# Amicus Curiae Brief — Ziglar v. Turkmen, 137 S. Ct. 292 (2016) (No. 15-1358) > Briefs, arguments, decisions, and more. URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385016_0663%3A19 ## Record - **Collection:** Supreme Court brief - **Document type:** Amicus Curiae Brief - **Published:** January 1, 2016 ## Text RECORD LED AND DEC 22 2016 GREFS OFFICE OF THE CLERK Nos. 15-1358, 15-1359 and 15-1363 In the Supreme Court of the United States 20+ JAMES W. ZIGLAR, Petitioner, Vv AHMER IQBAL ABBASI, et ai, Respondents. JOHN D. ASHCROFT, former Attorney General, ef ai., Petitioners, Ve AHMER IQBAL ABBASL et al., Respondents. _—_—— — oe = —_——- + DENNIS HASTY, ef ai. Petitioners, v. AHMER IQBAL ABBASI, et al, Respondents. ON WRITS OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT ————_—_—_—_—— BRIEF OF MEDICAL AND OTHER SCIENTIFIC AND HEALTH-RELATED PROFESSIONALS AS AMICI CURIAE IN SUPPORT OF RESPONDENTS AND AFFIRMANCE en | ERIC ORDWAY KAMI LIZARRAGA Counsel of Record GLENDA BLEIBERG WEIL, GOTSHAL & MANGES LLP ELIZABETH VELEZ Counsel for Amici Curiae JESSICA DIJILANI 767 Fifth Avenue JAY MINGA New York, New York 10153 ALEXANDRIA SWETTE (212) 310-8000 NIGAR SHAIKH eric.ordway@weil.com Of Counsel Ia TABLE OF CONTENTS Pave INTEREST OF AMICI CURIALG .............00..0.-......-0c0.0 1 BACKGROUND ....... a BM oek § peer an Seede att taints edanece 2 SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT .................0...........0....... 6 Ci Sy get re ON A en Ue GUUS eels Fin cay Res Aen! S l. The Medical and Other Scientific and Health-Related Literature Firmly Establishes that Solitary Confinement Causes Severe’ Psychological and SE OUINOTIE WUMNOIIND ogg mocoeccnividmsnenenanccocaneacs cnc. 8 A. Research Demonstrates that Solitary Confinement Causes Grave Psychological Damage ........ eu b. Research Additionally Demonstrates that Solitary Confinement Causes Serious Physiological Damage ..................06.- Sleep deprivation “greatly exacerbates the tendency to suffer psychiatric breakdown and become suicidall;]” “creates fatiguel,| and magnifies cognitive problems, memory deficits, confusion, anxiety, and sluggishness.” Kupers Expert Report, at 17. 24 ing, or whether he was trying to kill himself.” 7d. 182. Many studies also show that sensory depriva- tion during solitary confinement has corrosive effects on brain functioning. Sourcebook, at 19-20. Re- searchers have used _ electroencephalograms (“EEGs”), which record electrical activity in the brain, to study isolated prisoners’ brain waves. Grassian, Psychiatric Effects, at 330-31. These tests reveal that “even a few days of solitary confinement will predictably shift the [EEG] pattern toward an abnormal pattern characteristic of stupor and deliri- um.” /d. Canadian studies recorded similar results among isolated prisoners, who exhibited a “slowing of EEG [and] alpha frequency.” G.D. Scott et al., Changes in EEG Alpha Frequency & Evoked Re- sponse Latency During Solitary Confinement, 79 J. of Abnormal Psych., 54, 54 (1972). Lethargic condi- tions have been described by researchers in connec- tion with “a complete breakdown or disintegration of the identity of the isolated individual.” Smith, Effects of Solitary, at 492. Further, studies strongly suggest that solitary confinement can fundamentally alter the structure of the human brain in profound and permanent ways.® 6 While direct studies of the impact of solitary confine ment on prisoners’ brains have not been possible due to experimental challenges, evidence from human and animal studies inform an understanding of the brain mechanisms that underlie the observed symptoms in prisoners who have been isolated for protracted periods. See ACLU, /0tin~ Paper? The Dangerous Overuse of Solitary Confinement in the United States, 6 (Aug. 2014), 25 Dr. Huda Akil, a neuroscientist and specialist in the effects of emotions and stress on brain structure and function, reports that each key characteristic of solitary confinement—lack of physical activity, meaningful interaction with others and the natural world, and visual! stimulation—‘is by itself sufficient to change the brain... dramatically, depending on whether it lasts briefly or is extended,” even just for days. Kate Allen, Aesearchers Study Effects of Prolonged Isolation Among Prisoners, The Toronto Star (Feb. 14, 2014), https://www.thestar.com/ news/world/2014/02/14/researchers_study_effects_of prolonged_isolation_among_prisoners.html. Dr. Akil has summarized many neurobiologi- cal studies that reveal that certain regions of the brain of people who experience extreme psychological stress (like those in solitary confinement) literally diminish in volume because the neural cells become shriveled. See ACLU, /iiiciing Paper, at 6. Dr. Akil’s research aligns with decades of experimental studies on mammals demonstrating the neurological harms of isolation and sensory deprivation. ACLU, Briefing Paper, at 6. For example, a study at the University of California- Berkeley showed that rats in supermax:style cells had fewer neurological connec- tions and thinner cerebral cortexes--the brain’s “grey matter” that controls perception, language, planning, movement, and social cues. /d. https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/assets/stop_solitar y_briefing_paper_updated_august_2014.pdf (““ACLU, Bracting Paper’). 26 This neurological damage, and other physio- logical harms inflicted by solitary confinement can be long-lasting, even permanent. Several studies conclude that the decline in brain activity that occurs in solitary confinement, as confirmed by EEGs, can be irreversible if isolation is prolonged, as it was in this case. Sourcebook, at 20; see also Grassian, Psychiatric Effects, at 325. Various international bodies have stressed that “all forms of solitary con- finement without appropriate mental or physical stimulation are likely in the long term to have dam- aging effects.” European Committee for the Preven- tion of Torture & Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Rep. to the Gov't of Denmark on the visit to Denmark carried out by the CPT, from Jan. 28-Feb. 4, 2002, 20 (Sept. 25, 2002), http://www.cpt. coe.int/documents/dnk/2002-18-inf-eng.pdf; see also WHO, Prisons & Health, at 31. In sum, notwithstanding the pervasive use of solitary confinement in the United States, the con- sensus among experts is that solitary confinement, as imposed on Respondents in this case, inflicts serious and often long-lasting physiological harm. Il. International Legal Standards and the Laws of Other Countries Prohibit the Imposition of Solitary Confinement Un- der the Circumstances of This Case International law has long prohibited the cruel and inhuman treatment of prisoners, including in the 1948 United Nations (“U.N.”) Universal Declara- tion of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A(IIIT) (Dec. 10, 1948) (““UDHR”); the 1976 U.N. International Cove- nant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 27 2200A(XX]) (Mar. 23, 1976) (““ICCPR”); and the 1984 U.N. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punish- ment, G.A. Res. 39/46 (Dec. 10, 1984) (“CAT”). Moreover, international bodies recognize that soli- tary confinement qualifies as cruel and inhuman treatment unless applied in strictly limited circum- stances and for a strictly limited duration. The Mandela Rules, as well as the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights “OHCHR”) Manu- al on the Effective Investigation & Documentation of Torture & Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (1999) (“Istanbul Proto- col”), embody the recent iterations of these well- settled international law principles. These stand- ards for the use of solitary confinement likewise are reflected in the laws of many countries. Under such standards, the use of solitary con- finement was impermissible in this case because it was (i) based on religion or race, (ii) based on the pretext of immigration violations, and (iii) used as a measure of first, not last, resort. Moreover, even if the use of solitary confinement had been justified— which it was not—the indefinite, prolonged duration and extreme conditions endured by Respondents likewise violated international laws. Since World War II, international conventions have prohibited cruel and inhuman treatment, as well as torture. In 1948, the UDHR dictated that “Injo one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment.” UDHR art. 5. The 1976 ICCPR and the CAT—to which the United States is a party—contain identical prohibitions. See 28 ICCPR art. 7; CAT art. 2 (“Each State Party shall take effective legislative, administrative, judicial or other measures to prevent acts of torture in any territory under its jurisdiction. No exceptional circumstances whatsoever, whether a state of war or a threat of war, internal political instability or any other public emergency, may be invoked as a justifi- cation of torture.”). “Torture” and “cruel and inhuman treatment” both refer to “the infliction of ‘severe physical or mental pain or suffering.” Int’l Comm. of Red Cross, Customary IHL - Rule 90, Torture & Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment, 1, https://ihl- databases.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v1_rul_rul e90. Torture, however, additionally, is inflicted or justified for “a specific purpose,” like “obtaining... information or a confession” or “any reason based on discrimination of any kind.” Jd. at 2; CAT art. 1. Both of those purposes motivated the imposition of solitary confinement in this case. Compl. {4 1, 61, 77. Human rights bodies applying these interna- tional laws “have found violations of the prohibition of inhuman treatment” in cases of solitary confine- ment, particularly when prolonged and extreme, as occurred in this case. Customary IHL - Rule 90 at 2. For example, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights “IACHR’”) held that “prolonged isolation and deprivation of communications are in themselves cruel and inhuman treatment” because they are “harmful to the psychological and moral integrity of [a] person” and violate “inherent dignity as a human being.” Velasquez-Rodriguez v. Honduras, Inter-Am. 29 Ct. H.R. (ser. C), No. 4, 9 156 (July 29, 1988). The European Court of Human Rights has found that “complete sensory isolation, coupled with total social isolation, can destroy the personality” and thus “constitutes a form of inhuman treatment” in viola- tion of international law. J/lascu v. Moldova & Rus- sia, Application No. 48787/99, Eur. Ct. of H.R. (2004). The international prohibition on extreme, pro- longed solitary confinement was restated most recently in the U.N.’s 2015 Mandela Rules. These “minimum standards” for “detention of prisoners” require that “all prisoners shall be protected from|] torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, for which no circumstanc- es whatsoever may be invoked as a justification.” Mandela Rules at 1 (emphasis added). The Mandela Rules squarely prohibit “solitary confinement” as “amountling| to torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment’—unless im- posed under strictly limited circumstances. /d. at 43. Under these international standards, Re- spondents’ placement in solitary confinement for any duration was illegal, first because solitary confine- ment cannot be imposed based on race or religion. In 1969, the International Convention on the Elimina- tion of All Forms of Racial Discrimination “con- demnfed] racial discrimination” and guaranteed “It]he right to equal treatment before the tribunals and all other organs administering justice.” See G.A. Res. 2106, Int’] Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, art. 2(1), 5(a) (Jan. 4, 1969). The U.N.’s prior version of the Standard 30 Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners in place in 2001-2002, required that standards for incarceration “be applied impartially.”. U.N. Con- gress on the Prevention of Crime & the Treatment of Offenders, Standard Minimum Rules tor the Treat- ment of Prisoners at 6 (May 13, 1977) (“1977 U.N. Rules”). Thus, “[t]here shall be no discrimination on grounds of race, .. . religion ... national or social origin, ... or other status.” /d. This rule applied equally to “all categories of prisoners, criminal or civil, untried or convicted, including prisoners sub- ject to ‘security measures’... .” 1977 U.N. Rules at 4(1). The current Mandela Rules likewise dictate that “[t]here shall be no discrimination” in the appli- cation of prison standards “on the grounds of race, . . . religion, .. . [or] national or social origin.” Mandela Rules at 2. Yonsistent with this international legal stand- ard, many other countries prohibit the discriminato- ry treatment of prisoners based on their religion or race. See, e.g., Law No. 24.660, July 8, 1996 (Ley de Eyecucion de la Pena Privativa de la Libertad n° 24.660), Argentina (requiring that rules governing prison sentences be applied without discrimination based on race, religion, or other circumstances); Fundamental Law of Hungary (2011), art. XV(2) (guaranteeing fundamental rights, including to Hungarian prisoners, without discrimination based on race or religion); Canadian Charter of Rights & Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982 § 15 (providing equal protection and banning religious discrimination); Racial Discrimination Act 1975 (CTH) s 10, Australia (providing people of any “race, colour or national or ethnic origin” the right to 31 equality before the law); Jones v Scully (2002) 120 FCR 243, [111-113] (holding that ethno-religious groups, such as Muslims, constitute protected groups under the Racial Discrimination Act); Naen v Minis- ter for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs |2003] FCA 216, [72] (same). Yet, here, the Respondents were placed in iso- lated confinement precisely because of their religion and faced religious discrimination throughout deten- tion. Respondents were routinely physically and verbally accosted for being Muslim, and were con- sistently deprived of the ability to observe their faith. See Compl. 44 66, 103, 109, 117, 131-39. For exam- ple, the Respondents were denied access to the Koran, religiously appropriate food, and the means to maintain their daily prayer requirements. /d. 4] 128, 132-39, 261. Indeed, the Respondents were often punished for praying. For instance, one re- ceived an incident report for refusing to stand up for count during prayer, while others were unable to obtain razors or hygienic supplies (which guards purposely passed out during prayer times). /d. 4/4] 135, 138. International law further articulates that dis- criminatory treatment will not be excused even in a time of national emergency, like September 11th. The ICCPR, which prohibits inhuman treatment, provides that “[iJn time of public emergency” a state may “derogatele| [its] obligations under the present Covenant to the extent strictly required by the exigencies of the situation, provided that such measures .. . do not involve discrimination solely on 32 the ground of race, . . . religion or social origin.”’ ICCPR art. 4(1) (emphasis added); accord U.N. Human Rights Comm., General Comment No. 29, States of Emergency (Article 4) § 8 U.N. Doc. No. CCPR/C/21/Rev. 1/Add.11 (Aug. 31, 2001). Additionally, while the government in this case used the pretext of immigration violations to detain Respondents, international legal standards forbid the imposition of solitary confinement on that basis as well. “|I|mmigration detention, and condi- tions and treatment of detained migrants, [must] comply with international human rights law.” U.N. OHCHR Opening Remarks on “Human Rights of Migrants in Detention Centres,” 12th Sess., H.R. Council (Sept. 19, 2009). Under international hu- man rights law, “[administrative] detention of mi- grants on the grounds of their irregular status should under no circumstances be of a punitive nature.” Francois Crépeau, Rep. of Special Rappor- teur on Human Rights of Migrants 4 31, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/20/24 (Apr. 2, 2012). Thus, immigrants in detention “should not be subject” to “highly restricted movement, lack of outdoor recreation and lack of contact visitation”’—all of which occurred in the extreme solitary confinement at issue here. /d. The U.N.’s principles on arbitrary detention similarly require that a detained immigrant “must have the possibility, while in custody, of communicating with the outside world” and “must be informed of . . . any 7 In accordance with this international principle, China forbids discrimination based on religion or territory even in cases involving terrorism. Anti-Terrorism Law of People’s Republic of China, art. 6 (2016). 33 possibility of his or her being held incommunicado, as well as of the guarantees accompanying such a measure.” OHCHR, Rep. of the Working Grp. on Arbitrary Detention, Civ. & Pol. Rights, Annex II, Principles 1-5, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2000/4 (Dec. 28, 1999). The placement of detained immigrants into solitary confinement violates these principles. The OHCHR recently reiterated that interna- tional law prohibits prolonged solitary confinement for immigrant detainees, even if based on suspicion of terrorism. “|T|he use of ‘administrative detention’ under public security legislation [or] migration laws... resulting in [the] deprivation of liberty for unlimited time or for very long periods without effective judicial oversight, as a means to detain persons suspected of involvement in terrorism or other crimes, is not compatible with international human rights law.” OHCHR, Compilation of Delib- erations of Working Grp. On Arbitrary Detention, Delib. No. 9, 4 73, U.N. Doc. No. A/HRC/22/44 (Dec. 24, 2012). The OHCHR observed that such “admin- istrative detention is particularly worrying as _ it 8 Consistent with these international legal principles, Argentina forbids the use of solitary confinement as punishment for violations of immigration laws. Law No. 25.871, Jan. 20, 2004 (Ley de Ejecucién de la Pena Priva- tiva de la Libertad N° 25.8714), art. 82 & L. N° 25.871, art. 70, Argentina. Recognizing that immigration deten- tion should not be punitive, England and Wales prohibit “special accommodation” (i.e., solitary confinement) for punishment, except as a “temporarly]” measure for as long as a detainee is “refractory or violent.” The Deten- tion Centre Rules, 2001 SI 2001/238, Rule 42(1), England and Wales (“Detention Centre Rules”). 34 increases the likelihood of solitary confinement, acts of torture and other forms of ill-treatment”— precisely what occurred in this case.? Z/d. Additionally, the imposition of solitary con- finement was unlawful in this case because it was used as a measure of first resort. International law requires that solitary confinement be used only “as a last resort.” Mandela Rules at 45(1). In other words, solitary confinement “shall not be imposed by virtue of a prisoner’s sentence” in the first instance. /d.; see also G.A. Res. 45/111, Principle 7 (Dec. 14, 1990). Instead, international law contemplates the limited use of “{[p]unishment by close confinement” solely as a “disciplinjary|” measure for prisoners who break prison rules. 1977 U.N. Rules at 32(1). Many countries apply this same “last resort” principle by refusing to impose solitary confinement as part of an initial sentence and permitting it solely based on some additional, enumerated factor arising after the individual is detained. See, e.g., Detention ‘entre Rules, at 40, 42 (imposing isolation only to control violent behavior or in interest of security or safety); Prison Act of 16 March 1976, amended by * Indeed, the Istanbul Protocol specifically includes among its “list of torture methods” solitary confinement and the accompanying conditions that were imposed in this case, such as “a small or overcrowded cell..., exposure to extremes of temperature, denial of privacy... (djeprivation of normal sensory stimulation ..., abuse of physiological needs, restriction of sleep, food, water, toilet facilities, bathing, motor activities, medical care, social contacts .. . [and] loss of contact with the outside world.” Istanbul Protocol 4 145(m)-(n) (2004). 35 art. 7, Act of 25.04.2013 §§ 88-89, Germany (allowing isolation based on additional factors such as prison: er’s behavior, mental state, danger of escape or violent attack, or danger of suicide or self-harm); Australian Human Rights Commission, Auman rights standards for immigration detention, § 3.7 (2013) (Australian Human Rights Standards”) (same); Ordinance for Treatment of Detainees, art. 18 (981), Japan (same); Imprisonment Act (767/2005), “Vankeuslaki” (“Finland Imprisonment Act”) Ch. 18, Finland (permitting isolation only to prevent harm to prisoner or others, escape, drug use, drug-related offenses, or similar situations); Prison Rules 2007 (SI252/2007), Rules 62-64, Ireland (bas- ing isolation on factors such as whether individual is at “imminent” risk of harming himself); Lrish Prison Act (2007), part 3 (allowing isolation for violating prison disciplinary code); Anhalteordnung Detention Regulation [BGBI. II Nr.] No. 128/1999, as amended, BGBI. II Nr. 439/2005, § 5, Austria (basing solitary confinement on factors such as violence against other inmates, risk of infection, or disruption); Ogiamien v. Ontario, 2016 ONSC 3080 (Canada); &. v. Hamm, 2016 ABQB 440 (Canada) (finding segregation illegal when lacking rational explanation or where peniten- tiary did not establish absence of viable alternative): Bacon v. Surrey Pretrial Services Centre, 2010 BCSC 805 (Canada) (same); Grenier v. R., 2004 FC 132 (same); Cireulaire du 14 avril 2011 relative au placement a lisolement des personnes détenues NOR: JUSK1140023C, France (allowing isolation only when impossible to otherwise protect detainees or facility); Australian Human Rights Standards § 3.7 (providing for isolation as a last resort and where necessary to avoid scrious and imminent 36 threat of self-harm, injury, or destruction of proper- ty). Furthermore, the immediate use of isolation was particularly troubling in this case because Respondents had not been convicted or even charged with a crime. _ International law recognizes that “lsjolitary confinement of unconvicted individuals .. . is potentially harmful” because it can “coerce the detainees and force them to self-incriminate or to provide any type of information.” Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Rep. on the Use of Pretrial Detention in the Americas, Doc. 46/13, OEA/Ser.L/V/ILL., 4 280, (2013); see also Méndez 2011 Report 4 73 (“When solitary confinement is used intentionally during pretrial detention as a _ tech- nique for the purpose of obtaining information or a confession, it amounts to torture ... or to cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment”). !° Even if the use of solitary confinement could have been justified in this case, its duration was unjustifiable and violated international legal stand- ards. International law prohibits “[i]ndefinite” and ‘ See also Essex paper 3- Initial guidance on the interpre- tation & implementation of the Nelson Mandela Rules, Ch. 5. Restrictions, discipline & sanctions, U. of Essex- Human Rights Centre, at 13 (Apr. 2016) (solitary con- finement may not be used “intentionally for purposes such as punishment, intimidation, coercion or obtaining infor- mation or a confession, or for any reason based on dis- crimination” (quoting Juan E. Méndez, Interim Report of the Special Rapporteur on Torture & Other Cruel, Inhu- man or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, 4 60, U.N. Doc. A/68/295 (Oct. 7, 2013))). 37 “|p}rolonged” solitary confinement as “amount{[ing] to torture or other cruel, inhuman, or degrading treat- ment or punishment.” Mandela Rules at 43. As explained by the Special Rapporteur, “[t]he feeling of uncertainty when not informed of the length of solitary confinement exacerbates the pain and suffer- ing of the individuals who are subjected to it.” Méndez 2011 Report 4 59. And, “the longer the duration of solitary confinement .. . the greater the risk of serious and irreparable harm.” Id. 4 58. International law defines prolonged solitary con- finement as “a time period in excess of 15 consecutive days,” a limit far exceeded in this case. Mandela Rules at 44.1! The extreme isolation and sensory deprivation imposed on Respondents likewise violated interna- tional standards for the conditions of solitary con- finement. International law forbids placement in a '' Similarly recognizing the pain and suffering inflicted by prolonged solitary confinement, many countries limit its duration to relatively short time periods. See, e.g. Detention Centre Rules, at Rule 40(3) (capping isolation for immigration detainees at 24 hours, with extension to three days, upon authorization from Secretary of State); Finland Imprisonment Act, Ch. 15 § 8 (10-day cap, after which prisoner cannot be isolated again for seven days): Correctional Services Act 1982 (SA) s 36(3), Australia (30- day cap); Prisons Act 1981 (WA) s 43(1) (same); Corrective Services Act 2006 (QLD) s 53(2) (same); Corrections Management Act 2007 (ACT) s 90(8) (same); Law of the People’s Republic of China on Administration of Embar- kation and Disembarkation, arts. 59-60 (2013) (30-day cap, with extension to a maximum of 60 days upon addi- tional approval). 38 “constantly lit cell,” as occurred in this case, as “inhuman” treatment. Mandela Rules at 43(1). Moreover, under the 1977 U.N. Rules in place in 2001-2002, prisoners must be allowed regular com- munication with family and “reasonable facilities to communicate with the diplomatic and consular representatives of [their] State.” 1977 U.N. Rules at 37-38(1); Mandela Rules at 62. “{U]ntried prison- er[s]” must be allowed “visits from [] legal advis- er[s].". 1977 U.N. Rules at 93; Mandela Rules at 6l(a).'2 Thus, the complete social isolation and communications blackout used in this case likewise was in violation of international law. CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, and the reasons set forth in Respondents’ brief and in the other amicus briefs filed in support of Respondents, Amici respectfully submit that this Court affirm the Second Circuit’s decision and permit Respondents to litigate their constitutional challenges to the punitive treatment they suffered in solitary confinement. '2 Other countries similarly regulate the conditions of solitary confinement to moderate the degree of social isolation and sensory deprivation. See, eg., Finland Imprisonment Act, Ch. 15 § 8 (permitting inmates in isolation to keep their possessions and receive visitors); Id. at Ch. 11, § 3 (guaranteeing Finnish prisoners the right to religious observance); Corrective Services Regula- tion 2006 (QLD) § 5, Australia (guaranteeing isolated prisoners access to personal items, appropriate clothing, and reticulated water, and exercise in fresh air). December 22, 2016 39 Respectfully submitted, ERIC ORDWAY Counsel of Record KAMI LIZARRAGA GLENDA BLEIBERG ELIZABETH VELEZ JESSICA DJILANI JAY MINGA ALEXANDRIA SWETTE NIGAR SHAIKH WEIL, GOTSHAL & MANGES LLP 767 Fifth Avenue New York, NY 10153 (212) 310-8000 eric.ordway@weil.com Counsel for Amici Curiae APPIENDIX APPENDIX A Amici curiae are the following nineteen indi- viduals: 3, Huda Akil, Ph.D., is a Gardner Quarton Distinguished University Professor of Neuroscience and Psychiatry and Co-Director and Senior Research Professor of the Molecular and Behavioral Neurosci- ence Institute at the University of Michigan. Re- search in Dr. Akil’s laboratory is focused on under- standing the neurobiology of emotions, including pain, anxiety, and depression. Dr. Akil also served as a past President of the Society for Neuroscience, the largest neuroscience organization in the world, and has been elected a member of the National Academy of Sciences. 2. Scott Allen, M.D., F.A.C.P., is a Profes- sor of Medicine and Vice Chair of the Clinical Divi- sion at the University of California, Riverside. He also is the co-founder and co-director of the Center for Prisoner Health and Human Rights at The Miri- am Hospital. He serves as medical advisor to Physi- cians for Human Rights (“PHR”) on its work to stop torture and was lead medical author of PHR’s re- ports “Experiments in Torture,” “Aiding Torture,” and “Leave No Marks.” He served seven years as a full-time physician for the Rhode Island Department of Corrections, acting as the department’s medical program supervisor between 2001 and 2004. 3. Bradley Brockmann, Esq. is the Execu- tive Director for the Center for Prisoner Health and Human Rights at The Miriam Hospital. The Center is affiliated with Brown University and raises 2a awareness at the national and state level about healthcare issues and other justice-involved popula- tions. He designs and teaches courses focused on Prisoner Health at the School of Public Health at Brown University. Mr. Brockman also worked as a civil rights attorney with Prisoners’ Legal Services of Massachusetts. 4. Robert L. Cohen, M.D., is a clinical instructor at the New York University School of Medicine. He has been appointed numerous times by federal courts and the Department of Justice to monitor health care in U.S. prisons. Dr. Cohen’s recent presentations address the impact of solitary confinement on prisoner health, the health care of detained immigrants, and protection of the civil rights of detained persons. 5. Stefan Enggist is a Senior Project Manager in Switzerland’s Federal Office of Public Health. Previously, he was the Technical Officer of Health in Prisons at the World Health Organiza- tion’s Regional Office for Europe in Copenhagen, Denmark. 6. Joe Goldenson, M.D., is a physician who served as the Director and Medical Director for Jail Health Services for the San Francisco Department of Public Health for twenty-eight years. Dr. Goldenson also served as Assistant Clinical Professor at the University of California, San Francisco from 1980 to 2015, and has worked extensively as a correctional health medical expert and court monitor of inmate medical care in U.S. jails. He also served as a medi- cal expert and monitor retained by federal district courts in various cases. Mr. Goldenson is the Ameri- 3a can Public Health Association’s representative to the Board of the National Commission on Correctional Health Care (““NCCHC”). A Stuart Grassian, M.D., is a psychiatrist who taught at Harvard Medical School for almost thirty years. He has numerous publications and extensive experience evaluating the psychiatric effects of stringent conditions of confinement, includ- ing the psychiatric syndrome resulting from depriva- tion of social, perceptual, and occupational stimula- tion in solitary confinement. 8. Craig Haney, Ph.D., is a social psy- chologist and Distinguished Professor of Psychology at the University of California, Santa Cruz (“UCSC”). Dr. Haney is also the Director of the program in Legal Studies at UCSC and the UCSC Presidential Chair. Dr. Haney is noted for his numerous publica- tions, including five books, and his work on the study of the psychological impact of solitary confinement and prison isolation. Dr. Haney has served as an expert witness in several federal court cases related to the prison environment and punishment, and he has testified before the Subcommittee on the Consti- tution, Civil Rights and Human Rights of the U.S. Senate Judiciary Committee. 9, Terry A. Kupers, M.D., is a Professor at the Wright Institute and psychiatrist with a back- ground in psychoanalytic psychotherapy, forensics and social and community psychiatry. He has pro- vided expert testimony in several large class action litigations concerning jail and prison conditions, and he provides consultation and staff training on the psychological effects of prison conditions, including 4a solitary confinement. Mr. Kupers has published several books and articles and is a consultant to Human Rights Watch. 10. Shane O’Mara is Professor of Experi- mental Brain Research at Trinity College, Dublin (Personal Chair), and Principal Investigator and Director of the Trinity College Institute of Neurosci- ence. He has published more than 110 peer-reviewed papers, including on brain systems affected by stress, anxiety, depression, and motivation, and wrote the book Why Torture Doesn't Work: The Neuroscience of Interrogation. Ll. Hernan Reyes, M.D., is a Senior Re- search Fellow at the Human Rights Center at the University of California, Berkeley. He is also the former medical coordinator for Health in Prisons for the International Committee of the Red Cross (“ICRC”), a post he occupied from 1984-2012. Dr. Reyes documented prison health, as well as ill- treatment, human rights violations, and torture for the ICRC in more than 45 countries around the world during his 28 years with ICRC. Since 1991, he has been medical Observer for the ICRC to the World Medical Association (“WMA”) and its Ethics Commit- tee, working closely with the WMA on many ethical issues of concern in prisons. 12. Josiah D. Rich, M.D., M.P.H., is a Professor of Medicine and Epidemiology at the Warren Alpert Medical School of Brown University. He also is a practicing Infectious Disease Specialist at the Rhode Island Department of Corrections. Dr. Rich has written close to 190 peer-reviewed publica- tions, predominantly concerning the overlap between 5a infectious diseases, addictions, and incarceration. He is the Director and co-founder of the Center for Prisoner Health and Human Rights and also is a Co- Founder of the Centers for AIDS Research’s nation- wide initiative on collaboration in HIV in corrections. 13. Barry H. Roth, M.D. is a forensic psy- chiatrist who has performed forensic torture survivor evaluations for twenty years. Mr. Roth is a member of Physicians for Human Rights; Program in Psychi- atry and Law, Harvard Medical School; World Psy- chiatric Association Section on Psychological Conse- quences of Torture & Persecution; and the Interna- tional Forum of Teachers of the UNESCO Chair in Bioethics. Mr. Roth is a Distinguished Life Fellow of the American Psychiatric Association and Massachu- setts Psychiatric Society. He also is an instructor of the Harvard Law School Trial Advocacy Workshop and former Harvard Medical School instructor. 14. Pau Perez-Sales, M.D., a psychiatrist, is the Chair of the Section on Psychological Conse- quences of Persecution and Torture of the World Psychiatric Association. He is the founder of a number of groups dedicated to addressing the medi- cal care of victims of torture and has served as an independent consultant and forensic expert in na- tional and international courts for victims of abuse and torture. Dr. Perez-Sales was also the founding member and president of the Human Rights Section of the Spanish Association of Neuropsychiatry and is an elected member of the Board of the International Society for Health and Human Rights (“ISHHR”) and the Section on Torture of the World Psychiatric Association (“WPA”). 6a 15. Peter Scharff Smith, Ph.D., is an Asso- ciate Professor in the Department of Criminology and Sociology of Law at the University of Oslo. He also is a Professor in Criminology in the Department of Sociology and Social Work at Aalborg University. He has numerous publications concerning the use and effects of solitary confinement on prison in- mates. 16. Pablo Stewart, M.D., is a Clinical Pro- fessor of Psychiatry at the University of California, San Francisco School of Medicine. He has over thirty years of experience working in the criminal justice system, including serving for ten years as a federal- court-appointed psychiatric expert on the effects of solitary confinement on the mental health of in- mates. 17. Nora Sveaass, Ph.D., is a psychologist and Associate Professor at the Department of Psy- chology at the University of Oslo. Her research, publications, and _ professional experience have focused on human rights violations, the psychological consequences of torture and violence, and the treat- ment and rehabilitation of victims of torture and violence. Dr. Sveaass served two terms on the United Nations Committee against Torture from 2005 to 2013 and is currently a member of the United Na- tions Subcommittee for the Prevention of Torture. 18. Homer DD. Venters, M.D., is the Chief Medical Officer and Assistant Vice President of Correctional Health Services for New York City Health and Hospitals Corporation. He also is a faculty member at the New York University Center for Survivors of Torture and co-chairs a federal 7a health advisory group on medical care for detainees. Dr. Venters has written and testified before Con- gress on the health risks of incarceration and the intersection between correctional health and human rights. 19. Brie Williams, M.D., is an Associate Professor of Medicine in the Division of Geriatrics at the University of California, San Francisco. She also is the Founding Director of the University of Califor- nia Criminal Justice & Health Consortium, and the Director of the Criminal Justice and Health Project at the University of California, San Francisco. Dr. Williams has published work calling for a broader inclusion of prisoners in national health datasets and in health research funded by the National Institutes of Health, and for more scientific development of compassionate release policies. --- Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385016_0663%3A19. Public record. Not legal advice.