# Amicus Curiae Brief — National Ass'n v. Defenders of Wildlife > Briefs, arguments, decisions, and more. URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385016_0293%3A32 ## Record - **Collection:** Supreme Court brief - **Document type:** Amicus Curiae Brief - **Published:** January 1, 2007 - **Citation:** 551 U.S. 644 ## Text = 4 Nos. 06-340, 06-549 a a aS, IN THE Supreme Court of the United States NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF HOME BUILDERS, ef ai. Petitioners, Vv. DEFENDERS OF WILDLIFE, ef al.. Respondents. UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY. Petitioner, V. DEFENDERS OF WILDLIFE, ET AL.. Respondents. On Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit BRIEF OF AMICI CURIAE HIGH PRODUCTION HOMEBUILDERS IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONERS CARTER G. PHILLIPS STEPHEN M. NICKELSBURG* Eric A. SHUMSKY R. JUGE GREGG BRIAN E. NELSON SIDLEY AUSTIN LLP 1501 K Street, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20005 (202) 736-8000 Counsel for Amici Curiae February 20, 2007 *Counsel of Record I PAA WiLSON-EPES PRINTING Co., INC. — (202) 789-0096 -— WASHINGTON, D.C. 20002 QUESTION PRESENTED Amici will address the following question: Whether, assuming that § 7 of the Endangered Species Act applies to non-discretionary agency action, this provision is nonetheless bounded by requirements of proximate causation that prevent interference with the delegation to Arizona of permitting authority under § 402 of the Clean Water Act. (i) TABLE OF CONTENTS GIF SFOS 6 IIIS BCP vscccccccsecvcenresesonenstecnnnienecsssetors FAR Se RT Re 8 I ccccctcrcccecsesocssvcceensssseeneenconsens INTERESTS OF AMICT CURIAE...............esscsssssssscoseeses Il. Ill. THROUGHOUT THE LAW, PROXIMATE CAUSE — NOT MERE BUT-FOR CAUSE - IS THE DEFAULT RULE OF CAUSATION ............ A.To Prevent Limitless Liability, Proximate Cause Is The Rule At Common Law................... B. Proximate Cause Is The Default Rule For Fed- ETERS AL eer NOES RR CO CRON SECTION 7 OF THE ESA AND ITS IMPLE- MENTING REGULATIONS INCORPORATE BASIC PRINCIPLES OF PROXIMATE CAUSE PDTED PUI ATIEBS EY cecsecccecocsecssnsecsssevsoresscones A. This Court Has Interpreted ESA § 9 As Re- GUNTUR PUORMS CBD ..0000ccccccccesercessevssscseerees B. Section 7 Of The ESA Likewise Requires EE ET ITE ee THE DECISION BELOW IMPROPERLY ABANDONED TRADITIONAL CONCEPTS OF PROXIMATE CAUSATION AND EM- PLOYED AN EXTREME VERSION OF BUT- Fe Ne TIT accctienissestnencsnvecenaninininititenianetiinne Ua ncierniiebvinnininiinnsieniideapiiainienneninbienisiaiiniatiiuensints Page j iV l iV TABLE OF AUTHORITIES CASES Page Anza v. Ideal Steel Supply Corp., 126 S. Ct. 1991 SSE desiitduinidciesscdbiabiiaiiiiicidlelasanisteiaiaihiadselauiiisiatn 11, 12,24 Archer v. Warner, 538 U.S. 314 (2003).........c000000. 24 Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. Cali- fornia State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. PO acctcittitateveiteaniiiiiestiatisitiiieiiaiaiesi 9,10, 11, 21 Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Cmtys. for a Great Or., 515 U.S. 687 (1995)... cessseeeeseeees passim Benefield v. Exxon Corp., 959 F.2d 805 (9th Cir. SUTTaTdicbiieshcauitiaciesleshiadiidliidiiablanhesaiianiadentinnamenonaneinene i) Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154 (1997)... ceeeeeeeeee 3, 25 Brower v. County of Inyo, 489 U.S. 593 (1989) ..... 18 County of Westchester v. Town of Greenwich, 76 Fe EA ITI teccichcaniieaiedeniiininiecanitinacian 15 Defenders of Wildlife v. EPA, 420 F.3d 946 (9th eae sesicissenineniinccensesupesamibietnlaaianiaiian 6, 15, 20, 21, 26 Department of Transp. v. Public Citizen, 541 U.S. SETI TElipchsinkiesesibisichdiensseceiidubanatsisapemeeininiinnigin 13 Dura Pharms., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336 [EUPTIT iicelnititiiesteedhidinstidtuinderiensconnemepeduiamutunteenitiesacien 11, 12 Exxon Co., U.S.A. v. Sofec, Inc., 517 U.S. 830 EU IETEitiihaiebceisdnidnisterteneiaveenindisincnmtandniningiiiaciinniubicniass 9,11 Florida Audubon Soc’y v. Bentsen, 94 F.3d 658 Ss Se I caseiancictivennetnninrsennninteneisienaienammnianeets 23 Glass Packaging Inst. v. Regan, 737 F.2d 1083 (D.C. Cir. 1984), overruled in part on other grounds as explained in Hazardous Waste Treatment Council v. EPA, 861 F.2d 277 (D.C. ae eT hinscesdabeciephinicanistatantinstghscrnceiiiesicetinbaedaluebipiaiuiniitis 26 Holmes v. Securities Investor Prot. Corp., 503 ee ciccesscsnctdessinebiliitieinsditepdinaiinindinibe 10, 12, 24 Loggerhead Turtle v. County Council, 92 F. Supp. 2d 1296 (M.D. Fla. 2000)............. cesses 26 Vv TABLE OF AUTHORITIES — continued Page Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 PU Ua iecnicanissiepuissaniintanaageiiapitiisiaienetanaiiansdadsaaalieaatilie 23 Metropolitan Edison Co. v. People Against Nu- clear Energy, 460 U.S. 766 (1983)........ 13, 14, 19, 22 National Wildlife Fed’n v. Hodel, 839 F.2d 694 CE Ce Fie csinicncensesicnsemsseiinnnintemiinaiiasauntiaty 17 Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. EPA, 822 F.2d a EN NT THe 27 Siggers v. Barlow, 906 F.2d 241 (6th Cir. 1990)... 24 Strahan v. Coxe, 127 F.3d 155 (1st Cir. 1997) ....... 26 Southern Pac. Co. v. Darnell-Taenzer Lumber Ca, BOS UB. F314 CAGE) nccesrccsscecansess 9,10, 11,21, 24 TUM V. Fee, SST UE, 159 CPG TI ccccccecstnctcncenscnnesnns 14 United States v. Wells, 519 U.S. 482 (1997)........... 8 United States v. West of Eng. Ship Owner's Mut. Prot. & Indem. Ass'n (Lux.), 872 F.2d 1192 CNG, Fe Rc esnvvnssinnisscinsciinicstioniiiaiiiitiadaindusmmsliebianaa 15 Waters-Pierce Oil Co. v. Deselms, 212 U.S. 159 CIR ccerccentnctcisetstitnsisihinsnieiedeiiuaiaipiiidamiaaaiie 18 STATUTES National Housing Act of 1934, ch. 847, 48 Stat. 1246 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 1701 68 BOM.) .ccccccsnssnepnenssiencsabinctininaiintaapnpeibinanenniamnttte ] - Housing Act of 1961, Pub. L. No. 87-70, 75 Stat. DAD . xconccecuninaniestnnsnutiiaanisiadinighiiimneaadaaaias ] Department of Housing and Urban Development Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-174, 79 Stat. 667 .... ] BS UB. 6 EG sccceccnsiscittinincansconintiisuaiinendeniaiiieniains 1] BG UBC. © BS Ci re ccercccccniisssininsiiisuminiisclaniiiaitiinsi 18 © BE cscnsnnsntcvcnemncsncnhiidiainia 3, 8,14, 17, 18 © CED nnececnssevinssinicitssissaaiiiiiabeiniiliiditaaiatiad 4,15, 25 OB EDO cxcccnnvensctsniianssissitiliitiiaiiadelabiaabieniaan 4 vi TABLE OF AUTHORITIES - continued Page na Hr UII iosiscssienicinseissientecehiteneiatniaieitasiate 11 ip aTIITTI hssustiorssctnininiimnpitsiedinensenienianiinssienens 11 EE ITTIGT Ts IIIT cli icdttrduiierinigiinatieaseeinsientieindinibaneitieass l i helene tebe deiepneectnanenacinstnbenitates 2 I neh STII inrcssithchiaiedeenesiictninerastnratntctiennsionitianttions l Se eaETEIEcicenichicteahietieitiniomeenerivensisindsinenaniunes 13,14 iT issthaiaidsisipandaiiniatneaiuiniateanceataiiens l I PII nicer tlesiatnniclinieatasiiniatiaiai 25 a 19, 20 SOO tistchicisteesecciinntinnsicniinpeasen wnenemngaigets 20 SITE ciktcldeendpicindenhiesibsmestunnienetnsiematnenemanaes 19 SED tasinictincniinenaeanmasnenieianienpunenins 4,19, 20 Interagency Cooperation — Endangered Species Act of 1973, as amended, 51 Fed. Reg. 19,926, PRR e GID Dh, BOIID cccccccscnsenseenseccnpnnnsasse 4, 14, 20, 23 Final Rule to Remove the Arizona Distinct Popu- lation Segment of the Cactus Ferruginous Pygmy-owl From the Federal List of Endan- gered and Threatened Wildlife, 71 Fed. Reg. I Ik ST ncersnenstennisnmnseninntiaenconnmes 27 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 96-697 (1979), reprinted in eee AOE ccpncstcsicsinnisteneseenevicesiinnianienn 18 SCHOLARLY AUTHORITIES Charles Fisk Beach, Jr., A Treatise on the Law of Contributory Negligence or Negligence as a CC , os 8 Dan D. Dobbs, The Law of Torts (2001)................. 10 William B. Hale, Handbook on the Law of Torts tS ee ee ) W. Keeton et al., Prosser and Keeton on the Law es 9. 10. 19, 20 Vii TABLE OF AUTHORITIES — continued Page Robert V. Percival et al., Environmental Regula- tion: Law, Science, and Policy (2d ed. 1986)...... 15 1 Thomas G. Shearman & Amasa A. Redfield, A Treatise on the Law of Negligence (Sth ed. Se ceadiniesechctiaieiiehieienaciainaaehihetaiadillitiatia daa 8 1 J.G. Sutherland, A Treatise on the Law of Dam- I cerrntetnsrreteenmeteemeerentinnntenimninein 10 OTHER AUTHORITIES Cambridge Dictionary of American English I aaa a a aa 17 Restatement (Second) of Torts (1965) ...9, 15, 22, 23, 24 Restatement (Third) of Torts: Apportionment of EIN CTI cicstiiciansiipnciciienbucindibibiialinieuteenineabisteten 9 Roget's Il: The New Thesaurus (1988) .................+. 17 Arizona Ecological Servs. Field Office, FWS, Cactus Ferruginous Pygmy-Owl (Jan. 2003), at http://www.fws.gov/southwest/es/arizona/ Documents/Redbook/Cactus%20Ferruginous %20Py gmy%20ow pdf ..............ccsecsceeseeceeseeeeeeees 27 Arizona Ecological Servs. Field Office, FWS, Cactus Ferruginous Pygmy-Owl Survey Proto- col (Jan. 2000), at http://www.fws.gov/south- west/es/Arizona/Documents/PublicReview/ CFPO/FINAL REV_PROTOCOL.pdf............... 27 Arizona Ecological Servs. Field Office, FWS, - Pima Pineapple Cactus (June 2000), at http:// ' www.fws.gov/southwest/es/arizona/Documents /Redbook/Pima%20Pineapple%20cactus%20 Arizona Ecological Servs. Field Office, FWS, , Pima Pineapple Cactus, at http://www.fws.gov/ southwest/es/arizona/pima.htm (last visited EK Sans a irhteiniestescciiecitnnsiestiaitiietsiinneiibibinlihomeundintie 27 Vill TABLE OF AUTHORITIES — continued Page Felicity Barringer, Endangered Species Act Faces Broad New Chai enges, N.Y. Times, June 26, TETE? siceapcnicnstaeensailenvansingeniunianidecintinndiivanienaiinaieniities 6 Gillian Flaccus, City May Shoo Endangered Fly, ee ene 6 GAO, Pub. No. GAO-04-93, Endangered Spe- cies: More Federal Management Attention Is Needed to Improve the Consultation Process [SAT iccetiniiuiniileptitiadabinnte lebaitadaiinaebeniinnniniiniadiie 4,5, 6 Makes Sense For Environment And Home Buyers, NAHB Says (Apr. 14, 2006), at http:// www.nahb.org/news_details.aspx?newsI D= ee crentiintiineninniimmmminseenminenimien 5,6 Mitch Tobin, ‘Endangered’ Cactus May Really Be Prolific, Ariz. Daily Star (May 9, 2004)......... 6 USEPA, National Pollutant Discharge Flimina- tion System (NPDES): State Program Status, at http://cfpub.epa.gov/npdes/statestats.cfm (last CRIS FAR. OG, CII ceccstntcscnemscavernsencrenteenens USEPA, State or Tribal Assumption of the Sec- tion 404 Permit Program, at http://www.epa. gov/owow/wetlands/facts/fact23.html (last up- I a ee 2 tN INTERESTS OF AMICI CURIAE' Amici Beazer Homes USA, Inc., Centex Corporation, David Weekley Homes, Hovnanian Enterprises, Inc., KB Home, Kimball Hill, Inc., Lennar Corp., M.D.C. Holdings, Inc., Meritage Homes Corporation, M/I Homes, Inc., Pulte Homes, Shea Homes, Standard Pacific Corp., Toll Brothers, Inc., and Weyerhaeuser Real Estate Co. (collectively, “High Production Homebuilders”) are 15 of the largest residential homebuilders in the Nation. Amici engage in residential con- struction on all scales, from the design of individual homes to the development of large residential communities. In 2005 alone, amici sold more than 262,000 homes, generating over $90.9 billion in revenue and representing over 20% of the United States new home market. In providing these homes to the Nation’s population, amici not only satisfy a fundamental human need, they also promote a critical national priority, as Congress has reaffirmed over and over again.” Before they begin homebuilding projects, amici typically must obtain permits under a variety of federal, state and local regimes. These include the type of Clean Water Act (CWA) pérmits at issue in this case, which allow point-source dis- charges to the waters of the United States. See CWA § 402, 33 U.S.C. § 1342. And they include other federal permits, ' Pursuant to this Court's Rule 37.6, amici state that no counsel for any party authored this brief in whole or in part, and no person or entity other than amici made a monetary contribution to the preparation or submission of the brief. Counsel of record for all parties have consented to the filing of this brief, and letters of consent have been filed with the Clerk. * See 42 U.S.C. § 1441 (“The Congress declares that the general wel- fare and security of the Nation and the health and living standards of its people require housing production and related community develop- ment ....”), id. § 12701 (affirming “the national goal that every American family be able to afford a decent home in a suitable environment”); see also, e.g., National Housing Act of 1934, ch. 847, 48 Stat. 1246 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 1701 ef seqg.); Housing Act of 1961, Pub. L. No. 87-70, 75 Stat. 149; Department of Housing and Urban Development Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-174, 79 Stat. 667. 2 such as permits for the discharge of fill material under § 404 of the CWA. Id. § 1344.° Before such federal permits may be issued, § 7 of the Endangered Species Act (ESA) generally requires the federal agencies permitting the undertaking - here, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) -— to en- gage in “consultation” with the Fish and Wildlife Service (F WS) or the National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) and to ensure that their actions will not cause jeopardy to species. The nature and scope of these inter-agency consultations and actions are profoundly important to amici, because they are immensely burdensome and time-consuming. The permit- ting process for a residential development can take years and cost hundreds of thousands of dollars — figures often com- pounded by interest-group litigation when the permit finally issues. And agency-ordered “alternative measures” may cost millions. Accordingly, amici have a substantial-interest in ensuring that the consultation requirement remains within the boundaries established by Congress and the agencies’ own regulations. The decision below fails to follow the proper scope of these authorities. Like Petitioners EPA and NAHB, amici urge this Court to hold that, as a matter of law, the transfer of NPDES permit- ting authority from EPA to Arizona was nondiscretionary and therefore did not require ESA consultation at all. The focus of this Brief, however, is the question that this Court must address if it concludes that consultation was not categorically excluded: namely, the requisite causal relationship between an agency action and claimed jeopardy to species. This cau- > EPA has delegated the § 402 discharge permitting program to 45 of the 50 States (including Arizona). See USEPA, National Pollutant Dis- charge Elimination System (NPDES): State Program Status, at http:// cfpub.epa.gov/npdes/statestats.cfm (last updated Apr. 14, 2003). How- ever, the §$ 404 dredge and fill permitting program has been delegated to only two States. New Jersey and Michigan. See USEPA, State or Tribal Assumption of the Section 404 Permit Program, at bhitp://www.epa. gov/owow ‘wetlands facts‘fact23.html (last updated Feb. 22. 2006). 3 sation requirement both triggers the consultation requirement and defines its scope. Under the text of the ESA, its imple- menting regulations, this Court’s longstanding causation ju- risprudence — and indeed any common-sense understanding of causation — the agency action must be a proximate cause of the claimed “jeopardy.” That is, the agency must evaluate whether an action will result in harm to species that is direct and foreseeable, not remote, attenuated, or speculative. The alternative the Ninth Circuit adopted - bare “but-for” causation — would force agencies to engage in far-reaching analyses of hypothetical effects. Moreover, it would fore- close any agency action that could imaginably result in harm, no matter how remote that possibility or how attenuated the - chain of causation. This cannot be what Congress intended, which is why nothing in the statute, its regulations or its legis- lative history supports such an extreme result. Yet this is pre- cisely what the Ninth Circuit held: The court below con- cluded that the simple act of transferring permitting authority from EPA to the State of Arizona would cause jeopardy to species, notwithstanding the substantial causal remoteness between this “action” and any surmised harm. This decision would amount to an extraordinary expansion of the ESA, which this Court should reject. | STATUTORY AND REGULATORY BACKGROUND I. The § 7 consultation process arises out of the require- ment that federal agencies “insure that any action [they] au- thorize|]. fund||, or carr[y] out” is “not likely” to jeopardize any endangered or threatened species or to adversely modify critical habitat. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2); see generally Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 157-58 (1997). Consultation is an interagency dialogue between (1) the “action agency” that intends to authorize, fund, or carry out an action, and (2) the agencies with authority related to species (FWS and NMFS: collectively, the “Services”), and involving interested private parties, such as an applicant for a federal permit. 4 To determine whether consultation is required, the “action agency” first identifies whether a protected species or habitat exists within the proposed action area and whether the pro- posed action “may affect” the species or habitat. 50 C.F.R. § 402.14(a). If so, the “action agency” must engage in formal consultation with the Service, subject to two important excep- tions. /d.; see Interagency Cooperation - Endangered Species Act of 1973, as amended, 51 Fed. Reg. 19,926, 19,941 (June 3, 1986) (“A Federal agency must initiate formal consultation if it determines that its action ‘may affect’ any listed species or its critical habitat unless it determines through informal consultation or biological assessment procedures, with the written concurrence of the Service, that its action ‘is not likely to adversely affect’ such species or habitat.”’). Formal consultation requires the Service to prepare a “bio- logical opinion” (BiOp) evaluating whether the action is “likely to jeopardize” a protected species. 50 C.F.R. § 402.14(h). During this evaluation which often requires multiple rounds of discussions between the agencies — the “action agency” must provide substantial information to the Service. /d. § 402.14(c)-(g). If the Service ultimately reaches a “no jeopardy” conclusion, the action can go forward. /d. § 402.14(h). If, however, the Service concludes that the ac- tion is likely to jeopardize a protected species, it will recom- mend project modifications. /d. If no such alternatives exist, the agency must cancel the action, seek an exemption, or risk violating the ESA. A developer that proceeds without the blessing of the consultation process is in turn potentially sub- ject to suit under § 9 of the ESA, with the attendant threat of civil and criminal penalties. See 16 U.S.C. §§ 1538, 1540(a), (b). (g). Il. The consultation process is fraught with problems, in- cluding delay and expense. See GAO, Pub. No. GAO-04-93., Endangered Species: More Federal Management Attention Is Needed to Improve the Consultation Process (2004) (“GAO Report”). After examining several years’ worth of consulta- 5 tion records, the GAO concluded that 30-40% of the Services’ consultations exceeded the time frames established by statute or regulation. /d. at 3. Indeed, these statistics understate the delay, because they exclude the “sometimes significant amount of preconsultation time spent discussing a project be- fore the consultation is considered to have officially begun” — a period during which the action cannot proceed. /d.; see also id. at 17 (noting that preconsultation time “may account for the majority of the time spent on the entire consultation proc- ess” (emphasis added)). For a private party, the costs and delays of becoming en- tangled in consultation can be significant. For example, the listing of the bull trout caused the average processing time for permits to build private docks or structures on Lake Washing- ton (near Seattle) to increase from 2-3 months to two years. Id. at 55-56. The pygmy owl listing caused delays of 5-18 months. See http://www.nahb.org/news details.aspx?newsID =2379§ion|D=194 (“NAHB Release”). These burdens are compounded because the Services often push the bounds of their statutory and regulatory authority to and beyond their limits. According to the GAO, “action agency” officials reported “that the process had gotten out of control, that they were consulting on many more activities than was necessary, and that consultations were going beyond what was called for by the Endangered Species Act.” GAO Report at 43. For example, “the Services sometimes recom- mend consultation when it is not really necessary and ... they request similarly unnecessary amounts of scientific analysis and documentation on potential effects.” /d. at 39. Agency delay and overreach beget private costs. These costs involve the actual expenses incurred during the consul- tation process; increased costs of unwarranted or unauthor- ized project modifications and mitigation; and of course op- portunity costs. Applicants frequently must hire private con- sultants to assist in the preparation of biological assessments and mitigation plans and to negotiate with the agencies, often 6 at substantial cost. /d. at 55. In the case of the bull trout, per- mitting costs — which had been 5% of the total construction costs for a typical dock — rose to 33% of that total cost. /d. at 54. The consultation and project modifications ensuing from the pygmy owl listing added $1.7 - $2.7 million to the cost of a typical Arizona development. See NAHB Release. Similar stories abound, with compliance, consultation and mitigation giving rise to massive costs that an overly broad causation standard will only compound.’ SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT The decision below depended in part on the erroneous con- clusion that the ESA prohibits any agency action that could, under a but-for causation standard, result in “jeopardy” to protected species, no matter how tangential or remote the link might be. Defenders of Wildlije v. EPA, 420 F.3d 946, 962 (9th Cir. 2005). This interpretation finds no support in law or logic. Throughout the law, proximate causation is the domi- nant standard, and absent strong congressional intent to the contrary. serves as the default rule. Proximate cause is the core causation standard under the common law, as this Court has repeatedly recognized. It ts the presumptive standard in federal statutes — even those with broad language of causa- * See, e.g., Gillian Flaceus, City May Shoo Endangered Fly, Chi. Trib., Feb. 11, 2007 (“[Colton, California officials] say restrictions on building on the [Dethi Sands flower-loving fly] habitat have limited commercial growth and cost tens of millions of dollars in economic development.”): Felicity Barringer, Endangered Species Act Faces Broad New Challenges, N.Y. Times, June 26, 2005 (citing Agua Caliente Band of Cahuilla Indi- ans’ claim that more than half the tribe’s 31.000 acres fall into designated habitat, resulting in “‘an economic impact of hundreds of millions of dol- lars’”); Mitch Tobin. ‘Endangered’ Cactus May Really Be Prolific, Ariz. Daily Star, May 9, 2004 (“The [Pima pineapple] cactus may force one prominent builder to raise the price of 72 homes by $1,181 each. In the mid-1990s, the cactus threatened to add $10 million to the cost of a pro- posed 650-acre reservoir on the Southwest Side for the Central Arizona Project. The proposal was later shelved.”). 7 tion. Environmental statutes such as the ESA are no excep- tion. In Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Great Oregon, for instance, all nine Justices treated proximate cause as the “ordinary requirement|]” and applied it to § 9 of the ESA. 515 U.S. 687, 696 n.9 (1995). Nothing in § 7 of the ESA or its implementing regulations suggests that Congress intended to impose any standard other than the “ordinary” rule of proximate cause. To the contrary, the text and implementing regulations affirmatively show that § 7 incorporates the usual rule of proximate causation. Over and again, § 7 and its regulations employ terminology well- understood as denoting proximate cause. Moreover, the legis- lative history of the Act reveals a clear desire to avoid the costs and bureaucratic complications arising out of a regime predicated on but-for causation. Here, the transfer of permitting authority from EPA to Ari- zona is far too remote from the hypothesized harm to satisfy proximate cause. The transfer itself does not authorize any harm to species at all — it authorizes no permit to issue and no development to occur, much less any activity that is intrinsi- cally harmful. Instead, the transfer simply means that the Arizona agency may issue permits sometime in the future. Moreover, those permits do not themselves primarily induce development; individual development decisions are based on numerous independent, intervening factors, including the fi- nancial market, supply, demand, and political choice. And if development does occur, any harm to species remains specu- lative, especially because substantial other protections for species exist. Finally, the causal chain between the water dis- charge permits and the hypothesized harms to species — which are entirely “non-water quality related impacts,” NAHB Pet. App. 562 (Elevation Document) — is far too attenuated to war- rant application of the ESA.