# Respondents Brief — RICHLIN SEC. SERVICE CO. v. Chertoff

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Respondents Brief
- **Published:** January 1, 2008
- **Citation:** 553 U.S. 571

## Text

SIISS

|

No. 06-1717

———S—————_ =
.

In the Supreme Court of the Gnited States

RICHLIN SECURITY SERVICE COMPANY, PETITIONER
Vv.

MICHAEL CHERTOFF, SECRETARY OF
HOMELAND SECURITY

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO
THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT

BRIEF FOR THE RESPONDENT

PAUL D. CLEMENT
Solicitor General
Counsel of Record
JEFFREY S. BUCHOLTZ
Acting Assistant Attorney
General
GREGORY G. GARRE
Deputy Solicitor General

ANTHONY A. YANG

Assistant to the Solicitor
General

JEANNE E. DAVIDSON

REGINALD T. BLADES, JR.

MICHAEL JAY SINGER

MICHAEL E. ROBINSON
Attorneys

Department of Justice
Washington, D.C. 20530-0001
(202) 514-2217

QUESTION PRESENTED

Whether, under the Equal Access to Justice Act,
5 U.S.C. 504 and 28 U.S.C. 2412, paralegal services are
“attorney fees” compensable at market rates or “other
expenses” compensable at the rate of cost to the attor-
ney.

(I)

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page
i i i oe eri eee way ]
ee . cncuecttbapedededseeseckinss 6
Argument:
1. The EAJA reimburses paralegal charges at the
I ee ad ele ci ic esnrccnce 10

A. The plain language and the structure of the
EAJA demonstrate that the paralegal costs
are “other expenses” reimbursed at cost, not
“attorney fees” reimbursed at prevailing
EE on hdd eWaN cheb ddaskbtbseeoseccess 10
B. The legislative history and purpose of the
EAJA confirms Congress’s intent to reimburse
paralegal time at cost as an out-of-pocket
BE o.oo cov ienncanskoswhskendanedsccccsss 26
C. Principles of sovereign immunity require
that the term “attorney fees” be narrowly
construed to exclude paralegal expenses ........ 36
Il. The EAJA compensates “other expenses” at
the cost to the attorney, not at market rates

SE L.davicucdkcasGheadbdneieische ................. 16

Paralegal Compensation Survey Shows Solid
Increases (May 22, 2007) .

The data similarly show that billing rates for paralegal time have
increased in 2007 to a national median of $160 per hour. At the median
hours billed per paralegal in 2006 (1490 hours), a single paralegal would
generate $238,400 in law firm revenue at this rate, far outstripping the
$59,973 in median total cash compensation paid to paralegals nation-
wide. See Altman Weil, Inc., Paralegal Compensation Survey Shows
Solid Increases (May 22, 2007) ; ef. Richard L. Abel, American Lawyers 198 (1989)

17

This Court recently relied upon a similar statutory
anomaly in rejecting the argument that expert fees were
recoverable under the attorney’s fees provision of the
Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), 20
U.S.C. 1400 et seq. The IDEA “contains detailed provi-
sions that are designed to ensure that [‘attorney’s fees’ |
awards are indeed reasonable,” but contains no similar
provisions geared to regulating the amount of fees for
experts. See Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v.
Murphy, 126 S. Ct. 2455, 2460 (2006) (Arlington) (citing
20 U.S.C. 1415(i)(8)(C)-(G)). Given Congress’s attention
to regulating the appropriate amount of attorney’s fees,
this Court concluded that the “absence of any compara-
ble provisions relating to expert fees strongly suggests
that recovery of expert fees is not authorized.” /bid.
The same reasoning applies here. Congress’s attention
to establishing a cap on “attorney fees” in the EAJA
based upon a maximum rate that is obviously geared to
the billing rates for attorneys and the absence of an
analogous cap specifically geared to paralegal rates
“strongly suggests” that Congress did not intend para-
legal expenses to be compensated as an “attorney fee.”

The anomalous results produced under petitioner's
construction of “attorney fee” are reinforced by this
Court’s decision in Pierce v. Underwood, supra. There,
the Court explained that the EAJA’s fee cap suggests
Congress determined that the cap represented “gener-
ally quite enough public reimbursement for lawyers’
fees, whatever the local or national market might be.”
487 U.S. at 572. Given that assessment, the “need to
preserve the intended effectiveness of the [$125] cap”
led the Court to read narrowly the Act’s authorization to

(discussing data from 1984 to 1986 indicating that law firms billed
paralegal time at a rate two to four times the cost of a paralegal).

18

exceed the cap when the “limited availability of qualified
attorneys or agents for the proceedings involved” justi-
fies a higher fee, 28 U.S.C. 2412(d)(2)(A)(ii). See Under-
wood, 487 U.S. at 572-573; ef. 5 U.S.C. 504(b)(1)(A)(ii).
The Court thus held that “attorneys ‘qualified for the
proceedings’” did not permit an increase based on an
attorney’s “extraordinary leve! of the general lawyerly
knowledge and ability useful in all litigation” and was
limited to contexts where attorneys were qualified in
some “specialized sense” with “distinctive knowledge or
specialized skill needed for the litigation in question.”
Id. at 572. Given that an attorney with an “extraordi-
nary level of the general lawyerly knowledge and abil-
ity” can be reimbursed at a rate no greater than the
Act’s fee cap, it would be particularly incongruous to
interpret “attorney fees” as including paralegal ex-
penses that may be reimbursed at 2 rate up to the very
same cap.

Moreover, as the court of appeals explained (Pet.
App. 18a), to the extent that litigation against the gov-
ernment is influenced by the availability of EAJA fees,
allowing paralegal expenses to be recovered as “attor-
ney fees”—without a meaningful cap like the statute
sets for the fees of attorneys—would “create a perverse
incentive.” In particular, it could cause attorneys—
whose fees are capped at $125—to shift work to para-
legals—whose charges are generally lower and effec-
tively uncapped. As the court of appeals explained,
“treating paralegal fees as attorney’s fees would [thus]
distort the normal allocation of work and result in a less
efficient performance of legal services.” /bid. Treating
paralegal expenses as “other expenses” recoverable at
cost eliminates that “perverse incentive.”

19

3. In arguing that paralegal expenses are “attorney
fees” under the EAJA, petitioner principally relies not
on the statute’s text, but instead on this Court’s inter-
pretation of a different statute in Missowri v. Jenkins,
491 U.S. 274 (1989). Pet. Br. 14-24. Jenkins involved a
distinct statutory scheme reflecting materially different
statutory text with a different structure, purpose, and
history. Those differences illustrate Congress’s intent
to treat the reimbursement of paralegal expenses differ-
ently in the EAJA, and demonstrate that Jenkins’ rea-
soning and result should not be extended to this case.

a. The Court in Jenkins interpreted the Civil Rights
Attorney’s Fees Awards Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. 1988,
which authorizes courts to award prevailing parties in
certain civil rights actions a “reasonable attorney’s fee
as part of the costs.” 42 U.S.C. 1988(b). Just two years
earlier, the Court had concluded that Congress “com-
prehensively addressed” the “kinds of expenses that a
federal court may tax as costs” under Fed. R. Civ. P.
54(d) by restricting the meaning of “costs” to the six
types of costs listed in 28 U.S.C. 1920. Crawford Fitting
Co. v. J.T. Gibbons, Inc., 482 U.S. 437, 440-442 (1987);
see West Va. Univ. Hosps., Inc. v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83, 87
& n.3 (1991) (Crawford Fitting’s reasoning applies to
“costs” under 42 U.S.C. 1988). Jenkins accordingly ad-
dressed the meaning of a “reasonable attorney’s fee” in
Section 1988 against a backdrop in which paralegal ser-
vices were not recoverable “costs” and could be recov-
ered under Section 1988, if at all, only as attorney’s fees.
The Court held that they could be recovered as such
fees. See Jenkins, 491 U.S. at 285.

Thus, in Jenkins, the only statutory hook for award-
ing paralegal expenses was a provision for “attorney’s
fees,” so the choice was to reimburse paralegal expenses

20

as “attorney’s fees,” or nothing. In this context, the
Court concluded that the phrase “reasonable attorney’s
fee” could not have been meant by Congress “to compen-
sate only work performed personally by members of the
bar” and, instead, must have been intended to “refer to
a reasonable fee for the work product of an attorney.”
Jenkins, 491 U.S. at 285. The Court explained that the
term therefore must include “the work not only of attor-
neys, but also of secretaries, messengers, librarians,
janitors, and others whose labor contributes to the work
product for which an attorney bills her client,” including
“the work of paralegals.” /bid.

Jenkins then addressed the appropriate method of
valuing the work of paralegals, guided largely by the
Court’s prior recognition that Section 1988 grants “the
successful civil rights plaintiff a ‘fully compensatory
fee.’” 491 U.S. at 286 (quoting Hensley v. Eckerhart,
461 U.S. 424, 435 (1983)). That requirement to “yield
the same level of compensation that would be available
from the market” led the Court to conclude that para-
legal expenses must be reimbursed under Section 1988
in the same manner that such expenses are billed to cli-
ents in the relevant legal market at prevailing market
rates. Jd. at 286-287. Otherwise, “if the prevailing prac-
tice in the community were to bill paralegal time sepa-
rately at market rates, fees awarded to the attorney at
market rates for attorney time would not be fully com-
pensatory if the court refused to compensate hours
billed by paralegals or did so only at ‘cost.’” Jd. at 287.

b. While petitioner contends (Br. 15-16) that
Jenkins’ holding that paralegal expenses are an element
of a “reasonable attorney’s fee” under Section 1988 “ap-
plies with full force to EAJA,” the reasoning underlying
Jenkins’ holding demonstrates the opposite to be true.

2]

First, the presence of additional statutory language
in the EAJA shows that the Act’s use of the term “attor-
ney fees” is more limited than that of its textual counter-
part (“attorney’s fees”) in Section 1988. Section 1988
authorizes awards of “attorney’s fees” as part of the
“costs,” but because the word “costs” is a recognized
term of art that consists of the items listed in 28 U.S.C.
1920, see Casey, 499 U.S. at 87 & n.3, “attorney’s fees”
is the only term in Section 1988 that might authorize
compensation for expenses associated with preparing a
client’s case. Cf. Arlington, 126 S. Ct. at 2460. Jenkins
thus concluded that “attorney’s fees” under that statute
must take into account the “work not only of attorneys”
but also the expense of those “whose labor contributes
to the work product for which an attorney bills her cli-
ent” (including paralegals) and “other expenses and
profit.” 491 U.S. at 285 (emphasis added).

The EAJA, in contrast, expressly authorizes the re-
imbursement of “[attorney] fees and other expenses,”
5 U.S.C. 504(a)(1) and (b)(1)(A) (emphasis added),
thereby separating into two distinct components what
Section 1988 combines in the single term of “attorney’s
fees.” These other “expenses” include items that would
not be recoverable as traditional “costs.” Thus, the exis-
tence of the category of “other expenses” must inform
the meaning of “attorney fees.” If the term “attorney
fees” in the EAJA were given the same broad interpre-
tation as its Section 1988 counterpart, that interpreta-
tion would improperly strip meaning from (and perhaps
even render superfluous) Congress’s express provision
for “other expenses” under the Act.

Petitioner is wrong in arguing that this Court’s inter-
pretation in Jenkins that paralegal expenses are “attor-
ney’s fees” means that paralegal expenses must always

22

qualify as “attorney’s fees.” Of course, paralegal ex-
penses would not qualify as “attorney’s fees” in a statute
that separately addressed “paralegal expenses” as such.
And here, paralegal expenses do not qualify as “attorney
fees” because the EAJA—unlike Section 1988—provides
for reimbursement of a second category of “other ex-
penses” that is naturally read to encompass paralegal
expenses. Nothing in Jenkins precludes that construc-
tion.

Moreover, unlike Section 1988, the text of the EAJA
provides that “the amount of fees”—not other non-fee
expenses—are to be determined based on “prevailing
market rates,” 5 U.S.C. 504(b)(1)(A); establishes a cap
on the rate at which “attorney fees” may be reimbursed;
provides an exception from that ceiling on “attorney
fees” based on factors addressing attorneys, not para-
legals; and requires those categories of professionals
(attorneys, agents, and experts) whose fees are to be
reimbursed to submit itemized time. See 5 U.S.C.
504(a)(2) (requiring itemized statements of fees and ex-
penses from “any attorney, agent, or expert witness”
representing or appearing on behalf the fee applicant);
5 U.S.C. 504(b)(1)(A)(ii) (authorizing exception to fee
cap based on “limited availability of qualified attor-
neys”); see also H.R. Rep. No. 1418, supra, at 15 (“The
ceiling on attorney fees relates only to the compensation
of lawyers and agents (e.g., accountants themselves).”)
(emphasis added). It would be inconsistent with these
limiting aspects of the EAJA to compensate “other ex-
penses” for the work of paralegals using prevailing mar-
ket rates rather than cost since Congress expressly re-
served such treatment for the “amount of fees.” See
also S. Rep. No. 586, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 15 (1984)
(“paralegal time” is an expense reimbursed at “cost”

23

under the EAJA). Had Congress intended to treat
“other expenses” in the same manner, it presumably
would have enacted statutory text to that effect.

The EAJA’s fee cap further reflects a basic struc-
tural difference between the Act and Section 1988.
Whereas “Congress’s intent [was] to provide a ‘fully
compensatory fee’” to prevailing plaintiffs under Section
1988, Jenkins, 491 U.S. at 287, the EAJA is “fundamen-
tally” different because “it is not designed to reimburse
fees without limit” and, thus, often does not provide a
“fully compensat[ory]” award because prevailing market
rates for lawyers often exceed its $125-per-hour cap on
fees. See Underwood, 487 U.S. at 573 (emphasis
added).* The very existence of that cap, whose only
function is to limit “public reimbursement for lawyers’
fees” below prevailing market rates, id. at 572, illus-
trates a core distinction between the EAJA and fee-
shifting statutes similar to Section 1988. See id. at 573
(concluding that whether the contingent nature of an
attorney fee agreement may justify an increase in the
amount of a reasonable “attorney fee” was “quite differ-
ent” under the EAJA, which is a “fundamentally” differ-
ent “sort of statutory scheme” than statutes like Section
1988; distinguishing Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley
Citizens’ Council for Clean Air, 483 U.S. 711 (1987)
(Delaware Valley I1)); ef. Delaware Valley II, 483 U.S.
at 713 & n.1 (award of “reasonable attorney’s fee” under

* This is true even in cases, unlike the present case, where regula-
tions permit a cost-of-living adjustment to the EAJA’s $125-per-hour
ceiling. Assuming plaintiffs’ estimate (Br. 7) of an adjusted rate of
$168-per-hour to be correct, survey data indicate that the 2007 billing
rates of most attorneys far exceed that rate. See p. 16 n.7, supra (2007
median hourly rates nationwide for partners and associates were $305
and $200 and, in Washington, D.C., $455 and $295, respectively).

24

Clean Air Act “follow[s] the principles and case law”
developed under Section 1988).

c. The important statutory differences between the
EAJA and Section 1988 fatally undermine petitioner’s
argument that Jenkins’ interpretation of Section 1988
controls here. To be sure, this Court has often con-
strued similar text to have the same meaning in differ-
ent statutes and has applied that interpretive principle
to Section 1988 and “many other federal fee-shifting
statutes” which, like Section 1988, award prevailing par-
ties a reasonable attorney’s fee as part of costs. See,
e.g., City of Burlington v. Dague, 505 U.S. 557, 562
(1992); Independent Fed’n of Flight Attendants v. Zipes,
491 U.S. 754, 758 & n.2 (1989). However, the “presump-
tion that identical words * * * are intended to have the
same meaning” is “not rigid and readily yields’—even
when the same word is used in separate places within a
single statute—“whenever there is such variation in the
connection in which the words are used as reasonably to
warrant the conclusion that they were employed * * *
with different intent.” General Dynamics Land Sys.,
Inc. v. Cline, 540 U.S. 581, 595 (2004) (quoting Atlantic
Cleaners & Dyers, Inc. v. United States, 286 U.S. 427,
433 (1932)).

This Court in Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S. 517,
522-524 (1994), thus rejected the contention that its “de-
cisions construing similar fee-shifting language” in other
statutes controlled the proper interpretation of the
Copyright Act even though the Copyright Act’s fee-
shifting provision used “virtually identical language.”
Fogerty declined to extend to the copyright context the

* The Copyright Act authorizes courts to award “a reasonable at-
torney’s fee to the prevailing party as part of the costs” in civil actions
under the act. 17 U.S.C. 505.

25

holding in Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434
U.S. 412 (1978), that prevailing plaintiffs under Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S:C. 2000e et seq.,
should normally obtain an award of attorney’s fees but
prevailing defendants should not. While acknowledging
that “fee-shifting statutes’ similar language is a ‘strong
indication’ that they are to be interpreted alike,” the
Fogerty Court held that that “normal indication” did not
apply because Christiansburg’s reasoning relied on fac-
tors including policy considerations and Title VII’s legis-
lative history that did not apply to the Copyright Act.
510 U.S. at 523 (quoting Zipes, 491 U.S. at 758 n.2).”°
That conclusion applies with even greater force here.
As discussed, the pertinent text of the EAJA is not “vir-
tually identical” to Section 1988 and, instead, contains
material differences. In particular, the EAJA provides
another category of expenses—“other expenses”—that
are reimbursable, which is unavailable under the statute
at issue in Jenkins. Additionally, the broader context of
the EAJA’s attorney fees provisions illustrates that fee
awards under the Act, unlike Section 1988 and similar
statutes, are not driven by a policy of full compensation.
See pp. 14-16, 23, supra. Petitioner’s narrow focus on
the use of the term “attorney fees” in both the EAJA

Petitioner incorrectly suggests (Br. 19) that Sullivan v. Hudson,
490 U.S. 877 (1989), construed the EAJA’s use of the term “civil action”
based on the principle that similar terms in fee-shifting statutes are to
be construed alike. Hudson nowhere invoked or relied upon that
interpretive canon. Instead, the Court reviewed the reasoning in its
prior decisions that addressed whether other fee-shifting statutes
allowed a court to award attorney fees for administrative proceedings
that were related to the action before the court. and concluded that the
“principles we found persuasive” in those prior decisions also “were
controlling here.” /d. at 888-889, 892; cf. generally Shalala v. Schaefer,
509 U.S. 292, 298-300 & n.4 (1993) (limiting scope of Hudson’s holding).

26

and Section 1988 thus fails to account for the well-estab-
lished rule that.a statute’s use of such terms must be
interpreted not only by reference to the terms’ specific
text but also by “the specific context in which that lan-
guage is used, and the broader context of the statute as
a whole.” Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 341
(1997)."

B. The Legislative History And Purpose Of The EAJA Con-
firms Congress’s Intent To Reimburse Paralegal Time
At Cost As An Out-Of-Pocket Expense

The legislative history of the EAJA confirms that
paralegal expenses are not a category of “attorney fees”
reimbursed at prevailing market rates but rather are
a type of “other expenses” to be reimbursed only at the
out-of-pocket cost to attorneys. Congress expressed
its understanding in 1980 that “attorney fees” was lim-
ited to compensation for an attorney’s time alone and,
when Congress revisited the EAJA in 1984 to reenact
the statute, it clarified not only that the EAJA reim-
bursed reasonable out-of-pocket expenses incurred by
attorneys but also that “paralegal time” should be
“billed at cost” as such an expense. To the extent the

" Petitioner's reliance (Br. 23-24) on Casey is unavailing. Casey
simply discussed this Court’s decision in Jenkins; it did not a. or the
meaning of that decision and therefore provides no basis for disregard-
ing the considerations discussed above as to why Jenkins is not
controlling. See Casey, 490 U.S. at 99-100. More fundamentally, Casey
indicates that this Court has not been willing to read the phrase
“attorney’s fees” broadly to sweep in non-“attorney” fees where, as
here, there are textual indications that Congress intended to treat
“separate elements of litigation cost” (id. at 88) separately when it
comes to awarding litigation fees and expenses. Likewise, the Court
cautioned against a reading of fee-shifting statutes (including the
EAJA) that would deprive meaning from the full statutory text of those
provisions. See id. at 89, 91.

27

Court determines it useful to consult the legislative his-
tory, that should end the matter. Cf. Arlington, 126
S. Ct. at 2466 (Breyer, J., dissenting).

1. a. The EAJA’s authorization to award “attorney
fees” subject to a statutory ceiling resulted from a com-
promise entered to facilitate the Act’s passage by limit-
ing the size of awards and, hence, the Act’s impact on
the federal fisc. Initial efforts to enact the EAJA were
derailed in the 95th Congress because of concerns re-
garding the Act’s “high projected costs to the United
States.” H.R. Rep. No. 1418, supra, at 6. Those con-
cerns persisted and led to a compromise in the 96th Con-
gress limiting the scope of recovery. In the Senate, pro-
ponents of a broader bill to reimburse attorney fees
more fully initially succeeded in amending the Senate
bill to eliminate the $75 per hour “attorney fee” cap, but
the cap was later restored by the Judiciary Committee
before that bill passed the Senate. See S. Rep. No. 253,
supra, at 8.

The Chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee
explained that the bill’s $75 attorney fee cap did not
“make the taxpayer whole” and, while he would have
preferred authorizing more generous awards, the bill
reflected a necessary “compromise|[]” made in the “pro-
cess of attempting to grind out legislation.” See Award
of Attorneys’ Fees Against the Federal Government:
Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liber-
ties and the Admin. of Justice of the House Comm. on
the Judiciary, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 32 (1980) (statement
of Sen. DeConcini). That compromise “tried to strike
some common ground” recognizing that “attorneys’ fees
per hour vary immensely” by locality and that the “go-
ing rate” for attorneys in large cities was $75 per hour
“or more.” Jbid.; see also ibid. (statement of Rep.

28

Kastenmeier) (bill appears to “strike a balance” and to
be an “accommodation to the feelings of the Government
* * * as to cost” to facilitate “passing the bill”); id. a:
33 (statement of Rep. Railsback) (bill “represent[s] a
compromise”).

The 1980 House Report on the Senate bill, which was
enacted as the EAJA, accordingly explained that the $75
“ceiling on attorney fees relates only to the compensa-
tion of lawyers or agents (e.g., accountants themselves)”
and does not apply to the “costs connected with their
representation of a particular interest in a proceeding.”
H.R. Rep. No. 1418, supra, at 15 (emphasis added); cf.
H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 1434, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 22 (1980)
(EAJA’s text is identical to bill reported by House).
That understanding of “attorney fees” and the associ-
ated cap on reimbursement for attorney time indicates
that expenses for items such as paralegal time, if reim-
bursable at all under the EAJA, would have been under-
stood by Congress not as “attorney fees” but as “other
expenses” similar to the reimbursable “cost of any
study, analysis,” or “project” “necessary for the prepa-
ration of the party’s case,” 5 U.S.C. 504(b)(1)(A).

In the three-year period between the Act’s October
1981 effective date and its October 1984 repeal, see
EAJA, Pub. L. 96-481, Tit. II, §§ 203(c), 204(c), 208, 94
Stat. 2327, 2329, 2330, a “controversy [arose] over
whether the definition of ‘fees and other expenses’ was
intended to be exclusive or whether, in addition to the
costs of studies and analyses [expressly included in that
definition], courts and agencies may award reasonable
out-of-pocket expenses incurred in connection with a
case.” S. Rep. No. 586, supra, at 15 (emphasis added).

Compare, e.g., Ashton v. Pierce, 580 F. Supp. 440, 443 & n.4(D.D.C.
1984) (“compensation for * * * paralegal time” is “an expense

29

The Senate Report addressing the EAJA’s reenactment
thus explained that, while the bill reenacting the Act
retained the original 1980 “language” of the definition,
the Report provided congressional “clarification” that
the definition permits reimbursement of such out-of-
pocket expenses. /bid.

Significantly for present purposes, the Report stated
that “[e]xamples of the type of expenses that should or-
dinarily be compensable include paralegal time (billed at
cost).” S. Rep. No. 586, supra, at 15 (emphasis added).
In doing so, the Report expressly endorsed (1) an inter-
pretation of the EAJA reflected in 1981 Model Rules
implementing the Act and (2) the result reached by the
Sixth Circuit concerning out-of-pocket expenses in the
Section 1988 context in Northcross v. Board of Educ. of
the Memphis City Schs., 611 F.2d 624, 639 (6th Cir.
1979), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 911 (1980), overruled in
relevant part by Missouri v. Jenkins, 491 U.S. 274, 285
n.7 (1989). See S. Rep. No. 586, supra, at 15. Both the
Model Rules and the Sixth Circuit specifically treated

covering ‘study’ and ‘analysis’ within the meaning of [the EAJA],”
which is “reimbursed at actual salary cost for time expended”), and
American Acad. of Pediatrics v. Heckler, 580 F . Supp. 436, 440 (D.D.C.
1984) (paralegal expenses “may be reimbursed at actual salary cost to
the law firm as an expense of litigation” under the EAJA; following
Ashton), vacated in part, 594 F. Supp. 69 (D.D.C. 1984) (vacating
different portion of EAJA award), with Glick v. United States Civil
Serv. Comm'n, 567 F. Supp. 1483, 1487 n.5 (N.D. Ill. 1983) (rejecting
claim for paralegal expenses because such expenses are “part of the
lawyer's overhead, covered by the lawyer's fee rate” under the EAJA,
which “should not be assessed against a defendant at a ‘profit making’
rate”), aff'd, 799 F.2d 753 (7th Cir. 1986) (Table), and Photo Data, Inc.
v. Sawyer, 533 F . Supp. 348,353 (D.D.C. 1982) (limiting reimbursement
of expenses to the “reasonable cost of any study, analysis, engineering
report, test, or project”) (quoting 28 U.S.C. 2412(d)(2)A)).

30

paralegal expenses as reimbursable at the out-of-pocket
cost to an attorney, not as part of an attorney fee.

b. Petitioner contends (Br. 24-28) that the Senate
Report’s statement that paralegal expenses are “billed
at cost” does not undermine petitioner’s view that such
expenses are “attorney fees” compensable at market
rates. That position rests on four contentions, each of
which is misplaced. First, petitioner states (Br. 25) that
“expenses” under the EAJA encompass “attorney fees”
and that the Report merely notes that paralegal costs
are “expenses.” But the statute clearly distinguishes
between things like studies and fees for attorneys,
agents, and experts. The Report specifically explains
that “out-of-pocket expenses” may be reimbursed like
“the cost of studies and analyses” and proceeds to iden-
tify “paralegal time” as one “such expense[]” reimburs-
able at “cost.” S. Rep. No. 586, supra, at 15 (emphasis
added).

Second, petitioner asserts (Br. 26) that the Report’s
approval of the result in Northcross aids petitioner’s
case because, in petitioner’s view, Northcross “held that
attorney fees for paralegal services should be awarded
at market rates,” not cost. That is incorrect. North-
cross concluded that paralegal expenses constitute “rea-
sonable out-of-pocket expenses incurred by the attor-
ney,” which therefore would be reimbursed under 42
U.S.C. 1988 at the attorney’s cost for such assistance.
See Northcross, 611 F.2d at 639. Indeed, in Jenkins,
this Court itself concluded that Northcross “considered
paralegal work ‘out-of-pocket expense,’ recoverable only
at cost to the attorney.” 491 U.S. at 285 n.7.

Third, petitioner argues (Br. 25-26) the Report’s reli-
ance on a Model Rule issued by the Chairman of the Ad-
ministrative Conference of the United States is inconclu-

31

sive because the Rule permits expenses to be billed sep-
arately from an attorney fee under the EAJA if such
expenses are ordinarily billed to clients. Cf. 46 Fed.
Reg. 32,900, 32,913 (1981) (Model Rule 0.106(b)). The
Rule’s preamble, however, explains that the Rule is
based on the understanding that an “attorney’s out-of-
pocket expenses ordinarily chargeable to clients” should
be reimbursed separately and in addition to the
“charges for the attorney’s time” that would be subject
to the EAJA’s (then) $75-per-hour ceiling on attorney
fees. Id. at 32,904-32,905 (citing H.R. Rep. No. 1418,
supra, at 15). The preamble accordingly explains that
“paralegal costs should be chargeable as expenses” in
that manner. /d. at 32,905. Indeed, the preamble high-
lights the out-of-pocket character of paralegal expenses
in stating that the Model Rule’s drafters decided against
listing paralegal time or other specific items as “com-
pensable expenses” because “practices with respect to
charging [clients} for paralegal time, as with respect to
other expenses such as duplicating, telephone charges,
and the like, vary” depending on locality and field of
practice. /bid.

Finally, petitioner claims (Br. 26-28) that the Senate
Report “is not ‘legislative history’ at all” because the bil!
it accompanied was vetoed by the President late in the
second session of the 98th Congress and the EAJA was
not reenacted until the next year in the following Con
gress. In at least two unanimous decisions, however.
this Court has cited the same report as accurately re-
flecting congressional intent underlying the EAJA's
reenactment in contexts where, as here, the post-veto
passage of the EAJA involved statutory language that
was not materially different from the text discussed in
the report. See, e.g., Melkonyan v. Sullivan, 501 U.S.

Te

32

89, 96 (1991) (citing Report as demonstrating that Con-
gress “explicitly” adopted and ratified one side of circuit
split concerning the meaning of “final judgment”); Com-
missioner, INS v. Jean, 496 U.S. 154, 159 & n.7 (1990)
(citing Report as reflecting Congress’s understanding of
the EAJA’s definiticn of “position of the United
States”). See also United States v. Enmons, 410 U.S.
396, 404-405 & n.14 (1973) (concluding that earlier legis-
lative history may be pertinent where it reflects an in-
terpretation of “the very language subsequently enacted
by Congress”).

In this case, the relevant statutory text of 5 U.S.C.
504(b)(1)(A) discussed in the 1984 Report is identical to
the statutory text reenacted by Congress in 1985. In
fact, the post-veto bill was merely a “revision” of the
legislation that the President vetoed in 1984 and, while
portions were changed to “address concerns which the
Administration raised in the President’s veto message,”
H.R. Rep. No. 120, 99th Cong., Ist Sess. 6 (1985), the bill
at issue in the 1984 Senate Report reflected the defini-
tion of “fees and other expenses” enacted as law in 1985.
Compare 5 U.S.C. 504(b)(1)(A) (1988), with S. Rep. No.
586, supra, at 1-2 (text of bill reported by 1984 Report),
and EAJA, Pub. L. No. 96-481, Tit. II, § 203(a)(1), 94
Stat. 2326 (original definition retained upon reenact-
ment).

To the extent petitioner suggests (Br. 21-22) that
Congress likely intended paralegal expenses to be a
form of “attorney fees” reimbursed at prevailing market
rates because Congress enacted the EAJA in 1980
against a “legal background” in which courts “generally”
awarded paralegal expenses at market-rates, petitioner
is incorrect. Before 1980, the few precedential decisions
addressing the reimbursement of paralegal expenses

33

under other federal fee-shifting statutes had produced
decidedly uneven results."* More to the point, the Sen-
ate Report’s ratification of the outcome in Northcross—
in which the court held that paralegal expenses were
recoverable at cost—cuts decidedly against petitioner’s
position."

In short, to the extent there is any doubt from the
EAJA’s statutory text, the Act’s legislative history
strongly confirms that the Act reimburses “paralegal
time” as an “out-of-pocket expense[],” not an attorney
fee, and compensates that expense at “cost,” S. Rep. No.
586, supra, at 15, in the same manner that the Act
reimburses “other [non-fee] expenses” such as the
“cost of any study, analysis,” or “project * * * neces-

'’ Compare Northcross, 611 F.2d at 639, and Lamphere v. Brown
Univ., 610 F.2d 46, 48 & n.3 (1st Cir. 1979) (paralegal expense reim-
bursed at amount paid by attorney under Title VII when paralegals
were not regularly employed by the attorney), with Todd Shipyards
Corp. v. Director, OWCP, 545 F.2d 1176, 1182 (9th Cir. 1976) (interpret-
ing 33 U.S.C. 928).

'* Not only does petitioner misread Northcross, as discussed earlier,
petitioner’s description of the “legal background” in 1980 overreads
other decisions. See, e.g., Francia v. White, 594 F.2d 778, 781-782 (10th
Cir. 1979) (holding that award totaling $400 for legal services was abuse
of discretion where record showed expenditure of 133.75 hours of
attorney and paralegal time; remanding for recalculation of award
without addressing how to compensate paralegal expenses); cf. Jones
v. Armstrong Cork Co., 630 F.2d 324, 325 n.1 (5th Cir. 1980) (noting that
district courts had taken various positions concerning paralegal
expenses). Perhaps because of the “increasingly widespread custom of
separately billing for the services of paralegals” observed in the 1980s,
courts of appeals appear to have more frequently addressed the
question of reimbursing paralegal charges (in non-EA.JA contexts) after
the EAJA’s enactment. See Jenkins, 491 U.S. at 284 & n.7, 286 (citation
omitted) (noting circuit split under 42 U.S.C. 1988 based on Northcross
and cases decided after Northcross).

34

sary for the preparation of the party’s case,” 5 U.S.C.
504(b)(1)(A).

2. Petitioner suggests (Br. 34) that limiting reim-
bursement of paralegal expenses to cost as an “other
expense” would contravene the “central purpose of
EAJA” to eliminate financial disincentives to litigation
against the government. But the caps that Congress
enacted in the EAJA for attorney fees, among other pro-
visions, underscore that Congress did not pursue such a
purpose at all costs, and petitioner simply fails to ac-
count for the compromises that Congress struck to enact
the legislation.’ More generally, petitioner ignores the
fact that “no legislation pursues its purposes at all costs”
and that “[dJjeciding what competing values will or will
not be sacrificed to the achievement of a particular ob-
jective is the very essence of legislative choice.” Rodri-
guez v. United States, 480 U.S. 522, 525-526 (1987) (per
curiam) (“(I)t frustrates rather than effectuates legisla-
tive intent simplistically to assume that whatever fur-
thers the statute's primary objective must be the law.”).
Indeed, this Court’s decision in Underwood, which con-
strued the EAJA’s attorney fee previsions narrowly in
order to “preserve the intended effectiveness” of the
EAJA’s ceiling on the reimbursement of attorney fees,
illustrates that the Act’s general goals cannot form a
proper basis for determining the amount of reimburse-

* Petitioner cites to language in Jean, 496 U.S. at 163, suggesting
that the EAJA was intended to “eliminate” not just diminish the fi-
nancial disincentive to challenge certain governmental actions. Jean,
however, only addresses the “narrow” question of eligibility for an
EAJA award “rather than the amount that may be appropriately
awarded,” and nothing in Jean suggests that EAJA awards should fully
compensate litigants. See id. at 156, 163.

35

ment awarded under the EAJA. See Underwood, 487
U.S. at 572-573.

Petitioner contends that the EAJA should be con-
strued to reimburse paralegal costs at market rates
rather than cost because doing so would encourage para-
legal use at lower rates and, thus, encourage the “cost-
effective delivery of legal services.” Br. 28-29 (quoting
Jenkins, 491 U.S. at 288). There are two problems with
this argument in the EAJA context. First, because the
“EAJA subsidy is not directed to a category of litigation
that can be identified in advance,” a “lawyer will rarely
be able to assess with any degree of certainty the likeli-
hood that the Government’s position will be deemed so
unreasonable as to produce an EAJA award,” Under-
wood, 487 U.S. at 573-574, and it therefore may be un-
likely that the availability of fees will substantially influ-
ence litigation against the government. Cf. 5 U.S.C.
504(a)(1) (authorizing EAJA awards to prevailing par-
ties only where the government’s position is not “sub-
stantially justified”). Second, to the extent that such
litigation zs influenced by the availability of EAJA fees,
petitioner has it wrong. As the court of appeals ex-
plained, treating paralegal fees as attorney fees could
“distort the normal allocation of work and result in a
less efficient performance of legal services” under the
EAJA, because of the fact that the Act’s cap is set gen-
erally to attorney rates (not paralegal expenses) and
paralegal rates are much lower than those of attorneys.
Pet. App. 18a. The inefficient delegation of attorney
tasks to paralegals could, at the very least, increase the
time it takes to complete such tasks, thereby increasing
the overall size of EAJA awards in a manner contrary to
Congress’s intent to limit awards under the EAJA’s fee
caps.

36

C. Principles Of Sovereign Immunity Require That The
Term “Attorney Fees” Be Narrowly Construed To Ex-
clude Paralegal Expenses

Because the EAJA’s statutory text, structure, and
relevant background confirm that paralegal expenses
are not “attorney fees” reimbursed at prevailing market
rates, this Court need not invoke sovereign immunity
principles to resolve this case. However, if the Act’s text
were ambiguous on this point, those principles would
require that the Act’s award of “attorney fees” be con-
strued narrowly to exclude paralegal time.

It is well settled that waivers of sovereign immunity
“cannot be implied but must be unequivocally ex-
pressed.” United States v. Mitchell, 445 U.S. 535, 538
(1980) (quoting United States v. King, 395 U.S. 1, 4
(1969)). Statutory text waiving that immunity must be
“specific and express,” King, 395 U.S. at 4, and not en-
larged beyond what the language plainly requires.
United States v. Nordic Vill., Inc., 503 U.S. 30, 34
(1992); see Lane v. Pena, 518 U.S. 187, 191-192 (1996).
A statutory waiver therefore “must be ‘construed
strictly in favor of the sovereign,’” Nordic Vill., 503
US. at 34 (citation omitted), by interpreting “ambigu-
ities in favor of immunity.” United States v. Williams,
514 U.S. 527, 531 (1995). Even when Congress has
waived sovereign immunity, that waiver itself must be
“strictly construed, in terms of its scope, in favor of the
sovereign.” Department of the Army v. Blue Fox, Inc.,
525 U.S. 255, 261 (1999) (citing Lane v. Pena, supra, and
Library of Cong. v. Shaw, 478 U.S. 310 (1986)).

Nothing in the EAJA’s text clearly and unambigu-
ously requires that “attorney fees” be construed to in-
clude paralegal expenses. The statutory text does not
directly address the work of paralegals and, even in less

37

complex statutory fee-shifting regimes such as Section
1988, this Court has suggested that the term “attorney’s
fees” standing alone is “genuinely ambiguous” with re-
spect to whether it includes paralegal costs. See Casey,
499 U.S. at 100; pp. 12-13, supra. Moreover, as noted,
the Act contains provisions that are distinct from and
more detailed than the average fee-shifting statute, and
those unique provisions indicate that “attorney fees” in
the EAJA context are limited to compensation for time
worked by attorneys alone. See pp. 13-18, supra. Those
provisions defining the amount of fees that may be
awarded and the EAJA’s broader authorization to award
non-fee “other expenses” thus indicate that paralegal
costs are best understood as “other expenses,” not as
“attorney fees.” Even assuming that this interpretation
were not compelled as a textual matter, the statute’s
silence regarding paralegal expenses at the very least
reflects ambiguity regarding whether such costs are
“attorney fees,” which are reimbursed at prevailing
market rates, or “other expenses” necessary for the
preparation of a party’s case, which are reimbursed at
cost. Cf. Barnhart v. Walton, 535 U.S. 212, 218 (2002)
(Where a “statutory provision says nothing explicitly
about” an issue, “such silence * * * normally creates
ambiguity.”).

“Attorney fee” should thus be construed narrowly to
exclude paralegal expenses in light of any such ambigu-
ity. See Ardestani v. INS, 502 U.S. 129, 137-138 (1991)
_ (applying strict construction to the EAJA’s use of “ad-
versary adjudication” and rejecting view that “broad
purposes” of the EAJA can be invoked to overcome
strict construction); Ruckelshaus v. Sierra Club, 463
U.S. 680, 685-686 (1983) (strictly construing the term
“appropriate” in fee-shifting statute waiving sovereign

38

immunity from fee award); see also United States De-
partment of Energy v. Ohio, 503 U.S. 607, 626-627 (1992)
(construing statutory authorization to impose monetary
“sanctions” imposed as “civil penalties” against govern-
ment as excluding punitive penalties notwithstanding
Congress’s use of “a seemingly expansive phrase like
‘civil penalties arising under federal law’” and “unre-
solved tension” in the statutory scheme suggesting that
punitive sanctions may have been intended by Con-
gress). Application of sovereign immunity principles to
limit the recovery of paralegal expenses to actual costs
is particularly appropriate for two additional reasons.
First, the concerns about protecting the public fisc that
animate the strict construction rule are not just an ab-
straction in the EAJA context. Congress in enacting
and amending the EAJA specifically recognized the
need to limit the burden on the public fisc. It is quite
unrealistic to think Congress would have sub silentio
vastly increased the government’s exposure to charges
for paralegals above and beyond actual cost. Second,
application of the principles here will not leave peti-
tioner without a remedy or render paralegal expenses
unrecoverable. As discussed, Congress authorized
EAJA awards not only for “attorney fees” but also for
“other expenses” necessary for the preparation of a
party’s case, and paralegal expenses qualify as such
“other expenses.” Accordingly, this case (unlike Jen-
kins) concerns only the extent to which paralegal time is
reimbursed by the EAJA, not whether they are reim-
bursed at all.

39

Il. THE EAJA COMPENSATES “OTHER EXPENSES” AT
THE COST TO THE ATTORNEY, NOT AT MARKET
RATES CHARGED TO CLIENTS.

Petitioner argues in the alternative (Br. 36-43) that,
even if payments for paralegal time constitute “other
expenses” rather than “attorney fees,” the EAJA com-
pensates “other expenses” at market rates paid by the
client, not at the cost to the lawyer. That issue is not
fairly included in the question presented on which this
Court granted certiorari, was not pressed or passed
upon below, and, thus, is not properly before this Court.
See Yee v. City of Escondido, 503 U.S. 519, 535, 537
(1992) (questions “related” and “complementary” to
question presented are not “fairly included therein”);
S. Ct. R. 14.1(a); see also Caspari v. Bohlen, 510 U.S.
383, 388-389 (1994)."° However, even assuming the issue

'© The question presented asked whether a prevailing party under the
EAJA may “be awarded attorney fees for paralegal services at the mar-
ket rate for such services, as four circuits have held, or does EAJA
limit reimbursement for paralegal services to cost only, as the Federal
Circuit panel majority below held.” Pet. i (emphases added). The
petition stated that the four circuit decisions referenced in its question
presented included “the Eleventh Circuit's * * * [holding] that EAJA
authorizes recovery of market-rate attorney fees for paralegal services”
and decisions from three other circuits that “refer|ed] to compensation
for paralegal services as ‘fees’” and thus “presumably rellied] on the
part of EAJA that ties the proper method of calculating ‘fees’ to ‘mar-
ket rates.’” Pet. 7-9 (emphases added). Those four rulings, the petition
argued, were “directly at odds with the Federal Circuit’s basic holding
that paralegal services are cost-based ‘expenses,’ not ‘fees.’” Pet. 9.
Accordingly, the petition sought certiorari based on that purported
conflict and a purported conflict with this Court’s decision in Jenkins,
which held that paralegal costs were “attorney’s fees” under 42 U.S.C.
1988. Pet. 13-22. Fairly read, the question presented thus asked this
Court to review only whether paralegal costs were “attorney fees”
reimbursed at market rates under one line of authority or, instead,

40

were properly presented, petitioner’s argument is un-
availing.

As noted, the EAJA both distinguishes between
“fees” and “other expenses” and specifically provides
that the “amount of fees” that may be reimbursed “shall
be based upon prevailing market rates for the kind and
quality of the services furnished.” 5 U.S.C. 504(b)(1)(A)
(emphasis added); see pp. 11-14, supra. Congress’s spe-
cific choice to measure “fees” by market rates while pro-
viding no similar provision for “other expenses” strongly
indicates Congress’s intent to reimburse only the ex-
pense of such non-fee items, 7.¢., only their cost. Indeed,
in specifically identifying as other expenses the “reason-
able cost of any study [or] analysis * * * necessary
for the preparation of the party’s case,” 5 U.S.C.
504(b)(1)(A) (emphasis added), Congress manifested its
intent that non-fee “other expenses” be reimbursed at
“cost.” Not only does the interpretive principle of
ejusdem generis support this conclusion, the strict con-
struction owed to waivers of sovereign immunity re-
quires that “other expenses” be taken no further than

were other “expenses” reimbursed by cost under the decision below,
not whether such costs were other “expenses” that should be reim-
bursed at market rates.

In addition, petitioner never argued below that, if paralegal costs
were not “attorney fees,” they should nevertheless be compensated as
an “expense” at market rates. See, e.g., Pet. C.A. Reply Br. 5 (arguing
that “paralegal time billed at cost is an expense of the attorney” but
“paralegal time billed as fees at billing rates are not ‘expenses’ of the
attorney and may be allowed as fees”); id. at 6 (concluding that
“paralegal services should have been awarded as fees”). Petitioner’s
failure to make this argument below—and the related lack of any op-
portunity for the court of appeals to consider and pass upon the argu-
ment—s itself a persuasive reason for this Court not to address it. See
Sereboff v. Mid Atl. Med. Servs., Inc., 126 S. Ct. 1869, 1877 n.2 (2006).

41

the reimbursement of “cost” reflected in the statutory
text.

Moreover, compensating paralegal services at mar-
ket rates would be inconsistent with the statutory ceil-
ing that Congress placed on the amount of attorney and
other professional “fees” that may be reimbursed under
the EAJA. While Congress clearly authorized further
compensation (i.e., “other expenses”) beyond “fees” to
cover the reasonable cost of items or services necessary
for such professionals to prepare a case, there is no evi-
dence that Congress intended to reimburse parties for
any additional profit collected by attorneys that may be
imbedded in the market rates tied to any “other ex-
penses” billed to their clients. Such a reading would
improperly undermine the “need to preserve the in-
tended effectiveness of the [$125] cap,” Underwood, 487
U.S. at 573, that plays a critical role in the Act’s fee re-
imbursement.

Nor is petitioner correct in asserting (Br. 39) that
courts have adopted a “market rate” approach to com-
pensating “other expenses.” While courts have re

While petitioner argues (Br. 37-38) that the court of appeals
improperly distinguished between “fees” and “expenses” because fees
are a type of “expense” under the EAJA, petitioner’s contention seizes
on semantics not substance. The Act clearly distinguishes between
“fees” and “other [non-fee] expenses” and, while the court of appeals
did not retain the word “other” in its discussion of that distinction, a fair
reading of the court’s decision in context makes plain that its use of the
term “expenses” refers to “other expenses” that do not qualify as
“fees.” See, e.g., Pet. App. 4a, 15a.

* While petitioner states (Br. 39) that courts “regularly” approve
expenses such as “transportation and other travel costs, postage, [and]
long[-}distance telephone charges,” the courts of appeals have divided
over whether such charges are properly reimbursable under the EAJA.
Compare Aston v. Secretary of HHS, 808 F.2d 9, 12 (2d Cir. 1986)

42

quired that expenses be of a type that are normally
billed separately to clients in order to be reimbursable
under the EAJA, see, e.g., International Woodworkers
of Am. v. Donovan, 792 F.2d 762, 767 (9th Cir. 1986),
that requirement simply ensures that the expenses are
not general overhead costs that are already accounted
for (in addition to profit) in the prevailing market rates
for attorney fees. Cf. Jenkins, 491 U.S. at 287 n.8 (not-
ing that both “costs and profit margin” are imbedded in
amount of attorney’s fees billed to clients). Requiring
that such “other expenses” be of a type normally billed
to clients not only prevents over-reimbursing expenses,
it ensures that the profit margin in an attorney’s hourly
rate is not improperly extended beyond that contem-
plated by the EAJA’s attorney fee caps.

Petitioner’s distinction between expenses directly
paid by attorneys to third-party vendors and those paid
for similar products produced by a firm in-house does
not withstand scrutiny. While petitioner asserts (Br. 39)
that “other expenses” should be paid at “market rates—
that is, at the rate that the client is willing to pay in the
relevant market”—that reasoning would permit reim-
bursement for charges beyond those paid by attorneys
to third-party vendors if the practice in the relevant
legal market was to bill clients for the actual cost paid
by the firm plus a firm overhead charge. Petitioner’s
approach would likewise permit reimbursement of items
such as in-house photocopying at rates that would in-

(travel, postage, and telephone costs are reimbursable), and /nterna-
tional Woodworkers of Am. v. Donovan, 792 F 2d 762, 767 (9th Cir.
1986) (travel, air courier, postage, and telephone costs reimbursable),
with Precision Concrete v. NLRB, 362 F.3d 847, 854 (D.C. Cir. 2004)
(travel, taxis, courier and overnight delivery, facsimile and telephone
costs are not reimbursable).

43

clude profit margin in addition to cost. Nothing in the
EAJA’s text or history suggests Congress intended any
distinction between “other expenses” resulting from in-
house or external purchases or that such expenses
should be compensated at a profit-making rate for attor-
neys.

Petitioner’s final suggestion (Br. 40-42) that calculat-
ing the cost of paralegal services poses practical prob-
lems is overstated. Attorney’s fees calculations often
involve litigation over amounts of fees or costs included
in attorney’s fee requests, including when it comes to
determining the prevailing market rate. There is no
reason to believe that reasonable valuations of costs at-
tributable to paralegal expenses will prove inherently
more difficult, much less elusive."

Much of the difficulty that petitioner and its amici
suggest may be associated with calculating paralegal
costs stems from the degree of precision that they as-
sume is required to document such costs. Such preci-
sion, however, is artificial in the attorney-fee context
where reasonable approximations are generally ac-
cepted. Courts routinely estimate “reasonable” costs,

The two post-Richlin cases that petitioner cites do not suggest
otherwise. The prevailing party in one case requested a $35 hourly rate
based on the rate derived in this suit. That request was granted with-
out government opposition, and nothing in the court’s decision suggests
that the rate was insufficient. See Former Employees of BMC Soft-
ware, Inc. v. United States Sec’y of Labor, No. 04-00229, 2007 WL
4181696, at *3 & n.1 (Ct. Int'l Trade Nov. 28, 2007). The prevailing
party in the second case withdrew its request for paralegal expenses
rather than document the relevant paralegal costs, and the court’s
decision does not reflect the reason for that withdrawal. /nformation
Scis. Corp. v. United States, 78 Fed. Cl. 673 (2007). A law firm may
decline to disclose the cost it pays for its paralegals for any number of
reasons independent from the inability to determine that cost.

pen - - - —= — — re" - a sro aoe a

44

market rates, and the time “reasonably” expended on
litigation. Attorneys similarly routinely record and bill
their time in estimated six- or fifteen-minute intervals.
There is no reason why attorneys cannot also provide a
reasonable approximation of the costs of paralegal ser-
vices based on documentation of such costs.

CONCLUSION

The judgment of the court of appeals should be af-
firmed.

Respectfully submitted.

PAUL D. CLEMENT
Solicitor General

JEFFREY S. BUCHOLTZ

Acting Assistant Attorney
General
GREGORY G. GARRE
Deputy Solicitor General
ANTHONY A. YANG
Assistant to the Solicitor
General
JEANNE E. DAVIDSON
REGINALD T. BLADES, JR.
MICHAEL JAY SINGER
MICHAEL E. ROBINSON
Attorneys

FEBRUARY 2008

APPENDIX

APPENDIX

1. 5 U.S.C. 504 provides in relevant part:
Costs and fees of parties

(a)(1) An agency that conducts an adversary adjud-
ication shall award, to a prevailing party other than the
United States, fees and other expenses incurred by that
party in connection with that proceeding, unless the ad-
judicative officer of the agency finds that the position of
the agency was substantially justified or that special cir-
cumstances make an award unjust. Whether or not the
position of the agency was substantially justified shall be
determined on the basis of the administrative record, as
a whole, which is made in the adversary adjudication for
which fees and other expenses are sought.

(2) A party seeking an award of fees and other ex-
penses shall, within thirty days of a final disposition in
the adversary adjudication, submit to the agency an ap-
plication which shows that the party is a prevailing par-
ty and is eligible to receive an award under this section,
and the amount sought, including an itemized statement
from any attorney, agent, or expert witness represen-
ting or appearing in behalf of the party stating the ac-
tual time expended and the rate at which fees and other
expenses were computed. The party shall also allege
that the position of the agency was not substantially jus-
tified. When the United States appeals the underlying
merits of an adversary adjudication, no decision on an
application for fees and other expenses in connection
with that adversary adjudication shall be made under
this section until a final and unreviewable decision is
rendered by the court on the appeal or until the under-

(la)

2a

lying merits of the case have been finally determined
pursuant to the appeal.

xs kk kK *
(b)(1) For the purposes of this section—

(A) “fees and other expenses” includes the rea-
sonable expenses of expert witnesses, the reasonable
cost of any study, analysis, engineering report, test,
or project which is found by the agency to be neces-
sary for the preparation of the party’s case, and rea-
sonable attorney or agent fees (The amount of fees
awarded under this section shall be based upon pre-
vailing market rates for the kind and quality of the
services furnished, except that (i) no expert witness
shall be compensated at a rate in excess of the high-
est rate of compensation for expert witnesses paid by
the agency involved, and (ii) attorney or agent fees
shall not be awarded in excess of $125 per hour un-
less the agency determines by regulation that an in-
crease in the cost of living or a special factor, such as
the limited availability of qualified attorneys or ag-
ents for the proceedings involved, justifies a higher
fee.);

x* * ke *

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385016_0363%3A07. Public record. Not legal advice.
