# Petition for Writ of Certiorari — U.S. Army Corp of Eng'rs v. Hawkes Co., 136 S. Ct. 615 (2015) (No. 15-290) > Briefs, arguments, decisions, and more. URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385016_0613%3A02 ## Record - **Collection:** Supreme Court brief - **Document type:** Petition for Writ of Certiorari - **Published:** January 1, 2015 ## Text No. en et ee tee ttre tenn In the Supreme Court of the Anited States UNITED STATES ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS, PETITIONER Vv. HAWKES Co., INC., ET AL. ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI DONALD B. VERRILLI, JR. Solicitor General Counsel of Record JOHN C. CRUDEN Assistant Attorney General MALCOLM L. STEWART Deputy Solicitor General GINGER D. ANDERS Assistant to the Solicitor General JENNIFER SCHELLER NEUMANN ROBERT J. LUNDMAN Davip R. COOPER Attorneys Chief Counsel Department of Justice United States Army Washington, D.C. 20530-0001 Corps of Engineers SupremeCtBriefs usdoj.gov Washington, el 20314 (202) 514-2217 e% QUESTION PRESENTED Whether the United States Army Corps of Engi- neers’ determination that the property at issue con- tains “waters of the United States” protected by the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. 1362(7); see 33 U.S.C. 1251 et seq., constitutes “final agency action for which there is no other adequate remedy in a court,” 5 U.S.C. 704, and is therefore subject to judicial review under the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. 701 et seq. (I) PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING Petitioner.is the United States Army Corps of En- gineers. Respondents are Hawkes Co., Inc.; LPF Proper- ties, LLC; and Pierce Investment Company. (If) TABLE OF CONTENTS Page Ee 1 ES l Statutory and regulatory provisions involved .......................... 2 iinet remencnntnenaneenemmmmenmansenemnnenanns 2 Reasons for granting the petition....................c.ccscseseeseeeneeeeeees 11 A. The decision below created a circuit conflict................. 12 B. The decision below is incorrect ...................c-ss0-serseseeeseee 13 C. The question presented is recurring and significant iaienecertelonateanenetetaniniianstuammennsensnemenessesvmmersnssncsesees 21 D. This case is a better vehicle than Kent Recycling for addressing the question presented........................-+- 23 Conclusion sansneiennsansenedeseepeteanenseaneanmmememneansmmmensscenmenseesesmsnest 25 Appendix A — Court of appeals opinion (Apr. 10, 2015).......la Appendix B — District court memorandum opinion and order (Aug. 1, 2013)...............c.c-cs-e0- 22a Appendix C — Approved jurisdictional determination ee 44a Appendix D — Court of appeals order (July 7, 2015)........ 108a Appendix E — Statutory and regulatory provisions......... 105a TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Cases: Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136 (1967)................ 17 Belle Co. v. United States Army Corps of Eng’rs, 761 F.3d 383 (5th Cir. 2014), cert. denied sub nom. Kent Recycling Servs., LLC v. United States Army Corps of Eng’rs, 135 S. Ct. 1548 (2015), petition for reh’g pending, No. 14-493 8) 8, 11, 12, 13, 19, 22 Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154 (1997) ...5, 6, 12, 13, 17, 18 (IIT) Cases—Continued: Page Carabell v. United States Army Corps of Eng’rs, 391 F.3d 704 (6th Cir. 2004), vacated on other grounds sub nom. Rapanos v. United States, ee Ce Cae netenscnnenssonisensasnannmiianteniecenteennsen 4, 20 Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc. v. United States, A I icterninnrssitiennmnntsmanininaansininiatiananis 17 Fairbanks N. Star Borough v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 543 F.3d 586 (9th Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 8 ee 12, 16 Frozen Food Express v. United States, 351 U.S. 40 TEE iocestosesiiinancacinncumetistiineateniieamesisiiesbbindiaimaingeasiilnnciecaduniiies 17 National Ass'n of Home Builders v. Norton, a a Oe Ga. CD cercrnenrenesensencsnssernnenstememene 16 Precon Dev. Corp. v. United States Army Corps of Eng’rs, 633 F.3d 278 (4th Cir. 2011) ................:cccceeeees 19 Rochester Tel. Corp. v. United States, 307 U.S. 125 SE aceccnininduninetenestpenenapenimenessasigntesninaiemmennetiniiintinneates 15 Sackett v. EPA, 132 S. Ct. 1367 (2012)................... passim United States v. Deaton, 332 F.3d 698 (4th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 541 U.S. 972 (2004) 0.0... eeeceeeee 5 Statutes and regulations: Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. 701 6B GUE cesssscssesnssscscccacenscassesensesanenssesussanspsssenensscnegnansonpessseness 4 TE 5, 7, 9, 13, 19 8 eee : wall A : 22 Clean Water Act, Pub. L. No. 92-500, § 2, 86 Stat. RF ee 2 a ae Se crtasnensnnenememnnmmnnsnnmmmmemnenennianl 2 33 U.S.C. 1311(a) (§ BO1(a))..........0.ceccerececeerererecsererereees 2,14 BD EA Ti ccscsssensenmsescszsccenensesssemssssemmnasenseseet 4, 15, 20 Vv Statutes and regulations—Continued: Page enlace 5 ell 5, 15, 20 Rk aN nee 16 Se I cindtaserrnsirenieainerieneneanatiesl 15, 16, 19 TT HTT nis siascnreninsssmannatatmenneiaronmaatiiad 4, 15, 20 Re aT inicnnciinsentninannntinnnnnneinniionniaitil 15 Eno 2,14 8S eee 2,4, 14 I Erernnnenr ee 2,19 XESS cE RELAIS eeeoreer ncaa 2 33 U.S.C. 1344(e) isenaeateninniaiaimabiadeinmemeel 4 I career erin ticeaatiiiaiilestaniaiadl 22 aaa arisen ennai 4 EE iene” 2,11, 14 SERENE 2 33 C.F.R.: Pt. 320: I a 2, 21 ITTrnsrT ect caciradisbtclaeataetaeimeaeataeniiainiaiaend ebaantaeaeeaciaiaameeneill 4 teicher niall 4 Pt. 326: EFA eee 4 I aac 19 asian tata ceaenaaeattataiaaraitaccintaieainial 5 Fa Sa icissclsacnasinenenntnanianpeneneinnepamenaaintanaenaiieememssmnsasiceesl 4 ee 3 TN TTT 2, 3,14 Section 331.10 ........... cieneiisintiineiaiianimsstiitaabiaata 19 TTT ssisciocsieienarsnesienriiriasintmentiieealianlaticiabniriaahiiaal 19 Regulation—Continued: Page 40 C.F.R.: SU haicniitendialaningteniainpinenianieninieiel 4 Miscellaneous: 79 Fed. Reg. 22,188 (Apr. 21, 2014) .............ccccececeeecceeees 10 80 Fed. Reg. (June 29, 2015): i TITTconrsesiensenininmenenasneenennennenensennenennennaeneanenasansmmmmenesacemannens 11 a 10 a, SE canescransesvenssnasnenennssnnenssrsemmancumnnsemansessasemeansanmnnannenii 21 ee 11 TE ecintacuinnneustennnememmenmmeenmmennnnmenen 11 U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs: Regulatory Guidance Letter No. 05-02 (June 14, ERT RE IN, Nee 3 Regulatory Guidance Letter No. 08-02 ene 26, 2008) pinieetennenepeenipenseiaieunenpeneenennnieamnremnen 3 Regulatory—Protecting the Iutegelity of Ameri- ca’s Waters (Feb. 2, 2015), http://www. usace.army.mil/Portals/2/docs/civilworks/ budget/strongpt/fyl6sp_regulatory.pdf................... 21 Jn the Supreme Court of the Gnited States No. UNITED STATES ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS, PETITIONER v. HAWKES Co., INC., ET AL. ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI The Solicitor General, on behalf of the United States Army Corps of Engineers (Corps), respectfully petitions for a writ of certiorari to review the judg- ment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit in this case. OPINIONS BELOW The opinion of the court of appeals (App., infra, la- 21a), is reported at 782 F.3d 994. The opinion of the district court (App., infra, 22a-43a), is reported at 963 F Supp. 2d 868. JURISDICTION The judgment of the court of appeals was entered on April 10, 2015. A petition for rehearing was denied on July 7, 2015 (App., infra, 103a-104a). The jurisdic- tion of this Court is invoked under 28 U.S.C. 1254(1). (1) 2 STATUTORY AND REGULATORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED Relevant statutory and regulatory provisions are reproduced in the Appendix to this petition. App., infra, 105a-121a. STATEMENT 1. a. Congress enacted the Clean Water Act (CWA or Act) “to restore and maintain the chemical, physi- cal, and biological integrity of the Nation’s waters.” 33 U.S.C. 1251(a); see Pub. L. No. 92-500, § 2, 86 Stat. 816 (83 U.S.C. 1251 et seg.). Section 301(a) of the CWA prohibits the “discharge of any pollutant”— defined as the addition of any pollutant to the “waters of the United States” from any “point source”—except “as in compliance with” specified provisions of the CWA. 33 U.S.C. 1311(a), 1362(7) and (12). The CWA allows discharges under two complementary permit- ting regimes. Section 404 authorizes the Corps to issue permits “for the discharge of dredged or fill material into the navigable waters at specified dispos- al sites.” 33 U.S.C. 1344(a) and (d). Section 402 au- thorizes the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to issue permits for the discharge of any pollutant other than dredged or fill material. 33 U.S.C. 1342. The Corps’ regulations authorize (but do not re- quire) the Corps to provide the agency’s view on whether particular tracts contain “waters of the United States” that are subject to the agency’s regu- latory authority under Section 404 of the CWA when a landowner (for instance) asks the Corps to do so. See 33 C.F.R. 320.1(a)(6), 331.2; see also 33 C.F.R. Pt. 331, App. C. The Corps may provide its view in a docu- ment called a “{jjurisdictional determination,” which applicable regulations define as “a written Corps 3 determination that a wetland and/or waterbody is subject to regulatory jurisdiction under Section 404 of the Clean Water Act (33 U.S.C. 1344) or * * * the River and Harbors Act of 1899 (33 U.S.C. 401 et seq.).” 33 C.F.R. 331.2 (emphasis omitted). Neither the CWA nor its implementing regulations ~equire a landowner to obtain a jurisdictional determination before dis- charging dredged or fill material. An “({a]pproved jurisdictional determination” is “a Corps document stating the presence or absence of waters of the United States on a parcel or a written statement and map identifying the limits of waters of the United States on a parcel.”’ 33 C.F.R. 331.2 (em- phasis omitted). An approved jurisdictional determi- nation is valid for five years, 33 C.F.R. Pt. 331, App. C, “unless new information warrants revision of the determination before the expiration date.” Corps, Regulatory Guidance Letter No. 05-02, 7 1 (June 14, 2005). When the Corps issues an approved jurisdic- tional determination, an affected party may pursue an administrative appeal of that determination within the Corps. See 33 C.F.R. Pt. 331. Whether or not a jurisdictional determination has been requested or issued, a landowner planning to discharge dredged or fill material on its property has various options. The landowner may apply for a ' The Corps’ regulations also provide for issuance of preliminary jurisdictional determinations, which are “written indications that there may be waters of the United States on a parcel or indications of the approximate location(s) of waters of the United States on a parcel.” 33 C.F.R. 331.2. Preliminary jurisdictional determina- tions thus do not reflect any conclusion about whether “waters of the United States” are present. Jbid.; see Corps, Regulatory Guidance Letter No. 08-02, 1% 4, 7 (June 26, 2008). 4 Section 404 permit from the Corps. See 33 U.S.C. 1344; 33 C.F.R. Pts. 323, 325; 40 C.F.R. Pt. 230. If the landowner, having exhausted administrative remedies, is dissatisfied with the Corps’ final permitting deci- sion, it may seek judicial review under the Admin- istrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. 701 et seq., including with respect to the Corps’ determination that the property at issue contains waters protected by the CWA. See, e.g., Carabell v. United States Army Corps of Eng’rs, 391 F.3d 704, 706-707 (6th Cir. 2004), vacated on other grounds sub nom. Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715 (2006). The landowner may also proceed under an applicable general per- mit previously issued by the Corps. See 33 U.S.C. 1344(e); 33 C.F.R. Pt. 330 (nationwide permit program). Alternatively, a landowner may proceed without seeking a permit. The CWA exempts numerous activ- ities, including certain farming and road-maintenance activities, from the permitting requirements. 33 U.S.C. 1344(f). If the activity is not subject to any exemptions, and the government determines that a completed or ongoing discharge violates the CWA, then the government may take administrative action, including the issuance of a warning letter, a “cease and desist” order, 33 C.F.R. 326.3(c), an administra. tive compliance order, an administrative penalty, or a combination of those options, see 33 U.S.C. 1319(a) and (g). The recipient of an EPA compliance order may bring suit under the APA to challenge the order, and it may contend that the property is not covered by the CWA. See Sackett v. EPA, 132 S. Ct. 1367, 1370- 1371 (2012). The government may also bring an en- forcement action in district court to obtain injunctive 5 and other relief. 33 U.S.C. 1319(b); 33 C.F.R. 326.5. At that time, the discharger may contend, inter alia, that its conduct did not violate the CWA because it did not involve a discharge into “the waters of the United States.” See, e.g., United States v. Deaton, 332 F.3d 698, 701-703 (4th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 541 U.S. 972 (2004). In any of those proceedings, the fact that the landowner previously received a jurisdictional deter- mination does not expose it to additional penalties or otherwise alter its rights or obligations within the proceeding. b. The APA provides that “[a]gency action made reviewable by statute and final agency action for which there is no other adequate remedy in a court are subject to judicial review.” 5 U.S.C. 704. “As a general matter, two conditions must be satisfied for an agency action to be ‘final’” under the APA. Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 177 (1997). “First, the action must mark the consummation of the agency’s deci- sionmaking process—it must not be of a merely tenta- tive or interlocutory nature.” Jd. at 177-178 (citation and internal quotations omitted). “And second, the action must be one by which rights or obligations have been determined, or from which legal consequences will flow.” Jd. at 178 (citation and internal quotations omitted). In Sackett, supra, this Court held that an EPA compliance order, which reflects the EPA’s determi- nation that a landowner has violated the CWA by discharging pollutants into protected waters without a permit and which requires remedial action, see 33 U.S.C. 1319(a)(3), is “final agency action” subject to judicial review under the APA, 5 U.S.C. 704; see 132 S. Ct. at 1871-1372. The Court explained that the 6 compliance order represented the “consummation” of the agency’s decisionmaking process because the EPA’s conclusion that the Sacketts had violated the CWA was not subject to further review within the agency. Sackett, 132 S. Ct. at 1372 (quoting Bennett, 520 U.S. at 178) (internal quotation marks omitted). The Court also concluded that the compliance order “determined rights or obligations.” Jd. at 1371 (quot- ing Bennett, 520 U.S. at 178). The Court explained that the order by its terms imposed “the legal obliga- tion to ‘restore’” the property in question, and that the order required the Sacketts to give the EPA ac- cess to their property. Jbid. In addition, the order imposed “legal consequences” by “expos[ing] the Sacketts to double penalties in a future enforcement proceeding” and “severely limit[ing] [their] ability to obtain a permit” under the CWA. /d. at 1371-1372. 2. a. Respondents Pierce Investment Company and LPF Properties, LLC, own 530 acres of land in Minnesota. Respondent Hawkes Co., Inc. (Hawkes), would like to mine the 530 acres for peat, which is formed in wetlands. Hawkes has an existing peat mining operation nearby and would pay royalties to respondent property owners. App., infra, 5a-6a, 23a. In December 2010, Hawkes applied for a Section 404 permit from the Corps. In March 2011, the Corps informed Hawkes of the Corps’ preliminary determi- nation that the property contains waters of the United States. App., infra, 6a. In February 2012, after fur- ther meetings and visits to the property, the Corps provided Hawkes with an approved jurisdictional determination, which concluded that the property contains waters of the United States. Jd. at 6a-7a. Respondents’ complaint alleges that, during the pro- 7 cess of developing the jurisdictional determination, Corps employees asserted that the permit process would be costly and time-consuming. /d. at 6a; C.A. J.A. 9 (Am. Compl. 4 40). Respondents filed an administrative appeal. In Oc- tober 2012, finding that the approved jurisdictional determination lacked sufficient analysis to support a finding of regulatory jurisdiction, the Corps’ Missis- sippi Valley Division remanded the jurisdictional determination for reconsideration. App., infra, 7a, 44a. In December 2012, the Corps issued a revised approved jurisdictional determination, which again concluded that the property contains waters of the United States. Jd. at 7a-8a, 44a-102a. The revised approved jurisdictional determination explained that the property contains approximately 150 acres of wetlands that are adjacent to waters that flow directly or indirectly into traditional navigable waters. Jd. at 50a-5la. The Corps concluded that the wetlands have a significant nexus with a traditional navigable water, the Red River of the North. /d. at 83a-100a. b. In 2013, respondents filed this action, alleging that the Corps’ jurisdictional determination was arbi- trary and capricious under the APA, 5 U.S.C. 706(2). App., infra, 8a, 27a. The Corps moved to dismiss, arguing that the jurisdictional determination was not “final agency action” subject to judicial review under the APA, 5 U.S.C. 704, and that respondents’ chal- lenge to the jurisdictional determination was not ripe. App., infra, 8a. The district court dismissed the suit. App., infra, 22a-43a. The court held that the Corps’ jurisdictional determination was not final agency action under Ben- nett. Id. at 3la. The court concluded that, although 8 the jurisdictional determination “satisfies the first Bennett condition” because it marks the consumma- tion of the agency’s decisionmaking, id. at 32a, it “does not satisfy the second Bennett condition” be- cause “it does not determine [respondents’]} rights or obligations,” id. at 34a. The court explained that the jurisdictional determination “does not order [respond- ents] to take any kind of action” or “affect the legal standards used by agencies and courts in determining where the CWA applies.” Jd. at 35a. The court held that Sackett did not require a different result because the EPA compliance order at issue there subjected the recipient to several immediate consequences, including the obligation to remediate the property, and also limited the recipient’s ability to obtain a permit. Jd. at 36a-43a. 3. a. The court of appeals reversed. App., infra, la-17a. The court held that a jurisdictional determi- nation is a reviewable “final agency action” under the APA. /d. at 16a-17a. The court acknowledged that the Fifth Circuit had reached the opposite conclusion in Belle Co. v. United States Army Corps of Engi- neers, 761 F.3d 383 (2014), cert. denied sub nom. Kent Recycling Services, LLC v. United States Army Corps of Engineers, 135 S. Ct. 1548 (2015), petition for reh’g pending, No. 14-493 (filed Apr. 16, 2015). The court concluded, however, that the Fifth Circuit had “mis- applied the Supreme Court’s decision in Sackett.” App., infra, 2a. In the court of appeals’ view, “the Court’s application of its flexible final agency action standard in Sackett” indicated that a jurisdictional determination should be considered final agency ac- tion. Id. at 5a. 9 The court of appeals held that the jurisdictional de- termination satisfied Bennett’s first prong because it “was the consummation of the Corps’ decisionmaking process on the threshold issue of the agency’s statuto- ry authority.” App., infra, 9a. The court explained that the Corps’ regulatory guidance describes an approved jurisdictional determination as a “definitive, official determination.” /bid. (citation omitted). Turning to Bennett’s second prong, the court of ap- peals concluded that an approved jurisdictional de- termination determines “rights and obligations” and imposes “legal consequences.” App., infra, 10a. The court found little difference between “an agency order that compels affirmative action,” such as the EPA compliance order at issue in Sackett, and a jurisdic- tional determination, which, in the court’s view, “pro- hibits a party from taking otherwise lawful action.” Id. at lla. The court stated that a jurisdictional de- termination “requires [respondents] either to incur substantial compliance costs (the permitting process), forego what they assert is lawful use of their property, or risk substantial enforcement penalties.” /bid. The court of appeals also held that “there is no oth- er adequate [judicial] remedy” if immediate judicial review of the Corps’ jurisdictional determination is unavailable. App., infra, 13a (citation omitted; brack- ets in original); see 5 U.S.C. 704. While acknowledg- ing that respondents could seek a permit and then obtain judicial review of that decision, the court as- serted that, “as a practical matter, the permitting option is prohibitively expensive and futile.” App., infra, 14a. The court also stated that respondents’ “other option—commencing to mine peat without a permit and await an enforcement action—is even more 10 plainly an inadequate remedy” because respondents could incur “huge additional potential liability” by doing so. Jbid. (citing Sackett, 182 S. Ct. at 1372). The court therefore concluded that “a properly prag- matic analysis of * * * final agency action principles compels the conclusion that an [a]pproved [jurisdic- tional determination] is subject to immediate judicial review.” Id. at 16a. b. Judge Kelly concurred. App., infra, 18a-21a. She described the reviewability issue presented here “as a close question.” Jd. at 18a. She observed that a jurisdictional determination does not alter the recipi- ent’s legal obligations in the way that the compliance order in Sackett did. Jd. at 18a-20a. Judge Kelly concluded, however, that a jurisdictional determina- tion should be immediately reviewable to provide the landowner an opportunity, before seeking a permit, “to show the CWA does not apply to its land at all.” Id. at 20a. 4. The court of appeals denied the Corps’ petition for rehearing en banc and for panel rehearing. App., infra, 103a-104a. 5. In 2015, after a multi-year process and after the court of appeals issued its decision in this case, the Corps and the EPA issued a new rule clarifying the agencies’ interpretation of the scope of waters covered by the CWA. See 80 Fed. Reg. 37,055 (June 29, 2015) (“In this final rule, the agencies clarify the scope of ‘waters of the United States’ that are protected under the [CWA], based upon the text of the statute, Su- preme Court decisions, the best available peer- reviewed science, public input, and the agencies’ tech- nical expertise and experience in implementing the statute.”); see also 79 Fed. Reg. 22,188 (Apr. 21, 2014). ll That rule provides that it will govern jurisdictional determinations issued after its effective date. 80 Fed. Reg. at 37,054, 37,073-37,074. The approved juris- dictional determination at issue in this case was issued under the agencies’ previous interpretation of CWA coverage, and the new rule does not affect its five-year period of validity.” See p. 3, supra; 80 Fed. Reg. at 37,074. REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION This case presents a significant question concern- ing the proper mode and timing of judicial review of a jurisdictional determination stating that particular property contains “waters of the United States” cov- ered by the CWA. 33 U.S.C. 1362(7). The court of appeals held that a jurisdictional determination is reviewable “final agency action” under the APA. 5 U.S.C. 704. That ruling conflicts with the Fifth Cir- cuit’s recent decision in Belle Co. v. United States Army Corps of Engineers, 761 F.3d 383 (2014), cert. denied sub nom. Kent Recycling Services, LLC v. United States Army Corps of Engineers, 135 S. Ct. 1548 (2015), petition for reh’g pending, No. 14-493 (filed Apr. 16, 2015). A square but shallow circuit conflict thus has de- veloped on the question whether, in light of this Court’s decision in Sackett v. EPA, 132 S. Ct. 1367 (2012), a Corps jurisdictional determination is judicial- ly reviewable final agency action. In addition to this * Recipients of approved jurisdictional determinations predating the new rule have the option, however, of requesting that the Corps issue a new jurisdictional determination under the new rule. 80 Fed. Reg. at 37,074. In that event, the Corps would reconsider the CWA-coverage issue in light of current conditions on the property and the standards announced in the new rule. 12 petition seeking review of the Eighth Circuit’s deci- sion, a petition for rehearing of this Court’s denial of certiorari in Kent Recycling Services, LLC v. United States Army Corps of Engineers (No. 14-493) is cur- rently pending before the Court.’ In that case, how- ever, there are significant questions concerning whether petitioner Kent Recycling has standing and whether the case remains live. See 14-493 Br. in Opp. 8-12; 14-493 Br. in Opp. to Pet. for Reh’g 5-8. If the Court concludes that the question presented here should be resolved now rather than left for further percolation in the courts of appeals, this case would provide a more suitable vehicle than Kent Recycling for resolution of that issue. A. The Decision Below Created A Circuit Conflict 1. As the court of appeals acknowledged, App., in- fra, 2a, its decision squarely conflicts with the Fifth Circuit’s decision in Belle, supra. There, the Fifth Circuit held that a jurisdictional determination does not satisfy the test for final agency action set forth in Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 177-178 (1997), be- cause it does not impose legal obligations or conse- quences beyond those already imposed by the CWA itself. Belle, 761 F.3d at 389-394. The decision below also conflicts with the Ninth Circuit’s pre-Sackett decision in Fairbanks North Star Borough v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 543 F.3d 586 (2008), cert. denied, 557 U.S. 919 (2009) (Fairbanks). * Because the petition for a writ of certiorari seeking review of the Fifth Circuit’s decision in Belle, supra, is captioned Kent Recycling Services, LLC v. United States Army Corps of Engi- neers (No. 14-493) in this Court, this brief refers to the petition in No. 14-493 as Kent Recycling. 13 Unlike the Eighth Circuit, the Fifth Circuit in Belle concluded that this Court’s decision in Sackett does not mandate the conclusion that a jurisdictional de- termination is final agency action. Belle, 761 F.3d at 391-392. The Fifth Circuit explained that the EPA compliance order at issue in Sackett imposed legal obligations and consequences that went beyond those imposed by the CWA. /d. at 391 (citing Sackett, 132 S. Ct. at 1871-1372). Unlike a compliance order, the Fifth Circuit explained, a jurisdictional determination is simply a “notification of the property’s classification as wetlands” that “does not state that [the recipient] is in violation of the CWA,” does not increase the recipi- ent’s exposure to penalties, and does not affect its ability to obtain a permit. /d. at 391-393. 2. The division between the Fifth and Eighth Cir- cuits is unlikely to be resolved without this Court’s intervention. The Eighth Circuit was aware of the Fifth Circuit’s contrary ruling in Belle when it issued the decision below. App., infra, 2a. The government sought rehearing en banc on the ground that the deci- sion created a conflict with Belle, but the Eighth Cir- cuit denied the petition. /d. at 103a-104a. The circuit conflict is therefore likely to endure until this Court resolves the issue. B. The Decision Below Is Incorrect To be final agency action under 5 U.S.C. 704, an agency determination “must be one by which rights or obligations have been determined, or from which legal consequences will flow.” Bennett, 520 U.S. at 178 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). The court of appeals concluded that the jurisdictional determination at issue in this case satisfies that standard because it “requires [respondents] either to 14 incur substantial compliance costs (the permitting process), forego what they assert is lawful use of their property, or risk substantial enforcement penalties.” App., infra, lla. That is incorrect. The jurisdictional determination does not create the quandary that con- cerned the court, since a landowner who has not re- ceived a jurisdictional determination faces precisely the same set of options, and precisely the same expo- sure to penalties for any CWA violations that his con- duct may entail. Receipt of a jurisdictional determina- tion simply provides the landowner with additional information that may assist him in choosing among the available options. 1. a. A jurisdictional determination informs the landowner of the Corps’ view that particular property contains “waters of the United States” and is there- fore subject to the CWA’s prohibition on unauthorized pollutant discharges into those waters. 33 U.S.C. 1362(7); see 33 U.S.C. 1311(a). The jurisdictional determination does not direct the landowner to take (or refrain from taking) any action, and it does not impose any obligations not already imposed by the CWA. If the property in fact contains waters of the United States, the CWA requires the landowner to obtain a permit before discharging pollutants into those waters, whether or not he has requested or received a jurisdictional determination. 33 U.S.C. 1311(a), 1342, 1344; 33 C.F.R. 331.2. The jurisdictional determination also does not alter the manner in which the Corps may enforce the CWA. Whether or not the Corps has issued a jurisdictional determination, if the Corps or the EPA concludes that a landowner has violated the CWA by discharging pollutants without a permit, the EPA may issue an 15 administrative compliance order (of the sort at issue in Sackett), or it may institute an administrative pen- alty proceeding and impose a penalty. 33 U.S.C. 1319(a) and (g). Both types of administrative action afford the landowner the opportunity to obtain imme- diate judicial review of the agency’s underlying con- clusion that the land contains waters of the United States. See 33 U.S.C. 1319(g)(8) (providing for judi- cial review of administrative penalty decision); Sack- ett, 132 S. Ct. at 1371-1372 (compliance orders are reviewable under the APA). Such enforcement actions are necessarily predicat- ed on the agency’s assessment that the CWA applies to the waters in question; but the fact that the Corps has previously expressed that assessment in a juris- dictional determination does not affect the landown- er’s rights in an administrative penalty proceeding. See 33 U.S.C. 1319(a) and (g); Rochester Tel. Corp. v. United States, 307 U.S. 125, 129-130 (1939). Similarly if the United States commences a judicial enforcement action, the Corps’ prior issuance of a jurisdictional determination would not alter the United States’ bur- den of establishing that the land in fact contains wa- ters of the United States. 33 U.S.C. 1319(b). And if the landowner is ultimately found liable in any of those proceedings, the jurisdictional determination does not alter the range of potential sanctions to which the landowner is subject under the CWA. 33 U.S.C. 1319(d). Thus, before and after a jurisdictional determination is issued, the landowner faces the same legal regime, the same potential obligations, and the same legal exposure.‘ ‘4 The court of appeals believed that a jurisdictional determina- ‘tion increases “the penalties [respondents] would risk if they chose 16 b. In concluding that a jurisdictional determination satisfies Bennett’s second prong, the court of appeals conflated the potential practical effects of a jurisdic- tional determination with the altered legal obligations that are required under Bennett. App., infra, 1la-13a. It is true that, as a practical matter, a landowner who receives a jurisdictional determination that his prop- erty contains CWA-protected waters may have a greater incentive to seek a permit than someone who has not received a similar determination. But that incentive arises solely from the additional information that a jurisdictional determination conveys to the landowner about the agency’s view of the CWA’s cov- erage. When an agency communication does not alter the legal obligations or sanctions to which the recipi- ent is already subject, that sort of practical effect is not sufficient to render the communication “final agency action.” See National Ass'n of Home Builders to begin mining without a permit” because violating the CWA after receiving a jurisdictional determination would result in “substan- tial criminal monetary penalties and even imprisonment for a knowing CWA violation.” App., infra, 15a. That is incorrect. The CWA directs a court, in assessing an appropriate civil penalty for a violation, to consider, inter alia, any “good-faith efforts” to comply with the CWA’s requirements. 33 U.S.C. 1319%d). In addition, the CWA imposes criminal penalties for violating certain enumerated provisions of the statute, and knowing violations are subject to greater potential penalties. 33 U.S.C. 1319(c)(1)-(2). But those provisions do not mention, much less assign any particular eviden- tiary weight to, the Corps’ prior issuance of a jurisdictional deter- mination. At most, a property owner’s receipt of a jurisdictional determination might be offered as evidence of the owner’s knowledge of its obligations under the CWA. See Fairbanks, 543 F.3d at 595. But the same could be said of any number of non-final agency warnings or opinion letters, or even a private consultant’s report. 17 v. Norton, 415 F.3d 8, 13-16 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (incentive to comply voluntarily with agency’s guidance concern- ing underlying statutory obligation is insufficient to establish legal consequences under Bennett). The court of appeals therefore erred in likening a jurisdictional determination to a regulation or order that “prohibits a party from taking otherwise lawful action.” App., infra, lla. The decisions on which the court relied (id. at 1la-13a) all concerned regulatory actions that imposed additional legal requirements, beyond those established by statute, with which regu- lated parties were required to comply. See Bennett, 520 U.S. at 178 (where agency opinion authorized entities to “take” endangered species only upon ful- fillment of conditions listed in the opinion, and entities could be penalized for violating those conditions, opin- ion “alter[ed] the legal regime”); Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 151-152 (1967) (regulations were final because they “ha[d] the status of law and violations of them carry heavy criminal and civil sanc- tions”); Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc. v. United States, 316 U.S. 407, 418 (1942) (regulations had the “force of law” because they “require [the Federal Communica- tions Commission] to reject and authorize it to cancel licenses on the grounds specified in the regulations without more”); see also Frozen Food Express v. United States, 351 U.S. 40, 41-45 (1956) (order deter- mining which commodities fell within a statutory “ag- ricultural” exemption to a permitting requirement was final because it established a rule of general applica- bility that had the force of law). ce. The court of appeals’ reliance on Sackett was misplaced. In holding that the EPA compliance order at issue in Sackett was final agency action, the Court 18 did not rely on the pragmatic incentives that recipi- ents likely felt upon being notified of the agency’s allegations that their property contained covered waters and that they had violated the CWA. Rather, the Court found dispositive the fact that the compli- ance order materially increased both the landowners’ legal obligations and the penalties to which they were potentially subject. 132 S. Ct. at 1371-1372. A juris- dictional determination does not similarly alter the legal status quo. Specifically, the Sackett Court explained that the compliance order imposed a “legal obligation” on the Sacketts to “‘restore’ their property according to an agency-approved Restoration Work Plan,” and to give the EPA access to the property and relevant docu- mentation. 132 S. Ct. at 1871. Those obligations arose “(bly reason of the [compliance] order,” not as a result of the CWA itself. /bid. The Sackett Court further concluded that “‘legal consequences flow’ from issuance of the [compliance] order” because, under the CWA, a landowner can be liable for penalties for vio- lating the compliance order itself, in addition to penal- ties for violating the Act. /bid. (quoting Bennett, 520 U.S. at 178) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). The compliance order also “severely lim- itted] the Sacketts’ ability to obtain a permit for their fill” under Corps regulations that restrict the availa- bility of permits for activities that are the subject of a compliance order. Jd. at 1372. A jurisdictional determination possesses none of the characteristics that were dispositive in Sackett. It does not require the recipient to take any action, re- medial or otherwise. Nor does it expose a recipient to any additional penalties beyond those that the CWA 19 provides for violating the statute. 33 U.S.C. 1319(d). A jurisdictional determination also has no impact on the recipient’s ability to obtain a permit, since the regulations limiting permits following a compliance order do not apply to jurisdictional determinations. See 33 C.F.R. 326.3(e)(1)(iv). And because jurisdic- tional determinations (unlike EPA compliance orders) are typically provided to persons who request them, they are not easily used “to enable the strong-arming of regulated parties.” Sackett, 132 S. Ct. at 1374. 2. Even if a jurisdictional determination satisfied Bennett’s requirements for final agency action, review would be available under the APA only if there is “no other adequate [judicial] remedy.” 5 U.S.C. 704. Contrary to the court of appeals’ conclusion (App., infra, 13a-16a), respondents possess adequate alter- native opportunities to argue in court that their prop- erty does not contain CWA-protected waters. The permitting process provides one such avenue.” When the Corps denies a permit, or issues a permit subject to conditions that the applicant opposes, the applicant may seek judicial review of that decision, and may contend in that proceeding that any waters on its property are not covered by the Act. See 33 U.S.C. 1344(a); 33 C.F.R. 331.10, 331.12; see also Pre- ® In Sackett, the Court concluded that the Corps’ permitting pro- cess did not provide an adequate means of seeking review of an EPA compliance order. That holding, however, was based on a cir- cumstance not present here. Because the EPA had issued the compliance order, the Court stated that judicial review of the Corps’ permitting decision would not “provide an ‘adequate reme- dy’ for action already taken by another agency.” 132 S. Ct. at 1372. Here, the Corps “issued the [jurisdictional determination], so it is not the case that the only alternative remedy is one provided by a different agency.” Belle, 761 F.3d at 394 n.4. 20 con Dev. Corp. v. United States Army Corps of Eng’rs, 633 F.3d 278, 287-297 (4th Cir. 2011). Many parties have obtained judicial review of a CWA- coverage issue through that route. See, e.g., Carabell v. United States, 391 F.3d 704, 706-707 (6th Cir. 2004), vacated on other grounds sub nom. Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715 (2006). And if the Corps grants a permit that the applicant accepts, there will be no need for judicial review of the threshold jurisdictional determination. A recipient of a jurisdictional determination who elects to proceed with discharges on his property may also seek judicial review of the CWA coverage issue if he is the subject of an agency-initiated enforcement proceeding. If the agency imposes administrative penalties, 33 U.S.C. 1319(g), or issues an EPA compli- ance order, 33 U.S.C. 1319(a), those actions are imme- diately reviewable. See pp. 4-5, supra. The United States could also initiate a judicial enforcement action, in which it would have to demonstrate by a prepon- derance of the evidence that the property contains covered waters. 33 U.S.C. 1319(b). To be sure, the permitting process can sometimes be expensive, and a landowner who discharges dredged or fill material without a permit may face monetary penalties if a court ultimately concludes that the discharges occurred into CWA-protected waters. It is therefore understandable that persons in re- spondents’ position would prefer a pre-permit, pre- discharge judicial ruling on the CWA coverage issue. Neither the CWA nor the applicable agency regula- tions, however, require the Corps to issue jurisdic- tional determinations, either in general or in any par- ticular case. If respondents had not received a juris- 21 dictional determination, they could have obtained a judicial ruling on the coverage question only through the routes described above, 2e., by applying for a permit and then seeking judicial review of the Corps’ decision on that application, or by contesting the CWA’s applicability in opposing any enforcement action. The fact that respondents requested and re- ceived a jurisdictional determination does not make those avenues of review any less “adequate” than they would otherwise be. C. The Question Presented Is Recurring And Significant 1. The Corps issues tens of thousands of approved jurisdictional determinations every year. See 80 Fed. Reg. at 37,065; Corps, Regulatory—Protecting the Integrity of America’s Waters (Feb. 2, 2015), http:// www.usace.army.mil/Portals/2/docs/civilworks/bud- get/strongpt/fyl6sp regulatory.pdf. Although the CWA does not require the Corps to issue jurisdiction- al determinations, see 33 C.F.R. 320.1(a)(6), the Corps provides them in order to give requesting landowners information about the agency’s view of CWA coverage. And while no statutory or regulatory provision re- quires property owners to seek jurisdictional deter- minations before undertaking plans for their property or applying for a permit, those who request them are able to take the agency’s views on CWA coverage into account in deciding how best to proceed. Under the court of appeals’ decision, a landowner who disagrees with the agency’s approved jurisdic- tional determination may obtain judicial review imme- diately, before the Corps has had an opportunity to consider whether the landowner’s contemplated activi- ties would require a CWA permit, whether those ac- tivities are already covered by a general permit, see 22 33 U.S.C. 1344(e)(1), or whether an application for an individual permit should be granted. And if the Corps prevails in such a suit, the court’s decision will not definitively resolve the CWA coverage question. If jurisdictional determinations are reviewable under the APA, they would presumably be reviewed under the APA’s deferential “arbitrary [and] capricious” stand- ard. 5 U.S.C. 706(2)(A). A judicial decision upholding a jurisdictional determination under that standard would not prevent the landowner from arguing, in a subsequent civil enforcement action, that the agency had failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the property in question contained waters of the United States. Allowing immediate judicial review of the Corps’ jurisdictional determinations would therefore create a system of piecemeal and potentially duplicative pro- ceedings. That prospect might deter the Corps from engaging in an informationa’ practice that is triggered by a landowner’s request and is intended to benefit landowners as well as to promote compliance with the CWA. See Belle, 761 F.3d at 394 (immediate judicial review would “disincentivize the Corps from providing [jurisdictional determinations],” thereby “under- min{ing] the system through which property owners can ascertain their rights and evaluate their options”). 2. The question presented is likely to recur. The Corps issues thousands of jurisdictional determina- tions each year, and the Eighth Circuit’s decision in this case will likely encourage other regulated parties to seek immediate judicial review. Indeed, at least one other suit seeking review of a jurisdictional de- termination is currently pending before a district court in the Seventh Circuit. See Orchard Hill Bldg. 23 Co. v. United States Army Corps of Eng’rs, 1:15-cev- 6344 Docket entry No. 1 (N.D. Ill. July 21, 2015). D. This Case Is A Better Vehicle Than Kent Recycling For Addressing The Question Presented The petition for a writ of certiorari in Kent Recy- cling likewise presents the question whether a Corps jurisdictional determination is judicially reviewable under the APA. 14-493 Pet. i. The Court denied cer- tiorari in Kent Recycling in March 2015, shortly be- fore the Eighth Circuit issued its decision in this case. Kent Recycling then sought rehearing on the basis of the circuit conflict created by the Eighth Circuit’s decision, see 14-493 Pet. for Reh’g 3-6, and the peti- tion for rehearing remains pending before this Court. If the Court concludes that the question presented warrants its review, this case is the better of the two vehicles for resolving the issue. 1. As the government explained in its brief in op- position to the certiorari petition in Kent Recycling, it is unclear whether Kent Recycling has standing to seek this Court’s review and whether the case contin- ues to present a live controversy. See 14-493 Br. in Opp. 8-12. Although Kent Recycling alleges that it holds an option to purchase the property in question, 14-493 Pet. App. A2; see id. at D4 (3:12-cv-247 Compl. 1 14), the owner of the property at issue did not file its own certiorari petition challenging the Fifth Circuit’s decision, and is actively pursuing a permit to use the property as part of a mitigation bank (i.e., as wetlands that will be protected in order to offset authorized impacts on other waters protected by the CWA), see 14-493 Br. in Opp. 11-12. In addition, the jurisdiction- al determination at issue in Kent Recycling expired by its terms on May 15, 2014. 14-493 Pet. App. E2; 14- 24 493 Br. in Opp. 12 n.3. Although the Corps might (or might not) reach the same coverage determination under the new “waters of the United States” rule, the expiration of the purported “final agency action” that Kent Recycling seeks to challenge creates a further potential threshold obstacle to this Court’s resolution of the question presented in that case. 2. This case, by contrast, presents no significant defects as a vehicle for addressing the question wheth- er a jurisdictional determination is final agency action. Respondents in this case include the owners of the relevant land, and there is no reason to doubt their continuing interest in mining peat on the property. And while the jurisdictional determination respond- ents seek to challenge was issued under the agency’s previous interpretation of CWA coverage, which has been superseded by the new rule, the jurisdictional determination itself is valid until 2017. Unless re- spondents request a new jurisdictional determination under the new rule, they will retain a continuing in- terest in whether the existing jurisdictional determi- nation is immediately reviewable. Thus, if the Court concludes that the question pre- sented warrants its review at this time, the Court should grant this petition for a writ of certiorari. The petition for rehearing in Kent Recycling (No. 14-493) could then be held pending the resolution of this case, and disposed of as appropriate in light of the Court’s decision. 25 CONCLUSION The petition for a writ of certiorari should be granted. Respectfully submitted. DONALD B. VERRILLI, JR. Solicitor General JOHN C. CRUDEN Assistant Attorney General MALCOLM L. STEWART Deputy Solicitor General GINGER D. ANDERS Assistant to the Solicitor DAVID R. COOPER General Chief Counsel JENNIFER SCHELLER NEUMANN United States Army ROBERT J. LUNDMAN Corps of Engineers Attorneys SEPTEMBER 2015 APPENDIX A UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT No. 13-3067 HAWKES Co., INC., ET AL., PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS v. UNITED STATES ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS, DEFENDANT-APPELLEE AMERICAN FARM BUREAU FEDERATION; NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF HOME BUILDERS; NATIONAL MINING ASSOCIATION; AMERICAN PETROLEUM INSTITUTE; UTILITY WATER ACT GROUP; FOUNDATION FOR ENVIRONMENTAL AND ECONOMIC PROGRESS, AMICI ON BEHALF OF APPELLANTS Submitted: Dee. 11, 2014 Filed: Apr. 10, 2015 Before: LOKEN, BRIGHT, and KELLY, Circuit Judges. LOKEN, Circuit Judge. Hawkes Co., Inc. (Hawkes), wishes to mine peat from wetland property owned by two affiliated compa- nies in northwestern Minnesota. The United States Army Corps of Engineers derailed that plan when it issued an Approved Jurisdictional Determination (“JD”) that the property constitutes “waters of the (la) 2a United States” within the meaning of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act (the “Clean Water Act” or “CWA”), and therefore appellants must have a permit to discharge dredged or fill materials into these “nav- igable waters.” See 33 U.S.C. §§ 1344(a), 1362(7). Appellants brought this action seeking judicial review of the JD and now appeal the district court’s grant of the government’s motion to dismiss their Amended Complaint. The district court concluded that an approved JD, though the consummation of the Corps’ jurisdictional decisionmaking process, was not a “final agency action” within the meaning of the Administra- tive Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 704. While the appeal was pending, a panel of the Fifth Circuit reached the same conclusion. Belle Co., LLC v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 761 F.3d 383 (5th Cir. 2014), cert. denied, _ U.S. _, 185 S. Ct. 1548, = L. Ed. 2d ___, 83 U.S.L.W. 3291 (U.S. Mar. 23, 2015) (No. 14-493). We conclude that both courts misapplied the Su- preme Court’s decision in Sackett v. EPA, US. _, 132 S. Ct. 1367, 182 L. Ed. 2d 367 (2012). Therefore, we reverse. I. The CWA requires a permit from the Corps to discharge dredged or fill materials into “navigable waters,” and a permit from the Environmental Protec- tion Agency (or an authorized state agency) to dis- charge any “pollutant” into navigable waters. See 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311(a), 1342, 1344. The statute defines 3a “navigable waters” to mean “the waters of the United States,” § 1362(7). This broad definition prompted the Corps and the EPA to make “sweeping assertions of jurisdiction” over every stream, ditch, and drain that can be considered a tributary of, and every wet- land that is adjacent to, traditional navigable waters. Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 726-727, 126 S. Ct. 2208, 165 L. Ed. 2d 159 (2006) (plurality opinion). In United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 139, 106 S. Ct. 455, 88 L. Ed. 2d 419 (1985), the Supreme Court held that the Corps may require permits for the discharge of fill material into wetlands adjacent to the “waters of the United States.” But in Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 531 U.S. 159, 166, 121 S. Ct. 675, 148 L. Ed. 2d 576 (2001), the Court rejected the Corps’ assertion of CWA juris- diction over “nonnavigable, isolated, intrastate waters” where migratory birds are present. And in Rapanos, the Court concluded that the Corps’ asserted jurisdic- tion over “wetlands based on adjacency to nonnaviga- ble tributaries” went beyond its statutory authority. 547 U.S. at 782, 126 S. Ct. 2208 (Kennedy, J., concur- ring in the judgment). Because the Court’s plurality and Justice Kennedy adopted different narrower tests to determine when wetlands are “waters of the United States,” we held “that the Corps has jurisdiction over wetlands that satisfy either test” in United States v. Bailey, 571 F.3d 791, 799 (8th Cir. 2009). 4a The CWA imposes heavy civil and criminal penal- ties on a person who discharges into navigable waters without a required permit, or in violation of an issued permit. See 33 U.S.C. § 1319; Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 721, 126 S. Ct. 2208. When the Corps or the EPA finds that a person is violating the CWA’s discharge restrictions, or a permit issued under the CWA, the agency “shall issue an order requiring such person to comply,” as in Sackett, or bring a civil enforcement action, as in Riverside Bayview Homes and Rapanos. See 33 U.S.C. $§ 1319(a)(3) (EPA) and 1344(s) (Corps). In Sackett, the EPA issued an administrative compli- ance order against a person for depositing fill into jurisdictional wetlands without a permit, ordering, among other remedies, that the site be restored. The EPA persuaded the lower courts the order was not subject to “pre-enforcement judicial review.” Apply- ing the test for determining a final agency action in Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 177-78, 117 S. Ct. 1154, 137 L. Ed. 2d 281 (1997), a unanimous Court held that the compliance order was a final agency action subject to immediate judicial review under the APA: [Ijt is hard for the Government to defend its claim that the issuance of the compliance order was just “a step in the deliberative process” when the agen- cy rejected the Sacketts’ attempt to obtain a hear- ing and when the nezt step will either be taken by the Sacketts (if they comply with the order) or will involve judicial, not administrative, deliberation (if 5a the EPA brings an enforcement action). 132 S. Ct. at 1373. The question in this case is whether the Court’s application of its flexible final agency action standard in Sackett’ should also apply in this case, where ap- pellants seek judicial review of an adverse JD without either completing the CWA permit process or risking substantial enforcement penalties by mining peat and discharging dredged or fill materials without a permit. That question requires a close look at the allegations in their Amended Complaint. Il. In reviewing the district court’s Rule 12(b)(6) dis- missal, we accept as true the facts alleged in the Amended Complaint. Hawkes is in the business of mining and processing peat, a “wetland dependant” activity regulated in Minnesota through permits issued by the Minnesota Department of Natural Resources. Pierce Investment Co. and LPF Properties, LLC, have property interests in a 530-acre parcel in northwestern Minnesota that contains high quality peat near ' The Court has consistently taken a “pragmatic” and “flexible” approach to the question of finality, and to the related question whether an agency action is ripe for judicial review. See Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 148-50, 87 S. Ct. 1507, 18 L. Ed. 2d 681 (1967); accord Bell v. New Jersey, 461 U.S. 773, 779, 103 S. Ct. 2187, 76 L. Ed. 2d 312 (1983); Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Res. Conserv. & Dev. Comm'n, 461 U.S. 190, 200-201, 103 S. Ct. 1713, 75 L. Ed. 2d 752 (1983). 6a Hawkes’s existing peat-mining operations. All three companies are owned by members of the Pierce family. After obtaining an option to purchase the property subject to regulatory approval, Kevin Pierce and Hawkes met with Corps and MDNR representatives to discuss Hawkes’s plan to expand its operations to include the property, which would extend the life of its peat mining ten to fifteen years. In December 2010, Hawkes applied to the Corps for a CWA permit. Ata January 2011 meeting, Corps representatives urged Pierce to abandon his plan, emphasizing the delays, cost, and uncertain outcome of the permitting process. Pierce responded that he had an option to purchase and intended to proceed. In March, the Corps sent a letter advising it had made a “preliminary determina- tion” the wetland is a regulated water of the United States and, “at a minimum,” an environmental as- sessment would be required. At an April meeting, a Corps representative told Pierce a permit would take years and the process would be very costly. During a site visit in early June, another Corps representative told a Hawkes employee that “he should start looking for another job.” In August, the Corps sent Hawkes a letter advising that nine additional information items costing more than $100,000 would be needed, including hydrological and functional resource assessments and an evaluation of upstream potential impacts. In No- vember, Corps representatives met with the land owner and urged that he sell the property to a “wet- lands bank,” advising that an environmental impact 7a statement would likely be required, delaying the issu- ance of any permit for several years. Appellants challenged the Corps’ preliminary de- termination. In November, the Corps provided a “draft” JD concluding the property was connected by a “Relatively Permanent Water” (a series of culverts and unnamed streams) that flowed into the Middle River and then into the Red River of the North, a traditional navigable water some 120 miles away. Appellants’ wetland consultant pointed out numerous errors in the analysis. Nonetheless, in February 2012 the Corps issued an Approved JD concluding the pro- perty was a water of the United States because of its “significant nexus” to the Red River. See 33 C.F.R. §§ 320.1(a)(6), 325.9. Appellants responded by filing a timely administrative appeal. See 33 C.F.R. §§ 331.2, 331.3, 331.6. In October 2012, the Corps’ Deputy Commanding General for Civil and Emergency Operations sustained the appeal, concluding after detailed analysis that the administrative record “does not support [the Dis- trict’s] determination that the subject property con- tains jurisdictional wetlands and waters,” and re- manding to the District “for reconsideration in light of this decision.” On December 31, 2012, the Corps nonetheless issued a Revised JD concluding, without additional information, that there is a significant nexus between the property and the Red River of the North, and advising appellants that the Revised JD was a 8a “final Corps permit decision in accordance with 33 C.F.R. § 331.10,” which meant their administrative remedies were exhausted. See 33 C.F.R. § 331.12. Appellants then filed this action seeking judicial review of the Revised JD, alleging that it does not meet either of the applicable tests for the assertion of CWA jurisdiction established in Rapanos—the plural- ity’s “relatively permanent” test, or Justice Kennedy’s “significant nexus” test. The Corps moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing the Revised JD was not a final agency action and the issue was not ripe for judicial review. The district court dismissed the complaint for lack of final agency action. Hawkes Co., Inc. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 963 F Supp. 2d 868, 871, 878 (D. Minn. 2013). This appeal followed. The APA provides for judicial review of a “final agency action for which there is no other adequate remedy in a court.” 5 U.S.C. § 704. The APA “evinces Congress’ intention and understanding that judicial review should be widely available to challenge the actions of federal administrative officials.” Cali- fano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99, 104, 97 S. Ct. 980, 51 L. Ed. 2d 192 (1977). When an agency action is final and, if final, appropriate for judicial review are issues that have arisen in a variety of federal agency contexts in the past one hundred years. See, e.g., Port of Bos. Marine Terminal Ass’n v. Rederiaktiebolaget Trans- atl., 400 U.S. 62, 70-71, 91 S. Ct. 203, 27 L. Ed. 2d 203 9a (1970); Rochester Tel. Corp. v. United States, 307 U.S. 125, 132 n.11, 143-44, 59 S. Ct. 754, 83 L. Ed. 1147 (1939). In Bennett, 520 U.S. at 177-78, 117 S. Ct. 1154, the Court synthesized its prior precedents on the first issue: As a general matter, two conditions must be satis- fied for agency action to be “final”: First, the ac- tion must mark the consummation of the agency’s decisionmaking process—it must not be of a merely tentative or interlocutory nature. And second, the action must be one by which rights or obligations have been determined, or from which legal conse- quences will flow. A. Though the Corps argues otherwise, we agree with the district court (and every court to consider the issue) that the Revised JD clearly meets the first Bennett factor—it was the consummation of the Corps’ decisionmaking process on the threshold issue of the agency’s statutory authority. See Belle Co., 761 F.3d at 389-90; Fairbanks N. Star Borough v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 543 F.3d 586, 591-93 (9th Cir. 2008). The regulations provide that an Approved JD “consti- tute[s] a Corps final agency action.” 33 C.F.R. § 320.1(a)(6). The Corps’ Regulatory Guidance Let- ter No. 08-02, at 2, 5, described an Approved JD as a “definitive, official determination that there are, or that there are not, jurisdictional ‘waters of the United States’ on a site,” and stated that an Approved JD “can be relied upon by a landowner, permit applicant, or 10a other affected party for five years” (quotation omitted). Jurisdictional determinations and permit- ting decisions are discrete agency actions; a party may obtain a JD without seeking a permit, and may obtain a permit without seeking an Approved JD. Fair- banks, 543 F.3d at 593. Thus, when an Approved JD has issued, “the process of administrative decision- making has reached a stage where judicial review will not disrupt the orderly process of adjudication.” Port of Bos., 400 U.S. at 70-71, 91 S. Ct. 203; see Ohio For- estry Ass'n, Inc. v. Sierra Club, 523 U.S. 726, 733, 118 S. Ct. 1665, 140 L. Ed. 2d 921 (1998). The possibility that the agency might informally reconsider its deci- sion “does not suffice to make an otherwise final agency action non-final.” Sackett, 132 S. Ct. at 1372 (quotation omitted). B. The district court concluded that the Approved JD does not satisfy Bennett’s second factor because it is not an agency action “by which ‘rights or obligations have been determined,’ or from which ‘legal conse- quences will flow.’” In Sackett, the EPA compliance order required petitioners to restore property they had altered without a permit and subjected them to the risk of $75,000 per day in penalties if they chose to disobey. By contrast, the district court reasoned, ap- pellants “face no such obligations or changes in their rights as a result of their jurisdictional determination.” They “may pursue a permit without a disadvantage.” 963 F Supp. 2d at 876-77. lla 1. In our view, this analysis seriously understates the impact of the regulatory action at issue by exag- gerating the distinction between an agency order that compels affirmative action, and an order that prohibits a party from taking otherwise lawful action. Numer- ous Supreme Court precedents confirm that this is not a basis on which to determine whether “rights or obli- gations have been determined” or that “legal conse- quences will flow” from agency action. —In Bennett, the Court held that a Fish and Wild- life Service biological opinion satisfied the second factor because it required the Bureau of Reclamation to comply with its conditions and thereby had “direct and appreciable legal consequences.” 520 U.S. at 158, 178, 117 S. Ct. 1154. Though not self-executing, the biological opinion was mandatory. Likewise, here, the Revised JD requires appellants either to incur substantial compliance costs (the permitting process), forego what they assert is lawful use of their property, or risk substantial enforcement penalties. —In Abbott Laboratories, the Court held that pre- scription drug labeling regulations were a final agency action subject to pre-enforcement judicial review be- cause they “purport to give an authoritative interpre- tation of a statutory provision” that puts drug compa- nies in the dilemma of incurring massive compliance costs or risking criminal and civil penalties for distrib- uting “misbranded” drugs. 387 U.S. at 152-53, 87 S. Ct. 1507. 12a —In Frozen Food Express v. United States, 351 U.S. 40, 76 S. Ct. 569, 100 L. Ed. 910 (1956), plaintiff sought judicial review of an Interstate Commerce Commission order declaring that certain agricultural commodities were not exempt from regulations re- quiring carriers to obtain a permit to transport. I/d. at 41-42, 76 S. Ct. 569. As in this case, the order “would have effect only if and when a particular action was brought against a particular carrier.” Abbott Labs., 387 U.S. at 150, 87 S. Ct. 1507. The Court nonetheless held the order reviewable because the “determination by the Commission that a commodity is not an exempt agricultural product has an immediate and practical impact”; it “warns every carrier, who does not have authority from the Commission to trans- port those commodities, that it does so at the risk of incurring criminal penalties.” Frozen Food Express, 351 U.S. at 43-44, 76 S. Ct. 569. Here, the Revised JD is a determination regarding a specific property that has an even stronger coercive effect than the order deemed final in Frozen Food Express, which was not directed at any particuiar carrier. In Port of Boston, 400 U.S. at 70-71, 91 S. Ct. 203, the Court rejected as having “the hollow ring of another era” the contention that an “order lacked finality because it had no inde- pendent effect on anyone,” citing Frozen Food Ex- press. —In Columbia Broadcasting System v. United States, 316 U.S. 407, 62 S. Ct. 1194, 86 L. Ed. 1563 (1942), the Court held that FCC regulations barring 13a the licensing of stations that enter into network con- tracts, though not self-executing, were subject to im- mediate review. “It is enough that, by setting the controlling standards for the Commission’s action, the regulations purport to operate to alter and affect ad- versely appellant’s contractual rights and business relations with station owners whose application for licenses the regulations will cause to be rejected.” /d. at 422, 62 S. Ct. 1194. Here, the Revised JD alters and adversely affects appellants’ right to use their property in conducting a lawful business activity. The adverse effect is caused by agency action, not simply by the existence of the CWA. Though the Revised JD is not-self-executing, “the APA provides for judicial review of all final agency actions, not just those that impose a self-executing sanction.” Sackett, 132 S. Ct. at 1373. 2. The Corps argues, and the district court further concluded, that the Revised JD is not a final agency action “for which there is no other adequate [judicial] remedy ' 5 U.S.C. § 704, because appellants have two other adequate ways to contest the Corps’ jurisdic- tional determination in court—complete the permit process and appeal if a permit is denied, or commence peat mining without a permit and challenge the agen- cy’s authority if it issues a compliance order or com- mences a civil enforcement action. These other CWA remedies were held not to preclude judicial review of the EPA compliance order in Sackett, 132 S. Ct. at 1372. l4a In this case, the contention ignores the prohibitive cost of taking either of these alternative actions to obtain judicial review of the Corps’ assertion of CWA jurisdiction over the property. First, as a practical matter, the permitting option is prohibitively expen- sive and futile. The Supreme Court reported in Ra- panos, 547 U.S. at 721, 126 S. Ct. 2208, that the aver- age applicant for an individual Corps permit “spends 788 days and $271,596 in completing the process.” Moreover, the Amended Complaint alleged that the Corps’ District representatives repeatedly made it clear to Kevin Pierce, to a Hawkes employee, and to the landowner that a permit to mine peat would ulti- mately be refused. In our view, this alone demon- strates that the second Bennett factor is satisfied. Moreover, even if appellants eventually complete the permit process, seek judicial review of the permit denial, and prevail, they can never recover the time and money lost in seeking a permit they were not legally obligated to obtain. Cf. lowa League of Cities v. EPA, 711 F.3d 844, 868 (8th Cir. 2013). Second, appellants’ other option—commencing to mine peat without a permit and await an enforcement action—is even more plainly an inadequate remedy. Appellants “cannot initiate that process, and each day they wait for the agency to drop the hammer, they accrue” huge additional potential liability. Sackett, 132 S. Ct. at 1372. Because appellants were forth- right in undertaking to obtain a permit, choosing now to ignore the Revised JD and commence peat mining 15a without the permit it requires would expose them to substantial criminal monetary penalties and even im- prisonment for a knowing CWA violation. Thus, like the compliance order at issue in Sackett, the Revised JD increases the penalties appellants would risk if they chose to begin mining without a permit. See 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c). The prohibitive costs, risk, and delay of these al- ternatives to immediate judicial review evidence a transparently obvious litigation strategy: by leaving appellants with no immediate judicial review and no adequate alternative remedy, the Corps will achieve the result its local officers desire, abandonment of the peat mining project, without having to test whether its expansive assertion of jurisdiction—rejected by one of their own commanding officers on administrative ap- peal—is consistent with the Supreme Court’s limiting decision in Rapanos. For decades, the Corps has “deliberately left vague” the “definitions used to make jurisdictional determinations,” leaving its District offices free to treat as waters of the United States “adjacent wetlands” that “are connected to the navi- gable water by flooding, on average, once every 100 years,” or are simply “within 200 feet of a tributary.” Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 727-28, 126 S. Ct. 2208, quoting a GAO report. The Court’s decision in Sackett reflect- ed concern that failing to permit immediate judicial review of assertions of CWA jurisdiction would leave regulated parties unable, as a practical matter, to chal- lenge those assertions. The Court concluded that was l6a contrary to the APA’s presumption of judicial review. “(TJhere is no reason to think that the Clean Water Act was uniquely designed to enable the strong-arming of regulated parties into ‘voluntary compliance’ with- out the opportunity for judicial review—even judicial review of the question whether the regulated party is within the EPA’s jurisdiction.” 132 S. Ct. at 1374. In our view, a properly pragmatic analysis of ripe- ness and final agency action principles compels the conclusion that an Approved JD is subject to immedi- ate judicial review. The Corps’s assertion that the Revised JD is merely advisory and has no more effect than an environmental consultant’s opinion ignores reality. “[I}n reality it has a powerful coercive ef- fect.” Bennett, 520 U.S. at 169, 117S. Ct. 1154. Ab- sent immediate judicial review, the impracticality of otherwise obtaining review, combined with “the un- certain reach of the Clean Water Act and the draconi- an penalties imposed for the sort of violations alleged in this case leaves most property owners with little practical alternative but to dance to the EPA’s [or to the Corps’] tune.” “In a nation that values due process, not to mention private property, such treat- ment is unthinkable.” Sackett, 132 S. Ct. at 1375 (Ali- to, J., concurring). We conclude that an Approved JD 17a is a final agency action and the issue is ripe for judicial review under the APA.” The judgment of the district court is reversed and the case is remanded for further proceedings not in- consistent with this opinion. * The question of ripeness “turns on ‘the fitness of the issues for judicial decision’ and ‘the hardship to the parties of withholding court consideration.” Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., 461 U.S. at 201, 103 S. Ct. 1713, quoting Abbott Labs., 387 U.S. at 149, 87 S. Ct. 1507. The issues of ripeness and final agency action are distinct, but in this case, our analysis of the final agency action factors in Bennett resolves the ripeness issue as well. 18a KELLY, Circuit Judge, concurring. I view whether a JD is reviewable under the APA as a close question. In Sackett, the Supreme Court concluded that a compliance order issued by the EPA “severely limits [petitioners’] ability to obtain a permit for their fill from the Army Corps of Engineers [be- cause] [t]he Corps’ regulations provide that, once the EPA has issued a compliance order with respect to certain property, the Corps will not process a permit application for that property unless doing so ‘is clearly appropriate.’” Sackettv. EPA, U.S. _, 1328S. Ct. 1367, 1372, 182 L. Ed. 2d 367 (2012) (internal citation omitted) (quoting 33 C.F.R. § 326.3(e)(1)(iv)).2 The record in the present case does not reveal that a simi- lar impediment to receiving a permit exists once a JD has been issued. In Sackett, the Corps had a pub- lished policy regarding the decreased likelihood of re- ceiving a permit; here, the record includes case- specific facts, such as informal comments made by Corps representatives, suggesting that a permit ap- plication made by Hawkes might be “futile.” See Ma- jority Opinion, supra, op. at 1001. However, I ques- tion how much weight should be given to the futility of * “No permit application will be accepted nor will the processing of an application be continued when the district engineer is aware of enforcement litigation that has been initiated by other Federal, state, or local regulatory agencies, unless he determines that con- current processing of an after-the-fact permit application is clearly appropriate.” 33 C.F.R. § 326.3(e)(1)(iv) 19a the permit application for an individual applicant, or the time and cost spent applying, in determining whether or not the JD constitutes a final agency ac- tion. IfaJD isa final agency action, an applicant who is likely to obtain a permit would still be in a position to seek judicial review of the JD. Similarly, it must be the case that were the Corps to take steps to make the permit process both more efficient and less costly, the reviewability of the JD would not change. I also note other differences between the compli- ance order in Sackett and the JD in the present case. A compliance order, once issued, begins the accumula- tion of penalties (potentially doubled) for each day the landowner remains in violation. /d. A JD, however, has no such penalty scheme. Indeed, 33 U.S.C. § 1319(d), the CWA’s enforcement section on civil penalties, makes no mention of JDs. While the ex- istence of a JD may affect a court’s assessment of a party’s “good faith” while determining civil penalties, I agree with the other courts that have considered this issue that any penalties resulting from a JD are far more “speculative” than those threatened in Sackett. Belle Co., LLC v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 761 F.3d 383, 392 (5th Cir. 2014); see also, Fairbanks N. Star Borough v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 543 F.3d 586, 595 (9th Cir. 2008). The Appellants fail to point to a single case in which increased civil penalties were levied against a party for ignoring a JD. 20a Despite these dissimilarities with the circumstances in Sackett, | agree that Hawkes is left without ac- ceptable options to challenge the JD, absent judicial review. Hawkes’s choice is to either (1) follow through on their peat-mining plans until either the EPA issues a compliance order or the Corps com- mences an enforcement action, to both of which Hawkes could raise lack of CWA jurisdiction as a de- fense; or (2) apply for a permit (on the grounds that no permit is required) and, if the application is denied, appeal the denial in court. But what happens if Hawkes is, after all, granted a permit yet maintains it never needed one in the first place? It must decline the permit and challenge the original jurisdiction in court. This roundabout process does not seem to be an “adequate remedy” to the alternative of simply allowing Hawkes to bring the jurisdictional challenge in the first instance and to have an opportunity to show the CWA does not apply to its land at all. In my view, the Court in Sackett was concerned with just how difficult and confusing it can be for a landowner to predict whether or not his or her land falls within CWA jurisdiction—a threshold determina- tion that puts the administrative process in motion. This is a unique aspect of the CWA; most laws do not require the hiring of expert consultants to determine if they even apply to you or your property. This juris- dictional determination was precisely what the Court deemed reviewable in Sackett. See Sackett, 132 S. Ct. 2la at 1374-75 (Ginsburg, J., concurring). Accordingly, I concur in the judgment of the court. 22a APPENDIX B UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA Civil No. 13-107 ADM/TNL HAWKES Co., INC., PIERCE INVESTMENT CO., AND LPF PROPERTIES, LLC, PLAINTIFFS v. UNITED STATES ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS, DEFENDANT Aug. 1, 2013 MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER ANN D. MONTGOMERY, District Judge. I. INTRODUCTION On July 9, 2013, the undersigned United States District Judge heard oral argument on Defendant United States Army Corps of Engineers’ (the “Corps”) Motion to Dismiss [Docket No. 11]. Plaintiffs Hawkes Co., Inc. (“Hawkes”), Pierce Investment Co. (“Pierce”), and LPF Properties, LLC (“LPF”) filed this action seeking a declaratory judgment and injunc- tive relief to challenge a jurisdictional determination 23a made by the Corps under the Clean Water Act (“CWA”). For the reasons stated herein, the Corps’ motion is granted. Il. BACKGROUND Plaintiffs Pierce and LPF own a 530 acre parcel of land in Marshall County, Minnesota (the “Property”). The Property contains peat, and because peat forms in wetlands, the Property is necessarily considered a wetland. Am. Compl. [Docket No. 7] 99 6, 7, 27. Plaintiff Hawkes seeks permission to mine peat from the Property for use in the construction of golf greens. Hawkes is already mining peat from nearby land, and intends to pay royalties to Pierce and LPF in exchange for permission to expand its mining operation onto the Property. All three companies are closely-held cor- porations owned by members of the Pierce family, and Kevin Pierce is an officer in all of the companies. /d. 19 8, 32-33. On March 20, 2007, Kevin Pierce, representing Hawkes, met with the Corps and the Minnesota De- partment of Natural Resources (“MDNR”) to discuss Hawkes’ plan to mine peat on the Property. On Jan- uary 15, 2008, the parties met again. At this second meeting, Hawkes informed the Corps and MDNR that the high quality peat available on the Property could support Hawkes’ mining operation for another 10 to 15 years. Id. 19 35-37. 24a The CWA prohibits the discharge of materials into “navigable waters,” which is broadly defined as “wa- ters of the United States.” 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251(a), 1311(a), 1362(6). The Corps has interpreted the term “waters of the United States” to include wetlands adjacent to navigable waters. The Supreme Court has affirmed this interpretation. See 33 C.F.R. § 328.3; United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 139, 106 S. Ct. 455, 88 L. Ed. 2d 419 (1985). The Corps has authority under the CWA to issue permits for the discharge of dredged or fill ma- terials into navigable waters, including wetlands. See 33 U.S.C. § 1344. The Corps has also promulgated regulations which govern its decisionmaking processes in connection with CWA permits. See 33 C.F.R. § 320.1, et seq. Hawkes’ intended mining operation involves the filling or discharge of materials onto the Property. As a result, in December 2010, Hawkes applied for a permit from the Corps to begin mining. In January 2011, the parties met to discuss Plaintiffs’ plans. The Corps attempted to dissuade Plaintiffs from expanding their mining operations, in part by stressing the time and cost involved in the permitting process. Am. Compl. % 40. On March 15, 2011, the Corps by letter informed Hawkes it had tentatively determined that the Prop- erty was connected to Red River of the North, a “wa- ter of the United States,” and thus regulated by the 25a Corps under the CWA. Over the next several months, the parties met several times, and the Corps conducted a site visit of the Property. In connection with the permitting process, the Corps also requested Plaintiffs conduct a series of assessments relating to the Property, which Plaintiffs estimate will cost about $100,000. Am. Compl. 11 41-46, Exs. A, B. On November 8, 2011, the Corps sent Plaintiffs a preliminary version of its jurisdictional determination for the Property (sometimes referred to as the “JD”). The preliminary JD stated that CWA jurisdiction ex- isted over the Property because it was a wetland con- nected to a “relatively permanent water,” which in turn connected to the Red River of the North, a navi- gable water.’ Plaintiffs responded by letter, arguing ' For jurisdiction to exist under the CWA, the wetland at issue must have some connection to a “traditionally navigable water.” The nature of this connection is somewhat in dispute due to Ra- panos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 126 S. Ct. 2208, 165 L. Ed. 2d 159 (2006). In Rapanos, the four justice plurality opinion held that for jurisdiction to exist under the CWA, the wetland must con- nect to a traditionally navigable water by “relatively permanent, standing or continuously flowing bodies of water.” Jd. at 739, 126 S. Ct. 2208. Justice Kennedy, in a concurring opinion, wrote that jurisdiction exists if the wetland has a “significant nexus” to tradi- tional navigable waters. /d. at 778, 126 S. Ct. 2208; see also Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook Cnty. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 531 U.S. 159, 121 S. Ct. 675, 148 L. Ed. 2d 576 (2001). The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals has held that either test can establish CWA jurisdiction. United States v. Bailey, 571 F.3d 26a no jurisdiction existed because the Property did not connect to a “relatively permanent water.” Am. Compl. 9 49. On February 7, 2012, the Corps issued an Approved Jurisdictional Determination (the “Approved JD”) in which it apparently abandoned the “relatively perma- nent water” rationale and instead concluded a “signif- icant nexus” existed between the Property and the Red River of the North. An “approved jurisdictional determination” is the first formal decision the Corps makes with regard to jurisdiction, and it is appealable to a “Review Officer” within the agency. See 33 C.F.R. §§ 331.2, 331.3. On April 4, 2012, in accordance with CWA regula- tions, Plaintiffs appealed the Approved JD to the des- ignated Corps Review Officer. Am. Compl.951. On October 24, 2012, the Corps issued an appellate deci- sion in which it rejected several of the Plaintiffs’ ap- peal arguments. However, the appeal concluded that the Corps had failed to evaluate the Property’s chemi- cal, physical, and biological effects on the Red River of the North, and thus had not established a significant 791, 799 (8th Cir. 2009). The Environmental Protection Agency and the Corps have similarly issued informal guiding documents in which they have stated an intent to exercise jurisdiction under both tests. See U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Clean Water Act Ju- risdiction Following U.S. Supreme Court’s Decision in Rapanos (Dec. 2, 2008), available at http://www.usace.army.mil/Portals/2/ docs/civilworks/regulatory/cwa_guide/ewa_juris 2dec08.pdf. 27a nexus. As a result, the JD was remanded to the St. Paul District of the Corps for further factfinding. Jd. at Ex. C. On December 31, 2012, the Corps issued a Revised Approved Jurisdictional Determination (the “Revised JD”) in which it again concluded CWA jurisdiction ex- isted. Jd. at 1 54. The Corps informed Plaintiffs that the Revised JD constituted the “final Corps ap- proved jurisdictional decision,” meaning no further appeals of jurisdiction could be taken. Cameron Decl. [Docket No. 13] Ex. 1. On January 11, 2013, Plain- tiffs filed this action seeking review of the Revised JD. II. DISCUSSION A. Motion to Dismiss Standard Rule 12 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure states that a party may move to dismiss a complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Fed. R. Civ. P 12(b)(6). The court con- strues the pleadings in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, and the facts alleged in the com- plaint must be taken as true. Hamm v. Groose, 15 F.3d 110, 112 (8th Cir. 1994) (citation omitted). And although the court may not consider matters outside the pleadings at this stage, “documents necessarily embraced by the complaint are not matters outside the pleading[s].” Ashanti v. City of Golden Valley, 666 F.3d 1148, 1151 (8th Cir. 2012) (quotation omitted). 28a B. Feview of Final Agency Actions Under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), “agency action made reviewable by statute and final agency action for which there is no other adequate remedy in a court are subject to judicial review.” 5 U.S.C. § 704. For an agency action to be considered “final,” it must satisfy two conditions. First, the action must “mark the consummation of the agency’s decisionmaking process,” meaning it must be more than “tentative or interlocutory” in nature. Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 177-78, 117 S. Ct. 1154, 137 L. Ed. 2d 281 (1997) (quotations and citations omitted). Second, the action must be one “by which rights or obligations have been determined,” or one from which “legal consequences will flow.” Jd. at 178, 117 S. Ct. 1154. The parties do not dispute that Plaintiffs here could obtain judicial review by pursuing the permitting pro- cess, as Corps regulations expressly make the final permit decision reviewable under the APA. See 33 C.F.R. § 331.12. However, Plaintiffs argue that by it- self, a jurisdictional determination qualifies as a “final agency action” subject to immediate judicial review. C. Judicial Review of Jurisdictional Determinations Although no Eighth Circuit court has yet ruled on the issue, several other federal courts have held that a jurisdictional determination is not a “final agency action,” and thus not subject to immediate judicial 29a review. See, e.g., Fairbanks N. Star Borough v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 543 F.3d 586 (9th Cir. 2008); Greater Gulfport Props., LLC v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 194 Fed. Appx. 250 (5th Cir. 2006) (un- published); Coxco Realty, LLC v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, Nu. 3:06-cv-416-s, 2008 WL 640946, at *4-5 (W.D. Ky. Mar. 4, 2008); Hampton Venture No. One v. United States, 768 F Supp. 174, 175-76 (E.D. Va. 1991); St. Andrews Park, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Army Corps of Eng’rs, 314 F Supp. 2d 1238, 1244-45 (S.D. Fla. 2004); Child v. United States, 851 F Supp. 1527, 1534-35 (D. Utah 1994); Lotz Realty Co. v. United States, 757 F Supp. 692, 695-98 (E.D. Va. 1990); Ac- quest Wehrle LLC v. United States, 567 F Supp. 2d 402, 409-411 (W.D.N.Y. 2008); Belle Co., LLC v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, No. 12-247-BAJ-SCR, 2013 WL 773730, at *2-4 (M.D. La. Feb. 28, 2013). Fairbanks illustrates the above-cited cases’ rea- soning for denying judicial review of jurisdictional determinations. Like Plaintiffs in this case, the plain- tiff in Fairbanks sought judicial review after the Corps issued an approved jurisdictional determination for the wetlands at issue. Fairbanks, 543 F.3d at 593-94. In deciding whether a jurisdictional determination is a “final agency action,” the Ninth Circuit Court of Ap- peals found that while the first Bennett condition was satisfied, the second was not. The court also con- cluded that the jurisdictional determination did not impair the plaintiff’s ability to seek judicial review 30a through the permitting process. See Bennett, 520 U.S. at 177-78, 117 S. Ct. 1154; 5 U.S.C. § 704. Considering the first Bennett condition, the Ninth Circuit held that the plaintiff’s jurisdictional determi- nation represented a consummation of the Corps’ de- cisionmaking process. The court reasoned that when the Corps issues a jurisdictional determination and upholds it on administrative appeal, the Corps itself treats the determination as “final” and will not reopen it absent new information supporting a revision. Fairbanks, 543 F.3d at 592. The Ninth Circuit also found that Corps regulations treat the jurisdictional determination as a separate administrative process from the subsequent permit decision, with the latter being initiated at-will by the permit applicant. Prac- tically speaking, when an applicant requests a permit, his application does not reopen or otherwise disturb the Corps’ earlier jurisdiction decision. Jd. at 593. As a result, the Fairbanks court held that the jurisdic- tional determination satisfied the first Bennett condi- tion. However, the Ninth Circuit ultimately held that a jurisdictional determination was not a “final agency action”—and thus not subject to immediate judicial review—because it did not alter a party’s rights or obligations. See id. at 591-94. A jurisdictional de- termination, the court held, “does not itself command [a party] to do or forbear anything; as a bare state- ment of the agency’s opinion, it can be neither the 3la subject of ‘immediate compliance’ nor of defiance.” Id. at 591-92 (citation omitted). A finding of jurisdic- tion in this context, the court held, is akin to recogniz- ing already-existing facts about the nature of the wet- lands at issue. When the Corps finds jurisdiction, it “does not alter physical reality or the legal standards used to assess that reality.” Jd. at 594. In other words, the Corps’ jurisdictional determination clarifies a plaintiff’s position but does not alter it. As a result, the jurisdictional determination fails the second Ben- nett condition, and the determination is not subject to judicial review. As part of its analysis, the Ninth Circuit briefly noted its holding did not impair the plaintiff’s ability to challenge CWA jurisdiction. /d. at 594-95. The plaintiff could still challenge jurisdiction when judicial review was appropriate, such as in connection with a permit application or an enforcement proceeding. See id. As aresult, the plaintiff was not without “oth- er adequate remedy in a court.” See id.; 5 U.S.C. § 704. D. Plaintiffs’ Appeal of the Revised Jurisdictional Determination As discussed below, Plaintiffs’ jurisdictional deter- mination satisfies the first Bennett condition, but not the second. 32a 1. Consummation of the Agency’s Decisionmaking Process The Corps argues Fairbanks reached the correct end result, but disagrees with the Ninth Circuit’s con- clusion that a jurisdictional determination marks the consummation of the agency’s decisionmaking process. Instead, the Corps urges the Court to view jurisdic- tional determinations as the beginning, or at least as some non-definitive, stage of the permit process. In response, Plaintiffs note that Fairbanks, a case on which the Corps relies, held that a jurisdictional de- termination was the consummation of a Corps deci- sionmaking process. Plaintiffs further argue the lan- guage of Corps regulations themselves indicate an in- tent to treat jurisdictional determinations as final. Plaintiffs’ jurisdictional determination marked the consummation of the Corps’ decisionmaking process, and as such satisfies the first Bennett condition. Despite the Corps’ argument to the contrary, the ju- risdictional determination process is not—as this case demonstrates—necessarily contiguous with a permit application process. Here, Plaintiffs received the Re- vised JD but have not yet decided whether to pursue a permit. At this point, Plaintiffs could choose to aban- don their mining operation. If that were to occur, Plaintiffs would not have abandoned the administra- tive process at a midpoint. The Corps’ jurisdictional determination would remain in place regardless of future operations, changes in ownership, or complete 33a inactivity on the Property. The only ways in which the Revised JD could be altered would be if: (1) new information surfaced regarding the Property, or (2) a party later successfully challenged jurisdiction in con- nection with a permit application or enforcement ac- tion. The jurisdictional determination is thus a dis- crete decision. The possibility of the Corps revising its jurisdic- tional determination does not, as the Corps urges, transform this determination into an advisory opinion. The Ninth Circuit in Fairbanks concluded that the possibility of new information arising did not suggest that the determination “might be subject to subse- quent revision consideration or modification.” Fairbanks, 543 F.3d at 592 & n.4; see also Coxco, 2008 WL 640946, at *5 (holding jurisdictional determination may mark consummation of jurisdiction decisionmak- ing process). In other administrative and judicial contexts, a final decision may be reopened if new in- formation comes to light. See, e.g., Fed. R. Crim. P 33(b)(1) (governing motion for new trial based-on new- ly discovered evidence); 20 C.F.R. § 404.989 (allowing for reopening of otherwise final Social Security bene- fits decisions based on new evidence or showing of er- ror). But, for very practical and equitable reasons, the chance of new information altering a final decision does not justify treating the decision as entirely advi- sory. That is also the case here. 34a The language of Corps regulations further supports this conclusion. The Corps concedes CWA regula- tions describe a jurisdictional determination as “a Corps final agency action.” 33 C.F.R. § 320.1(a)(6). However, the Corps argues that this language does not mean the Corps views jurisdictional determinations as final for APA purposes, but rather only as “final” in the sense the public may rely on the determina- tion.’ See Final Rule for Regulatory Programs of the Corps of Engr’s, 51 Fed. Reg. 41,206, 41,207 (Nov. 13, 1986). The Corps’ argument, as Plaintiffs note, actu- ally supports viewing jurisdictional determinations as the consummation of a decisionmaking process. Ifa jurisdictional determination is “final” in the sense the public may rely on it, the determination must be more definitive than an advisory opinion. 2. Determines a Party’s Rights or Obligations Although Plaintiffs’ Revised JD may mark the con- summation of a Corps’ decisionmaking process, it does not determine Plaintiffs’ rights or obligations, and thus does not satisfy the second Bennett condition. Plain- tiffs argue Bennett stressed the practical nature of its articulated finality test, focusing on the legal conse- quences of the agency decision even if the decision itself did not expressly alter legal rights. See Ben- ® This argument also reflects the overall regulatory scheme, as 33 C.F.R. § 331.12 states administrative remedies have not been ex- hausted for APA purposes until a final permit decision is reached under § 331.10. 35a nett, 520 U.S. at 169-70, 117 S. Ct. 1154. Because the Corps has found jurisdiction, Plaintiffs argue, their options have narrowed to a set of difficult alternatives. Plaintiffs may proceed with mining and risk substan- tial liability; they may seek a permit through a lengthy and costly process; or they may abandon their mining plans altogether. As a result, Plaintiffs argue the Re- vised JD has materially altered their legal position. The Corps responds by arguing, as Fairbanks held, that jurisdictional determinations do not alter a party’s legal obligations so much as mark the boundaries for future decisions. Plaintiffs’ jurisdictional determination does not fix their rights or obligations. The Revised JD does not order Plaintiffs to take any kind of action. Although Plaintiffs may want to obtain a permit if they wish to expand their mining operations, the Corps has in no way obligated them to do so. See Fairbanks, 543 F.3d at 594; St. Andrews, 314 F Supp. 2d at 1244-45; Belle, 2013 WL 1773730, at *4. While Plaintiffs do have a difficult choice to make regarding how to pro- ceed, their options did not substantially change be- cause of the jurisdictional determination. The Prop- erty is undisputedly a wetland, and it has a potential connection to a navigable water. The Revised JD did not change these physical characteristics. Nor did it affect the legal standards used by agencies and courts in determining where the CWA applies. Even if Plaintiffs had never approached the Corps, Plaintiffs would have still needed to decide whether to begin 36a mining on a wetland possibly protected by the CWA or to pursue a permit. As a result, the Revised JD does not satisfy the second Bennett conditicn. E. Compliance Orders and Sackett Neither Plaintiffs nor the Court have identified a single decision contrary tc the holding of Fairbanks and the other cases cited above. However, Plaintiffs argue the Supreme Court’s recent holding in Sackett v. EPA, _ US. _, 182 S. Ct. 1367, 182 L. Ed. 2d 367 (2012), overruled these decisions.’ Without obtaining a jurisdictional determination or permit, the petition- ers in Sackett filled rocks and dirt onto part of their residential lot in preparation for building a house. In response, the EPA issued a compliance order in ac- cordance with 33 U.S.C. § 1319.‘ In the compliance order, the EPA determined that the petitioners’ prop- erty fell under CWA jurisdiction, and also that the * The Court in Belle, 2013 WL 773730, at *4, specifically distin- guished Sackett, holding jurisdictional determinations did not have the binding effect of compliance orders. Nevertheless, Plaintiffs argue Belle reached the wrong result, and that Sackett applies here. * The EPA and the Corps have concurrent jurisdiction to enforce the CWA. The EPA has the authority under the Act to issue com- pliance orders, binding decisions which the EPA can then choose to enforce in court by bringing an enforcement action. See 33 U.S.C. § 1319(a, b). Prior to Sackett, courts had held that a party subject to a compliance order had no judicial recourse until the EPA brought a civil action to enforce the order. See, e.g., Hoffman Grp. v. EPA, 902 F.2d 567, 569-70 (7th Cir. 1990). 37a petitioners had violated the Act. /d. at 1370-71. The petitioners sought review of the compliance order, arguing it was a “final agency action” under Chapter 7 of the APA and thus subject to judicial review. The Supreme Court sided with the petitioners. The Court held the compliance order bore the hall- marks of a “final agency action” under the two Rennett conditions. First, the compliance order marked the consummation of the EPA’s decisionmaking process, because the petitioners were not entitled to any fur- ther administrative review. Jd. at 1372. Second, the compliance order determined the petitioners’ rights and obligations. The order legally obligated the petitioners to “restore” their land in accordance with an EPA restoration plan, it required them to provide the EPA with access to the property, and it required them to provide EPA employees with “access and documentation related to the conditions of the site.” Id. at 1371 (citation omitted). If the petitioners did not comply, they would immediately risk aceruing substantial, daily penalties. Jd. at 1372. In addition, the Court noted that Corps regulations made it sub- stantially more difficult for the petitioners to obtain a permit after receiving a compliance order. /d. (citing 33 C.F.R. § 326.3(e)(1)(iv)). 1. Bennett Conditions Under Sackett Plaintiffs argue the Revised JD satisfies the same criteria for a “final agency action” as the compliance order reviewed by the Supreme Court in Sackett. As 38a a result, Plaintiffs argue the Court should extend Sackett’s holding to apply to all final CWA jurisdic- tional determinations as well. The Corps responds that Fairbanks and the other above-cited cases have correctly stated the law, and that because jurisdiction- al determinations are distinguishable from compliance orders, Sackett should have no effect here. Plaintiffs are unable to demonstrate how Sackett applies to ju- risdictional determinations. As discussed above, the jurisdictional determination satisfies the first Bennett condition. With regard to the second Bennett condition, however, Plaintiffs’ Re- vised JD is distinguishable from the petitioners’ com- pliance order in Sackett. The compliance order de- manded the petitioners restore their property in ac- cordance with a restoration plan set by the EPA, and grant the EPA access to both the land and records at issue. Sackett, 132 8S. Ct. at 1371-72. If the petition- ers chose to disobey the compliance order, they risked accruing up to $75,000 per day in penalties, which the EPA could recover if it subsequently prevailed in an enforcement action. /d. at 1370. ° Regarding the first Bennett condition, Sackett and Fairbanks actually adopt the same reasoning in concluding a compliance order and a jurisdictional determination mark the consummations of their respective decisionmaking processes. Sackett held the “mere pos- sibility” of an agency revisiting and revising its original decision based on new information does not “suffice to make an otherwise final agency action nonfinal.” Sackett, 132 S. Ct. at 1372. As dis- cussed above, Fairbanks held in agreement on this point. 39a As discussed above in Section III.D.2., Plaintiffs face no such obligations or changes in their rights as a result of their jurisdictional determination. Plaintiffs attempt to avoid this conclusion by arguing the threat of liability comprises a material change in their legal obligations, just as it did for the petitioners in Sackett. See Sackett, 132 S. Ct. at 1371. If Plaintiffs forgo the costly permit process and begin mining, they argue, they will face the risk of the Corps suing them. How- ever, the compliance order in Sackett “started the clock” on the petitioners’ exposure to liability, adding potentially tens of thousands of dollars per day in penalties pending restoration of the property. See id. In this case, the jurisdictional determination has not exposed Plaintiffs to liability, nor made any demands of them. And if an enforcement action was brought against them, Plaintiffs would not face substantial— and automatically accrued—liability for their ac- tions. Thus, the “specter of potential liability” was ® At the hearing, Plaintiffs argued that proceeding without a per- mit when the Corps has already determined jurisdiction could put Plaintiffs at risk of steeper penalties and even criminal liability if the Corps succeeded in an enforcement action, because violating the CWA after gaining knowledge of CWA jurisdiction could dem- onstrate Plaintiffs’ bad faith. Whether a particular agency action may be used as evidence rgainst a party in a subsequent proceed- ing does not amount to a change in that party’s rights or obliga- tions, nor is it fairly characterized as a legal consequence. See Fairbanks, 543 F.3d at 595 (“[TJhe possibility that Fairbanks might someday face a greater risk of increased fines should it proceed without regard to the Corps’ assertion of jurisdiction does not 40a much more concrete for the petitioners in Sackett than it is here. Pls.” Mem. Opp. [Docket No. 26] 23; see Lotz, 757 F Supp. at 696 (holding the permitting pro- cess did not impose the sort of “immediate and devas- tating consequences” which might amount to a deter- mination of rights or obligations). Also unlike the petitioners in Sackett, Plaintiffs may pursue a permit without a disadvantage. The com- pliance order “severely” limited the petitioners’ ability to obtain a permit from the Corps. Sackett, 132 S. Ct. at 1372. Here, the jurisdictional determination has not affected Plaintiffs’ ability to pursue a permit. And Plaintiffs’ description of the permit process as an unending, unreasonably expensive procedural night- mare is unpersuasive. Undoubtedly, pursuing a per- mit comes at a significant price, and it will take time before Plaintiffs may challenge the Revised JD through this process. But, as another court held in a relevant context, “[t]he possibility that an agency may make an error that is beyond the effective reach of a court is part of the price we pay for the advantages of an administrative process.” Thermal Ecology Must be Preserved v. Atomic Energy Comm’n, 433 F.2d 524, 526 (D.C. Cir. 1970). Although Plaintiffs might prefer a faster or less expensive way to challenge the Revised JD, the law views the permitting process as a proper procedural juncture to access judicial review in con- constitute a legal consequence of the approved jurisdictional de- termination.”) (emphasis original). 4la nection with the CWA. See, e.g., Fairbanks, 543 F.3d at 594-95. 2. Adequacy of Judicial Remedies In addition to considering the Bennett conditions, Sackett also considered whether the petitioners were left without “other adequate remedy in a court.” /d. at 1372 (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 704). Generally, the party seeking to alter wetlands subject to the CWA may seek judicial review by one of two methods. First, he may proceed with the planned development or other alteration without consulting the Corps or the EPA. The EPA may then choose to bring an enforcement action against him, which would bring the party into court. See 33 U.S.C. § 1319; 33 C.F.R. §§ 326.3, 326.5. The Court in Sackett rejected this option, holding that waiting to be sued while incurring potentially signifi- cant penalties was not a sufficient remedy. See gen- erally Sackett, 132 S. Ct. at 1372-74. Second, the party may apply for a permit from the Corps, and if the permit is denied through the admin- istrative process, he may file suit. See 33 C.F.R. §§ 331.10, 331.12. The Supreme Court held that this was not an adequate remedy for the petitioners in Sackett, because the EPA, a separate agency, had already issued a compliance order. /d. at 1372 (“The remedy for denial of action that might be sought from one agency does not ordinarily provide an ‘adequate remedy’ for action already taken by another agency.”). 42a Neither of these “dead ends” apply to Plaintiffs. First, unlike the petitioners in Sackett, Plaintiffs are not at the mercy of the Corps while they continue to accrue liability. On the contrary, Plaintiffs may choose if future administrative proceedings regarding the Property will occur and Plaintiffs will not accrue liability in the meantime. Unlike the petitioners, Plaintiffs have the ability to “initiate [the] process” which will bring them before the Court. See Sackett, 132 S. Ct. at 1372. Regarding the second remedy, as noted, Plaintiffs have the unhindered option of pursuing a permit from the Corps. Both Sackett and Fairbanks viewed the permit process as a proper avenue after which judicial review of agency action under the CWA was appropri- ate. See Sackett, 132 S. Ct. at 1872; Fairbanks, 543 F.3d at 594-95; see also Coxco, 2008 WL 640946, at *5. Sackett found the permit process inadequate only be- cause it would not serve to remedy the compliance or- der already issued by the EPA, a separate agency. Sackett, 132 S. Ct. at 1372. In this case, Plaintiffs face no such dilemma. Finally, Plaintiffs now have a third avenue to judi- cial review. If Plaintiffs choose to begin mining with- out a permit and the government issves a compliance order, Plaintiffs may, as a result of Sackett’s holding, seek immediate judicial review of the compliance order and resolve the status of their operations. Because the Revised JD does not satisfy both Bennett condi- 43a tions, and because Plaintiffs have “other adequate remedy in a court,” the determination is not reviewa- ble at this time. F. Ripeness Both parties offer brief arguments regarding why the doctrine of ripeness might also determine the out- come of this motion. Because the Court holds judicial review is not appropriate for the reasons stated above, it declines to reach the issue of ripeness. IV CONCLUSION Based on the foregoing, and all the files, records and proceedings herein, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that: 1. Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss [Docket No. 11] is GRANTED; and, 2. All claims in the Amended Complaint [Docket No. 7] are DISMISSED. LET JUDGMENT BE ENTERED ACCORDINGLY 44a APPENDIX C {SEAL OMITTED] DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY ST. PAUL DISTRICT, CORPS OF ENGINEERS 180 FIFTH STREET EAST, SUITE 700 ST. PAUL MN 55101-1678 REPLY TO ATTENTION OF Operations Regulatory (2007-01914-DJS) Dec. 31, 2012 Mr. Kevin Pierce Hawkes Peat Company P.O. Box 14111 Grand Forks, North Dakota 58208 Dear Mr. Pierce: The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, St. Paul Dis- trict (District) has completed our reevaluation of the approved jurisdictional determination (AJD) issued to you on February 7, 2012 in accordance with the appeal decision provided by the Mississippi Valley Division Commander on October 24, 2012. As you are aware, the Division Commander remanded the case back to the District for reconsideration and reevaluation of our determination that the wetlands on your property along with other similarly situated wetlands adjacent to the tributary have a significant effect on the chemi- 45a cal, biological, and physical integrity of the Red River of the North. Based on our reevaluation, we have affirmed our previous determination that the wetlands on your property have a significant nexus with the Red River of the North and are thus waters of the United States. A copy of the revised AJD is provided for your records. The District Engineer’s decision made pursuant to the Division Engineer’s remand of the appealed action becomes the final Corps permit decision in accordance with 33 C.F.R. 331.10. If you have any questions, contact Dan Seemon in our St. Paul office at (651) 290-5380. In any corre- spondence or inquiries, please refer to the Regulatory number shown above. Sincerely, /s/ KELLY (ILLEGIBLE| [for] TAMARA E. CAMERON Chief, Regulatory Branch Copy furnished: T. Acuff, CEMVD-PD-KM 46a EXECUTIVE SUMMARY MVP RESPONSE TO REMAND OF APPROVED JURISDICTIONAL DETERMINATION, CORPS FILE NUMBER MVP-2007-01914-DJS (HAWKES PEAT COMPANY, INC.) BACKGROUND Mr. Kevin Pierce appealed the approved jurisdictional determination (AJD) prepared by the St. Paul District Regulatory Branch (District). Mr. Pierce alleged that a significant nexus does not exist between the 155 acres of wetlands on his property and the Red River of the North. On October 24, 2012 the Division Commander issued a decision on the appeal and remanded the case back to the District for reconsideration. The remand direc- ted the District to review the administrative record and its decision that the wetlands on Mr. Pierce’s pro- perty along with other similarly situated wetlands ad- jacent to the tributary has a significant effect on the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the Red River of the North. chemical, physical, or biological integrity of the Red River of the North. ACTION REQUIRED OP-R staff has completed the additional analyses and reviews in accordance with the remand and has deter- mined that the wetlands located on Mr. Pierce’s prop- erty have a significant effect on the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the Red River of the North. 47a A revised and updated AJD has been prepared and will be transmitted to Mr. Pierce. A copy of the trans- mittal letter and the revised AJD will be provided to CEMVDPD-KM (Tonya Acuff) in accordance with the instructions from the Division Commander. Pursuant to our regulations, the final Corps decision is the District Engineer’s decision made pursuant to the Division Engineer’s remand of the appealed action. 48a APPROVED JURISDICTIONAL DETERMINATION FORM U.S. Army Corps of Engineers This form should be completed by following the in- structions provided in Section IV of the JD Form Instructional Guidebook. SECTION I;_ BACKGROUND INFORMATION A. REPORT COMPLETION DATE FOR APPROVED JURISDICTIONAL DETERMINATION (JD): ST PAUL, MN DISTRICT OFFICE, FILE NAME, AND NUMBER: 2007-01914-DJS, Hawkes Peat, Mercil Site PROJECT LOCATION AND BACKGROUND IN- FORMATION: State: Minnesota County/parish/borough: Marshall City: Newfolden Center coordinates of site (lat/long in degree decimal format): Lat. 48.417373° N, Long. -96.272519° W Universal Transverse Mercator: Zone 16 Name of nearest waterbody: Unnamed tributary to the Middle River 49a Name of nearest Traditional Navigable Water (TNW) into which the aquatic resource flows: Red River of the North Name of watershed or Hydrologic Unit Code (HUC): 09020309 [X) Check if map/diagram of review area and/or potential jurisdictional areas is/are available upon request. [_] Check if other sites (e.g., offsite mitigation sites, disposal sites, etc...) are associated with this action and are recorded on a different JD form. D. REVIEW PERFORMED FOR SITE EVALUATION (CHECK ALL THAT APPLY): {ij Office (Desk) Determination. Date: 12/20/2011 { * * * - --- Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385016_0613%3A02. Public record. Not legal advice.