# Opposition Brief — New York State Bd. of Elections v. López Torres

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Opposition Brief
- **Published:** January 1, 2008
- **Citation:** 552 U.S. 196

## Text

No. 06-766 . 7. Yon We
TAT IS VERS LTT ATES BOA TTT II ES APSR CT SRE. ALAA
1 OrbiGe Oe 1 CoERM i
IN THE | SUPREs.. COURT, U.S. _!

Supreme Court of the United States —

New YORK STATE BOARD OF FLECTIONS, ef ai,

Petitioners,

V.

MARGARITA LOPEZ TORRES, ef al.,

Respondents.

On Petition for Writ of Certiorari
to the United States Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit

BRIEF IN OPPOSITION
PAUL M. SMITH FREDERICK A.O. SCHWARZ, JR.
JENNER & BLOCK LLP DEBORAH GOLD3ERG*
601 13" Street, N.W. JAMES J. SAMPLE
Washington, D.C. 20005 BRENNAN CENTER FOR JUSTICE
(202) 639-6000 AT NYU SCHOOL OF LAW

161 Avenue of the Americas

JEREMY M. CREELAN 12" Floor
ELIZABETH VALENTINA New York, NY 10013

CARLETTA F. HIGGINSON (212) 998-6730
JOSHUA A. BLOCK

JENNER & BLOCK LLP KENT A. YALOWITZ

919 Third Avenue GLYNN K. SPELLISCY

New York, NY 10022 JOSHUA BROOK

(212) 891-1600 YUF-HAN CHOW
ARNOLD & PORTER LLP

ADAM H. MORSE 399 Park Avenue

JENNER & BLOCK LIP New York, NY 10022

330 N. Wabash Avenue (212) 715-1000

Suite 400

Chicago, IL. 60611 Attorne\ s for Respondents
(312) 222-9350

*C ours vl of Recs rd

1.

i
QUESTIONS PRESENTED

Whether a state election scheme that imposes severe
burdens on voters and potential candidates is neverthe-
less exempt from strict constitutional scrutiny because
one of its elements is a nominating convention.

Whether it was an abuse of discretion to enter a pre-
liminary injunction temporarily precluding use of the
state’s unconstitutional election scheme until the case is
tried on the merits or until the state legislature enacts a
constitutional system.

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
TR LE NE EE aT i
OR Ge FR OI sccscccensccesessccscesnsenincscecnnsoemneinn iv
EE TT eae EE a aE l
1. The Facts Adduced At The Preliminary
TTI sxc nenstiisicebeeimiasehaiaiibbnainiiaianambeietintt 2
a. Recruiting and Qualifying Delegates.................. 4
i. SI chscecscchslynsinnisiiilticsiennionsninienesiainiais 6
c. “Lobbying” the Party Leaders’ Chosen
TT ssceiasolcetii Sine iahiacmicibiniuiiiiaeninbeianieinbei 8
BF Ie IED vcectctcccscseccssntncnnscccnssssesesess 11
2. The Preliminary Injunction ...............::ccccccsseeseeeeees 1]
3. The Intestocutory Appeal .............cc-ccc.cccccssesssseosees 12
REASONS FOR DENYING THE WRIT ................:::00000 15
I. THE NOMINATION SCHEME IN THIS CASE
ls UNIQUE, AND THE SECOND CIRCUIT’S
OE a IN, cccrescesecnnvnvcccssicccsorcesesevens 16
II. THE CASE IS PROCEDURALLY UNSUITABLE
_, IEEE ARR rane eee era eR OE 17
HI. THE SECOND CIRCUIT CORRECTLY APPLIED

STORER V. BROWN AND SIMILAR BALLOT
FREE ITE SEE EES LIT RAPE SC 18

A. The Unitary Standard Governing Ballot
Access Cases Applies To Intra-Party

Nomination Processes. ..............:c.cesecseeeeeeees 18
B. The Second Circuit’s Decision Does Not
ON I a sasisecirieninmeseee 22

iil

IV. THE SECOND CIRCUIT’S DECISION DOES

Ee EE I TPE occnccnscccasisscvndeesseuboneseoiete 24
V. THERE IS NO CIRCUIT SPLIT. ..............cccccceessseveceerees 27
EET oe ae a a Re Ce 29

iV

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
CASES
Americas ' «rty of Texas v. White,

Ss SE 14, 20, 21, 24, 25
Anderson v. Celebrezze,

SF es FCN cenicerenssresssvsccinsniniecnimnnninnnnntiiai 21
Bachur v. Democratic National Party, 836 F.2d 837

Ce, BD acinccsenisstentmennsennscinesiinniiitnmmnmndudiéhiags 27
Bowe v. Board of Election Commissioners, 614 F.2d

SST Cre Gee: FE veweensscnccossessicsininiinensineneniiadineaiiiiieil 22
Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134 (1972)......ccccccceeeeeeees 20, 24
Campbell v. Bysiewicz, 242 F. Supp. 2d 164 (D. Conn.

FE nccsccrrunisinieinnnneniniimmmmmenal 22
Clingman v. Beaver, 544 U.S. 581 (2005) ............ 21, 23, 24
Hamilton-Brown Shoe Co. v. Wolf Brothers &

Ce, BOD UB. BP8 CII ecceescesccsesnenerenssnesevininensnseniins 17
Harper v. Virginia State Board of Elections, 383 U.S.

| TT 19
Kusper v. Pontikes, 414 U.S. 51 (1973) .....ccccccceeeeseees 20, 24
Lubin v. Panish, 415 U.S. 709 (i974) 0.0... cccceccceeeeeeees 20, 21
Molinari v. Powers, 82 F. Supp. 2d 57 (E.D.N.Y.

OP nccacswsnsencisessiariesesnmensinnssenieniiinansanadaal 22
Moore v. Ogilvie, 394 U.S. 814 (1969) ....... cc cceceeeeees 19, 20
Morse v. Republican Party of Virginia, 517 U.S. 186

COED . Review by this Court is particularly inappropriate given that a full range of
potential reforms is being publicly debated. The Legislature has recently
held hearings across the State to address the future of the Supreme Court se-
lection system. Not surprisingly, there is great variety in the remedies chat
have been proposed. The remedies proposed range from an appointive sys-
tem, to primaries (as exist for every other election in New York), to m. tor
and minor changes to the convention system. Strikingly, the system as it ex

isted prior to the district court’s decision was almost universally criticized in
the hearings for what the President of the New York State Bar Association
called its “undemocratic” and “sham” (as well as “unconstitutional”) form.

19

minor party or independent candidate access to general election
ballots, rather than “intraparty competition” at the nomination
phase. But the ballot access cases that undergird the Second
Circuit’s decision are part of a single line of cases in which this
Court has applied a consistent approach to analyzing barriers to
participation in the political process—strict scrutiny for “se-
vere” burdens; rational-basis scrutiny for “lesser” burdens—
whether at the nomination or general election stage, and irve-
spective of whether the plaintiffs are major-party, minor-party,
or independent candidates.

Beginning with the White Primary Cases, this Court estab-
lished the principle that the voters’ “right of participation” is
fully applicable at the intra-party nomination phase and must be
“protected just as is the right to vote at the election.” United
States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 318-19 (1941); Smith v. All-
wright, 321 U.S. 649, 653 & n.6, 663-64 (1944) (Democratic
Party primary); Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461, 469-71 (1953)
(pre-primary election by private club). In Harper v. Virginia
State Board. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 667 (1966), this Court
relied on these cases in striking down a poll tax, explaining that
any substantial infringement on the fundamental right to vote

“must be carefully and meticulously scrutinized.” (quotation
marks omitted).

In Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23 (1968), the Court struck
down an Ohio law that “heavily burdened” the ability of new
political parties to place electors on the presidential ballot. /d.
at 31. Following Harper, and resting its decision on both the
First and Fourteenth Amendments, the Court applied strict scru-
tiny to strike down the statute because the State “failed to show
any ‘compelling interest’ which justified imposing such heavy
burdens on the right to vote and to associate.” Jd.

In Moore v. Ogilvie, 394 U.S. 814 (1969), the Court used
the same standard to evaluate an Illinois statute that burdened
independent candidates. Following Classic and Allwright, the

20
Court applied strict scrutiny to severe burdens on the right to
vote, expressly applying the same level of scrutiny as in cases
of invidious discrimination: “A1l procedures used by a State as
an integral part of the election process must pass muster against
the charges of discrimination or of abridgment of the right tc
vote.” 394 U.S. at 818 (emphasis supplied).

In Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134 (1972), the Court struck
down a Texas law that placed severe burdens on candidates in
the Democratic Party primary election. The Court applied
“close scrutiny” because the “patently exclusionary character”
of the filing fee requirement “in every practical sense pre-
cluded” certain candidates “from seeking the nomination of
their chosen party, no matter how qualified they might be, and
no matter how broad or enthusiastic their popular support.” /d.
at 143.

And in Kusper v. Pontikes, 414 U.S. 51 (1973), the Court
applied the same standard to strike down an Illinois statutory
restriction on voters’ freedom to participate in their parties’
nomination that “deprived [the voter] of any voice in choosing
the party’s candidates, and thus substantially abridged her abil-
ity to associate effectively with the party of her choice.” Jd. at
58. The Court added: “As our past decisions have made clear,
a significant encroachment upon associational freedom cannot

be justified upon a mere showing of a legitimate state interest.”
id.

Then, in three cases annowiced together on March 26,
1974—Storer, Lubin v. Panish, 415 U.S. 709 (1974), and
White ~the Court applied this same standard: severe burdens
on the right to vote in any context require strict scrutiny, while
lesser burdens permit rational-basis review. Each of the cases
cited one or both of the others; all three cases cited and fol-
lowed Williams and Bullock. In Storer, this Court applied the
test to independent candidates, affirming some restrictions as
both legitimate and compelling, 415 U.S. at 736, and remand-

21

ing for further consideration of the “extent of the burden” im-
posed by other restrictions, id. at 740. In Lubin, this Court ap-
plied the same test to strike down California’s filing fees for all
party candidates in that state’s primary elections. Lubin found
that the right to vote is “‘heavily burdened’ if that vote may be
cast only for one of two candidates in a primary election at a
time when other candidates are clamoring for a place on the
ballot.” 415 U.S. at 716 (quoting Williams, 393 U.S. at 31).
Finally, in White, the Court applied strict scrutiny to restrictions
on the nominating procedures available to minor parties, hold-
ing that the restrictions’ “validity depends upon whether they
are necessary to further compelling state interests.” 415 U.S. at
780 (citing Storer).

Petitioners thus are wrong to insist that Storer is part of a
separate “strand” of jurisprudence. This Court has applied the
identical First and Fourteenth Amendment standard to restric-
tions on independent or minor-party candidate access to the
general election ballot (e.g., Storer, Williams) and restrictions
On intra-party nomination procedures for major and minor par-
ties (e.g., White, Kusper, Bullock, Lubin).’ Later cases use the
same test. See Clingman v. Beaver, 544 U.S. 581, 586-87, 589
(2005) (determining that burdens imposed by restrictions appli-
cable to both major and minor parties during nomination phase
were not severe); Zashjian v. Republican Party of Conn., 479
U.S. 208, 213-14, 216 & n.7 (1986) (applying strict scrutiny
where state imposed severe burdens on major-party nomina-
tions); Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 789-96 (1983)

' Petitioners attempt in a footnote to cabin Lubin and Bullock as cases in-
volving invidious discrimination decided on Fourteenth Amendment
grounds. Pet. 19n.2. But these cases did not address discrimination against
a protected class at all. They rested on associational rights protected by the
First and Fourteenth Amendments. See Lubin, 415 U.S. at 710, 716; Wil-
liams, 393 U.S. at 30-31; see also Norman v. Reed, 502 U.S. 279, 288 n.8
(1992): Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 786 n.6 (1983).

22

(applying strict scrutiny to restrictions on independent candi-
dates). The Petition does not cite a single case limiting the
analysis in Storer to independent candidates.” Indeed, as the
Second Circuit pointed out, the burdens on a party insurgent
closely parallel those on an independent candidate: “both are
Opposing an entrenched, dominant, and hostile political appara-
tus.” Pet. App. 60a.

B. THE SECOND CIRCUIT’S DECISION DOES NOT
“COLLIDE” WITH STORER.

Petitioners assert that the Second Circuit’s decision “col-
lides” with Storer by creating a constitutional “right to win.”
Pet. 22. But the court of appeals specifically disclaimed any
constitutional “right to win,” Pet. App. 45a, holding rather that
“the First Amendment affords candidates and voters a realistic
opportunity to participate in the nominating process, and to do
so free from burdens that are both severe and unnecessary to
further a compelling state interest,” id. at 41a-42a. The Second
Circuit affirmed the district court not because insurgent candi-
dates cannot “win,” but rather because “New York’s nominat-
ing process, as found by the District Court... deprives a candi-
date of access altogether.” Pet. App. 45a. Among other evi-
dence, the Second Circuit properly considered proof that not a
single insurgent candidate had ever obtained a major party
nomination for Supreme Court. See Norman v. Reed, 502 U.S.
279, 294 (1992) (relying in part on exten: of past successes in
overcoming alleged burdens to determine their severity).

, Lower courts have uniformly applied Storer in cases not involving inde-
pendent candidacies. See Bowe v. Board of Eiection Commr's, 614 F.2d
1147, 1152, 1153 n.10 (7th Cir. 1980); Ulrich v. Mane, 383 F. Supp. 2d 405,
412(E.D.N.Y. 2005); Campbell v. Bysiewicz, 242 F. Supp. 2d 164, 178 (D.
Conn. 2003); Molinari v. Powers, 82 F. Supp. 2d 57, 70-71 (E.D.N.Y
2000).

23

Petitioners also contend that “the proper equivalent to ballot
access is convention access, i.e., having a chance to put one’s
name up for consideration at the convention.” Pet. 23 (empha-
sis omitted). That contention is contrary to the evidence, which
showed that “‘a candidate who lacks the support of her party’s
leadership has no actual opportunity to lobby delegates.” Pet.
App. 18a. For a challenger candidate, “access” to the closed
convention bears no resemblance to the opportunity to compete
for support among the party’s voters free of unnecessary and
severe burdens; for the party’s voters, “access” to the conven-
tion not only never occurs, but would, in the words of Petition-
ers’ expert, “twist the design of the system on its head.” /d. at
17a. That is because “the process of lobbying delegates im-
poses severe, exclusionary burdens on candidates and voters,”
id. at 64a, and the conventions merely “rubber stamp” the will
of the party leadership without consultation or deliberation, id.
at 45a, 125a-26a. The Second Circuit thus found that mere for-
mal “access” to the conventions to request the nomination does
not address the legally relevant problem, namely that “candi-
dates lacking party leaders’ support and the voters who wish to
associate with them are practically, if not formally, excluded
from the nomination process.” Jd. at 45a.

This Court evaluates “the realities” of ballot restrictions, not
“empty formalism.”° The Court’s precedents fully support the
Second Circuit’s insistence on actual, rather than theoretical,

voter participation at the nomination phase. As the Court stated
in Classic:

7 Clingman, 544 US. at 610 (Stevens, J., dissenting); id at 599
(O'Connor, J., concurring) (“A realistic assessment... .require{s] examination
of the cumuiative effects of the State’s overall scheme.”); Tashjian, 479 U.S.
at 234 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (this subject matter “does not lend itscif to
bright-line rules but requires careful inquiry into the extent to which the one

or the other interest is inordinately impaired under the facts of the particular
case’’).

24

[W]e cannot close our eyes to the fact . . . that the practi-
cal influence of the choice of candidates at the primary
may be so great as to affect profoundly the choice at the
general election even though there is no effective legal
prohibition upon the rejection at the election of the
choice made at the primary, and may thus operate to de-
prive the voter of his constitutional! right of choice.

313 U.S. at 319; see Kusper, 414 U.S. at 58 (“A prime objec-
tive of most voters in associating themselves with a particular
party must surely be to gain a voice in that selection process.”);
Bullock, 405 U.S. at 146-47 (rejecting formal access to general
election ballot as a “reasone*!e” alternative to opportunity to
compete at primary election); Clingman, 544 U.S. at 590
(‘“*[t}he moment of choosing the party’s nominee’... is ‘the cru-
cial juncture at which the appeal to common principles may be
translated into concerted action, and hence to political power in
the community.””) (Thomas, J., for a plurality) (internal cita-
tions omitted).

This Court has further held that the voters’ right to partici-
pate at the nomination stage is particularly significant where the
party’s nomination “effectively controls the choice,” Classic,
313 U.S. at 318, or “may be more crucial than the general clec-
tion.” Bullock, 405 U.S. at 146-47. Here, the “[e]mpirical evi-
dence showed that because one-party rule is the norm in most
judicial districts, the general election is little more than cere-
mony.” Pet. App. 23a.

IV. THE SECOND CircuItT’s DECISION DoES NOT
“CLASH” WITH WHITE

Petitioners ignore the fact that White is of a piece with the
other ballot access cases, and instead rely exclusively on a one-
line quotation from White to argue that a state may “insist that
intraparty competition be settled before the general election by
primary election or by party convention.” White, 415 U.S. at

25
781. But White did not address whether conventions are per se
constitutional; that question was “not contested.” Jd.

The central question in White was whether the burdens im-
posed by a statute that required minor parties to demonstrate the
support of 1% of the electorate (either through a series of con-
ventions or through post-convention signature gathering) was
“necessary to further [a] compelling state interest.” 415 U.S. at
780; see id. at 782-83 & n.14. The Court simply did not ad-
dress whether the particular convention procedures used in
Texas provided members of a party with a sufficient role in the
nomination process, much less suggest that a//] conventions

would pass muster without regard to the traditional legal stan-
dard of review.

Further, the convention system addressed in White bears no
resemblance to New York’s uniquely burdensome and closed
hybrid system. Texas’s system involved precinct conventions
at which any registered voter.in the precinct could vote directly
for the candidate of his or her choice. 415 U.S. at 784 (“Any
voter, however registered, may attend the new party’s precinct
convention... .”).

The fact that New York has chosen a hybrid system rather
than a primary does not eliminate the candidates’ and voters’
right to participate free of severe and unnecessary burdens.
Otherwise, the First Amendment would limit the ability of a
state to burden the right to vote in a primary, but would not ap-
ply at all where a state adopts a nomination mechanism that
grants a handful of party leaders in a smoke-filled room the un-
bridled power to choose the party’s standard-bearers without
any voters’ input at all. That cannot be the law. “To the ex-
cluded voter who cannot cast a vote for his or her candidate, it
is all the same whether the party conducts its nomination by a
primary or by a convention open to all party members except
those kept out by the [restriction]. Each is an ‘integral part of

26
the election machinery.’” Morse v. Republican Party of Va.,
517 U.S. 186, 207 (1996) (quoting Classic, 313 U.S. at 318).

The Petition suggests that the Second Circuit prohibited the
use of conventions. That is not true. The Second Circuit ex-
pressly left open the possibility that New York could enact a
nominating system that would include a convention of some
kind—as long as the system viewed as a whole does not impose
the unnecessary and severe burdens that are hallmarks of the
current system. Pet. App. 82a-83a. In fact, the State already
uses several convention systems for non-judicial offices that do
not impose unconstitutionally severe burdens. For example, the
State’s major parties hold conventions to select their designees
for statewide offices; challenger “andidates for those offices
must gather petitions to obtain a place on the party’s primary
ballot if they do not succeed at the convention. See N.Y. Elec.
Law §§ 6-124, 6-126, and 6-158. New York’s small towns and
villages hold conventions in which any resident party member
may attend caucuses to nominate candidates for local offices.
Id. §§ 6-108, 6-202, and 15-108.

The Petition also claims that the lower courts “dismantled
New York’s chosen election method and replaced it with a pri-
mary.” Pet. 16. That is silly. The courts temporarily enjoined
the operation of the two offending sections of New York’s elec-
tion law, and clarified that the existing default provision (§ 6-
110) would govern until trial, unless the Legislature sooner
chose to enact a system that would survive constitutional scru-
tiny. Pet. App. 82a-83a. Far from “imposing” a primary, the
Second Circuit merely affirmed the district codrt’s deference to
the statutory default.

7 ‘oan ial ,

The Second Circuit also properly rejected petitioners’ argument that the
district court should have crafted its own version of a judicial convention
rather than eliminating the offending statutory provisions. Such tinkering

would have required the trial judge “to act as a one-person legislative super-
Footnote continued on next page

27
Not a single case—and certainly not White—has even con-
sidered, much less upheld, a convention system anything like
New York’s uniquely burdensome system. The “clash” Peti-
tioners allege between White and this case is entirely fictitious
and offers no reason to grant review.

Vv. THERE Is No CIRCUIT SPLIT.

In an effort to manufacture a basis for a grant of review by
claiming a circuit conflict, Petitioners mischaracterize the hold-
ings of Ripon Society, Inc. v. National Republican Party, 525
F.2d 567 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (en banc), and Bachur v. Democratic
National Party, 836 F.2d 837 (4th Cir. 1987). Neither case an-

nounced or applied legal principles at odds with the Second
Circuit.

In Bachur, the plaintiff challenged the Democratic National
Party’s rule requiring each state to send equal numbers of male
and female delegates to the party’s national convention.
Bachur, 836 F.2d at 838. The court observed that the plaintiff s
“vote for delegates is some steps removed from a vote for an
actua' candidate for public office” and deemed the restriction to
be “limited” rather than severe. /d. at 841 (following Anderson,
Bullock, and Tashjian). The Court therefore considered
whether the restriction had a “rational purpose.” /d. at 842.
The Court emphasized that it was not announcing a per se rule:
“We do not foreclose the possibility of a different result with
respect to a different restriction in a different case.” /d. at 841.
The Second Circuit correctly distinguished Bachur, explaining:
“In that case, there existed no entry barriers to candidates. Nor
did the regulations effectively prevent a party member from
voting for their preferred candidate....” Pet. App. 53a.

Footnote continued from previous page

chamber—precisely what is forbidden.” Pet. App. 80a

28

In Ripon, the plaintiff challenged the National Republican
Party’s formula for allocating delegates among the states.
Ripon, 525 F.2d at 570. The lack of a severe burden was obvi-
ous. Indeed, the plaintiff could not even “identify with any
confidence the set of people whose preferences are to be given
equal and accurate expression.” /d. at 585 n.58. For that rea-
son, the plurality considered whether the scheme rationally ad-
vanced a legitimate interest. /d. at 586-87. The plurality also
disclaimed any per se rule, stating that its decision “might be
otherwise in a case where there is only one party with a realistic
chance to win the election, and where a vote in the nominating
process is the only effective vote that can be cast.” Jd. at 589.
Indeed, the plurality explained, “although courts should be slow
to interfere with the internal processes of political parties, cir-
cumstances can be conceived of wherein they may grant relief.”
Id.. The plurality also distinguished between the internal pro-
cedural rules at issue in that case and a burden “mandated by a
state statute, applicable to all parties.” Jd. at 589 n.65. The
Second Circuit thus correctly distinguished Ripon, explaining:

the convention system considered in Ripon was, by and
large, a private function that directly implicated the
party’s right to govern its own internal affairs. By con-
trast, New York’s delegate selection process is one of
public election, which directly implicates the associa-
tional rights of party members voters and candidates.

Pet. App. 5! 2-52a (citations omitted).

Petitioners’ reliance on Ripon and Bachur is, accordingly,
doubly misplaced. Both involved challenges to the internal
rules of the national political parties, not challenges to burdens
imposed by statute. And both concerned restrictions that did
not block a single candidate from appealing to the voters of his
or her party. Neither case stands for the proposition that a State
may rely on the associational interests of the party leadership to
justify severe burdens, imposed by law, that effectively shut out

29
voters of the party from the nominating process. Neither case
conflicts with the Second Circuit’s analysis of New York’s
unique and extreme statutory scheme.

CONCLUSION
The petition for a writ of certiorari should be denied.

30

Respectfully submitted,

ARNOLD & PORTER LLP BRENNAN CENTER FOR JUSTICE

AT NYU SCHOOL oF LAW
KENT A. YALOWITZ
GLYNN K. SPELLISCY FREDERICK A.O. SCHWARZ, JR.
JOSHUA BROOK DEBORAH GOLDBERG*
YUE-HAN CHOW JAMES J. SAMPLE
399 Park Avenue 161 Avenue of the Americas
New York, New York 10022 12th Floor
(212) 715-1000 New York, NY 10013

(212) 998-6730

JENNER & BLOCK LLP

PAUL M. SMITH

601 13th St., N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20005
(202) 639-6000

JEREMY M. CREELAN
ELIZABETH VALENTINA
CARLETTA F. HIGGINSON
JOSHUA A. BLOCK

919 Third Avenue

New York, NY 10022
(212) 891-1600

ADAM H. MORSE

330 N. Wabash Ave # 4000
Chicago, IL 60611

(312) 222-9350

Attorneys for Respondents

*Counsel of Record

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385016_0511%3A03. Public record. Not legal advice.