# Petitioners Brief — RICHLIN SEC. SERVICE CO. v. Chertoff

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Petitioners Brief
- **Published:** January 1, 2008
- **Citation:** 553 U.S. 571

## Text

S1433

No.06°1717 . StrestistueTts

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

RICHLIN SECURITY SERVICE COMPANY,

Petitioner,
Vv.
MICHAEL CHERTOFF,
SECRETARY OF HOMELAND SECURITY,
Respondent.

On Writ of Certiorari to the United
States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit

PETITIONER'S BRIEF

BRIAN WOLFMAN

(Counsel of Record)

ScoTT L. NELSON

PUBLIC CITIZEN LITIGATION
GROUP

1600 20th Street, NW
Washington, D.C. 20009
(202) 588-1000

January 2008 Counsel for Petitioner

QUESTION PRESENTED

Under the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA), 5
U.S.C. § 504(a)(1) and 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A), may
a prevailing party be awarded attorney fees for
paralegal services at the market rate for such services,
or does EAJA limit reimbursement for paralegal
services to cost only?

FT

TABLE OF CONTENTS
QUESTION PRESENTED .................... i
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ................-. iv
ec oc i nus So ekcvb eves aaeeen 1
ee ed Nes ieee as hk ww Ree 1
PE ETT EEED son cscsccvnscveceecese 1
STATEMENT OF THE CASE ................. 3
A. The Equal Access To Justice Act .......... 4
B. Proceedings On The Merits .............. 8
eb SE 2 cove we eee scckyetonw ay 8
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT ................. 11
EE ASL oa dod bade adnan 14

A. Paralegal Services Are Compensable At
Market Rates Under This Court’s Decision In
Missouri v. Jenkins And The Text And
rk camer ebeebeeos 14

B. EAJA’s Adjustable Rate Cap Provides No
Basis For Compensating Paralegal Services
DP do cGienad se 0ba saab anne oe can 28

il

C. Paralegal Services Are Not “Other Expenses”
Under EAJA, But Even If They Are, They
Should Be Awarded At The Cost To The Client
Not The Cost To The Lawyer. ........... 36

EE csi sconce ew aeeskecnwed 43

ES ob 6 bivids rinses weneeseueaeonweee

iv
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
CASES

Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness Society,
ee I os cds ci be ive bade balms 20

Aumiller v. University of Delaware,
455 F. Supp. 676 (D. Del. 1978).......... 22, 31

Blum v. Stenson,
PEE gc cc cece ccccees 16, 20, 22

Brady v. Washington County,
509 F. Supp. 538 (E.D. Tenn. 1979) ......... 31

Burchett v. Bower,
470 F. Supp. 1170 (D. Ariz. 1979) ........... 22

Cable Atlanta, Inc. v. Project, Inc.,
572 F. Supp. 1113 (N.D. Ga. 1983) .......... 32

Cameo Convalescent Ctr., Inc. v. Senn,
738 F.2d 836 (7th Cir. 1984) ............ 16, 28

Chee v. Schweiker,
563 F. Supp. 1362 (D. Ariz. 1983) ........... 32

In re Chicken Antitrust Litigation,
560 F. Supp. 963 (N.D. Ga. 1980) ........ 22, 29

v

Citizens for Responsible Resource
Development v. Watt,
579 F. Supp. 431 (D. Ala. 1983)............. 32

City of Burlington v. Dague,
Pe er eT 17, 19

Coalition to Preserve Houston & Houston
Independent School District v. InterimBoard of
Trustees,

494 F. Supp. 738 (S.D. Tex. 1980) ........ 22, 31

Commissioner, INS v. Jean,
ED ic o's co. bed ieueeeueen 4, 34

David v. Sullivan,
777 F. Supp. 212 (E.D.N.Y. 1991) ............ 7

Dewalt v. Sullivan,
O68 P.O6 37 Ga Cle. 20GED ow wc ccc ccccceuns 6, 7

Dowdell v. City of Apopka, Fla.,
698 F.2d 1181 (11th Cir. 1983) ............. 38

Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Watt,
554 F. Supp. 36 (E.D.N.Y. 1982) ............ 32

Employees of BMC Software, Inc. v.
Sec’y of Labor, __ F. Supp. 2d__,
2007 WL 2994605 (C.L.T. 2007) ............. 41

vi

Former Employees of BMC Software, Inc. v.
Sec’y of Labor,
2007 WL 4181696 (C.I.T. 2007) ............. 42

Francia v. White,
594 F.2d 778 (10th Cir. 1979) ........... 22, 31

Gautreaux v. Chicago Housing Authority,
491 F.3d 649 (7th Cir. 2007) ............... 35

Goldstein v. California,
i 30

Groves v. Heckler,
599 F. Supp. 830 (M.D. Pa. 1984) ........... 32

Harris v. Sullivan,
968 F.2d 263 (2d Cir. 1992) ................. 6

Hensley v. Eckerhart,
461 U.S. 424 (1983) .......... 16, 17, 18, 20, 42

Hixon v. City of Golden Valley,
2007 WL 4373111 (D. Minn. 2007) .......... 35

Independent Federation of Flight Attendants
v. Zipes, 491 U.S. 754 (1989) ............ 10, 19

Information Sciences Corp. v. United States,
78 Fed. Cl. 673 (Fed. Cl. 2007) ............. 42

International Woodworkers of America v. Donovan,
792 F.2d 762 (9th Cir. 1985) ............... 39

vil

JA. Jones Construction Co. v. Southern Stress
Wire Corp., 575 F. Supp. 365 (N.D. Ga. 1982) . 32

Jean v. Nelson,
863 F.2d 759 (1988), aff'd on other issue, Comm’,
INS v. Jean, 496 U.S. 154 (1990) ..... 10, 29, 39

Johnson v. Combs,
471 F. 2d 84 (5th Cir. 1972) ................ 18

Johnson v. Sullivan,
919 F.2d 503 (8th Cir. 1990) ................ 6

Kauffman v. Schweiker,
559 F. Supp. 372 (M.D. Pa. 1981) ........... 32

Keith v. Volpe,
501 F. Supp. 403 (C.D. Cal. 1980) ........... 22

Kelly v. Bowen,
862 F.2d 1333 (8th Cir. 1988) .............. 39

Kennedy v. Crittendon,
1980 WL 243 (M.D. Ga. 1980) .............. 31

Laffey v. Northwest Airlines, Inc.,
572 F. Supp. 354 (D.D.C. 1983),
affd in part, rev d in part on other grounds,
746 7.28 ODS. Gir. IBD 2... ccc ce cceecs: 35

Marek v. Chesny,
ee ee 17, 37

McPherson v. School District No. 186,
465 F. Supp. 749 (S.D. Ill. 1978) ............ 31

Meissner v. Richlin Sec. Serv. Co.,
1998 WL 228175 (Fed. Cir. 1998) ............ 8

Meyer v. Sullivan,
958 F.2d 1029 (11th Cir. 1992) .............. 6

Mid-Hudson Legal Services v. G & U, Inc.,
465 F. Supp. 261 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) ..... 22, 29, 31

Miller v. Alamo,
983 F.2d 856 (8th Cir. 1993) ............... 29

Missouri v. Jenkins,
ED nig ccs céntcevcess passim

Moholland v. Schwetker,
546 F. Supp. 383 (D.N.H. 1982) ............ 32

Neely v. City of Grenada,
71 F.R.D. 484 (N.D. Miss. 1978) ......... 22, 31

New York Gaslight Club, Inc. v. Carey,
SE Givtdcuseventsetesess 18, 19

Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, Inc.,
I, 6c adc etadsusseccees 18

Northcross v. Board of Education,
as 18, 19

ix

Northcross v. Board of Education,
611 F.2d 624 (6th Cir. 1979) ......... 22, 26, 38

Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley Citizens’ Council
for Clean Air, 478 U.S. 546 (1986) .... 17, 18, 19

Pennsylvania v. O'Neill,
431 F. Supp. 700 (E.D. Pa. 1977) ........... 22

Pierce v. Underwood,
i oe oud ons kh 6, 7

Richlin Sec. Serv. Co. v. Chertoff,
437 F.3d 1296 (Fed. Cir. 2006) .............. 8

Richlin Sec. Serv. Co. v. Rooney,
18 F. App’x 843 (Fed. Cir. 2001) ............. 8

Sacco v. United States,
452 F.3d 1305 (Fed. Cir. 2006) ............. 19

Selzer v. Berkowitz,
477 F. Supp. 686 (E.D.N.Y. 1979) ........ 22, 31

Sherrill v. J.P. Stevens & Co., Inc.,
441 F. Supp. 846 (W.D.N.C. 1977) .......... 22

Skehan v. Board of Trustees,
501 F. Supp. 1360 (M.D. Pa. 1980) ....... 22, 31

Sullivan v. Finkelstein,
ne deweue eben 27

Sullivan v. Hudson,

i a Oe em dws 19
Swicker v. William Armstrong & Sons, Inc.,

484 F. Supp. 762 (E.D. Pa. 1980) ........ 22, 31
Todd Shipyards Corp. v. Director, Office of Workers'

Compensation Programs,

545 F.2d 1176 (9th Cir. 1976) ........... 22, 29

Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Morales,
RE a a Pe ae aera 17

Trustees of the Construction Industrial & Laborers
Health & Welfare Trust v. Redland Insurance
Co., 460 F.3d 1253 (9th Cir. 2006) .......... 38

United States v. Adkinson,
256 F. Supp. 2d 1297 (N.D. Fla. 2003), affd,
360 F.3d 1257 (11th Cir. 2004) ............. 39

United States v. Enmons,
a i ies etd 28

: Visser v. Magnarelli,
i 542 F. Supp. 1331 (N.D.N.Y. 1982) .......... 32

Wallace v. Sec'y of HHS,
1983 WL 44228 (D. Mass. 1983) ............ 32

WATCH v. Harris,
535 F. Supp. 9 (D. Conn. 1981) ............. 32

il
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A ee ee ee ee ee ee ee et ee ee he NO ee ee ee

a eh. ee

ee Se

‘aes a ae

xl

West Virginia University Hospitals, Inc. v. Casey,

|, rere Tre 23, 24, 38
STATUTES AND REGULATIONS

We cd ned keeseeksc suds adcewneas 1,3
Fe re 5, 9, 14, 37, 40
RRM ere Pee 1 ee mc 12
5 U.S.C. § 504(b)(1)(A) ..... 5, 6, 7, 16, 21, 37, 43
DERI oc ccc cckvccecsuse 5, 14
lie oeusscadeee ens 5,9
ES OER ee Sere 1
28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1M(A) .... 3, 5, 12, 14, 19, 37, 40

28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(A) 3, 5, 6, 7, 14, 16, 21, 37, 43

es URE ovo av booccavbencdunes 5
8 errr 3, 9, 11, 15, 16, 20, 23
Pub. L. No. 104-121, 110 Stat. 847 (1996) ........ 5
Pub. L. No. 99-80, 99 Stat. 183 (1985) ......... 4,5

Pub. L. No. 96-481, 94 Stat. 2321 (1980) ....... 4,5

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SI POE occ cescccsvccecce Ys
51 Fed. Reg. 16659 (May 6, 1986).............. 32

LEGISLATIVE MATERIALS

H.R. Rep. No. 99-120 (1985),
reprinted in 1985 U.S.C.C.A.N. 132 ...... 25, 27

S. Rep. No. 98-586,
98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984) ............ 24, 26

H.R. Rep. No. 96-1418 (1980),
reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4991 ...... 4, 21

S. Rep. No. 96-253, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979) .. 21

MISCELLANEOUS

Laffey Matrix, available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/dc/Divisions/
Civil_Division/Laffey_Matrix_7.html ........ 35

Jonathan R. Siegel, The Use of Legislative

History in a System of Separated Powers,
53 Vand. L. Rev. 1457, 1522 (2000).......... 27

xii

U.S. Dep’t of Laber, Bureau of Labor Statistics,
Consumer Price Index, All Urban Consumers,
available at ftp://ftp.bls.gov/pub/special.requests
EE eaesvaeeeeee suse becenvaeepare

OPINIONS BELOW

The opinion of the United States Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit is reported at 472 F.3d 1370
(2006), and is reproduced in the appendix to the
petition for a writ of certiorari at 1a. The opinion of the
Department of Transportation Board of Contract
Appeals is reported at 2005 WL 1635099 (2005), and is
reproduced at Pet. App. 25a. The Federal Circuit’s
supplemental opinion issued in response to petitioner's
petition for rehearing is reported at 482 F.3d 1358
(2007), and is reproduced at Pet. App. 54a. The Federal
Circuit’s unreported order denying rehearing and
rehearing en banc is reproduced at Pet. App. 57a.

JURISDICTION

The judgment of the United States Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit was entered on December 26,
2006. Pet. App. 1a. Petitioner filed a timely petition for
rehearing en banc on January 8, 2007, which the
Federal Circuit treated as a petition for panel
rehearing and rehearing en banc and denied on April
3, 2007. Pet. App. 57a. The petition for a writ of
certiorari was filed on June 25, 2007, and was granted
on November 13, 2007. This Court has jurisdiction
under 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1).

STATUTE INVOLVED

The Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA) authorizes
an award of fees and other expenses to certain parties
who prevail against the United States in court or in
adversary administrative proceedings.

5 U.S.C. § 504, the portion of EAJA that applies to

adversary administrative proceedings, provides in
relevant part:

2

(a)(1) An agency that conducts an adversary
adjudication shall award, to a prevailing party
other than the United States, fees and other
expenses incurred by that party in connection
with that proceeding, unless the adjudicative
officer of the agency finds that the position of
the agency was substantially justified or that
special circumstances make an award unjust.
Whether or not the position of the agency was
substantially justified shall be determined on
the basis of the administrative record, as a
whole, which is made in the adversary
adjudication for which fees and other expenses
are sought.
* «*

(b)(1) For the purposes of this section —

(A) “fees and other expenses” includes the
reasonable expenses of expert witnesses, the
reasonable cost of any study, analysis,
engineering report, test, or project which is
found by the agency to be necessary for the
preparation of the party’s case, and reasonable
attorney or agent fees. (The amount of fees
awarded under this section shall be based upon
prevailing market rates for the kind and quality
of the services furnished, except that (i) no
expert witness shall be compensated at a rate in
excess of the highest rate of compensation for
expert witnesses paid by the agency involved,
and (ii) attorney or agent fees shall not be
awarded in excess of $125 per hour unless the
agency determines by regulation that an

3

increase in the cost of living or a special factor,
such as the limited availability of qualified
attorneys or agents for the proceedings involved,
justifies a higher fee.)'

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

The Equal Access to Justice Act provides that
certain parties that prevail against the federal
government in court and adversary administrative
proceedings are entitled to an award of fees and other
expenses. Petitioner Richlin Security Service Company,
a sole proprietorship, prevailed in administrative and
judicial proceedings against the federal government
and was awarded attorney fees and other expenses
under EAJA by the Department of Transportation
Board of Contract Appeals (the Board). The question
presented is whether such an award may include
compensation for paralegal services at rates that
chents generally pay for paralegal services in the
relevant legal market, as this Court held was
appropriate under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 in Missouri v.
Jenkins, 491 U.S. 274, 284-89 (1989), or whether, as
the Federal Circuit held, those services may only be

‘The nearly identical portions of EAJA applicable to recovery
of fees and other expenses incurred in court proceedings are
codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 2412(d)(1)(A), (d)(2)(A). Petitioner's fee
application at issue here sought recovery for fees incurred in
adversary proceedings before the Department of Transportation's
Board of Contract Appeals and, thus, was filed under 5 U.S.C. §
504. In general, citations in this brief to provisions of section 504
are accompanied by citations to the corresponding provisions of
section 2412(d). The relevant portions of section 2412(d) are
contained in an addendum to this brief.

4

compensated at the cost to the attorney, regardless of
how the marketplace values them.

A. The Equal Access To Justice Act

EAJA was first enacted in 1980 for a three-year
period beginning on October 1, 1981 based on
Congress’s express finding that individuals, small
businesses, and non-profit organizations “may be
deterred from seeking review of, or defending against,
unreasonable governmental action because of the
expense involved in securing the vindication of their
rights in civil actions and in administrative
proceedings.” Pub. L. No. 96-481, § 202(a), 94 Stat.
2321, 2325 (1980); see also id. at §§ 202(b), (c)(1), 94
Stat. at 2325 (noting government’s “greater resources”
and that EAJA’s purpose was “to diminish the
deterrent effect of seeking review of, or defending
against, governmental action.”); Comm'r, INS v. Jean,
496 U.S. 154, 163 (1990) (“The specific purpose of the
EAJA is to eliminate for the average person the
financial disincentive to challenge unreasonable
governmental actions.”). In addition, Congress wanted
to “encouragle] private parties to vindicate their rights
and [thereby to] ‘curb[] excessive regulation and the
unreasonable exercise of Government authority.” Jd. at
164-65 (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 96-1418, at 12 (1980),
reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4991). In 1985,
Congress reenacted EAJA and made it permanent.
Pub. L. No. 99-80, 99 Stat. 183 (1985).

EAJA provides that “fees and other expenses” shall
be awarded to eligible parties who have prevailed in
adversary administrative proceedings or in court
against the federal government, unless the agency
adjudicator or court finds that the position of the

5

United States “was substantially justified or that
special circumstances make an award unjust.” 5 U.S.C.
§ 504(a)(1); 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A). An individual is
eligible for fees if his or her net worth does not exceed
$2 million, while a business is eligible if its net worth
does not exceed $7 million and it had 500 or fewer
employees when the action was commenced. 5 U.S.C.
§ 504(b)(1)(B); 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(B). Certain
charitable organizations and cooperatives are eligible
regardless of size or net worth. /d: 5 U.S.C.
§ 504(b)(1)(B).”

“Fees and other expenses” are defined to include
“reasonable attorney or agent fees.” 28 U.S.C.
§ 504(b)(1)(A); see also 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(A)
(defining “fees and other expenses” to include
“reasonable attorney fees”). EAJA does not leave the
amount of fees to the broad discretion of the court or
agency adjudicator, but states that the amount of fees
“shall be based upon prevailing market rates,” subject
to a dollar-per-hour cap on attorney fees that may be
adjusted in certain circumstances. 5 U.S.C.
§ 504(b)(1)(A)(ii); 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(A). At the time
of EAJA's enactment, the adjustable cap was $75 per
hour.’

*Originally, the net-worth limits for individuals and businesses
were $1 million and $5 million, respectively. See Pub. L. No. 96-
481, §§ 203(a)(1), 204(a), 94 Stat. at 2326, 2328. The current limits
were set in 1985. Pub. L. No. 99-80, §§ 1, 2, 99 Stat. at 185.

‘In 1996, Congress raised the cap to $125 per hour, effective
March 29, 1996. Pub. L. No. 104-121, §§ 231-233, 110 Stat. 847,
862-64 (1996). The 1996 hike from $75 per hour to $125 per hour

(continued...)

6

As noted above, the cap is not absolute, but may be
adjusted upward on two bases. First, any court, or an
administrative tribunal authorized by regulation to do
so, may award fees above the statutory cap if “an
increase in the cost of living ... justifies a higher fee.”
5 U.S.C. § 504(b)(1)(A); 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(A).
Courts and authorized administrative tribunals
generally award cost-of-living adjustments as a matter
or course when market rates exceed the unadjusted
statutory cap. See, e.g., Meyer v. Sullivan, 958 F.2d
1029, 1033-35 (11th Cir. 1992); Johnson v. Sullivan,
919 F.2d 503, 504-05 (8th Cir. 1990) (citing cases); see
also Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 571-72 (1988)
(suggesting that cost-of-living increases are automatic
by referring repeatedly to fee cap as “$75 per hour
(adjusted for inflation)”). The cap is adjusted upward
by measuring the increase in the cost of living between
the date of enactment of the statutory cap and the date
the relevant legal services were rendered, typically by
using the Bureau of Labor Statistics “all-items” index,
a general measure of inflation. See, e.g., Dewalt v.
Sullivan, 963 F.2d 27, 29-30 (3d Cir. 1992); Johnson,
919 F.2d at 504. Courts have held that the fee cap may
not be adjusted based on inflation in the cost of legal
services, see, e.g., Harris v. Sullivan, 968 F.2d 263 (2d

(continued)
reflected the increase in the cost of living between EAJA's original
October 1, 1981, effective date and the hike’s March 1996 effective
date. See U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics,
Consumer Price Index, All Urban Consumers, available at
ftp://ftp.bls.gov/pub/special.requests/cpi/cpiai.txt (showing 66.7%
cost-of-living increase from October 1981 through March 1996).

7

Cir. 1992); Dewalt, 963 F.2d at 29-30, and, thus, the
fee cap, even when adjusted for inflation, has failed to
keep up in recent years with the hyper-inflation in the
legal services market. The current inflation-adjusted
cap is approximately $168 per hour.

Second, courts and futhorized administrative
tribunals may award fees above the cap — whether
inflation-adjusted or not — based on the presence of
any “special factor,” one of which is mentioned in the
statute: “the limited availability of qualified attorneys
for the proceedings involved.” 5 U.S.C. 504(b)(1)(A); 28
U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(A). This Court has held that this
statutory formulation refers to “attorneys having some
distinctive knowledge or specialized skill needful for
the litigation in question — as opposed to an
extraordinary level of the general lawyerly knowledge
and ability useful in all litigation.” Pierce, 487 U.S. at
572. The Court cited patent law and foreign law as
examples of distinctive knowledge that would justify
an award above the cap, jd. and, although this basis
for enhancement has been allowed only rarely post-
Pierce, the lower courts have identified other examples.
See, e.g., David v. Sullivan, 777 F. Supp. 212, 219-21
(E.D.N.Y. 1991) (Medicare law).

‘As noted, administrative tribunals must be authorized by
regulation to adjust the cap. Some tribunals have been authorized
to exceed the cap, see, e.g., 5 C.F.R. §§ 2430.4, .5 (Federal Labor
Relations Authority); 29 C.F.R. §§ 2704.107, .201(b) (Federal Mine
Safety and Health Review Commission); some, including the
tribunal below, have not. See Pet. App. 38a.

8

B. Proceedings On The Merits

The merits of this litigation can be summarized
briefly. Mistakes in contracts between petitioner
Richlin Security Service Company and what was then
the Immigration and Naturalization Service (and is
now part of the Department of Homeland Security)
resulted in the substantial underpayment of Richlin’s
employees. See Richlin Sec. Serv. Co. v. Chertoff, 437
F.3d 1296, 1297 (Fed. Cir. 2006). The underpayments
were of such magnitude to a small business like Richlin
that, before it won this litigation, Richlin had been
unable to pay its employees what it owed them. /d. at
1298 (citing Richlin Sec. Serv. Co. v. Rooney, 18 F.
App’x 843, 844-45 (Fed. Cir. 2001)). In lengthy
proceedings before both the Board and the Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit, the government
contended that Richlin was required by law to suffer
the consequences of the contractual mistakes. The
Federal Circuit rejected that position as inconsistent
with the terms of the contract and controlling case law,
see Meissner v. Richlin Sec. Serv. Co., 1998 WL
228175, *4 (Fed. Cir. 1998), and, on remand from a
later appeal, the Board eventually awarded Richlin the
amount of the additional wages, payroll taxes, and
workers’ compensation premiums that Richlin was
required to pay as a result of the mistakes. Pet. App.
3a.

C. Fee Proceedings

After prevailing on the merits, Richlin sought an
award of fees and other expenses under EAJA for the
time spent over nearly nine years by its lawyers and
paralegals before the Board. The Board found that
Richlin met EAJA’s size and net-worth limitations, 5

9

U.S.C. § 504(b)(1)(B), that it was a prevailing party,
see id. § 504(a)(1), and that the government’s position
on the merits was not “substantially justified.” See id.
The Board awarded Richlin approximately $50,000 for
work done by the company’s lawyers. See Pet. App. 5a.

The Board did not, however, award Richlin fees at
the $50 to $95 per hour market rates for paralegal
services charged to Richlin over the course of the
proceedings. It noted that EAJA does not “expressly
provide for the reimbursement of paralegal services at
the market rate,” id. at 6a, and thus held that
paralegal services are reimbursable only at the
attorney's cost, even where, as is the case here,
paralegal time is billed to the client at hourly market
rates in the relevant legal market and not at the
attorney's cost as an out-of-pocket expense. The Board
took judicial notice of paralegal salaries in the
Washington, D.C. area “as reflected on the internet”
and awarded Richlin $35 per hour as the “reasonable
cost to the [law] firm.” Jd. (quoting Board decision). The
Board awarded approximately $10,600, representing
roughly 300 hours of compensable paralegal time. See
id.

A divided panel] of the Federal Circuit affirmed. The
panel majority acknowledged this Court’s ruling in
Missouri v. Jenkins, 491 U.S. 274, 284-89 (1989), that,
under the Civil Rights Attorney’s Fees Awards Act of
1976, 42 U.S.C. § 1988, paralegal services are a
component of “attorney’s fees” compensable at market
rates, as long as those services are separately billed in
the relevant market. The majority further
acknowledged the Court’s repeated admonition that
“fee-shifting statutes’ similar language is a ‘strong

10

indication’ that they are to be interpreted alike.” Pet.
App. 13a (quoting /ndependent Federation of Flight
Attendants v. Zipes, 491 U.S. 754, 758 n.2 (1989)). The
majority nevertheless distinguished EAJA from section
1988, largely on the ground that the former
contemplates an award of “expenses,” which
purportedly includes the cost to law firms of
paralegals, while the latter does not. Pet. App. 15a,
19a. The court of appeals also relied on EAJA’s per-
hour rate cap for attorney fees as justification for
limiting recovery for paralegal services, noting that “it
seemled] unlikely” that Congress would have capped
paralegal and attorney services at the same level. Pet.
App. 16a. In so holding, the court of appeals
acknowledged that its ruling was at odds with an
Eleventh Circuit decision, Jean v. Nelson, 863 F.2d
759, 778 (1988), aff'd on other issue, Commr, INS v.
Jean, 496 U.S. 154 (1990), which held that fees for
paralegal services are compensable at market rates
under EAJA.

Senior Circuit Judge Plager dissented on the
ground that “the panel’s position is at variance with
established Supreme Court law,” Pet. App. 20a-21a,
relying on this Court’s statement in Jenkins that a
“reasonable attorney’s fee’ cannot have been meant to
compensate only work performed personally by
members of the bar,” but was also intended to
compensate the work of “others whose labor
contributes to the work product for which an attorney
bills her client.” /d. at 21a (quoting Jenkins, 491 U.S.
at 285).

Richlin petitioned for rehearing en banc, explaining
that, in addition to the acknowledged conflict with the

1l

Eleventh Circuit, the Federal Circuit’s ruling had
opened a conflict with decisions of three other circuits.
The petition also noted that a Senate committee report
that the panel majority had relied on did not, in fact,
support its ruling, and that, in any event, the report
was not genuine legislative history because it had
accompanied a 1984 version of EAJA that was vetoed
by President Reagan, not the 1985 version that was
actually enacted.

The panel responded to the rehearing petition in a
supplemental opinion. See Pet. App. 54a. With respect
to the purported legislative history, the court of
appeals acknowledged its earlier reliance on a
committee report that accompanied vetoed legislation,
but held that because the President’s veto related to
issues other than the compensability of paralegal
services, the “earlier legislative history” drafted by a
different Congress in 1984 was “pertinent to the 1985
enactment on the issue presented here.” /d. at 56a n.2.
Senior Judge Plager dissented again “on the basis of
his dissent from the original panel opinion.” /d. In an
order accompanying its supplemental opinion, the
Federal Circuit denied rehearing and rehearing en
banc. Pet. App. 57a.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

A. Fees incurred for paralegal services are
compensable at market rates under EAJA. In Missouri
v. Jenkins, 491 U.S. at 285, the Court held, first, that
paralegal services are “attorney’s fees” under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1988 because that term logically includes charges not
only for the work of members of the bar, but also for
other law firm personnel whose services contribute to
the lawver’s work product. Jenkins also held that

12

paralegal services are compensable at market rates
under section 1988 if they are billed separately on that
basis in the relevant legal community, and that
separate paralegal billing encourages efficient delivery
of legal services. On the second question addressed in
Jenkins —- how to value paralegal services if they are
statutory attorney fees — EAJA provides its own
answer because all compensable fees, including
attorney fees, must be awarded at “prevailing market
rates.” 5 U.S.C. § 504(b)(1); 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A).
Thus, under EAJA, if paralegal services are “attorney
fees,” as they were held to be in Jenkins, they are
indisputably compensable at market rates.

Jenkins's determination that section 1988 fees
include paralegal services applies to EAJA. “Attornev’s
fees” under section 1988 and “attorney fees” under
EAJA are nearly identical terms, and, ordinarily,
Congress’s use of the same or similar terms should be
accorded the same meaning statute to statute. The
Court has applied that principle of statutory
construction with special force to federal fee-shifting
statutes in light of their generally similar purposes,
and it should be applied here. At the time of EAJA’s
enactment, courts already had interpreted section 1988
and other fee-shifting statutes to require that fees,
including fees incurred for paralegal services, be
awarded at market rates. If anything, the Congress
that enacted EAJA, and expressly required that fees be
awarded at “prevailing market rates,” would have been
more likely than the Congress that enacted section
1988, and required only that fees be “reasonable,” to
have provided compensation for paralegal services in
a manner that mimics the market.

13

B. The Federal Circuit erred in maintaining that
Jenkins is inapplicable here in light of EAJA’s
adjustable dollar-per-hour cap on attorney rates. The
Federal Circuit stated that if fees for paralegal services
were “attorney fees,” in light of the cap, law firm
charges for paralegal services would be fully
recoverable while charges for attorney services would
not, leading to the supposed overuse of paralegals and
undermining /Jenkins’s efficiency rationale. The
Federal Circuit’s view is misguided for a host of
reasons, not least of which is that it conflicts with
reality. When EAJA was enacted and reenacted in
pies pn eineian owuln avopuvuvesy a= vie bere vale Valilape
points from which to assess Congress’s intent and,
thus, the Federal Circuit's “overuse” argument
market rates for most or all lawyers practicing in most
locations were at or below the EAJA cap. Therefore.
Congress would not have expected market-rate
recovery for paralegal services to result in “overuse” of
paralegals in comparison to the higher-priced lawyers
for whom they work. In any event, limiting
reir bursement for paralegal services to the law firm's
cost, as the Federal Circuit held EAJA requires, would
improperly drive up the cost of litigation for clients
the people that EAJA was intended to benefit.

C. The Federal Circuit's holding that paralegal!
services are compensable at the cost of those services
to the /awyer is doubly wrong. Treating paralegal!
services as an item awardable at cost is at odds with
the judicial understanding of EAJA, under which cost
based awards generally are for out-of-pocket expenses
charged by third-party vendors. These expenses
include items such as travel costs and long-distance

14

phone calls, not the work of in-firm personnel (which is
billed separately by the firm at market rates or
recovered as overhead through the attorneys’ rates).

Even if it were appropriate under EAJA to
reimburse paralegal expenses at “cost,” reimbursement
should be based on the cost incurred by the c/ent, not
the /awyer. It is clients (not lawyers) whose interests
EAJA seeks to protect, and basing the client’s
reimbursement for paralegal services on what it costs
the lawyer to employ the paralegal leaves the client
with a loss that bears no rational relationship to the
costs faced by the client or EAJA’s purposes. After all,
EAJA provides an award of fees and other expenses to
the “prevailing party,” 5 U.S.C. § 504(a)(1); 28 U.S.C.
§ 2412(d)(1)(A), not that party’s lawyer. Awarding
paralegal expenses based on the cost incurred by the
chent would avoid that irrationality; and because doing
so reflects market reality, it also underscores why
paralegal services are “attorney fees” under EAJA that
should be awarded at “prevailing market rates.”

ARGUMENT

A. Paralegal Services Are Compensable At Market
Rates Under This Court’s Decision In Missour7 v.
Jenkins And The Text And Structure Of EAJA.

The reasoning of this Court’s decisions, together
with the statutory text, demonstrate that “attorney
fees” under EAJA includes paralegal services.
Accordingly, the Federal Circuit’s decision must be
reversed because the “amount of fees awarded under”
EK AJA “shall be based upon prevailing market rates for
the kind and quality of the services furnished.” 5
U.S.C. § 504(b)(1)(A) Gi); 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(A).

15

1. In Missouri v. Jenkins, 491 U.S. 274, the Court
considered whether and on what basis fees incurred for
paralegal services are awardable as “attorney's fees”
under the Civil Rights Attorney’s Fees Award Act of
1976, 42 U.S.C. § 1988. The Court first held that, in
using the term “attorney’s fee,” Congress must have
meant to compensate not only the work of members of
the bar, but the work of others, including paralegals,
whose services contribute to the lawyer’s work product.

Jenkins, 491 U.S. at 285. As the Court put it:

Id.

Clearly, a “reasonable attorney’s fee” cannot
have been meant to compensate only work
pertormed personally by members of the bar.
Rather, the term must refer to a reasonable fee
for the work product of an attorney. Thus, the
fee must take into account the work not only of
attorneys, but also of secretaries, messengers,
librarians, janitors, and others whose labor
contributes to the work product for which an
attorney bills her client; and it must also take
account of other expenses and profit. The parties
have suggested no reason why the work of
paralegals should not be similarly compensated,
nor can we think of any. We thus take as our
starting point the self-evident proposition that
the “reasonable attorney’s fee” provided for by
statute should compensate the work of
paralegals, as well as that of attorneys.

The Court then turned to what it termed the “more
difficult” question of how paralegal services should be
“valuated.” J/d. Relying on its prior fee-shifting
precedents holding that attorney fees are to be

16

compensated at “market rate,” see id. at 285-86 (citing,
e.g., Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 895 & n.11 (1984);
Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 447 (1983)), the
Court explained that

the prevailing ‘market rate’ for attorney time is
not independent of the manner in which
paralegal time is accounted for. Thus, if the
prevailing practice in a given community were
to bill paralegal time separately at market rates,
fees awarded the attorney at market rates for
attorney time would not be fully compensatory
if the court refused to compensate hours billed
by paralegals or did so only at “cost.”

Id. at 286-87 (footnote omitted). Moreover, the Court
explained, “encouraging the use of lower cost
paralegals rather than attorneys wherever possible, ...
‘encourages cost-effective delivery of legal services.”
Id. at 288 (quoting Cameo\ Convalescent Ctr., Inc. v.
Senn, 738 F.2d 836, 846 (7th Cir. 1984)).

2. Under EAJA, we are not faced with what
Jenkins called the “more difficult” question; if
paralegal services are “attorney fees” under EAJA,
they are necessarily compensable at “prevailing market
rates.” See 5 U.S.C. § 504(b)(1)(A); accord 28 U.S.C. §
2412(d)(2)(A). In other words, if Jenkins’ holding that
“attorney's fees” under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 includes
paralegal services — what Jenkins called a “self-
evident proposition,” 491 U.S. at 285 — applies to
EAJA, the decision below must be reversed.

Jenkins applies with full force to EAJA. To begin
with, the statutory term “attorney fees” used in EAJA
is nearly identical to the term “attorney’s fee”

17

construed in Jenkins. And, under ordinary principles
of statutory construction, the Court generally accords
the same meaning it has given Congress’s use of a term
in one statute to Congress’s use of the same or a
similar term in another statute. See, e.g., Trans World
Airlines, Inc. v. Morales, 504 U.S. 374, 383-84 (1992).

That principle of construction applies with special
potency to federal fee-shifting statutes, such as section
1988 and EAJA, for two reasons. First, “there are over
100 separate [federal] statutes providing for the award
of attorney’s fees.” Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley
Citizens’ Council for Clean Air, 478 U.S. 546, 562
\4v0U/) see aisu Marek V. Unesny, 4/3 U.S. 1, 43 (1985)
(Brennan, J., dissenting) (“Congress has enacted well
over 100 fee-shifting statutes.”). It makes no sense,
absent compelling circumstances to the contrary, to
ascribe to Congress an unexpressed intent to define the
same or similar terms differently. Rational legislators
would not create disparate definitions for dozens of the
same or similar statutory terms in dozens of statutes
because doing so would cause chaos for litigants,
lawyers, and courts trying to discern their meaning.
Thus, in the case of federal fee-shifting statutes,
according the same meaning to the same or similar
statutory texts marries fidelity to congressional intent
with the practical needs of the bar, the judiciary, and
the members of the public that fee-shifting statutes are
intended to benefit. For that reason, whether the issue
is the parameters of a “reasonable” fee, see City of
Burlington v. Dague, 505 U.S. 557, 562 (1992), who is
a “prevailing party,” see Hensley, 461 U.S. at 433 &
n.7, or, as here, what is encompassed by the term
“attorney fees,” courts generally should resolve the

18

issue consistently across the range of federal fee-
shifting statutes.

Second, this principle of statutory construction is
especially applicable in the fee-shifting context in light
of the common purposes of most, if not all, federal fee-
shifting provisions, including section 1988 and EAJA.
Those provisions are intended to encourage vindication
of federal rights by reducing the cost of challenging
unlawful conduct and, in turn, inducing future
compliance with federal law. See supra at 4 (discussing
these dual purposes of EAJA); Delaware Valley
Citizens’ Council, 478 U.S. at 559-60 (same with
respect to section 1988); Hens/ey, 461 U.S. at 429
(same); see also, e.g., New York Gaslight Club, Inc. v.
Carey, 447 U.S. 54, 63 (1980) (same purposes of fee-
shifting provision of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964).

The Court made this point in Northcross v. Board
of Education, 412 U.S. 427 (1973) (per curiam), where
it gave the fee-shifting provision of one civil rights
statute the same meaning it had earlier given to the
fee-shifting provision of another civil rights statute.
The Court noted that the “similarity of language” in
the two provisions “is, of course, a strong indication
that the two statutes should be interpreted pari
passu.” Id. at 428. It then went on to explain that “the
two provisions share the same raison détre” — to
vindicate federal rights and to encourage individuals to
seek judicial relief.” /d. (quoting Johnson v. Combs, 471
F. 2d 84, 86 (5th Cir. 1972), relying on Newman v.
Piggie Park Enterprises, Inc., 390 U.S. 400, 402
(1968)); see also Delaware County Citizens’ Council,
478 U.S. at 560 (“Given the common purpose of §

~«., & as wh so. sent: so Se

19

304(d) lof the Clean Air Act] and § 1988 to promote
citizen enforcement of important federal policies, we
find no reason not to interpret both provisions
governing attorney’s fees in the same manner.”).

For the foregoing reasons, the Court has accorded
uniform application to the same or similar terms in fee-
shifting statutes more frequently, more consistently,
and more forcefully than in any other context of which
we are aware. In light of the “similar” language of
“many ... federal fee-shifting statutes,” the Court has
noted that “our case law construing what is a
‘reasonable’ fee applies uniformly to all of them.”
VaxyUue, DVD U.D. al O0Z, see also, e.g., ZIpes, 491 U.S.
at 754 n.2 (“We have stated in the past that fee-
shifting statutes’ similar language is a ‘strong
indication’ that they are to be interpreted alike.”)
(quoting Northcross, 412 U.S. at 428); Pet. App. 13a
n.7 (“The Supreme Court has repeatedly made clear
that the various federal attorney’s fees statutes should
be construed to reach a uniform result.”) (quoting Sacco
v. United States, 452 F.3d 1305, 1310 (Fed. Cir. 2006)).
And, in an EAJA case, Sullivan v. Hudson, 490 U.S.
877, 888-90 (1989), the Court interpreted the term
“civil action” under 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A) to include
fees incurred in certain administrative proceedings, in
significant part because of this Court’s construction of
similar terms in Delaware Valley Citizens’ Council, 478
U.S. at 558, and New York Gas Light, 447 U.S. at 60.
Indeed, this principle of statutory construction is so
powerful with respect to fee-shifting statutes that, in
Hensley, the Court applied it prospectively, holding, in
a section 1988 case, that “[t]he standards set forth in
this opinion are generally applicable in all cases in

20

which Congress has authorized an award of fees to a
‘prevailing party.” 461 U.S. at 433 n.7.

3. EAJA’s textual demand for market-based fees,
which makes explicit a policy that is only implicit in
section 1988, provides strong confirmation that the two
statutes should be treated similarly with regard to the
compensability of paralegal services. In 1976, Congress
enacted 42 U.S.C. § 1988 to overrule Alyveska Pipeline
Service Co. v. Wilderness Society, 421 U.S. 240 (1975),
which held that courts in civil rights cases generally
did not have the power to award fees to the prevailing
party absent statutory authorization. Thereafter, in a
series of decisions, the Court made clear that a
“reasonable attorney’s fee” under section 1988 was one
based on how the private market valued legal services,
and the standard for the award of attorney fees became
one of commercial reasonableness. Thus, in Hensley,
461 U.S. at 433, the Court, adopting the primary
billing method in commercial law firms, held that the
starting point for fee calculation is the product of a
reasonable number of hours spent on the litigation and
the lawyer’s reasonable hourly rate. Similarly, B/um v.
Stenson, 465 U.S. at 895, held that the “reasonable
hourly rate” is to be calculated based on “prevailing
market rates in the relevant community.” And Jenkins,
491 U.S. at 285-87, as discussed above, held that
paralegal services, like services performed by lawyers
themselves, are compensable on the same basis on
which they are charged to paying clients in the
relevant legal community.

Under EAJA, however, the courts were not required
to construe a general concept such as reasonableness
in determining how fees should be calculated. EAJA is

21

specific on this point, providing that “[t]he amount of
fees awarded” “shall be based upon prevailing market
rates for the kind and quality of the services
furnished.” 5 U.S.C. § 504(b)(1)(A) (emphasis added);
28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2MA) (same). To be sure, the
statutory provisions requiring a market-rate award do
not by themselves specify what types of services are
included in the term “attorney fees,” and, thus, do not
on their own definitively resolve the question
presented here. But they go a long way in that
direction. The statutory command that fees be awarded
based on “prevailing market rates” is strong evidence
VL WULIB LEDS 5 ALLLOELIL Liiae CUULLDS a41lU AUIS ave
agencies use a market-based approach when awarding
compensation under EAJA. And a market-based
approach should, as Jenkins explained, provide
compensation for paralegal services in the manner
dictated by the market. Put another way, if there is
any distinction to be drawn between EAJA and section
1988, the Congress that enacted fAJA, and explicitly
required use of “prevailing market rates,” would have
been more, not less, likely to have intended that
compensation for paralegal services track the market
than the Congress that enacted section 1988 and
required only that a fee be “reasonable.”

Moreover, in enacting EAJA and its requirement
that fees be based on “prevailing market rates,”
Congress was aware of existing fee-shifting legislation,
including section 1988 and fee-shifting provisions of
other federal civil rights laws. See H.R. Rep. No. 96-
1418, at 8(1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4987:
S. Rep. No. 96-253, 96th, Cong., lst Sess. 4 (1979).
Under those statutes, courts generally awarded fees at

22

market rates. See generally Blum, 465 U.S. at 893-96
(discussing practice under statutes on which section
1988 was patterned). Indeed, under section 1988, in
the years leading up to EAJA’s enactment, courts that
considered whether and on what basis to award fees for
paralegal services generally awarded them on a
market-rate basis. See, e.g., Northcross v. Bd. of Educ.,
611 F.2d 624, 638 (6th Cir. 1979); Francia v. White,
594 F.2d 778, 781 (10th Cir. 1979); Skehan v. Bd. of
Trs., 501 F. Supp. 1360, 1370, 1374 (M.D. Pa. 1980);
Selzer v. Berkowitz, 477 F. Supp. 686, 690 & n.3
(E.D.N.Y. 1979).° Thus, the legal background against
which Congress enacted EAJA in 1980 was one in
which the market dictated compensability of attorney
fees, including paralegal services.

* Accord, e.g., Keith v. Volpe, 501 F. Supp. 403, 413-14 (C.D.
Cal. 1980); Coalition to Preserve Houston & Houston Indep. School
Dist. v. Interim Bd. of Trs., 494 F. Supp. 738, 745, 747 (S.D. Tex.
1980); Burchett v. Bower, 470 F. Supp. 1170, 1173 (D. Ariz. 1979);
Mid-Hudson Legal Servs. v. G & U, Inc., 465 F. Supp. 261, 274
nn.15-16 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); Aumiller v. Univ. of Delaware, 455 F.
Supp. 676, 682 & n.13(D. Del. 1978); Neely v. City of Grenada, 77
F.R.D. 484, 487 (N.D. Miss. 1978); Pennsylvania v. O'Neill, 431 F.
Supp. 700, 711 (E.D. Pa. 1977). In the years prior to EAJA’s
enactment, courts also awarded fees for paralegal services at
market rates under fee-shifting statutes other than section 1988.
See, e.g, Todd Shipyards Corp. v. Dir. Office of Workers’
Compensation Programs, 545 F.2d 1176, 1182 (9th Cir. 1976)
(Longshoremen’s and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act);
Swicker v. William Armstrong & Sons, Inc., 484 F. Supp. 762, 773
(E.D. Pa. 1980) (Title VID; Sherrill v. J.P. Stevens & Co., Inc., 441
F. Supp. 846, 848-49 (W.D.N.C. 1977) (same); see also In re
Chicken Antitrust Litig., 560 F. Supp. 963, 972, 977-78 (N.D. Ga.
1980) (federal antitrust settlement).

23

4. The Court’s decision in West Virginia University
Hospitals, Inc. v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83 (1991), strongly
supports the view that paralegal services are a part of
“attorney fees” under EAJA and, thus, compensable at
market rates. First, Casey makes clear that Jenkins
was not, as the Federal Circuit suggested, motivated
by an extratextual policy concern that if paralegal
services were not shoehorned into “attorney's fees,”
there would be no basis under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 for
recovering them at all because section 1988 does not
refer to “expenses.” See Pet. App. 15a. To the contrary,
in holding that expert witness fees were not
nscangpwenmagtate muevesscy © cco Maiucs peuuul 1700,
Casey rejected the plaintiffs assertion that Jenkins
was an instance where the Court “permitted the] ...
perception of the ‘policy’ of the statute to overcome its
‘plain language.” Casey, 499 U.S. at 99. The Court
explained that Jenkins was not a freewheeling
exposition of section 1988's policy, but a
straightforward interpretation of the term “attorney’s
fees,” which, the Court held, included law clerk and
paralegal services because they “had traditionally been
included in calculation of the lawyers’ hourly rates.” Jd.
As explained in detail above, that textual reading of
the term “attorney’s fees” in section 1988 is equally, if
not more, applicable to EAJA.

Second, Casey explained that a number of fee-
shifting statutes expressly authorize an award of both
attorney’s fees and expert's fees, thus undermining the
claim that section 1988's reference to “attorney’s fees”
alone authorized an award of expert fees. The Court
contrasted that situation with the paralegal services
question decided in Jenkins on the ground that fee-

24

shifting statutes do not single-out paralegal services
for special treatment, and it took pains to point out
that EAJA is no exception:

We do not know of a single statute that shifts clerk
or paralegal fees separately; and even those, such
as the EAJA, which comprehensively define the
assessable “litigation costs” make no separate
mention of clerks or paralegals.

Id. at 99-100 (emphasis added). Thus, Casey
underscores that paralegal services are a part of
“attorney fees” compensable at “prevailing market
rates” under EAJA because, just like other fee-shifting
statutes, EAJA “makel[s] no separate mention of clerks
or paralegals.” /d°

5. The Federal Circuit shunned the follow-the-
market approach endorsed in Jenkins and in EAJA’s
plain text based in part on a Senate committee report
that cited as an example of an “expense” paralegal time
“billed at cost.” See Pet. App. 19a (quoting S. Rep. No.
98-586, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 15 (1984)). That reliance
was misplaced for several reasons.

*The Federal Circuit majority acknowledged that, in Casey,
the Court “reaffirmed its holding in Jenkins that paralegal
services are included in § 1988's definition of attorney’s fees.” Pet.
App. lla. The majority quoted virtually all of the Casey opinion
immediately before and after the blocked quotation reproduced
above, see id., but omitted the part most relevant to this case: the
sentence that identified EAJA as a statute that, like other fee-
shifting statutes, makes no separate mention of paralegal services
and thus incorporates those services within the term “attorney
fees.”

den mw ee tomd

25

First, contrary to the Federal Circuit’s
understanding of EAJA, the report’s reference to
paralegal services as an “expense” tells us nothing
about whether those services should be valued at
market rate or at the attorney’s cost, since all items
compensable under EAJA, including attorney fees, are
“expenses.” See infra at 36-38 (discussing the Federal
Circuit’s misreading of EAJA in this regard). And the
report’s reference to paralegal time “billed at cost”
reflects only that if paralegal time is billed at cost in
the marketplace, it should be compensated under
EAJA on that basis. See Jenkins, 491 U.S. at 288

fawr -eee

‘ 2 tureasneeg, aaa . 47VV poyuues ual Lue WUrkK OL
paralegals invariably be billed separately. If it is the
practice in the relevant market not to do so, or to bill
the work of paralegals only at cost, that is all that §
1988 requires.”). But if paralegal time is billed on an
above-cost hourly basis, then the market should control
there as well. The Senate report does not address that
scenario or purport to preclude that result.’

Moreover, the Federal Circuit relied on the
committee report selectively. Shortly before the line
quoted by the Federal Circuit, the report relied on an
interpretation of EAJA issued by the Administrative
Conference of the United States (ACUS) that would
“permit the award of ‘reasonable expenses of the

‘In addition, the Federal Circuit assumed that the committee
report’s reference to an expense award “at cost” meant the
attorney's cost rather than the c/ient’s cost. That assumption is
not correct because EAJA provides reimbursement for the
expenses incurred by the “prevailing party,” not the prevailing
party's lawyer. See infra Part C.

26

attorney ... as a separate item, if the attorney ...
ordinarily charges clients for such expenses.” S. Rep.
No. 98-586, at 14 (quoting ACUS interpretation)
(emphasis added). The committee thus endorsed
ACUS’s position that the market should control the
determination of what types of services are separately
compensable under EAJA. Given that market-based
approach, it is unlikely that the same committee
believed that the market should be disregarded in
valuing any of those services, including paralegal
services. Indeed, immediately after its reference to
ACUS’s views, the committee report cited with
approval the Sixth Circuit’s decision in Northcross v.
Board of Education, a section 1988 case that took a
market-based approach to the award of fees and
expenses generally and held that attorney fees for
paralegal services should be awarded at market rates.
See 611 F.2d at 638. In sum, the committee report
taken as a whole bolsters Richlin’s view that, under
EAJA, paralegal services should be compensated as the
market compensates them. In any case, the report
hardly provides unambiguous support for the Federal
Circuit’s ruling.

Finally, the Federal Circuit majority’s reliance on
the committee report fails for a more fundamental
reason: The report is not “legislative history” at all.
The Senate report was prepared for a 1984 version of
EAJA passed by the 98th Congress but vetoed by the
President. See H.R. Rep. No. 99-120, pt. 1, at 6 (1985),
reprinted in 1985 U.S.C.C.A.N. 132, 134. Thus, the
court of appeals erred in its original opinion in stating
that “Congress acted to make EAJA permanent in
1984.” Pet. App. 19a. In fact, as that court later

27

acknowledged in its supplemental opinion, /d. at 56a
n.2, EAJA was made permanent not by the 98th
Congress in 1984, but by the 99th Congress in 1985,
and “{nlo Senate Report was submitted with thlat)
legislation.” 1985 U.S.C.C.A.N. 132. The House
committee report that accompanied the bill that was
actually enacted in 1985 makes no mention of the
treatment of paralegal services. See id. at 132-57.

To the extent that legislative history serves as
legitimate evidence of congressional intent, it does so
only because it is presumed to have been ratified by
Congress and the President when the relevant
legislation was enacted. See Jonathan R. Siegel, 7he
Use of Legislative History in a System of Separated
Powers, 53 Vand. L. Rev. 1457, 1522 (2000); cf
Sullivan v. Finkelstein, 496 U.S. 617, 631-32 (1990)
(Scalia, J., concurring). That did not occur with respect
to the 1984 report cited by the Federal Circuit. That
court’s assertion that the Senate report is “pertinent”
nonetheless because the President’s veto reflected
concern about a topic other than paralega! services and
the enacted 1985 legislation was otherwise “nearly,
identical” to the failed 1984 legislation, see Pet. App
56a n.2, sidesteps the problem: The Federal Circuit s
defense of the 1984 report does not attempt to explain
how a committee report produced to accompany
legislation voted on by one Congress could have been
ratified by another Congress that did not produce that
report, did not enact the legislation accompanying that
report, and never referred to the relevant issue in its
own legislative history.

In its opposition to certiorari, the government
claimed reliance on the 1984 committee report was

28

justified even though it accompanied vetoed legislation
because this Court endorsed that kind of reliance in a
footnote in United States v. Enmons, 410 U.S. 396, 404
n.14 (1973). See Cert. Opp. 8 n.4. If anything, the
Enmons footnote underscores that the 1984 report is
not a legitimate basis for giving meaning to the 1985
legislation. Over a four-justice dissent, the footnote
permitted reliance on floor statements accompanying
unenacted legislation only because those statements
were repeatedly endorsed in the legislative history
accompanying the legislation that was actually
enacted. As explained above, the legislative history
that accompanied the enacted version of EAJA did not
mention paralegal services, let alone endorse the
snippet of faux legislative history on which the Federal
Circuit relied.
* * *

For all of the reasons addressed above, paralegal
services are “attorney fees” that must be awarded at
“prevailing market rates” under EAJA.

B. EAJA’s Adjustable Rate Cap Provides No Basis For
Compensating Paralegal Services At Cost.

As explained above, our view that paralegal
services are compensable under EAJA at market rates
comports with Jenkins and EAJA’s text, structure, and
purpose. Moreover, as this Court put it in Jenkins,
“encouraging the use of lower cost paralegals rather
than attorneys wherever possible, ... ‘encourages
cost-effective delivery of legal services.” 491 U.S. at
288 (quoting Cameo, 738 F.2d at 846); Pet. App. 23a
(relying on market forces “encourages cost-effective
delivery of legal services.”) (Plager, J., dissenting); see

29

also Miller v. Alamo, 983 F.2d 856, 862 (8th Cir. 1993)
(“Work done by paralegals is compensable if it is work
that would have been done by an attorney. If such
hours were not compensable, then attorneys may be
compelled to perform the duties that could otherwise
be fulfilled by paralegals, thereby increasing the
overall cost of legal services.”); Jean, 863 F.2d at 778
(same).*

The Federal Circuit, however, maintained that this
rationale does not apply here in light of EAJA’s
adjustable cap on hourly rates. Pet. App. 18a. In its
view, if paralegal services were compensable at market
rates, there would be an undue incentive to use
paralegal services (recovery for which would be largely
or entirely uncapped), rather than lawyer services
(recovery for which would be limited by the fee cap).
See id. Thus, the Federal Circuit maintained,
paralegals would be “overused,” inducing “less efficient
performance of legal services.” /d. This argument is
insufficient to overcome Jenkins, EAJA’s text, and the

“The efficiency rationale for use of paralegals was well
understood at the time of EAJA’s enactment. See, e.g., Todd
Shipyards, 545 F.2d at 1182 (“Paralegals can do some of the work
that the attorney would have to do anyway and can do it at
substantially less cost per hour, resulting in less total cost billed
to the employer [client]. Therefore, paralegal time at paralegal
rates can reasonably be counted along with the attorney’s time as
‘attorney fees.”); Jn re Chicken, 560 F. Supp. at 977 (“The advent
and widespread use of the paraprofessional has meant that the
cost of effective legal counsel has been reduced and its availability
enhanced without impairing the quality or delivery of legal
services.”); Mid-Hudson, 465 F. Supp. at 274 n.16 (“The use of
paralegals saves lawyer’s time and consequently money. It should
be encouraged, not the reverse.”).

30

other evidence of congressional intent discussed in Part
A above. Moreover, for the reasons that follow, the
argument fails on its own terms.

1. The Federal Circuit’s position appears to be
based on that court’s mistaken belief that, as a general
proposition, Congress sought in EAJA to compensate
parties for their litigation expenses on a below-market-
rate basis. Pet. App. 16a-17a (“It seems unlikely that
Congress would have set the fee for paralegals as high
as $75 per hour ... [,] given the overall desire to cap
allowable fees below market rates.”). The Federal
Circuit erred because it looked at EAJA from today’s
perspective — where lawyers’ hourly rates at large
commercial law firms in major metropolitan areas are
generally above the EAJA cap — not from the vantage
point of EAJA’s original enactment in 1980 or its
reenactment in 1985. As this Court has put it,
however, “[t]o interpret accurately” Congress’s intent,
a court should not read statutes “as if they were
written today, for to do so would inevitably distort
their intended meaning.” Goldstein v. California, 412
U.S. 546, 564 (1973).

EAJA was not conceived as a statute under which
most legal work performed by most lawyers would be
compensable at below-market rates. To the contrary,
EAJA was conceived as a market-rate statute, as its
text expressly indicates, albeit one under which some
of the costs of legal services were capped (unless the
statutory criteria for lifting the cap were met). In 1980,
the circumstances in which the hourly-rate ceiling
would be below a lawyer’s reasonable hourly market
were relatively rare. Indeed, in the years leading up to
EAJA’s enactment, lawyers’ market rates were often

31

below $75 per hour, sometimes well below.’ Generally,
fee rates exceeded $75 per hour only for relatively
senior lawyers in large metropolitan law firms."
Indeed, even in the period between EAJA’s initial
enactment in 1980 and its reenactment in 1985, the
unadjusted $75 per hour rate cap proved sufficient to

* See, e.g., Francia, 594 F.2d at 781 ($32 per hour “and up”);
Skehan, 501 F. Supp. at 1368-69 ($50-$70 per hour for seven
attorneys in practice in Washington, D.C., and $80 per hour for
one attorney who graduated law school in 1957 and had practiced
for ‘seven years at the Office of the Solicitor General); Swicker, 484
t Cupp. ae ree fu (A 9OU UCLIDIUL CILiLy Ald UISCUSSINg Wide range
of cases in which hourly rates almost invariably were below $75
per hour, referring to 1977 study finding that “mean hourly rate
awarded in Title VII cases was $40,” and awarding fees of $60 per
hour for work of two attorneys and $40 per hour for
another); Kennedy v. Crittendon, 1980 WL 243, *4 (M.D. Ga. 1980)
($30 to $60 per hour); Brady v. Washington County, 509 F. Supp.
538, 543 (E.D. Tenn. 1979) (plaintiffs witness testified in fee
proceeding “that the customary charge for legal services in civil
matters in the area. . . is $50-an-hour.”); Mid-Hudson, 465 F.
Supp. at 270 (awards ranging from $50 to $80 per hour); Aumiller,
455 F. Supp. at 682 ($25 to $75 per hour); McPherson v. School
Dist. No. 186, 465 F. Supp. 749, 760 (S.D. Ill. 1978) (awarding $25
to $60 per hour and noting that the “current average hourly rate
in Springfield for complex federal litigation is $50 per hour for
experienced attorneys comparable in ability to” the senior lawyer
in the case); Nee/y, 77 F.R.D. at 486 (“prevailing hourly rate” of
$35 to $45 per hour).

- See, e.g.,Coalition to Preserve Houston, 494 F. Supp. at 747
($30 to $75 per hour for three attorneys and $85 to $100 per hour
for the senior lawyer); Selzer, 477 F. Supp. at 688, 690-91 (court
awarded “normal billing rates of approximately $125 per hour for
partners’ time and between $27.25 to $65 per hour for associates’
time” at major New York law firm, noting that fee resulted in an
average rate of about $60 per hour).

32

replicate the market for most or all legal work in most
cases.’

This point is driven home by the model rules issued
by the Administrative Conference of the United States
shortly after EAJA’s reenactment in 1985. The rules
provided that, in determining the compensable market
rate, the adjudicator should consider various factors,
including the customary fees for similar services and
prevailing market rates in the community. 51 Fed.
Reg. 16659, 16666 (May 6, 1986). This guidance would
have had little value if market rates for legal services
were generally expected to exceed the statutory fee cap.

"! See, e.g., Groves v. Heckler, 599 F. Supp. 830, 834 (M.D. Pa.
1984) ($65 per hour); Citizens for Responsible Resource Dev. v.
Watt, 579 F. Supp. 431, 449 (D. Ala. 1983) ($70 per hour); Cable
Atlanta, Inc. v. Project, Inc., 572 F. Supp. 1113, 1116 (N.D. Ga.
1983) ($60 per hour for one lawyer and $75 per hour for another):
Wallace v. Sec’y of HHS, 1983 WL 44228, *2 (D. Mass. 1983) ($35
to $60 per hour); Chee v. Schweiker, 563 F. Supp. 1362, 1365 (D.
Ariz. 1983) (“$50 per hour is a reasonable rate in plaintiff's local
area for the type of legal services rendered in this case.”);
Kauffman v. Schweiker, 559 F. Supp. 372, 377 (M.D. Pa. 1983)
($50 per hour); J.A. Jones Constr. Co. v. Southern Stress Wire
Corp., 575 F. Supp. 365, 370 (N.D. Ga. 1982) ($60 to $65 per hour
for one lawyer and $70 to $75 per hour for another); Envt/.
Defense Fund, Inc. v. Watt, 554 F. Supp. 36, 42 (E.D.N.Y. 1982)
(“The hourly rates requested for each individual appear to be
based on prevailing market rates and are at or within the 75
dollar-per-hour limit established by” EAJA.); Moholland v.
Schweiker, 546 F. Supp. 383, 387 (D.N.H. 1982) ($30 to $50 per
hour); Visser v. Magnarelli, 542 F. Supp. 1331, 1338 (N.D.N.Y.
1982) (awarding $75 per hour because “it represents the hourly
rate in this area normally charged for similar work by attorneys
of like skill”); WATCH v. Harris, 535 F. Supp. 9, 15-16 (D. Conn.
1981) (awarding fees at $45 to $50 per hour).

er ee.

33

We do not intend to suggest that the fee cap in 1980
or 1985 was at or above the prevailing market rates for
all lawyers in all markets; as noted earlier, it was not.
Rather, our point is only that EAJA was seen primarily
as a market-rate-based fee-shifting statute that would,
with its potential to adjust rates for increases in the
cost of living, provide market-rate compensation for
most, albeit not all, compensable legal work. EAJA’s
drafters could not have foreseen that inflation in legal
services would greatly outstrip inflation generally.
They would thus have had no reason to believe that the
EAJA fee cap would, as a general matter, promote the
“Uvcsusc UL iwKal persuuiuel ViLIeU AL relatively 10w
rates.

2. Even if we were to assume (incorrectly) that
EAJA’s drafters contemplated a world in which market
rates for lawyers generally exceeded EAJA’s cap, the
Federal Circuit’s concern about the fee cap would still
be misguided. That concern was necessarily premised
on the unstated proposition that EAJA will motivate
law firms to shunt work to paralegals incapable of
handling that work. But that proposition is implausible
because of the strong ethical and economic incentives
not to assign work in that manner. The requirement
that lawyers provide competent and zealous
representation would generally prohibit a lawyer from
demanding that a paralegal, say, write an appellate
brief, just as law firm partners generally cannot assign
the most complex and sensitive matters to a brand-new
lawyer, even if doing so would save clients money in
the short term. Nor would the market permit such
inappropriate use of paralegals. If a law firm were to
overuse paralegals in the manner contemplated by the

34

Federal Circuit, the client would not save in the end,
because the quality of legal services would suffer, and
the client would demand the proper use of law firm
personnel or take its business elsewhere. And, on the
other hand, if the EAJA rate cap induces law firms to
provide paralegals with additional work that they are
capable of handling, the client will save money, and
Jenkins’s efficiency rationale will be served in spades.

In addition, consider what would happen if the
Federal Circuit’s rule controlled. In cases subject to
EAJA, paralegal services would be recoverable only at
the cost of those services to law firms — and clients
would lose. In cases where fees were recoverable —
that is, where the client had prevailed and the
government’s position was held to be unreasonable —
EAJA would reimburse only the law firm’s cost in
employing the paralegal, even though the client would
have incurred fees at full market rate. That result
would run counter to a central purpose of EAJA: “to
eliminate for the average person the financial
disincentive to challenge unreasonable governmental
actions.” Jean, 496 U.S. at 163.

3. In any event, the Federal Circuit's concern about
the supposed overuse of paralegals proves far too
much. The Federal Circuit's concern, though
misguided, is, to be sure, premised on a basic truth
about the fee cap: EAJA provides less reimbursement,
as a percentage of the total fee incurred by the client,
the more the law firm uses higher-priced personnel
whose market rates exceed the fee cap. As noted, the
Federal Circuit claimed that if fees for paralegal
services are recoverable at market rates, law firms will
assign work to relatively low-priced paralegals whose

35

market-rate fees are likely to be fully recoverable
because they generally fall below the fee cap.

As explained earlier (at 30-33), in EAJA’s early
years, even in relatively rare instances where some
attorney rates in some locations exceeded the cap, the
rates of junior and mid-level lawyers did not, and,
thus, fees for their work were fully recoverable even if
fees for the work of their senior colleagues were not.
Today, however, largely because inflation in legal
services has outstripped increases in the cost of living
generally, the market rates for relatively junior
associates as well as their more senior colleagues often
exceed even tne intlation-adjusted KAJA cap. But even
when that occurs, the rates for junior associates and
senior partners frequently differ dramatically. See,
e.g., Gautreaux v. Chicago Hous. Auth., 491 F.3d 649,
660 (7th Cir. 2007) (rates ranging from $200 to $400
per hour); Hixon v. City of Golden Valley, 2007 WL
4373111 (D. Minn. 2007) (same); Laffey Matrix,
available at http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/de/Divisions/Ci
vil_Division/Laffey_Matrix_7.html (District of
Columbia fee rates ranging from $215 per hour for
lawyers with one to three years of experience to $425
per hour for lawyers with more than 20 years of
experience). Thus, if the Federal Circuit were correct
about the effect of the rate cap, in cases subject to

"The Laffey matrix serves as a benchmark for market-rate fee
shifting in federal litigation in the Washington, D.C. area and is
updated annually by the office of the U.S. Attorney for the District
of Columbia. It has its origins in Laffey v. Northwest Airlines, Inc.,
572 F. Supp. 354, 388 (D.D.C. 1983), afd in part, rev d in part on
other grounds, 746 F.2d 4 (D.C. Cir. 1984).

36

EAJA, junior Jawyers would be “overused” and
inefficiency supposedly would ensue. But no one would
suggest that the work of junior associates is not
compensable as “attorney fees” under EAJA and that
such work may only be reimbursed at the associates’
cost to their law firms.

To be sure, junior associates are lawyers and
paralegals are not. But the fact that junior lawyers,
just as surely as paralegals, would be “overused” under
the Federal Circuit’s view of EAJA demonstrates that
it is recent hyper-inflation in the market for legal
services generally, and nothing about the cost of
paralegal services in particular or the meaning of the
statutory term “attorney fees,” that is the true source
of the Federal Circuit’s concern.

* + *

For all of these reasons, EAJA’s fee cap is irrelevant
to the question presented and provides no basis for
ignoring Jenkins and EAJA’s requirement that
attorney fees be awarded at “prevailing market rates.”

C. Paralegal Services Are Not “Other Expenses”
Under EAJA, But Even If They Are, They Should
Be Awarded At The Cost To The Client Not The
Cost To The Lawyer.

1. The question in this case is whether paralegal
services are compensable under EAJA at market rates
or at the cost of those services to the lawyer, as the
government maintains. In taking the latter approach,
the Federal Circuit focused on the fact that EAJA
authorizes an award of “expenses,” claiming in
particular that EAJA draws a distinction between
“attorney fees,” billed at market rates, and “expenses,”

-~s -1e OOS

37

billed at cost. See, e.g., Pet. App. 19a (“[Wle hold that
paralegal services are not recoverable as fees, but are
only recoverable as expenses at the cost to the
attorney.”); id. at 55a-56a (“[Playments for paralegal
services under EAJA are not recoverable as ‘attorney's
fees’ but are recoverable as ‘expenses,’ allowable only
at cost.”). With that supposed statutory distinction in
mind, the court of appeals distinguished Jenkinson the
ground that, in contrast to EAJA’s reference to
“expenses,” section 1988 refers only to “attorney's fees”
and does not mention “expenses.” See id. at 15a.

The Federal Circuit seriously misread EAJA’s plain
LAL. GAA autnorizes an award ot “fees and other
expenses.” 5 U.S.C. § 504(a)(1) (emphasis added); see
also 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A) (same). “Fees and other
expenses” are defined to include “reasonable attorney
... fees,” the amount of which “shall be based upon
prevailing market rates for the kind and quality of
services furnished ....” 5 U.S.C. § 504(b)(1)(A); see also
28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2(A) (same). Thus, a// awards
under EAJA are awards of “expenses,” including
awards of “attorney fees.” The Federal Circuit’s
dichotomy between “expenses” awarded at cost, on the
one hand, and “attorney fees” awarded at market rate,
on the other, is flatly at odds with the statute.

Put another way, the term “expenses” cannot, as
the Federal Circuit contemplated, mean only those
items awardable at cost because that term includes
fees, which are awardable at market rates. Cf Marek,
473 U.S. at 9 (because section 1988 authorizes award
of “attorney's fees as part of the costs,” such fees are
“costs” under that section and Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 68). For that reason, the Federal Circuit's

38

reliance on the presence in EAJA of the term
“expenses” begs the questions — already answered in
Jenkins — whether the statutory term “attorney fees”
includes paralegal services, and whether fees for such
services may be awarded at market rates. (And as
previously discussed, under EAJA, once it is
determined that paralegal services are a component of
“attorney fees,” further reliance on Jenkins is
unnecessary because the statute says that “fees” are to
be awarded at “prevailing market rates.”)"®

2. The government apparently has recognized the
flaw in the Federal Circuit’s reasoning and now says
that the question presented is whether paralegal
services are compensable at market rate as fees, or as
“other expenses’ compensable at the rate of cost to the
attorney.” Cert. Opp. (D. But that new parsing of the
statute does not help the government. “Other
expenses” under EAJA generally refers to out-of-pocket
expenses for services provided by third parties outside
of the law firm. Those out-of-pocket expenses can
either be paid directly by the client or incurred in the
first instance by the lawyer on the client's behalf.

'’Moreover, the Federal Circuit’s reliance on the absence of an
express provision for the award of out-of-pocket “expenses” under
section 1988 as a basis for distinguishing Jenkins overlooks that
section 1988 has long been read to authorize recovery of out-of-
pocket expenses. See, e.g., Casey, 499 U.S. at 87 n.3 (noting that
courts have held that “reasonable out-of-pocket expenses incurred
by the attorney’ [are] included in § 1988 ‘attorney's fee’ award”)
(quoting Northcross, 611 F.2d at 639); T's. of the Constr. Indus. &
Laborers Health & Welfare Trust v. Redland Ins. Co., 460 F.3d
1253, 1257 (9th Cir. 2006); Dowdell v. City of Apopka, Fla., 698
F.2d 1181, 1190-91 (11th Cir. 1983).

39

Thus, courts have regularly approved
reimbursement for “other expenses,” such as
transportation and other travel costs, postage, long
distance telephone calls, and the like paid by the client
or the law firm to outside vendors to accomplish the
client’s objectives in the litigation."* In these situations,
to be sure, if the lawyer pays the bill to the outside
vendor, reimbursement is limited to the lawyer’s cost,
but only because such reimbursement is also the cost
to the client. Thus, these “other expenses” are in reality
charged at market rates — that is, at the rate that the
client is willing to pay for them in the relevant market,
whothor that in the Gimvuae uuae uue puuue COlpany
charges for long distance calls made on the client’s
behalf or that an airline charges for a flight taking the
lawyer to court. And, that is why, in deciding whether
“other expenses” are compensable under EAJA, the
courts have generally taken a follow-the-market
approach and allowed reimbursement of such expenses
when they are ordinarily billed separately to the client
in the relevant legal market rather than included in
the attorney’s overhead. See, e.g., Int Woodworkers,
792 F.2d at 767; Adkinson, 256 F.Supp.2d at 1319.

Awarding expenses at the lawyer’s cost — when it
is different from the client’s cost — runs headlong into
this market-based approach to expense recovery and is

'* See, e.g., Kelly v. Bowen, 862 F.2d 1333, 1335 (8th Cir. 1988);
Int] Woodworkers of Am. v. Donovan, 792 F.2d 762,767 (9th Cir.
1985): Jean, 863 F.2d at 778; United States v. Adkinson, 256 F.
Supp. 2d 1297,1319 (N.D. Fla. 2003), afd, 360 F.3d 1257 (11th
Cir. 2004).

40

an irrational basis for reimbursing a party under a fee-
shifting statute. By definition, clients incur paralegal
expenses at market rutes. The Federal Circuit,
however, decided that those services should only be
reimbursed at their lawyers’ cost. But that was no
better than plucking a number out of the air. The cost
to the lawyer might be a third, or half, or two-thirds of
what the party actually incurred for the paralegal’s
time, and thus has no relation to the market rate or
any other sensible guidepost for the cl/ient’s expense
recovery.

Paralegal services are not generally purchased from
third-party vendors, but are performed by in-house law
firm personnel under the direction of attorneys, which
is one reason why it makes sense to view paralegal
services as a component of statutory “attorney fees.”
See Jenkins, 491 U.S. at 285 (holding that term
“attorney's fees” was meant to compensate work of all
personnel “whose labor contributes to the work product
for which an attorney bills her client.”). But, for the
reasons stated above, if the Court rejects our position
that paralegal services are a component of EAJA
“attorney fees,” and agrees with the government that
paralegal services are “other expenses,” those services
should be reimbursed at the client's cost, not at the
lawyer's cost. After all, EAJA authorizes an award of
fees and other expenses “to the prevailing party,” 5
U.S.C. § 504(a)(1); 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A), not that
party's lawyer, and so if paralegal services are to be
awarded at cost, that cost should be the party’s.

3. The irrationality of the Federal Circuit’s decision
to award paralegal expenses at the lawyer’s cost is
underscored by the practical problems it will cause

oe ees ee Ret ke

41

(and has already caused). As noted earlier, the award
to Richlin for paralegal services was based on the
Board of Contract Appeals’ informal Internet survey of
paralegal salaries. But that is not the proper way tv
assess “the attorney’s cost.” Pet. App. 19a. The
attorney’s cost for a paralegal would include not only
the paralegal’s salary, but the cost of employer
provided fringe benefits and a share of all overhead
allocable to the paralegal, including utilities, rent or
depreciation, and similar administrative costs. The cost
computation would be difficult, and it would differ
paralegal to paralegal, firm to firm, and, arguably,
ocasuu Ww scasulL. DispuLles WUUIU arise 45 LU WHeLNe!
this or that cost were properly included in overhead

These problems are not theoretical. The difficulties
of properly assessing the cost to the attorney may be
insurmountable, as illustrated by two EAJA cases
decided in the wake of the decision below. In Former
Employees of BMC Software, Inc. v. Sec'v of Labor, _
F. Supp. 2d ___, 2007 WL 2994605 (C.I.T. 2007), the
court noted that “[clalculating the amount of the award
for the paralegal-type work in this case is particularl)
difficult in light of ... Richlin ....” Id. at *38. It
explained that although “(plrior to Rich/in, KAJA
awards had included compensation for paralegal work
at market rates ..., [now they] are only recoverable as
expenses at the cost to the attorney.” Id. (emphasis in
original, internal quotation omitted). Because it was
“impossible to calculate the [paralegal] fee award in
this case” based on the prevailing partys fce
application that had been filed prior to the decision
below, the applicant was “accorded the opportunity to
provide information on the cost to the law firm of any

42

paralegals and other non-attorneys whose time is
reflected in the [fee] Application.” Jd.

But proving actual cost turned out to be too
difficult, and “(rlather than attempt to separately
determine the actual cost to the firm for the”
paralegals, the prevailing party had to settle for less —
the hourly rate that the Federal Circuit had allowed to
Richlin, based on paralegal salaries alone. Former
Employees of BMC Software, Inc. v. Sec’y of Labor,
2007 WL 4181696, *3 (C.L.T. 2007). That result had the
virtue of simplicity, but not common sense: The award
for paralegal services lacked any connection either to
what the party had incurred for paralegal services or
to an accurate assessment of the attorney’s cost.

Even worse, in /nformation Sciences Corp. v.
United States, 78 Fed. Cl. 673, 683 (Fed. Cl. 2007),
“liln light of the level of proof demanded by Rich/in,”
the prevailing plaintiff “withdrlew] aclaim for recovery
of paralegal fees,” thereby relinquishing $15,875 that
it had incurred for paralegal services in opposing
unreasonable government conduct — fees to which it
would have been entitled had the court based its award

on market rates.
* * *

There is a mechanism that avoids the complexity
and irrationality of compensating paralegal services at
the lawyer’s cost. It is called a market, which silently
and definitively values legal services. It avoids both the
arbitrary loss of deserved compensation, as has
occurred as a result of the decision below, and the
“second major litigation,” Hens/ey, 461 U.S. at 437,
that would ensue if litigants were required to ascertain

43

the value of legal services based on the artificial
criterion of the lawyer's cost. It is also the mechanism
chosen by Congress when it decided that attorney fees
under EAJA should be valued at “prevailing market
rates.” 5 U.S.C. § 504(b)(1)(A); 28 U.S.C.
§ 2412(d)(2){A).

CONCLUSION

The decision below should be reversed and the case
remanded for the purpose of setting an award of
attorney fees for paralegal services at market rates.

Respectfully submitted,

Brian Wolfman

(Counsel of Record)

Scott L. Nelson

Public Citizen Litigation Group
1600 20th Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20009

(202) 588-1000

January 2008 Counsel for Petitioner

ADDENDUM
28 U.S.C. § 2412

(d)(1)(A) Except as otherwise specifically provided
by statute, a court shall award to a preveiling party
other than the United States fees and other expenses,
in addition to any costs awarded pursuant to
subsection (a), incurred by that party in any civil
action (other than cases sounding in tort), including
proceedings for judicial review of agency action,
brought by or against the United States in any court
having jurisdiction of that action, unless the court finds
that the position of the United States was substantially
justified or that special circumstances make an award
unjust.

* * *

(2) For the purposes of this subsection—

(A) “fees and other expenses” includes the
reasonable expenses of expert witnesses, the
reasonable cost of any study, analysis, engineering
report, test, or project which is found by the court to be
necessary for the preparation of the party's case, and
reasonable attorney fees (The amount of fees awarded
under this subsection shall be based upon prevailing
market rates for the kind and quality of the services
furnished, except that (i) no expert witness shall be
compensated at a rate in excess of the highest rate of
compensation for expert witnesses paid by the United
States: and (ii) attorney fees shall not be awarded in
excess of $125 per hour unless the court determines

that an increase in the cost of living or a special factor,
such as the limited availability of qualified attorneys
for the proceedings involved, justifies a higher fee.)

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385016_0363%3A06. Public record. Not legal advice.
