# Amicus Curiae Brief — Obergefell v. Hodges

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URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385016_0306%3A040

## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Amicus Curiae Brief
- **Published:** January 1, 2015
- **Citation:** 576 U.S. 644

## Text

Nos. 14-556, 14-562, 14-571, 14-574

Bu The
Supreme Court of the Anited

JAMES OBERGEFELL, et al., and
BRITTANI HENRY, et al., Petitioners,
Vv.
RICHARD HODGES, DIRECTOR, OHIO
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, et al., Respondents.

*

VALERIA TANCO, et al., Petitioners,
V.

WILLIAM EDWARD “BILL” HASLAM,
GOVERNOR OF TENNESSEE, et al., Respondents.

7
APRIL DEBORR, et al., Petitioners,

Vv.
RICK SNYDER, GOVERNOR OF MICHIGAN, et al., Respondents.

¢

GREGORY BOURKE, et al., and
TIMOTHY LOVE, et al., Petitioners,
v.
STEVE BESHEAR, GOVERNOR OF KENTUCKY, et al., Respondents.

— o
On Writs Of Certiorari To The United States
Court Of Appeals For The Sixth Circuit
+

BRIEF OF AMICUS CURIAE COLUMBIA
LAW SCHOOL SEXUALITY AND GENDER
LAW CLINIC IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONERS

¢

HENRY P. MONAGHAN SUZANNE B. GOLDBERG

435 West 116th Street Columbia Law School

New York, NY 10027 435 West 116th Street

(212) 854-2644 New York, New York 10027

monaghan@law.columbia.edu (212) 854-0411

Of Counsel sgoldb1@law.columbia.edu
Counsel of Record for

Amicus Curiae

COCKLE LEGAL BRIEFS (800) 225-6864

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE........................- 1

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT ..................ccccceeseeees 3

(TLE FETE aaa Es aaa Oe NO 4
I. States Generally Allow Freedom of Choice

IT.

in Marriage, Consistent with the Due Pro-
cess Clause, but for Their Selective Exclu-

sion of Same-Sex Couples

A.

ee Cee eee eee eee ee eee ee ee eee

The Marriage-Ban States Impose Few
Limits on a Person’s Choice of Spouse,
Other Than the Choice of a Same-Sex
Spouse at Issue Here

Also Consistent with Due Process,
States Do Not Prescribe Gender Roles
for Married Couples

States Further Protect Marital Choice
by Limiting Annulment and Recogniz-
ing Marriages Even Where Spouses
Had Dubious Motives

Eligibility for Marriage in the United
States Does Not Hinge on Spouses Be-
ing Able to Procreate Biologically

The Marriage Restrictions at Issue In-
fringe Same-Sex Couples’ Constitutionally
Protected Liberty Interests in Family In-

tegrity and Association

10

12

15

il

TABLE OF CONTENTS -— Continued
Page

Ill. The Due Process and Equal Protection
Guarantees Require Equal Access to Fun-
damental Rights, Including Autonomy in
Decisions about Childrearing, Intimacy,
aE 21

ID distin ticceieesinncinticciulerpenshanienientannicibestasneiianiiiakadinn 24

ill

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Page
CASES
Adler v. Adler, 805 So. 2d 952 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
nnn IITITITIT secihenssietiuiieeinieapenbaisieeapeieieteailicin tintin 14
Baskin v. Bogan, 766 F.3d 648 (7th Cir. 2014) ............ 1

Bishop v. Smith, 760 F.3d 1070 (10th Cir. 2014)......... 8
Bostic v. Schaefer, 760 F.3d 352 (4th Cir. 2014)...... 1,8

Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986).................. 22
Bratton v. Bratton, 136 S.W.3d 595 (Tenn.

i Ea al a Di 11
Brenner v. Armstrong, Nos. 14-14061, 14-14066

(11th Cir. filed Sept. 5, 2014).......0... eee. 1,15

Brenner v. Scott, 999 F. Supp. 2d 1278 (N.D.

ea Ee Cree eee ee OD Ae 15
Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60 (1917)..............0..... 23
Campbell v. Campbell, 377 S.W. 93 (Ky. 1964).......... 11
Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678

ERENT rE EEE eee SEL eee Le 7
Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632

Ie ceailaelaniataaa i a 7
Conde-Vidal v. Rius-Armendariz, No. 14-2184

CE Sy, SE ER BI, BID dececeniccccnccccccecectocssceccceccss 1

Coulter v. Hendricks, 918 S.W.2d 424 (Tenn. Ct.
IIT iaetanstineideibsidcibesnesinincendieeinsendeitebaisielinciaenclsdieitoraisania 14

iv

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES — Continued

Page
De Leon v. Abbott, No. 14-50196 (5th Cir. ar-

I eee 1,9
De Leon v. Perry, 975 F. Supp. 2d 632 (W.D.

ia 8
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) ........... 22
Hardesty v. Hardesty Ex’r, 34 S.W.2d 442 (Ky.

| Se cee EEL aek eon cs eee Nase eknt OSs eUL aPC 11
Hawkins v. Hawkins, 258 S.W. 962 (Ky. 1924).......... 14
Hodge v. Parks, 844 N.W.2d 189 (Mich. Ct. App.

SERRE AR en ep cetiy man aaa sen BRR ctsd ee NE AA Te ee 11
Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417 (1990)................ 7
Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013)........... 2
In re Estate of Smallman, 398 S.W.3d 134

NN I ssssicuiiesidieeisicenateicaiaiiptisnalariastladiiaaien latinas 13
In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384 (Cal. 2008) .......... 2
In re Miller’s Estate, 214 N.W. 428 (Mich. 1927)....... 13
Kerrigan v. Comm’r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d

I kaa ialeariaaiiaaa 2
Kitchen v. Herbert, 755 F.3d 1193 (10th Cir.

a a a a 8
Koebel v. Koebel, 176 N.W. 552 (Mich. 1920)............. 14
Latta v. Otter, 771 F.3d 456 (9th Cir. 2014)................. 1
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003)...18, 21, 22, 23
Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967)................. 4, 8, 22

M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102 (1996)..................ccs000 20

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES — Continued

Meriwether v. Fourth & First Bank & Trust
Co., 285 S.W. 34 (Tenn. 1926)

Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).............. 19, 22
Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977)....... 4,18
Pierce v. Soc’, of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925)......19, 20, 22

Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984)............... 7
Robinson v. Commonwealth, 212 S.W.3d 100
SET TTI cd icechadiitincendiahaidialidiainiaeyblltadabamnanaianadiiaiaseieeey 13
Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982).................. 18
Savini v. Savini, 58 So. 2d 193 (Fla. 1952)................ 13
Seabold v. Seabold, 84 N.E.2d 521 (Ohio Ct.
I aa i a a cl 5
Soley v. Soley, 655 N.E.2d 1381 (Ohio Ct. App.
Sees ern ecaiebiaisdaniidaianbbaaisamuadien 13
Surrogate Parenting Assoc., Inc. v. Com. ex rel.
Armstrong, 704 S.W.2d 209 (Ky. 1986)................... 16
Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987) .............. 17, 18, 22
United States v. Windsor, 133 S.Ct. 2675
le a 2,9
Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862 (Iowa 2009)............ 2

Verhage v. Verhage, No. 12-04-00309-CV, 2006
WL 1791565 (Tex. App. 2006)

Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978)............0...0.... 7

vi

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES — Continued

Page
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS
8 Ge | Eee aOS 3, 7
Rate. Cote Am. § O-B-BiB......cccceccvessescccscscscccccsesscsceceses 17
Ark. Code Ann. § 9-11-102..............ccccccccccsscsccesscscsscceees 6
BR, GRE I, BB Br Be ccccciccseciscensuscssscscsuceticsecossecces 4
hs I, i I cainierisicinedceimmmnnnetiaagiees 4
Bs Oe ID icececictcccdcsiinnccctecciniistcicniiiientd 4
ee Ny Or csc cccicccniessicninccstinnininnadininsiinniininns 11
es Ga I, Oe Br i rcctictcscsccecciesccsnecencecssccenssccs 12
Ark. Const. amend. LXXXITI ................ eee eeeeeeee eee 4
I a i a 6
a 4
I 12
Sis Ms I OR IR, Osi ieicledineniipemeoennbindleini 4
EE eR ea eae en ee en NEE 4
Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 199.520 ................cccccccesseeceeeeeees 16
By. Rev. Stat. Amm. § 403.006 .........0.ccccccosscccosseesvessccnees 4
Be Sy GN IN, Oe GI ossicicacccvecscntcctesctensicensasees 5
Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 402.020 ......00........ ccc cece eee 4,5,6
Be, Be GR. aaeee, BH GI ce cnceccscccccccsccecccsossccsenceses 12
Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 402.040 0.00000... eeeeeeeeeeeee 4
Se ne SL ND, OP IID sincvescedeedscemesoiensesciceedncsoies 4

Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 402.050 .........cccccccccececeseeeseseseeesees )

vii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES — Continued

Page
ee 9
Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 402.130 .o...ccccccccccescsssessescececececeee 9
8 9
Biot Bow, Bhat. Aan. § GG. IBD ..cersccvscsvssccssecssenssersesesussie 9
Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 402.160 ......0.... 0... eee cee cence eee 9
Bees Tar, Get, Game, BG BO cceccecsesesencicsscocsevtesconsieniats 9
Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 403.170 .............. 0... cece ecee cence ness 11
Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 40B.211 .......0seccccccscsccsccsnsescessees 11
Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 403.720(1)............00...ccccceeceeeeeees 10
La. Child. Code Amm. Gt. 1546.......cccccccccsscccsoscssccesccseses 6
Bei, Gs GO FI: CG, TED ecccoccepccnsceincnnsveeseesnnesnsetenenin 4
ete, CR SRD ARI. GG BI crcccocccceciovsintinticnsenententniamibiiaees 4
La. Cie, Cote Asm. G86. BEBO ..0cccoscscsescesccesensccecsesesseseses 4
Es Sb ara 4
Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 400.1501..............000...:00000 10
Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 551.1...................ccceceeeeenseees 4
Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 551.2.............ccccecccceseeeeeeeeees 5
Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 551.3..............ccccceecceseeeeceeees 5
Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 551.4.................cceccecseeeeeeeees 5
Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 551.5...............0.c.cccceceeeeeeeees 5
Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 551.7..................ccccceeceeeeseees 9
Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 551.9.................cccccceceeeseceees 9

Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 551.51...............c cece eeeeee neers 5

Vili

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES — Continued

Page
Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 551.103........................... 5,6
Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 551.151......................2......-. 9
Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 551.152......................:ceeee )
Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 551.153.........................2.004 9
Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 551.154......................2........ 4
Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 551.201............................... 6
Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 551.271..........................0004 4
Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 551.272....................c:sceeeeee 4
Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 552.2.....................cc.c0cee00 12
Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 552.6.....................0...0....00 11
Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 552.16.............................4. 11
Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 557.28...........................00+. ll
Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 700.2114........................... 16
Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 710.60............................04. 16
| eee 4
i eae nneueinninnasonines 4
Miss. Code. Ann. § 93-1-5 .......................cc.ccccccccccscceseees 6
Bigs. Code. Am. § 93-12-17 .........cccccccccccccccccccccccecccesceees i)
Miss. Code. Ann. § 93-5-233 ...............cccccccececsecececeeeeeees ll
Ss CE, MUIR, OP GIPIAID cccccccccccccocesccoscocesesoercescecoes 10
Mijas. Comat. art. AIV, § BEBA .......cccccccccccccccscccccccccescsees 4
ss ccc rnsnnnsenononsnnoooonsssond 4
a cnssonevsconseseused 4

ix

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES — Continued

Page
N.D. Cent. Code Ann. § 14-03-01 ...200.0...... ccc ccc eee cece eee 4
N.D. Cent. Code Ann. § 14-03.2-01 ......00.0....00.cccc cee ll
N.D. Cent. Code Ann. § 14-03-02 00.00.0000... 6
N.D. Cent. Code Ann. § 14-03-09 .......0000 0.0.0. i)
N.D. Cent. Code Ann. § 14-09-08 .....0.. 00.2... ...2.ccceeeeeee. 11
8 BF > & | «Sr esereeennseaeneEeenenCe aioe 4
OS eee eM een ee 4
a eee Se 4
Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2106.22 ..............0c coco ccc cece eee ee ll
Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 3101.01 ..............00..00.000.... 4,5,6
Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 3101.04 20000000000 cccecccececeeeee 6
Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 3101.05 ..........0.......200.00..20-02 220s 9
Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 3103.06 ...................cccecceeeeeeeee 12
Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 3103.08 .....0.......0......cccccecceeeeee 9
Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 3105.01 ....0..........ccccc cece cee ll
Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 3105.31 ..................00c..cccccceeeee 12
Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 3107.15 .0........0.0.0ccccccccecccceeee 16
Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 3111.88............0...........ccccceeeee 16
Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 3111.89.............000.00 ccc 16
Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 3111.90.....................cccccceeeeeees 16
Ohio Rev. Code Anmm. § 3111.91 ..............cocccoccocecocccceces 16
Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 3111.92...............ccccccccecceceeceeee 16

Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 3111.93 .........0.0. 0 coco cece cecc cee 16

x

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES — Continued

Page
Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 3111.94....................cccececeeneeees 16
Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 3111.95...................0.0...20 cece eee 16
Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 3111.96...................... 2. cece ceeeees 16
Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 3111.97 ..................0 0c ccc cece ceee ee 16
Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 3113.31..........................cceee00e 10
Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 3119.02.................00.0 ccc cee cece eee 11
A —_—_ 6
S.D. Codified Laws § 25-1-1 ...................ceseccsecseecesscesees 4
S.D. Codified Laws $ 25-1-30 ..................c.c.cccoccccscccccese 9
S.D. Codified Laws § 25-1-38 .................ccsccsscesscoseceenees 4
es ee CRD Ot ED ccnieccncccssccnsensenisnonsaniatnnin 11
S.D. Codified Laws § 25-4-411 ..................................... 11
S.D. Codified Laws § 25-10-1 .............. 20. cece cccc cece eeeee ees 10
es I, I, I I ann iccnstinripnenieeemntnbinanimaniabidl 4
Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-2-401 0.00.00... occ cece cece cece eee eee ees 16
Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-2-402.................ccccccceeceeeeeeeeeeees 16
Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-2-403................2.2-cccecececeeeceeecees 16
ee, Ge, Oe I itcenicnncoretescteccnnininniieiananittl 5
meme, Ge Bea, © Bie Bi leecccccccccccecccescccscccccsecsscecseces 5
Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-3-104........0...... 0c. cc cccccceeeceeeeeees 5,6
Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-3-105.....................ccccceeeee 5, 6, 12
Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-3-106...........................0eseeeeeees 5,6

Tenn. Code Amn. § 36-3-107..............cccccccocccsccccccccceese 5,6

Page
Se, Se, Br icittttenttnrcccscninnicnnniinnsensinenied 5
SN, Se Se etiencicniesncsntensicansecenescesinnennnnoal 4
Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-3-201...............0... cece cece eee cee eeeee 10
Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-3-210...................cccccccesseeeeeeeeees 10
Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-3-301........................ccscseeseecseesess g
Tenn. Code Ann. $ 36-3-302......................cccecccccceceeeeees 4
Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-3-501........0... 00... e cece ee eee ll
I, So eicciciieemaninis 10
Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-4-101........... 00... eee eee 11
Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-101.................. 2... 0cc ccc ceeceeee eens 11
Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-111 ................. 00... eee ee ee ee 10
po ee oe ere Oee 4
lal ale 4
Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 2.001 2000.00.00... ccc cece cece cee ee eee ee 4
es ee, Ce, Sr _.ctemnesumbbondnemniiial 5
Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 2.102 20.0000... 0. ccc ce cece cece eeee eee 6
Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 2.103 2020.00.00... 0c ccc cece cecececeeee eee 6
Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 2.202 2.2.0.0... ccc ccc ccc ceceeeeceeeeee 9
Tex. Fam. Code Amn. § 4.003.................cccccccccsccccescosees. 11
Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 4.102 ..2..........0. ccc cece ccc ecececeeeeees 12
Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 6.001 2000.00.00... ccc cece cece cnc cc cee eeee 11
Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 6.002 ................ccccccccececcceceeeeee ll

xi

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES — Continued

Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 6.003 ...2.0.....0.0 ccc cece eee cece eee ll

xi

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES — Continued

. Fam.
. Fam.
. Fam.
. Fam.
. Fam.
. Fam.
. Fam.
. Fam.
. Fam.
. Fam.
. Fam.
. Fam.
. Fam.
. Fam.
. Fam.
. Fam.
. Fam.
. Fam.
. Fam.
. Fam.
. Fam.
. Fam.

. Fam.

Page
ED CC criciinveceinincecnieiniieaiinieinicesaniiiini 11
S| Eon eee eee ll
I: Cae eseeeibemesieianieean ll
Se 11
I inlet 11
ene 12
ree 12
I ee 12
ES renee 12
I I ccisncsithisminpnniitiibitianimensianiiil 12
0 NG | 8 Se eeee see eeee 12
SSPE nsceenneeeemen ee 12
ls We nsicincdcditniiisndseninciiannssaeentute 12
Code Ann. § 6.109 ................cccccceceeceeceeeseees 12
I, SiC ciiccnnsiccsninscniiesnuntionnceeniiianiatin 12
I see 12
TS | | ESSERE neon 5
I, SII nvidcinnscecesensinictsnneninenienied 5
I anil 4
NS TF et cesenncecncecssntenencesmemeness 10
RL, Fo TI cerccsecccscesvsceseccserastcnnsse 11
SS Sk FREES eEeesereones 16

oS Eee 16

xiii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES — Continued

Page
Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 160.703 00.00.00... .cccccccccc cece eens 16
Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 160.704 ...................ccccccceeeeeees 16
Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 160.705 .................ccccceeeeeeeeees 16
Tex. Fam. Code Amm. § 160.706 ......cccccccccccssccccesescoceces 16
Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 160.707 .................ccccccceeeceeeees 16
pe ee 17
OTHER AUTHORITIES
1 Tex. Prac. Guide Fam. Law § 2:49 .......................... 10
15 Ky. Prac. Domestic Relations L. § 10:1................. 12
15 Ky. Prac. Domestic Relations L. § 10:2................. 12
15 Ky. Prac. Domestic Relations L. § 10:3................. 12
15 Ky. Prac. Domestic Relations L. § 10:4................. 12
15 Ky. Prac. Domestic Relations L. § 10:5................. 12
15 Ky. Prac. Domestic Relations L. § 10:6................. 12
15 Ky. Prac. Domestic Relations L. § 10:7................. 12
Mich. Civ. Jur. Marriage § 31........................ceeceecceeeee 12
Mich. Civ. Jur. Marriage § 32......................ccccceeeeeeeees 12
Mich. Civ. Jur. Marriage § 33.............................4- —
Mich. Civ. Jur. Marriage § 34......................ccccceceeeeeees 12
Mich. Civ. dur. Marriage § B6..........ccccccccccccccccscccccscceee 12
Mich. Civ. Jur. Marriage § 36.....................ccccsececeeeenes 12

Mich. Civ. Jur. Marriage § 37...................ccccseseceeceeeees 12

Xi1V
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES — Continued

Ohio Op. Atty. Gen. 69-051, May 27, 1969 .................. 9

W. Walton Garrett, 19 Tenn. Prac. Tenn. Di-
vorce, Alimony & Child Custody § 1:7 (2013
aerate a adhe iat laa ihc 12

1

INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE

The Columbia Law School Sexuality and
Gender Law Clinic (the Clinic or Amicus), founded
in 2006, is the first such clinical law program at an
American law school.’ The Clinic has extensive exper-
tise in the constitutional doctrine related to marriage
and family recognition. In fact, the Clinic has pre-
viously submitted amicus briefs on issues related to
due process and marital choice to the Sixth Circuit in
the instant case, the First Circuit in Conde-Vidal v.
Rius-Armendariz, No. 14-2184 (1st Cir. filed Nov. 13,
2014), the Fourth Circuit in Bostic v. Schaefer, 760
F.3d 352 (4th Cir. 2014), the Fifth Circuit De Leon v.
Abbott, No. 14-50196 (5th Cir. argued Jan. 9, 2015),
the Seventh Circuit in Baskin v. Bogan, 766 F.3d 648
(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 135 S.Ct. 316 (2014), the
Ninth Circuit in Latta v. Otter, 771 F.3d 456 (9th Cir.
2014), and the Eleventh Circuit in Brenner v. Arm-
strong, Nos. 14-14061, 14-14066 (11th Cir. filed Sept.
5, 2014).

The Clinic has also submitted amicus briefs in
numerous other cases seeking to end the exclusion of
same-sex couples from marriage and the exclusion of
same-sex couples’ marriages from legal recognition

’ All parties have consented to the filing of this amicus
curiae brief pursuant to Rules 37.3 and 37.6 of the Rules of the
Supreme Court. No counsel for a party authored this brief in
whole or in part, and no one other than amicus, its members, or

its counsel made any monetary contribution toward the brief’s
preparation or submission.

2

including United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675
(2013), and Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652
(2013), and before state supreme courts in California
in In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384 (Cal. 2008),
Connecticut in Kerrigan v. Comm’r of Pub. Health,
957 A.2d 407 (Conn. 2008), and Iowa in Varnum v.
Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862 (Iowa 2009).

The Clinic’s interest here is in addressing the
relation between state laws governing marriage and
the U.S. Constitution’s due process guarantee — and
in particular, the ways in which states generally
avoid restricting individuals’ choice of spouse. As this
amicus brief shows, the protection of individual de-
cisionmaking in matters as personally important as
marriage is reflected in marriage statutes and case
law throughout the country. This body of law imposes
few restrictions, apart from the ones at issue here, on
adults’ choice of marital partners and on the recogni-
tion of valid marriages.

The laws of the states at issue here stand out, by
contrast. They, along with the laws of a small group of
other states, impose a singular, categorical and consti-
tutionally impermissible burden on lesbians and gay
men who seek to exercise their fundamental right to
marry their chosen partner and to have that mar-
riage recognized.

3

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

Marriage laws in Kentucky, Michigan, Ohio,
Tennessee, and the nine other states that exclude
same-sex couples from marriage and marriage recog-
nition are largely consistent with the Due Process
Clause of the U.S. Constitution, U.S. Const. amend.
XTV, §1, which protects “freedom of choice” in
marriage, as this Court has recognized repeatedly.
That is, these states’ domestic relations frameworks
generally take pains not to restrict individuals’ ability
to marry the person of their choice. They likewise
impose few restrictions on the conduct and choices of
married couples, other than forbidding abuse. Simi-
larly, no state requires or even suggests distinct roles
for male and female spouses within a marriage.

Matters stand otherwise with respect to individ-
uals who would choose a spouse of the same sex.
Freedom of choice is absent here. Laws constraining
individuals from choosing a same-sex marital partner
and having that marriage recognized thus exist in
sharp contrast to states’ otherwise pervasive respect for
marital freedom of choice. In doing so, they infringe
the Constitution’s long-settled protection against state

interference in deeply personal decisions related to
family life.’

* Amicus endorses, but does not duplicate here, the Petition-
ers’ arguments that state restrictions on marriage and marriage
recognition for same-sex couples also violate the Constitution's
equal protection guarantee.

4

ARGUMENT

I. States Generally Allow Freedom of Choice
in Marriage, Consistent with the Due Pro-
cess Clause, but for Their Selective Exclu-
sion of Same-Sex Couples.

The constitutions, statutes and case law of Ken-
tucky, Michigan, Ohio, Tennessee, and the nine other
states that restrict same-sex couples from marriage
and marriage-recognition (the “marriage-ban states”’)
impose few burdens on the “freedom of choice” in
marriage that this Court has deemed to be funda-
mental under the Due Process Clause. See generally
Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 499 (1977);
Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 10-12 (1967). Their

* As of the filing of this brief, these states include: Arkansas,
see Ark. Const. amend. LXXXIII; Ark. Code Ann. §§ 9-11-107, 9-
11-109, 9-11-208 (West 2014); Georgia, see Ga. Const. art. I, § 4,
7 I; Ga. Code Ann. § 19-3-3.1 (West 2014); Kentucky, see Ky.
Const. § 233A; Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 402.005, 402.020, 402.040,
402.045 (West 2014); Louisiana, see La. Const. art. XII, § 15; La.
Civ. Code Ann. arts. 89, 96, 3520 (West 2014); Michigan, see
Mich. Const. art. I, § 25; Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. §§ 551.1, 551.271,
551.272 (West 2014); Mississippi, see Miss. Const. art. XIV,
§ 2634; Miss. Code Ann. § 93-1-1 (West 2014); Missouri, see
Mo. Const. art. I, § 33; Mo. Ann. Stat. § 451.022 (West 2014);
Nebraska, see Neb. Const. art. I, § 29; North Dakota, see N.D.
Const. art. XI, § 28; N.D. Cent. Code Ann. § 14-03-01 (West
2013); Ohio, see Ohio Const. art. XV, § 11; Ohio Rev. Code Ann.
§ 3101.01 (West 2014); South Dakota, see S.D. Const. art. XXI,
§ 9; S.D. Codified Laws §§ 25-1-1, 25-1-38 (West 2014); Tennes-
see, see Tenn. Const. art. XI, § 18; Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-3-113
(West 2014); and Texas, see Tex. Const. art. I, § 32; Tex. Fam.
Code Ann. §§ 2.001, 6.204 (West 2013).

5

restrictions on choice of a same-sex spouse defy this
otherwise pervasive freedom.

A. The Marriage-Ban States Impose Few
Limits on a Person’s Choice of Spouse,
Other Than the Choice of a Same-Sex
Spouse at Issue Here.

Apart from the restrictions challenged in this
case, the domestic relations law of Kentucky, Michi-
gan, Ohio, Tennessee, and the other marriage-ban
states prohibits marriage only when one or both part-
ners is currently married or lacks the capacity to
consent, or when the partners are related to a speci-
fied degree by blood or marriage. See, e.g., Ky. Rev.
Stat. Ann. § 402.020(1)(b) (bigamy); id. § 402.020(1\f)
(age of consent); id. § 402.010 (consanguinity); Mich.
Comp. Laws Ann. §§ 551.3-551.4 (consanguinity); id.
§ 551.5 (bigamy); id. § 551.2 (capacity to consent); id.
§§ 551.51, 551.103 (age of consent); Ohio Rev. Code
Ann. § 3101.01 (bigamy, age of consent, consan-
guinity); Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-3-101 (consanguinity);
id. § 36-3-102 (bigamy); id. § 36-3-104 to 36-3-107
(age of consent); id. § 36-3-109 (capacity to consent);
Seabold v. Seabold, 84 N.E.2d 521, 523 (Ohio Ct. App.
1948) (capacity to consent); see also, e.g., Tex. Fam.
Code Ann. § 2.101 (age of consent); id. § 6.201 (con-
sanguinity); id. § 6.202 (bigamy).

Parental consent is typically required for anyone
age sixteen or seventeen. See, e.g., Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann.
§ 402.020(1\f) (requiring parental consent); Mich.

6

Comp. Laws Ann. § 551.103 (same); Tenn. Code
Ann. §§ 36-3-104 to 36-3-107 (same); see also, e.g.,
La. Child. Code Ann. art. 1545 (same). Cf. Ark. Code
Ann. § 9-11-102 (providing minimum marriage age
of seventeen for men and sixteen for women, and
setting out consent requirements); Ohio Rev. Code
Ann. § 3101.01(A) (providing minimum marriage age
of eighteen for men and sixteen for women, and
setting out consent requirements).

States generally also forbid marriage for those
under sixteen years old. See, e.g., Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann.
§ 402.020(1\(f1) (generally barring marriages be-
tween individuals younger than sixteen); Mich.
Comp. Laws Ann. § 551.103 (same); Ohio Rev. Code
Ann. § 3101.01 (same); Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-3-105
(same); see also, e.g., Ga. Code Ann. § 19-3-2 (same);
N.D. Cent. Code Ann. § 14-03-02 (same); S.C. Code
Ann. § 20-1-100 (same); Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 2.102
(same).

Even these restrictions, however, are waivable
under certain circumstances. See, e.g., Ky. Rev.
Stat. Ann. § 402.020(1)(f)(3) (setting out exception to
minimum-age restriction based on pregnancy); Mich.
Comp. Laws Ann. § 551.201 (providing exception with
parental consent); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 3101.04
(setting out pregnancy exception); Tenn. Code Ann.
§ 36-3-107 (allowing for waiver of minimum age re-
quirements); see also, e.g., Miss. Code Ann. § 93-1-5(d)
(allowing waiver of minimum age requirements); Tex.
Fam. Code Ann. §§ 2.102-2.103 (same).

7

In other words, in the marriage-ban states, an
unmarried person who is at least eighteen years old
and has the capacity to consent can marry any other
consenting adult who is not a relative, and have that
marriage recognized — so long as the chosen partner
is also not of the same sex. See supra.

The four states in the instant case as well as
other marriage-ban states, like every other state,
thus impose few restrictions on the “freedom of per-
sonal choice in matters of marriage” guaranteed by
the U.S. Constitution’s Due Process Clause. See U.S.
Const. amend. XIV, § 1; Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v.
LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 639-40 (1974); see also
Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 387 (1978) (stress-
ing that “freedom of choice” is a “fundamental” aspect
of marriage).

This Court has reinforced that states should not
limit an individual’s choice of spouse outside of base-
line concerns related to consanguinity, minimum age,
bigamy, and consent. “(T]he regulation of constitu-
tionally protected decisions, such as ... whom [a
person] shall marry, must be predicated on legitimate
state concerns other than disagreement with the
choice the individual has made.” Hodgson v. Min-
nesota, 497 U.S. 417, 435 (1990); see also Roberts v.
U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 620 (1984) (“[TJhe Consti-
tution undoubtedly imposes constraints on the State’s
power to control the selection of one’s spouse... .”);
Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 684-85
(1977) (“{I]t is clear that among the decisions that an
individual may make without unjustified government

8

interference are personal decisions ‘relating to mar-
riage. .. .’”) (citations omitted); Loving, 388 U.S. at 12
(“Under our Constitution, the freedom to marry or not
marry, a person of another race resides with the
individual and cannot be infringed by the State.”).

Consistent with these holdings, numerous lower
courts have determined that this constitutional pro-
tection encompasses an individual’s choice of a same-
sex partner. In Bostic v. Schaefer, 760 F.3d 352, 376
(4th Cir.), cert. denied, 135 S.Ct. 308 (2014), for
example, the Fourth Circuit explained that the fun-
damental right to marry “is not circumscribed based
on the characteristics of the individuals seeking to
exercise that right.” The court added: “If courts
limited the right to marry to certain couplings, they
would effectively create a list of legally preferred
spouses, rendering the choice of whom to marry a
hollow choice instead.” Jd. at 377. The Tenth Circuit
likewise observed that “surely a great deal of the
dignity of same-sex relationships inheres in the lov-
ing bonds between those who seek to marry and the
personal autonomy of. making such choices.” Kitchen
v. Herbert, 755 F.3d 1193, 1214 (10th Cir), cert.
denied, 135 S. Ct. 265 (2014); see also, e.g., Bishop v.
Smith, 760 F.3d 1070, 1080 (10th Cir.), cert. denied,
135 S. Ct. 271 (2014) (“State bans on the licensing of
same-sex marriage significantly burden the funda-
mental right to marry....”); De Leon v. Perry, 975
F. Supp. 2d 632, 657 (W.D. Tex. 2014) (“While Texas
has the ‘unquestioned authority’ to regulate and define
marriage, the State must nevertheless do so in a way
that does not infringe on an individual’s constitutional

9

rights.”) (quoting United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct.
2675, 2693 (2013)), appeal docketed sub nom. De Leon
v. Abbott, No. 14-50196 (5th Cir. argued Jan. 9, 2015).

Of course, like every state, Kentucky, Michigan,
Ohio, Tennessee, and the other marriage-ban states
have rules in place regarding the solemnization of
marriages. See, e.g., Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 402.050(1)
(indicating who can solemnize a marriage); Mich.
Comp. Laws Ann. § 551.7 (same); id. § 551.9 (pro-
viding that “no particular form shall be required” to
solemnize a marriage); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 3101.08
(identifying individuals authorized to solemnize a
marriage); Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-3-301 (same); id.
§ 36-3-302 (providing that “no formula need be ob-
served” in solemnization of marriage); see also, e.g.,
Miss. Code Ann. § 93-1-17 (listing people able to
solemnize a marriage); N.D. Cent. Code Ann. § 14-03-
09 (same); S.D. Codified Laws § 25-1-30 (same); Tex.
Fam. Code Ann. § 2.202 (same).

But these rules do not restrict individuals in
their choice of spouse beyond the few eligibility re-
quirements discussed supra. See, e.g., Ohio Op. Atty.
Gen. 69-051, May 27, 1969 (prohibiting probate courts
from requiring IQ or other test to prove mental ca-
pacity or from refusing to issue a marriage license
based on a party’s inability to support a family). Even
premarital blood test and medical examination re-
quirements were repealed in the marriage-ban states
long ago. See, e.g., Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 402.120-
.170 (repealed in 1982); Mich. Comp. Laws Ann.
§§ 551.151-.154 (repealed in 1978); Ohio Rev. Code

10

Ann. § 3101.05 (repealed in 1981); Tenn. Code Ann.
§§ 36-3-201, 36-3-210 (repealed in 1985); see also, e.g.,
1 Tex. Prac. Guide Fam. Law § 2:49 (“Medical ex-

aminations and blood testing are no longer re-
quired... .”).

Against this backdrop, the rules at issue here,
which disallow individuals from marrying the person
of their choice and refuse recognition to individuals
who chose to marry a same-sex partner, see supra, cut
strikingly against the due process limitation on gov-
ernment interference with this intimate and personal
choice.

B. Also Consistent with Due Process, States
Do Not Prescribe Gender Roles for Mar-
ried Couples.

There is little in the law of any state, includ-
ing in the Sixth Circuit, specifying how spouses
should behave within marriage; the few rules that
do exist focus on violence and abuse, and all of those
are gender-neutral. See, e.g., Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann.
§ 403.720(1) (defining “domestic violence and abuse”);
Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 400.1501(d\i)-(iv) (defining
“domestic violence”); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 3113.31
(same); Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-3-601(4) (defining “domes-
tic abuse”); id. § 39-13-111 (criminalizing “domestic
assault”); see also, e.g., Miss. Code Ann. § 93-21-3(a)
(defining “abuse”); S.D. Codified Laws § 25-10-1(1)
(defining “domestic abuse”); Tex. Fam. Code Ann.
§ 71.004 (defining “family violence”).

11

Statutes governing divorce and child support
similarly do not differentiate between male and fe-
male spouses. See, e.g., Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 403.170
(divorce); id. § 403.211 (child support); Mich. Comp.
Laws Ann. § 552.6(1) (divorce); id. § 552.16(1) (child
support); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 3105.01 (divorce); id.
§ 3119.02 (child support); Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-4-101
(divorce); id. § 36-5-101(a\1) (child support); see also,
e.g., Miss. Code Ann. § 93-5-23 (child support and
alimony); N.D. Cent. Code Ann. § 14-09-08 (child sup-
port); S.D. Codified Laws § 25-4-41 (spousal support);
Tex. Fam. Code Ann. §§ 6.001-.008 (divorce); id.
§ 154.001 (child support).

Indeed, states within and outside of the Sixth
Circuit generally permit spouses to craft agreements
that define the terms of their marriage so long as
the agreements “have been entered into ... freely,
knowledgeably and in good faith and without exertion
of duress or undue influence upon either spouse.”
See Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-3-501 (allowing prenuptial
agreements); Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 557.28 (pre-
nuptial); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2106.22 (prenuptial);
id. § 3103.05 (postnuptial); Hardesty v. Hardesty Ex’r,
34 S.W.2d 442 (Ky. 1931) (prenuptial); Campbell v.
Campbell, 377 S.W. 93 (Ky. 1964) (postnuptial);
Hodge v. Parks, 844 N.W.2d 189, 195 (Mich. Ct. App.
2014) (postnuptial); Bratton v. Bratton, 136 S.W.3d
595, 600 (Tenn. 2004) (postnuptial); see also, e.g., Ark.
Code Ann. § 9-11-403 (prenuptial); N.D. Cent. Code Ann.
§ 14-03.2-01 (prenuptial); S.D. Codified Laws § 25-2-
18 (prenuptial); Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 4.003(a)(8), (b)

12

(prenuptial); id. § 4.102 (postnuptial). But see Ohio
Rev. Code Ann. § 3103.06 (restricting marital part-
ners from contracting to alter their legal relations).

C. States Further Protect Marital Choice
by Limiting Annulment and Recogniz-
ing Marriages Even Where Spouses Had
Dubious Motives.

States also strictly limit the circumstances in
which marriages can be annulled, reinforcing that
parties exercise nearly complete autonomy when
choosing marital partners, for better or worse. See,
e.g., Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 402.030 (permitting an-
nulment where spouse is underage only if sought by
the underage spouse or another acting on the un-
derage spouse’s behalf); Mich. Comp. Laws Ann.
§ 552.2 (same); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 3105.31 (same);
Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-3-105 (same); see also, e.g.,
Ark. Code Ann. § 9-12-201 (detailing limited grounds
available for annulment); Ga. Code Ann. § 19-4-1 (pro-
hibiting annulment where children are born of mar-
riage); Tex. Fam. Code Ann. §§ 6.101-.111 (restricting
annulment to situations, including, inter alia, an un-
derage spouse who lacked parental consent or a court
order; fraud, incapacity, and nondisclosed divorce); cf.
Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 3105.31 (discussing additional
limited grounds for annulment, including bigamy,
mental incapacity, and fraud); 15 Ky. Prac. Domestic
Relations L. §§ 10:1-:7 (same); Mich. Civ. Jur. Mar-
riage §§ 31-37 (same); W. Walton Garrett, 19 Tenn.

13

Prac. Tenn. Divorce, Alimony & Child Custody § 1:7
(2013 ed.) (same).

As a result, nearly all marriages — including
those entered into under circumstances that would
offend many Americans and those that contravene
state law, other than bigamous or closely consanguin-
eous marriages — are treated as presumptively valid.
See, e.g., Robinson v. Commonwealth, 212 S.W.3d 100,
104-06 (Ky. 2006) (holding that marriage between
37-year-old and 14-year-old was valid (“voidable, not
void”) and rejecting statutory rape charge on that
ground); Savini v. Savini, 58 So. 2d 193 (Fla. 1952)
(treating a marriage as valid and holding that a wife
was entitled to divorce, but not annulment, where her
husband deliberately concealed prior to marriage that
he had been convicted of rape and was on parole).
Courts also regularly decline to void marriages be-
tween first cousins that would not be permitted under
state law. See, e.g., In re Miller’s Estate, 214 N.W. 428
(Mich. 1927) (refusing to void a marriage between
first cousins that would not have been allowed under
state law); Soley v. Soley, 655 N.E.2d 1381 (Ohio Ct.
App. 1995) (same).

States systematically conclude, as well, that the
dubious motives of one or both spouses do not render
a marriage invalid, underscoring their general com-
mitment to non-interference with individuals’ choice
of spouse. See, e.g., In re Estate of Smallman, 398
S.W.3d 134, 154 (Tenn. 2013) (holding that evidence
suggesting that a womar. who married her husband
two weeks before he died was a “bad person” and a

14

“‘gold digger’” could not be a proper basis for invali-
dating a marriage and that evidence about the hus-
band’s ill health did not establish his lack of consent);
Coulter v. Hendricks, 918 S.W.2d 424, 425, 427 (Tenn.
Ct. App. 1995), appeal denied (citations omitted) (ob-
serving that Tennessee will not annul marriages “en-
tered into in jest”); see also, e.g., Adler v. Adler, 805
So. 2d 952 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001) (disallowing an-
nulment notwithstanding that the wife had lied about
her previous marriages and that the husband would
not have entered into the marriage had he been
aware of her marital history); Verhage v. Verhage, No.
12-04-00309-CV, 2006 WL 1791565 *1 (Tex. App.
2006) (adjudicating a divorce, rather than annulment,
where husband alleged that his “pen-pal wife” had
defrauded him, abused him, and transmitted a sexual
disease to him); cf. Hawkins v. Hawkins, 258 S.W.
962, 963 (Ky. 1924) (treating marriage as valid where
one spouse had “no other motive in view in marrying
{her husband] than to secure every ease, luxury, and
comfort obtainable for herself and family and to give
to her husband as little affection and pleasure and
association as possible”); Koebel v. Koebel, 176 N.W.
552, 553 (Mich. 1920) (describing a spouse’s motive
for marriage as “purely a commercial one in which
‘Dan Cupid’ had no part”).

15

D. Eligibility for Marriage in the United
States Does Not Hinge on Spouses Be-
ing Able to Procreate Biologically.

Within the extensive body of state law just dis-
cussed, there is no procreation requirement associ-
ated with marriage — and there is no law supporting
the position that eligibility to marry turns on a cou-
ples’ capacity to have children biologically. A federal
district court in Florida put the point sharply:

Florida has never conditioned marriage on
the desire or capacity to procreate. Thus
individuals who are medically unable to pro-
create can marry in Florida. If married else-
where, their marriages are recognized in
Florida. The same is true for individuals who
are beyond child-bearing age. And individu-
als who have the capacity to procreate when
married but who voluntarily or involuntarily
become medically unable to procreate, or
pass the age when they can do so, are al-
lowed to remain married. In short, the notion
that procreation is an essential element of a
Florida marriage blinks reality.

Brenner v. Scott, 999 F. Supp. 2d 1278, 1289 (N.D. Fia.
2014), appeal docketed sub nom. Brenner v. Armstrong,
Nos. 14-14061, 14-14066 (11th Cir. Sept. 5, 2014).

Indeed, state domestic relations laws expressly
recognize that married couples (as well as unmarried
individuals and couples) have children in a range of
ways and draw no legal distinction between children
conceived by or adopted by their parents. A Tennessee

16

statute, for example, dedicates an entire part to
establishing rules for “Parentage of Children Born of
Donated Embryo Transfer,” including that children
have the same legal status regardless of whether
their parents received medical assistance in concep-
tion. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 36-2-401 to -403. Ohio
also recognizes that couples have children via “non-
spousal artificial insemination” and embryo donation
and has legislated to protect those parent-child re-
lationships. See Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §§ 3111.88-.97.
Likewise, Michigan sets out a statutory framework
for inheritance by children conceived following a mar-
ried couples’ “utilization of assisted reproductive tech-
nology.” See Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 700.2114(a).
And the Kentucky Supreme Court has affirmed the
state’s allowance of parentage via surrogacy. See Sur-
rogate Parenting Assoc., Inc. v. Com. ex rel. Arm-
strong, 704 S.W.2d 209 (Ky. 1986); see also, e.g., Tex.
Fam. Code Ann. §§ 160.701-.707 (establishing rules
for “Child[ren] of Assisted Reproduction”).

All states also have long affirmed that adopted
children have the same legal status as children con-
ceived by their parents. See, e.g., Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann.
§ 199.520 (providing for equal treatment of adopted
and biological children); Mich. Comp. Laws Ann.
§ 710.60 (“After entry of the order of adoption, there
is no distinction between the rights and duties of
natural progeny and adopted persons... .”); Ohio Rev.
Code Ann. § 3107.15 (same, with limited exceptions
for adoptions of individuals age eighteen or older);

Meriwether v. Fourth & First Bank & Trust Co., 285

17

S.W. 34, 34 (Tenn. 1926) (rejecting challenge to an
adoptive child’s inheritance and holding that an
adopted child Has the same legal status as a “legiti-
mate natural” child); see also, e.g., Ark. Code Ann.
§ 9-9-215 (declaring adoption decree establishes “re-
lationship of parent and child between petitioner and
the adopted individual, as if the adopted individual
were a legitimate blood descendant of the petitioner,
for all purposes”); Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 162.017(a)
(“An order of adoption creates the parent-child rela-
tionship between the adoptive parent and the child
for all purposes.”).

This delinking of marriage and biological procre-
ation is consistent with this Court’s commentary on
the due process protections governing marriage. As
explained in Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 95-96
(1987), marriage remains a fundamental right for
individuals, such as prison inmates, who may never
have the opportunity to “consummate” a marriage,
much less have children within the marriage. While
observing that “most inmates eventually will be re-
leased” and might have that opportunity, the Court
did not limit the marriage right, or its recognition of
marriage’s important attributes, to those inmates. /d.
at 96. Instead, Turner stressed that numerous other
“important attributes of marriage remain ... [even]
after taking into account the limitations imposed by
prison life.” Jd. Among these are “expressions of
emotional support and public commitment ... [as] an
important and significant aspect of the marital rela-
tionship,” along with “spiritual significance” and “the

18

receipt of government benefits ... , property rights
..., and other, less tangible benefits.” Jd. at 95-96.

ll. The Marriage Restrictions at Issue Infringe
Same-Sex Couples’ Constitutionally Pro-
tected Liberty Interests in Family Integrity
and Association.

As this Court has explained many times, the
Constitution’s due process and equal protection guar-
antees protect the freedom to marry as one among
several “aspects of what might broadly be termed
‘private family life’ that are constitutionally protected
against state interference.” Moore, 431 U.S. at 536.
Others identified by this Court include “personal de-
cisions relating to ... procreation, contraception,
family relationships, child rearing, and education.”
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 574 (2003) (citing
Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505
U.S. 833, 851 (1992)).

These kinds of decisions, like the decision to
marry, are elemental to an individual’s ability to
“define the attributes of personhood.’” Jd. For this
reason, numerous cases hold that “the Constitution
demands ... the autonomy of the person in making
these choices.” Id.; see also, e.g., Santosky v. Kramer,
455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982) (“[F]reedom of personal choice
in matters of family life is a fundamental liberty in-
terest protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.”).

This Court has consistently held, too, that auton-
omy to choose how to structure one’s family life must

19

be accessible to all rather than available only for those
favored by the state. Two older decisions regarding the
rights of parents to control their children’s education,
Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 396-97 (1923), and
Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925),
lay the groundwork for this proposition. These deci-
sions make clear that due process jurisprudence is
centrally concerned with guaranteeing equal access to
fundamental associational rights, a commitment the
Court has carried forward to the present.

In Meyer, this Court overturned a law that made
it illegal to teach any language other than English to
a student who had not yet completed eighth grade.
Recognizing that the law’s impact fell singularly on
“‘those of foreign lineage,’” Meyer, 262 U.S. at 398
(quoting the decision below, Meyer v. State, 107 Neb.
657, 662 (1922)), the opinion stressed that “[tjhe pro-
tection of the Constitution extends to all, to those who
speak other languages as well as to those born with
English on the tongue.” Jd. at 401.

Pointedly, the fundamental associational right to
“establish a home and bring up children” had to be
available on an equal basis to the country’s newest
inhabitants as well as to its longtime residents. Jd. at
399. Equal access to this associational right out-
weighed the state’s proffered interest in establishing
English as the primary language, id. at 401, even
though that interest was surely central to American
life at that time.

20

In Pierce, this Court likewise overturned on due
process grounds a law that required all children to
attend public schools because the law “unreasonably
interfere[d] with the liberty of parents and guardians
to direct the upbringing and education of children
under their control.” 268 U.S. at 534-35. In this case,
the targets were religious minorities — specifically,
Roman Catholics — who maintained that the law “con-
flictted) with the right of parents to choose schools
where their children will receive appropriate mental
and religious training.” Jd. at 532. The states’ refusal
to allow those parents equal access to the right to
decide how their children weuld be educated offended
the “fundamental theory of liberty.” Jd. at 535.

Addressing a different type of restriction on fa-
milial choices, this Court similarly struck down a
state-imposed fee to appeal terminations of parental
rights because that fee unequally burdened indigent
persons’ associational right to be parents. See M.L.B.
v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102, 127 (1996). M.L.B. recognized
that “‘[djue process and equal protection principles
converge’” when state action restricts individual
choices related to family formation. Jd. at 120. The
fee requirement “fencled] out would-be appellants
based solely on their inability to pay core costs,” id.,
violating the core principle that where a fundamental
liberty interest is involved — such as the integrity of
the parent-child relationship — the state must provide
“‘equal justice’” to all. Jd. at 124 (quoting Griffin v.
Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 24 (1956)).

21

Same-sex couples and their deeply personal
decisions about how to build a family life together are
no exception to this rule. In Lawrence, 539 U.S. 558,
this Court relied on due process to strike down a
law that restricted gay people’s associational freedom
to make personal choices about sexual intimacy. By
holding that “the substantive guarantee of liberty”
may not be infringed for individuals who choose same-
sex partners any more than it can be infringed for
heterosexual couples, Lawrence affirmed that the due
process guarantee protects individuals’ ability to ex-
ercise their fundamental rights on an equal basis
with others. Id. at 575. As the Court explained, “[pjer-
sons in a homosexual relationship may seek autono-
my ... just as heterosexual persons do” for “‘the most
intimate and personal choices a person may make in a
lifetime.’” Jd. at 574 (quoting Casey, 505 U.S. at 851).

III. The Due Process and Equal Protection Guar-
antees Require Equal Access to Fundamen-
tal Rights, Including Autonomy in Decisions
about Childrearing, Intimacy, and Whom to

Marry.

Arguments that the instant cases implicate a
“new” right to marry a person of the same sex, rather
than the fundamental right to marry a person of one’s
choice, ignore the extent to which fundamental rights
are defined by what conduct they protect, not by who
can exercise them. If fundamental rights could be re-
defined so easily and superficially, the Constitution’s
insistence on equal and fair access to those rights

22

would be eviscerated — states could restrict a group’s
exercise of a fundamental right and then characterize

the right as one available only to those not similarly
burdened.

Refashioning the right at issue in any of the
Court’s familial-choice due process cases just dis-
cussed makes clear how unworkable this proposition
is. Meyer, for example, was not based on a fundamen-
tal right of Germans to raise their children in their
own tradition but rather on a general liberty interest
of all parents in choosing how their children will be
raised. Pierce did not describe a fundamental right to
parent in a Catholic fashion, but rather a general
liberty interest of all parents to choose how their
children are educated.

Likewise, Turner was not a case about “prisoner mar-
riage” any more than Loving was about a fundamental
right to “interracial marriage.” Instead, these cases
were about the fundamental right to marry. Cf. Gris-
wold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486 (1965) (“Mar-
riage is a coming together for better or for worse,
hopefully enduring, and intimate to the degree of be-
ing sacred. It is an association that promotes a way of
life, .. . a harmony in living, . . . a bilateral loyalty.”).

Indeed, Lawrence directly corrected a similar
rights-framing error in Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S.
186 (1986), which had characterized the plaintiff as
seeking protection for “a fundamental right to engage
in homosexual sodomy.” Jd. at 191. Lawrence rejected
that description as a mischaracterization of the nght

23

at issue. It held, instead, that defendants Lawrence
and Garner sought protection of their fundamental
right to “the autonomy of the person” to make “‘the
most intimate and personal choices ... [tha are]
central to personal dignity and autonomy ... [and]
to the liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.’” Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 574 (quoting Casey,
505 U.S. at 851). That liberty right could not properly
be understood as defined by the sex or sexual! orienta-
tion of the parties who sought to exercise it.

Likewise, the speculation that heterosexual cou-
ples might stop valuing marriage if gay and lesbian
couples can marry rests on the similarly impermis-
sible reasoning that a fundamental right can be
denied to some based on the preferences of others.
Indeed, that reasoning is uncomfortably akin to jus-
tifications offered for racially restrictive covenants
nearly a century ago. “It is said that such acquisitions
[of property] by colored persons depreciate property
owned in the neighborhood by white persons.” Buchanan
v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60, 82 (1917).

In Buchanan, this Court rejected this absurdly
speculative devaluation rationale in a manner that
applies similarly to the instant case: “[P]roperty
[marriage] may be acquired by undesirable white
[heterosexual] neighbors or put to disagreeable
though lawful uses with like results.” Jd.

In short, conditioning one group’s access to a fun-
damental right based on the preferences or actions
of another is wholly contrary to the longstanding

24

doctrine, just discussed, that recognizes the central
importance of these rights.

°

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Amicus respectfully
requests that this Court reverse the decision of the
United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
and permanently enjoin the laws at issue as unconsti-
tutional.

Respectfully submitted,

HENRY P. MONAGHAN SUZANNE B. GOLDBERG

435 West 116th Street Columbia Law School

New York, NY 10027 435 West 116th Street

(212) 854-2644 New York, New York 10027

monaghan@law.columbia.edu (212) 854-0411

Of Counsel sgoldb1@law.columbia.edu
Counsel of Record for

Amicus Curiae

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385016_0306%3A040. Public record. Not legal advice.