# Reply Brief — United States v. Atlantic Research Corp.

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URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385016_0501%3A11

## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Reply Brief
- **Published:** January 1, 2007
- **Citation:** 551 U.S. 128

## Text

267 _ Suprame Court, U.S. bey

lA FILED
au oo
ol 0 | APR 13 2007
Ab.
APY \_OFFICE OF THE cere: |
No. 06-562

Jn the Supreme Court of the Cinited States

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, PETITIONER
v.
ATLANTIC RESEARCH CORPORATION

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

REPLY BRIEF FOR THE UNITED STATES

PAUL D. CLEMENT
Solicitor General
Connusel of Record
Department ot Justice
Weshingtow, D.C. 20520-0001
(20.2) 314-2217

TABLE OF CONTENTS

A. Section 107(a)(1)-(4)(B) does not permit

responsible parties to sue for cost recovery ........ 2
B. Respondent’s interpretation cannot account

for Section 113(f), which provides the exclusive

mechanisms by which a potentially responsible

party can sue another under CERCLA ............ 8
C. Section 107(a) does not create an implied right to

contribution separate and apart from the explicit

contribution remedy set forth in Section 113(f) .... 12
D. The structure and purpose of CERCLA and

SARA do not permit a potentially responsible

party to sue another potentially responsible

party to recover cleanup costs ................5-. 13

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases:

Allied Towing Corp. v. Great E. Petroleum Corp.,

642 F. Supp. 1339 (E.D. Va. 1986) .............-..... i)
Artesian Water Co. v. Government of New Castle

County, 605 F. Supp. 1348 (D. Del. 1985) ............ i)
Barnhart v. Thomas, 540 U.S. 20 (2003)... 2.2. ......006. 4
Block v. North Dakota, 461 U.S. 273 (1983) ............- 8
City of Rancho Palos Verdes v. Abrams, 544 U.S. 113

SE kk NAdadbcsdks eben eedenekenbaweseeonnanes 14

Consolidated Edison Co. of N.Y., Ine. v. UGI Utils.,
Ine., 423 F.3d 90 (2d Cir. 2005), petition for cert.

pending, No. 05-1323 (filed Apr. 14, 2006) ........ 13, 14
Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Aviall Servs., Inc., 543 U.S. 157

GE ovo cos cc cencciusinéccsvececsevesecssecs 2, 5, 16

II

Cases—Continued: Page

D’Imperio v. United States, 575 F. Supp. 248 (D.N_J.
ET Sach eeasdh betas iabkn ash baenewanendde wes 9

E.1. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. United States,
460 F.3d 515 (3d Cir. 2006), petition for cert.
pending, No. 06-726 (filed Nov. 21, 2006) ............ 19

Harrison v. PPG Indus., Inc., 446 U.S. 578 (1980) ....... 4
Jones v. Inmont, 584 F. Supp. 1425 (S.D. Ohio 1984) ..... )
Key Tronic Corp. v. United States, 511 U.S. 809
Ds iiitunsbenisedeeasmedeienenineennineedees 5
Metropolitan Water Reclamation Dist. v. North Am.
Galvanizing & Coatings, Inc., No. 05-3299, 2006

WL 1354188 (7th Cir. filed May 1, 2006) ............. 5
United States v. BP Amoco Oil PLC, 277 F.3d 1012

(8th Cir.), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 942 (2002) .......... 15
United States v. Davis, 261 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2001) ....... 15
United States v. Estate of Romani, 523 U.S. 517

Db sue nhdnniebbatadndeeeeleanedess eeeeeesdes 10
United States v. Fausto, 484 U.S. 439 (1988) ........... 10
United States v. New Castle County, 642 F. Supp.

EE cdc vudcn dean ecareentekeunes 9
United States v. Southeastern Pa. Transp. Auth.,

SOG F Bd GET GG Cie. BOGB) ow wc ccccccccccccsccsece 15

/nited Techs. Corp. v. Browning-Ferris Indus.,
33 F.3d 96 (1st Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S.

SEE cna dicn di wbedeaeibedenehhedkhbeee keane 15
Walls v. Waste Res. Corp., 761 F.2d 311 (6th Cir.
SE Suture din kad ekduensen bbs teh adeseendaedienns 9

Wicklavid Oil Terminals v. Asarco, Ine., 792 F.2d 887
eee ss]

Ill

Statutes and regulation: Page
Act of Dee. 11, 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat.
roo)» eee pe edeannes 4

Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980,

42 U.S.C. 9601 et seq.:

§ 101(35), 42 U.S.C. 9601(35) (Supp. II] 2003) ...... 5
§ 101(40), 42 U.S.C. 9601(40) (Supp. III 2003) ..... 5
Pe ED eb cdccncgecccccenceis 7,14, 18
§ 106(b)(1), 42 U.S.C. 9606(b)(1) . 0... eee eae 18
§ 106(b)(2)(C), 42 U.S.C. 9606(b)(2)(C) .. 2.0.2.2... 7
De eT 45 G6N5s dn stencnecanedesnses 1
§ 107(a), 42 U.S.C. 9607(a) ........... 2 eee passim
§ 107(a)(1)-(4), 42 U.S.C. 9607(a)(1)-(4) «2.0.2... 3,4
§ 107(a)(1)-(4)(A), 42 U.S.C.

9607(a)(1)-(4)(A) ...........0.0.. 2, 3, 4, 7, 16, 18
§ 107(a)(1)-(4)(B), 42 U.S.C. 9607(a)(1)-(4)(B) passim
§ 107(b)(3), 42 U.S.C. 9607(b)(3) ... 2.6.6... eee eee 5
§ 107(r)(1), 42 U.S.C. 9607(r)(1)

EE vdvteccesscudassdabnedvcdnces 5
DERI Ge MERE vv weccccscecccccsesess 6
§ 111(a)(1), 42 U.S.C. 9611(aXl) ... 22... eee 6
§ 111(a)(2), 42 U.S.C. 9611 (a2) .. 2.2... 6
§ 113(f), 42 U.S.C. 9612%(f) ................. passim
§ 113(f)(1), 42 U.S.C. 9613(N0) 2.2... ee. 11, 12,18
§ 113(f)(2), 42 U.S.C. 9613(f)(2) ............... 1,15
§ 113(f)(3)(B), 42 U.S.C. 9613(f)3)(B) .... 6, 14, 17, 18
§$ 113(g)(3), 42 U.S.C. 9613(g (3) 0.2.2.2... 14, 15

§ 120(a)(1), 42 U.S.C. 9620(a)(1) «0.2... 20

IV

Statutes and regulation—Continued: Page
Ark. Code Ann. §§ 8-7-501 et seq. (2000) .............. 19
40 C.F.R.:

Section 300.700(¢)(2) ..........0008. mis heweeened cane 7
ED occvenceandavdisecacccheses 7
ns iced evenusaesieveaceawade 6

Miscellaneous:

131 Cong. Rec. (1985):

LON ENE RNT OT ORE EOD 17
EE SRT aes Cae ne 16
el TERS er PL 17

Envt’'l L. Inst., An Analysis of State Superfund
Programs: 50 State Study (1998) ........... 19

EPA, Memorandum of Agreement (MOAs) on State
Voluntary Cleanup Program (VCPs) (Dee. 22,
2006) .

19

concern is overstated, however, given that States can and do
require parties to reimburse the administrative-costs incurred
by States in entering into settlements. Moreover, many
States have established EPA-approved voluntary cleanup
programs in which they commit to ensure that such cleanups
will be conducted in accordance with federal law. See EPA,
Memoranda of Agreement (MOAs) on State Voluntary Clean-
up Programs (VCPs) (Dec. 22, 2006) . There is no obvious reason
why States could not enter into settlement agreements with
. private parties that satisfy the terms of those programs.
Wholly apart from any incentives to settle in order to trig-
. ger a federal contribution remedy, PRPs also have powerful
incentives to settle with States because virtually all States can
also pursue PRPs under state law (which often enables PRPs
to obtain contribution from other PRPs as well). See, e.g.,
Environmental Law Institute, An Analysis of State Super-
fund Programs: 50 State Study 7-9, 31-35, 53-57, 139-279
(1998) (listing state statutes) ; Ark. Code Ann. §§ 8-7-501 et seq. (2000).
Thus, the government's interpretation of Section 107(a)(1)-
(4)(B) leaves PRPs with considerable incentive and opportu-
nity to enter into settlements with States, and to engage in
cleanups more generally.

4. Finally, respondent renews the contention (Br. 26-27)
that, when federal PRPs are subject to liability, EPA would
forgo enforcement action (and thus insulate those PRPs from
liability for contribution). Respondent, however, does not
dispute the proposition that EPA has repeatedly taken en-
forcement action in those circumstances.’ Respondent’s

’* Respondent's amici contend that the government broke off settlement
negotiations in this case and in FJ. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. United
States, 460 F.3d 515 (3d Cir. 2006), petition for cert. pending, No. 06-726 (filed
Nov. 21, 2006), in the wake of this Court’s decision in Cooper Industries. But
the plaintiff PRPs were not negotiating with EPA to resolve their own cleanup
liability; rather, they were merely seeking monetary relief from federal PRPs.

20

amici unwittingly confirm that proposition when they cite
statements by EPA officials indicating their commitment to
ensuring that the government abides by its obligations under
CERCLA. See Browner Br. 16-17. Although the United
States does not bring actions against itself in federal court, it
routinely exposes itself to liability by pursuing enforcement
action against private PRPs, and can also be subjected to lia-
bility when state or tribal authorities or “innocent” private
parties take action themselves against PRPs.

The government’s waiver of sovereign immunity in Section
120(a)(1) likewise provides no support for respondent’s posi-
tion. That waiver merely imposes liability on federal PRPs
“to the same extent” as private parties; it does not define the
class of permissible plaintiffs under Section 107(a) (or, for
that matter, any other provision of CERCLA). The argument
that SARA’s waiver of sovereign immunity justifies reading
into Section 107(a) a broad right of cost recovery against gov-
ernmental and private PRPs alike is thus a non sequitur.
Like all of the other policy arguments advanced by respon-
dent and its amici, it should be rejected with !eave to renew it
before Congress, to which it is more properly directed.

* *+ *£+ *&

For the foregoing reasons and those stated in the govern-
ment’s opening brief, the judgment of the court of appeals
should be reversed.

Respectfully submitted.

PAUL D. CLEMENT
Solicitor General

APRIL 2007

Any “refusal” by the government to settle on those terms was understandable
in light of the fact that, in the government’s view, the plaintiff PRPs have no
cause of action absent resolution of their own liability.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385016_0501%3A11. Public record. Not legal advice.