# Amicus Curiae Brief — Lightfoot v. Cendant Mortg. Corp., 136 S. Ct. 289 (2015) (No. 14-1055)

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URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385016_0542%3A14

## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Amicus Curiae Brief
- **Published:** January 1, 2015

## Text

NO oe
. AUG 23 20%
No. 14-1055 OFFICE OF THE CLEFSS
IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

CRYSTAL MONIQUE LIGHTFOOT, et al.,
Petitioners,

U.

CENDANT MORTGAGE CORPORATION,
D/B/A/ PHH MORTGAGE, et al.,

Respondents.

On Writ of Certiorari to the
United States Courts of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit

AMICUS CURIAE BRIEF OF THE
AMERICAN ASSOCIATION FOR JUSTICE

IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONERS

Julie Braman Kane Jeffrey R. White

AMERICAN ASSOCIATION Counsel of Record

FOR JUSTICE AMERICAN ASSOCIATION

777 6% Street, N.W. FOR JUSTICE

Suite 200 777 & Street, N.W.

Washington, DC 20001 Suite 200

(202) 965-3500 Washington, DC 20001
(202) 944-2839
jeffrey.white@justice.org
Attorney for Amicus

TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

TABLE OF CONTENTS

IDENTITY AND INTEREST OF AMICUS

I. The Lower Court’s Inference of Subject
Matter Jurisdiction in a Civil Action
Involving a Congressionally Chartered
Corporation Based Entirely on Congress’
Ambiguous Reference to Federal Courts
Exceeds the Limited Role of Federal

A.

Bare reference in the charter to
federal courts is ambiguous as to
congressional intent to create
subject matter jurisdiction and
does not indicate federal interests
warrenting the availability of a

EL

Congressionally chartered
corporations vary greatly in the
federal interests involved in their

SOCCER EERE HO „„ „„ „ „„ eee eee

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% — R F R ——fFmPꝙͥ — — FuFnFnW,num e EEE EH HEHEHE HR Hee ee

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e PL SONGS SAS TR Oe 10

Congress has reacted to this
Court’s prior expansive view of
federal jurisdiction in cases
involving federally chartered

corporations by limiting
jurisdiction to cases where federal
interests are truly at stake 13

D. Conservation of federal judicial
resources counsels caution in
opening the doors to federal courts
to cases based solely on state law. ...... 19

II. The Lower Court’s Inference of Subject
Matter Jurisdiction in a Civil Action
Involving a Congressionally Chartered
Corporation Based Entirely on Congress’
Ambiguous Reference to Federal Courts
Erodes the Vitally Important Role of
State Courts in Our Federalist System 20

III. This Court Should Extend Its “Clear
Statement” Doctrine to the Purported
Creation of Federal Subject Matter
Jurisdiction in Cases Otherwise
Governed by State Law 24

ee eae — ͤ 27

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases
Altria Group, Inc. u. Good, 555 U.S. 70 (2008) ........ 26

American National Red Cross v. S.G., 505 U.S.
a 2, 8, 9

Atascadero State Hospital v. Scanlon, 473 U.S.
r — 21. 24

Bank of the United States v. Deveaux, 9 U.S. (5
e a 8,9

Bankers’ Trust Co. v. Texas & Pacific Railway,
EN ER 9

Briglia v. Mondrian Mortgage Corp.,698 A.2d
28 (N. J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1997)............... 12

Colarte vu. Federal National Mortgage
Assication, 689 A. 2d 869 (N. J. Super. Ct.
D 5 Ee a ee 12,14

Collins v. American Red Cross, 724 F. Supp.
e .. 19

Crum v. Veterans for Foreign Wars, 502 F.
Z EE PI cisececccesccnscenesensseneces 16

CSX Transportation Inc. v. Easterwood, 507
SEES 5 AES 26

iv

Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta v. Thomas, 220

F. zd 1235 (11th Cir. 2000) . . . .. 18
Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit
Authority, 469 U.S. 528 (1985) . 25
Government National Mortgage Association v.
Terry, 608 F.2d 614 (5th Cir. 1979) 16
Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452 (1991)......20, 21, 25
Gully v. First National Bank, 299 U.S. 109
——T—TTTTT—T—T—T———— 18
Gunn v. Minton, 133 S. Ct. 1059 (2013 11
Healy v Ratta, 292 U.S. 263 (1934)⸗⸗)⸗)⸗)⸗ 17
Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Insurance Co. of
America, 511 U.S. 375 (1994) 11,12
Latch v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 312 F.
Supp. 1069 (N. D. Miss. 1970) ꝗ 16, 20
Lebron v. National Railroad Passenger Corp.,
i ALN 10

Lightfoot u. Cendant Mortgage Corp., 769 F.3d
e 8, 9, 13

Luckett v. Harris Hospital-Fort Worth, 764 F.
2 Se 19

M’Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 316
UII etch diltedilecapndsensitentanniedisatialslacinmdacsieecuiues 13

Mansfield, C. & L.M.R. Co. v. Swan, 111 U.S.
Dr I I a a Yr eno ee 7

Murdock v. Memphis, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 590
TT 24

Murphy v. Colonial Federal Savings & Loan
Association, 388 F.2d 609 (2nd Cir. 1967)

OE RNA TT 16
National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833
%0TT—T———— 24
New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262
reren 23
New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992)
„„FFPPCCGTPTTTPPPPPPTTTT0T0T0T—G—V—T—T—T—T—T—————— 26
Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. (9
JJ... acecccncsceccsscsssccesccossens 3, 13, 14
Pacific Railroad Removal Cases, 115 US. 1
reer 15, 16
Puerto Rico u. Russell & Co., 288 U.S. 476
TTT —— 18
Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218
r 26
Romero v. Internatioal Terminal Operating Co.,
Z...... 18
Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574
r 7
Shamrock Oil & Gas Corp. v. Sheets, 313 U.S.
rene 17

Steel Co. v. Citizens for Better Environment, 523
EAE RS Re an 7

vi

Turner v. Bank of North America, 4 U.S. (4

Ne icine. ̃ —— —ů ů—ů ů 12
United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336 (1971).............. 26
United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) 21, 23
Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 461

0 — ͤ— ê 13
Will v. Michigan Department of State Police,

„ bb 24
Statutes
. 17
TTT 8
12 U.S. C. § 18196b 2 Diii) . . 26
. 18
JJ. e 11
TTT 14
„ cc 17
c 16
. —« 17
t 10
? 26
L Oe occsccscncccccnccsessncssscsnsccescesen 11
Act of Jan. 28, 1915, ch. 22, § 5, 38 Stat. 803. 15

Vil

Act of July 12, 1882, ch. 290, § 4, 22 Stat. 162. 15
Judges’ Bill of 1925, 43 Stat. 936 (codified at 28

D ̃ ̃ͤ A2 cpusbnennene 15
Other Authorities

Abrahamson, Shirley S., Reincarnation of State
Courts, 36 Sw. L. J. 951 (1982) 23

Elrod, Jennifer Walker, Don't Mess with Texas

Judges: In Praise of the State Judiciary,
37 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 629 (2014) .....22, 23

Elrod, Jennifer Walker, Js the Jury Still Out?:
A Case for the Continued Viability of the
American Jury, 44 Tex. Tech L. Rev. 303

EEE EE 22
Federalist No. 17 (Dec. 5, 1787) 21
Friendly, Henry J., Federal Jurisdiction: A

r 19, 20

Froomkin, A. Michael, Reinventing the
Government Corporation, 1995 U. III. L.
ET AO 10

Kaye, Judith S., Dual Constitutionalism in
Practice and Principle, 61 St. John’s L.
— 23

Service, Congressional or Federal
Charters: Overview and Enduring Issues
F 10

Kosar, Kevin R., Congressional Research
Service, Congressionally Chartered

Vill

Nonprofit Organizations (“Title 36
Corporations”): What They Are and How
Congress Treats Them (July 14, 2008)........... 11

Linde, Hans A., First Things First:
Rediscovering the States’ Bills of Rights,
9 U. Balt. L. Rev. 379 (1980) 23

Lund, Paul E., Federally Chartered
Corporations and Federal Jurisdiction,
36 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 317 (2009).................... 11

Maloan, Michael T., Federal Jurisdiction and
Practice: The American National Red
Cross and the Interpretation of “Sue and
Be Sued” Clauses, 45 Okla. L. Rev. 739

Manning, John F., Clear Statement Rules and
the Constitution, 110 Colum. L. Rev. 399
e. ee 26

Mosk, Stanley, State Constitutionalism: Both
Liberal and Conservative, 63 Tex. L.
F . s.. 23

O Connor, Sandra Day, Trends in the
Relationship Between the Federal and
State Courts from the Perspective of a
State Court Judge, 22 Wm. & Mary L.
F crceniseennaiacabibiianinmemens 23

Pollock, Stewart G., Adequate and Independent
State Grounds as a Means of Balancing
the Relationship Between State and
Federal Courts, 63 Tex. L. Rev. 977
RSL ESET: EA sD, Ce ae 23

ix

Shaw, Lorretta, A Comprehensive Theory of
Protective Jurisdiction: The Missing
“Ingredient” of “Arising Under”
Jurisdiction, 61 Fordham L. Rev. 1235

Shepard, Randall T., The Maturing Nature of
State Constitution Jurisprudence, 30
. 4:8 4 EES Ce 23

Shulman, Harry & Edward C. Jaegerman,
Some Jurisdictional Limitations on
Federal Procedure, 45 Yale L.J. 393

Sloviter, Dolores K., A Federal Judge Views
Diversity Jurisdiction Through the Lens
of Federalism, 78 Va. L. Rev. 1671 (1992)

„TTT 22
Tribe, Laurence H., American Constitutional
e 25, 27
Utter, Robert F., The Practice of Principled
Decision- mahing in State
Constitutionalism: Washington's
Experience, 65 Temp. L. Rev. 1153 (1992)
„ 23
Wright, C., A. Miller & E. Cooper, Federal
Practice & Procedure (Rev. ed. 1971). 22

Wright, J. Skelly, In Praise of State Courts:

Confessions of a Federal Judge, 11
Hastings C~nst. L. Q. 165 (1984)................... 21

Young, Ernest A., State Sovereign Immunity
and the Future of Federalism, 1999 Sup.

a 25
Rules
e 7
e EE ee ae 1

IDENTITY AND INTEREST OF AMICUS
CURIAE

The American Association for Justice (“AAJ”)
respectfully submits this brief as amicus curiae in
support of the Petition for Certiorari in this case.! AAJ
is a voluntary national bar association whose
members primarily represent plaintiffs in personal
injury and property rights cases, as well as plaintiffs
in civil rights, employment rights, and consumer
rights actions.

Some clients of AAJ members have state law
causes of action against federally chartered
corporations and seek to pursue those claims in state
courts. AAJ is concerned that lower court’s decision in
this case will allow federally chartered defendants to
override the plaintiff's choice of the state court forum
based on the federal charter with little or no evidence
that Congress actually intended that result. Removal
of such actions by federally chartered corporations
and the attendant litigation regarding subject matter
jurisdiction makes representation of clients more
difficult and adds unnecessary complexity and
expense to the vindication of state law rights.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

1. The lower court's bright-line rule
inferring subject matter jurisdiction in a case

All parties have consented to the filing of this amicus
curiae brief, and copies of the emails granting consent have been
filed with the Clerk. The undersigned counsel for amicus curiae
affirms, pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 37.6, that no counsel
for a party authored this brief in whole or in part and no person
or entity other than AAJ, its members, and its counsel
contributed monetarily to the preparation or submission of this
brief.

involving a congressionally chartered corporation,
based entirely on a reference to federal courts in the
charter, is inconsistent with the role of federal courts.
Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. The
requirement that a federal court be certain of its own
subject matter jurisdiction is of fundamental
importance. Plaintiffs in this case assert claims
against Fannie Mae that are based entirely on state
statutory and common-law causes of action. The court
of appeals below held that the district court had
subject matter jurisdiction in this case based on a
provision in Fannie Mae’s congressional charter that
authorizes Fannie Mae “to sue and be sued in any
court of competent jurisdiction, State or Federal.”

That provision expressly addresses no more
than Fannie Mae’s authority capacity to sue and is, at
best, ambiguous as to whether Congress meant also to
expand the original jurisdiction of district courts to
actions that otherwise belong in state courts. The
Ninth Circuit below, however, discerned in American
National Red Cross v. S.G., 505 U.S. 247 (1992), a
bright line rule that the bare mention of federal courts
in the sue-and-be-sued provision suffices to create
federal subject matter jurisdiction. However, Red
Cross stated that such a reference maybe read to
confer federal court jurisdiction, not that it was alone
sufficient. The mere mention of federal courts—
without clarifying indicators such statutory text,
legislative history, or a meaningful federal interest—
is too opaque to show congressional intent to expand
jurisdiction.

Nor is it plausible that Congress would use
such an ambiguous and indirect means to expand
federal court jurisdiction. The many federally
chartered corporations engage in widely diverse

activities that may or may not implicate federal
interests. Some are owned in whole or in part by the
United States. Government Sponsored Enterprises,
including Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, are privately
owned but perform quasi-governmental functions.
Finally, Congress has chartered over 100 charitable
and nonprofit organizations, most of which do not
engage in governmental or quasi-governmental
activities at all. A court must not grasp at a reference
to federal courts in the federal charter to infer that
Congress intended to guarantee easy access to federal
court in any case involving such a corporation.

The court below relied on Osborn v. Bank of the
United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824). But that
case involved a direct attack on the national bank by
a hostile state government where state courts could
not be relied on to protect federal interests. In the case
before this Court, a private corporation faces state law
claims by private individuals, a dispute in which state
courts can be counted on to administer justice fairly.
Indeed, when this Court extended Osborn to purely
private state-law disputes, Congress intervened by
limiting automatic jurisdiction over congressionally
chartered corporations to cases where the United
States owns more than halt the corporation’s capital
stock. Congress has clearly eresed any presumption
favoring federal jurisdiction in cases involving federal
corporations. It is instead the responsibility of the
federal judicial branch to avoid intrusion into state
authority except where clearly authorized by

Congress.

Additionally, Congress has by now
demonstrated that it is fully capable of expressly
conferring jurisdiction when it deems the federal
interest so requires. In fact, Congress has done so in

the charter for Freddie Mac. That Congress did not
similarly extend federal court jurisdiction in favor of
Fannie Mae strongly indicates congressional
intention to preclude federal court involvement in
such actions where federal law does not provide the
rule of decision.

As a practical matter as well, courts should
avoid inviting an influx of state law cases into federal
court unless Congress clearly so intended. Federal
courts possess no particular expertise in matters of
state law and their resources are required to attend to
matters that only federal courts can handle or that
they handle better thet state courts.

2. Implying federal subject matter
jurisdiction over cases that would otherwise be
decided by state courts undermines the vital role of
state courts in our federalist system. The Founders
designed our system of dual sovereigns to afford the
greatest protections to the rights end freedoms of the
American people. State government can be more
responsive to local needs, more accessible to citizen
participation, and can serve as “laboratories” in social
policy.

State courts play an essential role. They are the
primary administrators of criminal and civil justice,
the immediate and visible guardians of life and
property, and defenders of civil liberties. Indeed, state
courts have made significant advances in the securing
of state constitutional protections that are different
from or broader than those guaranteed by the United
States Constitution. State courts are also more
reflective of and responsive to the concerns of ordinary
citizens due to their broader reliance on trial by jury.

The decision below, however, has the effect of
ousting state courts from their responsibility to
administer justice in a significant class of cases based
entirely on state law, with no showing that
meaningful federal interests warrant such an
intrusion. Even assuming that the federal court
correctly applies state law, the outcome is one decided
by judges not selected under the state’s system, who
are not accountable to the state court’s constituency,
and who do not speak with the authority of the
sovereign state on a matter of state law.

To the extent that state courts are deprived of
opportunities to develop state-law protections of
personal rights and property rights, the advantages of
federalism are thwarted.

3. This Court has already crafted a tool
that protects the role and responsibility of state courts
in the federal system. The clear statement rule
requires simply that if Congress intends to alter the
usual constitutional balance between the states and
the federal government, it must make its intent clear.

Obviously, the actions of Congress may impact
the integral functions of state government, including
state courts. This Court has retreated from judicially
enforced textual protection of state sovereignty under
the Tenth Amendment. Rather, the Court has relied
on the structural safeguards inherent in the
constitutional design: The states can protect their
interests through their representation in Congress.

The necessary corollary is that when Congress
takes an action that intrudes upon state functions,
Congress must speak plainly and unambiguously. In
this way, the states are provided fair notice that

legislation affecting their interests is before the
Congress, affording them the opportunity to oppose or
alter unwanted intrusion into state sovereignty. It
also ensures that congressional representatives
consider the proposed legislation’s impact on the
states. And it allows the judicial branch, in
interpreting legislation, to avoid unintended
encroachments on the authority of the States.

The decision below found an implied expansion
of federal subject matter jurisdiction based on an
ambiguous statutory reference to federal courts in
Fannie Mae’s congressional charter. The court’s rule
evades the very structural protections that this Court
has relied upon to safeguard federalism. Congress has
shown it can speak clearly when creating original
jurisdiction over federally chartered corporations.
This Court should require such a clear statement.

ARGUMENT

I. The Lower Court’s Inference of Subject
Matter Jurisdiction in a Civil Action
Involving a Congressionally Chartered
Corporation Based Entirely on Congress’
Ambiguous Reference to Federal Courts
Exceeds the Limited Role of Federal
Courts.

A. Bare reference in the charter to
federal courts is ambiguous as to
congressional intent to create
subject matter jurisdiction and does
not indicate federal interests
warranting the availability of a
federal forum.

The requirement that a federal court be certain
as to its own subject matter jurisdiction is a matter of
fundamental importance. “Jurisdiction is power to
declare the law,” and without it, “the court cannot
proceed at all in any cause.” Steel Co. v. Citizens for
Better Environment, 523 U.S. 83, 94 (1998) (quoting
Ex parte McCardle, 7 Wall. 506, 514 (1868)). Subject
matter jurisdiction and personal jurisdiction “keep
the federal courts within the bounds the Constitution
and Congress have prescribed.” Ruhrgas AG v.
Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574, 583 (1999).
Therefore, the requirement that jurisdiction be
established as a threshold matter “is inflexible and
without exception.” 523 U.S. at 95 (quoting Mansfield,
C. & L.M.R. Co. v. Swan, 111 U.S. 379, 382 (1884)).
See also Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(hX3) (“If the court
determines at any time that it lacks subject-matter
jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the action.”).

Plaintiffs in this case assert claims against the
Federal National Mortgage Association (“Fannie
Mae”), that are based entirely on state statutory and
common-law causes of action. See Compl., “Fraud and
Deceit,” 11 33-40; “Racial Discrimination” in violation
of Cal. Civ. Code § 51 (“Unruh Act”), Compl. 11 41-47;
“Fraud and Quiet Title,” in violation of Cal. Civ. Code
2294, Compl. 11 48-59; “Slander of Title,” Compl. 11
60-64; “Negligent Misrepresentation,” Compl. 11 65-
71; “Civil Conspiracy,” Compl. 11 72-75; and
“Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress,” Compl.
11 76-82. The court of appeals below nevertheless
held that the district court had subject matter
jurisdiction in this case based on a provision in Fannie
Mae’s charter that authorizes Fannie Mae “to sue and
be sued, and to complain and to defend, in any court
of competent jurisdiction, State or Federal.” Lightfoot
v. Cendant Mortgage Corp., 769 F.3d 681, 683 (9th
Cir. 2014) (quoting 12 U.S.C. § 1723a(a)).

That charter provision expressly addresses no
more than Fannie Mae’s capacity to sue and “no right
is conferred on the [corporation] by the act of
incorporation, to sue in the federal courts.” Bank of the
United States v. Deveaux, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 61, 86
(1809). The Ninth Circuit, however, discerned ix this
Court’s decision in American National Red Cross v.
S.G., 505 U.S. 247 (1992), a bright line rule:

In Red Cross, the Supreme Court gave us
a clear rule for construing sue-and-be-
sued clauses for federally chartered
corporations. The Court held that “a
congressional charter’s ‘sue and be sued’
provision may be read to confer federal
court jurisdiction if, but only if, it
specifically mentions the federal courts.”

769 F.3d at 683 (quoting Red Cross, 505 U.S. at 255).

InRed Cross,this Court concluded from its
comparison of the charters in Deveaux, 9 U.S. at 85;
Bankers’ Trust Co. v. Texas & Pacific Railway, 241
U.S. 295, 304-05 (1916); and D’Oench, Duhme & Co. v.
FDIC, 315 U.S. 447, 455 (1942), that “a congressiona!
charter’s ‘sue and be sued’ provision may be read to
confer federal court jurisdiction if, but only if, it
specifically mentions the federal courts.” 505 U.S. at
255 (emphasis added). This Court did not state that a
bare reference to federal courts was itself sufficient to
confer new subject matter jurisdiction on federal
courts. Indeed, Justice Souter, writing for the Red
Cross majority, proceeded to inquire from the
legislative history of the Red Cross charter whether
Congress had in fact intended to create federal
jurisdiction. The Court ultimately rejected
respondents’ more limited view. Jd. at 260-63. Justice
Souter’s exercise would have been wholly superfluous
and unnecessary if the Court had in fact established a
bright line rule.

The court below, by contrast, undertook no
inquiry into the intent of Congress regarding Fannie
Mae’s charter. Indeed, the court’s only reference to
legislative intent was to state that there was “no
indication that Congress intended to eliminate federal
question jurisdiction in 1954. Instead, there was
silence.” 769 F.3d at 685.

The lower court determined that Red Cross
established a “rule” that “suffices to confer federal
jurisdiction” simply by use of the term “federal” court.
Lightfoot, 769 F.3d at 684. See also id. at 690 (Stein,
J., dissenting) (stating that the majority applied a rule
of “automatic federal subject matter jurisdiction”).

10

The Solicitor General has ably demonstrated that the
text and legislative history of Fannie Mae’s charter do
not support such a bright-line rule and do not support
subject matter jurisdiction in this case. Br. for the
United States as Amicus Curiae on Pet. for Certiorari
11-17.

Such a bright-line rule is opaque as to
congressional intent to expand the subject matter
jurisdiction of federal courts, and it is also opaque as
to any federal interests that might be at stake which
might have persuaded Congress to make a federal
forum available.

B. Congressionally chartered
corporations vary greatly in the
federal interests involved in their
activities.

This Court in Lebron v. Nat'l R.R. Passenger
Corp., 513 U.S. 374 (1995), reviewed in detail “the
long history of corporations created and participated
in by the United States for the achievement of
governmental objectives.” Jd. at 386 & 387-91. Well
over 100 federally chartered corporations are tasked
with widely diverse activities. See generally Kevin R.
Kosar, Congressional Research Service,
Congressional or Federal Charters: Overview and
Enduring Issues (Apr. 19, 2013), available at
https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RS22230. pdf; A.
Michael Froomkin, Reinventing the Government
Corporation, 1995 U. III. L. Rev. 543, 555-57 (1995).

Some are owned in whole or in part by the
federal government. See 31 U.S.C. § 9101 (listing 28
such “government corporations”). In addition, seven
Government Sponsored Enterprises (“GSEs”),

11

including Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, are privately
owned but perform quasi-governmental functions.”
Paul E. Lund, Federally Chartered Corporations and
Federal Jurisdiction, 36 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 317, 324
(2009); see 12 U.S.C. §§ 4501-4642 (detailing the
powers of GSE’s). Finally, Congress has chartered
over 100 charitable and nonprofit organizations,
including the American Red Cross and the Little
League, that do not engage in governmental or quasi-
governmental activities at all. See 36 U.S.C. §§ 10101-
240112; Kevin R. Kosar, Congressional Research
Service, Congressionally Chartered Nonprofit
Organizations (“Title 36 Corporations”): What They
Are and How Congress Treats Them (July 14, 2008).
The number and types of federally chartered
corporations will likely expand. Proposals to federally
charter insurance companies, securities firms, and
financial services companies have been discussed in
Congress. Lund, supra, at 325.

It is simply implausible that Congress would
use a charter provision that expressly authorizes a
corporation to sue or be sued to implicitly expand the
jurisdiction of the federal courts. It is doubly
implausible that Congress would telegraph such a
fundamentally important change by the oddly indirect
reference to federal courts in a provision that
addresses the authority of the corporation, not the
authority of the federal courts.

Federal district courts are “courts of limited
jurisdiction,’ possessing ‘only that power authorized
by Constitution and statute.” Gunn v. Minton, 133 S.
Ct. 1059, 1064 (2013) (quoting Kokkonen v. Guardian
Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994)). An
action is presumed to lie outside this limited
jurisdiction. Kokkonen, 511 U.S. at 377 (citing Turner

12

v. Bank of N. Am., 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 8, 11 (1799)), and
the “burden of establishing the contrary rests upon
the party asserting jurisdiction.” Id.

Amicus submits that courts may not infer
federal jurisdiction over a congressionally chartered
corporation based on a bare reference to federal courts
“unless [the] case implicates a meaningful federal
interest.” Lorretta Shaw, A Comprehensive Theory of
Protective Jurisdiction: The Missing “Ingredient” of
“Arising Under” Jurisdiction, 61 Fordham L. Rev.
1235, 1237 (1993). The fact that Congress referred to
federal courts in the sue-or-be-sued provision in
Fannie Mae’s charter by Congress does not establish
such a federal interest that a federal forum must be
available for any state-law dispute to which Fannie
Mae is a party. Indeed, there are many such cases that
do not implicate federal interests at all. See,
e.g.,Colarte v. Fed. Natl Mortg. Ass’n, 689 A.2d 869
(N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1996), overruled on other
grounds, Briglia v. Mondrian Mortg. Corp.,698 A.2d
28 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1997) (negligence action
under state law by injured pedestrian who fell on a
snow-covered sidewalk adjacent to property owned by
Fannie Mae). It should be the corporation’s burden on
removal to show either that Congress expressly
granted original jurisdiction in district court over
actions to which the corporation is a party, or that a
“meaningful federal interest” is at stake in the case,
supporting a finding that Congress intended to make
the federal forum available.

13

C. Congress has reacted to this Court’s prior
expansive view of federal jurisdiction in
cases involving federally chartered
corporations by limiting jurisdiction to
cases where federal interests are truly at
stake.

The court below viewed Osborn v. Bank of the
United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824), as the
seminal decision that “made clear that a sue-and-be-
sued clause for a federally chartered corporation
confers federal question jurisdiction if it specifically
mentions federal courts.” Lightfoot, 769 F.3d at 683.

In Osborn, Chief Justice John Marshall broadly
declared that, because the Bank of the United States
could only sue as authorized by its congressionally-
enacted charter, any such suit “literally, as well as
substantially” arises under the laws of the United
States for purposes of Article III. Osborn, 22 U.S. at
823. This Court has noted that Osborn “reflects a
broad conception of ‘arising under’ jurisdiction” that
has since been questioned. Verlinden B.V. v. Cent.
Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 492-93 (1983). Amicus
suggests that the context of the controversy facing
Chief Justice Marshall in Osbornindicates that
Osborn should not dictate the proper scope of federal
jurisdiction in this case.

In Osborn,the state of Ohio, defying this
Court’s decision in M’Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (1
Wheat.) 316 (1819), levied a ruinous annual tax on the
second National Bank. State officials seized some
$100,000 from the Bank’s office in Chillicothe, Ohio.
Osborn, 22 U.S. at 832-36. The Bank sued the state
officials in federal court, seeking to recover the seized
funds and enjoin the collection of the tax, alleging that

14

the seizure violated the federal Constitution. Id. at
859-60.

At that time there was no general authorization
for federal courts to hear cases arising under federal
law. Congress first authorized general federal
question jurisdiction in the Judiciary Act of 1875, now
codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Yet, the
Bank of the United States “was sadly in need of a
federal haven for its litigation.” Harry Shulman &
Edward C. Jaegerman, Some _ Jurisdictional
Limitations on Federal Procedure, 45 Yale L.J. 393,
405 (1936). “The Government was interested as an
owner in the Bank and the Bank was performing
governmental service [but] the Bank was the object of
great popular hatred and of measures of reprisal by
many state legislatures. Id. See also Michael T.
Maloan, Federal Jurisdiction and Practice: The
American National Red Cross and the Interpretation
of “Sue and Be Sued” Clauses, 45 Okla. L. Rev. 739,
759 (1992) (The Bank “was the subject of much hatred
from local populations and state legislatures . . land]
needed the security of a federal forum.”). As Daniel
Webster argued to the Court, the “constitution itself
supposes that [state judicial systems] may not always
be worthy of confidence, where the rights and
interests of the national government are drawn in
question.” 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 811.

Fannie Mae does not face those historical
exigencies. The corporation is not facing hostile state
governments eager to use state courts to block the
federal government’s actions and drain its funds.
Fannie Mae faces private citizens asserting causes of
action under state law. There is no good reason why a
case stemming from a fall on a snowy sidewalk, see
Colarte, supra, or a foreclosure of real property in

15

violation of state law, should require a federal forum.
What Chief Justice Marshall deemed essential to
preserve the federal government's interest from
covetous state governments should not be wrenched
out of context to accomplish an unnecessary
expansion of federal subject matter jurisdiction in a
state-law cause of action between private parties.

In fact, Congress itself acted to correct what it
perceived as judicial overreaching regarding federal
jurisdiction. In Pacific Railroad Removal Cases, 115
U.S. 1 (1885), this Court, relying on Osborn’s broad
view of “arising under” jurisdiction, held that any
claim against a federally chartered corporation
necessarily arose under federal law and could
therefore be removed to federal court. Jd. at 14.

The ensuing years witnessed a flood of cases
involving federally chartered corporations asserting
ordinary state-law claims in the federal courts or
removing such claims from state courts. Alarmed,
Congress took steps to relieve the federal courts’
workload by restricting subject matter jurisdiction
over such cases. In 1882, Congress eliminated
automatic federal question jurisdiction in cases
involving national banks. Act of July 12, 1882, ch. 290,
§ 4, 22 Stat. 162, 163. In 1915, Congress eliminated
automatic federal question jurisdiction over suits
involving federally chartered railroads. Act of Jan. 28,
1915, ch. 22, § 5, 38 Stat. 803, 805. Finally, Congress
enacted the Judges’ Bill of 1925, 43 Stat. 936, 941,
now codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1349, which eliminated
automatic federal question jurisdiction for all other
federally chartered corporations, except those in
which the federal government owns a controlling

16

interest.? See Gov't Nat'l Mortgage Ass’n v. Terry, 608
F.2d 614, 620-21 n.10 (5th Cir. 1979) (“[Sjection 1349
was passed to diminish the flood of federal litigation
that resulted from the Pacific Railroad Removal
Cases.”); Murphy v. Colonial Fed. Savings & Loan
Ass'n, 388 F.2d 609, 611-12 (2nd Cir. 1967) (purpose
of § 1319 was to stem “the flood of litigation to which
the federal courts were . . . subjected” as a result of the
decision in Pacific Railroad Removal Cases); Crum v.
Veterans for Foreign Wars, 502 F. Supp. 1377 (D. Del.
1980) (the purpose of § 1319 was to lighten the case
load of the federal courts); Latch v. Tenn. Valley Auth.,
312 F Supp. 1069, 1073 (N.D. Miss. 1970) (same).

Thus, in the case of government-chartered
corporations that are wholly or partially owned by the
federal government, where the federal interest in
litigating in a federal forum would be clear, Congress
has limited original jurisdiction of federal courts to
those cases where the interest of the United States is
strongest. Expanding federal jurisdiction by
implication could no longer be deemed consistent with
congressional intent. Chief Justice Stone observed,
that it is instead the responsibility of the federal
judicial branch to avoid intrusion into state authority
except where clearly authorized by Congress:

The power reserved to the states under
the Constitution to provide for the

2 28 U.S.C. § 1349 provides:

The district courts shall not have jurisdiction of
any civil action by or against any corporation
upon the ground that it was incorporated by or
under an Act of Congress. unless the United
States is the owner of more than one-half of its
capital stock.

17

determination of controversies in their
courts, may be restricted only by the
action of Congress in conformity to the
Judiciary Articles of the Constitution.
Due regard for the rightful
independence of state governments,
which should actuate federal courts,
requires that they scrupulously confine
their own jurisdiction to the precise
limits which the statute has defined.”

Shamrock Oil & Gas Corp. v. Sheets, 313 U.S. 100,
108-09 (1941) (quoting Healy v Ratta, 292 U.S. 263,
270 (1934)).

A second reason against implying a grant of
subject matter jurisdiction in Congress’ oblique
reference to federal courts is one that was not
available to Chief Justice Marshall: Congress has
already demonstrated that it is fully capable of
expressly conferring jurisdiction when it deems the
federal interest so requires.

For example, 28 U.S.C. § 1345 expressly
provides for original jurisdiction in the district courts
for suits by federal agencies, and 28 U.S.C. §
1442(aX1) authorizes such agencies to remove state
court actions to U.S. district court. Congress has also
provided that certain federally created entities shall
be deemed federal agencies for purposes of original
jurisdiction and removal under those statutes. One
such agency is the Federal Home Loan Mortgage
Corporation (“Freddie Mac”), a GSE like Fannie Mae.
See 12 U.S.C. § 1452(f) (Actions against Freddie Mac
“shall be deemed to arise under the laws of the United
States, and the district courts of the United States

18

shall have original jurisdiction of all such actions.)
The fact that Congress did not extend similar federal
court jurisdiction in favor of Fannie Mae strongly
indicates congressional intention to preclude federal
court involvement in such actions where federal law
does not provide the rule of decision.

Justice Cardozo has stated, based on Congress’
reaction, that Osborn’s broad pronouncement
regarding federal jurisdiction was no longer a guiding
principle. Gully v. First Nat'l Bank, 299 U.S. 109, 113
(1936). Indeed, this Court has come to regard the
Pacific Railroad Removal Cases as
“unfortunate.” Romero v. Int'l Terminal Operating
Co., 358 U.S. 354, 379 n.50 (1959).

Instead, this Court stated that in ascertaining
federal jurisdiction in such cases “the federal nature
of the right to be established is decisive—-not the
source of the authority to establish it.” Gully, 299 U.S.
at 114 (quoting Puerto Rico uv. Russell & Co., 288 U.S.
476, 483 (1933)). The proper inquiry for a federal court

The congressional authorization for the Federal
Reserve similarly provides:

[Alll suits of a civil nature at common law or in
equity to which any Federal Reserve bank shall
be a party shall be deemed to arise under the
laws of the United States, and the district courts
of the United States shall have original
jurisdiction of all such suits.

12 U.S.C. § 632. That provision expressly extends the district
court’s jurisdiction to state law causes of action. Fed. Reserve
Bank of Atlanta v. Thomas, 220 F.3d 1235, 1244 (11th Cir. 2000).
Creating federal jurisdiction by implication from an ambiguous
reference in the charter is unwarranted where Congress has
shown it can speak explicitly and directly.

19

on the question of subject matter jurisdiction is not
simply whether Congress mentioned federal courts in
the “sue or be sued clause,” but whether the statutory
text or legislative history indicate that Congress
recognized that meaningful federal interests
warranted the availability of a federal forum for state-
law causes of action.

D. Conservation of federal judicial resources
counsels caution in opening the doors t.
federal courts to cases based solely on
state law.

This principle also serves very pragmatic
concerns.As one commentator explained, “Federal
dockets are overcrowded, and the last thing federal
judges need is to be further saddled with cases
grounded entirely on state law.” Maloan, supra, at
760. See also Luckett v. Harris Hosp.-Fort Worth, 764
F. Supp. 436, 441 (N.D. Tex. 1991) (expressing
concerns that broader federal jurisdiction for
congressionally chartered corporations would open a
“floodgate” of state law cases); Collins v. Am. Red
Cross, 724 F. Supp. 353, 358 (E.D. Pa. 1989) (similar).

The influx of such cases diverts federal judicial
resources needed for federal law issues to preside over
actions based purely on state law in which district
courts possess no particular expertise. As Judge
Friendly warned, the federal judicial branch must
guard against “diversion of judge-power urgently
needed for tasks which only federal courts can handle
or which, because of their expertise, they can handle
significantly better than the courts of a state.” Henry
J. Friendly, Federal Jurisdiction: A General View 141
(1973). As one district judge has stated:

20

This court is not convinced, however,
that federal district courts should
automatically hear all cases in which
federal law is remotely, if at all, involved.
Such a rule would convert the federal
district court from a court of limited
jurisdiction, carefully defined by
Congress, to a court of general
jurisdiction hearing many cases in which
state law would predominate.

Latch, 312 F. Supp. at 1076.

Perhaps more important for the interests of
justice is the obvious fact that federal courts are not
experts in state law. As aptly stated by Judge
Friendly, “All such cases [in which state law is
unclear] are pregnant with the

injustice.” Friendly, supra, at 143.

II.

The Lower Court’s Inference of Subject
Matter Jurisdiction in a Civil Action
Involving a Congressionally Chartered
Corporation Based Entirely on Congress’
Ambiguous Reference to Federal Courts
Erodes the Vitally Important Role of State

Courts in Our Federalist System.

In Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452 (1991),
Justice O’Connor’s majority opinion featured a
compelling essay on the on the importance of

preserving the states’ role:

This federalist structure of joint
sovereigns preserves to the people
numerous advantages. It assures a
decentralized government that will be
more sensitive to the diverse needs of a

possibility of

21

heterogeneous society; it increases
opportunity for citizen involvement in
democratic processes; it allows for more
innovation and experimentation in
government; and it makes government
more responsive by putting the States in
competition for a mobile citizenry.

Id. at 458. She added that the “constitutionally
mandated balance of power’ between the States and
the Federal Government was adopted by the Framers
to ensure the protection of ‘our fundamental
liberties,” Jd. (quoting Atascadero State Hosp. v.
Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 242 (1985)). Thus, “a healthy
balance of power between the States and the Federal
Government will reduce the risk of tyranny and abuse
from either front.” Id. See United States v. Lopez, 514
U.S. 549, 552 (1995) (citing Gregory as setting forth
the “first principles” of federalism).

State courts play an essential role in this plan.
The Founders gave to the states “the one transcendent
advantage [of] the ordinary administration of criminal
and civil justice.” Federalist No. 17 (Dec. 5, 1787)
(Alexander Hamilton). A state court is “the immediate
and visible guardian of life and property.” Jd. Indeed,
state courts have served the “historic role as the
primary defenders of civil liberties and equal rights.”
J. Skelly Wright, In Praise of State Courts:
Confessions of a Federal Judge, 11 Hastings Const. L.
Q. 165, 188 (1984).

The decision below, however, has the effect of
ousting state courts from their responsibility to
administer justice in causes of action based entirely
on state law, with no showing that meaningful federal
interests warrant such an intrusion. The Chief Judge

of the Third Circuit has pointed out that federal court
adjudication of state law claims results in
“unavoidable intrusion of the federal courts in the
lawgiving function of state courts.” Dolores K.
Sloviter, A Federal Judge Views Diversity Jurisdiction
Through the Lens of Federalism, 78 Va. L. Rev. 1671,
1675 (1992). She stated convincingly,

When federal judges make state law—
and we do, . . judges who are not
selected under the state’s system and
who are not answerable to its
constituency are undertaking an
inherent state court function.

Id. at 1687. Seealso 13 C. Wright, A. Miller & E.
Cooper, Federal Practice & Procedure § 3502 (Rev. ed.
1971) (“{E]xpansion of the jurisdiction of the federal
courts diminishes the power of the states.”).

Former Colorado Supreme Court Justice
Rebecca Love Kourlis wisely observed: “For most
Americans, Lady Justice lives in the halls of state
courts,” quoted in Jennifer Walker Elrod, Don’t Mess
with Texas Judges: In Praise of the State Judiciary, 37
Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 629, 635 (2014).

One reason state courts are more reflective of
and responsive to the concerns of ordinary citizens is
their broader reliance on the jury, which John Adams
called “the heart and lungs of liberty.” Jennifer
Walker Elrod, Is the Jury Still Out? A Case for the
Continued Viability of the American Jury, 44 Tex.
Tech L. Rev. 303, 308 (2012). “(Sjtate courts
conduct[Jabout 46,200 civil jury trials per year. By
contrast, the federal courts conduct [only] about 2,100

23

civil jury trials per year.” Elrod, Don’t Mess with Texas
Judges, supra, at 638.

State courts are fully capable of protecting the
rights of their citizens. Indeed, one of the most
significant advances in the past half century in the
securing of individual protections has been the
rejuvenation of state constitutional rights that are
different from or broader than those guaranteed by
the Constitution of the United States, a development
that many state supreme court justices have
celebrated. See, eg., Shirley S. Abrahamson,
Reincarnation of State Courts, 36 Sw. L.J. 951 (1982);
Judith S. Kaye, Dual Constitutionalism in Practice
and Principle, 61 St. John’s L. Rev. 399 (1987); Hans
A. Linde, First Things First: Rediscovering the States’
Bills of Rights, 9 U. Balt. L. Rev. 379 (1980); Stanley
Mosk, State Constitutionalism: Both Liberal and
Conservative, 63 Tex. L. Rev. 1081 (1985); Sandra Day
O'Connor, Trends in the Relationship Between the
Federal and State Courts from the Perspective of a
State Court Judge, 22 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 801 (1981);
Stewart G. Pollock, Adequate and Independent State
Grounds as a Means of Balancing the Relationship
Between State and Federal Courts, 63 Tex. L. Rev. 977
(1985); Randall T. Shepard, The Maturing Nature of
State Constitution Jurisprudence, 30 Val. U. L. Rev.
421 (1996); Robert F. Utter, The Practice of Principled
Decision-making in State Constitutionalism:
Washington’s Experience, 65 Temp. L. Rev. 1153
(1992).

Additionally, a celebrated value of federalism is
the ability of states to serve as “laboratories” in social
policy. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 581 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring) (quoting New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann,
285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)). To

24

the extent that courts are deprived of opportunities to
develop state-law protections of personal rights and
property rights, this aim of federalism is thwarted.

III. This Court Should Extend Its “Clear
Statement” Doctrine to the Purported
Creation of Federal Subject Matter
Jurisdiction in Cases Otherwise
Governed by State Law.

This Court has already crafted a tool that
protects the role and responsibility of state courts in
the federal system. The clear statement rule provides
that “if Congress intends to alter the ‘usual
constitutional balance between the States and the
Federal Government,’ it must make its intention to do
so ‘unmistakably clear in the language of the statute.”
Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 65
(1989) (quoting Scanlon, 473 U.S. at 242).

The Court gave substantive content to the
Tenth Amendment protection of the states in Nat’
League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976), holding
that certain essential functions of a state are so
“integral” to statehood that they may not be
supplanted by federal law. “This Court has never
doubted that there are limits upon the power of
Congress to override state sovereignty, even when
exercising its otherwise plenary powers to tax or to
regulate commerce.” Id. at 842.4

This Court suggested in Murdock uv. Memphis, 87 U.S. (20
Wall.) 590, 633 (1874), that, even if the commerce clause allowed
it, “Congress may not have the power to authorize the Supreme
Court to supplant state courts as the authoritative declarers of
law within their jurisdictions by functioning as a court of last
resort with respect to state common law and statutory law.”
Ernest A. Young, State Sovereign Immunity and the Future of

25

The Court overruled National League of Cities
a decade later in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan
Transit Authority, 469 U.S. 528 (1985). The Garcia
Court did not dismantle federalism. Rather the
majority concluded that the states can fully protect
their interests through their representation in
Congress. Garcia reasoned that the states “are more
properly protected by procedural safeguards inherent
in the structure of the federal system than by
judicially created limitations on federal power.” Id. at
552.

The necessary corollary to that principle,
Justice O Connor subsequently pointed out, is that
Congress must speak plainly when intruding on state
authority:

Application of the plain statement rule
thus may avoid a potential constitutional
problem. Indeed, inasmuch as this Court
in Garcia has left primarily to the
political process the protection of the
States against intrusive exercises of
Congress’ Commerce Clause powers, we
must be absolutely certain that Congress
intended such an exercise.

Gregory, 501 U.S. at 464. This Court has long insisted
that when Congress legislates “in a field which the
States have traditionally occupied . we start with
the assumption that the historic police powers of the
States were not to be superseded by the Federal Act
unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of
Congress.” Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S.

Federalism, 1999 Sup. Ct. Rev. 1, 79 n.120 (1999) (quoting
Laurence H. Tribe, American Constitutional Law § 5-20, at 380
(2d ed. 1988)).

26

218, 230 (1947). See also Altria Group, Inc. v. Good,
555 U.S. 70, 77 (2008) (quoting Rice, 331 U.S. 218);
United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 349 (1971)
(“(U]nless Congress conveys its purpose clearly, it will
not be deemed to have significantly changed the
federal-state balance.”).

The clear statement rule provides fair notice to
the states that legislation affecting their interests is
before the Congress, affording them the opportunity
to oppose or alter the intrusion into state sovereignty.
It also ensures that congressional representatives
consider the proposed legislation’s impact on the
states. By this means, the judicial branch avoids
“unintended encroachment on the authority of the
States.” CSX Transp. Inc. v. Easterwood, 507 US.
658, 664 (1993); see also New York v. United States,
505 U.S. 144, 181 (1992) (Al] healthy balance of
power between the States and the Federal
Government will reduce the risk of tyranny and abuse
from either front.”); see generally John F. Manning,
Clear Statement Rules and the Constitution, 110
Colum. L. Rev. 399 (2010).

Additionally, requiring that Congress spell out
its intent to alter or enlarge federal jurisdiction
invites Congress to tailor the scope of federal
jurisdiction to closely conform to the federal interests
at stake with far greater precision. For example,
Congress has provided that all civil suits to which the
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation is a party
shall be deemed to arise under the laws of the United
States, except that certain actions “in which only the
interpretation of the law of such State is necessary,
shall not be deemed to arise under the laws of the
United States.” 12 US.C. § 1819%bX2XD)iii).
Similarly, 36 U.S.C. § 220505(bX9) confers original

27

jurisdiction over any civil action against the U.S.
Olympic Committee solely relating to the
corporation’s responsibilities under this chapter.”
Such carefully tailored grants of subject matter
jurisdiction should be encouraged by this Court.

To allow federal subject matter jurisdiction to
supersede the ordinary responsibility of state courts
to decide matters of state law based on an ambiguous
statutory reference by Congress evades the very
protections of states that Garcia relied upon. It
deprives the states of the opportunity to contest
intrusion by the federal government into a central
facet of state sovereignty. At the same time, it allows
Congress to use ambiguity “as a cloak for its failure to
accommodate the competing interests [in] the federal-
state balance.” Tribe, supra, at § 5-8, p. 317. Congress
has shown it can speak clearly when creating original
jurisdiction over federally chartered corporations.
This Court should require such a clear statement.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the
lower court should be reversed.

Date: August 23,2016 Respectfully submitted,

Jeffrey R. White

Counsel of Record
AMERICAN ASSOCIATION
FOR JUSTICE

777 & Street, N.W.

Suite 200

Washington, DC 20001
(202) 944-2839
jeffrey. white justice org
Attorney for Amicus Curiae

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385016_0542%3A14. Public record. Not legal advice.