# Reply Brief — Massachusetts v. EPA

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URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385016_0245%3A17

## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Reply Brief
- **Published:** January 1, 2007
- **Citation:** 549 U.S. 497

## Text

TO (27) PILED
NOV 15 2006
No. 05-1120 ; ninroe
In the Supreme Court of the United Stategn EE HE Cea

COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS, ET AL., Petitioners
v.

ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, ET AL., Respondents

--—

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO
THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

REPLY

THOMAS F. REILLY
Attorney General of Massachusetts

LISA HEINZERLING

Special Assistant Attorney General
600 New Jersey Ave., N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20001

JAMES R. MILKEY*

WILLIAM L. PARDEE

CAROL LANCU

Assistant Attorneys General

1 Ashburton Place, 18" Floor
Boston, MA 02108

(617) 727-2200

“Counsel of Record

- Attorneys for Petitioners
(Additional Counsel Listed on Signature Page)

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ee ID ectsinicsitsinsitesnrsinpinaniicsnmnstanusinimcenpinieiitien i
Argument
I. Petitioners have standing .........0....c.c.csccsssesescscsssseseseee 1
A. Petitioners have demonstrated injury in fact ... 2
B. Petitioners have demonstrated that their
injury is fairly traceable to EPA’s decision ....... 6
C. Petitioners have demonstrated
SOI enstctecicttnniicenennpncinmennmemmnmmns 10
IJ. The Clean Air Act authorizes regulation of
greenhouse gases from motor vehicles ...............0. 13
Ill. EPA may not decline to issue emission
standards for motor vehicles based on policy
considerations not reflected within section
202(a)(1) of the Clean Aiir Act ........cccccccseseeseseeseensees 18
A. EPA's decision must be reversed if it reflects a
misinterpretation of the Clean Air Act .............. 19
B. EPA committed plain legal error in
declining to issue emission standards for
motor vehicles based on policy
considerations not reflected within section
202(a)(1) of the Clean Air Act ......ccccceceeeeeees 23
SD csercenctciniprintincinitnernpdrmniinanneninmaennannien 27
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases:
Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737 (1984) ......cscccscssecsseeerseseeeseees 7
Am. Horse Prot. Ass'n v. Lyng, 812 F.2d 1 (D.C. Cir.
ED crccicrinsctasantverentcnntentininiondeasnneninieeimanamaen 20, 21
Ass’‘n. of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Camp, 397
SS: SUT sictnegnipntacenninnuecesianeiainatpentaninepeinanninimaninne 9
Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Cmtys. for a Greater
ee 14

i

Carroll v. Greenwich Ins. Co., 199 U.S. 401 (1905) ............ 12
Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, 438

CD BO GD cecepeeseesemnnsnesenmemensennnennneemenans 11
Elk Grove Village v. Evans, 997 F.2d 328 (7th Cir.

TIPE conenesssesinmivaennsnanpiimetantaebenannenninumimtmnnmmanniats 4
Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1 (1976)..........cccceeceeenees 26
FCC v. ITT World Communications, Inc., 466 U.S. 463

ane sratnesianenenspttehennecninitatsinmnaionepeeetemmmiitnes 20
FEC o. Altins, S24 US. 11 (1996) .......r.cccscscssesssccesesessees 2,12
Friends of the Earth v. Laidlaw Envtl. Services (TOC),

SP A NT GID cxnpsensecnentscernnnmmneonappimmanatanienen 2,9
General Motors Corp. v. NHTSA, 898 F.2d 165 (D.C.

GR, TERED enssnasevenseresvsivipsoestunpiipennestsansarcsqenianmepuentnenmmnians 21
Gladstone, Realtors v. Vill. of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91

EERUWURD econssssneresintencasersossnnnneenenniacapennanemdutinuenstncegnenseaentiins 5
Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821 (1985) ......ccscescsesseresees 19, 20
In re United Steelworkers of America v. Rubber Mfrs. Ass‘n,

FED Fe BERT GAL, COP, TED) nccscrocseccocsscencceccceges 22
Int'l Primate Prot. League v. Adm'rs of Tulane Educ.

FORE Se PR IOUED ercetesecentecnstenentenetenimmnenoennes 7
Japan Whaling Ass‘n v. American Cetacean Society, 478 U.S.

Ie inks dcmiinnentontipitrininccmecseovepetscntwnniines 21
Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228 (1982) .......cssssseseeeeseeserees 11
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992) . 2, 4,5, 7
McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93 (2003) ......cecccecseesseresesrenenees 3
Michigan v. EPA, 213 F.3d 663 (D.C. Cir. 2000) ..........00. «8
Midwest Indep. Transmission Sys. Operator, Inc. v.

FERC, 388 F.3d 903 (D.C. Cir. 2004) .......ccsseseseeeseeseees 21
Midwest ISO Transmission Owners v. FERC, 373 F.3d

Se ice GENE ecnenenisvepnecenesmsenteivtennenimteenerenbscinenanin 4
Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto.

BD, Gin, GED GE BONED ceretnspescencnnnnntrensecseen 20, 24
NAACP v. Fed. Power Comm'n, 425 U.S. 662 (1976) ..... 20

Natural Res. Def. Council v. SEC, 606 F.2d 1031, 1046
(D.C. Cir. 1979)

Natural Res. Def. Council v. Watkins, 954 F.2d 974

INL TEES cssrcnasinienaisiapivcnsmapinieinnmescaiiismeneiiiaaesmnnes 9
New York v. Connecticut, 4 U.S. 1 (1799) ....cccccccceeeserseseeees 2
NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1

GRUNT D cassepssersienintessentequessaneenenanibtegensaiminamncmenpeeaien 12
Oil, Chemical and Atomic Workers International Union v.

Zegeer, 768 F.2d 1480 (D.C. Cir. 1985) ..........cceceeceees 22
Olympic Airways v. Husain, 540 U.S. 644 (2004) ............ 10
Sierra Club v. Cedar Point Oil Co., 73 F.3d 546 (5th

RAs FIP ovincncconcvsiosncnsneiseneseucabnemameneasetetnaierdinemmnamenmnies 9
Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972) ...cccccssssesesesererees 3
Simon v. E. Kentucky Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26

SE cote eprineseqneeninianeenrescinenpincttinininesainitmeieminmeinnen 6,7
Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149 (1990)... 3,4
Young v. Cmty. Nutrition Inst., 476 U.S. 974 (1986) ....... 20

Statutes:

Sa a taes SED cicescniocncspenceseinpiniinessisabsistintinibniaginiiitsies 22

ee ede tate serennicntenerencntentinsenennasnenipenetantapenmnentintion 22

Be Ae BND crereteinsesnerentscsnnsccasenecsnnesencssensnszenetnen 22
Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. 706 ............ 19, 21

Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. 7401 et seq.:
Title I, 42 U.S.C. 7401 et seq.:

BRDU, GE UA, FERGIE) cccececeserccscccseccrsscrescssescencse 14

§ 108(a)(2), 42 U.S.C. 7408(a)(2).......scsccceerserreeseersees 17

§ 111(b)(1)(A), 42 U.S.C. 7411(b)(1)(A) «2... cceceeeseees 8

D BERD, Go UA. PERT) ccccsccccesccnesecsevesennesenssseses 16

§ 112(f)(2)(A), 42 U.S.C. 7412(f)(2)(A)........cceeeeee 25
Title II, 42 U.S.C. 7521 et seq.:

§ 202(a)(1),

42 U.S.C. 7521(a)(1) ...8, 12, 13, 18, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27

§ 209(c4), 422 U.S.C. 7545 (C)(1) ...secsecereeesereseseeeneerees 8

§ 213(a,(1), 42 U.S.C. 7547(a)(1).....ccsecccesseseeserenerseees 8 -
Titie III, 42 U.S.C. 7601 et seq.:

§ 302(g), 42 U.S.C. 7602(g) ....sessesecsrersereseesensees 13,17

ill

§ 302(h), 42 U.S.C. 7602(h) «0... ccsseseeseseeeee 13, 15, 17
Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No.

91-604, § 6(a), 84 Stat. 1676 ........:cccscsesesessseseenssenesenees 16
Federal Register:
Ss TE TF COO ccsicrscisctsicccnsceninsentistesimememantensies 6
Se Ee, CR: SH ID ccorcesnceynnvsncennnsesetinentnsennensancssonense 15
GP FR, CAN, BFGF CIPD cccncsesncsnsrsessncestesccenesenesconeesesnncese 8
SP NP TED srvnenenecenscenerescenessensenvenanmsetennnens 15
70 Fed. Reg. (2005):
1D, BI a esnsctcinenstnsennsjnassenntqntesnesonsacnasassesouensensepeneseenetente 8
OA TEPID. poctecenssesouncsnseananneccnensensemstesveneassscsensinssensanenwienne 9
70 BO, CN TOE GD ccccccescsonncencsccsscnstetonensnseccsensonenes 16
Miscellaneous:
116 Cong. Rec. (1970):
ETE cecristrccensmensttnntentepestnessnceenqumnesialineneaseeineneines 15
OD. TIO cenccssscenscescases eosseseseesssssessoveecszencecece ssonsconscssesseese 15
1 SEINE’ ntessnscsenpsscsmasseensoneseneqneesnesetutecescnessesepenseaneseetie 15
Brief of Respondent, McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93
GPO GIPPRIP ED cxcocesonssicecevesssrsnsssnnncsanssanstenssenstetvineseeeusseesees 3

Consumer Product Safety Commission, Carbon
Monoxide Questions and Answers, CPSC Document

#466, available at

http:/ /cpsc.gov/CPSCPUB/PUBS/ 466.htm1 ........... 16
Wendy E. Wagner, The Triumph of Cin deb

Standards, 2000 U. ILL. L. REV. 83 .. inn wae
HARRISON’S PRINCIPLES OF INTERNAL M EDICINE

Kasper et al., eds., 16th ed. 2005 .......s.scsscssessesessersseseeees 16
STEPHEN BREYER, BREAKING THE VICIOUS CIRCLE:

TOWARD EFFECTIVE RISK REGULATION (1993) ........... 16

iv

ARGUMENT

A common theme runs_ throughout respondents’
arguments on standing, statutory authority, and agency
discretion: a judicially restrained approach to this case,
respondents suggest, implies a ruling in their favor. This is not
so. On standing, respondents ask this Court to make factual
judgments by recasting them as legal determinations; these
determinations would do violence to this Court's Article III
jurisprudence. On statutory authority, respondents encourage
the Court to focus not on the statutory text at issue here, but
instead on the political and economic consequences of a ruling
in petitioners’ favor. Making interpretive principles turn, not
on statutory text, but on the Court’s own view of the political
and economic ramifications of a case is the very antithesis of
judicial restraint. Last, on agency discretion, respondents ask
for a new and lenient interpretive rule for cases involving
agencies’ refusals to issue rules. But nothing in the
background principles of administrative law that respondents
invoke allows an agency to turn its back on a statute that the
agency does not, for its own policy reasons, want to follow.

I. Petitioners have standing.

In the court of appeals, petitioners submitted forty-three
detailed affidavits establishing their standing. No party
responded to, let alone refuted, those declarations. By a vote of
2-1, the court declined to dismiss the petition for review on
grounds of standing. This Court declined to take up the issue
in granting review. Nonetheless, respondents make standing a
centerpiece of their briefs. Accepting their arguments would
rework and distort the role of standing. Respondents’
arguments should be rejected.

2
A. Petitioners have demonstrated injury in fact.

In their affidavits, petitioners described in detail how
emissions of greenhouse gases have already caused and are
causing States, cities, and individuals injuries that
unquestionably satisfy the “injury in fact” requirement of
Article III.! That is no doubt why EPA has not contested injury
in fact in these proceedings.

Rising temperatures have injured petitioners in the
following specific and concrete ways: coastal States have lost
and are losing land to rising sea levels (D.C. Cir. Jt. App. 666;
Stdg. App. 179, 194, 196, 208, 212, 216, 217, 234, 266, 304-305);
ground-level ozone (smog) is exacerbated by rising
temperatures, leading to adverse health effects and costly
efforts on the part of States to address the problem (Stdg. App.
3-5, 68); glaciers are melting, causing distinct injuries to
particular individuals (JA 190; Stdg. App. 182, 190, 212). These
injuries span a broad range, from the Commonwealth of
Massachusetts losing coastal land (Stdg. App. 196) to Frank
Keim no longer being able to hike on the Alaskan glaciers he
used to enjoy (Stdg. App. 190). The former injury, the loss of
sovereign territory, has been a cognizable Article III injury
since the founding of the republic (see New York v. Connecticut,
4 US. 1, 4 (1799)); the latter is exactly the kind of injury held
sufficient to support federal jurisdiction in Friends of the Earth
v. Laidlaw Envtl. Services (TOC), 528 U.S. 167 (2000).

Petitioners’ injuries are not “’some day’ injuries, as
respondents contend (Utility Air Regulatory Group (UARG)
Br. 13, quoting Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 564
n.2 (1992)); they are injuries in the here and now. Nor do
petitioners’ declarations describe mere “generalized
grievances” (Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers (AAM)

' Petitioners’ declarations are collected in a “standing appendix”
which has been lodged with the Court as part of the appeals court
record (“Stdg. App.”). For convenience, additional copies of this
document have also been lodged with the Clerk.

3

Br. 12); they attest to harms being visited—right now —upon
particular individuals and particuiar States. The fact that the
interests asserted here “are shared by the many rather than the
few does not make them less deserving of legal protection
through the judicial process.” Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S.
727, 734 (1972); see also FEC v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11, 24-25 (1998).

Industry respondents assert that petitioners’ case fess on
the “central allegation” that substantial harm will not occur
until the year 2100. AAM Br. 9-10; see also UARG Br. 12 & n4.
This characterization is incorrect; it ignores petitioners’
detailed statements of current harm.

The record is also filled with evidence of continuing harm.
See, e.g., JA 229, 233-235; Stdg. App. 5-6, 43-48, 170-174, 175-
180, 234-236. Each of the injuries described above is not only
continuing, but will worsen with rising concentrations of
greenhouse gases. Stdg. App. 182, 207-209, 211, 213-219, 234-
236. Because each of these injuries is present today and will
only become more grave, respondents’ arguments that these
injuries do not satisfy Article III are wrong.

Respondents ask this Court to hold that temporal distance
alone warrants denial of standing. Respondent UARG
suggests, based on McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93 (2003), that
standing cannot exist where an injury will not occur for five
years. UARG Br. 13. If this were true, no one would have
standing to object to illegal exposure to carcinogens, as most
cancers have latency periods far longer than the five-year
interval involved in McConnell. Instead, McConnell stands only
for the common-sense rule that temporal distance can vitiate
standing where the passage of time aggravates, as opposed to
reduces, uncertainty about injury; this is, indeed, the way the
case was argued to the Court. Brief of Respondent FEC at 129-
30, McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93 (No. 02-1676).

Nor does Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149 (1990), relied
upon by the automobile manufacturers (AAM Br. 10-11), hold
that temporal distance alone undoes standing. Whitmore held
that the plaintiff had no standing to object to the execution of a
fellow inmate, where the plaintiff's claim of injury assumed

4

that he would be granted habeas relief; that he would be
retried, convicted, and sentenced to death; and that a
comparison of his crime (which involved stabbing his victim
10 times, cutting her throat, and carving an “X” on the side of
her face) to his fellow inmate’s would show that his capital
sentence was arbitrary given the comparative mildness of his
crime. 495 U.S. at 156-157. To recall the facts of Whitmore is to
refute respondents’ extravagant reading of it; it was not
temporal distance, but an implausible chain of causation,
which led to the denial of standing there. That situation is
precisely the opposite of what is present here, namely, one in
which the magnitude and certainty of injury only increase as
time passes.

Here, the continuing harms petitioners describe are the
result of physics and chemistry, not the unpredictable
workings of the electoral or criminal system. “The injury is of
course probabilistic, but even a small probability of injury is
sufficient to create a case or controversy —to take a suit out of
the category of the hypothetical ... .” Elk Grove Village v.
Evans, 997 F.2d 328, 329 (7th Cir. 1993) (Posner, J.). Nothing in
the record refutes petitioners’ claims of continuing harm. To
say, as amici Robert H. Bork, et al. do, that Massachusetts’
claim of injury based on the loss of its land to the rising seas is
“entirely speculative’ unless one knows more about
economics (Bork Br. 12 & n. 9), is like saying that “a
homeowner whose house is destroyed by arson has not been
injured by the arsonist, if the house was adequately insured.”
Midwest ISO Transmission Owners v. FERC, 373 F.3d 1361, 1367
(D.C. Cir. 2004) (Roberts, J.).

Respondents refer dismissively to petitioners’ “reams of
untested declarations,” calling them “speculative.” AAM Br. 8-
9. While petitioners do bear the burden of proof on standing,
the factual questions underlying standing are addressed in the
same manner as other factual issues in litigation. Lujan, 504
US. at 561. Thus respondents were required to meet
petitioners’ proof with evidence, not adjectives. Nothing in the
record refutes the conclusion, supported in petitioners’

\

5

affidavits, that emissions of greenhouse gases have harmed
and will continue to harm petitioners.?

If there were evidence in the record creating a genuine
factual controversy about petitioners’ declarations of current
and continuing harm, further factfinding would be necessary.*
Respondents do not ask for this result. They apparently would
have this Court rule, by judicial fiat, that climate change has
not harmed, is not harming, and will not harm petitioners.
Respondents’ preferred disposition of the case is thick with
irony: invoking a doctrine grounded in judicial restraint,
respondents in effect are asking this Court to make the very
scientific finding that they assert the accountable and expert
agency charged with environmental protection need not, and
indeed may not, make. Respondents’ position stands standing
on its head.

B. Petitioners have demonstrated that their injury is fairly
traceable to EPA’s decision.

US. motor vehicles are responsible for 23 percent of this
country’s carbon dioxide emissions and some 6 percent of the
entire world’s. Stdg. App. 232. U.S. motor vehicles and power
plants together are responsible for more than 60 percent of
U.S. emissions of carbon dioxide. Pet. Br. 39 n.28. EPA has

2 The 2001 report by the National Research Council entitled Climate
Change Science, on which EPA relied in emphasizing the
uncertainties surrounding climate change, confirms petitioners’
claims of harm. See Brief of Amici Curiae Climate Scientists David
Battisti et al.

3 In a proceeding like this one, in which a petition for review is filed
directly in the court of appeals, creating a procedure for resolving a
factual dispute could be tricky, as Judge Tatel observed below. Pet.
App. A30. Nevertheless, this Court has made clear that factual
questions underlying standing are to be decided like other factual
questions, even proceeding to trial if necessary. See, e.g., Lujan, 504
US. at 561, quoting Gladstone, Realtors v. Vill. of Bellwood, 441 US. 91,
115 n.31 (1979).

6

cited the conclusion it reached in this case in declining to
regulate greenhouse gases from power plants.‘ Ibid. Despite
these impressive percentages,5 EPA argues that respondents
have not shown that their injury is fairly traceable to EPA’s
decision because these emissions do not “materially affect the
overall extent of global climate change.” U.S. Br. 13-14. EPA is
wrong on both the facts and the law.

It is uncontested that emissions of greenhouse gases
contribute to the harms petitioners have described. Moreover,
greenhouse gases, once emitted, become distributed
throughout the earth’s lower atmosphere. A ton of carbon
dioxide emitted by an automobile has the same climate-
changing effect as a ton of carbon dioxide emitted by any
other source. If EPA regulated greenhouse gases, the carbon
dioxide emitted by motor vehicles would be reduced. The
harms suffered by petitioners are thus “fairly . . . trace[able]”
to EPA’s decision not to regulate greenhouse gases from motor
vehicles. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560, quoting Simon v. E. Kentucky
Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 41-42 (1976) (EKWRO). No
intervening act of a third party separates the greenhouse gas

* Conceding the link between its decision in this case and its refusal
to regulate greenhouse gases from power plants, EPA joined the
motion for a stay of a separate proceeding challenging its decision on
power plants because the Court granted review here. CO» Litigation
Group (CLG) Br. 30.

5 EPA tries to minimize the effect of controlling emissions under
section 202(a)(1) by noting that this provision applies only to new
motor vehicles. U.S. Br. 13-14. Any rule applied to new vehicles
would ultimately affect all vehicles: the U.S. automobile fleet turns
over every 10-15 years. 60 Fed. Reg. 12459, 12472 (1995).

* Redressability is even clearer when one considers the linkage
between EPA’s decision on motor vehicles and its decision not to
regulate greenhouse gas emissions from power plants (sources
which together comprise over 60 percent of U.S. carbon dioxide
emissions, Pet. Br. 39 n. 28)—a linkage the Solicitor General confirms
in his brief to this Court. U.S. Br. 32.

_—

7

emissions left unregulated by EPA’s decision and the harm
those emissions cause.

The Court's precedents make clear that its concern with
ensuring that asserted injuries are fairly traceable to
challenged actions is satisfied when the causal chain is as
direct as it is here. In Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737 (1984), the
Court worried that recognizing standing where plaintiffs’
injuries arose from “’the independent action of some third
party not before the court’” would “pave the way generally for
suits challenging, not specifically identifiable Government

_violations of law, but the particular programs agencies

establish to carry out their legal obligations.” Id. at 757
(quoting EKWRO, 426 U.S. at 42), 759; see also DaimlerChrysler
Corp. v. Cuno, 126 S.Ct. 1854, 1864 (2006). Here, in contrast,
petitioners challenge a “specifically identifiable Government
violation(] of law” that results directly in the emission of more
greenhouse gases than would be emitted if EPA had not
declined to regulate greenhouse gases.

Respondents seek to avoid the straightforward result
dictated by the Court's decisions by asking this Court to adopt
a new constitutional rule of causation: in the Solicitor
General's formulation, judicial review of EPA’s decision not to
regulate greenhouse gases from motor vehicles would be
available only if these emissions “materially affect the overall
extent of global climate change.” U.S. Br. 14. This standard has
no basis in Article III] and would undo the Clean Air Act's
causal framework.

“(Sjtanding is gauged by the specific common-law,
statutory or constitutional claims that a party presents.
‘Typically, . . . the standing inquiry requires careful judicial
examination of a complaint's allegations to ascertain whether
the particular plaintiff is entitled to an adjudication of the
particular claims asserted.’” Int'l Primate Prot. League v. Adm’rs of
Tulane Educ. Fund, 500 US. 72, 77 (1991), quoting, with
emphasis added, Allen, 468 U.S. at 752; see also Lujan, 504 U.S.
at 580 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the

8

judgment) (“Congress has the power to . . . articulate chains of
causation that will give rise to a case or controversy .. .”).

Section 202(a)(1) of the Clean Air Act directs the
Administrator of the EPA to regulate air pollutants emitted by
new motor vehicles when the Administrator determines that
they “cause, or contribute to, air pollution which may
reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or
welfare.” 42 U.S.C. 7521(a)(1) (emphasis added). The same
causal relationship triggers regulation under other provisions
of the Act. See, eg., 42 US.C. 7411(b)(1)(A); 7545(c)(1);
7547(a)(1). These provisions reflect Congress's insistence that
regulation proceed where > source contributes to, and is not
solely responsible for, endangerment of public health or
welfare—which is overwhelmingly the norm in pollution
cases.

EPA, too, has recognized that effective air pollution control
requires regulation of sources that, standing alone, cause a
portion of a large-scale harm. With respect to ozone pollution,
for example, the agency has observed:

Each source’s contribution is a small percentage of the

overall.problem; indeed, it is rare for emissions from even

the largest single sources to exceed one percent of the
inventory of ozone precursors even for a_ single
metropolitan area. . . . [A]ttaimment requires controls on
numerous sources across a broad area.
63 Fed. Reg. 57356, 57375 (1998). EPA concluded that upwind
States “contribute[d] significantly” to ozone nonattainment
problems in downwind States within the meaning of section
110(a)(2)(D)(i)(I) of the Clean Air Act, even where their
contributions to ozone pollution in the downwind States were
on the order of one percent. Id. at 57391-93; see also Michigan v.
EPA, 213 F.3d 663, 674 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (upholding EPA’s
approach).”

? EPA also used a one-percent threshold in identifying significant
contributions to nonattainment in its recent interstate air pollution
trading rule. 70 Fed. Reg. 25162, 25175 (2005). Likewise, in

9

Respondents seek to quietly overturn Congress's decision
to require control of sources that “contribute to” a pollution
problem. Respondents argue that, as a matter of constitutional
law, this Court cannot hear this case because regulation of U.S.
motor vehicles— which, again, account for an impressive 23
percent of this country’s carbon dioxide emissions and some 6
percent of the entire world’s (Stdg. App. 232)—will not
“materially affect the overall extent of global climate change.”
US. Br. 13-14; see also UARG Br. 14-15 (petitioners must show
new motor vehicles “caused” global climate change). The
Solicitor General does not define “materially affect.” However,
he must have in mind a standard stricter than the statutory
“contributes to” standard; as noted, EPA has in the past found
that sources “contribute significantly to”—not. merely
“contribute to” —a pollution problem when their contributions
are on the order of one percent. By erecting a causal standard
for standing that is stricter than the causal standard prescribed
by the underlying statute, respondents would “raise the
standing hurdle higher than the necessary showing for success
on the merits... .” Laidlaw, 528 US. at 181. Yet “[t]he question
of standing is different” from “the merits.” Ass’n of Data
Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 153 (1970).

The Solicitor General also cites no authority for the idea
that a “material” effect is required for standing. There is none.
In Laidlaw, for example, plaintiffs were not required to
demonstrate that defendants’ mercury discharges into the
North Tyger River were responsible for some preordained
percentage of plaintiffs’ harm. Laidlaw, 528 U.S. at 182-184; see
also, e.g., Natural Res. Def. Council v. Watkins, 954 F.2d 974, 980
(4th Cir. 1992) (standing established if defendant “contributes
to the pollution” that affects the plaintiff); Sierra Club v. Cedar
Point Oil Co., 73 F.3d 546, 558 (5th Cir. 1996) (defendant's

regulating mercury emissions from U.S. power plants, EPA noted
that these emissions accounted for approximately one percent of the
total global pool of mercury emissions. 70 Fed. Reg. 15994, 16028
(2005}.

10

contribution to pollution suffices for traceability). Multiple
causation is pervasive in the law (see, e.g., Olympic Airways v.
Husain, 540 U.S. 644, 653 (2004)), and different statutory and
common-law frameworks deal with it in different ways. The
Court should reject respondents’ invitation to create a new
constitutional rule for such cases.

In any event, petitioners’ declarations satisfy any sensible
construction of the Solicitor General’s new standard. Seen in
its most favorable light, the Solicitor General’s standard might
be viewed as an effort to avoid federal jurisdiction over
decisions with truly de minimis effects. As noted, U.S. motor
vehicles are responsible for approximately 23 percent of this
country’s carbon dioxide emissions and 6 percent of the entire
world’s. Stdg. App. 232. In 1999, the U.S. transportation sector
emitted almost half a billion metric tons of carbon dioxide
(Stdg. App. 219); the emissions from this sector come mainly
from automobiles (Stdg. App. 220). Half a billion metric tons
of carbon dioxide cannot plausibly be viewed as de minimis.

C. Petitioners have demonstrated redressability.

Reversal of EPA’s decision declining to regulate
greenhouse gases from motor vehicles would make possible
significant controls on sources responsible for some 60 percent
of this country’s carbon dioxide emissions—23 percent from
motor vehicles and the rest from the power plants left
unregulated by the same legal conclusion EPA reached here.
Pet. Br. 39 n.28. Lower greenhouse gas emissions mean
reduced harms from climate change. Stdg. App. 232-236.
Petitioners’ injuries are thus redressable by judicial action.

Here, too, respondents provide no factual rebuttal to
petitioners’ claims; instead, they offer a new constitutional

8 EPA does briefly speculate about the possibility that other nations
will “free ride” on any effort by the U.S. to reduce its greenhouse gas
emissions (U.S. Br. 19), thus, presumably, somehow rendering US.
regulatory efforts nugatory. But just as standing cannot be .
established based on speculation or conjecture, it also cannot be

11

test for redressability. Here, too, their argument should be
rejected.

EPA asserts that petitioners’ injury must be “materially
alleviated” by a ruling in their favor. U.S. Br. 7; see also AAM
Br. at 16 (lawsuit must lead to “significant reduction” in
greenhouse gas concentrations). The government does not
define what it means or cite any judicial precedent for its
suggested standard. Congress has chosen to re_juire regulation
of mobile sources when they “contribute to” air pollution that
endangers public health or welfare. As already discussed, the
government's standard of materiality appears to be stricter
than the Clean Air Act's causal standard. This Court should
reject respondents’ implicit invitation to smother the standard
Congress chose with a stricter constitutional test.

In addition, there is no support in this Court's precedents
for respondents’ new constitutional test. On the contrary, this
Court has held that “a plaintiff satisfies the redressability
requirement when he shows that a favorable decision will
relieve a discrete injury to himself. He need not show that a
favorable decision will relieve his every injury.” Larson v.
Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 243 n. 15 (1982) (emphasis in original).

Acceptance of respondents’ test would have far-reaching
consequences. Incomplete redressability abounds in legal
cases. Creditors often receive just pennies on the dollar in
bankruptcy proceedings; plaintiffs in “pure” comparative fault
regimes have received as little as one percent of their total
damages; damage caps—such as the $75,000 cap of the
Warsaw Convention—can limit plaintiffs’ redress to a small
fraction of their total harm. On respondents’ theory, federal
jurisdiction would not exist in these cases because the redress

>
¢—

denied on this basis. See Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study
Group, 438 U.S. 59, 78 (1978) (“Nothing in our prior cases requires a
party seeking to invoke federal jurisdiction to negate the kind of
speculative and hypothetical possibilities suggested in order to
demonstrate the likely effectiveness of judicial relief.”).

12

available is too small in proportion to the total harm.’ And, on
respondents’ theory, even if Congress passed legislation
saying, explicitly and precisely, that “EPA must regulate
greenhouse gas emissions from motor vehicles,” no one would
have standing to challenge a failure by EPA to comply with
this legislative directive.

Oddly — given their otherwise dite representations of the
consequences of a ruling in favor of petitioners — respondents’
arguments on redressability amount to a complaint that
Congress did not go far enough in section 202 of the Clean Air -
Act. Congress’s incremental, source-by-source approach to
pollution control becomes, on respondents’ theory, a basis for
rejecting judicial review altogether. But this Court has
“frequently said that the legislative authority, exerted’ within
its proper field, need not embrace all the evils within its reach.
The Constitution does not forbid ‘cautious advance, step by
step,’ in dealing with the evils which are exhibited ii activities
within the range of legislative power.” NLRB v. Jones &
Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 46 (1937), quoting Carroll v.
Greenwich Ins. Co., 199 U.S. 401, 411 (1905). Respondents’
_theory of redressability is in tension with this fundamental
principle of judicial deference to legislative choices.

II. The Clean Air Act authorizes regulation of greenhouse
gases from motor vehicles.

Section 202(a)(1) of the Clean Air Act directs the EPA to
regulate “air pollutant(s]” from motor vehicles when, in the

° Another of respondents’ arguments would unsettle much of
administrative law. Industry respondents assert that petitioners
cannot show redressability because EPA might decide, on remand,
not to regulate greenhouse gases. UARG Br. 19-20; AAM Br. 16-17.
Scores of administrative law cases concern agency decisions in which
the agencies enjoy some discretion. This Court has made clear that
an injury caused by an agency decision is redressable by a judicial
remand to the agency, even if the complainant might lose on
remand. See, e.g., Akins, 524 U.S. at 25.

13

Administrator’s judgment, they “cause, or contribute to, air
pollution which may reasonably be anticipated to endanger
public health or welfare.” 42 U.S.C. 7521(a)(1). The Act defines
“welfare” to include effects on “climate” and “weather.” 42
U.S.C. 7602(h). Physical or chemical matter that is emitted into
the ambient air is an “air pollutant” under the Act. 42 U.S.C.
7602(g). Greenhouse gases are physical and chemical matter
emitted into the ambient air by motor vehicles. EPA thus has
authority over these gases under section 202(a)(1) of the Act.

In concluding that it lacked authority to regulate
greenhouse gases emitted by motor vehicles, EPA relied on
unenacted legislation; legislation that was enacted subsequent
to, and is fully compatible with, the provisions at issue here;
and the supposed incompatibility of regulation of greenhouse
gas emissions under section 202 with the Clean Air Act's
programs addressing air quality standards and stratospheric
ozone depletion and with the Energy Policy and Conservation
Act's fuel efficiency program. Pet. App. A68-A80. Petitioners
have rebutted each of these arguments. Pet. Br. 20-32.
Respondents’ submissions on these points add nothing to
EPA's original arguments; we refer the Court to our opening
brief on these issues.

Respondents also now attempt to bolster their extra-
‘textual analysis of the relevant provisions of the Clean Air Act
with arguments based on the language of these provisions;
these arguments are unpersuasive. EPA’s argument from text
amounts to this: “air pollution agents” must have
“imdependent meaning” beyond the items listed in section
302(g)'s “including” clause, and that independent meaning
constrains interpretation of the phrase “any chemical, physical

. substance or matter.” Only those chemical or physical
substances that are also “air pollution agents” are covered by
- the Act. U.S. Br. 34. EPA has, however, provided no
interpretation of the phrase “air pollution agent” beyond
saying that this term does not include greenhouse gases under

14

the Act’s “regulatory provisions.”!° Pet. App. A78. This
circular reasoning lies behind the Solicitor General's otherwise
mysterious reference to “cognizable ‘pollution.”” U.S. Br. 33
(emphasis added). The government's position appears to be
that although greenhouse gases may indeed constitute
“pollution,” they are not—for the extra-textual reasons noted
above — cognizable pollution under the Act. Nothing in the Act
supports a distinction between “cognizable” and “non-
cognizable” pollution.

Contrary to the Solicitor General’s suggestion, petitioners’
interpretation gives independent meaning to the phrase “air
pollution agent” (Pet. Br. 14), and thus does not render this
term “superfluous.” U.S. Br. 34; see also UARG Br. 45; AAM Br.
23; CLG Br. 7.

Moreover, although petitioners have focused on the text
following the “including” clause of section 302(g) because it so
clearly captures the emissions at issue in this case, it is also
beyond dispute that these emissions fall within the phrase “air
pollution agents,” even if one looks only at that language and
ignores the language of the “including” clause.\' This is true for
several reasons.

First, focusing on carbon dioxide: carbon dioxide is
specifically named as an “air pollutant” in section 103(g) of the
Act. 42 U.S.C. 7403(g). EPA asks the Court to ignore this

10 The government's inattention to the statutory text is pointedly
illustrated by its invention of hypothetical statutory text as a reason
why this statutory text—the relevant provisions of the Clean Air
Act—should be read in a particular way. U.S. Br. 34.

1! Respondents’ brusque treatment of the “including” clause, which
helps define what the term “air pollution agents” means, ignores the
teaching of this Court's decision in Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of
Cmtys. for a Greater Oregon, 515 U.S. 687, 697 n.10 (1995) (“Congress
explicitly defined the operative term” (there, “take”; here, “air
pollution agent”), “thereby obviating the need for us to probe its
meaning as we must probe the meaning of the undefined subsidiary
term” (there, “harm”; here, “any physical, chemical . . . substance or
matter”)).

15

unambiguous textual inclusion of carbon dioxide in a list of
“air pollutants” based on its theory that the Act draws a bright
line between “regulatory” and “nonregulatory” provisions.
U.S. Br. 34-35. EPA’s rigid distinction between “regulatory”
and “nonregulatory” provisions has no support in the text or
structure of the Act. Pet. Br. 16-17.

In addition, EPA itself has acknowledged that carbon
_ dioxide exacerbates ozone pollution by exacerbating the
conditions that create this pollution. See 66 Fed. Reg. 18245,
18246 (2001). Thus carbon dioxide is an “agent” of ozone “air
pollution.” Carbon dioxide helps to bring about air pollution
in the form of ozone; this is precisely what an “agent” — of “air
pollution” — does.

As for the other substances at issue here (methane, nitrous
oxide, and hydrofluorocarbons), to the extent respondents
address them at all, they appear to agree that these substances
are “air pollution agents” insofar as they cause effects other
than climate change. CLG Br. 3 n.2 (acknowledging that
methane is an air pollutant with respect to some of its effects);
UARG Br. 45 n.18 (appearing to concede that EPA could
regulate methane due to its “explosive characteristics” and
other features). EPA agrees as well. 61 Fed. Reg. 9905, 9906
(1996) (methane contributes to landfill gas pollution). Yet
nothing in the language of the Act supports treating a
chemical substance as a pollutant for one purpose, but not for
another, depending on the exact effects being targeted.
Respondents’ approach would, moreover, forbid EPA from
regulating pollutants based on effects specifically singled out
by Congress as among the important components of human
welfare.'2 42 U.S.C. 7602(h) (defining “welfare” to include

12 During debate on the 1970 Amendments, which added the terms
“climate” and “weather” to the definition of “welfare,” Senator
Boggs introduced into the record a White House Report stating that:
“Air pollution alters climate and may produce global changes in
temperature. . . . [T]he addition of particulates and carbon dioxide in
the atmosphere could have dramatic and long-term effects on world

16

“weather” and “climate”); Pet. Br. 15-16. There is no sense in
respondents’ approach.

Industry respondents, focusing solely on carbon dioxide,
argue that this chemical is not an “air pollution agent” for
several different reasons. They say that the Clean Air Act only
applies to substances that make the air “dirty.” UARG Br. 46;
AAM Br. 23. This is not a word used in the Act. It is also hard
to know what respondents mean by “dirty.” For example,
carbon monoxide is colorless and odorless (this is why carbon
monoxide detectors are needed);'° it is not “dirty” in the usual
sense of the term. Yet carbon monoxide has been regulated
under section 202 of the Act for decades, see Pub. L. No. 91-
604, § 6(a), 84 Stat. 1676, 1690 (1970), and respondents do not
question the appropriateness of this regulation.

Respondents also assert that carbon dioxide is not an “air
pollution agent” because it is “essential to life.” AAM Br. 20.
Yet chromium and selenium, for example, are essential
nutrients, see HARRISON’S PRINCIPLES OF INTERNAL MEDICINE
401 (Table 60-2), 410 (Kasper et al., eds., 16th ed. 2005), and
chromium and selenium compounds are nonetheless
regulated as hazardous air pollutants under the Act. 42 U.S.C.
7412(b)(1). EPA has, moreover, just announced a proposed
rule that would control the use of carbon dioxide as a
substitute for ozone-depleting substances because carbon
dioxide is deadly at certain concentrations. 71 Fed. Reg. 55140,
55143 (2006). Many substances have benign, or even
beneficent, consequences at lower concentrations and malign
consequences at higher concentrations. See STEPHEN BREYER,
BREAKING THE VICIOUS CIRCLE: TOWARD EFFECTIVE RISK
REGULATION 9 (1993) (“Drinking a bottle of pure iodine is

climate.” 116 Cong. Rec. 32907, 32914, 32917. This evidences an
affirmative awareness of the problem of global climate change at the
time “ongress added the words “climate” and “weather” to the
definition of “ welfare.”

%3 Consumer Product Safety Commission, Carbon Monoxide
Questions and Answers, CPSC Document #466, available at
http:/ / www.cpsc.gov /CPSCPUB/ PUBS/ 466. html.

17

deadly; placing a drop of diluted iodine on a cut is helpful.”).
Respondents’ categorical treatment of carbon dioxide as
“essential to life” ignores this basic scientific principle.

Respondents also argue that greenhouse gases do not
belong in the category of “air pollution agents” because they
exert their effects through their presence in the upper
atmosphere, rather than in the “ambient air” as EPA has
defined it. CLG Br. 10-11; UARG Br. 47-48. This is not a line
drawn by Congress; it is one of respondents’ invention.
Section 302(g) requires only that, to be an air pollutant,
substance or matter be “emitted into or otherwise enter[]} the
ambient air.” 42 U.S.C. 7602(g).'* There is no question that
motor vehicles emit greenhouse gases into the very zone
described by respondents. And, as a matter of scientific fact,
greenhouse gases contribute to climate change at all altitudes,
from the ground upwards.

Respondents’ suggestion, moreover, that pollution control
can and does focus only on cleaning the air to make it
breathable (AAM Br. 21) ignores the fact that the Act's core
provisions all protect welfare‘as well as human health. Pet. Br.
15. “[E}ffects on soils, water, crops, vegetation, manmade
materials, animals, wildlife, weather, visibility, and climate,
damage to and deterioration of property, and hazards to
transportation,” 42 U.S.C. 7602(h) (defining “welfare”), all go
well beyond concerns with breathable air. And citation to a
1968 law review article on the nature of the air pollution
problem (AAM Br. 23-25) hardly helps this Court to
understand the nature of today’s most challenging air
pollution problems, quite apart from climate change. One of
the reasons why ozone, example, has posed such a difficult
problem is that it does cross airshed boundaries (cf, AAM Br.
25), yet mo one in this proceeding is suggesting that ozone

4 Cf 42 U.S.C. 7408(a)(2) (for purposes of air quality standards
program, underlying scientific documents must describe effects on
public health or welfare due to “the presence of such pollutant in the
ambient air’). |

18

pollution is thus not the kind of “air pollution” the Clean Air
Act aims to address.

~ Whatever the outer limits of the term “air pollution
agents,” they are not close to being reached by including
carbon dioxide, methane, nitrous oxide, and
hydrofluorocarbons within the ambit of this term. Not only do
these chemicals fit exactly within the “including” clause of the
definition of “air pollution agents”; they also easily qualify as
“air pollution agents” even without consideration of that
clause. Indeed, EPA has recognized as much in other
regulatory proceedings. Pet. Br. 33-34. Perhaps this is why
EPA makes no effort to define “air pollution agents” in this
case except to say that this term does not include greenhouse
gases when they are being regulated as greenhouse gases. And
it does not so much as mention the other proceedings in which
it has taken a different approach to these chemicals.
Interpretation for the nonce is not interpretation at all; it is
merely improvisation.

III. EPA may not decline to issue emission standards for
motor vehicles based on policy considerations not
reflected within section 202(a)(1) of the Clean Air Act.

Four years after receiving a petition to regulate greenhouse
gases from motor vehicles, and in settlement of a lawsuit
charging EPA with unreasonably delay in answering the
petition, EPA issued a final decision declining to regulate
greenhouse gases. In the section of its decision relevant here,
entitled “Different Policy Approach,” EPA gave the reasons
why it would refuse to regulate greenhouse gases from motor
vehicles even if it had the authority to do so: it thought
regulation under section 202(a)(1) was “piecemeal and
inefficient”; it gestured toward the potential foreign policy
implications of pursuing regulation under the Clean Air Act; it
stated that technology might not be available to reduce all of
the greenhouse gas emissions the petition covered; and it

19

outlined uncertainties remaining in our understanding of
climate change. Pet. Br. 4-5, 39-44.

Nowhere did EPA assert that was declining to regulate
due to resource constraints, competing priorities, or an
inability to determine whether the statutory standard of
endangerment was met—factors that might counsel chariness
in judicial review. In arguing that EPA’s decision should be
reviewed under an especially forgiving standard of review,
respondents ignore the actual structure of EPA’s decision.
That decision must be reversed if it is inconsistent with the
Clean Air Act. It is.

A. EPA’s decision must be reversed if it reflects a
misinterpretation of the Clean Air Act.

A court reviewing an agency decision “shall . . . compel
agency action unlawfully withheld... .” 5 U.S.C. 706(1). EPA’s
decision not to regulate greenhouse gases from motor vehicles
should be overturned if it is “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of
discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.” 5 U.S.C.
706(2)(A). Under this standard, as explained in Part IILB
below, petitioners win. It is understandable, therefore, that
respondents work very hard to convince this Court to apply a
different standard of review here.

Indeed, respondents’ briefs brim with hints that EPA’s
decision declining to regulate greenhouse gases from motor
vehicles might not be reviewable at all. U.S. Br. 38 & n.15, 45 &
n.21; AAM Br. 43, 44. Respondents argue that agency refusals
to issue rules are fundamentally different from agency
decisions to issue rules, and that this difference makes the
former “effectively nonreviewable.” AAM Br. 43. Respondents
stop short, however, of actually saying that EPA’s decision is
unreviewable, settling instead for a “more deferential
standard” than the one that would be applied to agency rules
or revocations of rules. U.S. Br. 39.

As support for a different standard of review for this case,
the Solicitor General cites this Court’s decisions in Heckler v.

20

Chaney, 470 U.S. 821 (1985), and Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass‘n v.
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29 (1983). In Heckler, of
course, as the Solicitor General notes, the Court did not even
address rulemaking proceedings. U.S. Br. 38 n.15; 470 US. at
825 n.2. Moreover, the Court based its decision as much on an
analogy to prosecutorial decisions not to indict, and their
historical immunity from review, as on the concerns the
Solicitor General identifies. 470 U.S. at 832. Agency decisions
not to promulgate rules do not implicate the prosecutorial
discretion protected in Chaney. See Am. Horse Prot. Ass’n v.
Lyng, 812 F.2d 1, 4 (D.C. Cir. 1987). As for State Farm, the
Court's only reference to the actual standard of review that
might be applicable to refusals to promulgate rules was the
Court’s mention of what the petitioners in that case thought
that standard would be. 463 U.S. at 42. The case does not hold
that a different standard of review applies to refusals to
promulgate rules or, more particularly, that an agency that
refuses to issue a rule has more leeway in interpreting a statute
than an agency that issues a rule.

The Court's practice in reviewing agency decisions
confirms that there is no special rule of interpretation reserved
for agency refusals to promulgate rules. In Young uv.
Community Nutrition Institute, 476 U.S. 974 (1986), for example,
the Court reviewed the refusal of the Food and Drug
Administration (FDA) to promulgate a rule limiting aflatoxin
in food. FDA’s decision was challenged as a misinterpretation
of its governing statute. Using ordinary tools of statutory
interpretation, the Court investigated whether FDA had
legally erred in refusing to promulgate the rule. Id. at 979-984.
The Court upheld FDA’s decision, but it did so by applying an
ordinary standard of review to the case. To similar effect are
FCC v. ITT World Communications, Inc., 466 U.S. 463, 465-466,
469-474 (1984) (reviewing denial of rulemaking petition based
on ordinary principles of statutory construction), and NAACP
v. Federal Power Comm’n, 425 U.S. 662, 664, 666-671 (1976)
(same).

21

In Japan Whaling Association v. American Cetacean Society,
478 U.S. 221 (1986), moreover, in a context strikingly similar to
the one presented here, the Court scrutinized the Secretary of
Commerce's refusal to certify that Japan’s whaling practices
“diminish[ed] the effectiveness” of the International
Convention for the Regulation of Whaling, using ordinary
tools of statutory construction. There, the Court made clear
that an agency may not refuse to make a finding contemplated
by a statute “for any reason not connected with the aims and .
.. goals” of the relevant law. Id. at 233.

Likewise, the D.C. Circuit—contrary to respondents’
suggestions (U.S. Br. 36-37; UARG Br. 26-29; AAM Br. 44)—
reviews refusals to promulgate rules under the same standard
it uses for informal agency rulemaking. This is not surprising,
since section 706(1) of the Administrative Procedure Act
(APA) does not draw the distinction respondents cite. For this
reason, the very cases cited by respondents clearly hold that
agency refusals to promulgate rules are to be overturned if the
agency commits a “plain error of law.” Midwest Indep.
Transmission Sys. Oper., Inc. v. FERC, 388 F.3d 903, 911 (D.C.
Cir. 2004); Am. Horse Prot. Ass’n, 812 F.2d at 5; see also General
Motors Corp. v. NHTSA, 898 F.2d 165, 169-170 (D.C. Cir. 1990)
(agency refusal to institute rulemaking guided by ordinary
principles of statutory construction). The D.C. Circuit has, in
fact, explicitly rejected the analogy to Chaney on which the
government relies, Am. Horse Prot. Ass'n, 812 F.2d at 4, and has
overturned agencies’ denials of rulemaking petitions where
the denials were grounded in an error of law. See, e.g., id. at 7
(overturning agency refusal to institute rulemaking where
agency head had proved “blind to the nature of his mandate
from Congress”). To be sure, the D.C. Circuit has been hesitant
to overturn agency refusals to regulate where those refusals
are grounded in “factors not inherently susceptible to judicial
resolution,” such as competing agency priorities, see Natural
Res. Def. Council v. SEC, 606 F.2d 1031, 1046 (D.C. Cir. 1979),
but those factors are not present in this case, where petitioners’

22

claim is that EPA’s decision rested on a misinterpretation of
the statute on which the decision was based.

Creating a more deferential interpretive standard in the
context of agency refusals to take action would not only be
inconsistent with existing precedent and the APA, it would
have far-reaching (and bad) effects. A substantial number of
regulatory regimes prohibit certain conduct or commercial
activity in the absence of an agency decision allowing it; food
additives (21 U.S.C. 348(a)(2)), new drugs (21 U.S.C. 355(a)),
and certain medical devices (21 U.S.C. 360e(a)), to name just a
few examples, may not be marketed without agency approval.
If agency decisions “to institute proceedings or to promulgate
rules” (U.S. Br. 36) were subject to the more forgiving standard
of review respondents seek, then agency actions that decline to
free up—rather than constrain—market behavior would be
subject to the same forgiving standard.

In this case, the agency explained its refusal to act by
noting that it preferred to take a different route from the one
laid out in section 202(a)(1) of the Clean Air Act. Nothing in
the “background principles of administrative law” EPA
invokes (U.S. Br. 39) grants the agency the power to ignore
statutes it does not like.'5

15 The Solicitor General’s emphasis (U.S. Br. 39-43) on the lack of a
deadline for enacting standards, or for responding to petitions to
enact standards, under section 202(a)(1) is misplaced. If there were a
deadline for enacting standards under section 202(a)(1), perhaps
petitioners would not have had to wait four years for an answer
from EPA on the rulemaking petition. But once EPA answered that
petition, the lack of an initial deadline for an answer became
irrelevant. EPA answered the petition, and its answer may not
violate the Clean Air Act. Were the law otherwise, the many cases
recognizing that agencies may be held to account for “unreasonable
delay” in their decisionmaking, see, e.g., In re United Steelworkers of
America v. Rubber Manufacturers Ass'n, 783 F.2d 1117, 1120 (D.C. Cir.
1986) (per curiam); Oil, Chemical and Atomic Workers International
Union v. Zegeer, 768 F.2d 1480, 1487-1488 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (Ginsburg,
J.), would amount to empty gestures. On respondents’ theory, an

23

B. EPA committed a plain legal error in declining to issue
emission standards for motor vehicles based on policy
considerations not reflected within section 202(a)(1) of
the Clean Air Act.

Bad journalists bury the lede; bad interpreters bury the
text. The latter, unfortunately, is exactly what EPA did in
declining to regulate greenhouse gases and what it continues
to do in trying to justify that decision to this Court.'®

For the Court’s convenience, here is the pertinent text of
section 202(a)(1):

The Administrator shall by regulation prescribe (and from

time to time revise) standards applicable to the emission of

any air pollutant from any class or classes of new motor
vehicles or new motor vehicle engines, which in his
judgment cause, or contribute to, air pollution which may
reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or
welfare.
42 US.C. 7521(a)(1). In its brief treatment of this statutory
language, EPA concedes that this language means that once
the agency has made a finding that emissions from new motor
vehicles contribute to air pollution which may reasonably be
anticipated to endanger public health or welfare, EPA must
regulate those emissions. U.S. Br. 41-42. But section 202(a)(1)
places, in EPA’s view, absolutely no constraint on the agency's
decision whether to make such a determination in the first
place. U.S. Br. 40-41.

EPA believes that the phrase “in his judgment” justifies the

latter conclusion:

agency could simply respond to any judicia! directive to come to a
timely decision by saying that it disagreed with the policy approach
of the statute under which it operated.

16 Petitioners’ opening brief describes how EPA’s decision
concerning the scope of its discretion collides with section 202(a)(1).
Pet. Br. 35-48.

24

Nothing in Section 202(a)(1) . . . requires EPA to make [an
endangerment] determination at any particular time. To
the contrary, the provision emphasizes the Administrator's
ability to exercise his ‘judgment,’ which presumably
includes the judgment that this issue is not yet ripe for
determination. Thus, absent a formal judgment by the
Administrator that greenhouse gas emissions from new
motor vehicles can be expected to cause endangerment, the
agency retained its traditional flexibility to base its denial
of the rulemaking petition on a broad range of
discretionary factors.
U.S. Br. 41. EPA's interpretation and its presumption about the
scope of the Administrator's discretion should be rejected for
several reasons.

“In his judgment” modifies only the phrase “cause, or
contribute to, air pollution which may reasonably be
anticipated to endanger public health or welfare.” 42 U.S.C.
7521(a)(1). It does not modify the word “shall” or grant
wholesale discretion over the question whether to regulate
emissions from motor vehicles. But that is how EPA reads the
phrase. In EPA’s view, “in his judgment” smuggles even a
blatant disagreement with the policy of section 202(a)(1) into
section 202(a)(1) itself, as a “discretionary factor” the agency is
entitled to consider. Only thus can EPA argue that its
characterization of section 202(a)(1) as an “inefficient,
piecemeal” answer to the question before it helped to justify
its refusal to regulate under that provision. U.S. Br. 48. An
agency cannot, however, defend a decision based on its own
preference for a policy approach different from the one
Congress chose. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm, 463
US. at 43 (agency may not rely “on factors which Congress
has not intended it to consider”).

Moreover, EPA’s interpretation ascribes a very strange
intent to Congress. According to EPA, Congress thought that
emissions that contribute to air pollution which may
reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or welfare
are such a big problem that EPA must regulate them. But, at

25

the same time, Congress gave EPA absolute discretion as to
whether to make the determination on which regulation could
be based. On EPA’s theory, the agency could have right in
front of its eyes conclusive evidence that climate change (for -
example) is causing and will, for the indefinite- future,
continue to cause an environmental catastrophe, and so long
as it did not take a close look at that evidence, it would have
absolutely no obligation to do anything to mitigate the threat.
EPA’s interpretation does violence not only to the text of
section 202(a)(1) and to its basic sense, but also to an
animating theme of the Clean Air Act itself: that as scientific
knowledge advances, it should be pressed into service in
protecting the public from threats to its health and welfare. See
Amicus Brief of Former EPA Administrators Carol M.
Browner et al.

Acceptance of EPA’s position would also pay insufficient
respect to Congress's choice, in section 202, of technology-
based standards over the health-based standards found
elsewhere in the Act. See, e.g., 42 USC. 7412(f)(2)(A).
Technology-based standards demand much less intensive
examination of the precise health and environmental
consequences of pollution than health-based standards do. See,
e.g., Wendy E. Wagner, The Triumph of Technology-Based
Standards, 2009 U. ILL. L. REV. 83, 94-97, 106. Requiring highly
specific areas of scientific uncertainty to be resolved before
regulating, as EPA has done, misapprehends the nature of the
regulatory instrument Congress chose in enacting section 202.

Finally, EPA’s interpretation gets the standard of scientific
proof embodied in section 202(a)(1) just backwards. EPA
interprets the phrase “in his judgment” to give the
Administrator complete control over the determination of
when the issue of + endangerment “is . . . ripe for
determination.” U.S. Br. 41. See also id. at 44 (“EPA may
properly defer making an endangerment determination while
it waits for additional scientific and technical studies to be
completed”); id. at 45 (referring to “agency’s view that any
decision whether to regulate in this area would be better made

26

after further research was conducted into critical areas of
current scientific uncertainty”). Congress, however, included
the phrase “may reasonably be anticipated” precisely in order
to make clear that EPA need not, and should not, wait for all
scientific uncertainties to be resolved before taking action
against an environmental threat. Pet. Br. 41-43.

Citing Ethyl Corporation v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1 (D.C. Cir. 1976),
the Solicitor General argues that “[t]he fact that EPA may
regulate in the face of uncertainty . . . does not preclude the
agency from deferring regulation pending the acquisition of
additional information.” US. Br. 47 n.23 (emphasis in
original). This argument badly misconceives the decision in
Ethyl, which Congress ratified in amending the endangerment
standard of section 202(a)(1) in 1977. Pet. Br. 42 n.32. The court
in Ethyl concluded that the agency’s discretion was not only
enlarged by the endangerment standard then in existence
(because the standard permitted regulation in the face of
uncertainty), but was constrained by it as well:

A statute allowing for regulation in the face of danger is,

necessarily, a precautionary statute. Regulatory action may

be taken before the threatened harm occurs; indeed, the
very existence of such precautionary legislation would
seem to demand that regulatory action precede, and,
optimally, prevent, the perceived threat. ... We believe the
precautionary language of the Act indicates quite plainly

Congress’ intent that regulation should precede any

threatened, albeit unprecedented, disaster. . . . [T]he

statutes—and common sense—demand regulatory action

to prevent harm, even if the regulator is less than certain

that the harm is otherwise inevitable.
541 F.2d at 13 & n.18, 25. Under section 202(a)(1) as amended
to embody the Ethyl decision, the Administrator may not, as
happened here, just wave a hand in the direction of scientific
uncertainty in explaining a failure to act against a large-scale
risk. There is always uncertainty in environmental matters,
and, especially given the Clean Air Act’s promotion of
scientific research, there will always be “additional scientific

27

and technical studies” (U.S. Br. 44) awaiting completion.
Acceptance of EPA’s claim of the scope of its own discretion
under section 202(a)(1) would render the precautionary aspect
of that provision a nullity.

CONCLUSION

The judgment of the court of appeals should be reversed,
with directions to remand the case to EPA for a statutorily-
based, non-arbitrary decision on the petition for rulemaking.

Respectfully submitted,

THOMAS F. REILLY
Attorney General of Massachusetts

LISA HEINZERLING

Special Assistant Attorney General
600 New Jersey Ave., N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20001

(202) 662-9115

JAMES R. MILKEY*

WILLIAM L. PARDEE

CAROL IANCU

Assistant Attorneys General

1 Ashburton Place, 18% Floor
Boston, MA 02108

(617) 727-2200

*Counsel of Record

November 15, 2006

BILL LOCKYER
Attorney General of
California

MARC N. MELNICK
NICHOLAS STERN
Deputy Attorneys General
1515 Clay Street, 20th
Floor

P.O. Box 70550
Oakland, CA 94612
(510) 622-2133

RICHARD BLUMENTHAL
Attorney General of
Connecticut

KIMBERLY MASSICOTTE
MATTHEW LEVIN
Assistant Attorneys General
P.O. Box 120

55 Elm Street

Hartford, CT 06141-0120
(860) 808-5250

LISA MADIGAN

Attorney General of Illinois
MATTHEW J. DUNN
GERALD T. KARR

Assistant Attorneys General
188 West Randolph Street
20th Floor

Chicago, IL 60601

(312) 814-3369

G. STEVEN ROWE
Attorney General of Maine
GERALD D. REID
Assistant Attorney General
State House Station #6
Augusta, ME 04333-0006
(207) 626-8545

STUART RABNER
Attorney General of

New Jersey

STEFANIE A. BRAND
KEVIN P. AUERBACHER
LISA MORELLI

Deputy Attorneys General
Richard J. Hughes Justice
Complex

25 Market St., P.O. Box
093

Trenton, NJ 08625-0093
(609) 633-8713

PATRICIA A. MADRID
Attorney General of

New Mexico

STUART M. BLUESTONE
Deputy Attorney General
STEPHEN R. FERRIS
JUDITH ANN MOORE
Assistant Attorneys General
P.O. Drawer 1508

Sante Fe, NM 87504-1508
(505) 827-6010

ELIOT SPITZER

Attorney General

of New York

CAITLIN J. HALLIGAN
Solicitor General

J. JARED SNYDER

Assistant Attorneys General
120 Broadway

New York, NY 10271
(212) 416-8016

HARDY MYERS

Attorney General of Oregon
PHILIP SCHRADLE

Special Counsel to the
Attorney General
RICHARD WHITMAN
Assistant Attorney General
Oregon Dept. of Justice
1162 Court Street, N.E.
Salem, OR 97301

(503) 378-6002

PATRICK C. LYNCH
Attorney General

of Rhode Island

TRICIA K. JEDELE

Special Assistant Attorney
General

150 South Main Street
Providence, RI 02903
(401) 274-4400

WILLIAM H. SORRELL
Attorney General of
Vermont

KEVIN O. LESKE

Assistant Attorney General
109 State Street
Montpelier, VT 05609-1001
(802) 828-6902

ROB MCKENNA

Attorney General of
Washington

LESLIE R. SEFFERN
Assistant Attorney General
JAY D. GECK

Deputy Solicitor General
P.O. Box 40117

Olympia, WA 98504-0117
(360) 586-4613

ROBERT J. SPAGNOLETTI
Attorney General of the
District of Columbia
TODD S. KIM

Solicitor General

DONNA MURASKY
Senior Assistant Attorney
General

441 Fourth Street, N.W.
6th Floor South
Washington, D.C. 20001
(202) 724-6609

MALAETASI M. TOGAFAU
Attorney General

of American Samoa

P.O. Box 7

Pago Pago, American
Samoa 96799

011 (684) 633-4163

MICHAEL CARDOZO
Corporation Counsel
City of New York
SUSAN KATH

SCOTT PASTERNACK
TRACY TRIPLETT
Assistant Corporation
Counsel

100 Church Street
New York, NY 10007
(212) 676-8517

RALPH S. TYLER

City Solicitor

City of Baltimore
WILLIAM PHELAN, JR.
Principal Counsel
Baltimore City Dept. of
Law

100 Holliday Street
Baltimore, MD 21202
(410) 396-4094

JULIE TEEL

P.O. Box 7745

San Diego, CA 92167
(619) 224-3400

Counsel for Center for
Biological Diversity

JOSEPH MENDELSON III
660 Pennsylvania Ave. SE
Washington, DC 20003
(202) 547-9359

Counsel for International
Center for Technology
Assessment, Center for Food
Safety, Environmental
Advocates, and Greenpeace

SETH KAPLAN
62 Summer Street
Boston, MA 02110
(617) 850-1721

Counsel for Conservation
Law Foundation

JAMES B. TRIPP

257 Park Avenue South
17th Floor

New York, NY 10010
(212) 505-2100

Counsel for Environmental
Defense

BRIAN DUNKIEL

Shems Dunkiel Kassel &
Saunders PLLC

91 College Street
Burlington, Vermont
05401

(802) 860-1003

DANIELLE FUGERE

311 Calif. St., Ste. 510
San Francisco, CA 94104
(415) 544-0790

Counsel for Friends of the
Earth

JOHN M. STANTON
1200 18th Street, N.W.
Washington, DC 20036
(202) 887-8800

Counsel for National
Environmental Trust

DAVID DONIGER

1200 New York Ave., NW
Washington, DC 20005
(202) 289-2403

Counsel for Natural
Resources Defense Council

DAVID BOOKBINDER
408 C Street, NE
Washington, DC 20002
(202) 548-4598

HOWARD Fox

1625 Massachusetts Ave.,
NW, Suite 702
Washington, DC 20036
(202) 667-4500

Counsel for Sierra Club

ALEXANDRA SCHULTE
1707 H St., N.W. Suite 600
Washington, DC 20006
(202) 223-6133 x 109

Counsel for Union of
Concerned Scientists

ALEX FIDIS

218 D Street, SE
Washington, DC 20003
(202) 546-9707

Counsel for U.S. Public
Interest Research Group

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385016_0245%3A17. Public record. Not legal advice.
