# Amicus Curiae Brief — U.S. Army Corp of Eng'rs v. Hawkes Co., 136 S. Ct. 615 (2015) (No. 15-290)

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Amicus Curiae Brief
- **Published:** January 1, 2015

## Text

No. 15-290 a

FILED
nan
KT HK 2 2c ")

In The OFFICE OF THT oir ty
Supreme Court of the Anited States

SJ

UNITED STATES ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS,

Petitioner,

Vv.

HAWKES CO., INC., ET AL.,
Respondents.

+

On Writ Of Certiorari To The
United States Court Of Appeals
For The Eighth Circuit

S

AMICUS CURIAE BRIEF OF
MOUNTAIN STATES LEGAL FOUNDATION
IN SUPPORT OF RESPONDENTS

«

STEVEN J. LECHNER

Counsel of Record
GINA M. CANNAN
MOUNTAIN STATES LEGAL FOUNDATION
2596 South Lewis Way
Lakewood, Colorado 80227
(303) 292-2021
lechner@mountainstateslegal.com
gina@mountainstateslegal.com

Counsel for Amicus Curiae

COCKLE LEGAL BRIEFS (800) 225 6964
WWW .COCKLELEGALBRIEFS.COM

i
QUESTION PRESENTED

Whether the United States Army Corps of Engi-
neers’ determination that the property at issue con-
tains “waters of the United States” protected by the
Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7); see 33 U.S.C.
§ 1251 et seq., constitutes “final agency action for
which there is no other adequate remedy in a court,”
5 U.S.C. § 704, and is therefore subject to judicial
review under the Administrative Procedure Act, 5
U.S.C. § 701 et seq.

li

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page
QUESTION PRESENTED......................::ceceeeeeees i
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES .................cccccceseeeeeees iv
IDENTITY AND INTEREST OF AMICUS
SETI incssesssicedinninishdinbiuishabieiiiiiinseenitihdanabitiipmaiiniatins 1
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.........................0.200 3
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT ......0..............cceeeees 4
EE vcistrsttpncecegititsavtsaidunintuniimmnuniniianeuies 6
I. THE APA PROVIDES A BROAD PRE-

II.

ITI.

SUMPTION FAVORING JUDICIAL RE-
VIEW OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION ....

A JURISDICTIONAL DETERMINATION
UNDER THE CWA IS THE QUINTES-
SENTIAL FINAL AGENCY ACTION
SUBJECT TO JUDICIAL REVIEW UN-
Fy ee veccndsncicinstcnatenmnentintcicocerneiie

A. A Jurisdictional Determination Is Fi-
ee I aicintitnttesiniinntertanincnnemne

B. There Is No Adequate Remedy In
Court Following The Issuance Of A
Jurisdictional Determination..............

THE CORPS’ ATTEMPT TO LIMIT
JUDICIAL REVIEW UNDER THE APA
TO AGENCY ACTIONS THAT COMPEL
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION IS UNSUP-
PORTED BY THE CASE LAW AND IS
IN DEROGATION OF PRIVATE PROP-
er CIE setevscencssnmnansomesesesesmentniienes

11

11

21

ill

TABLE OF CONTENTS -— Continued

Page

IV. BROAD JUDICIAL REVIEW OF AGENCY
ACTION SERVES IMPORTANT PUBLIC
PS TIE i iccrscnsceseccccncsevecenssesien 28

NP ceiialiiidssicsiitsninveinnitciinnniiinniniaiinnsinmennse 34

iv

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Page
CASES
Abbot Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136
STI ediciideiisiasbidniddenintansnnianimasessnndsansinbinaneuienian passim
Appalachian Power Co. v. E.P.A., 208 F.3d 1015
I TUITITTTTITTTTTT iis cesenieiiastieslbiihendiabldnadbanmaniddneniing 26, 30
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) ...................008 17
Barrick Goldstrike Mines Inc. v. Browner, 215
I i ani aciiniericliinteenwniduniitids 14, 29
Bell v. New Jersey, 461 U.S. 773 (1983).............c0c00+- 16
Belle Co., L.L.C. v. U.S. Army Corps of Engi-
neers, 761 F.3d 383 (5th Cir. 2014).....................000 4
Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154 (1997) ............... passim
Better Gov't Ass’n v. Dept. of State, 780 F.2d 86
i aclsinennl 29
Bland v. United States, 412 U.S. 909 (1973)....... 11, 23
Block v. Community Nutrition Institute, 467
I ieee ase natin databamnineis 7
Board of Trade of City of Chicago v. SEC, 883
ET Re ee 11
Bowen v. Massachusetts, 487 U.S. 879 (1988)........... 23
Bowen v. Michigan Academy of Family Physi-
A ree Ie GE tcicciienitteinersnecsnsecnnsnscnssnconnes 7
Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99 (1977).................00088 9

Center for Native Ecosystems v. Cables, 509
F.3d 1310 (10th Cir. 2007) ............0200.0000000.. 15, 16, 26

Vv

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES — Continued

Page
Ciba-Geigy Corp. v. EPA, 801 F.2d 430 (D.C.

GAIT Ga scssosinssnosececinsssedpesisebunscusatiaiaiamiadiaiest Aaa 11, 30
Darby v. Cisneros, 509 U.S. 137 (1993) ............... 10, 22
Decker v. Nw. Envtl. Def. Ctr.,___. U.S. __, 133

hs CR, Be iiccctinscsicccncninceenctenpiininiabialiniiimmaaiaa 2,19
Dunlop v. Bachowski, 421 U.S. 560 (1975).................. 7
In re EPA, 803 F.3d 804 (6th Cir. 2015) ...................cceeee
ETC. v. Standard Oil Co. of Cal., 449 U.S. 232

Fier ovecscssenscsensienasicniiasiaiunsiaaieansenaisaaiaaiiaan 13, 14
Fairbanks N. Star Borough v. U.S. Army Corps

of Eng’rs, 543 F.3d 586 (9th Cir. 2008)............... 4,17
First Nat. Bank of Chicago v. Comptroller of

Currency of U.S., 956 F.2d 1360 (7th Cir.

ITT vsisccsscnsnssevatcsnsnensinnininisiammieinsadeiaidiiinman 19, 29
Franklin v. Massachusetts, 505 U.S. 788

Coie vchicesensiestasnnmneieiiiiniasacuiiineaminiiammaaadaiial 11, 14, 15
Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Over-

sight Bd., 561 U.S. 477 (2010)................ccccccse00 20, 25
Frozen Food Exp. v. United States, 351 U.S. 40

iia el ccavisicesesnecesensstetnaiiemseenationanaienimiaaaas 18
Hanousek v. United States, 528 U.S. 1102

Pie sccccccssiccccsnnsesesssstnneiininieninanneienaiiaaanniaa 31
Harrison v. PPG Industries, Inc., 446 U.S. 578

FIED incvecenussesosontennnennnntiniiiemanmiinapeiiahelaaa seus aaeanas 15

Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821 (1985)..............0cccceeee 9

vi

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES — Continued

Page
Herr v. U.S. Forest Serv., 803 F.3d 809 (6th Cir.
iat rrcenerenannnnnaneennennsenens 2, 25
Japan Whaling Ass’n v. Am. Cetacean Soc’y,
errant 7
Johnson v. U.S. EPA, No. 15-147 (D. Wyo.)................. 2
Lucas v. S. Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S.
eee enamine 27, 28
Mach Mining, LLC v. E.E.0.C., __. U.S. __,
ee 7
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137
I ata a esintaenmannnanenenninnnnel 8
Minard Run Oil Co. v. U.S. Forest Serv., 670
F.3d 236 (3d Cir. 2011), as amended (Mar. 7,
EEE ESTEE Ee 2, 26
Mount Royal Joint Venture v. Kempthorne, 477
ncn erntanaancitnnnennesenenes 2
Mountain States Legal Found. v. Nat. Wildlife
Ey Cy EIT cccecescnscccenscascenssseenensesccces 2
Nat'l Ass’n of Home Builders v. E.P.A., 667 F.3d
i ererertenene 19
Nat'l Ass’n of Home Builders v. U.S. Army
Corps of Engineers, 417 F.3d 1272 (D.C. Cir.
aera mnnnenernnannnens 26
Nietzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319 (1989)................... 17

Northcoast Environmental Center v. Glickman,
196 F.3d GEO (Sti Cir. 1906) ..........ccccccccccccccccsccceees. 24

Vii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES — Continued

Page
Northwest Mining Ass’n v. Babbitt, 5 F. Supp.
I i a a 2
Oregon Natural Desert Ass’n v. U.S. Forest
Service, 465 F.3d 977 (9th Cir. 2006)...................... 26
Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393
icici acca iaiaclaae 27
Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715
IT iiconsdintehabaaiiipeiisdeisiianiaeidaiimsbdiibagiaiindadindieiiuii 2, 31, 32, 33
Riverside Irr. Dist. v. Andrews, 758 F.2d 508
IR aici hich ial iale ad tian aadidl 2
Rusk v. Cort, 369 U.S. 367 (1962) ............cccccccceceeeeeeeees i)
Sackett v. E.PA., 132 S. Ct. 1367 (2012)............ passim
Shuler v. Babbitt, 49 F.Supp. 2d 1165 (D.
Ssetic IIIT ticitsiiiineieiiteiiasiheieeminneabnaiiniasa 2
Sierra Club v. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Comm’n, 825 F.2d 1356 (9th Cir. 1987).................. 17
Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook Cty. v.
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 531 U.S. 159
Serie tciciensininrapmeuniaialibhtietintiaicinaammeaiatieiaasiinameasiitiidinsiia 33
Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452 (1974) .................. 25
Stupak-Thrall v. Glickman, 988 F. Supp. 1055
Se Ses Ti a cinpiuitchnnnstidsenecinnsinseienndmaiennnianadesingibei 2

In re U.S. Dep't of Def., U.S. EPA Final Rule:
Clean Water Rule: Definition of Waters of
U.S., No. 15-3839, 2016 WL 723241, at *1
4 ee 2,31

eer

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES — Continued

Page
Western Radio Services Co., Inc. v. Glickman,
123 F.3d 1189 (9th Cir. 1997).............ccccccsesssereeessees 23
Whitman v. American Trucking Associations,
ee ee ee itccninenasnsnatsereniiteneninaniennsnensemmens 18
STATUTES
Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 551 et
GBD. cccnnnscecncesssnnsesesessscnsnserenssnnsvensscsacanessenesnsnente passim
ET OF Wl ntistncmnesicnsininnnienennninienaninenisnmicmnusianbin 7
ee BD diicinctincsinnnicinctnitnnsssinenitiainiamsitininiinianiiie 7
ee Be cniccrnninccchenitissiceniinininabeinicuiniinisiid 6,9
SEE an TTT cccrinnsiienienenanditnnadintdpintineummmneenindaell 9
eS OF See iataniivitisinienincennicnnaniinnvitispinnintiieiiags passim
Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1251 et seq. ......... passim
Re 3
I A SEIT sciicenismccniendattcncsiitincciiieinninsiiiciniiiingn 22
fe ee 3, 14, 22
ey Oe STEED ncnnnesnensnsesentonnniesitnenioimenementaneani 22
ee Ue i ciiconidvtnnndesininesceninnnevintininineeniebniananiiagl 3
ey Ur TUITE Niiicicinnincciiniceinitinisiesiiniesineihitateaadiadaicaniaatinniaantie 19
RULES

SS TEE 1

ix

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES — Continued

Page
Supreme Court Rule 37.3(a)...................sssssssesseeeeeeeeeees 1
Ee een 17
REGULATIONS
I ll 4
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY

Administrative Procedure Act, Hearings on
H.R. 184, H.R. 339, H.R. 1117, H.R. 1203,
H.R. 1206, and H.R. 2602 Before the H.
Comm. on the Judiciary, 79th Cong., Ist
nts CERT tisichisinistnsiitiuiiridaihdieaiaandienteinitinmiogndannensenes 10

Administrative Procedure Act: Hearings on S. 7
Before the House and Senate, 79th Cong. 2d
I 8, 10

Final Report of Attorney General’s Comm. on
Administrative Procedure, S. Doc. No. 8

SETAE EE ee a Te 10
f 5 5 = TTT CENTER 7,8,9
Be Se icnenececncmenennicreenmennennteneeal 8, 31
OTHER AUTHORITIES

Attorney General’s Manual on the Administra-
tive Procedure Act, 94 (1947) ..........cccccccccccsecceeeceeees 23

x

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES — Continued

E. Gates Garrity-Rokous, Preserving Review of
Undeclared Programs: A Statutory Redefini-
tion of Final Agency Action, 101 Yale L. J.

Richard E. Levy et al., Administrative Proce-
dure and the Decline of the Trial, 51 U. Kan.
Bis Se EEE chiiieieriniintadutsinnniuenenninnonssiananmaeasuel 28

1

AMICUS CURIAE BRIEF OF
MOUNTAIN STATES LEGAL FOUNDATION
IN SUPPORT OF HAWKES

Pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 37.3, Mountain
States Legal Foundation (“MSLF”) respectfully sub-
mits this amicus curiae brief, on behalf of itself and
its members, in support of Respondents.’

°

IDENTITY AND INTEREST
OF AMICUS CURIAE

MSLF is a nonprofit, public-interest legal foun-
dation organized under the laws of the State of Colo-
rado. MSLF is dedicated to bringing before the courts
those issues vital to the defense and preservation of
individual liberties, the right to own and use proper-
ty, the free enterprise system, and limited and ethical
government. MSLF has members who reside, own
property, and work in all 50 states.

Since its creation in 1977, MSLF and its attor-
neys have been actively involved in litigation regard-
ing the proper interpretation and implementation of
the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”), 5 U.S.C.

' Pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 37.3(a), all parties
consent to the filing of this amicus curiae brief. The undersigned
further affirms that no counsel for a party authored this brief in
whole or in part, and no person or entity, other than MSLF, its
members, or its counsel, made a monetary contribution specifi-
cally for the preparation or submission of this brief.

2

§ 551 et seg. E.g., Mountain States Legal Found. v.
Nat. Wildlife Fed’n, 497 U.S. 1020 (1990). In fact, a
substantial portion of the cases in which MSLF
attorneys provide representation involved clients who
are challenging agency action under the generous
judicial] review provisions of the APA. E.g., Herr v.
U.S. Forest Serv., 803 F.3d 809 (6th Cir. 2015);
Minard Run Oil Co. v. U.S. Forest Serv., 670 F.3d 236
(83d Cir. 2011), as amended (Mar. 7, 2012); Mount
Royal Joint Venture v. Kempthorne, 477 F.3d 745
(D.C. Cir. 2007); Northwest Mining Ass’n v. Babbitt, 5
F. Supp. 2d 9 (D.D.C. 1998); Shuler v. Babbitt, 49
F. Supp. 2d 1165 (D. Mont. 1998); Stupak-Thrall v.
Glickman, 988 F. Supp. 1055 (W.D. Mich. 1997).

MSLIF and its attorneys have also been — and are
currently — involved in litigation regarding the proper
interpretation and implementation of the Clean
Water Act (“CWA”), 33 U.S.C. § 1251 et seq. E.g.,
Decker v. Nw. Envtl. Def. Ctr.,__. U.S. ___, 133 S. Ct.
1326 (2013); Sackett v. EPA, __ U.S. __, 132 S. Ct.
1367 (2012); Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715
(2006) (plurality); Riverside Irr. Dist. v. Andrews, 758
F.2d 508 (10th Cir. 1985); In re U.S. Dep't of Def., U.S.
EPA Final Rule: Clean Water Rule: Definition of
Waters of U.S., No. 15-3839, 2016 WL 723241 (6th
Cir. Feb. 22, 2016) (“In re: Definition of ‘Waters of the
United States’”); Johnson v. U.S. EPA, No. 15-147 (D.
Wyo.). MSLF brings a unique perspective to the case
at bar by addressing the APA’s presumption of judi-
cial review, the courts’ interpretation of the
APA as providing for broad judicial review, and the

3

importance of judicial review to protect private prop-
erty owners from unlawful agency action.

°

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

The CWA grants the Corps jurisdiction to regu-
late discharges into navigable waters, or “waters of
the United States.” 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311(a), 1362(7).
Under the CWA, a permit is required for certain
discharges into waters of the United States. 33 U.S.C.
§ 1342. The CWA imposes fines and penalties for
unpermitted discharges, and knowing violations can
incur civil and/or criminal penalties to the tune of
$50,000 a day and up to three years imprisonment. 33
U.S.C. § 1819(c).

Hawkes Co., Inc. wishes to mine peat from a 530-
acre property in northwestern Minnesota owned by
two affiliated companies (collectively, “Hawkes”).
Petitioner’s Appendix (“Pet. App.”) at la, 5a. Hawkes
met with the Army Corps of Engineers (“Corps”) to
discuss agency jurisdiction and, exercising an abun-
dance of caution, also applied for a CWA permit. Pet.
App. at 6a. The Corps issued an approved jurisdic-
tional determination concluding the subject property
was a water of the United States because of its “sig-
nificant nexus” to the Red River, a traditional navi-
gable water some 120 miles away. Pet. App. at 7a.
Hawkes timely filed an administrative appeal of the
approved jurisdictional determination. Pet. App. at
7a. On appeal, the jurisdictional determination was

4

reversed, but the Corps issued a revised jurisdictional
determination with essentially the same information
and findings.’ Pet. App. at 7a, 45a-47a.

Hawkes filed suit seeking judicial review of the
jurisdictional determination as a final agency action
under the APA. Joint Appendix (“Joint App.” at 7-8).
The Corps filed a motion to dismiss, and the district
court granted that motion. Pet. App. 20a-3la. The
Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed and rejected
the district court’s reliance on Fairbanks N. Star
Borough v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 543 F.3d 586
(9th Cir. 2008) and Belle Co., L.L.C. v. Army Corps of
Engineers, 761 F.3d 383 (5th Cir. 2014) as contrary to
this Court’s decision in Sackett. Pet. App. lla-16a.
Under Sackett, the Eighth Circuit held that a juris-
dictional determination is a final agency action for
which there is no other adequate judicial remedy
under 5 U.S.C. § 704. Pet. App. 16a-17a. The Corps
timely filed a petition for writ of certiorari. To resolve
the circuit split, this Court granted certiorari.

+

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

The narrow issue presented by this case is
whether the Corps has overcome the APA's strong
presumption favoring judicial review of agency action.

* The revised jurisdictional determination stated that it was
a “final Corps permit decision in accordance with 33 C.F.R.
§ 331.10.” Pet. App. at 45a.

5

As the legislative history of the APA demonstrates,
Congress intended the APA’s judicial review provi-
sions to be an important check on federal agencies’
proclivity to exercise their powers arbitrarily or
assume powers not granted. Indeed, Congress recog-
nized that, in some circumstances, judicial review
would be the only available protection against unwar-
ranted governmental expansion into citizens’ private
lives.

The practical effect of a jurisdictional determina-
tion demonstrates that it does not fall within one of
the APA’s limited, enumerated exceptions to judicial
review. The Corps’ argument that a jurisdictional
determination is not final agency action eschews the
pragmatic interpretation of finality mandated by this
Court, fails to appreciate the measurable legal conse-
quences that flow from issuance of a jurisdictional
determination, and ignores the Corps’ own treatment
of the jurisdictional determination as binding and
final. The direct and immediate impact of the juris-
dictional determination on Hawkes’ use of its private
property for peat mining ipso facto demonstrates that
such determination constitutes final agency action.

The thrust of the Corps’ argument rests on its
erroneous attempt to distinguish between agency
orders that compel affirmative action — which the
Corps concedes are subject to judicial review — and
agency orders that prohibit regulated parties from
taking otherwise lawful action, which the Corps
asserts are not subject to judicial review. The Corps’
view of the APA conflicts with countless other

6

interpretations of the finality requirement of 5 U.S.C.
§ 704 and ignores the fundamental right of property
owners to use their private property.

Finally, judicial review of agency actions such as
jurisdictional determinations serves important public
policy interests, especially in the context of agency
attempts to assert jurisdiction under the CWA. In the
absence of judicial review, agencies will be able to
strong-arm private property owners into compliance
with their decisions — no matter how arbitrary or
abusive — because of the lack of other adequate reme-
dies. Therefore, judicial review of jurisdictional
determinations is necessary to protect regulated
parties from agency overreach.

+

ARGUMENT

I. THE APA PROVIDES A BROAD PRESUMP-
TION FAVORING JUDICIAL REVIEW OF
ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION.

The APA provides a right of judicial review of all
“final agency action for which there is no other ade-
quate remedy in a court.” 5 U.S.C. § 704.’ Thus, the

* There are only two limited exceptions to the APA’s broad
provision of judicial review: (1) where the statute precludes
review; and (2) where agency action is committed to agency
discretion by law. 5 U.S.C. § 701(a\(1), (2); Bennett v. Spear, 520
U.S. 154, 175 (1997) (“The APA, by its terms, provides a right to
judicial review of all ‘final agency action for which there is no
other adequate remedy in a court,’ and applies universally

(Continued on following page)

7

APA “creates a ‘presumption favoring judicial review
of administrative action. ’°” Sackett, 132 S.Ct. at
1373 (quoting Block v. Community Nutrition Insti-
tute, 467 U.S. 340, 345 (1984)). Recently, this Court
unanimously emphasized that “Congress rarely
intends to prevent courts from enforcing its directives
to federal agencies. For that reason, this Court ap-
plies a ‘strong presumption’ favoring judicial review
of administrative action.” Mach Mining, LLC uv.
E.E.0.C., __. U.S. __, 135 S. Ct. 1645, 1651 (2015)
(quoting Bowen v. Michigan Academy of Family
Physicians, 476 U.S. 667, 670 (1986)) (emphasis
added). And while the presumption is rebuttable, the
agency bears a “‘heavy burden’” to show that a
plaintiff is not entitled to judicial review. Jd. (quoting
Dunlop v. Bachowski, 421 U.S. 560, 567 (1975));
Japan Whaling Ass’n v. Am. Cetacean Soc’y, 478 U.S.
221, 230 n.4 (1986) (holding that a “right of action” is
“expressly created” by 5 U.S.C. § 704 “absent some
clear and convincing evidence” to the contrary).

When Congress passed the APA, it did so in
hopes of reining in what President Roosevelt referred
to as the “‘fourth branch’ of the Government for
which there is no sanction in the Constitution.” S.
Doc. No. 79-248, at 299 (1946). Senator McCarran,
the architect of the bill, described one of the APA’s
four main functions as “set[ting] forth a simplified

‘except to the extent that [§ 701 applies).’”) (quoting 5 U.S.C.
§§ 704, 701(a)). The Corps has not asserted that either 5 U.S.C.
§ 701 exception applies here.

8

statement of judicial review designed to afford a
remedy for every legal wrong.” Administrative Proce-
dure Act: Hearings on S. 7 Before the House and
Senate, 79th Cong. 2d Sess. 304 (1946) (“Hearings”)
(emphasis added). In recommending the bill to Con-
gress, the Senate Judiciary Committee stated that
judicial review was “indispensable[,] since its mere
existence generally precludes the arbitrary exercise of
powers or assumption of powers not granted.” S. Rep.
No. 79-752, at 217 (1945). Congress’s adoption of the
APA recognized that judicial review is deeply rooted
in American jurisprudence, and to allow the “barnacle
growth” of unchecked agency authority could “foull ]”
“the ship of state” and “endanger| ]” “our institutions.”
S. Doc. No. 79-248, at 350 (1946); see also Marbury v.
Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 170 (1803) (“[WJhat
is there, in the exalted station of an officer, which
shall bar a citizen from asserting, in a court of justice,
his legal rights, or shall forbid a court to listen to the
claim ?”).

It is apparent from the APA’s legislative history
that Congress viewed judicial oversight of agency
actions as the central mechanism by which the APA
would protect Americans from agency overreach and
abuse. S. Doc. No. 79-248, at 305 (1946) (Senator
McCarran emphasizing that judicial review is “some-
thing in which the American public has been and is
much concerned, harkening back, if we may, to the
Constitution of the United States, which sets up the
judicial branch of the Government for the redress of
human wrongs and for the enforcement of human

9

rights.”); id. at 347 (Representative Michener stating
that “[t]he only aim and purpose of this bill is to see
that the rank and file of American people receive the
justice which our system of jurisprudence attempts to
guarantee to them.”). And this Court has consistently
interpreted the APA as requiring judicial review of
almost all agency actions. See Heckler v. Chaney, 470
U.S. 821, 843-44 (1985) (Marshall, J., concurring)
(“The legislative material elucidating [the APAI]
manifests a congressional intention that it cover a
broad spectrum of administrative actions, and this
Court has echoed that theme by noting that the
[APA]’s ‘generous review provisions’ must be given
a ‘hospitable interpretation. ’°” (quoting Abbott
Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 140 (1967),
overruled on other grounds, Califano v. Sanders, 430
U.S. 99 (1977))); Califano, 430 U.S. at 104 (The APA
“undoubtedly evinces Congress[’s] intention and
understanding that judicial review should be widely
available to challenge the actions of federal adminis-
trative officials.”).

Thus, the APA affords broad judicial review of
agency action unless: (1) the agency action is not
final; (2) existing statutes preclude judicial review; or
(3) the agency action is committed to agency discre-
tion by law. 5 U.S.C. §§ 701(a)(1), (2), 704. Only upon
a showing of “‘clear and convincing evidence’” that
one of these exceptions applies “should the courts
restrict access to judicial review.” Abbott Laborato-
ries, 387 U.S. at 141 (quoting Rusk v. Cort, 369 U'S.
367, 379-80 (1962)). The limited exceptions to judicial

10

review in the APA demonstrate Congress’s intent that
such review serve as “a check against excess of power
and abusive exercise of power in derogation of private
right.” Final Report of Attorney General’s Comm. on
Administrative Procedure, S. Doc. No. 8, at 76 (1941);
see also Hearings at 307 (“In light of the great expan-
sion of governmental activities into the private lives
of our citizens, some protection of the citizen against
these agencies should be provided. It is long overdue.”
(statement of Sen. Reed)).

Congress also intended agency action to be
considered final for purposes of judicial review
“whether or not there has been presented or deter-
mined an application for a declaratory order, for any
form of reconsideration, or, unless the agency other-
wise requires by rule and provides that the action
meanwhile is inoperative, for an appeal to superior
agency authority.” 5 U.S.C. § 704; Administrative
Procedure Act, Hearings on H.R. 184, H.R. 339, H.R.
1117, H.R. 1203, H.R. 1206, and H.R. 2602 Before the
H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 76
(1945) ‘statement of Sen. McCarran); cf. Darby v.
Cisneros, 509 U.S. 137, 137 (1993) (federal courts do
not have the authority to require exhaustion of ad-
ministrative remedies before a plaintiff may seek
judicial review under the APA, where neither the
relevant statute nor agency rules specifically man-
date exhaustion as a prerequisite to judicial review).
There is no indication in the legislative history that
Congress intended the finality requirement to be
applied in a “hypertechnical fashion” — to the contrary,

11

“the legislative history of [5 U.S.C.) § 704 suggestis]
that Congress was merely codifying the self-imposed
judicial practice of exercising restraint in reviewing
tentative agency action.” Ciba-Geigy Corp. v. EPA,
801 F.2d 430, 435 n.7 (D.C. Cir. 1986). The APA’s
broad presumption of judicial review is therefore the
starting point for any inquiry regarding an agency’s
claim that its action is not yet final. Bland v. United
States, 412 U.S. 909, 912 (1973) (Douglas, J., dissent-
ing from denial of certiorari) (“[UJnder the [APA]
judicial review of the exercise of executive discretion
is the rule and unreviewability is the exception.”
(internal quotation omitted)).

Il. A JURISDICTIONAL DETERMINATION
UNDER THE CWA IS THE QUINTESSEN-
TIAL FINAL AGENCY ACTION SUBJECT
TO JUDICIAL REVIEW UNDER THE APA.

A. AJurisdictional Determination Is Final
Agency Action.

Although judicial review under the APA is avail-
able only for “final” agency actions, 5 U.S.C. § 704,
the APA’s finality requirement is interpreted in a
“flexible” and “pragmatic way.” Abbott Laboratories,
387 U.S. at 149-51; see also Ciba-Geigy, 801 F.2d at
435 & n.7 (recognizing that 5 U.S.C. § 704 does not
“convey|] some settled, inflexible meaning that
precludes pragmatic or functional considerations.”);
Board of Trade of City of Chicago v. S.E.C., 883 F.2d
525, 530 (7th Cir. 1989) (“‘Finality is a practical
concept[ |” that takes into consideration whether the

12

regulated individual or entity must “dance to [the
agency's] tune”). The “core question” in determining
finality “is whether the agency has completed its
decisionmaking process, and whether the result of
that process is one that will directly affect the par-
ties.” Franklin v. Massachusetts, 505 U.S. 788, 797
(1992). In Bennett, this Court synthesized its prior
precedents into a two-pronged inquiry, holding that
agency action is final if it: (1) represents the con-
summation of agency decision-making on the matter;
and (2) fixes legal rights or obligations, or is one from
which legal consequences will flow. 520 U.S. at 177-
78.

In the case at bar, the Corps concedes that the
first prong of the Bennett test is satisfied. Corps’ Br.
at 25-26. However, the Corps argues that an approved
jurisdictional determination under the CWA is not
final because it does not “impose legal consequences”
under the second Bennett prong. Corps’ Br. at 26. The
Corps’ argument eschews a “pragmatic” interpreta-
tion of the finality requirement in favor of a rigid
view that requires the plaintiff to demonstrate “legal
consequences” or “penalties” as a result of the agency
action. Corps’ Br. at 26. Under the Corps’ myopic
interpretation, the jurisdictional determination is
divorced from the CWA — the statute under which
the Corps issued the jurisdictional determination in
the first place ~— because any obligation to avoid
discharge of pollutants into “waters of the United
States” flows independently from the CWA itself,
rather than the jurisdictional determination. Corps’

13

Br. at 27. According to the Corps, the jurisdictional
determination merely expresses the Corps’ opinion
that a pre-existing obligation to avoid such discharges
exists. Corps’ Br. at 27-28.

In determining whether the agency action at
issue “fixes legal rights or obligations,” or is one from
which legal consequences flow, Bennett, 520 U.S. at
177-78, this Court looks primarily to whether the
agency's position is “definitive” and whether it has a
“‘direct and immediate effect on the day-to-day
business’” of the parties challenging the action. F-'T:C.
v. Standard Oil Co. of Cal., 449 U.S. 232, 239 (1980)
(quoting Abbott Laboratories, 387 U.S. at 152). Final
agency actions have “the status of law” and “immedi-
ate compliance with their terms [is] expected.” Abbott
Laboratories, 387 U.S. at 152. A jurisdictional deter-
mination is clearly “definitive” in that it is the agen-
cy’s final word on a specific property’s jurisdictional
status, and such determination will not be reconsid-
ered during the CWA permitting process. Sackett, 132
S. Ct. at 1374 (agency’s determination “that it has
regulatory authority over [the] property” is a “defini-
tive[ ]” ruling on that question) (Ginsburg, J., concur-
ring). A jurisdictional determination also clearly
conveys the impression that “compliance [is] expected”
because the Corps does not contend that private
property owners are free to disregard the jurisdic-
tional determination and commence peat mining
without consequences. See Abbott Laboratories, 387
U.S. at 151. To the contrary, violations for discharges
into waters of the United States without a permit can

14

incur civil and/or criminal penalties of $50,000 a day
and up to three years imprisonment. See 33 U.S.C.
§ 1319(c). As the D.C. Circuit has recognized, where a
landowner “will be subject to an enforcement action
and fines” if it does not conform to the agency’s view —
here, that Hawkes’ property contains jurisdictional
wetlands — then “the finality of [the agency’s] position
is clear enough.” Barrick Goldstrike Mines Inc. v.
Browner, 215 F.3d 45, 47-48 (D.C. Cir. 2000).

This Court has also considered whether the
challenge to agency action presented a legal issue
“fit for judicial resolution” and whether the parties
bringing the challenge “represented almost all the
parties affected,” in which case, “‘a pre-enforcement
challenge [is] calculated to speed enforcement’ of the
relevant Act.” Standard Oil, 449 U.S. at 239 (quoting
Abbott Laboratories, 387 U.S. at 150). A final agency
action is “‘a final and binding determination’” rather
than “‘a tentative recommendation. ’*” Bennett, 520
U.S. at 178 (quoting Franklin, 505 U.S. at 798). The
jurisdictional determination at issue here is analo-
gous to other final agency actions. For example, in
Bennett, the agency action at issue was a biological
opinion and accompanying incidental take statement
issued by the Fish and Wildlife Service (““FWS”).* Id.

* Notably, the biological opinion and incidental take state-
ment at issue in Bennett were far more attenuated than the
jurisdictional determination at issue here because they did not
purport to apply to individual regulated parties but instead
applied to other agencies. 520 U.S. at 157.

15

at 157. This Court held that the FWS’s action met the
second prong of its test because the action “alter/s]
the legal regime to which the action agency is subject,
authorizing it to take the endangered species if (but
only if) it complies with the prescribed conditions.”
Id. at 178. Much like the legal effects that flowed
from the biological opinion in Bennett, the legal
effects that flow from the jurisdictional determination
here is that Hawkes is ible to commence peat mining
activities if (but only if) it applies for and receives a
CWA permit. Petitioner’s Appendix (“Pet. App.”) at
lla-13a; see Pet. App. at 83a (Jurisdictional determi-
nation expressly rejecting Hawkes’ position that the
land at issue was not a “waters of the United States”).
Thus, the jurisdictional determination is “‘a final and
binding determination’” rather than “‘a tentative
recommendation[.]’” Bennett, 520 U.S. at 178 (quot-
ing Franklin, 505 U.S. at 798); see also Ciba-Geigy
Corp., 801 F.2d at 436 (“Once the agency publicly
articulates an unequivocal position and expects
regulated entities to alter their primary conduct to
conform to that position, the agency has voluntarily
relinquished the benefit of postponed judicial re-
view.”); Harrison v. PPG Industries, Inc., 446 U.S.
578, 586 (1980) (Agency’s decision was final when it
“rendered its last word on the matter.”).

An analogous circuit court decision is Center for
Native Ecosystems v. Cables, 509 F.3d 1310 (10th Cir.
2007), where the Forest Service had issued annual
operating instructions (“AOIs”) but not grazing per-
mits for a specific area. Jd. at 1328-29. Environmental

16

groups challenged the AOIs as final agency action
under the APA. Id. The Tenth Circuit held the second
prong of the Bennett test was satisfied because the
AOlIs set forth certain findings independent from —
and not available in — the grazing permits, and thus
conferred certain legal obligations. Jd. at 1330. The
court explained that AOIs are the agency’s “last word”
and “undoubtedly have clear and definite conse-
quences” on regulated parties. Id. The same rationale
is applicable to the jurisdictional determination here:
While a CWA permit has not yet been granted or
denied, the CWA permit process does not offer any
opportunity for revision of the jurisdictional determi-
nation, and the Corps characterizes the jurisdictional
determination as a discrete agency decision distinct
from a CWA permit. Corps’ Br. at 8-10.

Issuance of a jurisdictional determination also
“presents a ‘legal issue fit for judicial resolution.’”
Center for Native Ecosystems, 509 F.3d at 1330
(Standard Oil, 449 U.S. at 239). The jurisdictional
determination at issue here is the Corps’ stand-alone
pronouncement of the jurisdictional status of Hawkes’
property. Corps’ Br. at 8-10. Thus, judicial review
would not disrupt any ongoing administrative pro-
cess. See Bel’ v. New Jersey, 461 U.S. 773, 779-80
(1983) (Agency action is final notwithstanding “[t]he
possibility of further proceedings in the agency” on
related issues, so long as “judicial review at the time
[would not] disrupt the administrative process.”).

The Corps argues that its jurisdictional determi-
nation is not final agency action because it is the

17

CWA that requires landowners to obtain permits to
discharge into waters of the United States, not the
jurisdictional determination. See Corps’ Br. at 27
This argument is unavailing, because it contradicts
the Corps’ treatment of jurisdictional determinations
as binding during its permit process.’ Compare Fair-
banks, 543 F.3d at 593 (“An approved jurisdictional
determination upheld on administrative appeal is
the agency’s ‘last word’ on whether it views the
property as a wetland subject to regulation under
the CWA.” (quoting Sierra Club v. U.S. Nuclear
Regulatory Comm’n, 825 F.2d 1356, 1362 (9th Cir.
1987))), with Bennett, 520 U.S. at 178 (agency rec-
ommendations that are “binding” are final agency
action). An agency’s treatment of its own decision as
final is a clear indication that it is, in fact, final.

* Additionally, because Hawkes’ allegations must be taken
as true for purposes of the Corps’ motion to dismiss, this Court
must take as true Hawkes’ contention that their property does
not contain jurisdictional wetlands that fall within the definition
of “waters of the United States” under the CWA. See Joint App.
at 8; Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 696 (2009) (in considering a
motion to dismiss, the court “assum[es] the factual allegations
are true”); Nietzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327 (1989) (“Rule
12(bX(6) does not countenance dismissals based on a judge’s
disbelief of a complaint’s factual allegations.”). Therefore, it is
the jurisdictional determination that (erroneously) purports to
impose a permitting requirement on Hawkes, not the CWA. Pet.
App. at 13a (“[TJhe {jurisdictional determination) alters and
adversely affects [Hawkes’s] right to use [its] property in
conducting a lawful business activity. The adverse effect is
caused by agency action, not simply by the existence of the
CWA..”).

18

Whitman v. American Trucking Associations, 531 U.S.
457, 478-79 (2001). Indeed, even where an agency
“has not dressed its decision with the conventional
procedural accoutrements of finality, its own behavior
[may] belly] the claim that its interpretation is not
final.” Jd. (holding that EPA’s “interim implementa-
tion policy” for national ambient air quality stan-
dards was final, given the agency’s refusal to
reconsider it in subsequent rulemakings, representa-
tion to commenters that its interpretation was con-
clusive, and adoption of the interpretation under the
heading “final decision”).

As a practical matter, the jurisdictional determi-
nation is final as to its effect on Hawkes’ inability to
use its property. Indeed, whether Hawkes chose to
apply for a permit or proceed with peat mining with-
out a permit and face the consequences, a jurisdic-
tional determination would undoubtedly form the
basis of the Corps’ permitting process or, alternative-
ly, the Corps’ enforcement action. See Frozen Food
Exp. v. United States, 351 U.S. 40, 44 (1956) (Agency
decision is not “abstract, theoretical, or academic”
where it forms “the basis for [regulated entities] in
ordering and arranging their affairs.”). When an
agency decision is practically treated as final and
binding as to both the agency and regulated parties,
as jurisdictional determinations are, the impact “is
sufficiently direct and immediate as to render the
issue appropriate for judicial review. ” Abbott
Laboratories, 387 U.S. at 152.

19

Moreover, legal consequences flow from a site-
specific jurisdictional determination because it “sub-
stantially increase[s] the risk of regulation or en-
forcement relating to particular property. ™ Nat’
Ass’n of Home Builders v. EPA, 667 F.3d 6, 13-14
(D.C. Cir. 2011); see also First Nat. Bank of Chicago v.
Comptroller of Currency of U.S., 956 F.2d 1360, 1364
(7th Cir. 1992) (holding that comptroller’s opinion
letter to bank was final agency action because “the
bank requested not advice, perhaps on a purely
hypothetical course of action, but permission to go
forward with a concrete proposal. The Comptrol-
ler turned the bank down. He did not offer a
merely tentative view.”). Thus, jurisdictional deter-
minations are not only “definitive,” but also have a
“direct and immediate effect on the day-to-day
business” of affected property owners because they
constitute direct pronouncements on the Corps’
jurisdiction over the subject property. See Abbott
Laboratories, 387 U.S. at 151-52.

The Corps repeatedly argues that, if judicial
review of jurisdictional determinations is permitted,
the Corps (and other agencies) will be discouraged
from issuing jurisdictional determinations or conducting

* As a practical matter, even if the Corps does not bring an
enforcement action, a jurisdictional determination ipso facto
subjects Hawkes to a greater risk of litigation under the CWA’s
citizen suit provisions because a decree that the subject property
contains waters of the United States would provide the basis for
such suit. 33 U.S.C. § 1365; see, e.g., Decker, 133 S. Ct. at 1326.

20

other agency actions not mandated by statute. Corps’
Br. at 24-25 (Asserting that, if jurisdictional determi-
nations are considered final agency actions, “the
Corps might reconsider the practice, or at least revisit
its willingness to provide an approved jurisdictional
determination to anyone who requests it.”). However,
this is the exact same argument unanimously reject-
ed in Sackett, 132 S.Ct. at 1374, where the EPA
“warn(ed] that [it] is less likely to use [compliance]
orders if they are subject to judicial review.” This
Court reasoned, “[t]hat may be true — but it will be
true for all agency actions subjected to judicial re-
view. The APA’s presumption of judicial review is a
repudiation of the principle that efficiency of regula-
tion conquers all.” Jd. And, as with the compliance
order at issue in Sackett, judicial determinations will
remain an effective means of informing private
property owners of the presence of judicial waters of
the United States in cases where “there is no sub-
stantial basis to question their validity.” Jd. The
Corps’ desire to issue jurisdictional determinations
without fear of judicial review is not sufficient reason
to deprive Hawkes of its day in court. Cf. Free Enter.
Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S.
477, 499 (2010) (“[T]hat a given law or procedure is
efficient, convenient, and useful in facilitating func-
tions of government, standing alone, will not save it if
it is contrary to the Constitution, for convenience and
efficiency are not the primary objectives — or the
hallmarks — of democratic government.” (quotations
and alteration omitted)).

21

B. There Is No Adequate Remedy In
Court Following The Issuance Of A Ju-
risdictional Determination.

The APA provides that judicial review under the
APA is available where “there is no other adequate
remedy in a court. A preliminary, procedural, or
intermediate agency action or ruling not directly
reviewable is subject to review on the review of the
final agency action.” 5 U.S.C. § 704. The Corps argues
that, although Hawkes has exhausted its administra-
tive remedies and the jurisdictional determination
is now final, Hawkes has other adequate recourse
because it may now apply for a CWA permit.’ Corps’
Br. at 44-45. Then, the Corps argues, “[w]hen the
Corps denies a permit, or issues a permit subject to
conditions that the applicant opposes, the applicant
may seek judicial review of that decision” and may
argue at that time that the jurisdictional determina-
tion was erroneous. Corps’ Br. at 45.

” Alternatively, the Corps argues that Hawkes may decline
to apply for a permit and may wait for the Corps to bring an
enforcement action. Corps’ Br. at 50. Sackett essentially rejected
this option as an adequate remedy. Sackett, 132 S. Ct. at 1372
(noting that each day the regulated parties “wait for the agency
to drop the hammer” following the issuance of a compliance
order, “exorbitant civil and criminal penalties accrue”); see also
id. at 1375 (The CWA’s “draconian penalties for the sort of
violations alleged in this case” leave property owners “with little
practical alternative but to dance to the [agency’s] tune.”) (Alito,
J., concurring).

22

As a preliminary matter, the very fact that the
Corps has an administrative appeal process in place
to review jurisdictional determinations and that
Hawkes exhausted its administrative remedies
counsels in favor of judicial review. Darby v. Cisneros,
509 U.S. 137, 146 (1993) (“When an aggrieved party
has exhausted all administrative remedies expressly
prescribed by statute or agency rule, the agency
action is ‘final for purposes of [5 U.S.C. § 704) and
therefore ‘subject to judicial review. ’°” (quoting 5
U.S.C. §704)). Furthermore, the Corps’ proffered
“remedy” would be onerous and wasteful, and it fails
to address Hawkes’ contention that it is not legally
required to apply for a CWA permit in the first place.*
Upon receiving the Corps’ judicial determination,
Hawkes would face the unenviable choice of either
proceeding with the CWA permit process — which
Corps employees advised Hawkes would be costly,
lengthy, and ultimately futile; see Pet. App. at 6a-7a —
or proceeding with peat mining activities and facing
civil and/or criminal penalties of up to $50,000 per
day for knowing violations of the CWA (not to men-
tion imprisonment for up to three years). See 33
U.S.C. § 1319(b), (c). Surely the APA’s provision of
judicial review sought to avoid exactly this Hobson’s

* As Judge Kelly noted in her concurrence below, “what
happens if Hawkes is, after all, granted a permit yet maintains
it never needed one in the first place? It must decline the permit
and challenge the original jurisdiction in court. This roundabout
process does not seem to be an ‘adequate remedy. ~’” Pet. App.
at 20a.

23

Choice. See Bland, 412 U.S. at 912 (Douglas, J.,
dissenting from denial of certiorari) (“One needs no
reminder that government too can be lawless, that
government cannot lead the way in law and order
when it is the great malefactor. The [APA] is indeed
part of the citizen’s arsenal against lawless govern-
ment.”).

According to this Court, the “adequate remedy”
requirement merely “makes it clear that Congress did
not intend the general grant of review in the APA to
duplicate existing procedures for review of agency
action.” Bowen v. Massachusetts, 487 U.S. 879, 903
(1988). The Corps fails to explain how judicial review
of a jurisdictional determination would duplicate
existing procedures — there are no “special statutory
procedures” in place regarding jurisdictional deter-
minations. Id. Indeed, as the Corps vehemently
argues, there is no authorization in the CWA for
jurisdictional determinations at all. Corps’ Br. at 3-4.
Moreover, the Corps’ interpretation is in stark con-
trast to Congress’s clear intent in including the
“adequate remedy” proviso: “The second sentence of
[5 U.S.C. § 704) was designed ‘to negative any
intention to make reviewable merely preliminary or
procecural orders where there is a subsequent and
adequate remedy at law available. ’” Attorney
General’s Manual on the Administrative Procedure
Act, 103 (1947) (quoting S. Doc. No. 79-248 at 37
(1946)) (listing as examples “intermediate orders such
as orders setting matters for hearing”); see, e.g.,
Western Radio Services Co., Inc. v. Glickman, 123

24

F.3d 1189, 1196-97 (9th Cir. 1997) (Forest Service's
notice proposing construction of an access road was
not final agency action because it was preliminary to
a decision whether to build the road); Northcoast
Environmental Center v. Glickman, 136 F.3d 660,
669-70 (9th Cir. 1998) (holding that the Forest Ser-
vice’s preliminary research and development efforts
to manage a specific tree do not constitute final
agency action). The jurisdictional determination at
issue was clearly not preliminary or intermediate. It
purports to settle, once and for all, the question of
whether the Corps has jurisdiction over Hawkes’
property under the CWA. By the Corps’ own charac-
terization, it was final and binding, Pet. App. at 45a,
and Hawkes exhausted the administrative review
process before filing suit. Pet. App. at 8a. Therefore,
the jurisdictional determination constituted final
agency action for which there was no other adequate
remedy, and the Corps has failed to overcome the
APA’s strong presumption of judicial review.

Ill. THE CORPS’ ATTEMPT TO LIMIT JUDI-
CIAL REVIEW UNDER THE APA TO
AGENCY ACTIONS THAT COMPEL AF-
FIRMATIVE ACTION IS UNSUPPORTED
BY THE CASE LAW AND IS IN DEROGA-
TION OF PRIVATE PROPERTY RIGHTS.

The court below properly rejected the Corps’
attempt to distinguish “between an agency order that
compels affirmative action, and an order that prohib-
its a party from taking otherwise lawful action.” Pet.

25

App. at lla. The Corps would have this Court effec-
tively limit Sackett to its facts and hold that, unless
an agency action immediately imposes civil and/or
criminal penalties on the regulated party, it is not
final agency action under the second Bennett prong.
See Corps’ Br. at 25-27 (arguing that, until the recipi-
ent of a jurisdictional determination discharges
pollutants at the relevant site and the agency decides
to initiate enforcement proceedings, agency action is
not final because the jurisdictional determination
“does not contain any directives” or “alter the land-
owner’s exposure to penalties”).’

The Corps’ proffered interpretation contradicts
the basic principle that a party “may challenge [a]
regulation without waiting for enforcement proceed-
ings.” Herr, 803 F.3d at 822 (“[Cjourts ‘normally do
not require plaintiffs to bet the farm by taking the
violative action before testing the validity of the
law.’” (quoting Free Enter. Fund, 561 U.S. at 490-91));
Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 459-60 (1974)

* As the court below recognized, the jurisdictional determi-
nation does in fact alter Hawkes’ exposure to penalties. Pet. App.
at 14a-15a (“Because appellants were forthright in undertaking
to obtain a permit, choosing now to ignore the [jurisdictional
determination) and commence peat mining without the permit it
requires would expose them to substantial criminal monetary
penalties and even imprisonment for a knowing CWA viola-
tion.”). This impact is sufficient to render the jurisdictional
determination final agency action. See Sackett, 132 S.Ct. at
1372 (the fact that an agency action exposed the regulated
parties “to double penalties in a future enforcement proceed-
ing{ J” demonstrated that ‘he second Bennett prong was satisfied).

26

(plaintiff was not required to violate statute and risk
actual prosecution before he could seek a declaratory
judgment regarding the constitutionality of a stat-
ute). The Corps’ interpretation of the APA is also
contradicted by the lower courts’ frequent grants of
judicial review to challenges of agency action that do
not compel regulated parties to take affirmative
action. See, e.g., Oregon Natural Desert Ass’n v. U.S.
Forest Service, 465 F.3d 977, 982-83 (9th Cir. 2006)
(rejecting agency's argument that action is not final
because it “is not a rule, order, license, sanction, or
relief[ ]”); Center for Native Ecosystems, 509 F.3d at
1330 (annual operating instructions are final because
they are “the last word before grazing begins and
undoubtedly have clear and definite consequences for
permittees, who need to make their plans based on
what the [annual operating instructions) authorize”);
Minard Run, 670 F.3d at 247-49 (agency statement
that prohibited the exercise of private mineral rights
was final agency action subject to judicial review);
Nat! Ass’n of Home Builders v. U.S. Army Corps of
Engineers, 417 F.3d 1272, 1279 (D.C. Cir. 2005)
(Rejecting Corps’ argument that nationwide permits
were not final agency action because the Corps did
not deny authorization to specific dischargers, and
holding that nationwide permits “are not a definitive,
but otherwise idle, statement of agency policy — they
carry easily-identifiable legal consequences for

would-be dischargers.”); Appalachian Power Co. v.
EPA, 208 F.3d 1015, 1023 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (Holding
that EPA guidance is final agency action because it

27

“reflect[s] a settled agency position which has legal
consequences both for agencies administering
their permit programs and for companies who
must obtain permits in order to continue operat-
ing.”). Each of these cases applied Bennett’s two-prong
test, and none of them held that an agency’s action
must compel affirmative action in order to be consid-
ered final under 5 U.S.C. § 704.

Moreover, the Corps’ interpretation ignores the
simple fact that Hawkes’ right to own property is a
hollow right indeed without the right to use it. Lucas
v. S. Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1017
(1992) (“For what is the land but the profits thereof?”
(internal quotation omitted)); Pennsylvania Coal Co.
v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 414 (1922) (“For practical
purposes, the right to coal consists in the right to
mine it. | To make it commercially impracticable to
mine certain coal has very nearly the same effect for
constitutional purposes as appropriating or destroy-
ing it.”). This Court has recognized that imposing
restrictions on the right to use property is a slippery
slope. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1014 (If “the uses of private
property were subject to unbridled, uncompensated
qualification under the police power, ‘the natural
tendency of human nature [would be] to extend the
qualification more and more until at last private
property disappear(ed].’” (quoting Pennsylvania Coal
Co., 260 U.S. at 415) (alterations in original)). It
makes no practical difference to Hawkes whether the
Corps’ action is tantamount to an order that compels
affirmative action, as in Sackett; or an order that

28

prohibits otherwise lawful action, as in this case.
Either way, the agency’s action “requir[es] land to be
left substantially in its natural state heighten[ing
the) risk that private property is being pressed into
some form of public service under the guise of miti-
gating serious public harm.” Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1018.
And in either situation, “the property owners are at
the agency’s mercy.” Sackett, 132 S. Ct. at 1375 (Alito,
J., concurring). Thus, judicial review of agency action
is warranted regardless of whether the action at issue
requires affirmative action or prohibits otherwise
lawful action.

IV. BROAD JUDICIAL REVIEW OF AGENCY
ACTION SERVES IMPORTANT PUBLIC
POLICY INTERESTS.

As a matter of public policy, the APA’s presump-
tion of judicial review is more important today than
ever before. There is an “evolution toward increasing-
ly informal decisionmaking processes” underway in
federal agencies. E. Gates Garrity-Rokous, Preserving
Review of Undeclared Programs: A Statutory Re-
definition of Final Agency Action, 101 Yale L. J. 643,
656 (1991); Richard E. Levy et al., Administrative
Procedure and the Decline of the Trial, 51 U. Kan. L.
Rev. 473, 502 (2003) (“[W]ithin both general catego-
ries of agency decisionmaking — rulemaking and
adjudication — the trend has been toward increasingly
informal procedures.”). In Sackett, the EPA sought to
characterize its compliance order as nonfinal “in light
of ‘informal discussion’ and invit[ing) contentions of

29

inaccuracy|,]” but this Court unanimously rejected
that characterization as relevant, stating that those
features “do[] not suffice to make an otherwise final
agency action nonfinal.” 132 S. Ct. at 1372. As Justice
Alito noted in his concurrence, the Sackett issue arose
because Congress had failed to “provide a reasonably
clear rule regarding the reach of the Clean Water Act”
and “the EPA had] not seen fit to promulgate a rule
providing a clear and sufficiently limited definition of
the phrase[,]” so the agency had resorted to “informal
guidance.””’ Id. at 1375 (Alito, J., concurring).

The Corps attempts to characterize a jurisdic-
tional determination as analogous to “various types of
informal agency guidance that courts have generally
found to be non-‘final’ under the APA.” Corps’ Br. at
17 However, the lower courts have rejected agency
attempts to avoid judicial review merely by labeling
its action “informal.” See, e.g., Barrick Goldstrike
Mines, 215 F.3d at 47-48 (“[W]e reject{ ] the proposi-
tion that if an agency labels its action an ‘informal’
guideline it may thereby escape judicial review under
the APA.” (citing Better Gov't Ass’n v. Dept. of State,
780 F.2d 86, 93 (D.C. Cir. 1986))); see also First
Nat. Bank of Chicago, 956 F.2d at 1364 (letter from
Comptroller offering an interpretation of banking

The informal guidance defining “waters of the United
States” is now in rule form, but is currently enjoined pending
judicial review. See In re EPA, 803 F.3d 804, 809 (6th Cir. 2015).

30

regulations was final agency action regardless of how
“formal” it appeared); Ciba-Geigy, 801 F.2d at 436-39,
438 n.9 (a letter from an agency official stating the
agency’s position and stating the steps the regulated
party would need to take to be in compliance consti-
tuted final agency action). And, even if the Corps’
characterization were taken at face value, it should
not be able to evade judicial review where an “infor-
mal” action is final and binding on private property
owners." See Garrity-Rokous, Preserving Review of
Undeclared Programs, 101 Yale L. J. at 656 (“Admin-
istrative agencies’ evolution toward increasingly
informal decisionmaking processes is legitimate only
if the judiciary maintains the oversight role contem-
plated by the APA.”).

" The D.C. Circuit has aptly described the troubling
evolution of agency guidance that it characterizes as non-final:

The phenomenon we see in this case is familiar. Con-
gress passes a broadly worded statute. The agency
follows with regulations containing broad language,
open-ended phrases, ambiguous standards and the
like. Then as years pass, the agency issues circulars
or guidance or memoranda, explaining, interpreting,
defining and often expanding the commands in the
regulations. Law is made, without notice and
comment, without public participation, and without
publication in the Federal Register or the Code of
Federal Regulations. The agency may also think
there is another advantage — immunizing its lawmak-
ing from judicial review.
Appalachian Power Co., 208 F.3d at 1020.

31

The CWA in particular presents unique public
* policy concerns that necessitate judicial oversight. As
Sackett noted, “there is no reason to think that the
[CWA] was uniquely designed to enable the strong-
arming of regulated parties into ‘voluntary compli-
ance’ without the opportunity for judicial review —
even judicial review of the question whether the
regulated party is within the EPA’s jurisdiction.” 132
S. Ct. at 1367 Recent litigation disputing the EPA’s
broad assertion of jurisdiction by adopting an almost
limitless definition of “waters of the United States”
highlights the important role of the courts in limiting
agency overreach.” See e.g., In re: Definition of “Wa-
ters of the United States,” 2016 WL 723241, at *1. In
addition, the CWA imposes harsh civil and criminal
penalties for “‘a broad range of ordinary industrial
and commercial activities’” and regulated parties
spend well over $1.7 billion a year attempting to
obtain wetlands permits. Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 721
(quoting Hanousek v. United States, 528 U.S. 1102,
1103 (2000) (Thomas, J., dissenting from denial of
certiorari))."° As Justice Alito observed in his concur-
rence in Sackett, judicial review of agency assertions

* As discussed supra and contemplated by the APA's
legislative history, the “mere existence” of judicial review
operates to discourage the agency from “the arbitrary exercise of
powers or assumption of powers not granted.” S. Rep. No. 79-
752, at 217 (1945).

* If wetland permitting was a $1.7 billion per year industry
in 2006 when Rapanos was decided, the cost is necessarily far
greater a decade later.

32

of jurisdiction under the CWA is necessary because
“falny piece of land that is wet at least part of the
year is in danger of being classified by EPA employees
as wetlands covered by the [CWA]. At least [under
the majority’s decision], property owners like peti-
tioners will have the right to challenge the EPA’s
jurisdictional determination under the [APA].” 132
S. Ct. at 1375 (Alito, J., concurring).

The combination of the agencies’ broad assertion
of jurisdiction under the CWA and the draconian
penalties imposed for violations of the CWA creates
an administrative nightmare for regulated parties
who wish to simply use their land. As this Court
chillingly foretold in Rapanos:

The[se] enforcement proceedings are a
small part of the immense expansion of fed-
eral regulation of land use that has occurred
under the Clean Water Act — without any
change in the governing statute during the
past five Presidential administrations. In the
last three decades, the Corps and the [EPA]
have interpreted their jurisdiction over “wa-
ters of the United States” to cover 270-to-300
million acres of swampy lands in the United
States — including half of Alaska and an area
the size of California in the lower 48 States.
And that was just the beginning.

547 U.S. at 722 (emphasis added). This Court has
repeatedly been called on to rein in the EPA and the
Corps’ eager assertions of jurisdiction over private
property, no matter how tenuous that property’s

33

connection to jurisdictional waters. Jd.; see also Solid
Waste Agency of Northern Cook Cty. v. Army Corps of
Engineers, 531 U.S. 159, 167-74 (2001) (rejecting
Corps’ argument that the CWA’s definition of “navi-
gable waters” includes “nonnavigabie, isolated, intra-
state waters”). As the court below reasoned, in the
absence of judicial review, the agencies could prevail
on assertions of jurisdiction unsupported by the CWA
merely by exhausting the resources and patience of
regulated parties:

The prohibitive costs, risk, and delay of these
alternatives to immediate judicial review ev-
idence a transparently obvious litigation
strategy: by leaving appellants with no im-
mediate judicial review and no adequate al-
ternative remedy, the Corps will achieve the
result its local officers desire, abandonment
of the peat mining project, without having to
test whether its expansive assertion of juris-
diction — rejected by one of their own com-
manding officers on administrative appeal —
is consistent with the Supreme Court’s limit-
ing decision in Rapanos.

Pet. App. at 15a. Such dilatory and bad faith tactics
are undoubtedly the ills that Congress had in mind
when it adopted the APA. Therefore, the APA's pre-
sumption of judicial review should be interpreted
broadly to protect the rights of regulated parties who
have no other recourse at law.

¢

34

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court should
affirm the Court of Appeals and hold that a jurisdic-
tional determination constitutes final agency action
subject to judicial review under the APA.

Respectfully submitted,

STEVEN J. LECHNER

Counsel of Record
GINA M. CANNAN
MOUNTAIN STATES LEGAL FOUNDATION
2596 South Lewis Way
Lakewood, Colorado 80227
(303) 292-2021
lechner@mountainstateslegal.com
gina@mountainstateslegal.com

Counsel for Amicus Curiae

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385016_0613%3A17. Public record. Not legal advice.
