# Amicus Curiae Brief — Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 890 (2016) (No. 15-446)

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URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385016_0620%3A47

## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Amicus Curiae Brief
- **Published:** January 1, 2016

## Text

| OFFICE OF THE CLERK

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

CUOZZO SPEED TECHNOLOGIES, LLC,
Petitioner,

v.

MICHELLE K. LEE, UNDER SECRETARY OF
COMMERCE FOR INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND
DIRECTOR, PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE,

Respondent.

On Wait or CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED States Court
OF APPEALS FOR THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT

BRIEF OF AMICUS CURIAE UNIFIED
PATENTS INC. IN SUPPORT OF

RESPONDENT
KEVIN JAKEL Scorr A. McKrown
JONATHAN STROUD Counsel of Record
SHAWN AMBWANI STEPHEN G. KuNIN
UNIFIED Parents INc. JEFFREY I. Frey
2 North 1st Street, 5 Floor OsLon, McCLELLAND, MAIER
San Jose, California 95113 & Neustapt, L.L.P.
(650) 999-0899 1940 Duke Street
Alexandria, Virginia 22314
(703) 412-6297
smckeown@oblon.com

Counsel for Amicus Curiae

COUNSEL PRESS
(800) 274-3321 + (800) 359-6859

t

TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF CONTENTS.
TABLE OF CITED AUTHORITIES

STATEMENT OF INTEREST
INTRODUCTION.

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT.. .
ARGUMENT

I. Inter partes review (IPR) procedures
are a refinement of patent examination
and reexamination processes all using
the BRI standard, which have for more
than a century sought to improve patent
quality, thus reducing problematic district
court patent litigation .

A. IPR is an administrative proceeding
not intended to replace litigation in
district court

B. IPR is a refinement of an earlier PTO
post-grant procedure, inter partes
reexaminations, which construed
claims using the broadest reasonable
interpretation (BRI)

Page

ll

vt

Table of Contents

II. Amendment is not more limited in IPRs than
in other post-grant procedures, even in other
adjudicative proceedings, and post-grant
amendment is available by other routes at the
U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (PTO)

Il.

A.

Claims may be modified in
reexamination proceedings, which,
like IPR, are post-grant proceedings at
the PTO that allow limited amendment,
and use BRI

Interference proceedings, which
are adjudicatory proceedings
at the PTO that allow amendment
(and on which IPR procedure was
based), use BRI

Patent reissue is a post-grant proceeding
that likewise allows patentees to
amend claims, and uses BRI

Many factors have contributed to
the limited number of amendments
made to date in IPRs

When properly applied, the standards
of construction in the PTO and in the
courts are paths to the same result

Page

.14

15

17

19

19

21

int

Table of Contents

A. Because the PTAB properly applied
the BRI standard, Petitioner received
the “plain and ordinary” claim
interpretation it seeks

B. The PTO recognizes that BRI

and “plain and ordinary meaning”
are not alternatives.

C. The U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit recognizes
that BRI and “plain and ordinary
meaning” are not alternatives .

D. Factors other than BRI can result in
differences in claim construction in
the PTO and in the courts

J

Claim construction procedures
under the PTAB and in the courts
differ only inconsequentially

IV. Congress assumed BRI would continue to
be used by the PTO in post-grant patent
proceedings, as shown by the specific
statute of the AIA it promulgated, to
avoid claim-construction gamesmanship
by patentees .

CONCLUSION

Page

22

23

.24

.25

27

30

31

Ww

TABLE OF CITED AUTHORITIES

CASES

American Hoist and Derrick Company v.
Sowa & Sons Inc.,
725 F.2d 1350 (Fed. Cir. 1984) .6, 25

Bamberg v. Dalvey,
No. 2015-1548 (Fed. Cir. March 9, 2016) 18

Bamberger v. Cheruvu,
55 U.S.P.Q.2d 1523 (B.P.A.I. 1998). 17

Blackberry Corp. v. Mobilemedia Ideas LLC,
IPR2013-00016, Paper No. 31
(PTAB December 11, 2013). .10

Blackberry Corp. v. Mobilemedia Ideas LLC,
IPR2013-00036, Paper No. 64
(PTAB Jan. 21, 2014) .10

Chevron, USA, Inc. v.
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,
467 U.S. 837 (1984). 25, 26

COMMIL USA, LLC v. Cisco Systems, Inc.,
135 S. Ct. 1920 (2015). 10

eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C.,
126 S. Ct. 1837 (2006) 10

Vv

Cited Authorities

Ethicon, Inc. v. Quigg,
849 F.2d 1422 (Fed. Cir. 1988)

In re Cortright,
165 F.3d 1353 (Fed. Cir. 1999)

In re: Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC,
793 F.3d 1268 (Fed. Cir. 2015)

Lacavera v. Dudas,
441 F.3d 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2006)

Laitram Corp. v. NEC Corp.,
163 F.3d 1342 (Fed. Cir. 1998)

Masterlmage 3D, Inc. and MasterImage 3D
Asia, LLC v. RealD Inc.,
IPR2015-00040 (PTAB July 15, 2015).

Merck & Co. v. Teva Pharms. USA, Inc.,
347 F.3d 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2003)

Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Limited Partnership,
131 S. Ct. 2242 (2011).

Microsoft Corp. v. Proxyconn, Inc.,
789 F.3d 1292 (Fed. Cir. 2015)

Miel v. Young,
29 App. D.C. 481 (D.C. Cir. 1907).

Page

27

28

22

.26

.20

.20

.24

27

24

vi
Cited Authorities
Omega Eng7g, Inc. v. Raytek Corp.,
334 F.3d 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2003)

Phillips v. AWH Corp.,
415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005)

Podlesak v. McInnerney,
1906 Dec. Comm’r Pat. 265.

Trivascular, Inc. v. Samuels,
No. 2015-1631 (Fed. Cir. Feb. 5, 2016)

Wnek v. Dobbs,
85 U.S.P.Q.2d 1159 (BPAI 2006).

ZTE Corp. v. ContentGuard Holdings, Inc.,

passim

24, 25

18

IPR 2013-00136, Paper 33 (PTAB Nov. 7, 2013) = .19

STATUTES

35 U.S.C. § 2.
35 U.S.C. § 102.
35 U.S.C. § 120.
35 U.S.C. § 282.

35 U.S.C. § 301

4, 28, 30

vii

Cited Authorities

Page
35 U.S.C. § 302. 15
35 U.S.C. § 305. 15
35 U.S.C. § 306. 15
35 U.S.C. § 307 15
35 U.S.C, § 311 15
35 U.S.C. §§ 312-16. 2
35 U.S.C. § 314 Be
35 U.S.C. § 315. 12
35 U.S.C. § 316 .13, 14, 29
35 U.S.C. § 317 .10
35 U.S.C. § 325. 2
35 U.S.C. § 326. A
Act of July 4, 1836, ch. 357, § 8, 5 Stat. 120 17

Pub. L. 106-113, 113 Stat. 1501 A-571, § 4606 (1999) .12

Pub. L. 96-517, 94 Stat. 3016, § 1 (1980) 11-12

viit

Cited Authorities
Page
Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011). passim
OTHER AUTHORITIES
157 Cong. Rec. H4496 (daily ed. June 23, 2011). 3
157 Cong. Rec. S1097 (daily ed. Mar. 2, 2011)
(statement of Sen. Hatch) 3, 9-10
157 Cong. Rec. $1375 (daily ed. Mar. 8, 2011)
(statement of Sen. Ky}) A, 30
157 Cong. Rec. $5326 (daily ed. Sep. 6, 2011)
(statement of Sen. Leahy) 3,9
Brief of Amicus Curiae 3M Co. et. al. 17

Brief of Amicus Curiae New York Intellectual
Property Law Association, No. 15-446 17

Brief of Amicus Curiae of Pharmaceutical
Research and Manufacturers of America 17

Comments of Director of the USPTO
Michelle K. Lee, March 27, 2015 .20

Determining Patentability of a Claim in a
Patent Application, 2008 ABA Src. INTELL.
Prop. L. Rep. 108-3. 3

ww

Cited Authorities
Page
H.R. Rep. No. 112-98 (2011) a
James Bessen and Michael J. Meurer, The
Direct Costs from NPE Disputes, 99 Cornell
L. Rev. 387 (2014) yA
Laura Whitworth, What’s in a Claim?: The
Importance of Uniformity in Patent Claim
Construction Standards, 98 J. Par. & TRADEMARK
Orr. Soc’y 21 (to be published, 2016) .25
Manual of Patent Examining Procedure § 2111 16
Manual of Patent Examining Procedure § 2260. 15
Manual of Patent Examining Procedure § 2272 .16
Manual of Patent Examining Procedure § 2672. 16
Mark Consilivo & Jonathan Stroud, Unraveling the
USPTO’s Tangled Web: An Empirical Analysis
of the Complex World of Post-Issuance Patent
Proceedings, 21 J. INTELL. Prop. L. 1 (2013). mel
Office Patent Trial Practice Guide, 77 Fed.
Reg. 48764 (Aug. 14, 2012). 28

U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, AIA Trial
Statistics—February 2016

ll

x

Cited Authorities
Page
Patent Reexamination: Hearing on S. 1679
Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary,
96th Cong. 15-16 (1979). ~ “wae

Patent Trial and Appeal Board Statistics, 1/31/2016 .14

Pauline M. Pelletier, The Impact of Local
Patent Rules on Rate and Timing of Case
Resolution Relative to Claim Construction:

An Empirical Study of the Past
Decade, 8 J. Bus. & Tecnu. L. 451 (2013) 7

Peter S. Menell, Matthew D. Powers, and Steven C.
Carlson, Patent Claim Construction: A Modern
Synthesis and Structured Framework. .28

PTO Report to Congress On Inter Partes
Reexamination 12, 13

Rules of Practice for Trials Before the PTAB,
77 Fed. Reg. 48648 (Aug. 14, 2012) .10

Trimble, Marketa, “The Impact of “Patent Trolls” on
Patent Lawand the Legal Landscape of the United
States” (2009). Scholarly Works. Paper 561 3

RULES

37 C.FLR. § 1.75(b) .29

x2

Cited Authorities

Page
37 C.F.R. § 1.116(b) 15
37 C.F.R. § 42.20(e) 14
37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b) .21, 24, 28
37 C.ELR. § 42.121(a) 14
37 C.F_R. § 41.121 (a\(i). 18
37 C.FLR. § 42.122 19

37 C.F.R. § 41.208(a)(2) 18

]

STATEMENT OF INTEREST

Unified Patents Inc. is a member organization
dedicated to deterring non-practicing entities, or
NPEs, from using extortive litigation tactics to extract
settlements from operating companies based on patents

that are likely invalid before the district courts and
unpatentable before the patent office.’ Unified’s more

than 110 members are Fortune 500 companies, small
technology start-ups, automakers, industry groups, and
others dedicated to reducing the unnecessary drain on
the US economy of the now-routine baseless litigations
asserting infringement of broad patents of dubious validity
and patentability. Unified challenges patents, fighting
NPEs and helping to reduce the costs companies incur
fighting off their many dozens of annual NPE litigations.

Unified seeks to advance public policies that foster
competition and innovation by encouraging operating
companies to invest in commercializing technology.
Unfortunately, many companies are forced to spend many
millions of dollars in legal fees fighting off or licensing
baseless patent lawsuits brought by NPEs. Those NPEs
seek to exploit a severe imbalance in the cost of district
court patent litigation, 44% of which was before just one
district court, the Eastern District of Texas, in 2015.

1. This brief is filed with the written consent of all parties
through letters of consent on file with the Clerk. No counsel for
any party authored this brief in whole or in part, and no person
or entity other than amicus curiae, its members, or its counsel
made a monetary contribution intended to fund its preparation or
submission.

2

To those ends, Unified seeks to remove barriers to
cost-effective validity and patentability determinations
and to reduce the leverage afforded by the expense of
district court patent litigation. To date, inter partes
reviews (IPRs) have provided operating companies with
timely and cost-effective patentability determinations,
increasing certainty and dramatically reducing the costs
of baseless litigations. Over 4,000 IPR petitions were filed
in just under three and a half years, demonstrating that
operating companies have whole-heartedly embraced
them and use them in challenging the patentability of
patents of questionable validity. Many of the members
of the other amicus organizations arguing against the
tribunal's fairness and claim construction standard here
have nonetheless themselves taken advantage of the forum
and the claim construction standard when appropriate for
their individual business interests.

INTRODUCTION

Congress passed the America Invents Act (AIA)?
primarily to rescue American industry from the well-
documented problem of lopsided, costly, often questionable
patent lawsuits asserting low-quality patents. To address
patent quality, Congress created, among other things,
IPRs. IPRs allow interested parties to avail themselves
of agency expertise—that of the United States Patent &
Trademark Office (“PTO”)—to fast-track reconsideration
of issued patent claims based on evidence and arguments
not previously considered by the PTO.’

2. Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011).
3. 35 U.S.C. §§ 312-16; § 325(d).

3

Prior to the AIA, some patentees were suing many
dozens of companies in single lawsuits, asserting that low-
quality patent claims, often of amorphous scope, covered
some public, critical technology common to an entire
industry.‘ Notably, major changes in the law in the 2000s
meant many patents had been issued on technologies that
“should never be patented.” At the time Congress was
debating and passing the AIA, the patent bar was hotly
debating patent claim construction in other contexts.* But
Congress actively chose to endorse and leave in place the
PTO’s “broadest reasonable interpretation” (BRI) claim
construction—the logical and just choice continuing 100
years of PTO practice.

4. See, e.g., Trimble, Marketa, “The /mpact of “Patent Trolls”
on Patent Law and the Legal Landscape of the United States” (2009).
Scholarly Works. Paper 561, available at http://scholars.law.unlv.
edu/facpub/561.

5. Representative Joseph Crowley, in debating the AlA and
urging its passage, described a patent claiming a method “soliciting
charitable contributions on the Internet” asserted against the Red
Cross, concluding that “[tJhese patents, and many others in this
space, are not legitimate patents that help advance America. They
are nuisance patents used to sue legitimate businesses and nonprofit
business organizations like the Red Cross or any other merchants
who engage in normal activity that should never be patented.” 157
Conc. Rec . H4496 (daily ed. June 23, 2011); see also 157 Cong. Rec.
S5326 (daily ed. Sep. 6, 2011) (statement of Sen. Leahy) (noting IPRs
were introduced “to weed out recently issued patents that should not
have been issued in the first place.”) 157 Cong. Rec. S1097 (daily ed.
Mar. 2, 2011) (statement of Sen. Hatch) (similar comments).

6. See, e.g., Determining Patentability of a Claim in a Patent
Application, 2008 ABA Sec. INTELL. Prop. L. Rep. 108-3.

4

The Patent Office has used BRI procedures,
under law and regulation, for more than a century, in
examination, reexamination, reissue, on appeal, and in
every patentability procedure the patent. office conducts,’
based on a lack of a presumption of valia'ty and because
the Office reviews patentability, not invalidity.* The
AIA’s Congressional proponents explicitly assumed the
PTO would adopt BRI.’ Aside from different names, the
Petitioner has not identified any substantive difference
in the claim construction methods—as none exists. Yet
Appellant attempts to side-step this century of PTO
history, Congressional intent, and Board rulemaking,
ignoring the fact that the very starting point for any BRI
analysis is, as it is under the district court standard, the
“plain meaning.” Petitioner seeks instead to silence the

7. Podlesak v. McInnerney, 1906 Dec. Comm’r Pat. 265, 258.
(“[njo better method of construing claims is perceived than to give
them in each case the broadest interpretation which they will support
without straining the language in which they are couched.”): Miel
v. Young, 29 App. D.C. 481, 484 (D.C. Cir. 1907) (“This claim should
be given the broadest interpretation which it will support.”).

8. A patent is presumed “valid” unless overcome by clear
and convincing evidence before a district court, in deference to the
issuing agency’s expertise. Meanwhile, a petitioner’s burden before
the Office is limited to proving “unpatentability” by a preponderance
of the evidence, as the patent is not presumed valid before the agency
that issued it. Compare 35 U.S.C. § 282(a) and § 326(e).

9. For example, Senator Ky] stated that a purpose of the new
§ 301(a)(2) was to “allow the Office to identify inconsistent statements
made about claim scope—for example, cases where a patent owner
successfully advocated a claim scope in district court that is broader
than the “broadest reasonable construction” that he now urges in an
inter partes review.” 157 Cong. Rec. $1375 (daily ed. Mar. 8, 2011)
(statement of Sen. Kyl).

5

expert agency’s technically trained assessment of claim
meaning in favor of a district court claim construction
standard it believes will be more favorable to costly
litigation efforts.

These outcome-independent complaints are nothing
but a proxy for a deeper dissatisfaction with the new
administrative system for being, at core, too competent at
cutting short questionable and costly litigation. By finally
forcing these parties to spend money to defend their
questionable assets rather than proceeding lopsidedly
in district court under zero-down contingency counsel
agreements, and by providing quicker expert review of
patentability of patent claims that might not have been
granted were they considered today, IPRs have brought a
sorely needed balance back to the uneven settlement math
often exploited in patent cases. The complaints aired here
by Petitioner stem from a deeper desire to return to the
more lucrative system that came before.

The phrase “broadest reasonable interpretation”
describes the same procedure applied in both the PTO and
by the courts. In both venues, claims must be construed
consistent with the specification as understood by a person
of ordinary skill in the art, and the starting point for either
forum’s construction is the plain and ordinary meaning of
the claims. See generally Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d
1303, 1316 (Fed. Cir. 2005); Manual of Patent Examination
Procedure (MPEP) § 2111. While the PTO and courts have
occasionally differed in their claim constructions, those
few differences are a reflection of, among other factors,
the technical insight of the expert agency—and the limited
judicial authority with which it has been bestowed. The
Article | administrative law judges of the PTO’s Patent

6

Trial & Appeal Board (PTAB) are technically and legally
trained scientists and engineers that have practiced patent
law, and most importantly, they are chosen to be capable
of independently assessing a technical truth.”

Unlike the district courts, the PTAB is not picking
a winner in a contested proceeding between two parties.
It is not a battle of two claim constructions—that is, if an
accused infringer argues an overly narrow construction
to avoid infringement, the patentee’s construction (likely
argued to avoid invalidity) does not win by default; instead
the technical truth—as determined by the originally
issuing agency—rules the day. The PTAB seeks the
true construction of the claims, often disagreeing with
both parties and issuing what it believes is the true
construction.

Thus, while the PTAB and its fast-track IPRs may
have been disruptive for litigants relying on the costly
vagaries of district court patent litigation as a business
model—and those parties may complain when an agency
quickly arrives at an answer and puts an end to their legal
leverage—Congress sought to legislate an end to that bad
business with the AIA.

An unforeseen consequence of changing the PTO’s
claim interpretation practices would be to allow a patentee
in possession of an earlier district court claim construction

10. The administrative patent judges of the PTAB are generally
skilled in a relevant technical art, required to have at least a four-
year degree in engineering, chemistry, or biology, or the equivalent.
https://www.usajobs.gov/GetJob/PrintPreview/406508200. See also
American Hoist and Derrick Company v. Sowa & Sons Inc.,725 F.2d
1350, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 1984).

7

to wall off the expert agency from doing its own thorough
technical assessment.'! Such a result would undermine
Congress’s goal of culling improvidently granted patents
from the litigation lar.dscape.'* Because claim construction
is done using the same procedural guidelines in both the
PTO and the courts under these standards, the phrase
“broadest reasonable interpretation” is but a sideshow
highlighted here, masking its true purpose—as a vehicle
for a broader indictment of the new system. This Court
should not, as Congress did not, disturb the PTO’s
longstanding claim interpretation practices.

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

I. The new IPR challenge proceedings were built on
patent examination and reexamination before the
PTO, and have used the BRI standard for claim

11. It is especially critical to the success of the AIA that the
expert agency’s review of these patents not be hamstrung by previous
imprecision (or unnecessary exegesis) in claim construction.

12. Note that, in 2,871 cases studied for the period 2000-2010,
it took about twenty-two months to receive a court’s construction.
Pauline M. Pelletier, The Impact of Local Patent Rules on Rate
and Timing of Case Resolution Relative to Claim Construction:
An Empirical Study of the Past Decade, 8 J. Bus. & Tecnu. L. 451
(2013), available at http://digitaleommons.law.umaryland.edu/jbtl/
vol8/iss2/5. As the PTAB panels generally provide a preliminary,
nonbinding claim construction within about 6 months of filing of a
petition challenging patentability, only those patents litigated prior
to passage of the AIA are likely to have a construction that is first in
time. 35 U.S.C. § 314(b). Note that, should the standards applied in
both the PTAB and district court be the same, the PTAB will quite
be forced to issue claim construction positions first, positions that
may conflict with later district court rulings.

Il.

IIL.

8

interpretation for more than a century. Congress
sought to raise the level of patent quality by creating
an expedited reassessment and amendment procedure
for questionable issued patents. In passing the AIA,
Congress felt that administrative review of issued
patents would result in greater certainty about both
the validity and the meaning of a patent’s claims,
thus rebalancing the lopsided district court litigation
then taxing U.S. innovation. Changing the claim
interpretation standard, even in name only, is really
an attempt to prevent the agency from ruling in those
cases (such as this one) where an earlier district court
construction resulted in erroneous exegesis.

Petitioner greatly exaggerates the practical realities
of “defending” patents in IPR. Amendment is no less
“free” and no more iterative in IPRs than in patent
reexamination, reissue, or interference, which are
other post-grant PTO proceedings allowing claim
amendment. Patent interference is, like an IPR, an
adjudicative PTO proceeding applying BRI, and in
which amendment is by motion, nearly identical to
IPR. Petitioner cannot dispute that, as in patent
interference, amendments are available at the PTAB.

When properly applied, the PTAB and district court
claim constructions are procedural paths to the
same destination. Construction in district court and
in the PTAB is doctrinally indistinguishable: both
constructions begin with the plain and ordinary
meaning of claim terms, and both are performed in
the context of the patent specification as understood
by a person of ordinary skill in the art. With the
s.ume procedures properly applied, any differences

9

between court and PTAB claim constructions are
the result of differences in procedure, evidentiary
standards, presumption of validity, or the perspective
and authority of the adjudicator in differing venues.
To make the standards identical would be to imbue
and Article I tribunal with Article -II powers.

IV. Congress assumed BRI would be used by the PTO
in post-grant patent proceedings, as shown by the
text of the AIA statute promulgated to avoid claim-
construction gamesmanship by patentees.

ARGUMENT

1. Inter partes review (IPR) procedures are a refinement
of patent examination and reexamination processes
all using the BRI standard, which have for more
than a century sought to improve patent quality,
thus reducing problematic district court patent
litigation.

A. IPR is an administrative proceeding not
intended to replace litigation in district court.

IPRs advanced the quest for patent quality by
affording an expedited reassessment of issued patents,
leading to increased certainty about patentability, thereby
reducing problematic district court litigation. IPRs were
never intended to substitute for litigation itself. IPRs, like
reexamination, are administrative proceedings introduced
“to weed out recently issued patents that should not have
been issued in the first place.” 157 Cong. Rec. S5326 (daily
ed. Sep. 6, 2011) (statement of Sen. Leahy); see also 157
Cong. Rec. $1097 (daily ed. Mar. 2, 2011) (statement of Sen.

10

Hatch). IPRs were meant to allow improvidently issued
patents to be returned to the agency to give the PTAB
another chance to scrutinize patentability. This weeding-
out was intended to reduce the threat of litigation by, as
noted in this Court, “firms [that] use patents not as a basis
for producing and selling goods but, instead, primarily
for obtaining licensing fees.” eBay Inc. v. MercE xchange,
L.L.C., 126 S.Ct. 1837 (2006) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
The AIA was intended to reduce the threat of unjustified
litigation, along with the “harmful tax on innovation” that
is levied when patents are used “as a sword to go after
defendants for money, even when [the NPE plaintiffs’]
claims are frivolous.” COMMIL USA, LLC v. Cisco
Systems, Inc., 185 S. Ct. 1920, 1930 (2015).

Further, to protect the public—and as an example
of a major difference from what is permitted in a district
court—the PTAB can, under its discretion, continue an
IPR even where the petitioner settles and withdraws.
It may continue the proceeding after settlement at the
discretion of the Board according to “the particular
facts of each case.” 77 Fed. Reg. 48648 (Aug. 14, 2012).
Such facts might include clearly unpatentable claims,
id., or the stage of the proceedings, but in any case,
continuation after settlement is at the discretion of the
Board, 35 U.S. C. § 317(a), and the Board has in fact
continued proceedings after the parties have settled.
See, e.g., Blackberry Corp. v. Mobilemedia Ideas LLC,
IPR2013-00016, Paper No. 31 (PTAB December 11, 2013);
Blackberry Corp. v. Mobilemedia Ideas LLC, IPR2013-
00036, Paper No. 64 (PTAB Jan. 21, 2014). It must then
rule on claim construction. The possibility of continuing
the IPR even after the petitioner has settled is additional
evidence of the plain intent of Congress to protect the

1]

public from low quality patents with IPRs, rather than
to substitute IPRs for litigation.

B. IPR is a refinement of an earlier PTO post-
grant procedure, inter partes reexaminations,
which construed claims using the broadest
reasonable interpretation (BRI).

Other Congresses had attempted to improve patent
quality prior to the AIA, but none of the earlier actions
proved as successful as IPRs. (The number of IPR petitions
filed to date, well over 4,000," is a testament to their
popularity and success.) In 1980, Congress introduced ex
parte reexamination to provide a vehicle for a third party
or patent owner to obtain reexamination of a patent, in
an attempt to increase patent quality.* Pub. L. 96-517, 94

13. As of March 1, parties had filed 4,038 petitions since
September 2012. See U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, AIA Trial
Statistics—February 2016 (last visited March 29, 2016), available
at http://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/2016-2-29%20
PTAB.pdf.

14. H.R. REP. NO. 112-98, at 45 (2011); see also Patent
Reexamination: Hearing on S. 1679 Before the S. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 96th Cong. 15-16 (1979) (statement of Comm’r U.S. Patent
and Trademark Office Sidney Diamond) (finding “Reexamination
would eliminate or simplify a significant amount of patent litigation.
In some cases, the PTO would conclude as a result of reexamination
that a patent should not have issued. A certain amount of litigation
over validity and infringement thus wouid be completely avoided.”).
See generally Mark Consilivo & Jonathan Stroud, Unraveling the
USPTO's Tangled Web: An Empirical Analysis of the Complex World
of Post-Issuance Patent Proceedings, 21 J. INTELL. Prop. L. 1 (2013)
(providing a history of the legislation and motivations behind earlier
post-issuance regimes leading up to and including the AIA).

12

Stat. 3016, § 1 (1980). However, ex parte reexamination
proved unpopular because, although it was intended to
serve as a fast, low-cost alternative to patent litigation for
reviewing the originality aspects of patent validity, the
one-sided mechanism proved slow and unpredictable in
practice.'® Amendments were allowed, and the standard
for claim construction in ex parte reexamination was BRI.

In response to the tepid interest in ex parte
reexamination by patent challengers, Congress passed
the American Inventors Protection Act (AIPA) of 1999,
Pub. L. 106-113, 113 Stat. 1501A-571, § 4606 (1999). The
AIPA established a new inter partes reexamination (IPX)
procedure that allowed a reexamination requester more
participation than did the existing ex parte reexamination
procedure. The new IPX permitted third-party requesters
to submit a written comment each time the patent owner
filed a response to a PTO “office action” on the merits,
and to appeal an adverse decision of the patent examiner
to the Board of Patent Appeals & Interferences (BPAI)."*
Further, a requester could have full participation rights
in a patent owner’s appeal to the BPAI. As an additional
feature, if the requester were unsuccessful in the IPX,
any third-party requester would be estopped from later
asserting in any civil action, or in a subsequent IPX, the
invalidity of any claim the BPAI finally determined to
be valid and patentable on any ground the third-party
requester raised or could have raised in the IPX. 35 U.S.C.
315(c) (pre-AIA). The requester was also estopped from

15. See PTO Report to Congress On Inter Partes Reexamination
(PTO Report), http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/dcom/olia/reports/
reexam_report.htm (undated).

16. The BPAI was replaced by the PTAB in the AIA.

13

later challenging in a civil action any “fact” determined
in the IPX. Section 4607 of the Optional Inter Partes
Reexamination Procedure Act of 1999, uncodified. In 2002,
third parties obtained the right to appeal IPX decisions
to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit and
to participate in the patent owner’s appeal! to that Court.
But even with these refinements the IPX procedure also
proved to be unpopular, because the estoppel provisions
were unpopular, it did not allow discovery and cross-
examination, and it was slow. See PTO Report, 3-4. As of
2005, “a large number of reexamination proceedings hajd]
been pending before the USPTO for more than four years
without resolution.”’” Amendments were allowed, and the
standard for claim construction in IPX was BRI.

The IPR procedure introduced in the AIA expressly
addressed the deficiencies of the earlier reexamination
procedures, and importa~.ly added the additional
mandate of speed: in an IPR, the PTAB must finish its
work within | year (extendable to 18 months). 35 U.S.
Code § 316(a)(11) (2011). The AIA also incorporated
important administrative and time-saving refinements
to previous patent reexamination procedures. IPRs
replaced the duplicative patent examiner phase of patent
reexamination, leaving only a judicial review phase. These
measures resulted in a truncated timeline as compared
to the previous IPX procedure. See H.R. Rep. No. 112-98,
at 46 (2011). The success of IPRs is demonstrated by the
4040 IPR petitions that were filed between Sep. 16, 2012

17. Testimony of Mr. Jon Dudas, U.S. Sen. Comm. On the
Judiciary (Apr. 25, 2005), http:// www. idiciary.senate.gov/hearings/
testimony.cfm?id=e655f9e2809e5476862fr735dal04aa60khit it=e
655f9e2809e5476862f735dal04an60-1-1.

14

and Jan. 31, 2016. More important, as an example of the
effect of IPRs on judicial efficiency, in fiscal year 2015 out
of 1737 IPR petitions filed, 464 (27%) were settled within
15 months of filing."

Amendment of claims in an IPR is no less “free” than

in the re-examination procedures the IPR supplants.
In an IPR, a patentee may propose new claims on a

one-for-one basis, but these claims are only added if a
corresponding motion to amend claims has been granted
by the Board. In such a motion, the burden is on the patent
owner to show a patentable distinction of each proposed
substitute claim over the prior art. 37 C.F.R. § 42.20(c).
The particular standard used in interpreting a substitute
claim is irrelevant to the difficulty with which a claim may
be amended.

Il. Amendment is not more limited in IPRs than in other
post-grant procedures, even in other adjudicative
proceedings, and post-grant amendment is available
by other routes at the U.S. Patent and Trademark
Office (PTO).

Congress did not “eliminat[e] _.the right to amend
claims” in an IPR, as Appellant states. App. Bf 29.
In fact, as Appellant admits in the same paragraph,
“{iln IPR, the patentee may file one ‘motion to amend’
but must first confer with the Board. 35 U.S.C. 316(d@);
37 C.FLR. 42.121(a).” Jd. Amendment is permitted in IPR
proceedings, and is no more restricted than in certain

18. Patent Trial and Appeal Board Statistics, 1/31/2016, available
at http://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/2016-01-31%20
PTAB.pdf.

15

other post grant, even adjudicative proceedings of the
PTO, which also use BRI. The lack of a large number
of successful amendments in IPRs to date is not rooted
in any reluctance of the agency to accept amendments,
but instead, to the impossibility of saving low quality
patents with amendments that lack technical distinction.
In addition, there are alternatives to IPRs available to
patentees who wish to modify their claims.

A. Claims may be modified in reexamination
proceedings, which, like IPR, are post-grant
proceedings at the PTO that allow limited
amendment, and use BRI.

Patent reexamination is a post-grant patent review
process whereby “[aJny person at any time may file a
request for reexamination by the Office of any claim of
a patent on the basis of any prior art cited.” 35 U.S.C.
§ 302; 311 (pre-AIA). Like IPRs, reexamination permits
a patentee limited amendment options; usually one. If
the patentability of any claim anpears questionable, the
patentee may propose new claims. 35 U.S.C. §§ 305-307.
However, contrary to appellant's mischaracterizations, the
amendment, or substitution, process in a reexamination
is hardly as easy as in an original examination—while
both proceedings have long used BRI. There is simply no
“back-and-forth between the Patent Owner and exarniner”
in reexamination. Instead, after the examiner initially
rejects the claims in a non-final office action, a patentee
is provided with a single opportunity to amend the claims.
MPEP § 2260, 37 C.F.R. 1.116(b).

If this amendment is deemed insufficient to overcome
the rejections, a final office action (or Action Closing

16

Prosecution (ACP) in IPX) will issue from the examiner.
Once prosecution is closed, it cannot be reopened absent
extraordinary circumstances and the Patent Owner has
no further opportunity to substantively amend the claims
as the reexamination is forwarded on to the PTAB with
special dispatch.

Consideration of amendments submitted after
fina] rejection and prior to, or with, the appeal
will be governed by the strict standards of 37
CFR 1.116. ... Both the examiner and the patent
owner should recognize that substantial patent
rights will be at issue with no opportunity
for the patent owner to refile under 37 CFR
1.53(b), or 1.53(d), and with no opportunity
to file a request for continued examination
under 37 CFR 1.114. Accordingly, both the
examiner and the patent owner should identify
and develop all issues prior to the final Office
action, including the presentation of evidence
under 37 CFR 1.131(a) and 1.132.

MPEP §§ 2272; 2672 (emphasis added)

Unlike patent application processing, there is no
option to “continue prosecution” absent extraordinary
circumstances, and there is no “back and forth” or
“iterative” amendment process. See, e.g., App. Bf. 5,13.
Yet, the appropriateness of the BRI standard for use in
reexamination, in which these obstacles are put in the way
of amendment, is admitted by Appellant. /d. at 23 (“Because
reexamination is the functional equivalent of an initial
examination, it uses the same claim construction standard
to advance the same goals. The examiner is required to

17

give a claim its broadest reasonable interpretation.”).
Appellant’s amici agree. See, e.g., Brief of Amicus Curiae
New York Intellectual Property Law Association, No.
15-446, at 23; Brief of Amicus Curiae 3M Co. et. al., at
12; Brief of Amicus Curiae of Pharmaceutical Research
and Manufacturers of America at 13.

B. Interference proceedings, which are
adjudicatory proceedings at the PTO that allow
amendment (and on which [PR procedure was
based), use BRI.

Patent interference is a venerable PTO adjudicative
proceeding that, like the new IPRs, limits amendment
options to a motion process and, like IPRs, applies BRI
in proceedings involving granted patents. Interferences
ensue when two different parties file a patent application
claiming the same invention. Pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 102(g).
Interferences are, like IPRs, adversarial adjudicatory
proceedings that use BRI, and were first codified in 1836.
Act of July 4, 1836, ch. 357, § 8, 5 Stat. 120.

Petitioner admits that amendment is possible in
an interference, and acknowledges that BRI is used in
interferences. App. Br. 13. Petitioner recognizes that BRI
is acceptable in interferences because “a patentee may
‘narrow its claims by filing an application to reissue the
patent [and] request that the reissue application be added
to the interference’,” citing Bamberger v. Cheruvu, 55
U.S.P.Q.2d 1523, 1526 (B.P.A.I. 1998) (non-precedential).

19. Interferences will disappear for patent applications and
patents with an effective filing date on or after March 16, 2013, due to
the new first-to-file provisions of the AIA, 35 U.S.C. § 102 (a) (2015).

18

App. Br. 25, F N6. Such a reissue is a form of amendment,
with the change in the claim in the form of a substitution,
or addition, of claims. 37 C.F.R. § 41.121(a)(i), 37 C.F.R.
§ 41.208(a)(2), and PTO Standing Order 208.5.2 (March 8,
2011). As in IPRs, motions to amend in interferences are
not entered as a matter of right, and are not uniformly
granted. See Bamberg v. Dalvey, No. 2015-1548, slip op.
at 8-9 (Fed. Cir. March 9, 2016) (motion to amend denied
because the movant didn’t comply with the rules governing
such motions). Further, leave to file an application to
reissue a patent involved in an interference and to have the
reissue application added to the interference—additional
requirements for “amendment”—must itself be sought on
motion under 37 C.F.R. § 41.121(a)(i), 37 C.F_R. § 41.208(a)
(2), and Standing Order 208.5.1, and such motions are also
not uniformly granted. In those cases where such a motion
is granted, there is no automatic right to present as many
new claims as one desires. Wnek v. Dobbs, 85 USPQ2d
1159, 1160 (BPAI 2006) (nonprecedential). With adherence
to the proper procedure, amendment is no less freely
possible in an IPR than it has been in an interference for
the last 180 years.

In sum, a patentee in an adjudicated IPR has the
right to amend his claims, as applicants in interferences
have had with virtually the same claim interpretation
standards and administrative provisions, for well over a
century. Appellant here has not even attempted to explain
why if BRI has been satisfactory in interferences, it is not
suitable for IPRs.

19

C. Patent reissue is a post-grant proceeding that
likewise allows patentees to amend claims, and
uses BRI.

Appellant recognizes, but does not elaborate for this
Court, another alternative to the amendment processes
he denigrates: patent reissue. See App. Br. 25, FN6. The
PTAB itself recognizes that a patentee might avail himself
of more expansive amendment options as an alternative to
amendment. ZTE Corp. v. ContentGuard Holdings, Inc.,
IPR 2013-00136, Paper 33 at 3 (PTAB Nov. 7, 2013) (“if a
patent owner desires a complete remodeling of its claim
structure according to a different strategy, it may do so in
another type of proceeding before the Office.”) A patentee
may also have considerable flexibility in integrating a
reissue proceeding with an ongoing IPR, because during
an IPR the PTAB has the power to “enter any appropriate
order regarding the additional matter including providing
for the stay, transfer, consolidation, or termination of any
such matter.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.122.

D. Many factors have contributed to the limited
number of amendments made to date in IPRs.

A patentee in an IPR has the opportunity to seek
to amend his claims, but the Board has found few claim
amendments aliowable in IPRs thus far. Yet the various
factors that have contributed to the low number of motions
to amend—both sought and granted—do not themselves
discount a patentee’s ability to amend claims in an IPR.
For instance, the newness of the IPR process has limited
parties’ success, as many patent owners as yet lack the
familiarity with new procedures that might assure them
a grant of any motions to amend. See, e.g., ZTE, id.

20

(“ContentGuard did not appreciate fully its burden of
proof.”). Patentees involved in active litigation are usually
careful not to amend their claims so that their accused
infringers no longer infringe, further constraining the
types of amendments patent owners are willing to put
forth.

On the other side, an absence of precedent may give
PTAB panels a reluctance to grant amendment motions,
which, upon grant, issue directly. The PTO is well-aware
of these issues; an expanded panel of the PTAB has
recently found it necessary to clarify the requirements
for obtaining amendments. See MasterImage 3D, Inc.
and Masterlmage 3D Asia, LLC v. RealD Inc., 1PR2015-
00040 (PTAB July 15, 2015). The amendment procedure
has proven cumbersome; in response, the PTO is initiating
a series of “quick-fixes” to streamline the amendment
process, and continues to issue new rules packages
updating their procedures and regulations governing
amendment. Comments of Director of the USPTO
Michelle K. Lee, March 27, 2015 http://www.uspto.gov/
blog/director/entry/ptab_s_quick fixes for.

Finally, patentees may be constrained by the fear
of intervening rights from proposing amendments that
are acceptably differentiated from the original claims.
A patentee must propose neither an amendment with
a change too small to be granted nor one containing a
change “substantive” enough to trigger intervening rights.
See Laitram Corp. v. NEC Corp., 163 F.3d 1342, 1346 (Fed.
Cir. 1998) (“If substantive changes have been made to the
original claims, the patentee is entitled to infringement
damages only for the period following the issuance of”
the modified claim). The fear of intervening rights is

21

especially prevalent in arts where licensing entities are
the most active, such as consumer electronics. In such
quickly developing technologies, an amendment may not
only give up past damages, but foreclose future damages
if the technology has already advanced beyond the
patented device or methodology. In sum, IPR amendment
is available, robust, and evolving; but the procedure is
new, and patentees involved in litigation are generally
reluctant to make significant amendments, whereas the
PTAB is reluctant to grant amendments for technically
trivial changes, where the earlier challenged claims would
be held unpatentable.

Iii. When properly applied, the standards of construction
in the PTO and in the courts are paths to the same
result.

A major feature of earlier patent reexamination
procedures carried over to IPRs is the use of the BRI
standard for claim interpretation.”° Petitioner contests
the use of this standard, although it is the standard
that the PTO has used in reviewing both patents and
patent applications for decades. Petitioner argues that
the Board should instead construe the claim in a patent
being examined by the PTAB according to its plain and
ordinary meaning, “as a federal court would be required
to do.” App. Bf at (I). Phraseology aside, both the PTO
and the federal courts are required to construe claims
using the same methods.

20. “Aclaim in an unexpired patent shall be given its broadest
reasonable construction in light of the specification of the patent in
which it appears.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b) (emphasis added).

22

As explained below, plain and ordinary meaning is
used by PTO regulation, and was used in the assessment
of Petitioner’s claims. As such, what Petitioner really seeks
is a decision of this Court to remove the different labels
from these frameworks such that the Petitioner can silence
the expert agency’s technically reasoned construction in
favor of its own preferred, and earlier, court construction.
Petitioner’s patent claims were found to be unpatentable
by the PTAB, IPR2012-00001, aff, In re: Cuozzo Speed
Techs., LLC, 793 F.3d 1268 (Fed. Cir. 2015), and Petitioner
implies that the result might have been otherwise had the
BRI standard for claim construction not been used.

A. Because the PTAB properly applied the BRI
standard, Petitioner received the “plain and
ordinary” claim interpretation it seeks.

But Petitioner did receive a claim interpretation
based on plain and ordinary meaning. The PTAB made
clear to Petitioner that “the Board interprets claim
terms by applying the broadest reasonable construction
in the context of the specification in which the claims
reside. Also, we give claim terms their ordinary
and accustomed meaning as would be understood by
one of ordinary skill in the art.” Inst. Dec. 3—4 (internal
citations omitted; emphases added). Thus, “for purposes
of this decision we proceed on the basis that the plain
and ordinary meaning of words in their common usage
applies, albeit taken in the context of the disclosure of the
‘074 Patent.” Jd. at 4. Here, the Board properly applied
BRI using the methods of Phillips, i.e., the same methods
used in the courts.

23

B. The PTO recognizes that BRI and “plain and
ordinary meaning” are not alternatives.

In order to differentiate BRI from the district court
procedure, Appellant misrepresents the BRI standard
the PTAB is required to use, stating that this standard
“directs the Board to give claims their ‘broadest
reasonable construction rather than their plain and
ordinary meaning.” App. Br. 35 (emphasis added). But
both the PTO generally and the PTAB in particular make
clear that plain and ordinary meaning is fundamental to
any claim interpretation of the PTO. Expanding upon
“broadest reasonable interpretation,” the PTO explains
that

The broadest reasonable interpretation does
not mean the broadest possible interpretation.
Rather, the meaning given to a claim term
must be consistent with the ordinary and
customary meaning of the term (unless the
term has been given a special definition in the
specification), and must be consistent with the
use of the claim term in the specification and
drawings. Further, the broadest reasonable
interpretation of the claims must be consistent
with the interpretation that those skilled in the
art would reach.

MPEP § 2111. This explanation of what the PTO means by
“broadest reasonable interpretation” contains, identically,
the features of a claim interpretation based on Phillips:
“the words of a claim ‘are generally given their ordinary
and customary meaning the meaning that the term
would have to a person of ordinary skill in the art in

24

question at the time of the invention,” Phillips at 1312-
1313 (internal citations omitted); and, “claims must be
construed so as to be consistent with the specification, of
which they are a part.” /d. at 1316 (quoting Merck & Co.
v. Teva Pharms. USA, Inc., 347 F.3d 1367, 1371 (Fed.Cir.
2003)). The PTO’s Trial Practice Guide for IPRs similarly
states that “[a] claim in an unexpired patent shall be
given its broadest reasonable construction in light of the
specification of the patent in which it appears.” 37 C.F.R.
§42.100(b).

The PTAB in this case followed the published PTO
procedures regarding claim construction. Thus, the PTAB
accorded the patentee the proper, broadest reasonable
interpretation—of which he now argues he was deprived.

C. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit recognizes that BRI and “plain and
ordinary meaning” are not alternatives.

The Federal Circuit is consistent in its understanding
that the BRI standard comprises a “plain and ordinary”
understanding: for example, in Microsoft Corp. v.
Proxyconn, Inc., 789 F. 3d 1292, 1298 (Fed. Cir. 2015), the
court stated that claim constructions during IPR must
not be “unreasonable under general claim construction
principles” (emphasis in original). In addition, claims
should always be read in light of the specification and
teachings in the underlying patent, the PTO should consult
the patent’s prosecution history, and the construction
“must be consistent with the one that those skilled in the
art would reach.” /d. In Trivascular, Inc. v. Samuels, No.
2015-1631, slip op. at 6-7 (Fed. Cir. Feb. 5, 2016), the court
stated—invoking numerous citations from earlier decisions

25

(omitted here)—that “[uJnder a broadest reasonable
interpretation, words of the claim must be given their
plain meaning, unless such meaning is inconsistent with
the specification and prosecution history.” In particular,
“[w]hile the broadest reasonable interpretation standard
is broad, it does not give the Board an unfettered license
to interpret the words in a claim without regard for the
full claim language and the written description. Jd.

D. Factors other than BRI can result in differences
in claim construction in the PTO and in the
courts.

Differences between the courts and the PTO in claim
interpretation may be attributable to factors other than
the claim construction standard. One of these factors is
the statutory presumption of validity, which is a court’s
expression of “the deference that is due to a qualified
government agency presumed to have properly done its
job which includes [personnel] who are assumed to have
some expertise in interpreting the references and to be
familiar from their work with the level of skill in the art
and whose duty it is to issue only valid patents.” American
Hoist and Derrick at 1359.*: In short, a court will defer

21. This deference to technical qualification is distinguishable
from the deference to administrative agencies’ construction of
statutes administered under the authority of that agency as dictated
by Chevron, USA, Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council,
Inc. 467 U.S. 837 (1984). See generally Laura Whitworth, What's
in a Claim?: The Importance of Uniformity in Patent Claim
Construction Standards, 98 J. Pat. & TRADEMARK OFF. Soc’y 21 (to
be published, 2016). Under the two-prong Chevron test, in the AIA
(1) Congress was expressly silent regarding the precise issue of claim
construction standards in IPRs, even though it was conscious of the

26

to agency expertise—the technical expertise used by the
PTO in review proceedings, initial examination, and claim
construction and the nature of PTO examiners, staff,
and PTAB judges. District court judges must deal with
a broad universe of cases, and are not required to have
the engineering or scientific background required of PTO
examiners or PTAB judges, whose focus is much narrower.
In contrast, the PTAB determines technical truth guided
by its own technical and scientific training, with the input
of the parties. Absent deference to the expertise of the
agency, there is no presumption of validity.

question; and (2) Congress did not withdraw any of the powers given
to the PTO in 35 U.S. Code § 2(b). Therefore the PTO is entitled to
Chevron deference under this test. See also Lacavera v. Dudas, 441
F.3d 1380, 1383 (Fed. Cir. 2006)(“Because the PTO is specifically
charged with administering [35 U.S.C. § 2(b)(2)], we analyze a
challenge to the statutory authority of its regulations under the
Chevron framework.”)

22. The influence of the presumption of validity and defining
patent claims to require un-recited limitations in a court decision is
evident in PPC Broadband Inc., v. Corning Optical Communications
RF, L.L.C. (Fed. Cir. Feb. 22, 2016), which issued after this petition
was granted certiorari. The PTAB decided that “continuity” in the
context of the patent referred only to physical contiguity, and did
not require continuity in time. The court agreed with the PTAB’s
BRI construction, but in dicta volunteered that “(u)nder Phillips,”
which required both physical and temporal continuity.” The court’s
narrower claim construction would have preserved the validity of
the claims in question as the prior art did not demonstrate temporal!
continuity. As can be appreciated in this case, the USPTO stands in
the way of those seeking to enforce patent claims with un-recited
requirements. Such definitions are often times finessed from forums
lacking technical expertise more focused on selecting between
competing party-constructions as opposed to technical correctness.

27

The use of a plain and ordinary meaning standard
in the courts is an implicit bow to the work of the expert
agency and the resulting presumption of validity, and
it affects the evidentiary standard as well. Given the
presumption of validity, in district courts invalidity must
be shown by clear and convincing evidence, Microsoft
Corp. v. 141 Limited Partnership, 131 S. Ct. 2242 (2011),
while in the PTAB a petitioner must show unpatentability
with a lower preponderance of the evidence standard,
under no presumption of validity. See, e.g., Ethicon, Inc.
v. Quigg, 849 F.2d 1422, 1427 (Fed. Cir. 1988). Regardless
of the standard used for claim interpretation, it is easier
to show a claim unpatentable in the PTAB than invalid
in a court because of the differing burdens of persuasion,
as the patent is not presumed valid by the agency that
issued it. Changing the claim construction standard will
not change that reality, regardless of the outcome here.

E. Claimconstruction procedures under the PTAB
and in the courts differ only inconsequentially.

The following chart shows that in terms of evidence
available, and how that evidence is treated, there is little
difference between BRI and a Phillips claim construction;
the necessary conclusion is that, if properly applied, these
tools should lead to identical constructions, whether they
are made in the PTO from the point of view of examination
or in district court from the point of view of litigation:

28

Claim Interpretation PTO BRI District Court
Plain & ordinary Yes, for Yes, for
meaning in light of | undisputed undisputed
the specification and | terms.” terms.”
consistent with the
understanding of a
person skilled in the
art.
Intrinsic evidence. Yes. Yes.”
Extrinsic evidence. | Yes, if needed.” Yes, if needed.”
Claim construction {| Yes if astatements | Yes,
from prior litigation. | of the patent depending on
owner filed in a circumstances.”
proceeding before
a Federal court or
the PTO.”

23. MPEP § 2111; 2111.01 (IV) (2015); C.F.R. § 42.100(b); Jn
re Cortright, 165 F.3d 1353,1358 (Fed. Cir. 1999). see Office Patent
Trial Practice Guide, 77 Fed. Reg. 48764 (Aug. 14, 2012).

24. Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1313 (Fed. Cir.

2005).

25. MPEP § 2111.01 (IIT) (2015).
26. Phillips at 1313.
27. MPEP § 2111.01 (III) (2015).
28. Phillips at 1317.

29. 35 U.S.C. § 301.

30. See generally Peter S. Menell, Matthew D. Powers,
and Steven C. Carlson, Patent Claim Construction: A Modern
Synthesis and Structured Framework, available at http://ssrn.

com/abstract =1476395.

29

Claim construction
from patent family
members.

Yes.™

Yes.”

Claim
differentiation.

Yes."

Yes.**

Ability to amend
claims.

Yes.*®

No.

Claims construed to
preserve validity.

No.

Rarely.”

Any differences in the practices of the PTO and
the courts are not doctrinal, but rather a technical
disagreement experience of the competing decision
makers, and a recognition that the PTO will not presume
patents it issued valid.

31. 35 U.S.C. § 120.

32. Omega Eng’‘g, Inc. v. Raytek Corp., 334 F.3d 1314, 1334
(Fed. Cir. 2003).

33. 37 C.F.R. § 1.75(b).
34. Phillips at 1314.
35. 35 U.S.C. § 316(d).

36. The Federal Circuit has not “applied this principle
broadly” and has “not endorsed a regime in which validity analysis
is a regular component of claim construction.” Phillips at 1327
(emphasis added, internal citations omitted). Indeed, such a rare
construction is in deference to the PTO’s initial review, which has
no place in a later review proceeding conducted by the PTO itself.

30

IV. Congress assumed BRI would continue to be used by
the PTO in post-grant patent proceedings, as shown
by the specific statute of the AIA it promulgated,
to avoid claim-construction gamesmanship by
patentees.

Anticipating the differing frameworks, Congress
introduced a safeguard into the AIA to prevent patentees
from arguing a different claim interpretation in front
of the PTAB than it argued elsewhere. That safeguard
is 35 U.S.C. § 301, “Citation of Prior Art And Written
Statements.” Section 301(a)(2) solicits, from “any person
at any time,” written citations to “statements of the patent
owner filed in a proceeding before a Federal court or the
Office in which the patent owner took a position on the
scope of any claim of a particular patent.” Section 301(d)
states that such citations may be used by the PTO only
“to determine the proper meaning of a patent claim”
in an IPR, a re-examination, or a post-grant review.
Accordirg to Senator Kyl, the Section’s purpose was to
“help the Office understand and construe the key claims
of a patent,” and was meant to “allow the Office to identify
inconsistent statements made about claim scope—for
example, cases where a patent owner successfully
advocated a claim scope in district court that is broader
than the ‘broadest reasonable construction’ that he now
urges in an inter partes review.” 157 Cong. Rec. 51375
(daily ed. Mar. 8, 2011) (statement of Sen. Kyl, emphasis
added). By incorporating § 301 into the AIA, Congress
demonstrated that it not only recognized the existence of
the differently named frameworks of the court and PTO,
but also endorsed them, and acted to ensure that, in post-
grant PTO proceedings, the ultimate result would not be
influenced by gamesmanship.

31

CONCLUSION

Patents of high quality—which clearly and
appropriately claim an invention—reduce the costs and
delays of district court infringement litigation, thus
helping achieve Congress’s stated goals in passing the
AIA. Petitioner attempts to misrepresent the PTO’s BRI
standard for claim interpretation as somehow eschewing
the “plain meaning,” and contributing to inconsistency
between claim interpretations in an IPR and in court. But,
careful and correct assessment of a patent claim by either
a court or by the PTO should lead to the same construction,
as both forums apply plain and ordinary meaning to
disputed terms. That one forum’s imperfect application
of the “plain and ordinary meaning” sometimes inures to
a patentee’s benefit, under a framework that differs only
in the organization that applies it, is no reason to upend
a century of expert agency claim construction practices
and jurisprudence.

The rapacious litigants that Congress attempted
to restrain with the AIA were not inventors, operating
companies, or even licensing companies, but rather, were
legally trained profiteers whose business was based on
monetizing patents of low quality and then extracting
settlements for less than the high cost to defend these
suits. These profiteers, referred to as “NPEs” or more
pejoratively “patent trolls,” wield the high cost of district
court litigation (including the asymmetrical discovery
obligation that benefits organizations that exist only
to sue) as a sword to force otherwise unwarranted
financial settlements. Generally investing little, and
using contingency counsel, NPEs were taxing America’s
innovators to the tune of billions of dollars per year prior

32

to the AIA.” James Bessen and Michael J. Meurer, The
Direct Costs from NPE Disputes, 99 Cornell L. Rev. 387,
408 (2014).38 The AIA’s creation of, among other things,
IPR has significantly crippled NPEs’ ability to hold up
American industry through unjustifiable assertions of
low-quality patents by presenting a fast, efficient, low-
cost alternative to arcane, expensive, and time-consuming
patent litigation. The case before this Court seeks to start
to roll back that progress.

Respectfully submitted,

KEVIN JAKEL Scott A. McKrown

JONATHAN STROUD Counsel of Record

SHAWN AMBWANI STEPHEN G. KuNIN

UNIFIED PATENTs INc. JEFFREY I. FREY

2 North Ist Street, 5“ Floor Oston, McCLELLAND, MAIER

San Jose, California 95113 & Neustapt, L.L.P.

(650) 999-0899 1940 Duke Street
Alexandria, Virginia 22314
(703) 412-6297
smckeown@oblon.com

Counsel for Amicus Curiae

37. In aggregate costs, including legal costs, settlement costs,
and other costs for resolved lawsuits, unresolved lawsuits, and non-
litigated assertions.

38. Available at http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/clr/vol99/
iss2/3.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385016_0620%3A47. Public record. Not legal advice.