# Reply Brief — United States v. Atlantic Research Corp.

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URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385016_0501%3A09

## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Reply Brief
- **Published:** January 1, 2007
- **Citation:** 551 U.S. 128

## Text

@ 413]07

No. 06-562

In the Supreme Court of the Gnited States

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, PETITIONER
v.

ATLANTIC RESEARCH CORPORATION

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

REPLY BRIEF FOR THE UNITED STATES

PAUL D. CLEMENT
Solicitor General
Counsel of Record
Department of Justice
Washington, D.C. 20530-0001
202) 514-2217

TABLE OF CONTENTS

A. Section 107(a)(1)-(4)(B) does not permit

responsible parties to sue for cost recovery ........ 2
B. Respondent’s interpretation cannot account

for Section 113(f), which provides the exclusive

mechanisms by which a potentially responsible

party can sue another under CERCLA ............ 8
C. Section 107(a) does not create an implied right to

contribution separate and apart from the explicit

contribution remedy set forth in Section 113(f) .... 12
D. The structure and purpose of CERCLA and

SARA do not permit a potentially responsible

party to sue another potentially responsible

party to recover cleanup costs ................05: 13

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES —

Cases:

Allied Towing Corp. v. Great E. Petroleum Corp.,

642 F. Supp. 1339 (E.D. Va. 1986) ................0.. 9
Artesian Water Co. v. Government of New Castle

County, 605 F. Supp. 1348 (D. Del. 1985) ............ 9
Barnhart v. Thomas, 540 U.S. 20 (200. ). 2... 0... ee ee eee 4
Block v. North Dakota, 461 U.S. 273 (1983) ............. 8
City of Rancho Palos Verdes v. Abrams, 544 U.S. 113

Dbitrkketsidhtsesbaneateeenadinceniacenaunen 14

Consolidated Edison Co. of N.Y., Inc. v. UGI Utils.,
Inc., 423 F.3d 90 (2d Cir. 2005), petition for cert.
pending, No. 05-1323 (filed Apr. 14, 2006) ........ 13,14
Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Aviall Servs., Inc., 543 U.S. 157
GED 6c ecsédndecnanedduccensenncccsesedsencee 2, 5, 16

II

Cases—Continued: Page

D'Imperio v. United States, 575 F. Supp. 248 (D.N.J.

BOUND coe ranecevesesccccedcecceesesconecececesess 9

E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. United States,
460 F.3d 515 (3d Cir. 2006), petition for cert.
pending, No. 06-726 (filed Nov. 21, 2006) ............

Harrison v. PPG Indus., Inc., 446 U.S. 578 (1980) .......
Jones v. Inmont, 584 F. Supp. 1425 (S.D. Ohio 1984) .....
Key Tronic Corp. v. United States, 511 U.S. 809

REISE I ae ee eee Oe re OPT
Metropolitan Water Reclamation Dist. v. North Am.

Galvanizing & Coatings, Inc., N 0. 05-3299, 2006

WL 1354188 (7th Cir. filed May 1, 2006) .............
United States v. BP Amoco Oil PLC, 277 F.3d 1012

(8th Cir.), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 942 (2002) ..:.......
United States v. Davis, 261 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2001)...... ‘
United States v. Estate of Romani, 523 U.S. 517

Ps ktucddavenddesddndhaddeuseusesnestees tices
United States v. Fausto, 484 U.S. 489 (1988) ...........
United States v. New Castle County, 642 F. Supp.

AML Codec ccccccakdeddedencksentnades

United States v. Southeastern Pa. Transp. Auth.,
oe Per Teer TT TTT TS
United Techs. Corp. v. Browning-Ferris indus.,
33 F.3d 96 (1st Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S.
PE Sid doNdusd nent seueeeseeiusedabececcus
Walls v. Waste Res. Corp., 761 F.2d 311 (6th Cir.
DE 2 Hdd che Nanddaeenwadeedseesaennedesaeedanas
Wickland Oil Terminals v. Asarco, Inc., 792 F.2d 887
SG EE 6ddnkbbaadencedcsnveacebedstenecnese

Il

Statutes and regulation: Page
Act of Dee. 11, 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat.
Ds KpueGdesnds ddneeenateteueedunbeEeeansaee 4

Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980,
42 U.S.C. 9601 et seq.:

§ 101(35), 42 U.S.C. 9601(35) (Supp. IIT 2003) ...... 5
§ 101(40), 42 U.S.C. 9601(40) (Supp. 111 2003) ..... 5
PE SERGE sh ncinccccevscccccccass 7, 14, 18
§ 106(b)(1), 42 U.S.C. 9606(b)(1) .............200% 18
§ 106(b)(2)(C), 42 U.S.C. 9606(b)(2)(C) ............ 7
REE sc cde datantenaunbanns enum 1
§ 107(a), 42 U.S.C. 9607(a) .........0.0eeee “passim
§ 107(a)(1)-(4), 42 U.S.C. 9607(a)(1)-(4) .......... 3,4
§ 107(a)(1)-(4)(A), 42 U.S.C.

9607(a)(1)-(4(A) ........0. 0c eee. 2,3, 4, 7, 16, 18
§ 107(a)(1)-(4)(B), 42 U.S.C. 9607(a)(1)-(4(B) passim
§ 107(b)(3), 42 U.S.C. 9607(b)(3) ... 2.2... cece ee eee 5
§ 107(r)(1), 42 U.S.C. 9607(r)(1)

SE ME ED eho Kenscccnscccvsnuccesscoene 5
Be err 6
§ 111(a)(1), 42 U.S.C. 9611(a)(1) ... 2.22... e ee eee 6

- $111(a)(2), 42 U.S.C. 9611(a)(2) 0.2.2.2... eee eee 6
§ 113(f), 42 U.S.C. 9613(f) ..............2-. passim
§ 113(f)(1), 42 U.S.C. 9613(f)(1) ........... 11, 12, 18
§ 113(f)(2), 42 U.S.C. 9613(f)(2) 2.2.6... eee ee. 1,15
§ 113(f)(3)(B), 42 U.S.C. 9613(£)(3)(B) .... 6, 14, 17, 18
§ 113(g)(3), 42 U.S.C. 9613(g)(3) . 2... eee eee 14, 15

§ 120(a)(1), 42 U.S.C. 9620(a)(1) «0.6... ee ee eee eee 20

IV

Statutes and regulation—Continued: Page
Ark. Code Ann. §§ 8-7-501 et seq. (2000) .............. 19
40 C.F.R.:

RRR Re mate I BON ee aR oe 7
ED od oso 0sbekudcedsesedaneas 7
IED 005 $e v0Gadsuxnddbusesesaecases 6
Miscellaneous:
131 Cong. Ree. (1985):
REPU Teer TT TTT Tere TCT ee TT Trot 17
RP dikceadtacedekssaveanssaeeas eeedcneieun 16
DE hbsicdeccnadeuderdendaskeuesenesceecve 17

Envt’'l L. Inst., An Analysis of State Superfund
Programs: 50 State Study (1998) ........... 19

EPA, Memorandum of Agreement (MOAs) on State
Voluntary Cleanup Program (VCP3) (Dec. 22,
2006) .

19

concern is overstated, however, given that States can and do
require parties to reimburse the administrative costs incurred
by States in entering into settlements. Moreover, many
States have established EPA-approved voluntary cleanup
programs in which they commit to ensure that such cleanups
will be conducted in accordance with federal law. See EPA,
Memoranda of Agreement (MOAs) on State Voluntary Clean-
up Programs (VCPs) (Dec. 22, 2006) . There is no obvious reason
why States could not enter into settlement agreements with
private parties that satisfy the terms of those programs.

Wholly apart from any incentives to settle in order to trig-
ger a federal contribution remedy, PRPs also have powerful
incentives to settle with States because virtually all States can
also pursue PRPs under state law (which often enables PRPs
to obtain contribution from other PRPs as well). See, e.g.,
Environmental Law Institute, An Analysis of State Super-
fund Programs: 50 State Study 7-9, 31-35, 53-57, 139-279
(1998) (listing state statutes) ; Ark. Code Ann. §§ 8-7-501 et seg. (2000).
Thus, the government’s interpretation of Section 107(a)(1)-
(4)(B) leaves PRPs with considerable incentive and opportu-
nity to enter into settlements with States, and to engage in
cleanups more generally.

4. Finally, respondent renews the contention (Br. 26-27)
that, when federal PRPs are subject to liability, EPA would
forgo enforcement action (and thus insulate those PRPs from
liability for contribution). Respondent, however, does not
dispute the proposition that EPA has repeatedly taken en-
forcement action in those circumstances.” Respondent’s

*° Respondent’s amici contend that the government broke off settlement
negotiations in this case and in EJ. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. United
States, 460 F.3d 515 (3d Cir. 2006), petition for cert. pending, No. 06-726 (filed
Nov. 21, 2006), in the wake of this Court's decision in Cooper Industries. But
the plaintiff PRPs were not negotiating with EPA to resolve their own cleanup
liability; rather, they were merely seeking monetary relief from federal PRPs.

20

amici unwittingly confirm that proposition when they cite
statements by EPA officials indicating their commitment to
ensuring that the government abides by its obligations under
CERCLA. See Browner Br. 16-17. Although the United
States does not bring actions against itself in federal court, it
routinely exposes itself to liability by pursuing enforcement
action against private PRPs, and can also be subjected to lia-
bility when state or tribal authorities or “innocent” private
parties take action themselves against PRPs.

The government’s waiver of sovereign immunity in Section
120(a)(1) likewise provides no support for respondent’s posi-
tion. That waiver merely imposes liability on federal PRPs
“to the same extent” as private parties; it does not define the
class of permissible plaintiffs under Section 107(a) (or, for
that matter, any other provision of CERCLA). The argument
that SARA’s waiver of sovereign immunity justifies reading
into Section 107(a) a broad right of cost recovery against gov-
ernmental and private PRPs alike is thus a non sequitur.
Like all of the other policy arguments advanced by respon-
dent and its amici, it showld be rejected with leave to renew it
before Congress, to which it is more properly directed.

x* * *£* * &

For the foregoing reasons and those stated in the govern-
ment’s opening brief, the judgment of the court of appeals
should be reversed.

Respectfully submitted.

PAUL D. CLEMENT
Solicitor General

APRIL 2007

Any “refusal” by the government to settle on those terms was understandable
in light of the fact that, in the government's view, the plaintiff PRPs have no
cause of action absent resolution of their own liability.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385016_0501%3A09. Public record. Not legal advice.