# Respondents Brief — Environmental Protection Agency v. Defenders of Wildlife

> Briefs, arguments, decisions, and more.

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385016_0500%3A17

## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Respondents Brief
- **Published:** January 1, 2007
- **Citation:** 549 U.S. 1105

## Text

ore lo oo j “) oe \ VUprom 4 ‘
_

/

Nos. 06-340 & 06-549 | FEQ

4.

- -

'
t
‘

:
‘
i

i OFFICE OF "HE CLERK 1

In The
Supreme Court of the United States

°

NATIONAL ASSOCIATION
OF HOME BUILDERS, et al.,

Petitioners,

Vs.
DEFENDERS OF WILDLIFE, et a/.,
Respondents.
Sd

UNITED STATES
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY,

Petitioners,
Vs.
DEFENDERS OF WILDLIFE, ef a/.,
Respondents.
e

On Writs Of Certiorari To The United States
Court Of Appeals For The Ninth Circuit

Sd

OPENING BRIEF OF THE STATE OF ARIZONA
@—

TERRY GODDARD

Arizona Attorney General
Mary O'GRADY

Solicitor General

PAULA BICKETT

Counsel of Record

Chief Counsel. Civil Appeals

JAMES T. SKAKDON
Assistant Attorney General
1275 West Washington
Phoenix, Arizona S5007
(602) 542-3333

Counsel for State of Arizona

ALP LAW BRIER PRENTING ¢

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

1. Whether Section 7(a)(2) of the Endangered Spe-
cies Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2), which requires each
federal agency to insure that its actions do not jeopardize
the continued existence of any endangered or threatened
species or modify its critical habitat, impliedly repealed
the Environmental Protection Agency’s obligation to
transfer its pollution permitting authority to Arizona
under Section 402(b) of the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C.
§ 1342(b).

2. Whether the court of appeals correctly held that
the Environmental Protection Agency’s decision to transfer
- permitting authority to Arizona under the Clean Water Act
was arbitrary and capricious because it was based on
inconsistent interpretations of Section 7(a)(2) of the
Endangered Species Act; and if so, whether the court of
appeals should have remanded to the Environmental
Protection Agency for further proceedings without ruling
on the interpretation of Section 7(a)(2).

PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING

The State of Arizona filed a brief in support of the
petition for writ of certiorari and was an intervenor in the
court of appeals.

The United States Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA) is a Petitioner in this Court and was a respondent
in the court of appeals. The National Association of Home
Builders, Southern Arizona Home Builders Association,
Home Builders Association of Central Arizona, Arizona
Chamber of Commerce, Arizona Mining Association,
Arizona Association of Industries, Greater Phoenix Cham-
ber of Commerce, and American Forest & Paper Associa-
tion (collectively referred to as Home Builders or NAHB)
are also Petitioners in this Court and were intervenors in
the court of appeals.

The following parties are Respondents in this Court
and were petitioners in the court of appeals: Defenders of
Wildlife, Center for Biological Diversity, and Craig Miller.

in

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
IE rE icisenciininianiniiiihiacnticcapetniameinaniineniinnneniniatis i
Ste ae Ny SI scsinsnecnsssesnsneniniancnneniinteneiniancion il
ED ssccceiiisscchesintinisnnsiincitinhaisimanisdninnitnionisiaieinciine iil
II sincinisinaticstinnsenisliniiecedttneniniemitiaibesiphnniaaiis Vv
TITIES CII scisischsdapsslisnibenciodiianiehiianieshdeaigudabnciieiseainimdisiaindioaete 1
NN ITTTD ischasisnisshinionsiciiebeciiieeitiecitniieiiatinnnaniliaatecepnimepudianiiit 1
a 1
I ar NR ccetctntsinctenininessninniitcncnsiibiidapiniparnaninin 2
Ba | RI I acihccicacicicsiscsiiciliicttletebtbchntnsichaiineiase 3
es: PI MEIN i ainucinciscrtnsisisicntacetiilianbdticciimpeniaitinninnni 7
I I II sisitititcescntcienissniniinciiniininiiiteininatinanin 10
ITE scncidincacnccnnciianiniipeitichiighibaceiiicuidemiaiaaadgunianttains 11

I. The EPA’s Decision to Transfer Pollution
Permitting Authority to Arizona Was Legally
a

A. The EPA Must Transfer Permitting Au-
thority to a State Permitting Program that
Meets the Requirements of Section 402(b)
of the Clean Water Act. ........cscesssescsssseseseeses

B. Neither the Language nor the Purpose of
the Endangered Species Act Supports the
Majority Apparent Conclusion that the
Endangered Species Act Impliedly Re-
pealed Congress’s Mandate in Section
402(b) of the Clean Water Act ...............0000

1. Congress did not intend for the Endan-
gered Species Act to modify Section
402(b) of the Clean Water Act................

11

1]

13

iv

TABLE OF CONTENTS - Continued
Page

2. Section 7(a)(2) of the Endangered Spe-
cies Act can be easily reconciled with
Section 402(b) of the Clean Water Act.... 20

Il. Because the EPA Was Required to Approve
Arizona’s Pollution Permitting Program Under
the Clean Water Act, Its Approval Was Legally
Correct Regardless of Its Interpretation of Sec-
tion 7(a)(2) of the Endangered Species Act........ 22

A. The Court of Appeals Should Have Upheld
the EPA’s Approval Because It Was Le-
ET GI cncnccgitesesouenticinttaeseninincenenenmeeeen 22

B. The Court Should Not Remand to the EPA
Because Remand Is Futile and Detrimen-

tal to the States’ Interests .00..........cccceeeee seen 24

REET AF ILE POTTER) ORE PE PS EE FT Pa 26

Vv

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Page
CASES
Am. Forest and Paper Ass’n v. EPA, 137 F.3d 291

(Bide Cle, BBD a ccressosesccccscesssssiniscssnsnsennianmiaain 12, 21
Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense

Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984) ........ccecseseseseesseeeeees 20
Citizens for a Better Env’t v. EPA, 596 F.2d 720 (7th

CEe, FIFO nccccsecccsnscsccsicosonsssovesessinseennncninnianaianaale 13
Department of Transportation v. Public Citizen, 541

CB, TE COD occccccscascccesesccscsessisureenssiotnamaaiiaman 10
EPA v. California ex rel. State Water Res. Control

Bd. , 49B US. BOO (IGF) ncccosccccccccrsesccsssscsonesnssdncssesssocene 12
Ground Zero Ctr. For Non-Violent Action v. U.S.

Dep't of the Navy, 383 F.3d 1082 (9th Cir. 2004) .......... 21
Marbled Murrelet v. Babbitt, 83 F.3d 1068 (9th Cir.

BIDE .ccccacscnctecssestesesssinsvonnesnasecsssesnnnimiiaiiaaa 21
Matsushita Elec. Indus’l Co., Ltd. v. Epstein, 516

OTB, BOF (GD nceccncnsscccsissncncsscnnnsstecsetcepsiiansneadsaaaanaa 14
Milk Transport v. ICC, 190 F. Supp. 350 (D. Minn.

BBG) ccccsccascccscessesesctccssssesontcnssocdeesonssenetionnesiasennnanal 23
Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535 (1974)... eee eseee nee ee 14
Natural Res. Def. Council v. EPA, 859 F.2d 156

(DD.G. Che. Ba nceccexccsessonsssscncnenincsestesianimamammanan 12
N.C. Comm’n of Indian Affairs v. U.S. Dep't of ~

Labor, 725 F.2d 238 (4th Cir. 1984) ..........ccccceessessseeenees 23

Platte River Whooping Crane Critical Habitat
Maint. Trust v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm'n,
O63 F.8d 27 (D.C. Cie. 29GB) nccirccccscescesccsccssosccscnssssncsasases 21

vi

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES - Continued

Page
Posadas v. Nat'l City Bank, 296 U.S. 497 (1936) ............. 14
Ry. Executives’ Ass’n v. ICC, 784 F.2d 959 (9th Cir.

EE 23
SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80 (1943)............. 22, 23, 24
Shell Oil Co. v. Train, 585 F.2d 408 (9th Cir. 1978)......... 13
Sierra Club v. Babbitt, 65 F.3d 1502 (9th Cir. 1995)........ 21
Thornburgh v. Am. Coll. of Obstetricians & Gyne-

cologists, 476 U.S. 747 (1986) ....cccc.sescsssesscssessssneceseeeees 24
Traynor v. Turnage, 485 U.S. 535 (1988)..............cccceeeeeees 14
TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978).............cccccsssrcrrsesseees 14, 18
STATUTES AND REGULATIONS
Endangered Species Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-

205, § 7, 87 Stat. 884, 892 (1973)...........cecccessseseeeeenees 15
Endangered Species Act Amendments of 1978, Pub.

L. No. 95-632, § 3, 92 Stat. 3'752Z.........ccccccrcoscccscersesserees 15
Endangered Species Act Amendments of 1979, Pub.

L. No. 96-159, § 4, 93 Stat. 1226...............ccccsssssercceeseees 16
Endangered Species Act, § 7 ...........:cccccccseeseeeeeeeeeeees passim
Endangered Species Act, §7(a)(1), 16 U.S.C.

ainda sitirenansnemetiien 15, 16, 17
Endangered Species Act, §7(aX(2), 16 U.S.C.

I TTTTiistiiiericindihertiienieideensinagncummnnennaneanennannnenteets passim
Clean Water Act, § 402(b), 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b)......... passim

I rin arene nmanennnennnennnnnnneteen 12

Et EEE TID ccccnnsncsnccsensceccensvenenennanammneutencones 7

vil

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES — Continued

Page
ts Ob ED sitiesittintictintnccemnnstepccmmpninasinaintinnninnsné 1
es ee cacianicieendeencccniecnenctrennnniinininnssinensasiiiaiioniinia 9, 20
et We ED iisinacistinteisaisiiciniencieaspiesnnemssidniantinnninindunnniiitii 20
68 Fed. Reg. 39087, 39089 (July 1, 2003)... cece eeeeees 5
Rs ee ee Oe eititnticcnccinripaininitnineniivisbininanininnaen 3
A.A.C. R18-9-A901 — R18-9-1015...... eee ee ee een 3
OTHER AUTHORITIES
H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 95-1804 at 18 (1978)......cccccecesseeeseees 16

1 2

OPINIONS BELOW

The opinion of the United States Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit is reported at 420 F.3d 946 (9th Cir.
2005), and is reprinted at Petitioners National Association
of Home Builders’ Appendix (NAHB Pet. App.) at 1-68. The
denial of rehearing en banc and Judge Kozinski’s dissent
from that denial, which was joined by Judges O’Scannlain,
Kleinfeld, Tallman, Callahan, and Bea, is reported at 450
F.3d 394 (9th Cir. 2006), and is reprinted at NAHB Pet.
App. 134-158.

¢

JURISDICTION

Respondents petitioned the United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit to review EPA’s decision to
transfer its pollution permitting authority to Arizona under
33 U.S.C. § 1369(b)(1). The court of appeals issued its
judgment and opinion on August 22, 2005, and denied
rehearing en banc on June 8, 2006. Home Builders filed a
Petition for Writ of Certiorari on September 6, 2006. Ari-
zona filed its Brief in Support of Petition for Writ of Certio-
rari on September 26, 2006. After receiving extensions of
time from Justice Kennedy, EPA filed its Petition for Writ of
Certiorari on October 23, 2006. The Court granted Home
Builders’ and EPA’s Petitions for Certiorari on January 5,
2007, and has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1254/1).

¢

“STATUTES INVOLVED .

Sectiea 7(a)-(b) of the Endangered Species Act of 1973
(ESA), 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)-(b), and Section 402(b) of the
Federal Water Pollution Control Act (Clean Water Act or

2

CWA), 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b), are reproduced in EPA’s Pet.
App. 117a-124a. )

¢

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

This case concerns the State of Arizona’s efforts to
obtain authority to administer the surface water discharge
permitting program, known as the National Pollutant
Discharge Elimination System (NPDES), in Arizona under
Section 402(b) of the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b).
The EPA transferred the NPDES program to Arizona after
determining that its program met the requirements of the
Clean Water Act. Arizona was the forty-fifth State to
obtain EPA approval of its permitting program.

Congress clearly intended the States to run the
pollution permitting programs upon demonstrating that
their programs met the Clean Water Act criteria. And, this
Court and others have recognized that approval of the
transfer of NPDES authority to a State is mandatory after
it demonstrates that it meets the criteria set forth in
Section 402(b). There is no dispute that Arizona met the
statutory criteria. Nevertheless, a majority of a panel of
the Ninth Circuit vacated the transfer of the program to
Arizona on the grounds that the EPA, the transferring
agency, failed to comply with the requirements of Section
7(a)(2) of the Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1536/a)(2).

In reaching its conclusion, the majority panel deter-
mined that the Endangered Species Act repealed the
mandating language of Section 402(b) by implication,
contrary to this Court’s rulings, and misread the legisla-
tive history of the Endangered Species Act. The majority's
views of the reach of the Endangered Species Act are not

only wrong as a matter of law, but radical in nature,
potentially imposing Endangered Species Act Section 7
requirements on every decision of the United States
government, even where other acts of Congress have, as
here, directed agency decisions under specified circum-
stances. Because the court of appeals evred on a question
of law, Arizona urges the Court to vacate the court of
appeals’ decision and order it to uphold EPA’s administra-
tive decision approving Arizona’s program under the Clean
Water Act.

A. Statement of Facts.

In 2001, the Arizona Legislature authorized and
directed the Arizona Department of Environmental Qual-
ity (ADEQ) to establish a state pollution permitting
program, known as the Arizona Pollutant Discharge
Elimination System (AZPDES), which was to be consistent
with the requirements of § 402(b) of the Clean Water Act.
2001 Ariz. Sess. Laws, Ch. 357, §5 (codified at Arizona
Revised Statutes Annotated (A.R.S.) §§ 49-255 to -255.03).
Pursuant to this statutory authority, Arizona employees
drafted and promulgated the extensive regulations neces-
sary to obtain EPA approval of Arizona’s pollution permit-
ting program. See Arizona Administrative Code R18-9-
A901 though R18-9-1015.

In January, 2002, Arizona applied to EPA for transfer
of the NPDES program regarding Arizona waterways
(except those on Indian land). (NAHB Pet. App. 7.) EPA
consulted with the United States Fish & Wildlife Service
(Service) under § 7(a)(2) of the Endangered Species Act
concerning the effect of EPA’s transfer of the NPDES
program and the Service sent EPA its Biological Opinion

4

on December 3, 2002. (NAHB Pet. App. 77.) The Service
concluded that EPA’s approval of the AZPDES program
was “not likely to jeopardize the continued existence of
[listed] species, and is not likely to destroy or adversely
modify designated or proposed critical habitat.” (NAHB
Pet. App. 116.) The Service’s conclusion was based in part
on its analysis of causation:

Further, loss of any conservation benefit is not
caused by EPA’s decision to approve the State of
Arizona’s program. Rather, the absence of the
section 7 process that exists with respect to Fed-
eral NPDES permits reflects Congress’ decision
to grant States the right to administer these pro-
grams under state law provided the State’s pro-
gram meets the requirements of 402(b) of the
Clean Water Act.

(NAHB Pet. App. 114.)

On December 5, 2002, the EPA approved Arizona’s
application to administer the NPDES program pursuant to
Section 402(b) of the Clean Water Act. (NAHB Pet. App.
69.) Arizona thus became the forty-fifth State to obtain
this authority. (NAHB Pet. App. 4.) The EPA found that
Arizona had met all the requirements of Section 402(b).
(J.A.pp. 237) This finding is not disputed by any party.
(Pet. App. 31 n.11.)

Arizona obtained the EPA’s approval of its AZPDES
program as the result of more than two years of effort.
(Ariz. App. 6.)' The State invested over one million dollars
in resources and staff time in creating the AZPDES

' This refers to the Appendix attached to the State of Arizona's
Brief in Support of Petition for Writ of Certiorari.

5

program. (/d.) Arizona state employees developed new
state laws and rules, prepared the submission of the
Arizona program for approval, negotiated and drafted the
memoranda of agreement with EPA to implement the
program, and drafted the program guidance materials for
the regulated community. (/d.) Arizona’s resource com-
mitment to AZPDES, in terms of money and personnel
time, has increased substantially during the pendency of
this case.

Invalidation of the AZPDES program would seriously
disrupt the pollution permitting process in Arizona. If
Arizona’s authority to continue its program is vacated,
regulated facilities would not know where to send informa-
tion regarding their permits, how to send it, or what
government official to contact regarding permit issues.
(Ariz. App. 7.) Action on permit applications would be
substantially delayed pending a determination as to what
agency would take over their processing. (/d. at 8.)

Further, invalidation of the AZPDES program would
halt or delay Arizona business activities, including con-
struction projects that are proceeding under general
permits that have been issued in the AZPDES program.
For example, in 2003 the Arizona Department of Envi-
ronmental Quality (ADEQ) completed promulgation of the
AZPDES Construction General Permit. (/d.) As the Ninth
Circuit majority noted, ADEQ issues several thousand
storm-water-discharge construction permits annually.
(Pet. App. 49 n.22.) The EPA revised its National Con-
struction General Permit on July 1, 2003, but it does not
cover construction projects in Arizona outside of reserva-
tions. 68 Fed. Reg. 39087, 39089 (July 1, 2003). If Ari-
zona’s Construction General Permit is invalid, there will
be many new construction sites that would otherwise be

6

covered by the Arizona permit that will no longer be able
to legally discharge under any authority. (Ariz. App. 8.)

In addition, invalidation of the AZPDES program may
negatively affect Arizona’s environment and water quality.
(Id.) The ADEQ has implemented education and outreach
efforts to ensure that the regulated community under-
stands its responsibilities under the Clean Water Act and
Arizona law. (Jd.) Under the AZPDES program, there are
more inspections of and other site visits to discharging
facilities than there were when EPA was managing the
NPDES program in Arizona. (/d.) These benefits and
increased regulatory oversight would cease if the AZPDES
program is invalidated. (Jd.) -

Finally, since approval of AZPDES, ADEQ has pro-
vided the United States Fish and Wildlife Service (Service)
with significantly increased notice of proposed projects in
Arizona that may affect endangered species. (Ariz. App. 2-
3.) ADEQ requires every construction general permit
applicant to submit a Notice of Intent including a unique
geographic identifier. (Jd. at 3.) The Service has provided
ADEQ a geographic information system map that identi-
fies the areas in Arizona that are of critical habitat con-
cern. (Jd.) ADEQ’s “Smart Notice of Intent” computer
system matches the identified project area with the
established areas of concern provided by the Service. (/d.)
Upon receiving a general permit Notice of Intent in an area
of critical habitat concern, ADEQ informs developers that
they are not authorized to discharge for thirty-two business
days — thus, preventing the beginning of construction
during that time. (Jd.) ADEQ sends a copy of Notices of
Intent that affect critica) habitat areas to the Service. Ud.
at 4.) The Service thus has thirty-two days to assess the
impact on endangered species and contact the developer

concerning the impacts. (Jd.) Under the NPDES program in
Arizona, developers could automatically begin construction
within forty-eight hours of giving notice. (Jd. at 3.)’

B. Proceedings Below.

In April 2003, Respondents petitioned the court of
appeals to review EPA’s approval of the AZPDES program
under 33 U.S.C. § 1369(b)(1)(D), which allows “any inter-
ested person” to request the court of appeals to review
EPA’s determinations regarding state permitting pro-
grams. Respondents contended that EPA’s decision to
approve AZPDES was arbitrary and capricious because it
failed to follow § 7(aX2) of the Endangered Species Act.
(NAHB Pet. App. 13.) Arizona moved to intervene because
it had a significant protectable interest in the EPA’s
approval of the AZPDES program and intended to raise a
legal argument that EPA might not raise — that is, that
EPA could not deny the transfer based on §7 of the En-
dangered Species Act if the transfer met the requirements
of § 402(b) of the Clean Water Act. (State of Arizona’s
Motion to Intervene, May 2, 2003.) The court of appeals
allowed Arizona as well as Petitioners Home Builders to
intervene. (NAHB Pet. App. 13.)

Respondents also filed a lawsuit against the adminis-
trator of the EPA and other federal officers in the United
States district court in Arizona alleging, among other

* Although the Service opines in its Biological Opinion that
Arizona's process will not provide species conservation that is equiva-
lent to that required by § 7 of the Endangered Species Act (NAHB Pet.
App. 79), the Service does not address whether EPA received sufficient
notice of construction in an area of critical habitat concern to enable it
to protect listed species.

, 8

claims, that the Biological Opinion that supported EPA’s
decision to approve AZPDES violated the Endangered
Species Act. (/d.) The district_court ordered that the
challenge be severed from Respondents’ other claims and
transferred to the court of appeals because that court had
exclusive jurisdiction over the challenge. (NAHB Pet. App.
13.) The court of appeals consolidated the transferred
district court challenge with Respondents’ petition for
administrative review. (NAHB Pet. App. 13.)

A two-member majority of the court of appeals con-
cluded that EPA’s approval of Arizona’s transfer applica-
tion was arbitrary and capricious because it was based on
“legally contradictory positions regarding its section 7
obligations” (NAHB Pet. App. 23), and that therefore the
transfer decision must be remanded “to the agency for a
plausible explanation of its decision, based on a single,
coherent interpretation of the statute” (id. at 28). The
majority then decided the legal question that it had
purported to remand to EPA:

We hold that approving Arizona’s pollution per-
mitting transfer application was an agency ac-
tion “authorized” by the EPA, thus triggering
both section 7(a)(2)’s consultation requirement
and its mandate that agencies not affirmatively
take actions that are likely to jeopardize listed
species. The EPA may have complied with its ob-
ligations under the Clean Water Act, but compli-
ance with a “complementary” statute cannot
relieve the EPA of its independent obligations
under section 7(a)(2).... Section 7(a)(2) imposes
a duty on the EPA to “insure” its transfer deci-
sion is not likely to jeopardize protected species
or adversely modify their habitat, and this duty
exists alongside Clean Water Act provisions as

9

the agency’s “first priority.” [TVA v.] Hill, 437
U.S. [153,] 185 [(1978)).

(NAHB Pet. App. 47.) The majority then vacated the EPA’s
decision to approve Arizona’s pollution permitting applica-
tion. (NAHB Pet. App. 63.)

Judge Thompson dissented. (NAHB Pet. App. 64-68.)
He would have denied Respondents’ petition for review
because “EPA’s authority to grant or deny the State
of Arizona’s application to administer the pollution
permitting program was nondiscretionary.” (Jd. at 68.)
“(T)herefore its decision was not ‘agency action’ within the
meaning of section 7 of the Endangered Species Act.” (Jd.
at 66.)

The respondents EPA and the Service and intervenors
Arizona and Home Builders moved for rehearing en banc.
(NAHB Pet. App. 134). The court denied rehearing en
banc. (NAHB Pet. App. 135.) Judge Kozinski dissented
from the denial and five judges joined his dissent. (NAHB
Pet. App. 135-149.) Judge Kozinski disagreed with the
majority’s conclusion that EPA’s decisionmaking was
internally inconsistent and concluded that, even if there
was inconsistency, the majority should have remanded to
EPA for further clarification. (/d. at 138-39.) He also
determined that the majority got it “flatly wrong” when it
concluded that the Endangered Species Act required EPA
to take endangered species into account when making its
decision whether to transfer a permitting program under
§ 402(b) of the Clean Water Act. (Jd. at 141.) The majority's
interpretation “transformed the ESA into an overriding
mandate that trumps an agency's obligations under its
own governing statute,” which was contrary to the Ser-
vice’s regulation, 50 C.F.R. § 402.03, and this Court’s

10

decision in Department of Transportation v. Public Citizen,
541 U.S. 752 (2004). (Ud. at 141-44.)

The court stayed its mandate pending this Court’s
final disposition. (Court of Appeals Order of June 16,
2006.)

¢

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

I. In enacting the Clean Water Act, Congress in-
tended that the States would administer the pollution
permitting programs outlined in Section 402(b) of the Act
in accordance with Section 402(b) requirements. The
language of Section 402(b) is unambiguous: the EPA “shall
approve” a State’s application to administer the pollution
permitting programs unless the applying State does not
meet one of the requirements specified therein.

The pane] majority erred in determining that Section
7(a)(2) of the Endangered Species Act precluded the EPA
from approving Arizona’s permitting program even though
the program met all the requirements of the Clean Water
Act. Because Section 402(b) is mandatory, the majority in
effect determined that Congress impliedly repealed a
portion of the Clean Water Act. This conclusion is wrong
because Congress did not intend to alter Section 402(b)
when it enacted the Endangered Species Act, and the two
statutes can be easily reconciled.

II. Because EPA was required to approve Arizona’s
permitting program once it determined that the program
met the requirements of the Clean Water Act, the majority
should have upheld EPA’s approval regardless of any
inconsistencies in EPA’s interpretation of the Endangered

11

Species Act. This Court should therefore vacate the court
of appeals decision and uphold EPA’s decision based on the
correct interpretation of Section 7(a)(2) of the Endangered
Species Act.

¢

ARGUMENT

I. The EPA’s Decision to Transfer Pollution Per-
mitting A°-*hority to Arizona Was Legally Cor-
rect.

A. The EPA Must Transfer Permitting Author-
ity to a Staite Permitting Program that
Meets the Requirements of Section 402(b)
of the Clean Water Act.

The Ninth Circuit majority opinion ignored both the
clear statement of congressional intent in the Clean Water
Act, and its plain ianguage, in holding that Section 7 of
the Endangered Species Act expanded the requirements

that Arizona must meet to receive EPA approval of its
NPDES program.

In the Clean Water Act, Congress expressly stated its
intent that the respective States be responsible for run-
ning the Act’s several pollution control programs, includ-
ing the NPDES program at issue in this case:

It is the policy of the Congress to recognize, pre-
serve, and protect the primary responsibilities
and rights of States to prevent, reduce, and
eliminate pollution, to plan the development and
use ... of land and water resources, and to con-
sult with the Administrator in the exercise of his
authority under this chapter. /t ts the policy of
Congress that the States manage the construction

12

grant program under this chapter and implement
the permit programs under Sections 1342 and
1344 of this title.

33 U.S.C. §1251(b) (NAHB Pet. App. 160) (emphasis
added). Under Section 402(b), 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b), the EPA
administrator “shall approve” each state application to
administer the NPDES program “unless” she determines
that the applying State does not meet one of the nine
specified requirements set forth therein. (NAHB Pet. App.
165-67.)

This Court has recognized that EPA approval of a
state program is mandatory when a State, like Arizona,
demonstrates that it has met all nine criteria. EPA v.
Calif. ex rel. State Water Res. Control Bd., 426 U.S. 200,
208 (1976) (“The EPA may require modification or revision
of a submitted program but when a plan is in compliance
with the EPA guidelines ... and is supported by adequate
authority to achieve the ends of §§ 402(b)(1)-(9) .. . and to
administer the described program, the EPA shall approve
the program. ...”). And, before the majority opinion here,
the circuit courts consistently acknowledged that EPA
must approve a state program if it meets the requirements
of § 402(b). Am. Forest & Paper Ass’n v. EPA, 137 F.3d 291,
297 (5th Cir. 1998) (“The language of § 402(b) is firm: It
provides that EPA “shall” approve submitted programs
unless they fail to meet one of the nine listed require-
ments.”); Natural Res. Def. Council v. EPA, 859 F.2d 156,
173-174 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (noting that “Congress repeatedly
articulated its expectation that the States would play a
major role in administering’ the NPDES program and
finding that it “commands the Administrator to approve
the state permit system once he determines that the
statutory requirements and administrative guidelines are

13

met”); Citizens for a Better Env't v. EPA, 596 F.2d 720, 722
(7th Cir. 1979) (“If the state program satisfies the statu-
tory requirements of section 402(b) ... and the guidelines
issued under section 304(i) ... , the Administrator must
approve the program.”); Shell Oil Co. v. Train, 585 F.2d
408, 410 (9th Cir. 1978) (“Under § 1342(b), a state may
submit to the EPA” and “li]f the state can demonstrate
that it will apply the effluent limitations and the amend-
ments’ other requirements in the permits it grants and
that it will monitor and enforce the terms of those per-
mits,” the EPA Administrator “must approve the pro-
posal.”).

The majority nevertheless concluded that the EPA has
the “authority” and “duty” “to deny a pollution permitting
transfer application that meets Clean Water Act standards
but would jeopardize protected species.” (NAHB Pet. App.
31.) This conclusion is contrary to the mandatory language
in § 402(b) and neither the language nor the purpose of the
Endangered Species Act gives the EPA the authority to
override this mandatory provision of the Clean Water Act.

B. Neither the Language nor the Purpose of
the Endangered Species Act Supports the
Majority’s Apparent Conclusion that the
Endangered Species Act Impliedly Re-
pealed Congress’s Mandate in Section
402(b) of the Clean Water Act.

Without explicitly acknowledging it, the majority
concluded that Congress, in passing the Endangered
Species Act, intended to alter the statutory scheme for
approving the transfer of NPDES authority to States.
Where before a State like Arizona had to satisfy only
the nine criteria expressly stated in Section 402(b), the

14

majority held that Congress added a tenth requirement —
compliance with Section 7(a)(2) of the Endangered Species
Act. The Ninth Circuit thus held that the ESA repealed, by
implication, the provision of the Clean Water Act that the
Director of the EPA “shall” approve a state program upon
demonstration of its compliance with the Clean Water Act.

This Court has long followed “‘the cardinal rule ...
that repeals by implication are not favored.’” Morton v.
Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 549-550 (1974) (quoting Posadas v.
Natl City Bank, 296 U.S> 497, 503 (1936)). “In practical
terms, this ‘cardinal rule’ means that ‘[iJn the absence of
some affirmative showing of an intention to repeal, the
only permissible justification for a repeal by implication is
when the earlier and later statutes are irreconcilable.’”
TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 190 (1978) (quoting Mancari,
417 U.S. at 550). Moreover, “a statute dealing with a
narrow, precise, and specific subject is not subsumed by a
later enacted statute covering a more generalized spec-
trum. ... unless the later statute expressly contradicts the
original act or unless such a construction is absolutely
necessary in order that the words of the later statute shall
have any meaning at all.” Traynor v. Turnage, 485 U.S.
535, 547-548 (1988) (internal citations and quotations
omitted). “The rarity with which [the Court has] discov-
ered implied repeals is due to the relatively stringent
standard for such findings. ...” Matsushita Elec. Indus’
Co., Ltd. v. Epstein, 516 U.S. 367, 381 (1996).

1. Congress did not intend for the Endan-
gered Species Act to modify Section
402(b) of the Clean Water Act.

Congress expressed no intention to alter the Clean
Water Act NPDES approval scheme when it enacted the

15

Endangered Species Act of 1973. Instead, it clearly in-
tended for the requirements of the new Act, including
Section 7, to be limited to actions within federal agencies’
existing authorities. As originally enacted, Section 7
provided:

The Secretary [of the Interior! shall review other
programs administered by him and utilize such
programs in furtherance of the purposes of this
Act. All other Federal departments and agencies
shall, in consultation with and with the assis-
tance of the Secretary, utilize their authorities in
furtherance of the purposes of this Act by carry-
ing out programs for the conservation of endan-
gered species and threatened species listed
pursuant to section 4 of this Act and by taking
such action necessary to insure that actions au-
thorized, funded, or carried out by them do not
jeopardize the continued existence of such en-
dangered species and threatened species or re-
sult in the destruction or modification of habitat
of such species which is determined by the Secre-
tary, after consultation as appropriate with the
affected States, to be critical.

Endangered Species Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-205, § 7,
87 Stat. 884, 892 (1973) (emphasis added) (NAHB Pet.
App. 483).

When Congress amended the Endangered Species Act
in 1978, it divided Section 7 into subsections. As amended,
subsection 7(a) contained, in two separate sentences,
substantially the same language currently found in sub-
sections (a)(1) and (a2) of the ESA. See Pub L. No. 95-
632, § 3, 92 Stat. 3752 (1978). The 1978 amendment did
not change Section 7’s substantive provisions:

16

The conferees adopted Senate language creating
a new section 7(a), which essentially restates sec-
tion 7 of existing law, and outlines the responsi-
bilities of the Secretary and other Federal
agencies for protecting endangered species....
The Conferees felt that the Senate provision by
retaining existing law, was preferable since regu-
lations governing section 7 are now familiar to
most Federal agencies and have received sub-
stantial judicial interpretation.

H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 95-1804 at 18 (NAHB Pet. App. 487).
Thus, far from expressing an intent to repeal existing
provisions of the Clean Water Act, Congress intended to
preserve the substance of §7’s original requirements.
Congress again amended subsection 7(a) and separated it
into 7(a)(1) and (a)(2) but again expressed no intent to
make a substantive change. See Pub. L. No. 96-159, § 4, 93
Stat. 1226 (1979).

_ Despite this legislative history, the panel majority
concluded that Congress intended to give federal agencies
a substantive grant of authority when it enacted §7 in
1973 that impliedly repealed EPA’s mandatory obligations
under the Clean Water Act. (NAHB Pet. App. 38.) In
reaching this conclusion, the majority ignored the original
language of § 7 of the Endangered Species Act and failed
to acknowledge that the phrase “utilize their authorities”
clearly applied to the language that is now in § 7(a)(2).
The majority then bases its analysis of the meaning of § 7
in 1973 on the wrong language — that is, its analysis is
based on the current language of § 7 not the language that
was enacted in 1973.

Another aspect of the statute’s structure and his-
tory ... bolsters the conclusion that section 7 in-
cludes an affirmative grant of authority to attend
to protection of listed species with agencies’

17

authority when they take actions covered by sec-
tion 7(a)(2). Section 7(a)(1) of the Endangered
Species Act directs agencies to “utilize their au-
thorities in furtherance of the purposes of this
chapter by carrying out programs for the conser-
vation of [listed] species.” 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(1).
Section 7(a)(2), in contrast, does not refer to
agencies’ existing “authorities,” but instead di-
rects agencies that, when considering covered
“actions,” they are to proceed in a manner not
likely to jeopardize listed species.

The House Report indicates that this distinction
between the two sections was, as one would
expect, deliberate. The Report noted the re-
quirement of present section 7(a)(2) as imposing
a “further require|ment!” beyond that of section
7(a(1). See H.R. Rep. No. 93-412, at 14
(1973).... (emphasis added). The contrasting
language of the two sections indicates that the
“further requirement” imposed by section 7(a)(2)
turns on the distinction between using existing
authority to promote conservation of species and
conferring an additional, do-no-harm obligation —
and reciprocal authority — applicable when the
agency’s own actions could cause harm to endan-
gered species.

(NAHB Pet. App. 34-35.)

Of course, the House Report in 1973 did not support
the majority’ construction of §7 because the Report
commented on the original language in § 7, which required
agencies to act within their existing authorities. Similarly,
Representative Dingell’s comments about the 1973 Act, on
which the majority also relied (NAHB Pet. App. 35), are
instructive in interpreting the language of §7 as it was
originally enacted but do not support the majority’s con-
clusion that Congress intended agencies to act within their

18

existing authorities when “carrying out programs for the
conservation” of listed species but not when insuring that
their actions were not likely to jeopardize listed species.

The majority also relied on this Court’s opinion in TVA
v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978), to support its expansive
interpretation of § 7(a)(2). (NAHB Pet. App. 32-35.) But
Hill construed the language of §7 as it was originally
enacted in 1973, 473 U.S. at 160, and addresses whether a
federal agency must comply with §7 when it is acting
within its existing authority, id. at 164 n.14. Therefore,
Hill does not support the majority’s analysis.

In sum, nothing in the language or legislative history
of the Endangered Species Act indicates that Congress
intended to repeal any portion of § 402(b) of the Clean
Water Act. Indeed, the majority acknowledges that Con-
gress chose not to impose the requirements of the Endan-
gered Species Act on the States. See NAHB Pet. App. 6
(“By its terms § 7(a)(2) applies only to ‘federal agencies’ not
to state governmental bodies. Accordingly EPA’s pollution
permitting decisions are subject to section 7(a)(2) but state
pollution permitting decisions are not.”).’ Yet under the
majority’s analysis, Arizona must enact or agree to provi-
sions similar to § 7 of the Endangered Species Act in order
to obtain EPA approval of its permitting program.

The majority opinion found that the transfer of the
NPDES program to Arizona would harm endangered
species because Section 7 consultation would not be

* See also Brief of Amici Curiae States of Nebraska, et al., in Support
of the Petition for Wnt of Certiorari at 13 (analyzing the language and
legislative history of the Endangered Species Act and concluding that
States are encouraged tc work cooperatively with the federal government
but that such state programs are strictly voluntary).

19

required when Arizona was running the program. (NAHB
Pet. App. 6, 47.) Although Arizona took a number of
actions to increase its protection of endangered species,
including its innovative “Smart Notice of Intent” program
that provides early warning to the State and the Service
whenever a development is proposed near critical habitat,
the majority opinion makes it clear that Arizona’s volun-
tary efforts did not suffice under Section 7 to allow the
program transfer to proceed:

In the abstract, voluntary compliance by state
agencies willing to follow [Fish and Wildlife Ser-
vice] recommendations to the same extent as
would the EPA might substitute for section 7
coverage. The EPA, however, could not so con-
clude without first analyzing the likelihood that
all relevant Arizona agencies can and would live
up to the Game and Fish Department’s promises,
as well as considering the effectiveness of federal .
oversight if Arizona agencies fail to live up to any
such promises.

(NAHB Pet. App. 60.) Thus, the majority indicated that
EPA must withhold approval from a State unless it either
created a statutory program substantially similar to the
Endangered Species Act or agreed to consult with the Fish
and Wildlife Service or National Marine Fisheries Service
on all state NPDES permitting decisions. That the effect of
the majority’s opinion is to impose the Endangered Species
Act on the States under the guise of Clean Water Act
approval further reinforces the conclusion that the major-
ity erred in concluding that Congress impliedly repealed
the mandate in § 402‘b) of the Clean Water Act.

20

2. Section 7(a)(2) of the Endangered Spe-
cies Act can be easily reconciled with
Section 402(b) of the Clean Water Act.

If the majority had deferred to the Service’s regulation
and other federal decisions interpreting § 7(a)(2) to apply
only to discretionary agency actions, it could have recon-
ciled § 402(5) with § 7(a)(2). It erred in making no attempt
to reconcile the provisions.

In 1986, the agencies responsible for enforcing the
Endangered Species Act, the Fish & Wildlife Service and
the National Marine Fisheries Service, promulgated a
regulation interpreting the scope of §7’s requirements:
“Section 7 and the requirements of this Part apply to all
actions in which there is discretionary Federal involve-
ment or control.” 50 C.F.R. § 402.03 (emphasis added)
(NAHB Pet. App. 230); see also 50 C.F.R. § 402.16 (requir-
ing reinitiation of formal consultation “where discretion-
ary Federal involvement or control over the action has
been retained”) (NAHB Pet. App. 243). Under this regula-
tion, §7 did not apply to the EPA’s approval of Arizona’s
permitting program because it lacked discretion to with-
hold its approval after Arizona had met the requirements
of § 402(b).

Instead of finding the two statutes reconcilable by
deferring to the Service’s reasonable interpretation in
accordance with Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources
Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984), the majority
interpreted “discretionary” to be somehow consistent with
its interpretation of § 7(a)(2) as conferring additional
agency authority. (NAHB App. 40-42.) Contrary to the
majority’s assertion, this interpretation was not consistent
with its other decisions interpreting the Endangered
Species Act. As Judge Thompson noted in his dissent, the
Ninth Circuit has “consistently recognized that an agency

21

may have decisionmaking authority and yet not be em-
powered, either as an initial matter or in conjunction with
some continuing authority, to act to protect endangered
and threatened species.” NAHB Pet. App. 64-65 (Thomp-
son, J., dissenting) (citing Ground Zero Ctr. For Non-
Violent Action v. U.S. Dep't of the Navy, 383 F.3d 1082,
1092 (9th Cir. 2004); Marbled Murrelet v. Babbitt, 83 F.3d
1068, 1074-75 (9th Cir. 1996), and Sierra Club v. Babbitt,
65 F.3d 1502, 1508-10 (9th Cir. 1995)).

The majority could have also reconciled § 7(a)(2) with
§ 402(b) of the Clean Water Act by adopting other circuits’
interpretation of the scope of § Ta)(2). See Am. Forest &
Paper Ass’n, 137 F.3d at 297, 299 (finding that the lan-
guage of § 402(b) is non-discretionary and that § 7(a)(2) is
not a “font of new authority” but “a directive to agencies to
channel their existing authority in a particular direction”),
Platte River Whooping Crane Critical Habitat Maint. Trust
v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 962 F.2d 27, 34 (D.C.
Cir. 1992) (Section 7 “directs agencies to ‘utilize their
authorities’ to carry out the ESA's objectives; it does not
expand the powers conferred on an agency by its enabling
act.”) Instead, the majority rejected the analysis of those
decisions, acknowledging that there was an intercircuit
conflict on the question. (NAHB Pet. App. 44.)

The majority erred in failing to reconcile § 7(a)(2) with
§ 402(b) of the Clean Water Act. Because § 7(a)(2) applies
only to discretionary agency actions, it did not conflict
with EPA’s responsibility to approve Arizona’s permitting
program when it determined that the program met the
requirements of § 402(b) of the Clean Water Act. EPA thus
correctly approved Arizona's permitting program and this
Court should vacate the majority's decision to vacate that
approval.

22

II. Because the EPA Was Required to Approve
Arizona’s Pollution Permitting Program Under
the Clean Water Act, Its Approval Was Legally
Correct Regardless of Its Interpretation of Sec-
tion 7(a)(2) of the Endangered Species Act.

A. The Court of Appeals Should Have Upheld
the EPA’s Approval! Because It Was Legally
Correct.

The majority determined that it “must review the
EPA’s actions based on the ‘grounds ... upon which the
record discloses that its action was based.’” (NAHB Pet.
App. 25 (quoting SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 87
(1943)). The majority then concluded that it must remand
to the EPA because EPA’s approval of Arizona’s pollution
permitting program was inconsistent with its original
belief that § 7 required consultation. (NAHB Pet. App. 28.)
EPA has persuasively demonstrated that its position
concerning §7 consultation was not inconsistent with its
decision to rely on the Service’s Biological Opinion. See
EPA’s Petition at 23-25. Moreover, the Chenery rule does
not apply here because Intervenors Arizona and Home
Builders correctly argued below that EPA was required to
approve Arizona's permitting program under the Clean
Water Act. Thus, the court of appeals should have upheld
the EPA’s approval.

In Chenery, the Court held that, when an agency’s
decision involves an exercise of judgment in an area that
Congress has entrusted to the agency, the reviewing court
could not uphold the agency’s decision based on grounds
that were different from those on which the agency relied.
318 U.S. at 94-95. The Court explicitly stated that this
principle did not apply when the administrative agency
made an erroneous determination of law. /d. at 88 ("|Wle

23

do not disturb the settled rule that, in reviewing the
decision of a lower court, it must be affirmed if the result
ss correct although the lower court relied upon a wrong
ground or gave a wrong reason.”) (internal quotations
omitted); id. at 94 (“But if the action is based upon a
determination of law as to which the reviewing authority
of the courts does come into play, an order may not stand if
the agency has misconceived the law.”).

The lower courts have consistently held that the rule
in Chenery does not apply to their review of an agency’s
interpretation of a federal statute. See Ry. Executives’
Ass’n v. ICC, 784 F.2d 959, 969 (9th Cir. 1986) (“Generally,
a reviewing court may only judge the propriety of an
agency decision on the grounds invoked by the agency, ...
the court is not so bound when, as here, the issue in
dispute is the interpretation of a federal statute.”); N.C.
Comm’n of Indian Affairs v. U.S. Dep't of Labor, 725 F.2d
238, 240 (4th Cir. 1984) (finding no Chenery problem
because “the question of interpretation of a federal statute
+s not ‘a determination or judgment which an administra-
tive agency alone is authorized to make’”) (quoting Chen-
ery, 332 U.S. at 89); Milk Transport v. ICC, 190 F. Supp.
350, 355 (D. Minn. 1960) (Chenery does not apply to the
court’s interpretation of a federal statute).

In this case, the court of appeals granted Arizona's
and Home Builders’ motions to intervene under § 509(b) of
the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. 8 136%b), and Rule 151d) of
the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure. Arizona re-
quested intervention to argue that “$ 7 of the Endangered
Species Act could not legally preclude the transfer of
NPDES authority to a state pursuant to 33 U.S.C.
§ 1342(b).” (State of Arizona’s Motion to Intervene at 7.)
The parties briefed that legal issue and the majority

24

reached the issue in holding that EPA’s obligations under
the Clean Water Act could not “relieve the EPA of its
independent obligations under section 7(a)(2).” (NAHB
Pet. App. 47.) Because the legal argument that Arizona
raised was a sufficient basis for upholding EPA’s approval
of Arizona’s permitting program, the majority erred in
vacating the approval. This Court should review the EPA’s
decision because any inconsistencies in its decisionmaking
involve the interpretation of federal statutes. Because the
court of appeals misinterpreted these statutes, the Court
should vacate its decision.

B. The Court Should Not Remand to the EPA
Because Remand Is Futile and Detrimental
to the States’ Interests.

The EPA’s decision to approve Arizona’s program
should not be remanded for clarification because this
Court is free to, and should, review the court of appeals’
erroneous construction of federal statutes. Moreover, the
Court should not remand here because it would be futile.
See Thornburgh v. Am. Coll. of Obstetricians & Gynecolo-
gists, 476 U.S. 747, 756 n.7 (1986), overruled on other
grounds by Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833
(1992). ({T}he ruling in Chenery has not required courts to
remand in futility.”). To the extent that there was any
inconsistency in the EPA’s position on the applicability of
Section 7(a)(2) to its approval of state permitting programs
under the Clean Water Act, EPA has clarified its position
in connection with Alaska’s application for transfer of
NPDES permitting authority. (EPA Pet. App. 93a-102a.)
EPA's position is that the decision whether to approve the
transfer of NPDES permitting authority to a State is not
subject to the requirements of Section 7/a)(2) because
Section 402(b) of the Clean Water Act requires that the

25

State’s application be granted if the Clean Water Act
criteria are satisfied. Jd. The Service and the National
Marine Fisheries Service have confirmed that their inter-
pretations of the relevant statutory provisions are consis-
tent with EPA’s. (EPA Pet. App. 103a-116a.) Thus, remand
would serve no purpose as EPA has clarified its position.

Remand is also inappropriate here because, until this
Court determines whether Section 7(aX2) applies to
transfers of NPDES permitting authority to a State, the
status of Arizona and Alaska’s permitting programs’ is
uncertain. This Court should address the question so that
States in the Ninth Circuit are not governed by rules that
are different from those applied in all other circuits.

7

‘ The State of Alaska has applied for transfer of NPDES permit-
ting authority and has not yet received EPA approval of its permitting
program. Brief of Amicus Curiae Alaska in Support of Petitions for Writ
of Certiorari at 1.

26

CONCLUSION

This Court should vacate the judgment of the court of
appeals and uphold EPA’s approval of the Arizona’s per-
mitting program.

DATED: February 20, 2007.

Respectfully submitted,

TERRY GODDARD
Attorney General of Arizona

Mary O’GRADY
Solicitor General

PAULA S. BICKETT
Counsel of Record
Chief Counsel, Civil Appeals

JAMES T. SKARDON
Assistant Attorney General
1275 West Washington
Phoenix, Arizona 85007
(602) 542-3333

Counsel for State of Arizona

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385016_0500%3A17. Public record. Not legal advice.
