# Amicus Curiae Brief — Deboer v. Snyder, 135 S. Ct. 1040 (2015) (No. 14-571)

> Briefs, arguments, decisions, and more.

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385016_0308%3A022

## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Amicus Curiae Brief
- **Published:** January 1, 2015

## Text

} "RASS

MAR 2 4 2015
No. 14-571 -DEFISE OF Tie net |

In the Supreme Court of the Gnited States

APRIL DEBOER, et al.,
Petitioners,

Vv.

RICK SNYDER, GOVERNOR OF MICHIGAN, et ail.,
Respondents.

On Writ of Certiorari to the United States
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit

BRIEF OF THE AMERICAN FREEDOM LAW CENTER
AS AMICUS CURIAE IN SUPPORT OF RESPONDENTS

—_—_—_- —~—-__ — -———

Rogsert J. Muise
Counsel of Record
AMERICAN FREEDOM LAW CENTER
P.O. Box 131098
ANN ArRBor, MI 48113

(855) 835-2352
rmuise@americanfreedomlawcenter.org

Davip YERUSHALMI

AMERICAN FREEDOM LAW CENTER
1901 PENNSYLVANIA AVE. NW
WasuINGcTon, D.C. 20006

(855) 835-2352

Counsel for Amicus Curiae

aE

Becker Gallagher - Cincinnati, OH - Washington, D.C. ~- 800.890.5001

i
QUESTION PRESENTED

Does the Fourteenth Amendment require a state to
license a marriage between two people of the same sex?

ii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

QUESTION PRESENTED .................... i
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ................... ii
STATEMENT OF IDENTITY AND INTERESTS
¢ | ree 1
ny on oes ee ehu knees Jawan aee 2
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT ............. 5
PE {bh ceveeunet need ebhavkesenee ce eens 5
I. Michigan’s Marriage Amendment Satisfies the

ss 6 a ae nee bib ae A ee ware 5
II. Michigan’s Marriage Amendment Also Satisfies

a Higher Level of Scrutiny ................. 7
DE! 2c. cckeaeesseeeheseebesbedes 12

ill

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

CASES
Bray v. Alexandria Women’s Health Clinic,

i ee ee nde eee aneen 9
Clark v. Jeter,

rr 7
Deboer v. Snyder,

772 F.3d 388 (6th Cir. 2014) .......... 3, 5, 6, 7
Geduldig v. Aiello,

ey ee ED og gg pase eccescevevenesss 8
Griswold v. Connecticut,

ee ed cee eee oe 2
Harris v. McRae,

se vee ee be aa 9
Heller v. Doe,

i a eek eh eaeeh awe 6
Lawrence v. Texas,

a ee eeeeeees 4
Maher v. Roe,

SPIED cc cccccvsescecesconcecs 9
Michael M. v. Super. Ct. of Sonoma Cnaty.,

CD i cece céeeeabee es 8,9, 10
San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. Dist. v. Rodriguez,

i oe Be oe i ee eae ee ee are e 6

Schweiker v. Wilson,
DEED og ccc cccéecesesbaeseeeus 6

iv

Turner v. Safley,

ET scavcccdeseuctveesees 9,10
United States v. Windsor,

133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013) ................. 10, 11
CONSTITUTIONS AND STATUTES
ee ee eae eb eee a aeed 5,12
noo cbs ase eeeheneeneee saunas 9
i Ce eee eeneeeeeek os 2
ee 2
An Act Regulating Marriages § 1(1820) ......... 2
1lLaws of the Territory of Mich. 646 (1871) ....... 2
OTHER AUTHORITIES

Francis de Sales, Introduction to the Devout Life,
(John K. Ryan ed., Image Books/Doubleday, New
rd ie ale ao ang 5

The Federalist No. 47, (J. Cooke ed. 1961)
I i ed aes 7

1

STATEMENT OF IDENTITY AND INTERESTS
OF AMICUS CURIAE

Pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 37, Amicus Curiae
American Freedom Law Center (hereinafter referred to
as “AF'LC”) respectfully submits this brief in support of
the respondents, urging the Court to protect and affirm
the fundamental right of the people of Michigan to
establish their own public policy with regard to the
meaning and purpose of marriage.’

Defining marriage as a matter of law is the
prerogative of the states and not the federal
government, including the federal courts. Most
important, restricting marriage to one man and one
woman promotes legitimate state (and _ societal)
interests. Therefore, this Court should affirm the
decision of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit, which upheld the right of the people to define
marriage for purposes of state law.

AFLC is a national, public interest law firm that
advances and defends America’s Judeo-Christian
heritage and moral values, including the defense of
traditional marriage, which is necessary to promote the
common good. AFLC accomplishes its mission through

' All parties have consented to the filing of this brief. Letters

evidencing such consent have been filed with the Clerk of the
Court.

Amicus AFLC further states that no counsel for any party
authored this brief in whole or in part, and no counsel or party
made a monetary contribution intended to fund the preparation or
submission of this brief. No person other than Amicus AFLC, its
supporters, or its counsel made a monetary contribution to the
preparation or submission of this brief.

2

litigation, education, and public policy initiatives. It
has offices in Arizona, California, Michigan, New York,
and Washington, D.C.

INTRODUCTION

In Michigan, state law has defined marriage as a
relationship between one man and one woman since its
territorial days. See An Act Regulating Marriages § 1
(1820), in lLaws of the Territory of Mich. 646, 646
(1871). In 1996, this longstanding view of marriage
was reaffirmed when the state enacted a law that
declared marriage “inherently a unique relationship
between a man and a woman.” Mich. Comp. Laws
§ 551.1. In 2004, the people of Michigan took the
extraordinary step of amending the state’s constitution
to protect traditional marriage. This amendment
expresses, without equivocation, the will of the people
and the policy of the state: “To secure and preserve the
benefits of marriage for our society and for future
generations of children, the union of one man and one
woman in marriage shall be the only agreement
recognized as a marriage or similar union for any
purpose.” Mich. Const. art. I, § 25.

In 1965, this Court stated that “[mJarriage is a
coming together for better or for worse, hopefully
enduring, and intimate to the degree of being sacred.
It is an association that promotes a way of life, not
causes; a harmony in living, not political faiths; a
bilateral loyalty, not commercial or social projects. Yet
it is an association for as noble a purpose as any
involved in our prior decisions.” Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486 (1965). And while the
Court in Griswold ultimately failed to follow its own
wisdom by establishing federal precedent that

3

promotes practices (contraception and abortion) that
ultimately destroy the sanctity of marriage, truth
reveals that the “noble” purpose of this “sacred” union
is the procreation and subsequent rearing of
children—a purpose that can only be fulfilled by a man
and a woman. Deboer v. Snyder, 772 F.3d 388, 405 (6th
Cir. 2014) (observing that “nature’s laws (that men and
women complement each other biologically) . . . created
the policy imperative”). This fundamental truth is
transcendent and unchangeable.

Indeed, there is a rational basis and a substantial (if
not compelling) state interest in limiting marriage to
unions between one man and one woman. And one
need look no further than the laws of nature to find it.
The complementarity of the sexes reiterates a truth
that is evident to right reason and recognized as such
by all the major cultures of the world. Marriage is not
just any relationship between human beings. It has its
own nature, essential properties, and purpose. No
ideology or political agenda can erase from the human
spirit the certainty that marriage exists solely between
a man and a woman, who by mutual! personal gift,
proper and exclusive to themselves, tend toward the
communion of their persons. In this way, they
mutually perfect each other in order to cooperate in the
procreation and upbringing of new human lives.

While social scientists, certain activists and
lawyers, and even federal judges appear willing to
upset this balance of nature and in the process deny
the very essence of our created beings as man and
woman, they do so at the peril of society and the
common good.

4

And to be clear, the state is not preventing anyone
from forming a same-sex relationship, living with a
same-sex partner, or even engaging in perverse sexual
acts with a person of the same sex. See, e.g., Lawrence
v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 563 (2003) (striking down on
due process grounds a Texas sodomy statute which
made it a misdemeanor for a person to “engage[] in
deviate sexual intercourse with another individual of
the same sex” and thus reversing the convictions of two
men who were observed by police officers engaging in
anal sexual intercourse). People remain “free” to
engage in all sorts of sexually deviant behavior. That
“privacy” interest is not at issue. See generally id.

What the state (through its people) is not going to
do, however, is sanction and thus validate that same-
sex relationship as a “marriage” as a matter of law.
Nor should it be forced to do so by a federal court, any
more than it should be forced to sanction as valid
incestuous relationships, relationships between adults
and minors, or bigamous relationships, among others.

If the Court is going to disregard the natural law
and force a state to sanction same-sex relationships
there is no principled way to limit that holding.
Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 590 (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(observing that “the Court makes no effort to cabin the
scope of its decision to exclude” laws prohibiting, for
example, bigamy, adult incest, or bestiality).”

* Petitioners argue that they do not seek a “redefinition of the right
to marry,” (which of course they do), “[t]hey seek simply an end to
their exclusion from the freedom to marry the one adult of their
choice.” Petr’s Br. at 61 (emphasis added). But why limit it to only
one adult? Accepting Petitioners’ arguments provides no

5
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

Michigan has a rational basis for defining marriage
as a relationship between one man and one woman,
and that basis is biology. The awareness of the
biological reality and self-evident truth that couples of
the same sex do not have children in the same way as
couples of opposite sexes satisfies rational basis review,
and, in fact, satisfies a heightened level of scrutiny
under the Fourteenth Amendment. Indeed, it is
without doubt a proper exercise of Michigan’s sovereign
authority within our federal system to resolve this
public policy issue by preserving the longstanding and
traditional definition of marriage as a matter of state
law. Therefore, Michigan is not required to license a
marriage between two people of the same sex, and it
would improper for this Court to conclude otherwise.

ARGUMENT

I. Michigan’s Marriage Amendment Satisfies the
Rational Basis Test.

The question presented is subject to rational basis
review. See Deboer, 772 F.3d 404-06. Under rational
basis review, the Court does not require the state “to
have chosen the least restrictive means of achieving its

principled (or honest) way to confine marriage to just two adults
(regardless of gender). Destroying the institution of marriage,
which is the inevitable outcome if this Court were to accept
Petitioners’ arguments, will have disastrous effects. See Francis
de Sales, Introduction to the Devout Life, at 219-20 (John K. Ryan
ed., Image Books/Doubleday, New York 1989) (1609) (“[T]he
preservation of holy marriage is of the highest importance for the
state since it is the origin and source of all that flows from the
state.”). We can resist natural law for only so long.

6

legislative end.” Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 330
(1993); see also San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. Dist. v.
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 51 (1973). As long as it
“rationally advances a reasonable and identifiable
governmental objective, [the Court] must disregard”
the existence of alternative methods of furthering the
objective “that [it], as individuals, perhaps would have
preferred.” Schweiker v. Wilson, 450 U.S. 211, 235
(1981).

Indeed, “[r)ational basis review does not empower
federal courts to ‘subject’ legislative line drawing to
‘courtroom’ factfinding designed to show that
legislatures have done too much or too little.” Deboer,
772 F.3d at 405.

Consequently, the actual question presented is does
Michigan have a rational basis for defining marriage as
a relationship between one man and one woman? The
answer to that question is clearly and simply “yes.”
And Michigan’s rational basis is, in a word, biology.

As the Sixth Circuit quite properly held:

By creating a status (marriage) and by
subsidizing it (e.g., with tax-filing privileges and
deductions), the States created an incentive for
two people who procreate together to stay
together for purposes of rearing offspring. That
does not convict the States of irrationality, only
of awareness of the biological reality that
couples of the same sex do not have children in
the same way as couples of opposite sexes and
that couples of the same sex do not run the risk
of unintended offspring. That explanation, still
relevant today, suffices to allow the States to

7

retain authority over an issue they have
regulated from the beginning.

Deboer, 772 F.3d at 405-06.

In the final analysis, an activist court will no doubt
be strongly tempted to substitute its policy preference
(whether as an individual judge at tiie district court
level or collectively in the case of this Court or the
federal appellate courts) for that of the people of
Michigan in such a politicized issue as “same-sex
marriage.” However, courts have no authority to do so.
Forcing the people of Michigan to accept this Court’s
policy preference on the issue of marriage would be
nothing short of lawlessness. See The Federalist No.
47, p. 324 (J. Cooke ed. 1961) (J. Madison) (“[The]
accumulation of all powers legislative, executive and
judiciary in the same hands, whether of one, a few or
many, and whether hereditary, self-appointed, or
elective, may justly be pronounced the very definition
of tyranny.”).

Il. Michigan’s Marriage Amendment Also
Satisfies a Higher Level of Scrutiny.

Even if this Court were to improperly disregard
rational basis review in favor of a higher level of
scrutiny by concluding that Michigan’s definition of
marriage discriminates on the basis of “gender,” see
generally Br. of Pet’rs at (“Whatever limits fnay be
imposed on the right to marry, the gender of the
partners cannot be one of them.”), Michigan’s Marriage
Amendment similarly satisfies this level of scrutiny.
See also Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461 (1988)
(stating that “intermediate scrutiny” applies “to

8

discriminatory classifications based on sex or
illegitimacy”).®

For example, in Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484
(1974), the Court held that a state disability insurance
program provision excluding benefits for disability
resulting from normal pregnancy did not discriminate
on the basis of sex in violation of the Equal Protection
Clause. “While it is true,” the Court stated, “that only
women can become pregnant, it does not follow that
every legislative classification concerning pregnancy is
a sex-based classification.” Jd. at 496, n. 20.

In Michael M. v. Superior Court of Sonoma County,
450 U.S. 464 (1981), the Court held that California’s
statutory rape law did not unlawfully discriminate on
the basis of gender. The Court stated, “[Blecause the
Equal Protection Clause does not ‘demand that a
statute necessarily apply equally to all persons’ or
require ‘things which are different in fact .. . to be
treated in law as though they were the same,’ a statute
will be upheld where the gender classification is not
invidious, but rather realistically reflects the fact that
the sexes are not similarly situated in certain

* Petitioners contend that intermediate scrutiny applies here
because “[t]he marriage bans, in tandem with Michigan's second
parent adoption law, ... trigger intermediate scrutiny because the
burden and disparate impact on children is at least as onerous as
that inflicted by the illegitimacy classifications invalidated by this
Court decades ago.” Br. of Pet’rs at 54-55. But Petitioners are
attempting here to inject an adoption law into the mix to argue
against Michigan’s Marriage Amendment. Whether Michigan’s
second parent adoption law requires amending is a matter to take
up with the Michigan legislature. It’s not a basis for striking down
a duly enacted constitutional amendment.

9

circumstances.” Michael M., 450 U.S. at 469 (citations
to quotations omitted). Here, same-sex partners are
not similarly situated to opposite-sex partners as a
matter of biological fact. Therefore, the law does not
need to treat them as though they were the same.

Indeed, even in the politicized abortion context the
Court “establish [ed] conclusively that it is not ipso facto
sex discrimination” for a law to disfavor abortion. Bray
v. Alexandria Women’s Health Clinic, 506 U.S. 263, 273
(1993) (citing Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977) and
Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980)). In Bray, the
Court held that for purposes of a claim brought under
42 U.S.C. § 1985(3), opposition to abortion does not
reflect an animus against women. As the Court noted,
“(I]t cannot be denied that there are common and
respectable reasons for opposing [abortion], other than
hatred of, or condescension toward (or indeed any view
at all concerning), women as aclass....” Bray, 506
U.S. at 270.

Similarly here, opposition to “same-sex marriage”
does not reflect an animus against same-sex partners.
There are common and respectable reasons for
opposing same-sex marriage, as noted above. The most
notable (and common) reason is biology.

It is a biological fact that persons of the same sex
are incapable of producing offspring naturally. It
matters not that some married couples are incapable of
having children for various reasons, whether due to
illness, disabilities, or even incarceration. See Turner
v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987) (striking down a state
regulation of inmate marriages because it was not
reasonably related to legitimate penological

10

objectives).* The indisputable fact remains that as a
class, same-sex couples cannot reproduce while couples
of the opposite sex can.

In Michael M., for example, the Court recognized
that because women (and not men) can become
pregnant, this fact of nature provides a disincentive for
women to engage in the criminal offense of statutory
rape (even though not all women are capable of
becoming pregnant due to age, physical disabilities, or
other reasons). As the Court noted in upholding the
statute, the law “reasonably reflects the fact that the
consequences of sexual] intercourse and pregnancy fall
more heavily on the female than on the male.” Zd. at
476. In short, biology provided a legitimate basis for
upholding the statute against an equal protection
challenge under a heightened level of scrutiny. And
the same is true here regarding Michigan’s Marriage
Amendment.

In closing and drawing upon this Court’s reasoning
in United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013), the
only legitimate result in this case is for the Court to
affirm the Sixth Circuit’s holding. As stated by this
Court (with slight paraphrasing to make the relevant
point here):

In acting [to preserve the longstanding and
traditional] definition of marriage, Michigan was]
responding “to the initiative of those who
[sought] a voice in shaping the destiny of their
own times.” Bond v. United States, 564 U.S. __,

* Under Petitioners’ theory of the law, states would likely have to
allow male inmates to marry other male inmates.

11

___, 1381 S. Ct. 2355, 180 L. Ed. 2d 269 (2011).
These actions were without doubt a proper
exercise of its sovereign authority within our
federal system, all in the way that the Framers
of the Constitution intended. The dynamics of
state government in the federal system are to
allow the formation of consensus respecting the
way the members of a discrete community treat
each other in their daily contact and constant
interaction with each other. ... It reflects . . .
the community’s considered perspective on the
historical roots of the institution of
marriage ....

Id. at 2692-93 (emphasis added).

12
CONCLUSION

The Court should hold that the Fourteenth
Amendment does not require a state to license a
marriage between two people of the same sex.

Respectfully submitted,

ROBERT J. MUISE
Counsel of Record
American Freedom Law Center
P.O. Box 131098
Ann Arbor, MI 48113
(855) 835-2352
rmuise@americanfreedomlawcenter.org

David Yerushalmi

American Freedom Law Center
1901 Pennsylvania Ave. NW
Washington, D.C. 20006

(855) 835-2352

Counsel for Amicus Curiae
American Freedom Law Center

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385016_0308%3A022. Public record. Not legal advice.