# Petitioners Brief — Environmental Defense v. Duke Energy Corporation

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URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385016_0237%3A11

## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Petitioners Brief
- **Published:** January 1, 2007
- **Citation:** 549 U.S. 561

## Text

40 C.F.R.:

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LEGISLATIVE MATERIALS

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136 Cong Rec. $3428 (March 28, 1990)... eccecceceteeeneeee 15
136 Cong. Rec. $16904 (daily ed. Oct. 27, 1990) ......... 15
136 Cong. Rec. $16914 (daily ed. Oct. 27, 1990)... 15
136 Cong. Rec. $3383 (daily ed. Mar. 28, 1990) ...0......00..... 15
136 Cong. Rec. $3720 (daily ed. Apr. 3, 1990)..........0000.... 15
136 Cong. Rec. $3723 (daily ed. Apr. 3, 1990).........0.......... 15
Joint Explanatory Statement to Accompany .

S. 1630, Rep. 101-952, 2d Sess. 344-345 (1990)............... 15
ADMINISTRATIVE MATERIALS
36 Fed. Reg. 24876 (Dec. 23, 1971).............:cscssseseesessneeseees 18
39 Fed. Reg. 42510 (Dec. 5, 1974).........cccceccsrrocssscessesesenseses 5
40 Fed. Reg. 58416 (Dec. 16, 1975)...................ssccscccsssssssesesees
41 Fed. Reg. 56767 (Dec. 30, 1976)........0...0.060. chsbatdialed 8,28
43 Fed. Reg. 26380 (June 19, 1978) 0......c... cee ccssseeseseseeees 9

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44 Fed. Reg. 51924 (Sept. 5, 1979) .............:....cccccsesessveees 9,31
45 Fed. Reg. 52676 (Aug. 7, 1980) .......... cece eeeeeeees passim
46 Fed. Reg. 36695 (July 15, 1981)...........ccecceseeeeesseeeseeees 11

“47 Fed. Reg. 6017 (Feb. 10. 1982) cccccsscccssssssssssssssssssssssseee 21
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53 Fed. Reg. 5860 (Feb. 26, 1988) ..................ceccccesssesseceeees 47
56 Fed. Reg. 27630 (June 14, 1991)... eeeeseseeseeeeereeeees 16
57 Fed. Reg. 32314 (July 21, 1992)............ ec ceseseeeee passim
61 Fed. Reg. 38250 (July 23, 1996)...........ccceeeeeees 17,19,49
67 Fed. Reg. 80186 (Dec. 31, 2002) 0.00... ceeeeeeeeeeees passim
70 Fed. Reg. 61081 (Oct. 20, 2005)............ccececcsossrcsersssorores 23
71 Fed. Rem. 9066 (Feb. 27, ZOGG) ........ccrrerceccrsccccnevssssseseres 21
OTHER MATERIALS

Henry J. Friendly, “Some Kind of Hearing,”
gO BR, RIESE ee 27

General Accounting Office, Air Pollution Emissions
from Older Electric-Generating Units,
gS _, SIRES r at ron, mame aeee 21

Jonathan Levy and Jack Spengler, Health Benefits of
Emissions Reductions from Older Power Plants,
9 Risk in Perspective, Vol. 2 (2001) ...............cscesessssseeeees 21

XIV

Arnold W. Reitze, Jr., Stationary Source Air
SP St Tr i

XV

OPINIONS BELOW
The district court’s opinion (Pet. App. 22a) is reported at
278 F. Supp. 2d 619, and its order granting final judgment

(Pet. App. 85a) is unreported. The court of appeals’ opinion
(Pet. App. 1a) is reported at 411 F.3d 539. ,

JURISDICTION

The court of appeals denied rehearing en banc on August
30, 2005. This Court granted certiorari on May 15, 2006 (126
S. Ct. 2019). Jurisdiction rests on 28 U.S.C. 1254(1).

STATUTES AND REGULATIONS

Relevant provisions of the Clean Air Act (Act or CAA), 42
U.S.C. 7401 ef seg., and of Title 40 of the Code of Federal
Regulations are reproduced in an addendum to this brief.

STATEMENT

This case arises from an extensive “Plant Modernization
Program” by which respondent Duke Energy Corporation
(Duke) undertook to refurbish coal-burning power plants.
Because of age and physical deterioration, these plants could
operate only sporadically (and in some cases had been shut
down for years) and, without modernization, they were due to
be retired and replaced. The United States brought an
enforcement action alleging that Duke’s projects triggered the
Act’s Prevention of Significant Deterioration (PSD)
provisions, which apply when a source undergoes a
“modification,” i.¢., “[a]ny physical change” that “increases
the amount of any air pollutant emitted by such source.” 42
U.S.C. 7411(a)(4), 7479¢(2\(C). The United States maintained
that, under regulations promulgated by the Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) in 1980 and 1992 defining PSD
modifications as physical changes that increase “actual”
emissions, measured in “tons per year,” a modernization that
enables a source to operate more of the time - and emit more
pollution — requires a PSD permit.

The Fourth Circuit held that the enforcement suit could not
proceed, reasoning that Congress had required EPA to adopt a

regulatory test for PSD “modifications” identical to one the
agency uses in regulations implementing the distinct New
Source Performance Standards (NSPS) program. Under that
NSPS standard, a modification cannot occur unless there is an
increase in a source’s maximum hourly emissions rate. Like
other tests of emissions capacity or potential, that test
excludes consideration of how much of the time (and how
intensively) a source in fact operates. It thus exempts from
PSD coverage the comprehensive overhaul of an old source —
a source that, due to age and physical decay, was inoperative
most or all of the time — even when the modernization
project’s result is to “increase[] the amount of any air
pollutant emitted by such source” by hundreds or thousands
of tons per year.

In imposing that result, the Fourth Circuit starkly violated
Section 307 of the Act. That provision vests the D.C. Circuit
with exclusive jurisdiction to review challenges to nationally
applicable CAA regulations, and, in strong terms, disables
courts in enforcement actions from deciding issues that could
have been presented to the D.C. Circuit. 42 U.S.C. 7607(b),
(e). The rationale the Fourth Circuit offered for finding the
jurisdictional bar inapplicable — that the court was merely
“interpreting” rather than invalidating EPA’s regulations —
does not withstand a moment’s scrutiny. Even if courts were
free to substitute their reading of a regulation for that of the
agency, the court of appeals here did not actually “construe”
the PSD regulations, whose language and preamble the court
deemed “irrelevant” to the case because of what it saw as a
peremptory statutory command. In fact, the PSD regulations
manifestly cannot be “interpreted” to be the same as the
NSPS regulations, or to impose an hourly rate test.

It would be hard to imagine a more serious affront to the
exclusive review role Congress assigned to the D.C. Circuit.
The 1980 regulations the Fourth Circuit found contrary to
statute were, in relevant part, adopted to conform to the D.C.
Circuit's decision in Alabama Power v. Costle, 636 F.2d 323
(1979), which construed the Act’s PSD provisions to mandate

2

that EPA evaluate whether the program applies to physical
changes by looking at their effects on “actual emissions,” and
held the PSD statute to require distinctive regulatory elements
that the D.C. Circuit had held unlawful for NSPS. And the
Fourth Circuit’s decision was issued even as numerous
parties, including Duke, were challenging the same
regulations in the D.C. Circuit. In a decision rendered nine
days after the Fourth Circuit’s, New York v. EPA, 413 F.3d 3
(D.C. Cir. 2005), the D.C. Circuit not only reyected (on merits
and waiver grounds) the very statutory challenges Duke
successfully pressed in the instant case, but also held, based in
part on distinctive statutory requirements of the PSD
program, that EPA must measure PSD modifications by
increases in a source’s “actual” emissions, not “potential” or
“allowable” emissions.

Even if Congress had not been so clear in forbidding courts
in enforcement actions from deciding broad statutory
questions assigned to the D.C. Circuit, the interpretation
imposed by the court below could not stand. EPA’s
regulatory test for PSD modifications — tailored to the D.C.
Circuit’s construction of the Act in Alabama Power, and
upheld in full in New York - is easily a permissible reading of
the statute, one carefully calibrated to the distinctive textual
requirements and programmatic purposes of the Act’s PSD
provisions. Indeed, the Fourth Circuit did not identify the
slightest inconsistency between EPA’s regulatory test and the
language of the statutory definition it implements.

Instead, relying on Rowan Cos., Inc. v. United States, 452
U.S. 247 (1981), the court of appeals invoked what it
perceived as a congressional “mandate” on EPA to adopt
identical regulatory definitions of source “modification” for
the NSPS and PSD programs. But this Court has never — in
Rowan or any other case — endorsed any such rigid
presumption. To the contrary, the Court has consistently
emphasized the need to interpret each term of a complex
regulatory statute like the CAA in light of the specific
statutory context in which it functions. As the D.C. Circuit

3

has held, EPA’s regulations not only may but must give effect
to the PSD provisions’ distinctive and explicit targeting of the
actual “tons per year” of pollution emitted by major emitting
sources. The test urged by Duke and imposed by the court
below (without consideration of its patent lack of fit with the
PSD provisions of the Act) would exempt plant renovation
projects that undeniably increase the amount of air pollutants
emitted by a source by thousands of tons a year. That test is
inconsistent with the plain text, intricate mechanics, and
fundamental objectives of the statutory PSD program, and
with D.C. Circuit holdings in jurisdictionally proper Section
307(b) rulemaking reviews.

A. Statutory And Regulatory Background

1. The 1970 Act. Congress enacted the Clean Air Act
Amendments of 1970 “to protect and enhance the quality of
the Nation’s air resources so as to promote the public health
and welfare and the productive capacity of its population.” 42
U.S.C. 7401(b). The CAA directs EPA to establish National
Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS) for air pollutants at
a level requisite to protect public health and the welfare, id.
7409, and authorizes States to establish state implementation
plans (SIPs) containing measures sufficient to achieve and
maintain the NAAQS. /d. 7410. See General Motors Corp.
v. United States, 496 U.S. 530, 533 (1990); Union Elec. Co. v.
EPA, 427 U.S. 246, 249-50 (1976). EPA has promulgated
NAAQS for various pollutants, including sulfur dioxide,
nitrogen dioxide, and particulates. 40 C.F.R. pt. 50.

The 1970 Act also established the NSPS program, which
directs EPA to prescribe uniform, national, technology-based
performance standards for various categories of equipment.
42 U.S.C. 7411. The NSPS apply to newly constructed
sources and to those that undergo “modification.” 42 U.S.C.
741 1(ay(2), (4). Believing that the controls required in the
1970 legislation would suffice to attain the NAAQS,
Congress fixed 1975 as the deadline for meeting those
standards. 42 U.S.C. 7410(b), (e), (f) (1970). That year

4

passed, however, with air quality in much of the country still
not meeting them. See, e.g., S. Rep. No. 95-127 at 55 (1977);
123 Cong. Rec. 18022 (June 8, 1977) (“record to date” under
NSPS had been “disappointing”) (Sen. Muskie).

2. The 1977 Amendments and the PSD Program.
Responding to these widely recognized failures, Congress
enacted the 1977 CAA Amendments, a “lengthy, detailed,
technical, complex and comprehensive response to a major
social issue.” Chevron USA, Inc. v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837, 848
(1984). Among their major innovations were two new
programs, collectively referred to as New Source Review
(NSR): the Nonattainment program (NNSR), codified in Part
D of the Act, 42 U.S.C. 7501-7515, which applies to areas
failing to meet the NAAQS, and the PSD program, codified in
Part C, id. 7470-7492, which applies in areas where air
quality satisfies those standards.

“Before 1977, no CAA provision specifically addressed
potential air quality deterioration in areas where pollutant
levels were lower than the NAAQS.” Alaska Dept. of Env'l
Conservation v. EPA, 540 U.S. 461, 471 (2004).' The PSD
program’s purposes include guarding against harms to public
health and welfare anticipated to occur notwithstanding
NAAQS attainment, protecting air quality in National Parks,
and preventing large sources from harming air quality in
downwind States. 42 U.S.C. 7470. Congress also established
the program to insure “that economic growth will occur in a
manner consistent with the preservation of existing clean air
resources,” and “that any decision to permit increased air
pollution * * * is made only after careful evaluation of all the
consequences” and based upon “informed public
participation.” /d. 7470(3), (5).

EPA established an administrative PSD program in 1974. 39 Fed. Reg.
42510 (Dec. 5, 1974). The statutory PSD program enacted in 1977
“follow|ed] the outline” of that program, but is “more claborate and in
many ways more stringent.” 48 Fed. Reg. 52676, 52679 (Aug. 7, 1980).

The PSD provisions require permitting prior to
construction or modification of “major emitting facilities,”
large factories and power plants “that emit, or have the
potential to emit” 100 or 250 “tons per year” of a pollutant
(depending on source type). 42 U.S.C. 7475(a), 74791). The
permit process requires a “complete” assessment of baseline
air quality in the locality and a prediction of the proposed
project’s effect on local air quality. /d. 7475(a), (e). An
applicant must show that emissions will not “cause” or
“contribute to” an exceedance of any applicable PSD
“increment.” /d. 7473, 7475(a)(3), (d). A “central feature” of
the PSD program, Alabama Power, 636 F.2d at 374,
increments are caps on increases in pollutant concentrations,
the most stringent applicable in “class I” areas like National
Parks. A source must employ the “best available pollution
control technology” (BACT), identified “case-by-case” in
light of local environmental and economic factors, id.
7475(a), 7479(3), and must comply with NSPS and other
CAA requirements. /d. 7475(a)(3).

The NSR programs added in 1977 represented a significant
departure from the 1970 Act’s approach. Whereas NSPS sets
categorical, national performance requirements for classes of
equipment irrespective of size or location, NSR applies only -
to the nation’s largest pollution sources and demands site-
specific review, prior to construction activity, of projected
effects on local air quality. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 850 &
n.24 (NNSR): Alabama Power, 636 F.2d at 346-51 (PSD).

Congress partially “grandfathered” sources built before
August 7, 1977, from NSR requirements. See 42 U.S.C.
7475(a). It was widely believed, and asserted before
Congress, that many existing plants had limited useful lives
and would be shut down within a relatively short time. See,
e.g., H.R. Rep. No. 94-1175 at 159 (“electric utility industry”
provided testimony that “it is imprudent to backfit FGD |a
control technology] into existing ‘plants, especially older units
facing retirement within 10-15 years”); S. Rep. No. 95-127 at
128 (1977) (“There are in the United States approximately

6

200 old coal-fired power plants over 20 years of age. * * *
Most will be totally phased out of operation in the next 5 to
20 years.”’) (additional views of Sen. Baker).

Congress provided, however, that NSR would apply to any
“modification” of an existing source. For PSD purposes,
“(t]he term ‘construction,’ when used in connection with any
source or facility, includes the modification (as defined in
section 7411(a) of this title) of any source or facility.” 42
U.S.C. 7479(2)(C).? Similarly, under the NNSR program,
“(t]he terms ‘modification’ and ‘modified’ mean the same as
the term ‘modification’ as used in section 7411(a)(4).” /d.
7501(4). Thus, existing sources are subject to NSR when
they undergo “any physical change in, or change in the
method of operation of, a stationary source which increases
the amount of any air pollutant emitted by such source or
which results in the emission of any air pollutant not
previously emitted.” /d. 7411(a)(4) (CAA Section 111(a)(4)).
The PSD provisions contain a single, partial exemption for
“modifications or expansions” where emissions are less than
“50 tons per year.” /d. 7475(b).

3. Judicial Review of CAA Rulemakings. Intended to
promote “even and consistent national application” of EPA’s
implementing regulations and protect “the integrity of the
time sequences provided throughout the Act,” S. Rep. No. 91-
1196 at 40-41 (1970), Section 307(b) of the Act describes the
exclusive means of judicial review of CAA regulations and
other EPA actions. See Harrison v. PPG Industries, Inc., 446
U.S. 578 (1980); Adamo Wrecking Co. v. United States, 434
U.S. 275 (1978). Section 307(b\(1) provides that specified
actions, including “any * * * nationally applicable regulations
promulgated, or final actions taken, by the Administrator

* The PSD provisions as enacted in August 1977 failed to specify that the
term “construction” included modifications. Congress corrected that
oversight in the Clean Air Act Technical and Conforming Amendments,
enacted November 16. 1977, Pub. L. 95-190, § 14(a)(54), 91 Stat. 1402.
See New York, 413 F.3d at 13; Alabama Power, 636 F.2d at 401 0.49.

7

under” the Act may be challenged “only” in the D.C. Circuit,
by petition for review filed “within sixty days” of the
promulgation or other final action, except that petitions
“based solely on grounds arising after such sixtieth day” are
considered timely if filed within 60 days of when those
grounds arose. 42 U.S.C. 7607(b)\(1). Section 307(b)(2)
provides that “[a]ction of the Administrator with respect to
which review could have been obtained [by such petition for
review] shall not be subject to judicial review in civil or
criminal proceedings for enforcement.” /d. 7607(b)(2).° This
prohibition applies “whether or not review was actually
sought.” Harrison, 446 U.S. at 605.

In 1977, Congress added Section 307(d)’s detailed
requirements for CAA _ rulemakings, see 42 U.S.C.
7607(d)(1 (J) (PSD), and its prescription that only objections
raised in the statutory public comment process or by petition
for reconsideration are subject to judicial review, id.
7607(d)(7)B). See Appalachian Power Co. v. EPA, 249 F.3d
1032, 1055 (D.C. Cir. 2001). The 1977 amendments also
added Section 307(e), stating that “[njothing in [the CAA]
shall be construed to authorize judicial review” of EPA
regulations or orders under the CAA, “except as provided in
this section.” 42 U.S.C. 7607(e).

4. Alabama Power and the 1980 Regulations. EPA
issued initial regulations implementing the 1977 PSD
provisions in 1978. 43 Fed. Reg. 26380 (June 19, 1978).

3

In 1977, Congress reaffirmed the importance of having the validity of
national actions definitively settled by a court expert in administrative law
and the CAA’s complexities. It rejected a recommendation from the
Administrative Conference “to permit the validity of regulations to be
challenged in defense to an enforcement proceeding,” 41 Fed. Reg.
56767, 56768 (Dec. 30, 1976), and amended Section 307(b) to expand the
categories of actions subject to exclusive review. See Pub. L. 95-95 §$§
303, 305, 91 Stat. 685, 772, 776-77 (1977); H.R. Rep. No. 95-294 at 322
(1977) (“reaffirm[ing]” “intent to strictly limit Section 307 challenges”).
See also Harrison, 446 U.S. at 584-85, 590-91. Congress did accept a
recommendation to extend the time to seek review from 30 to 60 days.

8

Those regulations: (a) defined “modification” as a physical
change that increases a source’s “potential emission rate,” id.
at 26382; (b) adopted a qualified form of “netting” for
measuring intra-source emissions increases (i.e., subtracting
contemporaneous decreases in emissions from increases at the
source in determjning whether a modification has occurred),
and (c) restricted PSD applicability to changes that increased
a source’s potential emissions by at least 100 or 250 tons per
year (depending on source type), id.

On review under Section 307(b), the D.C. Circuit issued an
initial per curiam opinion, Alanama Power Co. v. Costle, 606
F.2d 1068 (1979), intended to guide ongoing EPA rulemaking
to correct identified flaws in the 1978 rules while the court
prepared its full opinion, id. at 1077. EPA published
proposed regulations that would have confined PSD-
triggering “modifications” to those physical changes which
increased a source’s “potential to emit” pollutants. 44 Fed.
Reg. 51924, 51948 (Sept. 5, 1979). Soon thereafter, the D.C.
Circuit issued its full decision, 636 F.2d 323 (1979), which
explored the PSD enactment in detail.

The court held that EPA’s exemption for projects that
increased emissions by less than 100 or 250 tons per year was
contrary to the Act’s “clear language,” explaining that:

Implementation of ilie statute’s definition of
“modification” will undoubtedly prove inconvenient
and costly to affected industries; but the clear language
of the statute unavoidably imposes these costs except
for de minimis increases. The statutory scheme intends
to “grandfather” existing industries; but the provisions
concerning modifications indicate that this is not to
constitute a perpetual immunity from all standards
under the PSD program. If these.plants increase
pollution, they will generally need a permit.
Id. at 400. The Alabama Power court ‘also held that the
distinctive purpose of the PSD provisions required that EPA
provide for netting (the “bubble concept”), because “Congress
intended to apply the permit process * * * only where

9

industrial changes might increase pollution in an area, not
where an existing plant changed its operations in ways that
produced no pollution increase.” /d. at 401. Acknowledging
that in ASARCO, Inc. v. EPA, 578 F.2d 319 (D.C. Cir. 1978),
it had found EPA’s use of a bubble concept unlawful for the
NSPS program, the D.C. Circuit explained that the different
results reflected the “significantly different” regulations and
statutory programs at issue. While ASARCO had held the
bubble to be “contrary to the intent of the NSPS,” Alabama
Power explained, netting was “precisely suited” to PSD’s
focus on actual consequences for local air quality. 636 F.2d at
402, 406. Cf. ASARCO, 527 F.2d at 327, 329.

EPA then promulgated new and extensively revised PSD
regulations. 45 Fed. Reg. 52676 (Aug. 7, 1980). The 1980
regulations define a PSD “major modification” as “any
physical change in or change in the method of operation of a
major stationary source that wold result in a significant net
emissions increase of any pollutant subject to regulation
under the Act.” 40 C.F.R. 51.166(b)(2)(i) (1987).* This
definition, like Section 111(a)(4) of the Act, requires two
basic determinations: (1) whether a project constitutes a
“physical change” (or “change in the method of operation”)
and (2) whether the change would result in an “increase” in
emissions. EPA exempted some activities from PSD
requirements at the first step, including certain everyday
activities that would otherwise fit within the broad statutory
language. Thus, the regulations define “physical change” and
“change in the method of operation” to exclude, among other
things, “routine maintenance, repair, and replacement,” and
an “increase in the hours or rate of operation.” 40 C.F.R.

* EPA promulgated separate sets of regulations, identical in relevant
respects, for incorporation in SIPs, 45 Fed. Reg. at 52729-35 (40 C.F.R.
51.24(b) (1980) (recodified in 1987 at 40 C.F.R. 51.166(b) (1987)), and
for areas without approved state plans, 45 Fed. Reg. 52735-41 (40 C.F.R.
52.21(b) (1980)). Following the practice of the courts below, see Pet.
App. Sa, 36a, we cite to the regulations as recodified in 1987.

10

51.166(b)(2)(iii) (a), ().°

As to the second step, the regulations define a “net
emissions increase” as “any increase in actual emissions from
a particular physical change or change in method of
operation,” together with “[a]ny other [contemporaneous]
increases and decreases in actual emissions at the source.” 40
C.F.R. 51.166(b)(3)(i)(a), (6).° Determining whether there
has been an increase requires a source-wide assessment of the
“extent that the new level of actual emissions exceeds the old
level.” Jd. 51.166(b)(3)(v). The regulations specify that
“actual emissions as of a particular date shall equal the
average rate, in tons per year, at which the unit actually
emitted the pollutant” during a preceding two-year or other
period representative of normal source operation, and that
“actual emissions” “shall be calculated using the unit’s actual
operating hours, production rates, and types of materials
processed, stored, or combusted during the selected time
period.” /d. 51.166(b)(21)(i), (11). They provide that for a unit
which “has not begun normal operations on the particular
date, actual emissions shall equal the potential to emit of the
unit on that date.” /d. 51.166(b)(21 ){iv).’

“Following the lead” of the D.C. Circuit’s construction of
the PSD provisions in Alabama Power, and the “language” of
the statutory definition, EPA announced that it had “shifted
the focus of its regulatory definitions from ‘potential to emit’

“

* The regulations also specify pollutant-specific, annual thresholds below
which increases are not deemed “significant,” and are therefore PSD-
exempt. See, e.g., 40 C.F.R. 51.166(b)\23)(i) (40 “tpy” (tons per year)
thresholds for nitrogen oxides and sulfur dioxide).

® EPA’s regulations for the NNSR program use the same test for
“modifications.” See, e.g., 46 Fed. Reg. 36695, 36697 (July 15, 1981).

” The regulations provide that the potential to emit ascribed to a unit can
be reduced upon the applicant’s agreement to a permit limitation. 40
C.F.R. 51.166(b,4). See Puerto Rican Cement Co. v. EPA, 889 F.2d 292,
297 (1* Cir. 1989). The D.C. Circuit has addressed the potential to emit
concept in a number of cases. See, e.g., Nat'l Mining Ass'n v. EPA, 59
F.3d 1351, 1361-65 (D.C. Cir. 1995).

11

to ‘actual emissions.’” 45 Fed. Reg. at 52700 (discussing 636
F.2d at 400-01). Adoption of an actual emissions test avoided
practical “problems” created by the 1979 proposal’s
“potential to emit” standard. 45 Fed. Reg. at 52700. Because
“an existing source’s potential emissions could give a figure
considerably higher than what it is actually emitting,” that test
would yield “paper” reduction credits even as the actual
emissions increased — “especially” if, prior to the change, the
source “operated only a small part of the time.” /d. EPA
decided to avoid such “‘paper offset[s],”” which “could
permit actual air quality to deteriorate seriously, while the
change which increased actual emissions avoided NSR.” /d.

5. The CMA Litigation. Pursuant to Section 307(b),
many partics — including respondent Duke’s corporate
predecessor — filed petitions for review challenging various
aspects of the 1980 PSD regulations in the D.C. Circuit.
Chemical Manufacturers Ass'n v. EPA, Nos. 79-1112, et al.
See New York, 413 F.3d at 14-15. Certain petitioners —
including General Motors and other major industrial firms -
attacked EPA’s use of an “actual emissions” test in place of
the capacity-based test used in the 1978 PSD regulations and
the 1979 proposal. Their brief raised as its first issue whether
EPA exceeded its “statutory authority” by providing “that a
modification subject to review under Parts C and D of the
Clean Air Act would occur whenever actual emissions from a
source increased as a result of an alteration to that source,
even where the source’s capacity to emit remains constant.”
Br. of Industry Pet’rs on Actual Emissions Definition of Net
Increase at 1, No. 79-1112, ef al. (dated Feb. 12, 1981;
docketed Feb. 17, 1981).

The CMA _ proceedings were stayed for settlement
discussions, which resulted in a 1982 agreement between
EPA and certain petitioners — including Duke — under which
EPA undertook to propose new regulations, with petitioners
reserving the night to reopen their judicial challenge in the
event those proposals were not adopted. See Settlement
Agreement, D.C. Cir. Case No. 79-1112 (Feb. 22, 1982). The

12

regulatory changes, set forth in “Exhibit B” to the Agreement,
see 61 Fed. Reg. 38250, 38268-69 (July 23, 1996), would
have amended the emissions “increase” test “[b]y adding a
new subparagraph (b)(2)(v)” to the 1980 PSD regulations
providing that a modification “shall not be deemed to occur if
one of the following occurs: (a) there is no significant net
increase in the source's potential to emit (as calculated in
terms of pounds of pollutant emitted per hour) or (b) there is
no significant net increase in the source’s actual emissions.”
Id. at 38269 (emphasis added). Exhibit B also called for EPA
to propose “deleting” all 11 instances in which “actual”
preceded “emissions” in EPA’s regulatory definition of
“significant net emissions increase.” See id. & n.28. EPA
published proposed regulations based on the Exhibit B
language in 1996, but identified several ways in which such
changes could impair the efficacy of the PSD program, 61
Fed. Reg. at 38269-70, and reached a final decision not to
adopt the changes in 2002, 67 Fed. Reg. 80186, 80204-06
(Dec. 31, 2002), leading Duke and other petitioners in CMA
to reopen their challenges to the 1980 rules.

6. Application of the 1980 Regulations. In Puerto Rican
Cement Co. v. EPA, 889 F.2d 292 (1" Cir. 1989) (Breyer, J.),
the First Circuit sustained an EPA determination that the PSD
requirements applied to an upgrade project that increased
“overall emissions” by enabling a facility to be used more
intensively, even though the change did not increase its
hourly emissions rate. /d. at 293, 297. After upholding EPA’s
application of its regulations to the project, id. at 297-98, the
court, pointing to Section 307(b) and CMA, rejected as
“obviously too late” a claim that the regulations were contrary
to the Act. /d. at 299.

EPA addressed the 1980 regulations’ application to the
refurbishment of an old power plant in response to an
applicability determination requested by the Wisconsin
Electric Power Company (“WEPCo”). EPA rejected the
utility’s contention that only increases in the source’s
maximum emissions “rate” triggered PSD review, explaining

13

that “actual emissions are the product of” a source’s
emissions rate, the production rate, and hours of operation,
and that “an increase in any one of these three specified
factors, if attributable to a physical or operational change, can
trigger an emissions increase for PSD purposes[.]” JA 294.

Reviewing that determination in Wisconsin Electric Power
Co. v. Reilly, 893 F.2d 901 ( 7" Cir. 1990), the Seventh Circuit
observed that the PSD and NSPS regulations measured
emissions increases in “a fundamentally distinct manner” -
the NSPS rules are “concerned primarily with increases in
emissions rates, expressed in kilograms per hour,” whereas
the PSD rules are “concerned with changes in fotal annual
emissions, expressed in tons per year,” id. at 913, 915
(emphasis original). Recognizing that the emissions increase
caused by WEPCo’s renovations “would come not from an
increase in emission rate, but rather from increases in
production rate or hours of operation,” id. at 916, the court
rejected the utility’s claim that its project was PSD-exempt
under the regulatory language providing that increases in
“hours of operation” or “production rate” do not themselves
constitute a “physical change,” explaining that the exemption
“was provided to allow facilities to take advantage of
fluctuating market conditions, not construction’ or
modification activity.” /d. at 916 n.11.

The court in WEPCo set aside EPA’s application of the
“actual to potential” test set forth in the 1980 reguiations for
sources that “have not begun normal operations,” to calculate
post-change annual emissions by assuming round-the-clock
operation. While agreeing that EPA “cannot reasonably rely
on a utility’s own unenforceable estimates of its annual
emissions,” the court found that the record permitted a “‘more
realistic assessment’” of post-change emissions and remanded
to EPA for such an assessment. 893 F.2d at 917 (quoting
Alabama Power, 636 F.2d at 379): see also New York, 413
F.3d at 15. On remand, EPA estimated WEPCo’s future
annual emissions “based on all the available facts in the
record,” including how much the unit was likely to be used

14

after the improvements and at what production and emissions
rates — a test referred to as the “actual-to-projected-actual”
test — and found that, by that measure, a significant net
emissions increase would occur for one pollutant but not for
others. JA 68; see 57 Fed. Reg. at 32317 & n.10.
When Congress comprehensively amended the CAA in
1990, see Pub. L. No. 101-549, 104 Stat. 2399 (1990), it
debated, but declined to adopt, proposals to amend the Act’s
PSD provisions to exclude modernization projects like the
one at issue in WEPCo, including calls to enact a
modification test that would only be triggered by increases in
a source's “potential capacity” to emit.” However, Congress
did amend the NNSR provisions, which, like the PSD
provisions, incorporate Section 111(a)’s definition of
“modification.” 42 U.S.C. 7501(4). The 1990 revisions to the
NNSR provisions — enacted in response to continuing failure
to attain health-based air quality standards in many areas —
reaffirmed NSR’s focus on actual quantities of pollutants
being released and their impacts on local air quality.
Congress in 1990 ratcheted down the statutory thresholds,

* An amendment offered by Senator McClure would have exempted any
physical change to an “existing utility unit or source” from NSR unless it
“increase|d] the maximum potential capacity of the unit or source to emit
criteria air pollutants under its physical and operational design.” Amt. No.
1404, Sec. 709(g), 136 Cong Rec. $3428 (daily ed. March 28, 1990). See
also, e.g., 136 Cong. Rec. $16904 (daily ed. Oct. 27, 1990); 136 Cong.
Rec. $16914 (daily ed. Oct. 27, 1990); 136 Cong. Rec. $3383-84 (daily
ed.M-» 28, 1990): 136 Cong. Rec. $3720 (daily ed. Apr. 3, 1990). The
Conference Committee stated that failure to include such provisions in the
final version of the bill was “not intended to affect or prejudice in any way
the issues or resolution of the WEPCO matter.” Joint Explanatory
Statement to Accompany S. 1630, Rep. 101-952, 2d Sess. 344-345 (1990).
Senator Mitchell observed while in 1970 “it was assumed that electric
utility units had an average lifetime of 30 years,” many utilitics “are now
choosing to extend the life of their plants,.” thereby “cxacerbat[ing]”
pollution problems. 136 Cong. Rec. $16904 (daily ed. Oct. 27, 1990). See
136 Cong. Rec. $3723-25 (daily ed. Apr. 3, 1990) (Sen. Chafee); 36
Cong. Rec. $3383-84 (daily ed. Mar. 28, 1990) (Sen. Baucus).

15

expressed in tonnages of annual emissions, for applying
NNSR, based on the severity of an area’s pollution. NNSR in
“serious” ozone nonattainment areas, for example, was
expanded to apply to any source “that emits, or has the
potential to emit, at least 50 tons per year.” 42 U.S.C.
751 la(c); H.R. Rep. No. 101-490, at 234 (1990) (“regulation
of smaller sources is essential for attainment in heavily
polluted areas”). The 1990 amendments directed that owners
of a modified source “shall assure that the total tonnage of
increased emissions of the air pollutant * * * shall be offset
by an equal or greater reduction * * * in the actual emissions
of such air pollutant.” /d. 7503(c)(1) (emphasis added).

7. The 1992, 1996 and 2002 Rulemakings. After the
WEPCo decision, EPA adopted regulations that, among other
things, addressed the means of calculating post-change
emissions for PSD modifications. 57 Fed. Reg. 32314 (July
21, 1992). The 1992 regulations left in place the 1980
regulations’ measure of emissions in terms of “actual”
emissions measured in “tons per year,” and the express
requirements that the pre-change baseline take account of the
source’s hours of operation and production rates. The 1992
PSD regulations added to that test a provision allowing
electric utilities to measure post-change emissions using
“representative annual emissions” — defined as “the average
rate, in tons per year, at which the source is projected to emit
a pollutant for the two-year period after a physical change * *
* considering the effect any such change will have on
increasing or decreasing the hourly rate and on projected
capacity utilization,” 40 C.F.R. 51.166(b)(32) (1993) — so
long as the owner or operator then submits annual emissions
data for five years following resumption of regular operations
to verify its projection. 40 C.F.R. 51.166(b)(21)(v) (1993).°

” The agency explained that its “extensive experience with electric
utilities, and the generally similar nature of operations within this source
category, provide EPA an adequate basis on which to predict future actual
emissions from such units in most cases.” 56 Fed. Reg. 27630, 27631

16

Having formally proposed the regulatory changes in the
CMA Exhibit B in 1996, 61 Fed. Reg. 38250 (July 23,
1996),'° EPA rejected them in a 2002 NSR rulemaking. EPA
reiterated concerns it expressed in 1996 about the effects of
such a change on the PSD program, and noted comments
from States and others that the proposal would frustrate SIP
administration, lead to overconsumption of PSD increments
and to nonattainment backsliding, and “virtually eliminate
NSR in most modification cases.” 67 Fed. Reg. at 80205.
EPA declined to adopt Exhibit B, concluding it “could lead to
unreviewed increases in emissions that would be detrimental
to air quality” and “make it difficult to implement the
statutory requirements for state-of-the-art controls.” /d.
Duke and other utility petitioners moved to reopen the D.C.
Circuit CMA proceedings, which were consolidated with
challenges to the 1992 and 2002 PSD regulations.

8. D.C. Circuit Proceedings. On June 24, 2005, the D.C.
Circuit upheld the 1980 PSD modification regulations against

(June 14, 1991) (proposed rule). EPA distinguished the different tests
used under NSPS and PSD, 57 Fed. Reg. at 32316, and discussed the test
under 1980 PSD regulations in detail, id. at 32316-18.

'° In the 1996 notice, EPA explained that the effect of the Exhibit B
language would be to “eliminate a source's level of operations as a factor
when determining whether a proposed change will result in an increase,”
and that if “[p]Jast and future levels of utilization of the source are
completely disregarded * * * an existing source could make any change
so long as the change docs not significantly increase the source's hourly
potential emissions rate.” 61 Fed. Reg. at 38269. Such an approach
would allow a source to avoid PSD for physical changes that allow it to
operate “at much higher levels (e.g., more hours per day or weck) than it
had in the past,” with the result that “actual emissions (measured in tpy
[tons per year]) could more than double due to the increase in utilization
even though hourly potential emissions remain the same” — a “particular
concer” in the case of “older sources,” of which the impact had “never
been assessed.” /d. EPA also determined that Exhibit B’s rejection of an
actual emissions test might “conflict” with the 1990 Amendments’ NNSR
provisions, under which “offsetting emissions reductions .* * * must be
calculated in terms of actual emissions.” /d. at 38269 n. 31 (emphasis
added) (citing 42 U.S.C. 7503(c)). See supra, pp. 15-16.

17

the revived challenges of a utility industry coalition that
included Duke. New York, 413 F.3d 3. The court rejected
petitioners’ argument that Congress, by incorporating into the
PSD program the statutory definition of “modification” set
out in the 1970 Act’s NSPS provisions, intended to impose
for the statutory PSD program a “modification” definition set
forth in EPA’s pre-1977 NSPS regulations, which gauged
modifications by increases in hourly emissions rate. 413 F.
3d at 19-20; see also id. at 18 (noting that the industry
petitioners “challenge the 1980 rule’s definition of
modification in the NSR context to the extent that it differs
from the NSPS definition”). The D.C. Circuit explained that
it “ha[d] (naturally) required indications in the statutory
language or history to infer that Congress intended to
incorporate into a statute a preexisting regulatory definition,”
and that, in the case of the 1977 PSD enactment, it found
none. /d. at 20. The court also observed that when the PSD
provisions were enacted in 1977, EPA’s NSPS regulations
contained two different and “possibly inconsistent” regulatory
definitions for “modification,” id. at 19,'' and that the
regulatory definitions for NSPS and EPA’s’ 1974
administrative PSD program “already differed” at that point.
413 F.2d at 12. Noting that industry had made “no attack at
all on the reasonableness of EPA’s definition of modification
for NSR (apart from its divergence from one of the 1975
NSPS definitions)” the court “reject{[ed] this portion of
industry's challenge to the 1980 and the 2002 rules.” /d. at 20.

The New York court returned to the _ statutory
“modification” definition in striking down portions of EPA’s
2002 regulations exempting certain projects from NSR “even
if the change increases the source’s net actual emissions.”

'' NSPS regulations in place in 1977 contained one provision (in place
with minor changes since 1971, see 36 Fed. Reg. 24876, 24877 (Dec. 23,
1971)), with language tracking the statutory definition, 40 C.F.R. 60.2(h)
(1976), and another prescribing an hourly rate standard, id. 60.14(b). See
40 Fed. Reg. 58416, 58416-17 (Dec. 16, 1975).

18

413 F.3d at 38. Examining the text of the definition and other
PSD provisions, the court held that the “plain language of the
CAA indicates that Congress intended to apply NSR to
changes that increase actual emissions instead of potential or
allowable emissions.” /d. at 40.

B. Factual Background and Proceedings Bei» v

1. Duke’s Plant Modernization Program. This case
concerns significant rehabilitation projects at eight of Duke’s
plants in the Carolinas. See Pet..App. 26a-28a. The units
began service between 1940 and 1975, and had, by the 1980s,
become so debilitated that a number were removed from
Duke’s installed generating capacity because “they no longer
[could] provide reliable service.” State ex. rel. Utilities
Comm. v. Eddleman, 358 S.E.2d 339, 348 (N.C. 1987).
Duke’s CEO testified to South Carolina utility officials about
the “geriatric condition” of Duke units, JA 201, stating they
were “no longer reliable because of their age and condition,”
and that “[h]istorically, units of this age and condition would
be retired and scrapped.” Pet. App. 28a; JA 204; see
Eddleman, 358 S.E.2d at 349 (“*Ordinarily, plants of this age
and condition are retired and replaced by new capacity.””)
(quoting and upholding N.C. Utilities Commission finding
regarding the Duke plants).

In 1985, Duke embarked on what it called its “Plant
Modernization Program” (PMP), aimed at “refurbish[ing]”
projects it had taken off line, JA 224, so they could “operate
safely, reliably, and cost effectively for an additional 20
years.” Pet. App. 28a; see JA 232. Duke’s project manager
described the modernization of one of the facilities, Unit 4 of
the Buck Steam Station, as equivalent to taking a 1932 Ford
and “rebuild[ing] it completely” so that it could run “from
here [North Carolina] to Denver every day.” U.S. Summ. J.
Ex. 24 at 25 (Milton Starnes Dep. 25:16).'? Duke’s PMP

'* Duke's prescribed “major rehabilitation” for its plants included, for
example, replacement of “[m]ajor portions of the boiler water walls of the
boiler superheater and of the drum circulation system” at Buck 4, as well

19

strategy was to “[cJapitalize all expenditures” of PMP, JA
230, with “rehabilitation and upgrading” projects completed
over a number of years to make “the extended operating life
of the rehabilitated units a cost-effective alternative to the
addition of new capacity.” JA 232.

Duke’s target for PMP projects was improving a unit's
availability for service to a range of 80-85%. JA 230. But no
such heavy utilization was needed to yield a significant
increase in emissions. Duke's expert testified that the Buck 4
unit, which did not operate at all for 10 years prior to and
during the PMP, would need to operate for only 151 hours —
less than seven days — to increase sulfur dioxide emissions by
40 tons per year, the threshold for a significant increase under
the PSD regulations,'’ while the United States’ expert
projected that Buck 4’s post project emissions would increase
by 873.2 tons per year. '*

2. District Court Proceedings. In December 2000, the
United States filed an enforcement action against Duke
pursuant to Sections 113(b) and 167 of the CAA, charging
that Duke had violated the Act by engaging in 29

as manufacture and installation of new generator coils and replacement of
condenser tubes (JA 206-07); for Buck 3, complete “rewinding” of a
“condemned” generator rotor “too dangerous to operate under
circumstances” as well as “major replacements of the boiler” (JA 206);
and, for Allen 2, “modifications and upgrading” of the boiler, replacement
of a precipitator, replacement feed water heaters, and a “completely
rewound” generator stator with “new copper coils, insulation, and the
works” (JA 206). Duke was “counting on total rchabilitation, or there was
no way” its older units could make it into the 21" Century. JA 210.

' US. Ex. 96 (Ex. FCG-5 to Expert Report of Frank C. Graves).

'* JA 445 (Comparison Test 2). Buck 4 resumed commercial operations
on January 1, | 995, CA4 JA at 790, without having undergone NSR and
without any PSD pollution controls. EPA's online Unit Emissions Report
for Buck 4 reports that. in 2003, Buck 4 operated 5,132 hours and emitted
1,095 tons of SO. See http://cfpub.cpa.gov zdmindex.cfm (quick reports,
unit level emissions report, acid rain database. facility name “Buck,” Unit
ID “7") (last visited July 15, 2006). Unlike the parties in Puerto Rican
Cement and WEPCo, Duke never sought an applicability determination.

20

“modifications” without obtaining PSD permits required
under the Act and the applicable state implementation plans. '°
Petitioners intervened as plaintiffs. Plaintiffs submitted that
Duke’s extensive refurbishments resulted in large increases in
emissions and constituted modifications under the governing
PSD regulations.'° Among other defenses, Duke countered
that a PSD “increase” could not occur absent an inerease in
hourly emissions rate. Pet. App. 58a-59a.

The district court sided with Duke, and concluded that the
“PSD statutory definition [of modification] incorporated not
only the NSPS statutory definition of modification, but also
the regulations implementing the NSPS program,” Pet. App.
35a, see id. 67a, and, further, that Duke's post-PMP emissions
had to be calculated by “assuming the same pre-project”
hours of operation, meaning that “only if the project increases
the hourly rate of emissions will there be an annual emissions
increase.” /d. 59a-60a. Although the PSD regulations require
comparison of annual, rather than hourly emissions, the court
reasoned that consistency could be achieved by “annualizing”
the hourly rates -- i.e., assuming that the plant would operate
the same pre-project number of hours, even for changes

'S This is one of a number of NSR enforcement cases involving major
renovation projects at older coal-fired power plants. See, e.g., United
States v. Cinergy, 397 F. Supp. 2d 1025 (S.D. Ind. 2005), appeal pending
(7 Cir. No. 06-1224); United States v. East Kentucky Power Co-op., Civ.
No. 04-34 (E.D. Ky.) (filed 2004); United States v. American Elec. Power
Serv. Corp., Civ. No. C2-05-360 (S.D. Ohio) (filed 2005). Because those
sources account for a large share of emissions of pollutants such as sulfur
dioxide (SO,) and nitrogen oxides (NOx), see, e.g., General Accounting
Office, Air Pollution Emissions from Older Electric-Generating Units,
No. GAO 02-709, 2-3, 20-21 (2002); Jonathan Levy and Jack Spengler,
Health Benefits of Emissions Reductions from Older Power Plants, 9 RISK
IN PERSPECTIVE | (2001), and because BACT typically reduces emissions
dramatically, sec 71 Fed. Reg. 9866, 9871 (Feb. 27, 2006), NSR
enforcement carries substantial bencfits for air quality and public health.

'© In 1982, EPA approved North and South Carolina's incorporation of the
1980 PSD regulations into their respective SIPs, 47 Fed. Reg. 7836 (Feb.
23, 1982) (NC); 47 Fed. Reg. 6017 (Feb. 10, 1982) (SC).

21

whose very purpose was to support increased operations. The
court found support for an hourly rate test in the regulatory
language providing that increases in “hours of operation”
would not count as “physical changes” or changes in a
source’s “method of operation.” /d. 58a-59a. Plaintiffs
stipulated that Duke’s refurbishments would not cause a PSD-
triggering “net emissions increase” under the district court’s
hourly rate test, and based on that stipulation, the district
court entered final judgment for Duke. Pet. App. 87a.

3. Fourth Circuit Proceedings. On June 15, 2005, the
Fourth Circuit affirmed the judgment for Duke. It did not
adopt the district court’s regulatory ratification theory.
Instead it reasoned that “because Congress mandated that the
PSD definition of ‘modification’ be identical to the NSPS
definition of ‘modification, the EPA cannot interpret
‘modification’ under the PSD inconsistently with the way it
interprets the term under the NSPS.” Pet. App. | 1a (footnote
omitted). The panel relied on Rowan, 452 U.S. 247, a case it
had ordered the parties to brief afier oral argument. Pet. App.
lla-12a n.4, 21a. The Fourth Circuit read Rowan to teach
that “when Congress itself provided ‘substantially identical’
statutory definitions of a term in different statutes, the agency
charged with enforcing the statutes could not interpret the
statutory definitions ‘differently.”” /d. (quoting 452 U.S. at
257); see Pet. App. 14a (concluding that Congress “intended
the statutory definitions of ‘modification’ in the PSD and
NSPS provisions to be interpreted identically”). Finding that
Congress had in this way “directly spoken to the precise
question at issue,”” Pet. App. | la n.3 (quoting Chevron), the
court declared that “the language and various interpretations
of the PSD regulations, on which the district court partially
based its holding and which the parties exhaustively discuss,
are largely irrelevant to the proper analysis of this case.” /d.

In a footnote, the Fourth Circuit addressed its power to
resolve the case on these grounds, stating that while Section
307(b) barred it from passing on the “validity” of the PSD
regulations, the district court had shown that the regulations

22

“can be interpreted consistently with pre-existing principles -
the NSPS regulations,” and that “the statute” required the
PSD rules to be so construed. Pet. App. 15a n.7.
4. Rehearing Petitions in New York and this Case.

D.C. Circuit’s New York decision was handed down nine ba
after the decision in this case. In upholding the 1980 PSD
regulations, the D.C. Circuit acknowledged the Fourth
Circuit’s decision, but held that the petitioners had waived the
argument that EPA “must use identical regulatory definitions
of modification across the NSPS and NSR programs.” 413
F.3d at 20. The Utilities Air Regulatory Group (UARG), of
which Duke is a member, and which was represented in New
York by Duke’s Fourth Circuit counsel, sought panel and en
banc rehearing in New York, arguing that “[t}he statutory
construction argument addressed and resolved by the Fourth
Circuit in Duke Energy was the same one [UARG] presented
in this case: the proper interpretation of CAA § 169(2)(C),
the provision of the Act defining ‘construction’ for purposes
of PSD.” Pet. for Reh., D.C. Cir. No. 02-1387 at 13 (Aug. 8,
2005). The D.C. Circuit denied rehearing on December 9,
2005. 431 F.3d 801. No party petitioned for certiorari.

Petitioners and the United States sought rehearing in the
Fourth Circuit, pointing both to the D.C. Circuit’s ruling
upholding the 1980 regulations and to its reading of the PSD
provisions to require an actual emissions test for PSD. Those
petitions were denied on August 30, 2005.'’ This Court
granted certiorari on May 15, 2006.

'? EPA then issued a notice proposing to amend its regulations to
establish, for Electric Generating Units, a “uniform emissions test
nationally under the NSPS and NSR programs[.|” 70 Fed. Reg. 61081,
61083 (Oct. 20, 2005). While it “disagreed” with the Duke decision, and
noted “differences” between NSPS and PSD precluding an identical
modification test for both, EPA considered the need for changes
“apparent” duc to the Fourth Circuit’s ruling. /d. at 61081, 61083 & n.3.

23

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

In deciding this case based on a statutory “mandate” that
EPA use identical regulatory tests for NSPS and PSD
modifications, the Fourth Circuit exceeded express statutory
limits upon its authority. Section 307(b) of the Act, in the
clearest possible terms, provides that review of national CAA
regulations be obtained only in the D.C. Circuit, by petition
for review filed within 60 days, and that matters reviewable in
this manner “shall not” be subject to judicial review in
enforcement proceedings such as this one.

The Fourth Circuit’s decision is the paradigm of the broad,
facial, nationally significant ruling that Congress assigned to
the D.C. Circuit — exclusively. The court of appeals nowhere
found, and in the circumstances could not have found, that the
regulations promulgated in 1980 and 1992 lulled prospective
litigants into believing that EPA had adopted PSD regulations
identical to the NSPS regulations, or that EPA had adopted a
“maximum hourly rate” test for PSD. The PSD rules on their
face differ markedly from the NSPS rules in numerous
significant respects, including their measurement of increases
by “actual emissions” in “tons per year,” and their provisions
for “netting.” EPA’s 1980 preamble explained that these
features of the rules represented a significant departure from
the prior, potential emissions-focused test and had been
tailored to the distinct requirements of the PSD program, as
elucidated by the D.C. Circuit in Alabama Power. The CMA
litigation and “Exhibit B” — which sought to strip the “actual”
emissions language from the regulations and insert new
hourly rate language — show that regulated parties understood
that EPA had adopted a new, PSD-specific approach to
determining modifications. Review of any statutory challenge
like that sustained by the Fourth Circuit plainly “could have
been obtained” in the D.C. Circuit, and was barred in this
enforcement case. 42 U.S.C. 7607(b)(2), (d)(7)(B), (e).

The Fourth Circuit’s insistence that it was merely engaged
in “interpretation” of the 1980 PSD regulations — significantly

24

undercut by its statement that their language was “irrelevant,”
and its failure to examine the regulatory text or accompanying
Federal Register preamble at all — rings hollow. Whatever
room the PSD regulations may leave for interpretation on
other points, on the point relevant here — whether their
definition of modification mirrors the NSPS regulations, and
imposes an hourly rate test - the regulations are
unambiguous, and they cannot be so “interpreted.”

The court of appeals’ extrajurisdictional foray
compromised the interests in regulatory stability, orderly
administration, and uniformity that Section 307(b) was
enacted to protect. The court held the PSD regulations
defective on a ground that was not presented to EPA in its
NSR rulemakings and that was waived in the Section 307(b)
review proceeding in the D.C. Circuit. Its ruling conflicts
with D.C. Circuit rulings on both the validity of specific PSD
regulations and on the meaning of the statutory provisions
that are pivotal to multiple mayor CAA programs.

Having ventured into territory prohibited to it by Section
307(b), the Fourth Circuit seriously misapprehended the
substance of the Act. EPA’s regulatory standard for PSD
modifications adheres to the text of the statutory modification
definition — which broadly embraces “any physical change”
that “increases the amount of any air pollutant emitted” by a
source ~ and to the D.C. Circuit’s pathmarking construction
of the PSD provisions in Alahama Power. As the D.C.
Circuit has held, the Act unambiguously rules out an
approach under which actual emissions increases resulting
from a physical change are disregarded.

This Court’s Rowan decision does not support the Fourth
Circuit's reading of the Act. That case did not espouse the
“effectively irrebuttable” presumption the court below took
from it, but rested on a thoroughly conventional review of
statutory text, purposes and history, which led to a conclusion
that Congress had specifically intended the IRS to implement
the particular statutes at issue through parallel regulatory
standards. Here, there is no indication that Congress intended

25

or expected EPA to devise a uniform definition of
“modification” without regard to the particulars of the
different programs in which it must operate. This Court has
directed that common statutory terms be read in context, and
the Act’s PSD provisions provide explicit support for EPA’s
definition of PSD emissions in terms of actual “tons per
year.” The D.C. Circuit, relying on the modification definition
and other provisions of the PSD program, has held that EPA
not only may but must measure PSD increases to capture
actual increases in emissions, and must include in its PSD
rules elements statutorily forbidden for NSPS.

The Fourth Circuit’s mistaken conversion of the
presumption of uniform usage into a peremptory iron law led
it to impose on EPA a test for PSD modifications that would
violate the PSD statute. By immunizing modernization
projects that greatly “increase the amount” of pollution
actually “emitted” by sources, the court’s maximum hourly
rate test would defeat the basic aim of the PSD enactment to
assess and limit adverse impacts on local air quality.

ARGUMENT

I. SECTION 307(b) OF THE ACT PRECLUDED THE
FOURTH CIRCUIT FROM REVIEWING THE
STATUTORY VALIDITY OF EPA’S REGULATORY
TEST FOR PSD MODIFICATIONS

The Fourth Circuit’s theory that the PSD provisions’ cross-
reference to the Section I111(a)(4) definition of
“modification” required that EPA’s regulations on NSPS
modifications and PSD modifications be identical involves
precisely the kind of matter the Act reserves to the D.C.
Circuit exclusively and that “shall not be” reached by a court
in an enforcement action. 42 U.S.C. 7607(b)(2).

A. The Fourth Circuit Plainly Violated Section 307(b).
Congress could not have been more explicit that statutory
challenges to EPA _ regulations may be adjudicated
exclusively in the D.C. Circuit on timely petition for review.

26

Section 307(b) provides that EPA regulations and other
actions of national effect are reviewable “only” in that court,
by petition filed within 60 days, and that actions reviewable
by such a petition “shall not be subject to judicial review” in
enforcement actions. See also 42 U.S.C. 7607(e). An
exercise of Congress’s recognized powei to “prescribe the
procedures and conditions under which, and the courts in
which, judicial review of administrative orders may be had,”
the statute “is written in simple words of plain meaning and
leaves no room to doubt the congressional purpose and
intent.” City of Tacoma v. Taxpayers of Tacoma, 357 U.S.
320, 335-36 (1958) (discussing Federal Power Act’s review
provision, 16 U.S.C. 825b)).'* “[T]here is little room for
doubt regarding congressional intent where, as here, the
relevant statute speaks not only to the existence and nature of
pre-enforcement review but also to the non-existence of
enforcement-cum-review.” United States v. Ethyl Corp., 761
F.2d 1153, 1157 (5" Cir. 1985). In short, Section 307(b)
means “exactly what it says.” Harrison, 446 U.S. at 589.
Section 307 reflects Congress’s considered — and
reconsidered — judgment that limitations on the timing, scope,
and forum for judicial review are of central importance to the
” eas implementation of this uncommonly complex statute. See
Alabama Power, 606 F.2d at 1075. In 1977, after reviewing
proposals to narrow Section 307’s limitations, Congress
instead expanded the grant of exclusive jurisdiction (while
also enlarging the time for review and adding detailed
requirements for EPA rulemaking). See supra, p. 8 & n.3.
Congress deliberately called upon the D.C. Circuit’s special
expertise in superintending the administration of complex

'’ See F.C.C. v. ITT World Comme'ns, Inc., 466 U.S. 463, 468 (1984)
(discussing exclusive D.C. Circuit review of certain FCC orders, see 47
U.S.C. 402(a)); E. 1. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Train, 430 U.S. 112,
136-137 (1977) (discussing Section 50%b) of Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C.
1369(b)); NLRB v. Cheney Cal. Lumber Co., 327 U.S. 385, 388 (1946).

27

regulatory statutes,'’ and promoted stability and uniformity
by giving that court’s decisions a definitive role in overseeing
CAA implementation. See City of Tacoma, 357 U.S. at 336
(referring to “statutory finality” created by Federal Power
Act’s exclusive review provision); Lubrizol Corp. v. Train,
547 F.2d 310, 317 (6" Cir. 1975) (in Section 307(b),
“Congress established a single, national forum whose
decisions would be uniform and final, save for review by the
Supreme Court”). Implementing the Act is an iterative
process, in which both the D.C. Circuit and the EPA must
construe the Act in light of D.C. Circuit precedent, subject to
this Court’s review. See Davton Power & Light Co. v. EPA,
§20 F.2d 703, 708 (6" Cir. 1975) (EPA regulations were
“promulgated in response to” ruling of D.C. Circuit, which
was “[c]learly * * * in the best position to determine whether
the regulations are consistent with its order”).*? Section

" See, e.g., Henry J. Friendly, “Some Kind of Hearing,” 123 U. PA. L.
REV. 1267, 1310 (1975) (noting D.C. Circuit’s “special importance for
administrative law” in light of CAA’s and other exclusive review
provisions); O ‘Donoghue v. United States, 289 U.S. 516, 535 (1933) (The
“courts of the District” are “in closer contact with, and more immediately
open to the influences of, the legislative department, and exercise a more
extensive jurisdiction in cases affecting the operations of the general
government and its various departments” than other federal courts). In
opposing the 1976 Administrative Conference proposal, later rejected by
Congress, to limit the scope of exclusive review, EPA General Counsel
G. William Frick emphasized the D.C. Circuit's “obvious expertise in
administrative law matters,” its “sensitivity to Congressional mandates,”
and its “thorough{] familiar[itv]” with the CAA, a “very complex statute
— and with its equally complex legislative history.” 41 Fed. Reg. at
56769. See Citizens to Save Spencer County v. EPA, 600 F.2d 844, 859
(D.C. Cir. 1979) (reviewing. pursuant to Section 307, challenges of
“baroque complexity” to “highly complex” PSD rules promulgated by
EPA “besieged on all side by vocal private and public interest groups”).

* Because agencies must adhere to precedent grounded on unambiguous
statutory commands, National Cable & Telecomms. Ass'n v. Brand X
Internet Servs. 125 S. Ct. 2688, 2700 (2005): Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843
n.9, Section 307(b) protects EPA from the quandary presented (as here) by
conflicting judicial readings of those commands.

28

307(b) ensures that a court reviewing complex decisions of
national significance will have before it the rulemaking
record upon which to evaluate the agency’s actions. See 42
U.S.C. 7607(d)(7)(A) (defining “record for judicial review”);
Lubrizol Corp., 547 F.2d at 316; cf. Florida Power & Light
Co. v. Lorion, 470 U.S. 729, 744-45 (1985) (discussing
reasons for initial court of appeals review under Hobbs Act).

By barring other courts from deciding matters that “could
have been” resolved in the D.C. Circuit, the Act gives parties
of all stripes reason to present their inevitably conflicting
theories about the Act’s meaning in the same time and place.
And by barring review of such matters in enforcement
actions, the Act expresses Congress’s strong preference that
regulations restricting the emission of harmful pollutants into
the air should be followed — or promptly challenged — but not
disobeyed in hopes that the local court in which enforcement
proceeds will invalidate them. See S. Rep. No. 91-1196 at 38
(the issue before courts in public or citizen enforcement
actions is the “factual one of whether there had been
compliance”); Hawaiian Elec. Co. v. EPA, 723 F.2d 1440,
1447 (9" Cir. 1984) (challenge to 1980 PSD modification
regulations barred by Section 307(b), a “valid mechanism to
prevent continual piecemeal attacks on the same EPA
action”); see also Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S.
305, 323 n2 (1982) (discussing Clean Water Act
enforcement). The effect of a D.C. Circuit ruling that CAA
regulations are flawed is a remand to EPA, see Florida
Power & Light Co., 470 U.S. at 744, rather than, as here, a
disruptive intercircuit conflict over the validity of national
regulations and over the meaning of the Act.

Section 307’s multiple prohibitions against entertaining in
other fora challenges that could have been brought by petition
in the D.C. Circuit squarely applied here. Any claim that the
“plain language of the Clean Air Act” mandated that EPA
adopt “identical[]” modification regulations for the NSPS and
the NSR programs (Pet. App. 14a), was a “facial” challenge
to the regulations, a pure question of law that fell in the very

29

heartland of the D.C. Circuit’s exclusive review authority.
See Whitman v. American Trucking Ass ‘ns, 531 U.S. 457, 479
(2001) (pointing to the “special judicial-review provision of
the CAA, 42 U.S.C. § 7607(b)” in holding that Court,
reviewing a D.C. Circuit decision, could address issue that
was “purely one of statutory interpretation”). Nothing about
the Fourth Circuit’s abstract statutory theory depended on
EPA’s application of its regulations to particular
circumstances. Cf. Puerto Rican Cement, 889 F.2d at 296-98.
EPA’s adoption in 1980 — as in a// generations of its PSD and
NNSR regulations ~ of a test for modifications that differs in
explicit and decisive ways from the agency’s NSPS
modification test constituted “[a]ction of the Administrator
with respect to which review could have been obtained under
paragraph (1)” of Section 307(b), 42 U.S.C. 7607(b)(2).7"

Nor could anyone have believed, in 1980, that EPA had
established PSD regulations that were identical to its NSPS
regulations. The marked difference between the modification
tests — “hourly rate” for NSPS and “actual, annual” for NSR —
has been a staple of judicial and academic descriptions of the
NSPS and PSD regulatory regimes.” The PSD regulations’

*' See H.R. Rep. No. 95-294 at 322 (“{U]Jnless a petitioner can show that
the basis for his challenge did not cxist or was not reasonably to be
anticipated before the expiration of 60 days, the court of appeals is
without jurisdiction to consider a petition filed later than 60 days after the
publication of the promulgated rule.”).

2 See New York 1, 413 F.3d at 18 (“While the NSPS regulatory definition
of modification allegedly focuses on the hourly rate of emissions, the NSR
definition focuses on net emissions increases measured in tons per year’);
WEPCo, 893 F.2d at 913, 915 (contrasting NSPS and PSD regulations);
United States v. Ohio Edison Co., 276 F. Supp. 2d 829, 875 (S.D. Ohio
2003) (rejecting claim that PSD regulation provides for “hourly emissions
rate test” and finding it “abundantly clear” that it “focuses on ... total
annual emissions” whereas NSPS regulation “focuses on the maximum
potential hourly emissions”); United States vy. S. Ind. Gas & Elec. Co., 245
F. Supp. 2d 994, 998 (S.D. Ind. 2003). See also 57 Fed. Reg. at 32316
(“Emissions increases for NSPS purposes are determined by changes in
the hourly emissions rates at maximum physical capacity.” whercas “the

30

“actual emissions” metric and their references to “tons per
year,” 40 C.F.R. 51.166(b)(1)(i)(a), (21)(ii), (23)(i), nowhere
appear in the NSPS regulations, which measure emissions
increases by changes in hourly rates, in “kg/hr.” /d. 60.14(b).
The 1980 PSD regulations specifically require that a source's
pre-change emissions be “calculated using the unit’s actual
operating hours,” 40 C.F.R. 51.166(b)(21)(ii), while the
NSPS regulations contain no such provision. The NSPS
regulations contain elaborate procedures, absent from the
PSD regulations, for calculating hourly emission rates. 40
C.F.R. 60.14(b) (1), (2) (discussing emissions factors,
material balances and testing procedures). See also 40 Fed.
Reg. at 58420 (Appendix C). The equally elaborate netting
provisions in the PSD regulations, e.g., id. 51.166(b)(3) -
linked to the statute’s distinctive focus on large sources’
effects on local air quality, see Alabama Power, 636 F.2d at
401 — are absent from the NSPS regulations, as are the PSD
“significance” thresholds, measured in “tons per year.” 40
C.F.R. 51.166(b)(23)(i). These and other differences provided
vivid notice to prospective litigants that EPA, in 1980, did not
espouse the view that its PSD and NSPS modification
regulations had to be, or were, the same. The only avenue for
a claim that EPA had thereby violated “the plain language of
the Clean Air Act,” Pet. App. 14a, was a petition for review in
the D.C. Circuit.

The 1980 preamble provided equally vivid notice.
Highlighting the significance of its new emissions increase
test for PSD, EPA announced that it had “shifted the focus of
its regulatory definitions from ‘potential to emit’ to ‘actual
emissions.”” 45 Fed. Reg. at 52700; see New York, 413 F.3d
at 14 (discussing this shift). Explaining this departure from

NSR regulations examine total emissions to the atmosphere * * *
determined by changes in annual emissions as expressed in tons per ycar
(tpy).”); Arnold W. Reitze, Jr., STATIONARY SOURCE AIR POLLUTION LAW
170 (2005)) (“Unlike NSPS, which are based on a change in the hourly
rate of emissions, PSD applicability is triggered by significant changes in
total annual emissions, expressed in tpy.” ).

31

the 1979 proposed regulations, under which PSD would have
been triggered by increases in “a unit’s potential to emit the
pollutant,” 44 Fed. Reg. at 51948, EPA pointed to Alabama
Power’s mandate to address “actual” impacts on air quality.
45 Fed. Reg. at 52700. EPA also explained that the shift to an
actual emissions test was also necessary to prevent
malfunction and misuse of the netting mechanism. /d.; see
also id. at 52713 (increased emissions “due to increased hours
of operation or capacity utilization” occurring afier the
baseline period count against increment).

That EPA had adopted a new modification standard
specially tailored to the PSD provisions was not lost on the
agency’s readership. The General Motors petitioners in CMA
complained vociferously that under the new regulations PSD
would apply to projects that “result in a significant increase in
actual emissions, even though the source’s net capacity to
emit remains constant or declines.” Br. at 5-6 (D.C. Cir. No.
79-1112) (emphasis in original). And Exhibit B to the CMA
settlement proposed to “delet[e]” the word “actual” from the
1980 regulations, and to substitute a test that would have
exempted all physical changes from PSD review in the
absence of a net increase in “PTE [potential to emit] (as
calculated in terms of pounds of pollutant emitted per hour).”
67 Fed. Reg. at 80205 (quoting Exhibit B).**

B. The Fourth Circuit’s “Interpretation” of the 1980
PSD Regulations Contravened Section 307(b) and
Is Foreclosed By the Regulatory Text.

In response to objections that EPA’s regulations were
subject to exclusive review in the D.C. Circuit, the Fourth
Circuit stated it was merely addressing an “interpretation” of
EPA’s 1980 PSD regulations, which in its view could be
“interpreted consistently with pre-existing principles,” namely

** The considerations just summarized utterly banish from this case the
kind of fair notice concerns that might be raised by some applications of
Section 307(b\2). See ddamo Wrecking, 434 U.S. at 283 n.2.

32

“the NSPS regulations.” Pet. App. 15a n.7..* The court of
appeals did not itself explain how such an interpretation could
be accomplished, instead pointing to the distnct court’s
opinion, and insisting that a “choice of this interpretation — as
required under the statute — over the EPA’s interpretation is
not an invalidation of those regulations.” /d.*

But the Fourth Circuit’s own opinion makes plain that the
court strayed far into forbidden D.C. Circuit terrain. Indeed,
the court confided that, because its ruling was based upon the
statute under the first prong of Chevron, “the language and
various interpretations of the PSD regulations” were “largely
irrelevant to the proper analysis of this case.” Pet. App. lla
n.3. The court went on wholly to ignore the central tools for

** No genuine question is presented here of Section 307(b)(2)'s effect on
the authority of courts in enforcement actions to review agencies’
interpretations of their own regulations, since the Fourth Circuit's ruling
was by any measure a clearly forbidden, facial, statutory invalidation of
national CAA regulations. By its terms, Section 307(b)(2) does not turn
on “invalidation” versus “interpretation” of regulations, but instead on
whether judicial review “could have been obtained” under Section
307(b\(1), which authorizes review of some agency interpretations of their
own regulations. See Harrison, 446 U.S. at 586-94 (Section 307(b)(1)
provides for court of appeals review of NSPS applicability determination);
Puerto Rican Cement, 889 F.2d at 296-98, 299 (reviewing EPA's
application of PSD regulations to the petitioner's facility).

** There was an odd mismatch between the court of appeals’ reading of
what “the statute” required — identity between NSPS and PSD
modification regulations mandated by the common statutory definitions —
and its rather casual endorsement of the district court's analysis, which
had relied on provisions of the PSD regulations, relating to netting and
“significance” thresholds, (Pet. App. 64a-65a & n.22) that are entirely
absent from the NSPS regulations and thereby violate the Fourth Circuit's
reading of the CAA’s “mandate.” See also id. at 64a (district court’s
insistence that its interpretation did not make the PSD and NSPS tests
“indistinguishable”). The Fourth Circuit left unexplained, as well. how the
1992 amendment to the PSD regulations test for emissions increases,
unaddressed by the district court and unchallenged by Duke or any other
utility despite its patent difference from the NSPS increase test. New York,
413 F.3d at 17, could be “interpreted” to conform its statutory theory.

33

interpreting regulations, such as the regulatory text,
Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576, 587-88 (2000),
and the rulemaking preamble. Even when regulatory text
permits alternative readings, a court has no warrant to
overturn an agency’s interpretation merely because the court
concludes the text “can be interpreted” differently.°° A
species of “interpretation” that deems regulatory language
and the agency’s contemporaneous Federal Register
explanation “irrelevant” would, among other defects, nullify
the explicit restrictions imposed by Congress in Section
307(b), and open the door to all manner of congressionally
prohibited collateral attacks. The Fourth Circuit's actions
consisted of a statutory invalidation of national EPA rules, a
paradigmatic violation of Section 307(b) and (e).

In any event, the court was entirely wrong in concluding
that the PSD modification regulations “can be interpreted” to
be identical to, or the functional equivalent of, the NSPS
regulations. As we have just explained, the PSD regulations
nowhere provide for, and cannot accommodate, the maximum
hourly rate test imposed by the courts below. They were
deliberately crafted to capture net increases in “actual
emissions,” measured in “tons per year,” whether or not there
is an increase in maximum hourly emissions rates or other
measure of capacity to emit, and the two sets of regulations
differ in numerous other obvious and fundamental ways.
Section 307(b) barred the Fourth Circuit from doing what
Duke and the other CM4 challengers unsuccessfully tned to
do: “delete” the PSD regulations’ reliance on “actual”
emissions, and amend the regulation to add a “potential to
emit” test under which no PSD “modification” could be found
absent an increase in hourly emissions rates. Supra, p. 12-13.

*° An agency's interpretation merits “substantial deference,” Thomas

Jefferson Univ. v. Shalala, 512 U.S. 504, 512 (1994), and “control{s]”
unless “plainly erroncous or inconsistent with the regulation."” Auer v.
Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461 (1997) (citations omitted). See Puerto Rican
Cement, 889 F.2d at 297.

34

The basis for the Fourth Circuit’s alternative
“interpretation” of the PSD regulations was the district court’s
opinion, which relied (Pet. App. 59a-60a) on the provision
stating that “[a] physical change or change in the method of
operation shall not include” an “increase in the hours of
operation or in the production rate * * *” 40 C.F.R.
51.166(b)(2)(111)().*” The court understood this provision to
mean that even when a plant undergoes an extensive physical
change — a “modernization” — the very purpose of which is to
allow it to operate dramatically more hours, regulators must
pretend that hours of operation and production rates will
remain unchanged. See Pet. App. 58a-59a (“in calculating
post project emissions levels the hours and conditions of
operation must be held constant”).*

This reading is manifestly wrong. By providing that an

*’ The court of appeals (Pet. App. 1Sa n.7) also cited statements by
Edward Reich, Director of EPA’s Division of Stationary Source
Enforcement, in which Reich stated that increased hours of operation
would not suffice to trigger PSD. JA 28, 35. Reich's statements on the
increased hours exemption do not address situations where a physical
change enables increased hours of operation, and, to the extent they are
construed to exempt the resulting emissions from the definition of
emissions “increase” (rather than “change”™), are flatly inconsistent with
the text of and preamble to the 1980 regulations, and with EPA’s
application of them since Reich's statements, see. e.g., JA 294; 57 Fed.
Reg. at 32328. In Puerto Rican Cement, the court properly rejected a
similar reliance on the “deviant” reading of the PSD regulations in by an
EPA official, observing that the statements were inconsistent with “EPA
materials written both before, and after,” and that “[nJo large agency can
guarantee that all its administrators will react similarly, or interpret
regulations identically, throughout the United States.” 889 F.2d at 298-99.

** The district court claimed to fit an hourly rate test into the PSD rules by
“annualizing” it (e.g., Pet. App. 64a), a step the court considered
necessary to conform to the regulations’ numerous references to annual
emissions. The regulations, however, make no mention of annualization
of hourly rates, and the “net emissions increase” definition encompasses
annual emissions preciscly because it references “actual emissions,”
which are defined by “tons per year” of emissions. 40 C.F.R.
$1.166(b 31), (b)(21).

35

increase in hours or production rates does not constitute a
“physical change or change in the method of operation,” what
the regulations plainly mean is that a modification will not be
found in the absence of a physical change. The fact that an
increase in operating hours does not alone suffice to meet the
first prong of the two-part modification test in no way
suggests that increases in actual emissions caused by a
physical change should be ignored. See Ohio Edison, 276 F.
Supp. 2d at 876 (exemption “clearly” limited to “an increase
in hours of operation unaccompanied by physical construction
to the unit itself’). The question of what counts as an
increase is addressed by the second prong of the modification
test, defining a “significant emissions increase,” which, far
from ignoring hours or production rates, requires
consideration of both. 40 C.F.R. 51.166(b)(21)(11).
Properly understood, the regulations ensure that prosaic
business decisions that might appear to fall within the
statute’s broad references to “any physical change” or “any *
* * change in the method of operation” do not trigger PSD
requirements. As EPA explained in 1980, the exemption
derived from the agency’s decision that the regulatory
definition of modification “should focus on changes in ‘actual
emissions,”” and that:
While EPA has concluded that as a general rule Congress
intended any significant net increase in such emissions to
undergo PSD or nonattainment review, it is also
convinced that Congress could not have intended a
company to have to get an NSR permit before it could
lawfully change hours or rate of operation. Plainly, such
a requirement would severely and unduly hamper the
ability of any company to take advantage of favorable
market conditions. The emphasis of the relevant statutory
provisions on ‘construction’ strongly supports EPA’s
interpretation of Congress’ intent. See, e.g., section
165(a), 42 U.S.C. 7475.

45 Fed. Reg. at 52704. EPA’s rationale, like the regulatory

text, demonstrates that the exemption was not meant as an

36

instruction to engage in the counterfactual exercise in
measurement engaged in by the district court.

Because “modification” is a dual test under the statute -
requiring a “physical change” and an “increase” in the
amount of pollutant emitted by a source — the PSD regulations
broadly allow a facility to increase its hours of operation or
production rates in response to business needs without
triggering PSD. But, under PSD, if a dilapidated source is
physically rebuilt to expand operations, the additional
pollution that results from the expanded use of the facility is
considered in determining whether PSD applies, because both
of the statutory criteria are satisfied. See 57 Fed. Reg. at
32328 (“[A]n increase in emissions attributable to an increase
in hours of operation or production rate which is the result of
a construction-related activity is not excluded from [PSD and
NNSR] review.”) (citing WEPCo, 893 F.2d at 916 n.11, and
Puerto Rican Cement, 889 F.2d at 298).

C. The Ruling Below Produced the Very Disarray
Section 307(b) was Enacted to Prevent.

The Fourth Circuit’s ruling struck a serious and wholly
gratuitous blow to a complex body of case law and agency
regulations that emerged from 25 years of rulemaking and
judicial review under CAA Section 307(b) and (d). The EPA
regulations the Fourth Circuit found wanting were themselves
enacted in large part to conform to a D.C. Circuit decision
(Alabama Power) that had construed the PSD provisions of
the Act not only to permit but to require a distinctive
regulatory test for modification — a test that reflects statutory
imperatives peculiar to the NSR programs and that make it
fundamentally different from the NSPS regime. Without the
benefit of the administrative record on which Congress
commanded that EPA’s national policy decisions be
reviewed, 42 U.S.C. 7607(d)(2)-(7), the court struck down
EPA’s regulatory test on statutory grounds that had not even
been presented to the agency in any of the various PSD
rulemakings, id. 7607(d)(7)(B), or presented to the D.C.

37

Circuit in the CMA/New York proceeding.

The Fourth Circuit's broad statutory ruling produced just
the sort of “inconsistent adjudications,” Ethyl Corp., 761 F.2d
at 1156, Section 307(b) was enacted to prevent, and its
decision was at odds with decisions of the very court
Congress assigned exclusive authority to make determinations
of this kind. Alabama Power and New York are utterly
inconsistent with the “mandate” the Fourth Circuit discerned
from the Act. See also New York v. EPA, 443 F.3d 880, 889
(D.C. Cir. 2006) (New York I/) (in Section 307(b) challenge
to 2003 NSR rules, stating that “|t]o the extent industry
intervenors [including Duke] rely on the NSPS regime to
reargue their position that ‘modifications’ require an increase
in maximum emissions rates, that issue was resolved in New
York I, 413 F.3d at 19-20, 40”). If other courts can be
persuaded (as they are being importuned) to brush aside
Section 307(b), the Fourth Circuit's ruling will continue to
invite collateral attacks on every generation of EPA’s PSD
and NNSR modification regulations (all of which differ in
important ways from the agency’s NSPS regulations). When
it enacted and expanded Section 307(b), Congress sought to
ward off just that result, recognizing that regulatory stability
and national uniformity are particularly important in the CAA
context, not least for States that incorporate regulations in
their SIPs. See Train v. Natural Resources Def. Council, 421
U.S. 60, 87 (1975) (noting States’ “reliance” on EPA’s CAA
implementing regulations).

Il. EPA’S DEFINITION OF PSD MODIFICATIONS BY
REFERENCE TO INCREASES IN ACTUAL, ANNUAL
EMISSIONS IS CONSISTENT WITH THE ACT

The Fourth Circuit’s ruling would warrant reversal even if
there were no Section 307(b). EPA’s decision to assess PSD
“modifications” in terms of physical changes’ net effect on a
source’s actual, annual emissions is entirely consistent with
the Act and reasonable. The court below condemned it only
by erroneous reliance on an exceptionally rigid presumption

38

that is unsupported by this Court’s decisions. The court
thereby imposed a test for PSD modifications that is itself
contrary to the plain text and basic purposes of the statute —
and to the decisions of the court of appeals with express
authority to determine the validity of CAA regulations.

A. The Statutory Text Supports EPA’s Approach.

An agency’s construction of a statute it administers must be
upheld if it is consistent with the “unambiguously expressed
intent of Congress,” and — to the extent the statute is
ambiguous — “based on a permissible construction of the
statute.” Chevron,467 U.S. at 842-43. See 42 U.S.C.
7607(d)(9) (statutory standard of review of CAA regulations,
including PSD regulations, id., 7607(d)(1)(J)).

The plain language of the Act strongly supports the
agency's approach. In promulgating the 1980 rules, EPA
properly emphasized that plain text: “any physical change in,
or change in the method of operation of, a stationary source
which increases the amount of any air pollutant emitted by
such source or which results in the emissions of any air
pollutant not previously emitted” - observing that “the
underlined words in the definition appear to refer to what the
source is actually emitting at a particular time.” 45 Fed. Reg.
at 52700 (quoting 42 U.S.C. 7411(a), underlining added by
EPA). EPA noted that Alabama Power had described the
PSD provisions in terms that “like the section 111(a)(4)
definition, suggest changes in actual emissions,” and that the
agency's regulatory definition was “consistent with the [D.C.
Circuit’s] view of section 111(a)(4).” /d. (citing 636 F.2d at
400-01).

EPA’s definition of PSD modifications in terms of actual
emissions is supported by statutory language defining “major
emitting facilit[ies]” subject to PSD as sources “which emit,
or which have the potential to emit,” pollutants in specified
annual amounts. 42 U.S.C. 7479(1) (emphasis added). This
“juxtaposition * * * indicates that when Congress enacted the
NSR program in 1977, it was conscious of the distinction

39

between actual and potential emissions.” New York, 413 F.3d
at 39 (citing Alabama Power, 636 F.2d at 353, which, based
on this same text, concluded that “[p]lainly, the pollutants that
sources ‘emit’ is a reference to some measure of actual
emissions”). “If Congress had intended for ‘increases’ in
emissions to be measured in terms of potential or allowable
emissions, it would have added a reference to ‘potential to
emit’ or ‘emission limitations.*” Mew York, 413 F.3d at 40.
Thus, “the plain language of the CAA indicates that Congress
intended to apply NSR to changes that increase actual
emissions instead of potential or allowable emissions.” /d. *”

EPA’s decision to measure emissions increases in annual
terms — in “tons per year” — is also firmly rooted in the text,
which measures emissions for PSD coverage and exemption
purposes in “tons per year.” 42 U.S.C. 7475(b), 7479(1). See
also id. 7602(j), (x) (NNSR source definition in terms of “tons
per year” of emissions). In the 1990 amendments, Congress
continued the NSR programs’ reliance on actual, annual
emissions. Congress enacted mgorous new NNSR thresholds
based on actual annual emissions of pollutants, calibrated to
the severity of the given area’s pollution levels. See, ¢.g., 42
U.S.C. 751la(c) (major source thresholds for serious ozone
areas of “50 tons per year”); 751 1a(d) (for severe areas, “25
tons per year”); 75lla(e) (for extreme area, “10 tons per
year”). The NSR provisions, in short, are plainly “concerned
with increases in total annual emissions.” WEPCo, 893 F.2d
at 904 (emphasis added).

The PSD program protects local air quality largely through
the increment mechanism (wholly absent from NSPS), and
the “emphatic goal of the PSD provisions is to prevent those
thresholds from being exceeded|.]” Alabama Power, 636 F.2d
at 362. Increments are set by reference to a “baseline

*’ See also 42 U.S.C. 7475(b) (exempting “an expansion or modification

of a major emitting facility which is in existence on August 7, 1977" with
“less than fifty tons per year” of “al/owable” emissions from certain PSD
obligations) (emphasis added); 4lahuma Power, 636 F.2d at 400 n.47.

40

concentration,” 42 U.S.C. 7473, 7479(4), which “include[s]
all emissions actually being made by major facilities.”
Alabama Power, 636 F.2d at 376 (emphasis added). EPA’s
definition of “significant net emissions increase” was meant
to “establish as close a correspondence as possible” between
PSD permitting requirements and activities that in fact
“consumed increment.” 45 Fed. Reg. at 52701. See also id.
at 52721 (“both baseline concentrations and increment
consumption should be based on actual air quality impacts’’);
id. at 52714 (increased pollution from existing sources not
“grandfather[ed]” into baseline, but instead counted against
increment). This choice was surely reasonable, if not
statutorily mandated: Under the PSD statute, “all emissions
are considered” in calculating increment consumption,
Alabama Power, 636 F.2d at 381 (citing H.R. Rep. No. 95-
564 at 151 (1977). Exempting changes that significantly
increase actual, annual emissions would frustrate States’
ability to track and allocate increment in ways that reflect
their policy choices regarding new development. See S. Rep.
No. 95-127, pt. 98 at 31 (1977)."'

Moreover, EPA’s focus on actual emissions ensures that
netting credits are conferred only for contemporaneous
“decreases” in emissions that produce real air quality benefits.
A test turning on capacity to emit would convert netting,
designed to provide flexibility for projects whose overall
effect is benign, into a program of exemptions for projects
that in fact harm air quality. See 45 Fed. Reg. at 52700; 61
Fed. Reg. at 38269. That result would be especially perverse
given that Alabama Power held netting to be statutorily

* As explained in Alabama Power, Congress rejected proposals to make
the baseline turn on “plant capacity in existence.” See 636 F.2d at 380-81.
"A test exempting such projects from PSD review and BACT controls
would allow “modernized” projects to consume increment otherwise
available to other sources, see 45 Fed. Reg. at 52720, potentially barring a
“major new source with state-of-the-art emissions controls” from locating
in the area. 61 Fed. Reg. at 38270.

4]

required for PSD, even though statutorily prohibited for
NSPS, see ASARCO, 578 F.2d at 327-29, precisely because of
the PSD provisions’ distinctive focus on projects’ actual
effects on local air quality. 636 F.2d at 401.

EPA’s use of actual emissions has the virtue of “coherence”
and “consistency with” the PSD provisions’ “primary
purpose.” See Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 346
(1997). That purpose is reflected both in broad statutory
aspirations, 42 U.S.C. 7470, and in the elaborate mechanics of
the program. On every page, the statutory text confirms what
Alabama Power emphasized: The PSD program is focused
on assessing and limiting actual “effects” and “impacts” on
air quality in the vicinity of the source.”

B. Congress’s Use of the Same Statutory Definition of
“Modification” for NSPS and the NSR Programs
Provided No Basis to Invalidate the PSD Rules.

The Fourth Circuit found EPA’s PSD regulations contrary
to the Act only by using a decidedly nontraditional “tool[] of -
statutory construction,” Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843 n.11, ie.,
what it called an “effectively irrebuttable” presumption
derived from Rowan. Pet. App. 17a. This conclusion was
seriously misguided in multiple respects.

Rowan itself does not announce, or employ, any such rigid
presumption. In that case, the Court considered the meaning

* See, e.g.. 42 U.S.C. 7470(5) (requiring “careful evaluation” of any
decision “to permit increased air pollution in any area”), 7472(a) &
7475(d) (heightened protection for specified Parks and wilderness areas):
7473 (increments); 7475S(a\2) (requiring hearing on “air quality impact of
such source”); 7475(a)(6) (requiring analysis of “any air quality impacts
projected for the areca as a result of growth associated with such a
facility”); 7475(a\ 7) (requiring monitoring “to determine the effect which
emissions from any such facility may have” on “air quality in any area
which may be affected”); 7475(e)(1) (pre-permitting analysis of “ambient
air quality at the proposed site”); 7475(e 3) B) (detailing requirements to
assess “the effect of emissions from a proposed facility”); 7479(3) (“case-
by-case,” source-specific BACT requirement, “taking into account energy,
environmental, and economic impacts”).

42

of the statutory term “wages” as used in federal revenue laws.
The relevant statutes set forth three definitions of that term —
identical definitions governing contributions to the Social
Security (FICA) and unemployment insurance (FUTA)
programs, and a similar definition in the income-tax
withholding statute. See 452 U.S. at 249 & n.2. Treasury
regulations provided that employees’ meals and lodging
furnished for the “convenience of the employer” were not
“wages” for purposes of the withholding statute, but were
“wages” under FICA and FUTA. The Court described the
question before it as whether the latter regulatory definitions
were consistent with the agency’s obligation to “‘implement
the congressional mandate in some reasonable manner,’” 452
U.S. at 252 (citation omitted), adding that the regulations
were due “less deference” because promulgated under only a
general grant of rulemaking authority, id. at 253.

The Court found in the history of the three statutes “strong
evidence that Congress intended ‘wages’ to mean the same
thing under FICA, FUTA, and income tax withholding.” 452
U.S. at 255. That history revealed “congressional concern for
‘the interest of simplicity and ease of administration,’” id. at
255-56 (quoting S. Rep. No. 77-1631 at 165 (1942)), and an
intent “to coordinate the income-tax withholding system with
FICA and FUTA.” /d. at 257. “[OJne of the means Congress
chose” to pursue that end was “to base withholding upon the
same measure — ‘wages’ — as taxation under FICA and
FUTA,” a term with a meaning known to be “‘intentionally
narrow and precise.’ 452 U.S. at 255-56 (quoting Central
Illinois Pub. Serv. Co. v. United States, 435 U.S. 21, 31
(1978)). See also 452 U.S. at 254 (noting agency’s
“acknowledgment” that benefits at issue were not “income,”
and that Central Illinois had held “wages” to be a “narrower
concept” than “income”). The Court found it “extraordinary”
that “‘a Congress pursuing this interest” would have intended,
“without ever saying so, for identical definitions to be
interpreted differently.” /d. at 257. It noted, as well, that the
IRS had first adopted parallel regulations, only to later change

43

the FICA/FUTA rules “without explanation.” /d. at 259, 260.

Rowan itself never endorsed the extremely strong and
general “presumption” the court of appeals took from it. — In
reaching its decision in that case, the Court analyzed the text
and history of the relevant statutes and its own prior
construction of the term “wages,” found indications that
Congress had intended the agency to adopt identical
definition of “wages,” and highlighted Treasury’s wholesale
failure to explain its decisions. Nothing in Rowan suggests
that an inference created by Congress’s use of identical or
similar definitions is ever “irrebuttable” (Pet. App. 17a) by
reference to the particular statutory contexts in which the
terms are used. Nor has this Court ever cited Rowan as
establishing any such overbearing canon of construction. In
the 25 years since Rowan was decided, this Court has cited it
only once, in United States v. Vogel Fertilizer Co., 455 U.S.
16, 24 (1982), decided the same Term, and there only for the
proposition that Treasury regulations promulgated under
general rulemaking authority receive less than full deference.

This Court’s precedent, in fact, strongly refutes the Fourth
Circuit’s acontextual canon. The presumption of uniform
usage “is not rigid and readily yields whenever there is such
variation in the connection in which the words are used as
reasonably to warrant the conclusion that they were employed
in different parts of the act with different intent.’” General
Dynamics Land Svs., Inc. v. Cline, 540 U.S. 581, 595 (2004)
(citations omitted). Far from establishing any irrebuttable
presumption, this Court has always “recognize[ed] the
controlling significance of context,” Wachovia Bank, Nat'l
Assoc. v. Schmidt, 126 S. Ct. 941, 948-49 (2006), in
construing common statutory terms.”

* See, e.g., United States v. Cleveland Indians Baseball Co., 532 U.S.
200, 213 (2001); Concrete Pipe & Products of Cal., Inc. v. Constr. Lab.
Pension Trust for S. Cal., 508 U.S. 602, 634 (1993); Erlenbaugh v. United
States, 409 U.S. 239, 245 (1972); Lee v. Madigan, 358 U.S. 228, 231
(1959); Helvering v. Stockholms Enskilda Bank, 293 U.S. 84, 86-87
(1934). Walter Wheeler Cook’s comparison of an over-rigid presumption

44

And contrary to the Fourth Circuit’s view, the fact that
terms here are found in the form of a shared statutory
definition does not deactivate that “controlling” principle.
Thus, in Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 343 (1997),
this Court unanimously held that the term “employee” in Title
VII, a term governed by a sing/e definition covering that
entire statute, 42 U.S.C. 2000e(f), includes former employees
in some parts of the statute but not in others, depending upon
the “context” of the particular use. 519 U.S. at 343-44. See
id. at 343 (noting that term “may have a plain meaning in the
context of a particular section,” but not have “the same
meaning in all other sections and in all other contexts”). See
also Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842, 845 (court of appeals erred by
imposing “static judicial definition” of term “source” as used
in NNSR, stripping EPA of ability to interpret term in a way
that made sense “in the context of this particular program’).
The Court in Robinson concluded that construing “employee”
to include former employees was warranted in the context of
Title VII's retaliation provisions, a construction “consisten|t]
with a primary purpose” of those provisions to maintain
access to statutory remedies. 519 U.S. at 346. Compare Pet.
App. 18a (Fourth Circuit’s conclusion that common definition
of “modification” created “mandate” that “the different
purposes of the NSPS and PSD programs cannot override”).

In contrast to Rowan, there is every indication that
Congress did not mean to require EPA to adopt identical
regulatory definitions of “modification,” and component
terms like emissions “increase,” for the distinct, technical,
and complex NSPS, PSD, and NNSR programs. ** EPA must,

of uniform usage to “‘original sin’” has “become a staple of [this Court's]
opinions.” General Dynamics Land Svs., 540 U.S. at 596 n.8 (citations
omitted). Sce also Nat Mining Assn, 59 F.3d at
1358 (upholding EPA’s differing interpretation, in Section 307(d) CAA
rulemaking, of “very similar” definitions of major source, and noting that
“[{d]ifferent [CAA] programs have different objectives and structure”).

* Nor, as the D.C. Circuit explained, is there is any evidence Congress
intended to import any specific NSPS regulation as a_ statutory

45

under each program, give effect to the two-step concept of
“modification” set forth in 42 U.S.C. 7411(a)(4) — requiring a
“physical [or operational] change” that “increases the amount
of any air pollutant emitted.” (And there is surely no
inconsistency between the PSD regulations and that statutory
language). By fitting the general definition to the particulars
of the respective programs, EPA has properly interpreted the
constituents of the definition, including “increase” and
“amount emitted” — themselves undefined by Congress — to
effectuate differences in coverage, operation, and purpose
between NSPS, enacted in 1970, and the two NSR programs
enacted seven years later. NSPS and NSR_ differ
fundamentally, and EPA was surely not precluded from
taking account of their differences in crafting its respective
modification regulations.

NSPS sets identical operational requirements for new and
modified sources within a source category, without regard to
site-specific factors, and with no threshold based on source
size or emissions levels. Congress adopted an entirely
different approach in the 1977 amendments. PSD is
pervasively concerned with protecting local air quality, a
purpose that necessitates, as Alabama Power explains, a focus
on actual pollution “amounts” — as well as netting to allow
sources to make physical changes without PSD review when
their overall effect will be to leave air quality in the vicinity
unharmed. See Northern Plains Resource Council v. EPA,
645 F.2d 1349, 1356 (9" Cir. 1981) (contrasting “equipment
oriented” NSPS with “site oriented” PSD program). Instead
of generic, national technology-based standards, the PSD
provisions require modeling of local pollutant levels, specific

requirement for PSD. See New York, 413 F.3d at 18-20; cf. 42 U.S.C.
7478(b) (expressly providing for certain projects commenced before 1977
amendments’ effective date to be governed by 1974 PSD regulations).

* Recognizing the relevant similarities between the two NSR programs,
EPA has chosen to adopt NNSR_ modification regulations “largely
identical” to its PSD regulations. Sce 57 Fed. Reg. at 32316 n.7.

46

determinations of the probable impacts of the proposed
project’s emissions on local air quality, and pollution controls
imposed in a “case-by-case” manner.

The word “source” in the common modification definition
has a different referent under PSD than under NSPS.
Compare 42 U.S.C. 7411(a)(3) (NSPS “stationary source’)
with id. 7479(1) (PSD “major emitting facility”). That
difference reflects the disparate mechanics and purposes of
the respective programs. Unlike the NSPS definition, the
PSD definition (like other PSD provisions) measures
emissions in “tons per year,” id., draws the distinction
between what a source “emits” and its emissions “capacity,”
see New York, 413 F.3d at 39-40; Alabama Power, 636 F.2d
at 353, and evinces Congress's intent that PSD, unlike NSPS,
be restricted to facilities “which, due to their size, are
financially able to bear the substantial regulatory costs
imposed by the PSD provisions and which, as a group, are
primarily responsible for emission of the deleterious
pollutants that befoul our nation’s air.” /d.; see id. at 400
n.46; compare 53 Fed. Reg. 5860 (Feb. 26, 1988) (adopting
NSPS for residential wood stoves). It is both feasible and
important to measure increases in actual emissions from the
large sources that count as “major emitting facilities,” and
PSD’s dominant emphasis on the specific, local air quality
impacts of these large sources fully justified EPA’s decision
to predicate PSD applicability and increment consumption on
actual, annual emissions. See 45 Fed. Reg. at 52701.
Whereas in Rowan the agency could offer no reason for its
different regulations on “wages,” here EPA extensively
explained the basis for its PSD regulations. That the Fourth
Circuit disregarded EPA’s rationale, along with the text of the
regulations, illustrates just how far it strayed from any proper
approach to judicial review. See 42 U.S.C. 7607(d)(7), (9).

Congress’s use of the same broadly worded, and general,
definition of modification under multiple CAA programs
cannot be understood as a mandate that EPA construe these
terms without regard to the “different contexts” in which

47

these undefined terms must function throughout this
“technical and complex” statute. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 863-
64; see id. at 845.*°

In another stark contrast to Rowan, 452 U.S. at 254, 263
(citing Central Illinois), EPA’s PSD regulations were crafted
to conform to precedent from the court empowered by
Congress to review national CAA regulations. Alabama
Power, 636 F.2d at 353, 399-402 & n. 46: see also New York,
413 F.3d at 39-40. And the D.C. Circuit has instructed EPA
to do what principles of administrative law would ordinarily
require — define a PSD “modification” in a manner faithful to
the text of the statutory definition and to the textual
requirements and programmatic ends of the other PSD
provisions with which it must function. The Fourth Circuit’s
ruling, remarkably, forbids EPA from doing so, imposing
instead a mandate of obliviousness to context. The
Congresses that enacted these elaborate programs surely did
not intend that result.*’

*© Congress's refusal to alter the PSD modification provisions in 1990,
after EPA had operated for a decade under diverging regulatory
definitions for NSPS and NSR, and after WEPCo, see supra, n. 8, further
undermines the Fourth Circuit's conclusion. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at
863-864; cf. Nat'l Mining Ass'n, 59 F 3d at 1363 (Congress's choices “in
1990” should be construed “against a backdrop of over a decade of
skirmishing between the agency and affected companies” when these
issues were “very much in the forefront”).

*’ The court of appeals’ rationale would apply to the NNSR program,
which like PSD incorporates the Section 11 1(a)(4) definition, see 42
U.S.C. 7501(4). It would condemn every itcration of EPA’s modification
regulations under that major CAA program, see, e.g. 40 C.F.R.
51.16S(aX vif A). (ayvil) (2005), applicable in areas failing to mean the
health-based NAAQS. See 42 U.S.C. 7502(c\5). And it would do so
despite unambiguous statutory text measuring NNSR emissions in actual,
annual terms. See supra, pp. 15-16, 40. See also 42 U.S.C. 742% 23)
(modification definition for solid waste incinerators, added in 1990,
phrased very similarly to Section | 11(a\4) definition).

48

C. The Emissions Increase Test Imposed by the
Fourth Circuit Violates the Statute.

The effect of the court of appeals’ “identical regulations”
mandate was to require that EPA use a maximum hourly rate
test for PSD — at least until such time as EPA amends its
NSPS regulations. See Pet. App. 18a.** But that test would
violate the plain text and fundamental objectives of the Act’s
PSD provisions and contravene the D.C. Circuit’s unappealed
decisions in Alabama Power and New York.

The “plain language of the CAA” requires that EPA “apply
NSR to changes that increase actual emissions instead of
potential or allowable emissions.” New York, 413 F.3d at 40.
See also Alahama Power, 636 F.2d at 353, 400-01. A
maximum hourly rate test violates that command. The
“amount” of pollutant “emitted” by a source is not merely a
function of its maximum hourly rates, but also of how much
the plant is in use. See JA 294. Yet the regulatory test
improperly imposed by the courts below simply pretends that
increases in actual emissions from expanded use do not exist.
See Pet. App. 58a-59a; cf. 61 Fed. Reg. at 38269 (effect of
Exhibit B proposal “to eliminate a source’s level of
operations as a factor when determining whether a proposed
change will result in an increase” and to “completely
disregard] |” utilization). Such an approach is at odds with an
entire PSD enactment concerned with changes in actual local
air quality, not in engineering potentials or regulatory
allowances. See 45 Fed. Reg. at 52700 (potential emissions

** The Fourth Circuit never explained why, even assuming the common
statutory definitions mandated regulatory identity between NSPS and the
PSD, it was the PSD regulations that should be condemned, even though
those regulations hew to the plain language of the modification definition,
fit with PSD-specific provisions of the Act, and were crafted to conform
to a decision of the court empowered by Congress to review CAA
regulations. See also New York, 413 F.3d at 19 (stating that NSPS hourly
rate regulation was “possibly inconsistent” with another NSPS regulation
that tracked the statutory definition of modification) (comparing 40 C.F.R.
60.2(h) (1976) with 40 C_F.R. 60.14(a) (1976)).

49

test “could permit actual air quality to deteriorate seriously”);
61 Fed. Reg. at 38268-70 (detailing adverse “environmental
consequences” of Exhibit B proposal); 67 Fed. Reg. at 80205
(Exhibit B approach “detrimental to air quality”).

Nor does such an approach to PSD “modifications” fare
well as a matter of “ordinary or natural meaning.” S.D.
Warren Co. v. Maine Bd. of Envt'l Protection, 126 S. Ct.
1843, 1847 (2006) (citation omitted). A major overhaul that
enables an old plant to operate, say, ten times as many hours
as it could in its prior condition — with a correspondingly
large increase in quantities of pollution actually released into
the local airshed that is PSD’s concern — is, manifestly, a
“physical change” that “increases the amount of any air
pollutant emitted” by the source. “Were it not for the
hundreds of pages of briefing” submitted in the D.C. Circuit
and elsewhere trying to impose on PSD accounting
methodologie calculated to disregard actual emissions, “one
would have thought it fairly clear that this text does not
permit” such an approach. American Trucking, 531 U.S. at
465. See New York I, 443 F.3d at 889.

Ignoring increases in emissions from the expanded
operations of “modernized” sources is inconsistent with the
limits Congress placed on the grandfathering benefit
conferred on existing sources in 1977. As the D.C. Circuit
observed in Alabama Power, by extending the Act’s PSD
requirements to “modifications,” Congress denied these
sources a “perpetual immunity from all standards under the
PSD program.” 636 F.2d at 400.

CONCLUSION
The judgment of the court of appeals should be reversed.

Respectfully submitted.

50

JEFFREY M. GLEASON

J. BLANDING HOLMAN, IV

CALEB JAFFE

Southern Environmental
Law Center

200 W. Franklin Suite 330

Chapel Hill, N.C. 27516

(434) 967-1450

VICKIE PATTON
Environmental Defense
2334 North Broadway
Boulder, Colorado 80304
(303) 447-7215

SEAN H. DONAHUE
Counsel of Record

2000 L St., NW

Suite 808

Washington, D.C. 20036
(202) 466-2234

DAVID T. GOLDBERG

99 Hudson St., 8th Floor
New York, N.Y. 10013
(212) 334-8813

Counsel for Petitioners

JULY 2006

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ADDENDUM

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Clean Air Act, ch 360, 69 Stat. 322 (1955),

as amended by the Clean Air Act Amendments
of 1970, Pub. L. 91-604, 84 Stat. 1676, and by
the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, Pub. L.
95-95, 91 Stat. 685, and by the Clean Air Act
Amendments of 1990, Pub. L. 101-549, 104 Stat.
2399 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401 ef seq.):

42 U.S.C. 7411 (excerpted)............
42 U.S.C. 7412 (excerpted) ............
3k oe err er ares
Se Corr oy ee eee
42 U.S.C. 7473 (excerpted) ............
42 U.S.C. 7475 (excerpted) ............
ER A eS SRE ey ete =

Page

42 U.S.C. 7501 (excerpted) ................. 14a
42 U.S.C. 7502 (excerpted)... 2... ccc ceees 14a
42 U.S.C. 7607 (excerpted)... 0... cccneess 1Sa
Code of Federal Regulations:
40 C.F.R. 51.166 (1987) (excerpted) ......... 22a
40 C.F.R. 51.166(b)(21) (1993) (excerpted)... . 33a
40 C.F.R. 60.2, 60.14 (1976)(excerpted). ..... 35a
40 C.F.R. 60.14 (1987) (excerpted) ........... 40a

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42 U.S.C. § 7411 [Section 111]
Standards of performance for new stationary sources
(a) Definitions. For purposes of this section:

(1) The term “standard of performance” means a standard
for emissions of air pollutants which reflects the degree of
emission limitation achievable through the application of
the best system of emission reduction which (taking into
account the cost of achieving such reduction and any
nonair quality health and environmental impact and
energy requirements) the Administrator determines has
been adequately demonstrated.

(2) The term “new source” means any stationary source,
the construction or modification of which is commenced
after the publication of regulations (or, if earlier, proposed
regulations) prescribing a standard of performance under
this section which will be applicable to such source.

(3) The term “stationary source” means any building,
structure, facility, or installation which emits or may emit
any air pollutant. Nothing in subchapter II of this chapter
relating to nonroad engines shall be construed to apply to
Stationary internal combustion engines.

(4) The term “modification” means any physical change
in, or change in the method of operation of, a stationary
source which increases the amount of any air pollutant
emitted by such source or which results in the emission of
any air pollutant not previously emitted.

(5) The term “owner or operator” means any person who

owns, leases, operates, controls, or supervises a stationary
source.

2a

(6) The term “existing source” means any stationary
source other than a new source.

*k KE &

(b) List of categories of stationary sources; standards of
performance; information on pollution control techniques;
sources owned or operated by United States; particular
systems; revised standards.

(1) (A) The Administrator shall, within 90 days after
December 31, 1970, publish (and from time to time
thereafter shall revise) a list of categories of stationary
sources. He shall include a category of sources in such list
if in his judgment in causes, or contributes significantly
to, air pollution which may reasonably be anticipated to
endanger public health or welfare.

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(2) The Administrator may distinguish among classes,
types, and sizes within categories of new sources for the
- purpose of establishing such standards.

(3) The Administrator shall, from time to time, issue
information on pollution control techniques for categories
of new sources and air pollutants subject to the provisions
of this section.

* * kk *

(d) Standards of performance for existing sources; remaining
useful life of source.

(1) The Administrator shall prescribe regulations which

shall establish a procedure similar to that provided by
section 7410 of this title under which each State shall

3a

submit to the Administrator a plan which (A) establishes
standards of performance for any existing source for any
air pollutant (i) for which air quality criteria have not been
issued or which is not included on a list published under
section 7408(a) of this title or emitted from a source
category which is regulated under section 7412 of this
title but (ii) to which a standard of performance under this
section would apply if such existing source were a new
source, and (B) provides for the implementation and
enforcement of such standards of performance.
Regulations of the Administrator under t! | paragraph
shall permit the State in applying a standard of
performance to any particular source under a plan
submitted under this paragraph to take into consideration,
among other factors, the remaining useful life of the
existing source to which such standard applies.

(2) The Administrator shall have the same authority—

(A) to prescribe a plan for a State in cases where the State
fails to submit a satisfactory plan as he would have under
section 7410(c) of this title in the case of failure to submit
an implementation plan, and

(B) to enforce the provisions of such plan in cases where
the State fails to enforce them as he would have under
sections 7413 and 7414 of this title with respect to an
implementation plan.

In promulgating a standard of performance under a plan
prescribed under this paragraph, the Administrator shall
take into consideration, among other factors, remaining
useful lives of the sources in the category of sources to
which such standard applies.

**£* * *

4a

42 U.S.C. § 7412 [Section 112]

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(a)(5) The term “modification” means any physical change in,
or change in the method of operation of, a major source which
increases the actual emissions of any hazardous air pollutant
emitted by such source by more than a de minimis amount or
which results in the emission of any hazardous air pollutant
not previously emitted by more than a de minimis amount.

*** * *
42 U.S.C. § 7471 [Sect

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385016_0237%3A11. Public record. Not legal advice.
