# Respondents Brief — Kircher v. Putnam Funds Trust > Briefs, arguments, decisions, and more. URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385016_0221%3A13 ## Record - **Collection:** Supreme Court brief - **Document type:** Respondents Brief - **Published:** January 1, 2006 - **Citation:** 547 U.S. 633 ## Text : Supreme Coun US : hi Saati OF THE CLERK | No. 05-409 IN THE Supreme Court of the United States CARL KIRCHER, ET AL., Petitioners, Vv. PUTNAM FUNDS TRUST, ET AL., Respondents. On Writ Of Certiorari To The United States Court Of Appeals For The Seventh Circuit BRIEF FOR RESPONDENTS MARK A. PERRY Counsel of Record MIGUEL A. ESTRADA AMANDA M. ROSE GIBSON, DUNN & CRUTCHER LLP 1050 Connecticut Ave. N.W. Washington, D.C. 20036 (202) 955-8500 Counsel for Respondent Janus Capital Management LLC [Counsel for Other Respondents Listed on Inside Cover] John D. Donovan, Jr. Ropes & GRAY LLP One Internationa! Place Boston, Massachusetts 02110 (617) 951-7000 Thomas B. Smith Ropes & GRAY LLP 700 12th Street, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20005 (202) 508-4600 Attorneys for Respondents Putnam Funds Trust, Put- nam International Equity Fund, Putnam Investment Funds, Artisan Funds, Inc., and Scudder International Fund, Inc. Steven B. Feirson Stephen J. McConnell Nory Miller DECHERT LLP 4000 Bell Atlantic Tower Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19103 (215) 994-2369 Attorneys for Respondent Pacific Life Insurance Company Christopher P. Hall fodd D. Brody MORGAN, LEWIS & Bockius LLP 101 Park Avenue New York, N.Y. 10178 (212) 309-6702 Attorneys for Respondent Deutsche Investment Man- agement Americas Inc. Dale R. Harris DAVIS GRAHAM & STUBBS LLP 1550 17th Street Denver, Colorado 80202 (303) 892-9400 Attorneys for Respondent Janus Investment Fund Phil C. Neal Mark A. Rabinowitz NEAL, GERBER & EISENBERG LLP Two North LaSalle Street Chicago, Hlinois 60602 (312) 269-8083 Attorneys for Respondent Columbia Wanger Asset Management L P. John W. Rotunno Kenneth E. Rechtoris BELL, BOYD & LLoyD LLC 70 West Madison Street Chicago, Dlinois 60602 (312) 807-4213 Attorneys for Respondents Artisan Partners Limited Partnership and Columbia Acorn Trust James R. Carroll David S. Clancy SKADDEN, ARPS, SLATE, MEAGHER & FLOM LLP One Beacon Street Boston, Mass. 02108 (617) 573-4800 Attorneys for Respondent Putnam Investment Man- agement, LLC Charles F. Smith Lee P. Garner SKADDEN, ARPS, SLATE, MEAGHER & FLOM LLP 333 West Wacker Drive Chicago, Illinois 60606 (312) 407-0787 Attorneys for Respondent Van Kampen Series Fund, Inc. Robert Y. Sperling David E. Koropp WINSTON & STRAWN 35 West Wacker Drive Chicago, Dlinois 60601 (312) 558-5600 Attorneys for Respondent Van Kampen Investment Advisory Corporation i QUESTION PRESENTED The first question presented in the petition for a writ of certiorari is: “Whether the court of appeals had jurisdiction, contrary to the holdings of three other circuits, to review a district court order remanding for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction a suit removed under the Securities Litigation Uniform Stan- dards Act of 1998 (‘SLUSA’), notwithstanding 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d)’s bar on appellate review of remand orders based on lack of subject-matter jurisdiction and the district courts’ conclusion that petitioners’ claims are not preempted by and thus not rernovable under SLUSA.” il RULE 29.6 STATEMENT Respondent Artisan Partners Limited Partnership has no parent corporation, and no publicly held company owns 10% or more of its stock. This respondent is a limited partnership, the general partner of which is Artisan Investment Corpora- tion, which has no parent corporation, and no publicly held company owns 10% or more of its stock. Respondent Artisan Funds, Inc. has no parent corpora- tion, and no publicly held company owns 10% or more of its stock. Respondent Columbia Wanger Asset Management, LP has no parent corporation, and no publicly held company owns 10% or more of its stock. This respondent is a limited partnership, the general partner of which is CWAM Acquisi- tion GP, Inc., which is a wholly owned subsidiary of Colum- bia Management Group, Inc., which in turn is a wholly owned subsidiary of Fleet National Bank, which in tur is a subsidiary of Bank of America Corporation, a publicly traded company. Respondent Columbia Acorn Trust has no parent corpo- ration, and no publicly held company owns 10% or more of its stock. Respondent Deutsche Investment Management Ameri- cas Inc. is a wholly owned subsidiary of Deutsche Bank Americas Holding Corp., which is a wholly owned subsidi- ary of Taunus Corporation, which is a wholly owned subsidi- ary of Deutsche Bank AG, a publicly traded company that owns 10% or more of respondent’s stock. No other publicly held company owns 10% or more of its stock. Respondent Janus Capital Management LLC is a wholly owned subsidiary of Janus Capital Group Inc., a publicly traded company that owns 10% or more of respondent’s stock. No other publicly held company owns 10% or more of its stock. ill Respondent Janus Investment Fund has no parent corpo- ration, and no publicly held company owns 10% or more of its stock. Respondent Pacific Life Insurance Company is a wholly owned subsidiary of Pacific Life Corporation, a private stock holding company. No publicly held company owns 10% or more of respondent’s stock. Respondent Putnam Investment Management, LLC is an indirect subsidiary of Marsh & McLennan Companies, Inc., a publicly traded company that owns 10% or more of respon- dent’s stock.. No other publicly held company owns 10% or more of its stock. Respondents Putnam Funds Trust, Putnam International Equity Fund, and Putnam Investment Funds have no parent corporation and no publicly held company owns 10% or more of their stock. Respondent Scudder International Fund, Inc. has no par- ent corporation, and no publicly held company owns 10% or more of its stock. Respondent Van Kampen Investment Advisory Corpora- tion merged on November 30, 2003, into Van Kampen Asset Management, which is a wholly owned subsidiary of Van Kampen Investments, Inc., which is a wholly owned subsidi- ary of MSAM Holding II Inc., which is a wholly owned sub- sidiary of Morgan Stanley, a publicly traded company that owns 10% or more of respondent’s stock. No other publicly held company owns 10% or more of its stock. Respondent Van Kampen Series Fund, Inc. has no parent corporation, and no publicly held company owns 10% or more of its stock. iv TABLE OF CONTENTS SPREE UIIIIITITTT losccaciciadinnmotdiasiinntnnvedenteensoeseeenescontnssneteoencene l SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT .........ccccccessceeeeseeeneneenes 6 ITT senteititncidcninnsinantemnasiasinninsipaiapnosrantiechonvees 10 I. The Seventh Circuit Properly Exercised Appellate Jurisdiction Under Thermtron......... 10 A. The Remand Orders Were Not Based On A Lack Of Subject-Matter Jurisdiction .... 11 1. The Jurisdictional Label Used By The District Court Is Not Conclusive........ 12 2. The Seventh Circuit Correctly Rejected The District Court’s Jurisdictional Label .................c00000 16 a. SLUSA’s Removal Provision Is Broader Than Its Preclusion ERS AS es re 18 b. A Colorable Defense Of SLUSA Preclusion Is Sufficient To Confer Removal Jurisdiction....... 25 c. Respondents Asserted A Colorable Defense Of SLUSA CIR i a 28 d. Because It Had Removal Jurisdiction, The District Court’s Remand Orders Were I IIIIIEN scstnistndninesontiansecosocsese 32 B. Affirmance Would Further The Objectives Of SLUSA Without Undermining The Policy Of § 1447(d).....37 Il. The Seventh Circuit Also Had Appellate Jurisdiction Under Wad ..0...........ccccccceeeeeeeeeees 4] TIT Pithinditinsiciidpinnsendaintincbsatnebeaevicnvoenceesinsnicnenen 47 Vv TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Cases Abney v. United States, GE TET, Gare IG OP ccscscntntcccscntinascvinsnccnenieomanseininenn 41 Adkins v. Ill. Cent. R.R. Co., 326 F.3d 828 (7th Cir. 2003).............. satlimmaduiaiiatiaal 43 Alaska Dep't of Envtl. Conservation v. EPA, BE es re Ce crcnccssesiistneseccticnnccccinnsceeseesiinnianns 23 Aliota v. Graham, — 984 F.2d 1350 (3d Cir. 1993)... ccc ccccecceeeeeeeeeeenees 13 Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, _ = iS & | ET eer ereee nee 20-21 American Nat'l Red Cross v. S. G., es BOE CED cicentedccnthiensestesinsctesciiscnvotinsnnitiing 19 Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp., BR GE. CR cccicensesesneevnecensinenntionntcssnnsing passim Baldwin v. Iowa State Traveling Men's Ass'n, DT Fee COD initerncncintsintnscesticnctinnptantinniiennd 43 Barr v. Matteo, Pe ek Br CI cictiiicsccrectintenisenintnniarninintinannne 27 Bell v. Hood, ee eee CIP ED cticsnemniccsinescsnnstincionsie 5, 16, 26, 33 Beneficial Nat'l Bank v. Anderson, ee: 0 eR ciracanistoinsoscnctubcmnssienotagetineensiasieinitois 19 Blackburn v. UPS, Inc., yoo ek | Fk XK eer 12 Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, es ae I caitccttectinnesieintpeynisianinivicaseansceiiniibil 6 Briscoe v. Bell, ae ets I FN chicnscsipthsniisactstcecnniccmnainiiasiietiaincumatd 13 vi Burford v. Sun Oil Co., FE es BE CID ciciccesencnsccensecaccinnnencnbinscentonnsninie 36 C.LR. v. Sunnen, Be CR, Fee CI ccccntecnccssccnsencscceveneresenneresetecccians 43 Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, Ge Ce Fe FD veces citncceccintinnsevictntancsinneneiti passim Caterpillar Inc. v. Lewis, SOD TA, GE Ga rcs cencncnescastccsetscovecasesteesnanpeststncten 12 Chicot County Drainage Dist. v. Baxter State Bank, Be hs Oe CI cirecectsscerccsincrssctntsosinntetesinnninnesneceni 45 Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., BPE as ee CD cecicstentvinsvtinsenmscreremnnnstniestnnenatian 44 In re Continental Cas. Co., y fm Pb le Lt | eer 12 Dalrymple v. Grand River Dam Auth., 145 F.3d 1180 (10th Cir. 1998) 0... ceecceeneeserneeees 15 Davis v. Michigan Dep't of Treasury, I Gs I ncn ctncintcsnicenncnininennnennnvinnnesen 25 Dudek v. Prudential Secs., Inc., ya 33 Dura Pharms., Inc. v. Broudo, Be ls Re Ie CI ctcitineicnceonosmsicietecesineniencnenenscine 1 El Paso Natural Gas Co. v. Neztsosie, ER eee 27 Fauntleroy v. Lum, Bs Se I svisicctisninnisteotnreesctinntncneninenincennnnnnens 28 Ferrari, Alvarez, Olsen & Ottoboni v. Home Ins. Co., oe Fe | een 15 Vil Fong Foo v. United States, Fee Cs Ce Ch eisintbniderncverinmnseeveneiimetnniniticings 14 Franchise Tax Bd. v. Construction Lab. Vac. Trust, ee I: 0 I ccteisicinannscumittnitosnsctnsnscemnpetsasians 28, 33 Gold-Washing & Water Co. v. Keyes, Fe Os BOP COED tictecentininecvinncentncsesunvermecantitdasintenn 29 Gozlon-Peretz v. United States, 9 gg | DINE 21 Gravitt v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., gS Se, , SES ee 11, 38, 40 Greenwood v. Peacock, Pe as Ne CD cecenctaseesctcecnescconsteremnepsensinesarinns 33 Gutierrez de Martinez v. Lamagno, POD Wes BEF COCR crcticicttnsinerrratsienenieeens 9, 17, 34 Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, | Fe Os. Fe CE cnceirenictinttccestinesintmneneiinnenonenatens 28 Hilton v. South Carolina Pub. Rys. Comm'n, Fe Ca Be CEE veteterictteteniceenrpeniorieniomampesiin 39 INS v. National Ctr. for Immigrants’ Rights, Inc., FE Eres, ID COO cttaietacnnieccctennbensinnemcenepiiniaateniom 21 Izumi Seimitsu Kogyo Kabushiki Kaisha v. U.S. Philips Corp., PI Es BOF I aciccnissnptnercininnntninerneciesiinnnanniiinnein 31 Jama v. ICE, Pe Os Ne CI cccctdessth tentennniincactninviinsastiianniiantions 21 Jamison v. Wiley, 14 F.3d 222 (4th Cir. 1994)..............ccceccssocesvosserseees 34 In re Janus Mut. Funds Iny. Litig., 310 F. Supp. 2d 1359 (J.P.M.L. 2004) .........cccccceeeees 3 Jefferson County v. Acker, ee Sy Er OD settntsatetnsertetenvencienepeinsineid passim Vill Johnson Co. v. Wharton, BE BI. Be CD orcevanecsccccssnscceroceoninnbepsinnnsnrensinets 45 Kelly v. Robinson, FF Ses Be CD ctctesintincssnccniacietetetuntennipiminhtcinecanl 24 King v. St. Vincent's Hosp., FE Cs RO OOO cincvininsqcivcntecicedpinevinigtineeitataiijens 23 Kontrick v. Ryan, S4O U.S. 443 (2006) ..cccrrcccssescesorcescecescsoossssovessonees 5, 16 Levering & Garrigues Co. v. Morrin, BP Cre. CP CRIED ccncnghinternesesisnepibeteninenernnnent 29 Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Weitzel, 424 U.S. 737 (1976) .......cccccccsceseceeeteeeneees 7, 13, 14, 15 Lindsey v. Dillard’s, Inc., 306 F.3d 596 (8th Cir. 2002) 0.0... eee ceeeeceeeeeeeeeens 15 Lousiville & Nashville Ry. Co. v. Mottley, BEE Ghee OG CEI cenceecntcwsessstactntecsertvenipescenimnenienes 16 McLaughlin Bros. v. Hallowell, ee es Pe wetedevistedotcbeavincetesenecisvoinsitniedbint 46 Mangold v. Analytic Servs., Inc., 77 F.3d 1442 (4th Cir. 1996) 0.0... ccceececeeseeeereeeees 15 Martin v. Franklin Capital Corp., Re a eh POP I cttstetictntrncrectvtninciosecsscasepobitiinetin 35 Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Dabit, PF OR ID erieenivtosccicovocscscnsssunincansanitied passim Mesa v. California, eee 16, 25, 28, 33 Midlantic Nat'l Bank v. New Jersey Dep't of Envitl. Prot., FOP Ee, FO IG cictorinmenescinpsteininninarsitansetinesincten 40 ix Missouri Pac. Ry. Co. v. Fitzgerald, PE OF. FW CED vsiccsccssnsssecoseinreniivnstonsocssboenniecones 46 Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., Se Whats. 0 CI nccscesciccnosicocccneniansenssensetennsoosoepensanes 44 In re Mut. Funds Inv. Litig., 384 F. Supp. 2d 845 (D. Md. 2005) ........:cccceeceeeeenees 3 Nashville, Chattanooga & St. Louis Ry. v. Wallace, Fae As BOP CAO) cevscviintnssrsnecnsstinstinsscrasonisinsnnncies 13 Norton v. Mathews, BET Tae DOO GIGI vvccescsnccncccsocsnsstosenssvsetontionieoneeses 30 Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Graham, RE Be eas UE CID nicnnsscecnseconsensneiscnesscanswenssuntinnies 19 Oneida Indian Nation v. County of Oneida, BEG UB. GE CBG) scsccccscrcescrcocsssnesessscosencesessosoooesoes 26 Osborn v. Bank of United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824) .......ccccesceeeeeerseeeeenes 33 Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., Fk FBR FO CED ccciicceresentotsccovesioccssnmmatnatinen passim Railroad Co. v. Mississippi, BGR ADD. CFS CEG IGD ccccsccosecsocscrssctitecscsoossnsvevesesessssees 29 Riley v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 292 F.3d 1334 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, SOT Wis DO ED ccicssocecsceintsistntiacneeccscaseanenticsboonten 2 Romero v. International Term. Oper. Co., BOO has BOW NII D vencsesosoniesincnttinscbetepentnsencetsoescoane 24 Rowinski v. Salomon Smith Barney Inc., 398 F.3d 294 (3d Cir. 2005) ...........ccceccceeseeeeeeeeeeeees 38 Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574 (1999) .....cccccscsssessessseesssesseeesee 14, 34, 45 Salinas v. United States, Bae iets Be CIT D cscnsiocecccvcdntencesnecensnenescoventsosoeneseees 20 Scarborough v. Principi, 541 U.S. 401 (2004) oo. ceeecessssesesesereesereeereeeenees 5, 16 Schweiker v. Hogan, BT Cs FE COP OED verevtcccccctscrsccesscsvssconssopeoscsnssovonees 44 SEC v. Zandford, FD GI ED CED wictiviinscsnvssercincrensnsnovnvosnnsccesoncosees 30 Semtcek Int'l Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., Fe WT CPOE D siciscrcdeseticorvossososeseievisoreccoqeneccsses 45 Skelly Oil Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., Fe es EF Ce aiicavitansctisccdoictncnisevenstonseesiennens 33 Snapper, Inc. v. Redan, 171 F.3d 1249 (11th Cir. 1999)... ceeeseseeeeeeeeeees 12 St. Paul Mercury Indem. Co. v. Red Cab Co., Pe Ws See ID sindsecesenedonsevsictesscsmecsostoiscensciocese 34 Steel Co. v. Citizens for Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83 (1998) ...........ccecccsrcessrsrereees 17, 26, 29, 30 Stoll v. Gottlieb, Be Ws WED CEI caccssonsccccscccsecoiinsncsonetnesocovescesonees 45 Taylor v. Freeland & Kronz, Fe Oe OE ciansecvenciosemnepresecesensnneevencenentcnes 12 Tennessee v. Union & Planters’ Bank, BAe Wie SID LEON cesepvccnecessetscsescenssenoeesesesiccesvcenes 16 Thermtron Prods., Inc. v. Hermansdorfer, Re TO vicdpecstudisiiecnnsspertecianpoovvcocioet passim Things Remembered, Inc. v. Petrarca, PEO UB. FBO CEGISD srcicrsstnsoscsocoviccccoscosossossscocess passim Trans Penn Wax Corp. v. McCandless, Fe Fe BF Ce ee CI cdtccctasntnincnenssioriconsccsvenese 35 xl Underwriters Nat'l Assur. Co. v. North Carolina Life & Accident & Health Ins. Guar. Ass'n, RD Tt Ie CTI ciccictciscccsesscttcncevistinitiininennanenn 45 United States v. Cotton, Fe WA ee GE in so nscinesnnnenivyennsctnniensnitennsintnsensniee 31 United States v. Jorn, | Tn TNT 14 United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., PS Tf ; ae ne NE RE TEN 7, 14 United States v. Munsingwear, Inc., De Cas BP CE cicitserecsisticcisnipetnennatinianiasnaiianal 45 United States v. O'Hagan, Fe Rk Se CP cerrcieccesittinteniscnenqsaneesnenasionsninnabinn 30 United States v. Rice, See Ts Fe I vocsecinesnncwsiniitsecntepinniaintioneniannal 43 United States v. Ruiz, Bae Wats Ge CIID virecinescncsescneescnseseiseninisienntnnioanstens 28 United States v. Sisson, I IE Ce FE sncenscscnnscnenisetnseninisniinneiiane 7, 14,15 UPS, Inc. v. Mitcheil, Ne Te ee eR sidictitcirincinnensintpivinttnntesedvainbioniviane 39 Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, RE Rs I aces cds eiccssbbitntninineies 9, 18, 32, 33 Waco v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., BOD Oy BO CIB vesiccecscicirrecsnsincricreonosnsansbasens passim Will v. Hallock, i Gs i SD cececccennictccsenichossksaisnnettetecbinapiie 44 Willingham v. Morgan, es CE RD aici tanicciennnissennecineniniiveinenad passim Yankaus v. Feltenstein, ee Rs Cae UG OP ccnincinniocspissnesdveicniauntinbeistetniannnds 46 xii Yee v. City of Escondido, as. SEED sinice divtstcsenitanensciintabestiahasiesinenatibaea 12 Statutes Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. ee ORs OF ccciinscsasensenceiincaneianenieannanedadotin 21, 40 Private Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737......... 1 Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77a et seq. (as I aciicie hike chieniin ssa cen tecnisiibsaedictsiccnebisiucindiniptopniaicclebeiviicies l ae Oe Fa eiccccinaiictin inactinslacieaciaidireiiniaianicinibaiaies 3 Re ee I iiceeecksihctsiccccitienibelielictebininuataia 2, 18-19 Se ae Oe FRI atiilinnscthesnsedeacienndinsepetecninabints passim a Oe hittin ainichshhsnscniesvivctiinebpucecaiiilianatint 2 eles Pe icihiinicsncicennscidensenateiscdndnsentininibs 2 sa Ae Pia eiicneriscistssinntincchpninstinmaniatenninioraiodie 3 Sr AE FP aphrerncrencescessicnbnsdamsinciosiniiteiilan 35 eda i niciensihienincitcictapsnamaconisonticiaiaetenncctnes 2 BP earns Oe FEE icssiticsvineiicienienneneevenaelorieianieeees 2 OE iis cenctveecciiieonl 29 ae ns te I iiiciasecticenisnnensbintiniiobiaomiatntagiens 2 Ses Oe i cthiriniiinnnliinnsidiesiniiakmemeniienints 2 ie a PUI cictdric tenis svicennibesnidicinieie quinceleiartl 2 er Ee PU vccincccccnseschenpisiniinimpenicnnnciianal 1 CR SRA eee n mes ace RTI 1 Bs nk & TEESE RESO ae eIN ere 41 CI A a as 4) es ar UI i cisiieiin cstcainssansicnteLdcabeasinidthtgdeale ati 2 Raa: 0b 8 Pe ccicechastintcinwtbiisbeipuneciiveasinnionsntipicnene 2 Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78a CE IE icctesichchdscdeicsnnintbisersiindinipanente 1 ae aay: Ue PURI cxssivissisnisenichigihptniedtsdapsecpsincamanpiebniiansindenl 3 ae es Oe Pe icciciveichsccotintssiskicctnadabiapeniniis 35 BP a te PII iccscicnischianrcictaiectnecnctenndasisitndiit l BP tare at PRE Ria incicsdidisticncaneunsetinemiindveidstaite | 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(3).............. clic aelatideadeameailn sich ] oF es Oe PIO concicinissccinsessuvtninnsbniiniesstins 41 BD TPS B FU I OD vce erevescecscesssecensaveonessebonce 41 Fa ire PAID ils cchcisies-nicienilloisicsteiongecbalapinisicdinmiianie 2 ae eee PID ctenincs biciienteennnwntenensiinntiianesiiaehimabeiiniainnn 2 Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-353, 112 Stat. 3227.............4. 2 ge sas AN AIT Sicircishencdinsinapsssninocaeiplasoncsdibedacaigeubinestpaiadediinbeiniie 14 aan Sse iavicisbiasibcadcissiiibasdy iilideegsairidiuababieabaabeiti 10, 11 yp 4 | Oe 5 * . SEARS ee ree eee 40 a a FR ates ciicachntnciitssinsasinsisthonicicneninsitieiniben 34 nies EE itch ainpiesenii dessin shssethacedbigesnk asia iepedlanebi 25 Be as ae IE isk distil snntincibsiceconicokainehialasisiienneaiidedeiien 27 es ae inca: cnccintidcceacbinbibicucsbinteneenitannend passim ase SE irdicicitincsiicnstthnntinisbininitinsibinindinlaneia passim Be ga I eetisnprptivsihcdnsdscclemnnttnncninjaniieetnapiapibiaialetial 39 els Op Ee Rint csitciccisnndiiinnitvicsiccnnuioasentnintalibains 21 XIV Other Authorities H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 369, 104th Cong., Ist Sess. (1995)........ccccecsseeeeeeeeeeeees 1,2 H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 803, 105th Cong., 2d Sess. (1998) ..........sscccecsecessereeeees 2,37 H.R. Rep. No. 640, 105th Cong., 2d Sess. (1998) ..........008. 2, A 242 OO S. Rep. No. 182, 105th Cong., 2d Sess. (1998) .........:cccesceeeees 2, 21, 27 Securities Litigation Abuses: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Secs., Comm. on Banking, Housing & Urban Affairs, 1997 WL 687807..... 23-24 16 Moore's Federal Practice § 107.44[2][a] (3d Morris & Goss, Why Claims Under the Securities Act of 1933 Are Removable to Federal Court, 36 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 626 (2004).............. 20 5A Wright & Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure § 1350 (2d ed. 1990).........ccccscseseeeeeeeees 26 14C Wright & Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure § 3739 (3d ed. 1998)...........cccccceeceseseeeeees 34 ISA Wnght & Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure § 3914.11 (2d ed. 1992)............cceeceeeee 47 BRIEF FOR RESPONDENTS Respondents respectfully submit that the judgment of the court of appeals should be affirmed. STATEMENT After removal, the district court held that petitioners’ state-law claims are not precluded by the Securities Litiga- tion Uniform Standards Act of 1998 (SLUSA). The court of appeals held that it had jurisdiction to review the district court’s resolution of the SLUSA issue, then reversed and re- manded with directions to dismiss petitioners’ claims pursu- ant to SLUSA. 1. In 1995 and 1998, Congress enacted two statutes that, together, sought to regularize private enforcement of the se- curities laws at the federal level and to significantly limit pri- vate securities litigation at the state level. Both statutes amended the two principal pillars of federal securities law: the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a et seq., and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a et seq. a. The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PSLRA), Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737, was enacted to “implement[] needed procedural protections to discourage frivolous litigation.” H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 369, 104th Cong., Ist Sess. 32 (1995). Congress concluded that the “private securities litigation system is too important to the integrity of American capital markets to allow this system to be under- mined by those who seek to line their own pockets by bring- ing abusive and meritless suits.” /d. at 31. The PSLRA imposes rigorous pleading requirements on plaintiffs in federal securities suits. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(1), (2); see Dura Pharms., Inc. v. Broudo, 125 S. Ct. 1627, 1633 (2005). It also imposes an automatic stay of discovery dur- ing the pendency of motions to dismiss (15 U.S.C. §§ 77z- 1(b), 78u-4(b)(3)), constrains who can serve as lead plaintiff in a securities class action (15 U.S.C. §§ 77z-1(a)(3), 78u- 4(a)(3)), and authorizes sanctions for frivolous litigation (15 2 U.S.C. §§ 77z-1(c), 78u-4(c)). In addition to these proce- dural reforms, the PSLRA also establishes a “‘safe harbor” for forward-looking statements, to encourage issuers to dissemi- nate relevant information to the market without fear of open- ended liability. H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 369, supra, at 32; see 15 U.S.C. §§ 77z-2(c), 78u-5S(c). b. SLUSA, Pub. L. No. 105-353, 112 Stat. 3227, was enacted “in order to prevent certain State private securities class action lawsuits alleging fraud from being used to frus- trate the objectives of the [PSLRA].” SLUSA § 2 (App. to Pet. Br. 15a). “[S]tate-court class actions involving nation- ally traded securities were virtually unknown” when the PSLRA was enacted. S. Rep. No. 182, 105th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1998). But “the decline in federal securities class action suits that occurred after the passage of the PSLRA was ac- companied by a nearly identical increase in state court fil- ings.” Riley v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 292 F.3d 1334, 1341 n.12 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 950 (2002). Congress determined that “(t]he solution to this problem is to make Federal court the exclusive venue for most securities fraud class action litigation involving nation- ally traded securities.” H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 803, 105th Cong., 2d Sess. 15 (1998). SLUSA precludes any court from hearing a state-law “covered class action” alleging fraud or manipulation in con- nection with the purchase or sale of a “covered security.” 15 U.S.C. § 77p(b). SLUSA also authorizes removal of “[a]ny” covered class action “involving” covered securities, as set forth in the preclusion provision. 15 U.S.C. §77p(c). A covered class action is one that seeks damages on behalf of 50 or more persons. 15 U.S.C. § 77p(f)(2). Covered securi- ties include mutual fund shares. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77p(f)(3), 771r(b). Expressly excluded from SLUSA’s preclusive reach are derivative actions (15 U.S.C. § 77p(f)(2)(B)), actions un- der the law of the State of incorporation involving proxy so- licitations (15 U.S.C. § 77p(d)(1)), actions by States or their securities comrvissioners (15 U.S.C. §§ 77p(d)(2), 77p(e)), 3 and actions between an issuer and indenture trustee (15 U.S.C. § 77p(d)(3)). 2. Petitioners are individuals who allegedly purchased shares in mutual funds or their equivalents offered or advised by respondents. See Resp. C.A. Br. 1 n.1, 6.3. Petitioners filed these putative class actions in Illinois state court (in the circuit courts for Madison and St. Clair Counties), alleging that respondents had engaged in an undisclosed practice of facilitating “market timing”—a term that petitioners use to mean frequent trading of mutual fund shares to take advan- tage of price arbitrage opportunities in funds holding interna- tionally traded securities. See Pet. Br. 6-7. Petitioners alleged that respondents marketed mutual funds as long-term investments, but then “exposed long term shareholders to market timing traders” by “failing to make daily adjustments” to the value of portfolio securities traded on foreign exchanges. J.A. 174 (Potter). Petitioners alleged that respondents thereby “g{a]ve market timing traders the opportunity to earn vastly higher returns at no additional risk,” and that these “excess profits . . . c[a]me at the expense of fellow shareholders.” /d. at 176, 177. Alleging that re- spondents had facilitated this course of conduct without dis- closing it to other investors, petitioners sought damages (in- cluding punitive damages) and other relief on behalf of all With one exception (see note 13, infra), SLUSA’s amendments to the 1933 Act (15 U.S.C. § 77p) parallel those to the 1934 Act (15 U.S.C. § 78bb(f)). Both petitioners (Pet. Br. 5 n.1) and the court of appeals (Pet. App. 3a, lla) refer only to the 1933 Act codification; for consistency, respondents will generally do the same. More than 400 lawsuits alleging “market timing” in various mutual funds, including some of respondents’ funds, have been transferred for coordinated proceedings in the District of Maryland. See /n re Janus Mut. Funds Inv. Litig., 310 F. Supp. 2d 1359 (J.P.M.L. 2004). That court has held state-law claims analogous to petitioners’ precluded by SLUSA. In re Mut. Funds Inv. Litig., 384 F. Supp. 2d 845, 871-72 (D. Md. 2005). 4 investors who “held” shares in respondents’ mutual funds for more than 14 days. /d. at 180-84; see also id. at 192, 197- 200 (Kircher); 218, 223-26 (Parthasarthy), 244, 249-52 (Dudley I); 262, 267-70 (Dudley II); 279, 284-87 (Vogeler); 296, 301-03 (Jackson); 316-18 (Spurgeon). Respondents removed the cases to the United States Dis- trict Court for the Southern District of Illinois, asserting (in- ter alia) that “(t]he Court has subject matter jurisdiction over this action pursuant to SLUSA.” J.A. 360 (Potter). Respon- dents alleged that each aspect of the preclusion defense was met because “this action is a covered class action,” petition- ers had sued under state law, mutual fund securities are “cov- ered securities,” and petitioners’ “claims are ‘in connection with’ the purchase or sale of a covered security because they are based upon statements and alleged manipulative conduct relating to the value and nature of securities sold or consid- eration received.” /d. at 360-61; see also id. at 331-36, 337- 40 (Parthasarthy), 341-57 (Kircher); 369-72 (Vogeler); 373- 89 (Dudley I); 390-406 (Dudley II); 407-12 (Jackson); 413- 35 (Spurgeon). Based on these allegations, respondents con- cluded that “SLUSA mandates that this action be removed to federal court.” Jd. at 362. Petitioners’ sole objection to removal under SLUSA was that the “in connection with” requirement was not met be- cause the putative classes were comprised of “holders,” rather than purchasers or sellers, of mutual fund shares. Pet. App. 6a. In a series of similar orders, the district court con- cluded that because petitioners ostensibly were suing on be- half of “holders,” their claims would not be “cognizable un- der the 1934 Act”; on that basis, the district court held that “SLUSA does not preempt them.” Pet. App. 61a (Spurgeon); see also id. at 26a-27a (Kircher), 30a (Dudiey I; 39a-40a (Parthasarthy), 43a-45a (Potter); 50a-51a (Vogeler), 56a-57a (Jackson). Having rejected respondents’ federal defense on the merits, the district court remanded the cases to state court. In each case, the court stated that it was remanding for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. See Pet. Br. 13 & n.22. 5 3. Respondents appealed the rejection of their SLUSA- preclusion defense to the Seventh Circuit, which issued two opinions by different three-judge panels. a. The court of appeals (Easterbrook, Evans and Wil- liams, JJ.) first determined that it had jurisdiction to consider respondents’ appeal. Pet. App. 10a-17a. The court recog- nized that 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d) precludes appellate review of remand orders that are based on § 1447(c). /d. at 12a (citing Thermtron Prods., Inc. v. Hermansdorfer, 423 U.S. 336 (1976), and Things Remembered, Inc. v. Petrarca, 516 U.S. 124 (1995)). The court ruled, however, that a remand under SLUSA “is not within § 1447(c) or equivalent to it, for [it] comes at the end rather than the outset of federal adjudica- tion.” /d. at 13a. As the court noted, “[t}he Supreme Court has itself reviewed remand decisions that fall outside the scope of § 1447(c).” Jbid. (citing Thermtron; Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 517 U.S. 706 (1996); and Carnegie- Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343 (1988)). The court of appeals rejected petitioners’ contention that a SLUSA-based remand connotes a lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, and thus is governed by § 1447(c). “[T]he Su- preme Court has observed that a court lacks ‘subject-matter jurisdiction’ only when Congress has not authorized the fed- eral judiciary to resolve the sort of issue presented by the case (or the Constitution forbids adjudication).” Pet. App. 13a (citing Kontrick v. Ryan, 540 U.S. 443 (2004), and Scar- borough v. Principi, 541 U.S. 401 (2004)). Under SLUSA, “a federal judge is not only authorized but also required to decide whether any court may entertain the litigation,” and “{o}jnly after making the substantive decision that Congress authorized it to make did the district court remand.” /d. at 14a. To “say that jurisdiction evaporated at that juncture .. . would be tautological,” the court explained, because “({o]therwise every federal suit, having been decided on the merits, would be dismissed ‘for lack of jurisdiction’ because the court’s job was finished.” /bid. (citing Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678 (1946)). 6 b. In its second decision, the court of appeals (Easter- brook, Ripple and Wood, JJ.) concluded that petitioners’ claims are precluded by SLUSA. Pet. App. la-9a. Although petitioners “insist{ed] that any private action that is untenable after Blue Chip Stamps [v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975),] also is unaffected by SLUSA,” the Seventh Circuit held that “[iJt would be more than a little strange if the Su- preme Court’s decision [in Blue Chip Stamps] to block pri- vate litigation by non-traders became the opening by which that very litigation could be pursued under state law, despite the judgment of Congress (reflected in SLUSA) that securi- ties class actions must proceed under federal securities law or not at all.” Pet. App. 6a-7a, 8a. This Court has expressly approved the Seventh Circuit’s merits decision in this case. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Dabit, 547 U.S. _ (2006), slip op. 1, 14. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT Petitioners assert that the Seventh Circuit was stipped of appellate jurisdiction by 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d), which provides that “[a]n order remanding a case to the State court from which it was removed is not reviewable on appeal or other- wise.” But that statute does not bar a// review of remand or- ders and associated decisions, and it does not apply here. I. In Thermtron Products, Inc. v. Hermansdorfer, 423 U.S. 336 (1976), the Court held that § 1447(d) bars appellate review only of remand orders based on the grounds specified in § 1447(c)}—— - Waco is not so much an exception to § 1447(d) as a rec- ognition of that statute’s limited scope. Section 1447(d) is designed to “‘avoid[] interruption of the litigation of the mer- 43 its of removed causes.” United States v. Rice, 327 U.S. 742, 752 (1946). It precludes review of a remand because “[t]he only thing that is at stake is the forum that will hear a claim. This is certainly not an unimportant matter, but it is not so fundamental that a second or third layer of judges must test its correctness.” Adkins v. Ill. Cent. R.R. Co., 326 F.3d 828, 832 (7th Cir. 2003). But Waco makes clear that where—as here—a district court’s remand is preceded by a substantive decision that will alter the contours of the state-court action, the appealability of that decision is unaffected by § 1447(d). 2. Like the district court’s decision dismissing the cross- action in Waco, the district court’s decision that these actions are not precluded by SLUSA would have been conclusive in state court, leaving respondents in the “anomalous position” of having lost a total defense to liability without any oppor- tunity to secure appellate review of the district court’s deci- sion. 293 U.S. at 143; see Pet. App. 15a (“it is now or never for appellate review of the question whether an action under state law is preempted” by SLUSA). That decision was ap- pealable even if § 1447(d) technically barred review of the resultant decision remanding the actions to state court. Upon removal, the district court was statutorily required to “subject” petitioners’ actions to the preclusion provision of SLUSA (15 U.S.C. § 77p(c)), and necessarily decided the contested question whether the actions are, in fact and law, precluded. Accordingly, the issue of SLUSA preclusion was “actually litigated and determined” by the district court, and therefore vould have precluded respondents from raising their SLUSA defense on remand. C./.R. v. Sunnen, 333 US. 591, 598 (1948); see Baldwin v. Iowa State Traveling Men's Ass'n, 283 U.S. 522, 525-26 (1931). The district court’s ruling on the SLUSA preclusion de- fense is likewise plainly “the subject of an appeal.” Waco, 293 USS. at 143. Its decision “conclusively determine(d] the disputed question” of SLUSA preclusion; that question is one of great importance to respondents and is “completely sepa- rate” from the merits of the petitioners’ claims under state 44 law; and the district court’s decision not only will be “effec- tively unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment,” but will be actually unreviewable. Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1983) (internal quotations omitted). Indeed, the denial of a SLUSA preclu- sion defense is likely immediately appealable under Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949), even in a Case initiated in federal court. Cf Will v. Hallock, 126 S. Ct. 952, 959 (2006). 3. Although petitioners have elected not to address Waco in this Court, they did do so in the court of appeals. Since they may resurrect these arguments for their reply brief, respondents offer some anticipatory rebuttals. a. Petitioners argued below that this case is not within the Waco doctrine because the district court made “only” a jurisdictional ruling. In fact, the district court also had before it respondents’ motions to dismiss petitioners’ actions as pre- cluded by SLUSA, which it simultaneously denied as “moot.” But even if, arguendo, the district court’s remand order was based on a want of subject-matter jurisdiction, a necessary predicate to that order was that petitioners’ actions are not within the preclusive reach of SLUSA. On petition- ers’ reading of the statute, a case is removable only if it is precluded; a necessary corollary of that reading is that a case that is not removable is not precluded. The preclusion deci- sion itself is not jurisdictional even if its consequences can be so described. b. Petitioners also argued below that the district court’s decision would not be “conclusive” in state court, staking out 16 Respondents relied on the Waco doctrine both before the court of appeals (see, e.g., Juris. Memo. for the Janus Appellants (7th Cir. Mar. 16, 2004), at 7-10) and in their brief in opposition to the petition for a writ of certiorari (at 17 & n.7). This issue is therefore properly before the Court. Schweiker v. Hogan, 457 U.S. 569, 585 n.24 (1982). Neverthe- less, petitioners chose not to address it in their merits brief. 45 several positions that are directly contrary to this Court’s precedents. First, petitioners argued that it is not the province of the federal courts to prejudge a state court’s application of the collateral estoppel doctrine. But as this Court has explained, States cannot give federal judgments whatever preclusive “effect they would give their own judgments”; rather, they “must accord them the effect that this Court prescribes.” Semtek Int'l Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 531 U.S. 497, 507 (2001). This Court has prescribed that “where the judg- ment or decree of the federal court determines a right under a federal statute, that decision is ‘final until reversed in an ap- pellate court, or modified or set aside in the court of its rendi- tion.”” Stoll v. Gottlieb, 305 U.S. 165, 170 (1938). Second, petitioners suggested that a federal court’s deci- sion is not entitled to preclusive effect if made in the context © of a jurisdictional inquiry. “This Court has long recognized,” however, “that ‘[t]he principles of res judicata apply to ques- tions of jurisdiction as well as to other issues’” (Underwriters Nat'l Assur. Co. v. North Carolina Life & Accident & Health Ins. Guar. Ass'n, 455 U.S. 691, 706-707 & n.13 (1982)), and has explicitly instructed that “[i]ssue preclusion in subse- quent state-court litigation [after remand] ... may ... attend a federal court’s subject-matter [jurisdiction] determination.” Ruhrgas, 526 U.S. at 585; see also Chicot County Drainage Dist. v. Baxter State Bank, 308 U.S. 371, 376 (1940) (“[Fed- eral court] determinations of [jurisdictional] questions, while open to direct review, may not be assailed collaterally”). 17 Nor does a statutory bar to appellate review vitiate the preclusive effect of a federal court’s decision on matters of federal law. See Johnson Co. v. Wharton, 152 U.S. 252, 261 (1894) (“The existence or non- existence of a right, in either party, to have the judgment in the prior suit reexamined, upon appeal or writ of error, cannot, in any case, control’); see also United States v. Munsingwear, Inc., 340 U.S. 36, 38-39 (1950). 46 Third, petitioners argued that respondents could ulti- mately seek review in this Court upon the conclusion of the state court proceedings. This Court has held, however, that when a federal court remands a case, and the state court thereafter proceeds to final judgment, the action of the fed- eral court is not reviewable on writ of error to such judgment. Missouri Pac. Ry. Co. v. Fitzgerald, 160 U.S. 556, 582-83 (1896). “A state court cannot be held to have decided against a Federal right when it is the [federal court], and not the state court, which has denied its possession.” Jd. at 582.; accord, McLaughlin Bros. vy. Hallowell, 228 U.S. 278 (1913); Yankaus v. Feltenstein, 244 U.S. 127 (1917). 4. Waco does not swallow—or even affect—the rule that remand orders are not appealable, because review under Waco does not upset the district court’s determination that the action must proceed, if at all, in state court. Section 1447(d)’s bar on continued litigation over choice of forum is thus fully respected, as Waco itself demonstrates. Although reversal of the dismissal of the cross-action would have dem- onstrated that the City indeed had the right to a federal fo- rum, it would not serve to return the case to federal court. 293 U.S. 143-44 (“A reversal cannot affect the order of re- mand, but it will at least, if the dismissal of the petitioner’s complaint was erroneous, remit the entire controversy, with the Fidelity Company still a party, to the state court for such further proceedings as may be in accordance with law’’). Under Waco, the underlying actions here would be re- turned to state court pursuant to the remand orders; but the Seventh Circuit’s determination that the actions are pre- cluded by SLUSA—-which has since been approved by this Court in Dabit—would be binding and the cases would be dismissed by the state courts. That is precisely what the state courts did here upon being notified of the federal decisions. See J.A. 5 (Parthasarthy); 11-12 (Potter); 28 (Vogeler). Ac- cordingly, if the Court were to hold Thermtron and Quack- enbush inapplicable to this case, the Seventh Circuit’s accep- tance of appellate jurisdiction could be affirmed on the alter- native ground articulated in Waco. As a treatise co-authored 47 by one of petitioners’ amici explains. “[t]he City of Waco rule is correct” because “the federal judicial system is built on the premise that district court rulings on the merits are ap- pealable as a matter of right, and that the appeal should go to a federal court. Appeal upon completion of the federal pro- ceedings is the only answer available in the present systerr.~ ISA Wright & Miller, Federal Practice & Proceds~. § 3914.11 at 712 (2d ed. 1992). CONCLUSION The judgment of the court of appeals should be affirmed. Respectfully submitted. MARK A. PERRY Counsel of Record MIGUEL A. ESTRADA AMANDA M. ROSE GIBSON, DUNN & CRUTCHER LLP 1050 Connecticut Ave. N.W. Washington, D.C. 20036 (202) 955-8500 Counsel for Respondent Janus Capital Management LLC [Counsel for Other Respondents Listed on Next Page] March 28, 2006 (617) 951-7000 Thomas B. Smith Ropes & GRAY LLP 700 12th Street, N.W. 19103 (215) 994-2369 Attorneys for Respondent 101 Park Avenue New York, N.Y. 10178 (212) 309-6702 Attorneys for Respondent Deutsche Invesimeni Man- agement Americas Inc. Dale R. Harris DAVIS GRAHAM & STUBBS LLP 1550 17th Street Denver, Colorado 80202 (303) 892-9400 Attorneys for Respondent Janus Investment Fund Phil C. Neal Mark A. Rabinowitz NEAL, GERBER & EISENBERG LLP Two North LaSalle Street Chicago, Dhnois 60602 (312) 269-8083 Attorneys for Respondent Columbia Wanger Asset Management LP. John W_ Rotunno Kenneth E. Rechtons Bet., Bovp & LLoyd LLC 70 West Madison Street Chicago, Dlinois 60602 (312) 807-4213 Attorneys for Respondents Artisan Partners Limited Partnership and Columbia Acorn Trust James R. Carroll David S. Clancy SKADDEN, ARPS, SLATE, MEAGHER & FLOM LLP One Beacon Street Boston, Mass. 02108 (617) 573-4800 Attorneys for Respondent Putnam Investment Man- agement, LLC Charlies F. Smith Lee P. Garner SKADDEN, ARPS, SLATE, MEAGHER & FLOM LLP 333 West Wacker Drive (312) 407-0787 Attorneys for Respondent Van Kampen Series Fund, Inc. Robert Y. Sperling David E. Koropp WINSTON & STRAWN 35 West Wacker Drive Chicago, Dlinois 6060! (312) 558-5600 Attorneys for Respondent Van Kampen Investment Advisory Corporation la Title 28 U.S.C. § 1291 provides, in pertinent part: § 1291. Final decisions of district courts The courts of appeals * * * shall have jurisdiction of appeals from al! final decisions of the district courts of the United States, * * * except where a direct re- view may be had in the Supreme Court. * * * Title 28 U.S.C. § 1367 provides, in pertinent part: § 1367. Supplemental jurisdiction (a) Except as provided in subsections (b) and (c) or as expressly provided otherwise by Federal stat- ute, in any civil action of which the district courts have original jurisdiction, the district courts shall have supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims that are so related to claims in the action within such original jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or controversy under Article III of the United States Constitution. * * * ** * (c) The district courts may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a claim under subsec- tion (a) if— (1) the claim raises a novel or complex issue of State law, (2) the claim substantially predominates over the claim or claims over which the district court has original jurisdiction, (3) the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction, or (4) in exceptional circumstances, there are other compelling reasons for declining jurisdic- tion. s* * 2a Title 28 U.S.C. § 1442 provides, in pertinent part: § 1442. Federal officers or agencies sued or prosecuted (a) A civil action or criminal prosecution com- menced in a State court against any of the following may be removed by them to the district court of the United States for the district and division embracing the place wherein it is pending: (1) The United States or any agency thereof or any officer (or any person acting under that offi- cer) of the United States or of any agency thereof, sued in an official or individual capacity for any act under color of such office or on ac- count of any right, title or authority claimed un- der any Act of Congress for the apprehension or punishment of criminals or the collection of the revenue. x* * (3) Any officer of the courts of the United States, for any act under color of office or in the performance of his duties. (4) Any officer of either House of Congress, for any act in the discharge of his official duty under an order of such House. *** Title 28 U.S.C. § 1453 provides, in pertinent part: § 1453. Removal of class actions *** (b) In general.—A class action may be removed to a district court of the United States in accordance with section 1446 (except that the 1-year limitation under section 1446(b) shall not apply), without re- gard to whether any defendant is a citizen of the State in which the action is brought, except that such 3a action may be removed by any defendant without the consent of all defendants. (c) Review of Remand Orders.— (1) In General.—Section 1447 shall apply to any removal of a case under this section, except that notwithstanding section 1447(d), a court of appeals may accept an appeal from an order of a district court granting or denying a motion to re- mand a class action to the State court from which it was removed if application is made to the court of appeals not less than 7 days after entry of the order. *“* * (d) Exception.—This section shall not apply to any class action that solely involves— (1) a claim concerning a covered security as defined under section 16(f)(3) of the Securities Act of 1933 (15 U.S.C. § 78p(f)(3)) and section 28(f)(5)(E) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. § 78bb(f)(5)(E)); *“* * Title 18 U.S.C. § 3731 provides, in pertinent part: § 3731. Appeal by United States In a criminal case an appeal by the United States shall lie to a court of appeals from a decision, judg- ment, or order of a district court dismissing an in- dictment or information or granting a new tnial after verdict or judgment, except that no appeal shall lie where the double jeopardy clause of the United States Constitution prohibits further prosecution. s*** --- Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385016_0221%3A13. Public record. Not legal advice.