trial or
access to a judicial forum—perhaps invoking the the-
ory that a party will not appreciate the importance of
such rights until after a dispute has arisen (and
knowing full well that a plaintiff who has already
brought a lawsuit in court is not likely to agree ex
post tw arbitrate his claims). That would invalidate
all predispute arbitration agreements.

Applying the fig leaf of referring to waivers of ju-
ry trials or access to courts does not change the sub-
stance of such an anti-arbitration rule. “The ‘goals
and policies’ of the FAA *** are antithetical to
threshold limitations placed specifically and solely on
arbitration provisions.” Casarotto, 517 U.S. at 688
(quoting Southland, 465 U.S. at 10).

In short, the Kentucky court cannot avoid the
preemptive force of the FAA simply by
recharacterizing its heightened explicit-reference re-
quirement as one that is not trained on arbitration
but instead is targeted towards rights (like the waiv-
er of a jury trial and access to courts) that are fun-
damental characteristics of arbitration.

31

Ill. The FAA Applies To The Question Of Con-
tract Enforceability Presented Here.

Unable to show that the decision below comports
with the FAA, respondents at the petition stage ar-
gued that the FAA does not apply here at all (see
Opp. 16)—a position that even the majority below
did not endorse. See Pet. App. 44a-48a (applying the
FAA). According to respondents, the FAA applies on-
ly to “dispute[s] regarding an arbitration agreement's
validity,” not to “dispute[s] as to whether an agree-
ment was ‘ever concluded.” Opp. 16 (quoting Buck-
eye, 546 U.S. at 444 n.1).

Respondents’ contention is mistaken for multiple
reasons. To begin with, there is no contract-
formation dispute here: each of the attorneys-in-fact
undisputedly entered into a written arbitration
agreement on behalf of her principal, and the ques-
tion is only whether those agreements should be en-
forced. That question is squarely governed by Section
2 of the FAA. See 9 U.S.C. § 2 (providing that written
agreements to arbitrate disputes are “enforceable,
save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity
for the revocation of any contract”); see also Pet. App.
100a (Noble, J., dissenting) (remarking that the ma-
jority’s elevation of the jury trial right and explicit
reference rule does not “actually affect[] the /for-
mation of a contract to arbitrate”).

In any event, parties cannot circumvent the FAA
by attempting to characterize discriminatory state-
law rules governing the enforceability of arbitration
agreements as rules of contract formation. Indeed,
this Court rejected an analogous attempt by the re-
spondents in Imburgia, who contended that the FAA
was inapplicable because the dispute there involved
the “threshold question of whether there’s an arbi-

32

tration agreement in the first place.” Tr. of Oral Arg.
at 30, Imburgia, 2015 WL 6552642, at *30; see al-
so id. at *41, 46-47.

This Court squarely rebuffed that attempt to lim-
it the FAA’s reach, recognizing that the question be-
fore it was whether the California court’s “interpreta-
tion of [the] contract *** is consistent with the
[FAA].” Imburgia, 136 S. Ct. at 468 (emphas-s add-
ed). It should do the same here.

Even if the issue here were genuinely one of con-
tract formation, that would still make no difference.
In Saturn Distribution Corp. v. Williams, 905 F.2d
719 (4th Cir. 1990), for example, the court consid-
ered—and squarely rejected—the argument “that the
scope of FAA preemption is limited to laws covering
existing arbitration agreements, and does not extend
to laws that prohibit or regulate the formation of ar-
bitration agreements.” Jd. at 723 (emphasis added).
Striking down a Virginia law “that prohibit[ed] au-
tomobile manufacturers and dealers from entering
into agreements that contain mandatory alternative
dispute resolution provisions,” the Saturn court ex-
plained that “[t]o restrict the FAA to existing agree-
ments would be to allow states to ‘wholly eviscerate
Congressional intent to place arbitration agreements
upon the same footing as other contracts.” Jd. at 722,
723 (quotation marks omitted); accord Sec. Indus.
Ass'n v. Connolly, 883 F.2d 1114, 1117 (1st Cir. 1989)
(holding that the FAA preempts state regulation re-
stricting securities firms from entering into future
arbitration agreements).

These holdings make sound practical sense: If re-
spondents were correct, a State could enact a law ex-
pressly forbidding attorneys-in-fact to enter into ar-
bitration agreements under any circumstances, or a

33

law providing that consumers lack the capacity to
enter into arbitration agreements unless they receive
prior court approval, and those laws would be im-
mune from federal scrutiny even if they blatantly
disfavor arbitration. The FAA’s protections cannot be
nullified simply by dressing up state-law hostility to
arbitration in the garb of “contract formation.”?

*In a supplemental brief filed at the petition stage, we ex-
plained why this case is not affected by a rule promulgated by
the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services that would pro-
hibit Medicare-participating skilled nursing facilities and Medi-
caid-participating nursing facilities from entering into new pre-
dispute arbitration agreements with residents at their facilities.
First, that rule applies only prospectively, to contracts entered
into after its November 28, 2016 effective date. Pet. Supp. Br. 1.
Second, the rule’sa validity is the subject of a pending lawsuit
and, in a decision rendered after the filing of the supplementa!
brief, the district court issued a preliminary injunction barring
enforcement of the rule, holding that the plaintiffs had shown a
substantial likelihood of success on the merits of their claims
that the rule violates the FAA and exceeds the agency s author-
ity. See Am. Health Care Ass'n v. Burwell, --- F. Supp. 3d ----,
2016 WL 6585295 (N.D. Miss. Nov. 7, 2016).

34

CONCLUSION

The judgment of the Kentucky Supreme Court
should be reversed.

Respectfully submitted.

ANDREW J. PINCUS
Counsel of Record

ARCHIS A. PARASHARAMI

DANIEL E. JONES
Mayer Brown LLP

\ 1999 K Street, NW
Washington, DC 20006
(202) 263-3000
apincus@mayerbrown.com

Counsel for Petitioners

DECEMBER 2016

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385016_0688%3A08. Public record. Not legal advice.
