# Amicus Curiae Brief — Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. At Austin, 135 S. Ct. 2888 (2015) (No. 14-981)

> Briefs, arguments, decisions, and more.

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385016_0328%3A018

## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Amicus Curiae Brief
- **Published:** January 1, 2015

## Text

IN THE

Supreme Court of the Anited States

ABIGAIL NOEL FISHER,
Petitioner,

Vv.
UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS AT AUSTIN, et ai.,
Respondents.

On Writ of Certiorari to the
United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit

BRIEF OF THE AMERICAN
ASSOCIATION FOR ACCESS, EQUITY
AND DIVERSITY AND EIGHT OTHER

ORGANIZATIONS AS AMICI CURIAE
IN SUPPORT OF RESPONDENTS

DEAN SPARLIN* JOSEPH D. WEINER
SPARLIN LAW OFFICE,PLLC Counsel of Record

4400 Fair Lakes Court, MICHAEL L. CHILDERS*
Suite 106 EMILY A. MCNEE*
Fairfax, VA 22033 LITTLER MENDELSON P.C.
(703) 803-8800 80 South 8th Street

dsparlin@sparliniaw.com Suite 1300

Minneapolis, MN 55402
en =«6er ae

ACTION PRACTICE jweiner@littler.com
1629 K Street NW MATTHEW J. CAMARDELLA*
Suite 300 JACKSON LEWIS P.C.
Washington, DC 20006 58 South Service Road
(202) 349-1699 Suite 250
schuyler@schuyleraap.com Melville, NY 11747

(631) 247-4369

*Of Counsel camardem®@jacksonlewis.com

IESE OATES RY ti TS TE TR SL. ASSEN LETT =
WILSON-EPES PRINTING Co. Inc. — (202) 789-0096 — WASHINGTON.D C 20002

TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ........................c00000
IDENTITY AND INTEREST OF

I. PETITIONER LACKS STANDING

Il.

BECAUSE SHE HAS SUFFERED NO
INJURY AND THE ISSUE BEFORE
ee Ae

A. Petitioner Did Not Suffer an Injury ...

1. Petitioner Has Failed to Show
a Concrete, Particularized Harm
Stemming from UT-Austin’s
Decision to Deny Her Admission....

2. Petitioner Cannot Pursue a Claim
on Behalf of Other Similarly-
Situated Individuals ......................

3. Petitioner Has Not Suffered a
Constitutional Harm ......................

EEL TES Ce

THE COURT SHOULD ANALYZE
BENIGN AND INVIDIOUS CLASSI-
FICATIONS DIFFERENTLY CON-
SISTENT WITH ITS PAST PRACTICE
AND THE PURPOSE OF THE EQUAL
PROTECTION CLAUSE. ...............:::ccec00

(i)

‘i

TABLE OF CONTENTS—Continued
Page

A. The History of the Fourteenth
Amendment Supports a Distinction
Between Benign and Invidious Use of
A ae OC nC 10

1. The Fourteenth Amendment Was
Intended to Eliminate Discrimina-
tion Against African Americans..... 10
2. Use of the Equal Protection Clause
to Target Invidious Discrimination . 11
B. The Court Can Appropriately Analyze

Benign Classifications Differently
from Invidious Classifications Using a

Spectrum Approach..........................0+ 14
1. Benign Classifications Are Distin-
guishable from Invidious Ones ...... 14

a. Historically, the Supreme Court
Distinguished Benign and

Invidious Classifications .......... 14
b. Legitimate Concerns Arise

When Applying Strict Scrutiny

to Benign Race- Based

iia eed iacienaas 17

2. Courts Can Maintain Consistency
While Analyzing the Purpose and
Motives of Benign Classifications
Using an Intermediate Level of
IT uincccucctantahinnaiiunssehentniienseinne 19

a. Applying a Spectrum Test
Allows for Consistency.............. 20

ill

TABLE OF CONTENTS—Continued

b. Consistency across’ Benign
Race and Gender Programs Is
REISE aero

C. The Court Has Modified’ the
Expressed Level of Scrutiny Based
on Its Valuation of the State’s
Interest Consistent with the

Spectrum Approach. ........................0000-

D. Properly Valuing the State’s Interest
Better Explains the Court’s Decisions
in Equal Protection Cases...................

Ill. THE HOLISTIC CONSIDERATION OF
RACE, WHICH ONLY PARTIALLY
MODERATES THE ADVERSE IMPACT
OF TEST SCORES ON MINORITIES, IS
NOT AN IMPERMISSIBLE “RACIAL
I eiciinitidihiciimiiadisnvsoiesicinnbommens

A. College Admission Tests Have
Serious Adverse Impact on Minority
I iciaticiiiciimnnioedinmniatenntinminsisten

B. Holistic Consideration of Race Is
Essential to Mitigate the Racial Bias

C. Removal of Race from the Admissions
Process Will Not Result in Racial

21

22

26

30

31

32

39
40

iv

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
CASES Page(s)

Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena,

TE TS OE passim
Arena v. Graybar Elec. Co., Inc.,

669 F.3d 214 (5th Cir. 2012)........................ 4
Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona,

I ses cncsinnionenes 8
Brown v. Board of Educ. of Topeka,

Te ce 16
Burns v. State,

I il ecciceeeial 11
Bush v. Kentucky,

I a eset 12
Castaneda v. Partida,

iowa 32

City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living
Center, Inc.,
ee I diiiccccnitccniccmvecesoseneenon 24, 25, 28

Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.,
222 F.R.D. 137 (N.D. Cal. 2004), aff'd,
474 F.3d 1214 (9th Cir. 2007), rev'd on

other grounds, 113 S. Ct. 2541 (2001) ......... 31-32
Fisher v. Univ. of Texas,
758 F.3d 633 (5th Cir. 2014) ...........0..0000000... 6,9

Fla. Chapter of the Associated Gen.
Contractors of Am. v. City of Jacksonville,
Kk eee 7

Fullilove v. Klutznick,
I a eesti 14, 35

Vv

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

Page(s)

Gratz v. Bollinger,

ee Rh SED éccteninoctecnsoceacenssesisiionmeniad 17, 18
Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,

ee ee OE veniciccacscctiuntcecitcctnadiinniaes 32
Grupo Dataflux v. Atlas Global Grp., L.P..,

ff Rk 5 SE eee 4
Grutter v. Bollinger,

539 U.S. 306 (2003) ................cececcesceseeseeseees passim
Hamer v. City of Atlanta,

872 F.2d 1521 (11th Cir. 1989) .................... 32
Johnson v. California,

543 U.S. 499 (2005) ................ccccccssseeseeeeeeeses 17, 18
Loving v. Virginia,

DR ene 14
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife,

I veicciinisierieeecsesticiiecesantueumaiaamnas 5
Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC,

Ge Ss ee Se Po vvicetnvstnadvekntinigsenamesanatens 14
Neal v. Delaware,

I es I cicnceisntncesvninsaiiinmnetiin 12
Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke,

SF es Se OEE csccecnvitiviniiincteiniciininimaniianl 16, 32
Renne v. Geary,

ee Re IED crcsceserncsisecsertnorensenneilicbeiahaniadana 8

Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co.,
2,2 Ff | —_ Fare passim

vi
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

Page(s)

Romer v. Evans,

amines 25, 26
Snowden v. Hughes,

a 19
Strauder v. West Virginia,

Neen ccecmenemnnens 11,12
Texas v. Lesage,

a 8
Tigner v. Texas,

trans 19

United Jewish Organizations of
Williamsburgh, Inc., v. Carey,
I cceesseesens 15

Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Americans
United For Separation of Church & State,

Inc., 454 U.S. 464 (1982) ...........0.... ee. 5
Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metrop. Hous.

Dev. Corp.,

a 15, 16
Warth v. Seldin,

a 6,7
Washington v. Davis,

a 15, 16
Yick Wo v. Hopkins,

Ee 15

CONSTITUTION

Ee 5,6

vii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

Page(s)
8 Rf eee passim
U.S. CONST., amend. XIV, § 1 ...................0000.. passim
STATUTES
NN iat nadall 2
Act of July 25, 1868, ch. 245, 15 Stat. 193...... 13
OTHER AUTHORITIES

ACT, Predicting Long-Term College Success
Through Degree Completion Using ACT
Composite Score, ACT Benchmarks, and
High School Grade Point Average (2012) .... 33-34

Adam Chandler, JLegal Scholarship
Highlight: The Trouble with Fisher,
SCOTUSblog (Sept. 6, 2012, 5:41 PM),
http//www.scotusblog.com/2012/09/legal-
scholarship-highlight-the-trouble-with-

SEIT iicthdetrenineindtiinnseeniadientumscanatadintisisetaninicien 9
An Open Discussion With Justice Ruth Bader
Ginsburg, 36 Conn. L. Rev. 1033 (2004)...... 26

A.P. Ellis & A.M. Ryan, Race and Cognitive-
Ability Test Performance: The Mediating
Effects of Test Preparation, Test-Taking
Strategy Use and Self-Efficacy, 33 J.
Applied Soc. Psych. 2607 (2003) .................. 40

Brian C. Eades, Note, Affirmative Action: The
United States Supreme Court Goes Color-
Blind: Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena,

29 Creighton L. Rev. 771 (1996) .................. 20

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

Page(s)

Charles A. Scherbaum et al., Examining the
Effects of Stereotype Threat on Test-Taking
Behaviors, 14 Soc. Psychol. Ed. 361 (2011). 40

13 Charles Alan Wright, et al., Fed. Practice

& Procedure (3d ed. 2008)......................00.... 4
College Board, 2008 College-Bound Seniors
otal Group Profile Report (2008) ............... 31, 33

College Board, Validity of the SAT for
Predicting First-Year College Grade Point
Average, Research Report No. 2008-5

SI iaiiiciciaecipia deena ieialal aaa saebiahiatiaiuadile 33, 34
Cong. Globe, 42d Cong., Ist Sess. app. 68
REET Resin eres Nee Sane em Ee 11

Eric Schnapper, Affirmative Action and the
Legislative History of the Fourteenth
Amendment, 71 Va. L. Rev. 753 (1985) ....... 13

Frank S. Ravitch, Creating Chaos In The
Name Of Consistency: Affirmative Action
And The Odd Legacy Of Adarand
Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 101 Dick. L.
SEER ER aee eer lee eee 22

Goodwin Liu, The Myth and the Math of
Affirmative Action, Wash. Post, Apr. 14,
2001, available at http://diversity.umich.

edu/admissions/statementa/liu.html............ 7,8
H.R. Exec. Doc. No. 11, 39th Cong., Ist Sess.
oe ES REI FREE E SEI SEMI Se AiR NER on 13

ix
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued
Page(s)

Paul Brest et al., Processes of Constitutional
Decisionmaking (2006) .............cccccccceseeeeeeeees 10

Roy. O. Freedle, Correcting the SAT’s Ethnic
and Social-Class Bias: A Method for
Reestimating SAT Scores, 73 Harvard Ed.
GS RAE Ee ne RES PSAP Seem 40

U.S. Bureau of Refugees, Freedmen and
Abandoned Lands, Sixth Semi-Annual
Report on Schools for Freedmen (July 1,
SEE a ie een ane Denis cee ae ee 13

William Nelson, The Fourteenth Amendment:
From Political Principle to Judicial
EER Rn 2 La a ee oe 10-11

IDENTITY AND INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE

The American Association for Access, Equity and
Diversity (“AAAED”), California Hispanic Chambers
of Commerce (“CHCC”), Feeding and Teaching
Organization of Los Angeles (“Feeding and Teaching”),
Fund for Leadership, Equity, Access and Diversity
(“LEAD Fund”), California Leadership Institute
(“CLI”), National Association for Diversity Officers in
Higher Education (“NADOHE”), National Organization
for Women Foundation (“NOW Foundation”), TODOS
UNIDOS, Inc., and Transgender Legal Defense &
Education Fund (“TLDEF”) respectfully submit this
brief amici curiae in support of the Respondent
University of Texas at Austin (“UT-Austin”).'

AAAED, founded in 1974 as the American
Association for Affirmative Action, is a national non-
profit organization of approximately 1,000 practicing
professionals and institutions. Nearly one-half of
AAAED members, who manage affirmative action,
equal opportunity, diversity, and other human re-
sources programs, work for colleges and universities.

CHCC, representing the interests of over 700,000
Hispanic owned businesses in California, recognizes
the importance of affirmative action in academic
admissions to the diverse business and education
communities, and its impact on procurement, which is
so essential to economic growth.

' Pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 37.6, counsel for amici
certify that no counsel for any party authored this brief in whole
or in part and that no person or entity other than amici made a
monetary contribution intended to fund the brief’s preparation or
submission. Letters from the parties consenting to the filing of
this amici brief have been filed with the Court.

2
Feeding and Teaching is dedicated to alleviating
hunger and providing skills to the needy, developing
programs to increase awareness of the hunger
problem, and providing an opportunity for
volunteerism and community involvement.

The LEAD Fund was established as a 501(c\3)
charitable organization to provide thought leadership
in promoting inclusive organizations and institutions
through research and education on issues related to
diversity, social responsibility, human, and civil
rights.

CLI is a non-partisan and non-profit organization
dedicated to educating current and future leaders and
building a catalyst for change.

NADOHE serves as the preeminent voice for
diversity officers in higher education, producing and
disseminating empirical evidence to support diversity
initiatives, identifying and circulating exemplary
practices, providing professional development for
current and aspiring diversity officers, informing and
influencing national and local policies, and creating
and fostering networking opportunities.

NOW Foundation, a 501(c\3) organization devoted
to furthering women’s rights through litigation and
education, has as a primary objective assuring access
to all aspects of education for women and girls,
including equal access for women and girls of color.

TODOS UNIDOS is a 501(c)\3) nonprofit
corporation founded in 2004 providing programs and
services in the areas of education, health, social,
cultural and economic development, and serves
thousands of Latinos and others in California.

3

TLDEF is a nonprofit law firm committed to ending
discrimination in employment, education, and access
to health care based upon gender identity and
expression, and to achieving equality for transgender
people through public ed ication, test-case litigation,
direct legal services, and put.ic policy efforts.

Given their missions and membership composition,
Amici are uniquely suited to opine on ithe importance
of both (1) the need for diversity on campus to ensure
that students receive the best possible education and
graduate with the skills and experiences necessary to
succeed as citizens, workers, and leaders, and (2) the
need for diversity on campus to employers who, to
remain competitive, must hire qualified workers
reflecting the increasingly diverse communities and
markets in which their businesses operate.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

Following remand by this Court, the Fifth Circuit
concluded UT-Austin’s limited consideration of race in
admissions to further holistic diversity satisfied a
strict scrutiny inquiry. Unhappy with that decision,
Petitioner again seeks to bar consideration of race by
UT-Austin (or any other institution of higher
education) asserting that, in essence, the use of race
can never satisfy strict scrutiny. Petitioner asks the
Court to endorse a standard of review strict in theory,
but fatal in fact.

Amici support the Fifth Circuit decision and submit
this brief to further elaborate on three issues. First,
Petitioner lacks standing bocause she can make no
show'ng of an injury and the issue at the heart of her
case is moot. Second, even if Petitioner has standing,
the Court should rule in favor of Respondent because
(1) UT-Austin’s admissions program satisfies the

4

requirements historically associated with the level of
scrutiny applied by the Court to benign classifications,
and (2) since holistic consideration of race only
partially moderates the adverse impact of test scores,
it does not constitute an impermissible “racial
preference.”

ARGUMENT

I. PETITIONER LACKS STANDING
BECAUSE SHE HAS SUFFERED NO
INJURY AND THE ISSUE BEFORE THE
COURT IS MOOT.

Jurisdiction must exist at every stage of litigation.
A party “may raise a court’s lack of subject-matter
jurisdiction at any time in the same civil action, even
initially at the highest appellate instance.” Grupo
Dataflux v. Atlas Global Grp., L.P., 541 U.S. 567, 576
(2004) (citations omitted). The fact that “defendant/]
failed to challenge jurisdiction at a prior stage of the
litigation, . . .” does not preclude it from raising it later.
Arena v. Graybar Elec. Co., Inc., 669 F.3d 214, 223 (5th
Cir. 2012). The “independent establishment of
subject-matter jurisdiction is so important that [even]
a party ostensibly invoking federal jurisdiction may
later challenge it as a means of avoiding adverse
results on the merits.” Jd. (quoting 13 Charles Alan
Wright, et al., Fed. Practice & Procedure § 3522 at
122-23 (3d ed. 2008)).

5
A. Petitioner Did Not Suffer an Injury.

1. Petitioner Has Failed to Show a Concrete,
Particularized Harm Stemming from
UT-Austin’s Decision to Deny Her
Admission.

To have Article [II standing, Petitioner must have
suffered (1) a concrete, particularized “injury in fact”
(2) that bears a causal connection to the alleged
misconduct, and (3) that a favorable court decision is
likely to redress. Valley Forge Christian Coll. v.
Americans United For Separation of Church & State,
Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 471 (1982) (citations omitted). The
“injury in fact” — an invasion of a legally-protected
interest must be (1) concrete and particularized
(injury must affect the plaintiff in a personal and
individual way); and (2) “actual or imminent’, not
‘conjectural’ or ‘hypothetical.” Lujan v. Defenders of
Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992) (citations and
footnote omitted). Further, a plaintiff must make a
factual showing of perceptible harm. Id. at 566.

While UT-Austin denied Petitioner admission to its
undergraduate program,’ Petitioner has not provided
evidence of a causal connection to the holistic review
employed by UT-Austin and her rejection. In fact,
absent consideration of race, Petitioner would not
have been admitted to UT-Austin:

® Petitioner may claim other possible harms resulting from
Respondent's action, such as fewer or less prestigious
employment or economic opportunities, but those speculative
claims suffer from the same shortcoming as her principal claim
of harm—denial of admission to UT-Austin. No causal connection
exists between Petitioner's rejection and UT-Austin’s race-
conscious admission program.

6

Fisher’s AI scores were too low for admission
to her preferred academic programs at UT
Austin; Fisher had a Liberal Arts AI of 3.1
and a Business AI of 3.1. And, because nearly
all the seats in the undeclared major program
in Liberal Arts were filled with Top Ten
Percent students, all holistic review
applicants “were only eligible for Summer
Freshman Class or [Coordinated Admissions
Program] admission, unless their AI exceeded
3.5.” Accordingly, even if she had received a
perfect PAI score of 6, she could not have
received an offer of admission to the Fall 2008
freshman class. If she had been a minority
the result would have been the same.

Fisher v. Univ. of Texas, 758 F.3d 633, 638-39 (5th Cir.
2014). Because UT-Austin rejected Petitioner's
application based on her academic record, Petitioner
cannot establish any causal link between that decision
and UT-Austin’s race-conscious admissions program.

2. Petitioner Cannot Pursue a Claim on
Behalf of Other Similarly-Situated
Individuals.

Article III judicial power exists “only to redress or
otherwise protect against injury to the complaining
party, even though the court’s judgment may benefit
others collaterally.” Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490,
498-99 (1975). To claim an “injury,” plaintiff must
have suffered “some threatened or actual injury
resulting from the putatively illegal action.” Id.
However, UT-Austin denied Petitioner admission
because of her academic record. Assuming arguendo
that other candidates for admission at UT-Austin
suffered the type of harm claimed by Petitioner, she

7

may not “cloak” herself in their injury since it is not
enough to allege an injury that has been suffered by
other, unidentified members of the class to which she
belongs and purports to represent. Jd. at 502.

3. Petitioner Has Not Suffered a Constitutional
Harm.

Petitioner has an “injury in fact” when she can
establish the “inability to compete on an equal
footing.” Ne. Fla. Chapter of the Associated Gen.
Contractors of Am. v. City of Jacksonville, 508 U.S. 666
(1993). Further, it is not necessary to prove that the
benefit would have flowed, absent the consideration of
race, as the existence of a barrier to compete equally
is the violation. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena,
515 U.S. 200, 211 (1995). In both cases, the Supreme
Court ruled the plaintiffs were denied an opportunity
to compete equally, because the imposition of the
barrier, not the ultimate inability to obtain a benefit,
established the “injury in fact.” Id.; City of
Jacksonville, 508 U.S. at 666.

Unlike those cases, UT-Austin did not consider
Petitioner’s race. Throughout UT-Austin’s evaluation
of her personal application, there was no denial of an
opportunity to compete equally and, consequently, no
potential for constitutional harm.

Even if Petitioner could establish that she faced a
barrier in her opportunity to compete, she fails to
prove a Constitutional harm because consideration of
race likely would not have impacted the admissions
outcome in any statistically significant way. While
affirmative action programs give minority applicants
a significant boost in selective admissions, it is not
true most white applicants would fare better if schools
eliminated the practice. Goodwin Liu, The Myth and

8

the Math of Affirmative Action, Wash. Post, Apr. 14,
2001, at BO1, available at http://diversity.umich.edu/
admissions/statements/liu.html. This occurs in any
selection process in which the applicants who do not
benefit from affirmative action greatly outnumber
those who do. Id.

A study of 1989 data showed that elimination of
racial preferences would have increased the likelihood
of admission for white undergraduate applicants from
25 percent to only 26.5 percent. Jd. Further, at scores
of 1300 and above, the chance of admission for white
applicants would have increased by one percentage
point or less. Id. From a statistical standpoint,
consideration of race in the admissions process would
not have impacted Petitioner's ability to compete
equally in any meaningful way. Without a barrier to
overcome, the Constitutional harm is nonexistent.

B. The Issue Is Moot.

Federal courts only have constitutional authority to
resolve actual disputes. A live case or controversy
must exist for the court to resolve, and legal actions
cannot commence or continue after the matter has
been resolved, else the matter becomes “moot.” See
Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43
(1997); Renne v. Geary, 501 U.S. 312 (1991). Further,
when a plaintiff seeking forward-looking relief
challenges a discrete governmental decision as based
on an impermissible criterion, and the facts show
the government would have made the same decision
regardless, there is no liability and no cognizable
injury. Texas v. Lesage, 528 U.S. 18, 21 (1999).

Petitioner did not bring this case on behalf of
future applicants. She enrolled at Louisiana State

9

University and never reapplied or requested a transfer
to UT-Austin. In fact, she flatly rejected an offer
to attend a satellite campus, with the option of
transferring. Accordingly, the Fifth Circuit denied
standing for forward-looking relief, leaving the
application fee of one hundred dollars as the only
injury in dispute. Fisher, 758 F.3d at 639-50. “To
the extent that Fisher’s alleged injury is a monetary
one .. ., it bears no causal connection to the
complained-of university conduct. UT’s consideration
of race in admissions did not make Fisher any
more likely to apply to UT and thus to pay the fees. If
anything, the opposite is true.” Adam Chandler, Legal
Scholarship Highlight: The Trouble with Fisher,
SCOTUSblog (Sept. 6, 2012, 5:41 PM), http://
www.scotusblog.com/2012/09/legal-scholarship-high
light-the-trouble-with-fisher/. UT-Austin offered to
refund this application fee, and it matters not that
Petitioner refused the offer. The case was resolved the
instant the offer was made.

There is no live case or controversy for the court to
consider. Even assuming an actual dispute, no
remedy can resolve it. The redressability of an injury
is integral to the standing inquiry. Fisher, 758 F.3d at
640 n. 26. Thus, petitioner lacks standing on the basis
of “mootness.”

10

Il. THE COURT SHOULD ANALYZE BENIGN
AND INVIDIOUS CLASSIFICATIONS
DIFFERENTLY CONSISTENT WITH ITS
PAST PRACTICE AND THE PURPOSE OF
THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE.

A. The History of the Fourteenth
Amendment Supports a Distinction
Between Benign and Invidious Use of
Race.

1. The Fourteenth Amendment Was

Intended to Eliminate Discrimination
Against African Americans.

In the aftermath of the Civil War, Southern states
passed “black codes” which severely restricted the
civil rights of African Americans. Besides creating
more stringent criminal penalties for blacks than
whites, these codes limited the abilities of African
Americans to hold real property, personal property,
and to form and enforce contracts. See Brest et al.,
Processes of Constitutional Decisionmaking 301-09
(2006). Congress first attempted to respond to this
discriminatory regime by enacting the Civil Rights Act
of 1866, which passed over President Andrew
Johnson’s veto. Jd. However, concerns about the
constitutionality and the long-term security of this
provision led to the drafting of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Id. The intent was to remedy systemic
racial discrimination that had taken place prior to the
war and to empower the Federal government with
tools to prevent the reestablishment of any system
seeking to distinguish among citizens either de jure or
de facto. See William Nelson, The Fourteenth
Amendment: From Political Principle to Judicial

11

Doctrine 124 (1988) (quoting Representative Samuel
Shellabarger).

The framers of the amendment contemplated the
Equal Protection Clause as an enforcement provision
to secure the rights of citizens:

[Bly declaring all our people United States
citizens. . . declaring that the States shall not
deny them equal protection of these equal
laws, and then declaring that Congress shall
have power .. . to enforce the enjoyment of
these privileges of citizenship by seeing to it
that the laws do not abridge them nor the
States withhold protection to them.

Cong. Globe, 42d Cong., lat Sess. app. 68 (1871).

With a clear Congressional mandate, the courts set
about the task of dismantling the legal regime
constructed by the former Confederacy to deprive
African Americans of the equal rights to which they
were entitled. See, e.g., Burns v. State, 48 Ala. 195
(1872).

2. Use of the Equal Protection Clause to
Target Invidious Discrimination.

The Federal courts penned a series of decisions
striking down state actions, which sought to deny to
some citizens rights enjoyed by others based solely on
an arbitrary construction. In Strauder v. West
Virginia, the Supreme Court held that the categorical
exclusion of African Americans from jury service was
unconstitutional under of the Equal Protection
Clause. See generally 100 U.S. 303 (1880). The
majority noted the purpose of the Equal Protection
Clause was “to assure to the colored race the
enjoyment of all the civil rights that under the law are

12

enjoyed by white person, and to give to that race the
protection of the general government, in that
enjoyment, whenever it should be denied by the
States.” Id. at 306. Strauder formed the foundation
for the first major series of decisions targeting
discrimination aimed against African Americans. See
Bush v. Kentucky, 107 U.S. 110 (1883); Neal v.
Delaware, 103 U.S. 370 (1881).

While compelling on its own merits, the early
judicial interpretation of the amendment is only a
piece to understanding the original intent behind the
Fourteenth Amendment. The legislative and social
history surrounding the amendment is relevant to the
standard of review and treatment of affirmative action
programs today. As one commentator explains:

From the closing days of the Civil War until
the end of civilian Reconstruction some five
years later, Congress adopted a series of
social welfare programs whose benefits were
expressly limited to blacks. These programs
were generally open to all blacks, not only to
recently freed slaves, and were adopted over
repeatedly expressed objections that such
racially exclusive measures were unfair to
whites. The race-conscious Reconstruction
programs were enacted concurrently with the
fourteenth amendment and were supported
by the same legislators who favored the
constitutional guarantee of equal protection.
This history strongly suggests that the
framers of the amendment could not have
intended it generally to prohibit affirmative
action for blacks or other disadvantaged
groups.

13
Eric Schnapper, Affirmative Action and the Legislative
History of the Fourteenth Amendment, 71 Va. L. Rev.
753, 754 (1985).

The Freedman’s Bureau Acts of 1865 and 1866 are
illustrative of this point. The Freedman’s Bureau was
established, in part, for the proper administration of
race conscious social, legal, and educational programs
designed to benefit African Americans. H.R. Exec.
Doc. No. 11, 39th Cong., Ist Sess. (1865). The
Bureau’s role in ensuring that former slaves received
a quality education was at the heart of its purpose. As
General Oliver Howard, the Commissioner of the
Freedman’s Bureau, noted, “The most urgent want of
the freedmen was a practical education; and from the
first I have devoted more attention to this than to any
other branch of my work.” 2 Oliver O. Howard
Autobiography 368 (1907). During its later years,
the Bureau provided land and funding to help
establish exclusively black educational! institutions.
U.S. Bureau on Refugees, Freedmen and Abandoned
Lands, Sixth Semi-Annual Report on Schools for
Freedmen, 60-632 (July 1, 1868). Eventually, the
Bureau’s work in providing educational opportunities
to former slaves subsumed nearly all of its other
functions when the Congress indefinitely continued
“the educational department of” the Bureau. Act of
July 25, 1868, ch. 245, 15 Stat. 193.

14

B. The Court Can Appropriately Analyze
Benign Classifications Differently from
Invidious Classifications Using a Spectrum
Approach.

1. Benign Classifications Are Distinguishable
from Invidious Ones.

a. Historically, the Supreme Court
Distinguished Benign and Invidious
Classifications.

In Loving v. Virginia, the Supreme Court declared
“[t)]he clear and central purpose of the Fourteenth
Amendment was to eliminate all official state sources
of invidious racial discrimination in the States.” 388
U.S. 1, 10 (1967) (emphasis added). Accordingly, in
Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, a majority of the
Court held intermediate scrutiny applied to benign
race-based measures. 497 U.S. 547, 563 (1990); see
also Fullilove v. Klutznick, 488 U.S. 448, 473 (1980)
(applying intermediate scrutiny to a minority set-
aside program in plurality decision). These decisions
established that “benign” racial classifications, in
at least some circumstances, were subject to
intermediate review. Metro Broad., Inc., 497 U.S. at
563.

Despite this precedent, the Court later held that
strict scrutiny applies to all racial classifications. The
Court rationalized this departure by stating that
“lajbsent searching judicial inquiry into the
justification for . . . race-based measures, there is
simply no way of determining what classifications are
‘benign’ or ‘remedial’ and what classifications are in
fact motivated by illegitimate notions of racial
inferiority or simple racial politics.” Richmond v. J.A.
Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989). Following

15

Croson, the majority in Adarand continued to upend
the Court’s earlier position, and adopted strict
scrutiny for programs enacted by the federal
government. Adarand Constructors, Inc., 515 U.S. at
219.

Prior to these cases, courts found no difficulty in
distinguishing between “benign” and “invidious”
programs. For example, a classification made simply
to oppress African Americans or other minorities
would have no conceivable justification sufficiently
compelling to withstand judicial review. See, e.g., Yick
Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 374 (1886). Similarly,
the validity of classifications that segregate
individuals based on race requires skepticism.

When considering facially neutral policies to show
an unconstitutional racial classification, a party must
first prove a “racially discriminatory purpose.”
Washington ». Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 240 (1976); Vill.
of Arlington Heights v. Metrop. Hous. Dev. Corp.,
429 U.S. 252, 264 (1977). In Davis, the Court
upheld a facially neutral law that had a racially
disproportionate impact on minorities, citing “the
basic equal protection principle that the invidious
quality of a law claimed to be racially discriminatory
must ultimately be traced to a racially discriminatory
purpose.” 426 U.S. at 241. The use of race “in a
purposeful manner” does not suffice unless a “racial
slur or stigma” is intended or inferred, or the
classification can be shown independently to have
been intended to violate a constitutional right. United
Jewish Organizations of Williamsburgh, Inc., v. Carey,
430 U.S. 144, 163 (1977). The Court has enumerated
several factors to establish invidious intent for facially
neutral laws, including legislative history, sequence of
events, patterns of behavior, and departures from

16
normal decision-making procedures, as evidentiary
sources to divine invidious intent. Arlington Heights,
429 U.S. at 266-68. Those same factors could be used
to distinguish benign from invidious intent where it is
not obvious.

Benign classifications are distinguishable from
invidious ones in measurable ways that justify
applying a different standard of review. In the
affirmative action context, a benign classification
via a race-based program does not produce the same
type of harm as an invidious classification. See
Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 375
(1978) (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part) (“[T)here is absolutely no basis for concluding
that Bakke’s rejection as a result of Davis’ use of
racial preference will affect him throughout his life in
the same way as the segregation of the Negro
schoolchildren in Brown I would have affected
them. .. . The use of racial preferences for remedial
purposes does not inflict a pervasive injury upon
individual whites in the sense that wherever they go
or whatever they co there is a significant likelihood
that they will be treated as second-class citizens
because of their color.”). With a Lenign program,
minority and non-minority students benefit alike.
Minority students receive an increased chance of
success through quality education and all students
receive the benefits of diversity. Moreover, a societal
benefit ensues when educational institutions produce
a diverse set of leaders with legitimacy in the eyes of
the citizenry.

The blanket application of strict scrutiny to all
racial classifications has come under question

precisely because it is not sustainable as a standard
for reviewing the legitimacy of benign governmental

17

actions based on race. See, e.g., Johnson v. California,
543 U.S. 499, 516 (2005) (Ginsburg, J., joined by
Souter and Breyer, JJ., concurring); id. at 524
(Thomas, J., joined by Scalia, J., dissenting); Gratz v.
Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 298-302 (2003) (Ginsburg, J.,
joined by Souter and Breyer, JJ., dissenting); Adarand
Constructors, Inc., 515 U.S. at 243-49 (Stevens, J.,
joined by Ginsburg, J., dissenting). This Court should
revisit the standard of review in cases like this one,
where universities seek to ensure diversity in their
student bodies through benign race-based affirmative

action programs.

b. Legitimate Concerns Arise When
Applying Strict Scrutiny to Benign
Race-Based Programs.

This Court has expressed concerns about applying
strict scrutiny to review benign race-based programs.
For exampie, in Adarand, Justice Stevens expressed
his concerns with applying the label “strict scrutiny”
to benign race-based programs:

[Strict scrutiny] has usually been understood
to spell the death of any governmental action
to which a court may apply it. The court
suggests today that strict scrutiny means
something different—something less strict—
when applied to benign racial classifications.
Although I agree that benign programs
deserve different treatment than invidious
programs, there is a danger that the fatal
language of ‘strict scrutiny’ will skew the
analysis and place well-crafted benign
programs at unnecessary risk.

515 U.S. at 243-44 n.1 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Justice Stevens emphasized the difference between

18

invidious discrimination, aptly labeled an “engine of
oppression,” and. “benign” legislation, which has an
entirely different purpose—a “desire to foster
equality.” Jd. at 243. Further, Justice Stevens
advocated for applying strict scrutiny to invidious
classifications and intermediate scrutiny to benign
classifications. Id.

In Gratz, Justice Ginsburg criticized the Court's
application of the same standard of review for all
official race classifications. 539 U.S. at 298 (Ginsburg,
J., dissenting). Justice Ginsburg stated that:

government decisionmakers may properly
distinguish between policies of exclusion and
inclusion. . . . Actions designed to burden
groups long denied full citizenship stature are
not sensibly ranked with measures taken to
hasten the day when entrenched
discrimination and its aftereffects have been
extirpated.
Id. at 301 (citations omitted); see also Johnson v.
California, 543 U.S. at 516 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
Strict scrutiny may have been necessary at the time to
“smoke out” the invidious classification masquerading
as benign. See Croson, 488 U.S. at 493. Today,
however, universities seeking to increase campus
diversity have done so to provide a richer classroom
experience and the educational benefits that result
from a diverse student body. They have not done so in
order to hide an invidious intent behind a benign
facade.

In Adarand, this Court stated that strict scrutiny
takes “relevant differences” into account “to
distinguish legitimate from illegitimate uses of race
in governmental decisionmaking.” 515 U.S. at 228.

19

Importantly, Adarand recognizes that not all racial
classifications are the same. “The Constitution does
not require things which are different in fact or
opinion to be treated in law as though they were the
same,” Tigner v. Texas, 310 U.S. 141, 147 (1940), and
“not every denial of a right conferred by state law
involves a denial of the equal protection of the laws,
even though the denial of the right to one person may
operate to confer it on another.” Snowden v. Hughes,
321 U.S. 1, 8 (1944). Because of this proposition, this
Court has applied varying levels of judicial scrutiny to
different classifications of groups under the Equal
Protection Clause, based on the type of classification
being made. Programs like UT-Austin’s, designed to
promote inclusion and remedy the historical
disadvantages of race discrimination, are deserving of
a different standard of review along the equal
protection spectrum. Properly contextualized, the
Equal Protection analysis should consider benign
classifications differently.

2. Courts Can Maintain Consistency While
Analyzing the Purpose and Motives of
Benign Classifications Using an
Intermediate Level of Scrutiny.

Any concern that subjecting benign classifications to
a more flexible standard of review will mean all
affirmative action programs are per se constitutional
is unfounded. The difference in standard simply alters
the first analytical step—determining how closely to
scrutinize the program at issue. Because not all

5 Amici do not argue for the cessation of a searching inquiry
when race is a component of a decision. Rather, the Court should
conduct that inquiry but balance it against the State’s interest to
determine whether the classification is benign or otherwise.

20

classifications are equally objectionable under the
Equal Protection Clause, the Court should consider
the classification under review make a determination
whether the classification is benign or invidious.
Reviewing benign classifications under a more relaxed
standard does not alter the need, or the opportunity,
for the Court to conduct a searching inquiry. Rather
this process follows precisely what the Court
prescribed in Adarand—considering relevant differ-
ences and distinguishing a legitimate use of race from
an illegitimate one in making a determination.

a. Applying a Spectrum Test Allows for
Consistency.

Depending on the classification at issue, i.e. race,
sex, etc., the Court applies a variation on the stated
standard. Instead of forcing classifications into rigid
tiers, or diluting the standard of strict scrutiny, a
flexible and intermediate standard of review for
benign classifications presents a more realistic and
practicable approach.

By employing a more flexible spectrum for re. iew of
equal protection challenges, the Court will create
greater consistency in its decisions. The Court’s
current process “assumes that there is no significant
difference between a decision by the majority to
impose a speciai burden on the members of a minority
race and a decision by the majority to provide a benefit
to certain members of that minority notwithstanding
its incidental burden on some members of the
majority.” Adarand Constructors, Inc., 515 S. Ct. at
212 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also Brian C. Eades,
Note, Affirmative Action: The United States Supreme
Court Goes Color-Blind: Adarand Constructors, Inc. v.
Pena, 29 Creighton L. Rev. 771, 784 (1996). Benign

21

classifications hold a different purpose from invidious
classifications seeking on their face to burden a
minority racial group. Consistency does not
necessitate analyzing all race-based classifications
under the same standard. Instead, the Court can
continue to conduct a thorough inquiry and then raise
or lower its deference appropriately, addressing
benign racial classifications under one standard and
reviewing invidious ones under a more rigid standard
of review.

b. Consistency across Benign Race and
Gender Programs Is Desirable.

Intermediate scrutiny represents a more logical
choice of review for affirmative action programs based
on race.‘ Like gender classifications, benign racial
classifications are used in the affirmative action
context for a legitimate purpose, and reflect no
intentional malice or prejudice. Numerous scholars
have pointed out the inconsistency in standard of
review for benign affirmative action programs based
on gender versus race:

[A]s the law currently stands, the Court will
apply ‘intermediate scrutiny’ to cases of
invidious gender discrimination and ‘strict
scrutiny to cases of invidious race
discrimination, while applying the same
standard for benign classifications as
invidious ones. If this remains the law, . . . the
government can more easily enact affirmative
action programs to remedy discrimination

* Amici do not argue the level of scrutiny for affirmative action
programs aimed at other classes, such as gender, sexual identity,
or disability should be raised but instead racial considerations
should track other classes.

22

against women than it can enact affirmative
action programs to remedy discrimination
against African-Americans—even thoug
Amici do not argue the level of scrutiny for
affirmative action programs aimed at other
classes, such as gender, sexual identity, or
disability should be raised but instead racial
considerations should track other classes. h
the primary purpose of the Equal Protection
Clause was to end discrimination against the
former slaves.

E.g., Frank S. Ravitch, Creating Chaos In The Name
Of Consistency: Affirmative Action And The Odd
Legacy Of Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 101
Dick. L. Rev. 281, 296 (1997) (citation omitted).
Adarand and Croson do not present viable legal
standards when measured against the practical
realities of their holdings. Under the current state of
the law, it is harder to remedy race than sex discrim-
ination through affirmative action, even though the
Fourteenth Amendment was intended to benefit
African Americans.

C. The Court Has Modified the Expressed
Level of Scrutiny Based on Its Valuation
of the State’s Interest Consistent with

the Spectrum Approach.

The Court’s reliance on the three-tiered scrutiny
classification system is not reflected in the outcomes
of many of its most contested cases. The standard
has become “strict in theory but fatal in fact” such
that no use of race has been found satisfying
these requirement, with the exception of Grutter v.
Bollinger. 539 U.S. 306 (2003). The Court ostensibly

23

applied strict scrutiny in that case, but the level of
review actually applied allowed for more deference to
state interests than otherwise dictated by the classi-
fication. This relaxed standard of review employed in
Grutter is not surprising given the fact that legitimate
state and societal interests allow for the consideration
of race, but the rhetoric of such a searching judicial
inquiry rarely will find a situation in which that
standard is met.

Practical considerations have required the Court to
lessen (or heighten) the analysis dictated by the tiered
system in cases involving sex-based classifications,
sexual orientation, mental disabilities, and certain
fundamental or quasi-fundamental rights, based on
the nature of the state’s interest. This practical
restructuring of the system in which courts first
identify a classification and then apply a correspond-
ing level of judicial scrutiny is the natural consequence
when the subtle factors underlying legitimate, yet
competing, interests collide in matters of public policy.

For example, in Grutter, the Court clarified that
remedying past discrimination is not the only permis-
sible justification for race-based governmental action.
539 U.S. at 328. Recognizing that attaining a diverse
student body is a compelling interest, the Court
applied a type of strict scrutiny that took “into account
complex educational judgments in an area that lies
primarily within the expertise of the university.” Id.
Weighing on the Court’s decision was the State’s
interest in the way diversity “prepar|es) students for
work and citizenship” and cultivates “a set of leaders
with legitimacy in the eyes of the citizenry.” Id. at 331-
32.

24

Not everyone agreed that this level of review was
consistent with the Court’s jurisprudence. Chief
Justice Rehnquist noted that “[{a]lthough the Court
recites the language of our strict scrutiny analysis, its
application of that review is unprecedented in its
deference.” Jd. at 380 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
Justice Kennedy wrote the “Court confuses deference
to a university's definition of its educational objective
with deference to the implementation of this goal.” Id.
at 388 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Assuming the Court
must apply a formulaic and regimented analysis under
strict scrutiny, these criticisms are not without merit.
However, the Court’s review of laws has always been
fluid. The outcome in Grutter corresponds with the
Court’s practice of weighing the nature of the state’s
interest in determining the level of review to apply.

This adjustment of the level of scrutiny does not
move in only one direction. The Court has raised the
level of scrutiny when it finds a questionable interest
asserted by the state. In City of Cleburne v Cleburne
Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432 (1985), the Court
purported to use a rational basis inquiry in striking
down a zoning ordinance that denied a special use
permit for a group home for individuals with mental
disabilities. The Court took pains to affirm that it was
not applying a heightened level of scrutiny to this
analysis based on a mental disabilities classification.
Id. at 442-46. The Court then engaged in a searching
inquiry into the purpose and rationale in passing such
an ordinance. Id. at 446-51; see also id. at 458
(“Cleburne’s ordinance is invalidated only after being
subjected to precisely the sort of probing inquiry
associated with heightened scrutiny.” (Marshall, J.,
concurring)). In doing so, the Court ignored the City’s
purported interest in maintaining property values,

25

which would be the level of review ‘raditionally
“accorded economic and social legislation.” Id. at 442.

Instead, the Court balanced Cleburne’s purported
interests against the rights of the mentaliy disabled
and invalidated the ordinance. Under rational basis
review, a court should not undertake any such
balancing. The question presented is merely, “Is the
purported rationale reasonable?” In Cleburne, it was
reasonable but for the fact the ordinance appeared to
target a particular class of individuals because of an
inherent characteristic. Jd. at 456 (Marshall, J.,
concurring). The Court adjusted its scrutiny based on
“the constitutional and societal importance of the
interest adversely affected and the recognized
invidiousness of the basis upon which the particular
classification is drawn.” Jd. at 460 (internal quota-
tions omitted).

_ A similar increase in the scrutiny level occurred in
Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996). Until this
decision, no court had recognized sexual orientation as
a protected class and the Colorado Constitutional
Amendment at the heart of Romer prohibited
government action to protect individuals on the basis
of sexual orientation. Jd. at 624. The State’s principal
argument was not that it discriminated against
homosexuals, but that it placed them in the same
position as other non-protected groups. Jd. at 626.
The Court noted that the disadvantage imposed upon
individuals based on their sexual orientation was
“born of animosity toward the class of person affected.”
Id. at 634. While true, such an inquiry is not
consistent with the purported rationa! basis standard
of review.

26

D. Properly Valuing the State’s Interest
Better Explains the Court’s Decisions
in Equal Protection Cases.

Determinations of the constitutionality of any gov-
ernment action inherently involve value judgments.
The State’s interest could be exceedingly positive as it
relates to educational diversity, see Grutter, 539 U.S.
at 306, or it can be exceedingly negative as it relates
to laws that penalize individuals because of their
sexual orientation. See Romer, 517 U.S. at 620. That
interest lies upon a spectrum that requires balancing
many factors before the Court can pass on the
constitutionality of the law. See An Open Discussion
With Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, 36 Conn. L. Rev.
1033, 1045-1046 (2004) (“The decision generally turns
on the character of the right involved, the individual
interest at stake, and the strength of the government
interest tugging the other way. I would not assign
heavy weight to the labels. I don’t think the Court
routinely uses them in reaching its decision. The
decisions are often reached without resorting to
preconceived labels, and then fitted into the tiers.”).

One way to conceptualize how the Court determines
the level of scrutiny is to reduce the analysis to an
equation:

Level of Scrutiny (“LS”) = Basis of Classification
(“BC”yY
For purposes of the formula, rational basis review

equals 0, intermediate scrutiny equals 1, and strict
scrutiny equals 2. If the level of scrutiny was tied

5 A similar equation could exist for Fundamental Rights: LS =
FR.

27

solely to the protected status of the basis of classifica-
tion, i.e. race = 2, sex = 1, everything else = 0, only
three possible outcomes ensue. As the cases
demonstrate, however, the level of scrutiny does not
mirror this simple classification. In practice, the
Court has considered the value of competing interests
and applied a varying level of scrutiny relative to the
weight assigned to the competing values. In effect,
this has created a spectrum.

In cases involving a “suspect” class where the Court
values the state interest highly, the deference afforded
rises. In cases involving potential animus toward a
group that warrants rational basis review, the Court
engages in a more searching inquiry. A more accurate
equation recognizes the value of the relative
government interest:

LS = BC — Government Interest (“GI”)

When the government interest is strong and
positive, it exerts a downward pull on the level of
scrutiny that has been, and should be, applied by the
Court. Grutter is illustrative. In theory, assuming BC
is 2 because of the use of race, the level of scrutiny
should also be 2 for strict scrutiny:

2=2

However, the level of scrutiny was not strict.
Instead, the Court factored in the strength of the
government interest. If we assigned a value to that
interest of 0.5,° the formula becomes:

®* While assignment of the 0.5 value in this case is simply
an approximation for illustrative purposes, the relevant
consideration is that the Court assigned the state interest a
positive value.

28
15=2-0.5

This formula more accurately reflects the level of
scrutiny the Court used in upholding the Michigan
Law School program; a level of inquiry somewhere
between intermediate and strict scrutiny.

Conversely, when the State’s purported interest is
negative, it raises the level of scrutiny the Court
applies. Here, Cleburne is illustrative. In theory, the
Court used rational basis review because mental
disability is not a protected class:

0=0

The Court actually applied a heightened form a
scrutiny to strike down the ordinance. Assigning a
value of -0.8’ for the invidious intent employed by
Cleburne, the formula denotes:

8 = 0 -(-0.8)

Again, this formula more accurately reflects the
heightened level of scrutiny the Court applied—
something more than rational basis review.

These formulae demonstrate the inherent flaw in a
tiered analysis: Defining the level of scrutiny based on
one variable (race, sex, mental disability) ignores the
competing interests of the state (educational diversity,
disapproval of lifestyle choices, property values) that
are necessary considerations for any reasoned
decision.

The irony in this rigid-tier approach is that the
Court has encouraged and evaluated the nature of the
government interest in myriad cases involving suspect
classifications and fundamental rights, but prohibits

’ The precise amount of the value is immaterial as long as the
formula approximates a skeptical negative value to this variable.

29
it when weighing invidious or benign racial
classifications. Croson, 488 U.S. at 493. In doing so,
the law ignores:

[T)he difference between a “No Trespassing”
sign and a welcome mat. ‘t would treat a
Dixiecrat Senator’s decision to vote against
Thurgood Marshall’s confirmation in order to
keep African-Americans off the Supreme
Court as on a par with President Johnson’s
evaluation of his nominee’s race as a positive
factor. It would equate a law that made black
citizens ineligible for -nilitary service with a
program aimed at re ‘uiting black soldiers.
An attempt by the majority to exciude
members of a minority race from a regulated
market is fundamentally different from a
subsidy that enables a relatively small group
of newcomers to enter that market. An
interest in ‘consistency does not justify
treating differences as though they were
similarities.
Adarand Constructors, Inc., 515 U.S. at 245 (Stevens,
J., dissenting). To the extent the Court’s refusal to
distinguish invidious from benign programs in Croson
and Adarand does not reflect the spectrum upon which
the Court actually conducts its Equal Protection
jurisprudence, the Court should overturn those cases
and better provide guidance to lower courts regarding
the proper weight to afford governmental interests.
The Court can, and does, distinguish between
invidious and benign laws and programs, and
affording a more deferential review of benign racial
classifications better reflects the constitutional
purpose of the Equal Protection Clause.

30

lil. THE HOLISTIC CONSIDERATION OF
RACE, WHICH ONLY PARTIALLY
MODERATES THE ADVERSE IMPACT
OF TEST SCORES ON MINORITIES,
IS NOT AN IMPERMISSIBLE “RACIAL
PREFERENCE.”

The question presented is whether the “use of racial
preferences in undergraduate admission decisions”
violates the Equal Protection Clause. Brief for
Petitioner at i. To describe UT-Austin’s consideration
of race as a “preference,” however, grossly distorts UT-
Austin’s use of race in its admission process.’ Using
this Court’s prior guidance, UT-Austin considers race
not as a “preference,” but rather as a part of a “holistic”
review. SJA at 4a (citing Grutter, 539 U.S. at 306).

Minorities face comparative systemic and
institutionalized disadvantages in the process as a
whole. The SAT and ACT tests, which contribute
heavily to the AI used as a baseline for admissions
decisions, have severe adverse impacts on minority
applicants. UT-Austin’s modest consideration of race

* Petitioner mischaracterizes various documents to create the
false impression UT-Austin awards racial “preferences” in its
admissions decisions. For example, page 8 of Petitioner’s brief
cites pages 152a, 174a, and 280a of the Supplemental Joint
Appendix (“SJA”): “In 2004, UT reintroduced racia: preferences
by adding “race” to the list of “special circumstances” that make
up a key component of the PAI [Personal Achievement Index].”
Page 152a of the SJA states that race may be considered as one
of seven “special circumstances,” but does not describe any “racial
preference.” Race is not assigned any specific weight in the PAI,
but is one of many factors considered in a “holistic” review. SJA
at 4a. Additionally, Petitioner's remaining page citations are not
relevant. Page 174a of the SJA is from a Division of Diversity
and Community Engagement report, which does not address the
admissions process. Finally, page 280a does not exist.

31

has, at most, a small mitigating impact on the far more
significant hurdles disadvantaged minorities must
overcome.

A. College Admission Tests Have Serious
Adverse Impact on Minority Applicants.

The large and persistent racia’ gap in college
admission test scores is well documented and widely
recognized. In 2008, when Petitioner applied for
admission to UT-Austin, average SAT scores among
858,561 white college-bound seniors were 528 for
Critical Reading, 537 for Mathematics, and 518 for
Writing. College Board, 2008 College-Bound Seniors
Total Group Profile Report 3 (2008) (hereinafter “2008
Group Profile”) (Table 8). The corresponding averages
for black college-bound seniors were 430, 426, and 424
for Critical Reading, Mathematics, and Writing,
respectively. Id. In statistical terms, the disparities
between average white and black scores for each of
these tests exceeded 370 standard deviations.’ This
dwarfs the statistical disparities noted in some of this
Court’s most widely noted discrimination decisions.
See, e.g., Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 222 F.R.D.
137, 165 (N.D. Cal. 2004) (47 standard deviations),

* Applying a two-sample t-test using the mean and standard
deviation values reported in the 2008 Group Profile, the

disparities between white and black test scores were

t= —— = 381.25 standard deviations for Critical

102
656.561 174,363

Reading, t =-——-y-——e= = 427.46 standard deviations for

108
856561 174,383

_ —s«$16-424— ee
Mathematics, and t = Ee = 378.38 standard deviations
656.561 174,363

for Writing.

32

affd, 474 F.3d 1214 (9th Cir. 2007), rev'd on other
grounds, 113 S. Ct. 2541 (2001) (47 SDs); Castaneda v.
Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 496 n.17 (1977) (29 standard

deviations).

B. Holistic Consideration of Race Is
Essential to Mitigate the Racial Bias of
Facially Neutral Admission Test

Criteria.

Confronted with such glaring adverse impact, an
admission system based on facially neutral objective
standards would place minority college applicants at a
distinct disadvantage. The severity of these barriers
is illustrated by the fcllowing hypothetical scenario,
derived from actual statistics.

Established by this Court in Griggs v. Duke Power
Co., selection criteria with adverse impact on
minority groups are discriminatory unless shown to
have a “demonstrable relationship to successful
performance.” 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971).'° When the
selection criterion is a test, the “demonstrable
relationship” must be established through research
that measures test “validity” by means of a
“correlation coefficient.” Hamer v. City of Atlanta, 872
F.2d 1521, 1525-26 (11th Cir. 1989). A correlation
coefficient of 1.0 establishes a perfect relationship
between test performance and downstream success.
Conversely, a 0.0 correlation coefficient denotes the
lack of any relationship at all between test scores and

performance. Id. at 1526.

© Although Griggs involved hiring discrimination, this
principle has been extended to university admissions and testing.
See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 308 n.44.

33

A report released in the same year that Petitioner
applied for college admission documented a 0.35
correlation between combined scoring on all three SAT
segments and the selected measure of success, which
was first-year college grade point average (“GPA”).
College Board, Validity of the SAT for Predicting First-
Year College Grade Point Average, Research Report
No. 2008-5, at 5 (2008) (hereinafter, “Validity of the
SAT”) (Table 5). Because first-year GPA can be
determined only for students admitted, researchers
were restricted in their ability to assess correlations
between SAT scores and GPA for candidates denied
admission. To compensate, researchers calculated an
“adjusted correlation coefficient,” which was reported
as 0.53. Id.

The practical impact of the SAT, with its adverse
impact and its adjusted correlation coefficient of 0.53,
is illustrated infra. Each of the points on this graph
represents one individual among a randomly drawn
sample of 200 candidates for college admission,
including 100 white and 100 black applicants. The
sample was drawn based on specifications that exactly
mirror the broader SAT scoring and first year GPA
patterns in existence at the time of Petitioner's
application.'' The diagonal line represents the

'! SAT scores were specified to have a mean of 528 and
standard deviation of 102 for the 100 hypothetical white students
and a mean of 430 and standard deviation of 97 for the 100
hypothetical black students. This corresponds to the means and
standard deviations on the SAT Critical Reading test for these
groups reported in the 2008 Group Profile, supra. First-year
GPAs were specified to have a mean of 2.80 and standard
deviation of 0.81, which corresponds to the median statistics
reported in a 2012 ACT validation study based on data gathered
between 2000 and 2006. ACT, Predicting Long-Term College
Success Through Degree Completion Using ACT Composite Score,

34

positive 0.53 correlation between SAT score and first-
year GPA.
Compearteon of GAT Score and First Year Grade Potrd Average By Race

Ree 060° OC Oe 068

Despite the general positive relationship between
SAT score and projected GPA, students with low SAT
scores often achieve high GPAs and students with high
SAT scores often have low GPAs. Notwithstanding
this high degree of variability, a university that relies
on test scores as a selection determinant will tend to
admit more white applicants than black applicants.
The concentration of triangular data points,
representing white applicants, on the right side of
the graph, reflects this tendency. Crucially, however,
not all of these elevated test scores translate into

ACT Benchmarks, and High School Grade Point Average, at 16
(2012) (Table 3). Finally, correlations between SAT and first-year
GPA, for both white and black students, were set at 0.53,
consistent with the adjusted correlation coefficient in the 2008

Validity of the SAT report.

35

collegiate success as the vertical distribution of
these same high-scoring triangular data points
demonstrates.

If admission decisions were based solely on test
scores, the imbalance between white and black
admission rates would be huge. The following chart
illustrates the gap in success rates for the sample at
various test score cutoffs:

SAT Percentage
Score Admitted

Cutoff | White | Black

700 0 1
650 13 1
600 26 5

Such vast gaps in acceptance rates would only be
acceptable if black students, by the same large
margin, were inherently less capable of academic
success. They are not. See Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 545
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (“[IJncreased opportunities
have produced an _ ever-increasing number of
demonstrations that members of disadvantaged races
are entirely capable not merely of competing on an
equal basis, but also of excelling in the most
demanding professions.”).

36

Consistent with Justice Stevens’ observation that
students are equally capable of success regardless of
race, a system that prefers white applicants effectively
operates to disproportionately exclude more qualified
black candidates. Statistics from the sample,
presented in the following table, are demonstrable. At
each potential scoring cutoff, the combined group of
admitted students is projected to perform significantly
better in college than those who were not admitted.

Percentage Average GPA Average GPA
Admitted (Admissions) (Non-Admissions)

White | Black | Total | White | Black | Total | White | Black

Oo | 1 Jj 3% | -- 3.95 2.75 | 2.71 | 2.79

| 13 1 3.17 | 3.11 3.95 2.72 2.65 2.79
26 5 3.35 | 3.20 4.12 2.64 | 254 | 2.73 —

a 36 17 | 3.27 3.12 3.58 _ 2.57 2.48 2.64

57 35 3.07 | 2.97 3.24 | 2.48 2.36 2.56

76 50 3.00 | 2.91 3.13 | 2.33 2.07 2.46

_} 85 _ _| 64 2.92 2.86 | 3.01 | 2.26 1.86 2.42

| 92 | 78 2.86 2.79 2.94 | 2.16 1.78 2.30

96 92 2.81 2.76 2.87 1.80 1.51 1.94

39

The racial disparity in these decisions is obvious.
Because white students tend to get higher SAT scores,
but equivalent GPAs. the larger proportion of
admitted white applicants will likely include
individuals with lower projected GPAs. These
admissions come at the expense of more qualified
black applicants, who could have done as well, or even
better, if afforded the opportunity.

C. Removal of Race from the Admissions
Process Will Not Result in Racial
Neutrality.

Petitioner argues that the “racial preference”
allegedly embodied in the UT-Austin’s consideration of
race must be removed to achieve “the imperative of
racial neutrality.” Brief for Petitioner at 4 (quoting
JA. Crosson Co., 488 U.S. at 519 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). In
truth, however, an admission system stripped of its
ability to consider race as a “special circumstance,”
SJA at 152a, will not be facially neutral.” Petitioner
asks the Court to return her and other white
applicants to the advantaged position they have
enjoyed historically and continue to enjoy. Such an
outcome does not reflect racial neutrality.

There are many potential explanations for the
existing racial bias in college admission test scoring.
A seminal article by research psychologist Roy O.
Freedle concludes that cultural and statistical biases
contribute significantly to poorer outcomes for

'? The sample illustration above is an oversimplification, since
it focuses solely on test scores. Test scores, however, make up an
important element of the UT-Austin’s admissions process, and no
other factor sufficiently mitigates against their disparate racial
impact.

40

African-Americans, evidenced by scoring differences
being narrower for harder questions and wider for
easier items more likely to be tainted by cultural
differences in reactions to verbal cues. Freedle,
Correcting the SAT’s Ethnic and Social-Class Bias: A
Method for Reestimating SAT Scores, 73 Harvard
Ed. Rev. 1 (2003). Psychological factors such as
“stereotype threat” also lead non-Asian minorities to
underperform as compared to whites and Asians with
similar cognitive and academic abilities. See, e.zg.,
Scherbaum et al., Examining the Effects of Stereotype
Threat on Test-Taking Behaviors, 14 Soc. Psychol. Ed.
361 (2011). Differences in test preparation appear to
contribute further to racial disparities. See Ellis &
Ryan, Race and Cognitive-Ability Test Performance:
The Mediating Effects of Test Preparation, Test-
Taking Strategy Use and Self-Efficacy, 33 J. Applied
Soc. Psych. 2607 (2003).

Regardless of the exact causes of these wide racial
differences, the most important truths for this case are
that (1) they exist, and (2) they are not explained by
corresponding differences in academic ability. UT-
Austin’s modest consideration of race, while arguably
not sufficient, mitigates some of this impact.
Interpreting the Equal Protection Clause to forbid
such consideration ignores the fact that removal of
this factor would result not in a racially neutral
selection process, but rather a racially biased one.

CONCLUSION

Petitioner filed this case because she was denied
admission to UT-Austin. Every year, thousands of
students are denied admission to the academic
institution of their choice. While certainly
disappointing, Petitioner was not denied admission

41

because of her race, leaving no remedy for the Court to
grant. Regardless, UT-Austin’s careful and benign
consideration of race does not violate the Fourteenth
Amendment. Supreme Court precedent supports
using a standard of review that is not strict in theory
and fatal in fact. UT Austin’s admission process, as
reviewed by the Fifth Circuit, satisfies that standard.
Forbidding the holistic manner in which UT-Austin
considers race in admissions would not create a race-
neutral playing field, but would create further
setbacks to the goal of equal opportunity in education.
For these reasons, Amici respectfully submit that the
Court should affirm the decision of the Fifth Circuit.

Respectfully submitted,

DEAN SPARLIN* JOSEPH D. WEINER
SPARLIN LAW OFFICE, PLLC Counsel of Record
4400 Fair Lakes Court, MICHAEL L. CHILDERS*

Suite 106 EMILY A. MCNEE*
Fairfax, VA 22033 LITTLER MENDELSON P.C.
(703) 803-8800 80 South 8th Street

dsparlin@sparliniaw.com Suite 1300

Minneapolis, MN 55402

SCHUYLER AFFIRMATIVE

erm Pascere jweiner@littler.com
1629 K Street NW MATTHEW J. CAMARDELLA*
Suite 300 JACKSON LEWIS P.C.
Washington, DC 20006 58 South Service Road
(202) 349-1699 Suite 250
schuyler@schuyleraap.com Melville, NY 11747
(631) 247-4369

*Of Counsel camardem@jacksonlewis.com

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385016_0328%3A018. Public record. Not legal advice.