# Slip Opinion — League of United Latin American Citizens v. Perry > Briefs, arguments, decisions, and more. URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385016_0212%3A1 ## Record - **Collection:** Supreme Court brief - **Document type:** Slip Opinion - **Published:** January 1, 2006 - **Citation:** 548 U.S. 399 ## Text ~. (Slap Opiansen! OCTOBER TERM, 2005 l Syllabus NOTE: Where ot as feastble, a syllabus (headmete: wall be released. as os being done im connection with this case at the time the opanion os ussned The svilabus constututes no part of the opamon of the Court bat has been prepare | by the Reperter af Deestoms for the comvenrmenee of the reader See United States ¥. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co, 200) S B20 507 SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES Syllabus LEAGUE OF UNITED LATIN AMERICAN CITIZENS ~ BT AL. vc. PERRY, GOVERNOR OF TEXAS, ET AL. APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE LASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS No. 05-204. Argued March 1, 2006—Decided June 28, 2006* The 1990 census resulted in a 3-seat increase over the 27 seats previ- ously allotted the Texas congressional delegation. Although the De- mocratic Party then controlled 19 of those 27 seats. as well as both state legislative houses and the governorship, change was im the air: The Republican Party had received 17% of the 1990 statewide vote, while the Democrats had received only 51%. Faced with a possible Republican ascent to majority status, the legislature drew a congres- sional redistricting plan that favored Democratic candidates. The Republicans challenged the 1991 Plan as an unconstitutional parti- san gerry mander, but to no avail. The 2000 census authorized two additional seats for the Texas delegation. The Republicans then controlled the governorship and the State Senate, but did not vet control the State Llouse of Repre- sentatives. So constituted, the legislature was unable to pass a redis- tricting scheme, resulting in htigation and the necessity of a court- ordered plan to comply with+he_L—S.-Constitution'’s one-person, one- vote requirement. Conscious that the primary responsibility for drawing congressional districts lies with the political branches of government, and hesitant to undo the work of one political party for the benefit of another. the three-judge Federal District Court sought to apply only “neutral” redistricting standards when drawing Plan L1I51C, including placing the two new seats in high-growth areas, fol- *Together with No. 05-254. Travis County, Texas, etal. v. Perry, Governor of Texas, et al., No. 05-276, Jackson et al. v. Perry, Governor of Texas, et al., and No. 05-439, G/ Forum of Texas el al. v. Perry, Gov- ernor of Texas, et al., also on appeal from the same court. 2 LEAGUE OF UNITED LATIN AMERICAN CITIZENS v. PERRY Syllabus lowing county and voting precinct lines, and avoiding the pairing of incumbents. Under Plan 1151C, the 2002 congressional elections re- sulted in a 17-to-15 Democratic majority in the Texas delegation, compared to a 59% to 40% Republican majority in votes for statewide office in 2000, thus leaving the 1991 Democratic gerrymander largely in place. In 2003, however, Texas Republizane gained control of both houses of the legislature and set out to increase Republican representation in the congressional delegation. After a protracted partisan struggle. the legislature enacted a new congressional districting map, Plan 1374C. In the 2004 congressional elections, Republicans won 21 seats to the Democrats’ 11, while also obtaining 58% of the vote in statewide races against the Democrats’ 41%. Soon after Plan 1374C was enacted, appellants challenged it in court, alleging a host of con- stitutional and statutory violations. In 2004 the District Court en- tered judgment for appellees, but this Court vacated the decision and remanded for consideration in light of Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267. On remand, the District Court, believing the scope of its mandate was limited to questions of political gerrymandering. again rejected appellants’ claims. Held: The judgment is affirmed in part, reversed in part, and vacated in part, and the cases are remanded. 399 F. Supp. 2d 756, affirmed in part, reversed in part, vacated in part, and remanded. JUSTICE KENNEDY delivered the opinion of the Court with respect to Parts LI—A and III, concluding: 1. This Court held, in Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 118-127, that an equal protection challenge to a political gerrymander pre- sents a justiciable case or controversy, although it could not agree on what substantive standard to apply, compare id., at 127-137, with id., at 161-162. That disagreement persists. The \V eth plurality would have held such challenges nonjusticiable political questions, but a majority declined to do so, see 541 U.S., at 306, 317, 343, 355. Justiciability is not revisited here. At issue is whether appellants of- fer a manageable, reliable measure of fairness for determining: whether a partisan gerrymander is unconstitutional. P. 7. 2. Texas’ redrawing of District 23's lines amounts to vote dilution violative of §2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965. Pp. 17-36. (a) Plan 1374C’s changes to District 23 served the dual goals of increasing Republican seats and protecting the incumbent Republi- can against an increasingly powerful Latino population that threat- ened to oust him, with the additional political nuance that he would be reelected in a district that had a Latino majority as to voting age population. though not a Latino majority as to citizen voting age Cite as: 548 U-S.__ (20006) 3 Syllabus population or an effective Latino voting majority. The District 23 changes required adjustments elsewhere, so the State created new District 25 to avoid retrogression under §5 of the Act. Pp. 17-18. (b) A State violates §2 “if, based on the totality of circumstances, it is shown that the political processes leading to nomination or elec- tion... are not [as] equally open to... members of [a racial group as they are to] other members of the electorate.” 42 U.S. C. §1973(b). Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 50-51, identified three threshold conditions for establishing a §2 violation: (1) the racial group must be “sufficiently large and geographically compact to constitute a major- ity in a single-member district’; (2) the group must be “politically co- hesive”; and (3) the white majority must “vot[e] sufficiently as a bloc to enable it ... usually to defeat the minority’s preferred candidate.” The legislative history identifies factors that courts can use, once all three threshold requirements are met, in interpreting §2’s “totality of circumstances” standard, including the State's history of voting- related discrimi .tion, the extent to which voting is racially polar- ized, and the extent to which the State has used voting practices or procedures that tend to enhance the opportunity for discrimination against the minority group. See id., at 44-45. Another relevant con- sideration is whether the number of districts in which the minority group forms an effective majority is roughly proportional to its share of the population in the relevant area. Johnson vy. De Grandy, 512 U.S. 997, 1006. The district court’s determination whether the §2 requirements are satisfied must be upheld unless clearly erroneous. See Gingles, supra, at 78-79. Where “the ultimate finding of dilu- tion” is based on “a misreading of the governing law,” however, there is reversible error. De Grandy, supra, at 1022. Pp. 18-20. (c) Appellants have satisfied all three Gingles requirements as to District 23, and the creation of new District 25 does not remedy the problem. The second and third Gingles factors—Latino cohesion, majority bloc voting—are present, given the District Court's finding of racially polarized voting in the District 23 and throughout the State. As to the first Gingles precondition—that the minority group be large and compact enough to constitute a majority in a single-member district, 478 U.S., at 50—appellants have established that Latinos could have had an opportunity district in District 23 had its lines not been al- tered and that they do not have one now. They constituted a major- ity of the citizen voting age population in [istrict 23 under Plan 1151C. The District Court suggested incorrectly that the district was not a Latino opportunity district in 2002 simply because the incum- bent prevailed. The fact that a group does not win elections does not resolve the vote dilution issue. De Grandy, 512 U.S., at 1014, n. 11. 4 LEAGUE OF UNITED LATIN AMERICAN CITIZENS v. PERRY Syllabus In old District 23 the increase in Latino voter registration and overall population, the concomitant rise in Latino voting power in each suc- cessive election, the near victory of the Latino candidate of choice in 2002, and the resulting threat to the incumbent's continued election were the very reasons the State redrew the district lines. Since the redistricting prevented the immediate success of the emergent Latino majority in District 23, there was a denial of opportunity in the real sense of that term. Plan 1374C’s version of District 23, by contrast, is unquestionably not a Latino opportunity district. That Latinos are now a bare majority of the district's voting-age population is not dis- positive, since the relevant numbers must account for citizenship in order to determine the group's opportunity to elect candidates, and Latinos do not now have a citizen voting-age majority in the district. The State's argument that it met its §2 obligations by creating new District 25 as an offsetting opportunity district is rejected. In a dis- trict line-drawing challenge, “the first Gingles condition requires the possibility of creating more than the existing number of reasonably compact districts with a sufficiently large minority population to elect candidates of its choice.” Id., at 1008. The District Court's finding that the current plan contains six Latino opportunity districts and that seven reasonably compact districts, as proposed by appellant GI Forum, could not be drawn was not clearly erroneous. However, the court failed to perform the required compactness inquiry between the number of Latino opportunity districts under the challenger's pro- posal of reinstating Plan 1151C and the “existing number of reasona- bly compact districts.” /bid. Section 2 does not forbid the creation of a noncompact majority-minority district, Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 999, but such a district cannot remedy a violation elsewhere in the State, see Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899, 916. The lower court recog- nized there was a 300-mile gap between the two Latino communities in District 25, and a similarly large gap between the needs and inter- ests of the two groups. The court's conclusion that the relative smoothness of the district lines made the district compact, despite this combining of discrete communities of interest, is inapposite be- cause the court analyzed the issue only in the equal protection con- text, where compactness focuses on the contours of district lines to determine whether race was the predominant factor in drawing those lines. See Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 916-917. Under §2, by contrast, the injury is vote dilution, so the compactness inquiry con- siders “the compactness of the minority population, not .. . the com- pactness of the contested district.” Vera, 517 U.S., at 997. A district that “reaches out to grab small and apparently isolated minority com- munities” is not reasonably compact. /d., at 979. The lower court's findings regarding the different characteristics, needs, and interests Cite as: 48U.S. __ (2006) : 5 Syllabus of the two widely scattered Latino communities in District 23 are well supported and uncontested. The enormous geographical dis- tances separating the two communities, coupled with the disparate needs and interests of these populations—not either factor alone— renders District 25 noncompact for §2 purposes. Therefore, Plan 1374C contains only five reasonably compatt Latino opportunity dis- tricts, one fewer than Plan 1151C. Pp. 20-29. (d) The totality of the circumstances demonstrates a §2 violation. The relevant proportionality inquiry, see De Grandy, 512 U.S., at 1000, compares the percentage of total districts that are Latino op- portunity districts with the Latino share of the citizen voting-age population. The State's contention that proportionality should be de- cided on a regional basis is rejected in favor of appellants’ assertion that their claim requires a statewide analysis because they have al- leged statewide vote dilution based on a statewide plan. Looking statewide. there are 32 congressional districts. The five reasonably compact Latino opportunity districts amount to roughly 16% of the total, while Latinos make up 22% of Texas’ citizen voting-age popula- tion. Latinos are, therefore, two districts shy of proportional repre- sentation. Even deeming this disproportionality insubstantial would not overcome the other evidence of vote dilution for Latinos in Dis- trict 23. The changes there undermined the progress of a racial group that has been subject to significant voting-related discrimina- tion and that was becoming increasingly politically active and cohe- sive. Cf., e.g., id., at 1014. Against this background, the Latinos’. di- minishing electoral support for the incumbent indicates their belief he was unresponsive to their particularized needs. In essence, the State took away their opportunity because they were about to exer- cise it. Even accepting the District Court's finding that the State's action was taken primarily for political, not racial, reasons, the re- drawing of District 23's lines was damaging to its Latino voters. The State not only made fruitless the Latinos’ mobilization efforts but also acted against those Latinos who were becoming most politically active. Although incumbency protection can be a legitimate factor in districting, see Aarcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725, 740, not all of its forms are in the interests of the constituents. If, as here, such protec- tion means excluding some voters from the district simply because they are likely to vote against the officeholder, the change is to bene- fit the officeholder, not the voters. This policy, whatever its validity in the political realm, cannot justify the effect on Latino voters. See Gingles, supra, at 45. Pp. 29-36. (ce) Because Plan 1374C violates §2 in its redrawing of District 23. appellants’ First Amendment and equal protection claims with respect to that district need not be addressed. Their equal protection LEAGUE OF UNITED LATIN AMERICAN CITIZENS v. PERRY Syllabus claim as to the drawing of District 25 need not be confronted because that district will have to be redrawn to remedy the District 23 viola- tion. Pp. 36-37. JUSTICE KENNEDY concluded in Part II that Sie appellants have established no legally impermissible use of poli ical classifica- tions, they state no claim on which relief may be granted as to their contention that Texas’ statewide redistricting is an unconstitutional political gerrymander. Justice SOUTER and JUSTICE GINSBURG joined Part II-D. Pp. 7-15. (a) Article I of the Constitution, }§2 and 4, gives “the States pri- mary responsibility for apportionment of their ... congressional .. . districts,” Growe v. Emison, 507 U.S. 25, 34, but §4 also permits Con- gress to set further requirements. Neither the Constitution nor Con- gress has stated any explicit prohibition of mid-decade redistricting to change districts drawn earlier in conformance with a decennial census. Although the legisiative branch plays the primary role in congres- sional redistricting. courts have an important role when a districting plan violates the Constitution. See, e.g., Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1. That the federal courts sometimes must order legislative redis- tricting, however. does not shift the primary responsibility away from legislative bodies, see, e.g., Wise v. Lipscomb, 437 U.S. 535, 540, who are free to replace court-mandated remedial plans by enacting redis- tricting plans of their own, see, e.g., Upham v. Seamon, 456 U.S. 37, 44. Judicial respect for legislative plans, however, cannot justify leg- islative reliance on improper criteria for districting determinations. Pp. 7—10. (b) Appellants claim unpersuasively that a decision to effect mid- decennial redistricting, when solely motivated by partisan objectives. presumptively violates equal protection and the First Amendment because it serves no legitimate public purpose and burdens one group because of its political opinions and affiliation. For a number of rea- sons, that test is unconvincing. There is some merit to the State's as- sertion that partisan gain was not the sole motivation for replacing Plan 1151C: The contours of some contested district lines seem to have been drawn based on more mundane and local interests, and a number of line-drawing requests by Democratic state legislators were honored. Moreover, a successful test for identifying unconstitutional partisan gerrymandering must do what appellants sole-motivation theory explicitly disavows: show a burden, as measured by a reliable standard, on the complainants representational rights. See Vieth, supra, at 292-295, 307-308. Appellants’ sole-intent standard is no more compelling when it is linked to the circumstance that Plan 1374C is “mid-decennial legislation. The Constitution's text and structure and this Court's cases indicate there is nothing inherently - Cite as: 548 U.S. __ (2006) 7 Syllabus suspect about a legislature's decision to replace mid-decade a court- ordered plan with one of its own. Even if there were, the fact of mid- decade redistricting alone is no sure indication of unlawful political gerrymanders. Appellants’ test would leave untouched the 1991 Texas redistricting, which entrenched a party on the verge of minor- ity status, while striking down the 2003 redistricting plan, which re- sulted in the majority Republican Party capturing a larger share of the seats. A test that treats these two similarly effective power plays in such different ways does not have the reliability appellants ascribe to it. Pp. 10-14. (c) Appellants’ political gerry sommdutiee theory that mid-decade re- districting for exclusively partisan purposes violates the one-person, one-vote requirement is rejected. Although conceding that States op- erate under the legal fiction that their plans are constitutionally ap- portioned throughout a decade, see, e.g., Georgia v. Ashcroft, 539 U.S. 461, 488. n. 2. appellants contend that this fiction should not provide a safe harbor for a legislature that enacts a voluntary. mid- decade plan overriding a legal court-drawn plan. This argument mir- rors appellants’ attack on mid-decennial redistricting solely moti- vated by partisan considerations and is unsatisfactory for the same reasons. Their further contention that the legislature intentionally sought to manipulate population variances when it enacted Plan 1374C is unconvincing because there is no District Court finding to that effect, and they present no specific evidence to support this seri- ovs allegation of bad faith. Because they have not demonstrated that the legislature's decision to enact Plan 1374C constitutes~a violation of the equal-population requirement, their subsidiary reliance on Larios v. Cox. 300 F. Supp. 2d 1320, summarily affd, 542 U.S. 947, is unavailing. Pp. 14-16. JUSTICE KENNEDY, joined by THE CHIEF JUSTICE and JuUsTICE ALITO, concluded in Part IV that the Dallas area redistricting does not vio- late §2 of the Voting Rights Act. Appellants allege that the Dallas changes dilute African-American voting strength because an African- . American minority effectively controlled District 24 under Plan 1151C. However, before Plan 1374C, District 24 had elected an An- glo Democrat to Congress in every election since 1978. Since then, moreover, the incumbent has had no opposition in any of his primary elections, and African-Americans have consistently voted for him. African-Americans were the second-largest racial group in the dis- trict after Anglos, but had only 25.7% of the citizen voting age popu- lation. Even assuming that the first Gingles prong can accommodate appellants’ assertion that a §2 claim may be stated for a racial group that makes up less than 50% of the population, see. e.g., De Grandy, supra, at 1009, they must show they constitute “a sufficiently large LEAGUE OF UNITED LATIN AMERICAN CITIZENS v. PERRY Syllabus minority to elect their candidate of choice with the assistance of cross-over votes,” Voinovich v. Quiller, 507 U.S. 146, 158. The District Court committed no clear error in rejecting questionable evidence that Afriean-Americans have the ability to elect their candidate of choice in favor of other evidence that an African-American candidate of choice would not prevail. See Anderson v. Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 574. That African-Americans had influence in the district does not suffice to state a §2 claim. If it did, it would unnecessarily infuse race into virtually every redistricting, raising serious constitutional questions. See Georgia v. Ashcroft, 539 U. S. 461, 491. Id., at 480, 482, distinguished. Appellants do not raise a dist rict-specific political ger- rymandering claim against District 24. Pp. 37-41. THe CHIEF JUSTICE, joined by JUSTICE ALITO, agreed that appellants have not provided a reliable standard for identifying unconstitutional political gerrymanders, but noted that the question whether any such standard exists—i.e., whether a challenge to such a gerrymander presents a justiciable case or controversy—has not been argued in these cases. THE CHIEF JUSTICE and Justice ALITO therefore take no position on that question, which has divided the Court. see Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, and join the plurality’s Part II disposition without specifying whether appellants have failed to state a claim on which relief can be granted or failed to present a justiciable contro- versy. Pp. 1-2. Justice SCALIA, joined by Justice THOMAS, concluded that appel- lants’ claims of unconstitutional political gerrymandering do not pre- sent a justiciable case or controversy, see Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 271-306 (plurality opinion), and that their vote-dilution claims premised on §2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 lack merit for the reasons set forth in JUSTICE THOMAS'’s opinion concurring in the judgment in Holder v. Iall, 512 U.S. 874, 891-946. Reviewing ap- pellants’ race-based equal protection claims, JUSTICE SCALIA, joined by THE CHIEF Justice, Justice THOMAS, and JUSTICE ALITO, concluded that the District Court did not commit clear error in rejecting appel- lant GI Forum's assertion that the removal of Latino residents from District 23 constituted intentional vote dilution. JUSTICE SCALIA, joined by THe CHler Justice, Justice THOMAS, and Justice ALITO, subjected the intentional creation of District 25 as a majority- minority district to strict scrutiny and held that standard satisfied because appellants conceded that the creation of this district was reasonably necessary to comply with §5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, which is a compelling state interest, and did not argue that Texas did more than that provision required it to do, Pp. 2-11. KENNEDY, d., announced the judgment of the Court and delivered the Cite as: K48U.S._ (2006) ; 9 Syllabus opinion of the Court with respect to Parts Ll—A and III, in which Sre- VENS, SOUTER, GINSBURG, AND Breyer, JJ., joined, an opinion with re- spect to Parts | and IV, in which Roperts, C. J., and ALITO, J., joined. an opinion with respect to Parts [II-B and II-C, and an opinion with respect to Part II-D, in which SOUTER and GINSBURG, dd., joined. STE- VENS, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, in which BREYER, J., joined as to Parts I and II. Sourer, J., filed an opin- ion concurring in part and dissenting in part. in which GINSBURG, J., joined. BREYER, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part. Roperts, C. J., filed an opinion concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part, and dissenting in part. in which ALITO, J., joined. Scala, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment in part and dis- senting in part, in which THOMas, J., joined, and in which ROBERTS, ©. J., and ALITo, J., joined as to Part III. Cite as JIRT_S (2006) 4 1 Chnmon of Kronen yA NOTICE: This epamen os satyect to fog al reves bedewe peblecatioon an the prelhemnary prod of the Tneted States Pepeats — Revchers cae repented! | netify the Reperter of Deesions. Supreme Court ofthe | nated States Wash- mytien, DC QOS of any Upagrapieecal o@ other femal oops na onde: that corrections may be made before the pre tmnary print goes to press SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES Nos. 05-204, 05-254, 05-276 and 05-139 LEAGUE OF UNTITED LATIN AMERICAN CITIZENS, ET AL., APPELLANTS 05-204 v. RICK PERRY, GOVERNOR OF TEXAS, ET AL. TRAVIS COUNTY, TEXAS, ET AL., APPELLANTS 05-254 v. RICK PERRY, GOVERNOR OF TEXAS, bT AL. EDDIE JACKSON, ET AL., APPELLANTS 05-276 . RICK PERRY, GOVERNOR OF TEXAS, ET AL. GI FORUM OF TEXAS, eT AL, APPELLANTS 05-439 ». RICK PERRY, GOVERNOR OF TEXAS, ET AL. ON APPEALS FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS jJune 28, 2006] JUSTICE KENNEDY announced the judgment of the Court and delivered the opinion of the Court with respect to Parts I-A and III, an opinion with respect to Parts | and IV, in which Tite Ciike JUstické and JUSTICE ALITO join, an opinion with respect to Parts II-B and H—C, and an opinion with respect to Part II-D, in which JUSTICE 2 LEAGUE OF UNITED LATIN AMERICAN CITIZENS v. PERRY Opinion of KENNEDY, J. SOUTER and JUSTICE GINSBURG join. These four consolidated cases are appeals from a judg- ment entered by the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas. Convened as a three-judge court under 28 U. S. C. §2284, the court heard appellants’ constitutional and statutory challenges to a 2003 enactment of the Texas State Legislature-that drew new distric’, lines for the 32 seats Texas holds in the United States House of Representatives. (Though appellants do not join each other as to all claims, for the sake of convenience we refer to appellants collectively.) In 2004 the court entered judg- ment for appellees and issued detailed findings of fact and conclusions of law. Session v. Perry, 298 F.Supp: 2d 451 (per curiam). This Court vacated that decision and re- manded for consideration in light of Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267 (2004). 543 U.S. 941 (2004). The District Court reexamined appellants’ political gerrymandering claims and, in a second careful opinion, again held for the defen- dants. Henderson v. Perry, 399 F.Supp. 2d 756 (2005). These appeals followed, and we noted probable jurisdiction. 546 U.S. __ (20085). Appellants contend the new plan is an unconstitutional partisan gerrymander and that the redistricting statewide violates §2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 79 Stat. 437, as amended, 42 U.S. C. §1973. Appellants also contend that the use of race and politics in drawing lines of specific districts violates the First Amendment and the. Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The three-judge panel, consisting of Circuit Judge Higginbotham and District Judges Ward and Rosenthal, brought considerable experience and expertise to the instant case, based on their knowledge of the State’s peo- ple, history, and geography. Judges Higginbotham and Ward, moreover, had served on the three-judge court that drew the plan the Texas Legislature replaced in 2003, so they were intimately familiar with the history and intrica- ‘, Cite as: 448 U.S. (2006) 3 Opinion of KENNEDY, J. cies of the cases. We affirm the District Court's dispositions on the state- wide political gerrymandering claims and the Voting Rights Act claim against District 24. We reverse and remand on the Voting Rights Act claim with respect to_ District 23. Because we do not reach appellants’ race- based equal protection claim or the political gerrymander- ing claim as to District 23, we vacate the judgment of the District Court on these claims. To set out a proper framework for the case, we first recount the history of the litigation and recent districting in Texas. An appropriate starting point is not the reap- portionment in 2000 but the one from the census in 1990. The 1990 census resulted in a 30-seat congressional delegation for Texas, an increase of 3 seats over the 27 representatives allotted to the State in the decade before. See Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 956-957 (1996). In 1991 the Texas Legislature drew new district lines. At the time, the Democratic Party controlled both houses in the state legislature, the governorship, and 19 of the State's 27 seats in Congress. Yet change appeared to be on the horizon. In the previous 30 years the Democratic Party's post-Reconstruction dominance over the Republican Party had eroded, and by 1990 the Republicans received 47% of the statewide vote, while the Democrats received 51%. Henderson, supra, at. 763; Brief for Appellee Perry et al. in No. 05-204, etc., p.2 (hereinafter Brief for State Appellees). ‘ Faced with a Republican opposition that could be mov- ing toward majority status, the state legislature drew a congressional redistricting plan designed to favor Democ- ratic candidates. Using then-emerging computer technol- ogy to draw district lines with artful precision, the legisla- ture enacted a plan later described as the “shrewdest 4 LEAGUE OF UNITED LATIN AMERICAN CITIZENS v, PERRY Opinion of KENNEDY, J. gerrymander of the 1990s.” M. Barone, R. Cohen, & C. ‘ook, Almanac of American Politics 2002, p. 1448 (2001). See Henderson, supra, at 767, and n. 47. Although the 1991 plan was enacted by the state legislature, Democ- ratic Congressman Martin Frost was acknowledged as its architect. Session, supra, at 482. The 1991 plan “carefully constructs democratic districts ‘with incredibly convoluted lines’ and packs ‘heavily Republican’ suburban areas into just a few districts.” Henderson, supra, at 767, n. 47 (quot- ing M. Barone & R. Cohen, Almanac of American Politics 2004, p. 1510 (2008) (hereinafter 2004 Almanac)). Voters who considered this unfair and unlawful treat- ment sought to invalidate the 1991 plan as an unconstitu- tional partisan gerrymander, but to no avail. See Terrazas v. Slagle, 789 F. Supp. 828, 833 (WD Tex. 1992); Terrazas v. Slagle, 821 F.Supp. 1162, 1175 (WD Tex. 1993). The 1991 plan realized the hopes of Democrats and the fears of Republicans with respect to the composition of the Texas congressional delegation. The 1990'S were years of con- tinued growth for the Texas Republican Party, and by the end of the decade it was sweeping elections for statewide office. Nevertheless, despite carrying 59% of the vote in statewide elections in~2000, the Republicans only won 13 congressional seats to the Democrats’ 17. Henderson, supra, at 763. These events likely were not forgotten by either party when it came time to draw congressional 14, 2001) (per curiam), summarily affd, 586 U.S. 919 (2002), App. E to Juris. Statement in No. 05-276, p. 202a. The congressional districting map resulting from the Balderas \itigation is known as Plan 1151C. As we have said, two members of the three-judge court that drew Plan 1151C later served on the three-judge court that issued the judgment now under review. Thus we have the benefit of their candid comments concerning the redistricting approach taken in the Balderas litigation. Conscious that the primary responsibility for drawing congressional districts is given to political branches of government, and hesitant to “und|o] the work of one politi- cal party for the benefit of another,” the three-judge Bal- deras court sought to apply “only ‘neutral’ redistricting standards” when drawing Plan 1151C. Henderson, 399 I’. Supp. 2d, at 768. Once the District. Court applied these principles—such as placing the two new seats in high- growth areas, following county and voting precinct lines, and avoiding the pairing of incumbents—“the drawing ceased, leaving the map free of further change except to conform it te one-person, one-vote.” J/bid. Under Plan 1151C, the 2002 congressional elections resulted in a 17- to-15 Democratic majority in the Texas delegation, com- pared to a 59% to 40% Republican majority in votes for statewide office in 2000. Jd., at 763-764. Reflecting on the Balderas Plan, the District Court in Ilenderson was candid to acknowledge “[t|he practical effect of this effort was to leave the 1991 Democratic Party gerrymander largely in place as a ‘legal’ plan.” /d., at 768. The continuing influence of a court-drawn map that “perpetuated much of [the 1991] gerrymander,” ibid., was not lost on Texas Republicans when, in 2003, they gained control of the State House of Representatives and, thus, both houses of the legislature. The Republicans in the legislature “set out to increase their representation in the congressional delegation.” Session, 298 I°. Supp. 2d, at 6 LEAGUE OF UNITED LATIN AMERICAN CITIZENS v. PERRY Opinion of KreNNEbY. J 471. See also id., at 470 (There is little question but that the single-minded purpose of the Texas Legislature in enacting |a new plan] was to gain partisan advantage’). After a protracted partisan struggle, during which Democ- ratic legislators left the State for a time to frustrate quo- rum requirements, the legislature enacted a new congres- sional districting map in October 2003. It is called Plan 1374C. The 2004 congressional elections did not disap- point the plan's drafters. Republicans won 21 seats to the Democrats’ 11, while also obtaining 58% of the vote in statewide races against the Democrats’ 41%. Henderson, supra, at. 764. Soon after Texas enacted Plan 1374C, appellants chal- lenged it in court, alleging a host of constitutional_and statutory violations. Initially, the District Court entered judgment against appellants on all their claims. See Session, 298 F.Supp. 2d, at 457: id., at 515 (Ward, J. concurring in part and dissenting in part). Appellants sought relief here and, after their jurisdictional state- ments were filed, this Court issued Vieth v. Jubelirer. Our order vacating the District Court judgment and remand- ing for consideration in light of Vieth was issued just weeks before the 2004 elections. See 543 U.S. 941 (ect. 18, 2004). On remand, the District Court, believing the scope of its mandate was limited to questions of political gerrymandering, again rejected appellants’ claims. Hen- derson, 399 F. Supp. 2d, at 777-778. Judge Ward would have granted rehef under the theory—presented to the court for the first time on remand—that mid-decennial redistricting violates the one-person, one-vote require- ment, but he concluded such an argument was not within the scope of the remand mandate. /d., at 779, 784-785 (specially concurring). Cite as: 548 U.S. (2006) 7 Opinion of the Court I] A Based on two similar theories that address the mid- decade character of the 2008 redistricting, appellants now argue that Plan 1374C should be invalidated as an uncon- stitutional partisan gerrymander. In Davis v. Bandemer, A478 U.S. 109 (1986), the Court held that an equal protection challenge to a political gerrymander presents a justiciable case or controversy, id., at 118-127, but there was dis- agreement over what substantive standard to apply. Com- pare id., at 127-187 (plurality opinion) with id., at 161-162 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). That disagreement persists. A plurality of the Court in Vieth v. Jubelirer would have held such challenges to be nonjusticia- ble political questions, but a majority declined to do so. See 541 U.S., at 806 (KENNEDY, J., concurring in judgment); id., at. 317 (STEVENS, J., dissenting); id., at 343 (SOUTER, J., dissenting); id., at 355 (BREYER, J., dissenting). We do not revisit. the justiciability holding but do proceed to examine whether appellants’ claims offer the Court a manageable, reliable measure of fairness for determining whether a partisan gerrymander violates the Constitution. B Before addressing appellants’ arguments on mid-decade redistricting, it is appropriate to note some basic princi- ples on the roles the States, Congress, and the courts play in determining how congressional districts are to be drawn. Article | of the Constitution provides: , “Section 2. The House of Representatives shall be composed of Members chosen every second Year by the People of the several States... . “Section 4. The Times, Places and Manner of hold- ing Elections for . . . Representatives, shall be pre- scribed in each State by the Legislature thereof; but 8 LEAGUE OF UNITED LATIN AMERICAN CITIZENS v. PERRY Opinion of KENNEDY, J. the Congress may at any time by Law make or alter such Regulations ... .” This text, we have explained, “leaves with the States primary responsibility for apportionment of their federal congressional . . . (listricts.”. Growe v. Emison, 507 U.S. 25, 34 (1993); see also Chapman v. Meier, 420 U.S. 1, 27 (1975) (“[Rjeapportionment is primarily the duty and responsibility of the State through its legislature or other body”); Smiley v. Holm, 285 U.S. 355, 366-367 (1932) (reapportionment implicated State’s powers under Art. I, §4). Congress, as the text of the Constitution also provides, may set further requirements, and with respect to districting it has gener- ally required single-member districts. See U.S. Const., Art. |, §4; 81 Stat. 581, 2 U.S. C. §2c; Branch v. Smith, 538 U.S. 254, 266-267 (2003). But see id., at 275 (plurality opinion) (multimember districts permitted by 55 Stat. 762, 2 U.S. C. §2a(c) in limited circumstances). With respect to a mid-decade redistricting to change districts drawn earlier in conformance with a decennial census, the Constitution and Congress state no explicit prohibition. Although the legislative branch plays the primary role in congressional redistricting, our precedents recognize an important role for the courts when a districting plan vio- lates the Constitution. See, e.g., Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964). This litigation is an example, as we have discussed. When Texas did not enact a plan to comply with the one-person, one-vote requirement under the 2000 cen- sus, the District Court found it necessary to draw a redis- tricting map on its own. That the federal courts sometimes are required to order legislative redistricting, however, does not shift the primary locus of responsibility. “Legislative bodies should not leave their reappor- tionment tasks to the federal courts; but. when those with legislative responsibilities do not respond, or the imminence of a state election makes it impractical for Cite as: 548 U.S. (2006) 9 Opinion of KENNEDY, J. them to do so, it becomes the ‘unwelcome obligation’ of the federal court to devise and impose a reapportion- ment plan pending later legislative action.” Wise v. Lipscomb, 437 U.S. 535, 540 (1978) (principal opinion) (quoting Connor v. Finch, 431 U.S. 407, 415 (1977)). Quite apart from the risk of acting without a legislature’s expertise, and quite apart from the difficulties a court faces in drawing a map that is fair and rational, see id., at 414-415, the obligation placed upon the Federal Judiciary is unwelcome because drawing lines for congressional districts is one of the most significant acts a State can perform to ensure citizen participation in republican self- governance. That Congress is the federal body explicitly given constitutional power over elections is also a notewor- thy statement of preference for the democratic process. As the Constitution vests redistricting responsibilities fore- most in the legislatures of the States and in Congress, a lawful, legislatively enacted plan should be preferable to one drawn by the courts. It should follow, too, that if a legislature acts to replace a court-drawn plan with one of its own design, no pre- sumption of impropriety should attach to the legislative decision to act. As the District Court noted here, Session, 298 F.Supp. 2d, at 460-461, our decisions have assumed that state legislatures are free to replace court-mandated remedial plans by enacting redistricting plans of their own. See, e.g., Upham v. Seamon, 456 U.S. 37, 44 (1982) (per curiam); Wise, supra, at 540 (principal opinion) (quot- ing Connor, supra, at 415); Burns v. Richardson, 384 U.S. 73, 85 (1966); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 587 (1964). Underlying this principle is the assumption that to prefer a court-drawn plan to a legislature’s replacement would be contrary to the ordinary and proper operation of the politi- cal process. Judicial respect for legislative plans, however, cannot justify legislative reliance on improper criteria for 10 LEAGUE OF UNITED LATIN AMERICAN CITIZENS v. PERRY Opinion of KENNEDY, J. districting determinations. With these considerations in mind, we next turn to consider appellants’ challenges to the new redistricting plan. \ C Appellants claim that Plan 1374C, enacted by the Texas Legislature in 2003, is an unconstitutional political ger- rymander. A decision, they claim, to effect mid-decennial redistricting, when solely motivated by partisan objec- tives, violates equal protection and the First Amendment because it serves no legitimate public purpose and bur- dens one group because of its political opinions and affilia- tion. The mid-decennial nature of the redistricting, appel- lants say, reveals the legislature’s sole motivation. Unlike Vieth, where the legislature acted in the context of a re- quired decennial redistricting, the Texas Legislature voluntarily replaced a plan that itself was designed to comply with new census data. Because ‘Texas had “no constitutional obligation to act at all’ in 2008, Brief for Appellant Jackson et al. in No. 05-276, p. 26, it is hardly surprising, according to appellants, that the District Court found “|t|here is little question but that the single-minded purpose of the Texas Legislature in enacting Plan 1374C was to gain partisan advantage” for the Republican major- ity over the Democratic minority, Session, supra, at 470. A rule, or perhaps a presumption, of invalidity when a mid-decade redistricting plan is adopted solely for parti- san motivations is a salutary one, in appellants’ view, for then courts need not inquire about, nor parties prove, the discriminatory effects of partisan gerrymandering—a matter that has proved elusive since Bandemer. See Vieth, 541 U.S., at 281 (plurality opinion); Bandemer, 478 U.S., at 127. Adding to the test’s simplicity is that it does not quibble with the drawing of individual district. lines but challenges the decision to redistrict at all. lor a number of reasons, appellants’ case for adopting Cite as: 548 U.S. (2006) ll Opinion of KENNEDY, J. their test is not convincing. To begin with, the state ap- pellees dispute the assertion that partisan gain was the “sole” motivation for the decision to replace Plan 1L151C. There is some merit to that criticism, for the pejorative label overlooks indications that partisan motives did not dictate the plan in its entirety. The legislature does seem to have decided to redistrict with the sole purpose of achieving a Republican congressional majority, but parti- san aims did not guide every line it drew. As the District Court found, the contours of some contested district lines were drawn. based on more mundane and local interests. Session, supra, at 472-473. The state appellees also con- tend, and appellants do not contest, that a number of line- drawing requests by Democratic state legislators were honored. Brief for State Appellees 34. Evaluating the legality of acts arising out of mixed motives can be complex, and affixing a single label to those acts can be hazardous, even when the actor is an individual performing a discrete act. See, e.g., Hlariman v. Moore, 547 U.S. ___, _ _. (2006) (slip op., at 9-10). When the actor is a legislature and the act is a composite of manifold choices, the task can be even more daunting. Appellants’ attempt to separate- the legislature's sole motive for discarding Plan 1151C from the complex of choices it made while drawing the lines of Plan 1374C seeks to avoid that difficulty. We are skeptical, however, of a claim that seeks to invalidate a statute based on a legislature’s unlawful motive but does’ so without refer- ence to the content of the legislation enacted. Even setting this skepticism aside, a successful claim attempting to identify unconstitutional acts of partisan gerrymandering must do what appellants’ sole-motivation theory explicitly disavows: show a burden, as measured by a reliable standard,-on the complainants’ representational rights. For this reason, a majority of the Court rejected a test proposed in Vieth that is markedly similar to the one 12 LEAGUE OF UNITED LATIN AMERICAN CITIZENS v, PERRY Opinion of KENNEDY, J. - appellants present today. Compare 541 U.S., at 336 (STEVENS, J., dissenting) (“Just as race can be a factor in, but cannot dictate the outcome of, the districting process, so too can partisanship be a permissible consideration in drawing district lines, so long as it does not predominate’), and id., at 338 ([A]n acceptable rational basis can be neither purely personal nor purely partisan”), with id., at 292-295 (plurality opinion), and id., at 3807-308 (KENNEDY, J., concurring in judgment). The sole-intent standard offered here is no more compel- ling when it is linked to the circumstance that Plan 1374C is mid-decennial legislation. The text and structure of the Constitution and our case law indicate there is nothing inherently suspect about a legislature’s decision to replace mid-decade a court-ordered plan with one of its own. And even if there were, the fact of mid-decade redistricting alone is no sure indication of unlawful political gerryman- ders. Under appellants’ theory, a highly effective partisan gerrymander that coincided with decennial redistricting would receive less scrutiny than a bumbling, yet solely partisan, mid-decade redistricting. More concretely, the test would leave untouched the 1991 Texas redistricting, which entrenched a party on the verge of minority status, while striking down the 2008 redistricting plan, which resulted in the majority Republican Party capturing a larger share of the seats. A test that treats these two similarly effective power plays in such different ways does not have the reliability appellants ascribe to it. Furthermore, compared to the map challenged in Vieth, which led to a Republican majority in the congressional delegation despite a Democratic majority in the statewide vote, Plan 1374C can be seen as making the party balance more congruent to statewide party power. To be sure, there is no constitutional requirement of proportional representation, and equating a party’s statewide share of the vote with its portion of the congressional delegation is Cite as: 548 U.S. (2006) 13 Opinion of KENNEDY, J. a rough measure at best. Nevertheless, a congressional plan that more closely reflects the distribution of state party power seems a less likely vehicle for partisan dis- crimination than one that entrenches an electoral minor- ity. See Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735, 754 (1973). By this measure, Plan 1374C can be seen as fairer than the plan that survived in Vieth and the two previous Texas plans—all three of which would pass the modified sole- intent test that Plan 1374C would fail. A brief for one of the amici proposes a symmetry stan- dard that would measure partisan bias by “comparfing] how both parties would fare hypothetically if they each (in turn) had received a given percentage of the vote.” Brief for Gary King et al. 5. Under that standard the measure of a map’s bias is the extent to which a majority party would fare better than the minority party should their respective shares of the vote reverse. In our view amici’s proposed standard does not compensate for appellants’ failure to provide a reliable measure of fairness. The existence or degree of asymmetry may in large part de- pend on conjecture about where possible vote-switchers will reside. Even assuming a court could choose reliably among different models of shifting voter preferences, we are wary of adopting a constitutional standard that invali- dates a map based on unfair results that would occur in a hypothetical state of affairs. Presumably such a challenge could be litigated if and when the feared inequity arose. Cf. Abbott Laboratories vy. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 148 (1967). More fundamentally, the counterfactual plaintiff would face the same problem as the present, actual appel- lants: providing a standard for deciding how much partisan dominance is too much. Without altogether discounting its utility in redistricting planning and litigation, we conclude asymmetry alone is not a reliable measure of unconstitu- tional partisanship. In the absence of any other workable test for judging 14 LEAGUE OF UNITED LATIN AMERICAN CITIZENS v, PERRY Opinion of KENNEDY, J. partisan gerrymanders, one effect of appellants’ focus on mid-decade redistricting could be to encourage partisan excess at the outset of the decade, when a legislature redistricts pursuant to its decennial constitutional duty and is then immune from the charge of sole-motivation. If mid-decade redistricting were barred or at least subject to close judicial oversight, opposition legislators would also have every incentive to prevent passage of a legislative plan and try their luck with a court that might give them a better deal than negotiation with their political rivals. See Henderson, 399 F. Supp. 2d, at. 776-777. D Appellants’ second political gerrymandering theory is that. mid-decade redistricting for exclusively partisan purposes violates the one-person, one-vote requirement. They observe that population variances in legislative - districts are tolerated only if they “are unavoidable despite a good-faith effort to achieve absolute equality, or for which justification is shown.”. Aarcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725, 730 (1983) (quoting Airkpatrick v. Preisler, 394 U.S. 526, 531 (1969); internal quotation marks omitted), Working from this unchallenged premise, appellants contend that, because the population of Texas has shifted — since the 2000 census, the 2008 redistricting, which relied on that census, created unlawful interdistrict: population variances. To distinguish the variances in Plan 1374C from those of ordinary, 3-year-old districting plans or belatedly drawn court-ordered plans, appellants again rely on the volun- tary, mid-decade nature of the redistricting and its parti- san motivation. Appellants do not contend that a decen- nial redistricting plan would violate equal representation three or five years into the decade if the State’s population had shifted substantially. As they must, they concede that States operate under the legal fiction that their plans are Cite as: 5487S (2006) 15 (pinion of KENNEDY, J constitutionally apportioned throughout the decade, a presumption that is necessary to avoid constant redistrict- ing, with accompanying costs and instability. See Georgia v. Ashcroft, 539 U.S. 461, 488, n. 2 (2003); Reynolds, 377 U.S., at 583. Appellants agree that a plan implemented by a court in 2001 using 2000 population data also enjoys the benefit. of the so-called legal fiction, presumably be- cause belated court-drawn plans promote other important interests, such as ensuring a plan complies with the Con- stitution and voting rights legislation. In appellants’ view, however, this fiction should not provide a safe harbor for a legislature that enacts a volun- tary, mid-decade plan overriding a legal court-drawn plan, thus “‘unnecessarily’” creating population variance “when there was no legal compulsion” to do so. Brief for Appel- lant Travis County et al. in No. 05-254, p. 18. This is particularly so, appellants say, when a legislature acts because of an exclusively partisan motivation. Under appellants’ theory this improper motive at the outset seems enough to condemn the map for violating the equal- population principle. For this reason, appellants believe that the State cannot justify under Aarcher v. Daggett the population variances in Plan 1374C because they are the product of partisan bias and the desire to eliminate all competitive districts. As the District Court noted, this is a test that turns not on whether a_ redistricting furthers equal-population principles but rather on the justification for redrawing a plan in the first place. Henderson, supra, at 776. In that respect appellants’ approach merely restates the question whether it was permissible for the Texas Legislature to redraw the districting map. Appellants’ answer, which mirrors their attack on mid-decennial redistricting solely motivated by partisan considerations, is unsatisfactory for reasons we have already discussed. Appellants also contend that the legislature intention- 16 LEAGUE OF UNITED LATIN AMERICAN CITIZENS v. PERRY Opinion of KENNEDY, J. ally sought to manipulate population variances when it enacted Plan 1374C. There is, however, no District Court finding to that effect, and appellants present no specific eVidence to support this serious allegation of bad faith. Because appellants have not demonstrated that the legis- lature’s decision to enact Plan 1374C constitutes a viola- tion of the equal-population requirement, we find unavail- ing their subsidiary reliance on Larios v. Cox, 300 F. Supp. 2d 1320 (ND Ga. 2004) (per cu. iam), summarily aff'd, 542 U.S. 947 (2004). In Larios, the District Court reviewed the Georgia Legislature's decennial redistricting of its State Senate and House of Representatives districts and found deviations from the equal-population requirement. The District Court then held the objectives of the drafters, which included partisan interests along with regionalist bias and inconsistent incumbent protection, did not justify those deviations. 300 F.Supp. 2d, at 1351-1352. The Larios holding and its examination of the legislature's motivations were relevant only in response to an equal- population violation, something appellants have not estab- lished here. Even in addressing political motivation as a justification for an equal-population violation, moreover, Larios does not give clear guidance. The panel explained it “need not resolve the issue of whether or when partisan advantage alone may justify deviations in population” because the plans were “plainly unlawful” and any parti- san motivations were “bound up inextricably” with other clearly rejected objectives. /d., at 1352. In sum, we disagree with appellants’ view that a legisla- ture’s decision to override a valid, court-drawn plan mid- decade is sufficiently suspect to give shape to a reliable standard for identifying unconstitutional political gerry- manders. We conclude that appellants have established no legally impermissible use of political classifications. lor this reason, they state no claim on which relief may be granted for their statewide challenge. Cite as: 548 U.S. (2006) 17 Opinion of the Court Plan 13874C made changes to district lines in south and west Texas that appellants challenge as violations of §2 of the Voting Rights Act and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The most significant changes occurred to District 23, which—both before and after the redistricting—covers a large tand area in west Texas, and to District 25, which earlier included Houston but now includes a different area, a north-south strip from Austin to the Rio Grande Valley. After the 2002 election, it became apparent that District 23 as then drawn had an increasingly powerful Latino population that threatened to oust the incumbent Republi- can, Henry Bonilla. Before the 2003 redistricting, the Latino share of the citizen voting-age population was 57.5%, and Bonilla’s support among Latinos had dropped with each successive election since 1996. Session, 298 F. Supp. 2d, at 488-489. In 2002, Bonilla captured only 8% of the Latino vote, ibid., and 51.5% of the overall vote. Faced with this loss of voter support, the legislature acted to protect Bonilla’s incumbency by changing the lines— and hence the population mix—of the district. To begin with, the new plan divided Webb County and the city of Laredo, on the Mexican border, that formed the county’s population base. Webb County, which is 94% Latino, had previously rested entirely within District 23; under the new plan, nearly 100,000 people were shifted into neighboring District 28. Jd., at 489. The rest of the county, approximately 93,000 people, remained in District 23. To replace the numbers District 23 lost, the State added voters in counties comprising a largely Anglo, Re- publican area in central Texas. /d., at 188. In the newly drawn district, the Latino share of the citizen voting-age population dropped to 46%, though the Latino share of the total voting-age population remained just over 50%. /d., at 489. 18 LEAGUE OF UNITED LATIN AMERICAN CITIZENS v. PERRY . Opinion of the Court These changes required adjustments elsewhere, of - course, so the State inserted a third district between the two ike 7 Opinion of STEVENS, J. While the Republicans did not do as well as they had hoped in elections for the United States House of Repre- sentatives, they made gains in the Texas Llouse of Repre- sentatives and won a majority of seats in that body. This gave ‘Texas Republicans control over both bodies of the state legislature, as well as the Governor's mansion, for the first time since Reconstruction. With full control of the State’s legislative and executive branches, the Republicans “decided to redraw the state's congressional districts solely for the purpose of seizing between five and seven seats from Democratic incum- bents.” Session, 298 F.Supp. 2d, at 472 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). According to former Lieutenant Governor Bill Ratliff, a highly regarded Repub- lican member of the State Senate, “political gain for the Republicans was 110% of the motivation for the Plan, . . . it was ‘the entire motivation.” /d., at 473 (quoting trial transcript). Or, as the District Court stated in the first of its two decisions in this litigation, “|t]here is little question but. that the single-minded purpose of the Texas Legisla- ture in enacting Plan 1374C was to gain partisan advan- tage.” /d., at 470. See also ante, at 5 (quoting District Court’s conclusion). Indeed, as the State itself argued before the District Court.Fhe overwhelming evidence demonstrated that partisan gain was the motivating force behind the decision to redistrict in 2003.” State Defen- dants’ Post-Trial Brief in No. 2:03—CV-354 (ID Tex.), p. 51 (hereinafter State Post-Trial Brief). This desire for political gain led to a series of dramatic confrontations between Republicans and Democrats, and cans. Nor do the circumstances surrounding the replacement of Plan 1151C suggest that the legislature was motivated by a misimpression that Plan 1151C was unfair to Republicans, and accordingly should be replaced with a more equitable map. Rather, as discussed in detail below, it is clear that the sole motivation for enacting a new districting map Was to maximize Republican advantage. 8 LEAGUE OF UNITED LATIN AMERICAN CITIZENS v. PERRY Opinion of STEVENS, J. ultimately resulted in the adoption of a plan that violated - the Voting Rights Act. The legislature did not pass a new map in the regular 20038 session, in part because Democ- ratic House members absented themselves and thus de- nied the body a quorum. Governor Perry then called a special session to take up congressional redistricting—the same step he had declined to take in 2001 after the release of the decennial census figures, when Republicans lacked a majority in the House. During the first special session, the House approved a new congressional map, but the Senate’s longstanding tradition requiring two-thirds of that body to support a measure before the full Senate will consider it allowed Democrats to block the plan. Lieutenant Governor Dewhurst then announced that he would suspend operation of the two-thirds rule in any future special session considering congressional redistrict- ing. Nonetheless, in a second special session, Senate Democrats again prevented the passage of a new district- ing map by leaving the State and depriving the Senate of a quorum. When a lone Senate Democrat returned to Texas, Governor Perry called a third special session to consider congressional redistricting. During that third special session, the State Senate and the State House passed maps that would have apparently avoided any violation of the Voting Rights Act, because they would have, inter alia, essentially preserved Balderas District 23, a majority-Latino district in southwest Texas, and Balderas District 24, a majority-minority district in the Dallas-Fort Worth area, where black voters consti- tuted a significant majority of voters in the Democratic primary and usually elected their candidate of choice in the general election. Representative Phil King, the redis- tricting legislation’s chief sponsor in the Texas Ilouse, had previously proposed fragmenting District 24, but, after lawvers reviewed the map, King expressed concern that redrawing District 24 might violate the Voting Rights Act, Cite as: 548 U.S. (2006) 9 Opinion of STEVENS, J. and he drafted a new map that left District 24 largely unchanged. Nonetheless, the conferees seeking to reconcile the House and Senate plans produced a map that, as part of its goal of maximizing Republican political advantage, significantly altered both Districts 23 and 24 as they had existed in the Balderas Plan. Balderas District 23 was extended north to take in roughly 100,000 new people who were predominately Anglo and Republican, and was also moved west, thus splitting Webb County and the City of Laredo, and pushing roughly 100,000 people who were predominately Latino and Democratic into an adjacent district. Session, 298 F.Supp. 2d, at 488-489. Black voters who previously resided in Balderas District 24 were fragmented into five new districts, each of which is pre- dominately Anglo and Republican. See App. 104-106. Representative King testified at trial that District 24 was cracked even though cracking the district was not “‘the path of least resistance’” in terms of avoiding Voting Rights Act liability, because leaving Balderas District 24 intact would not “accomplish our political objectives.” State Post-Trial Brief 51-52 (quoting transcript). This map was ultimately enacted into law as Plan 1374C. The overall effect of Plan 1874C was to shift more than eight million Texans into new districts, and to split more counties into more pieces than the Balderas Plan. More- over, the 32 districts in Plan 1374C are, on average, much less compact under either of two standard measures than their counterparts had been under the Balderas Plan. See App. 177-178 (expert report of Professor Gaddie).* Numerous parties filed suit in federal court challenging “These two standard measures of compactness are the perimeter-to- area score, Which compares the relative length of the perimeter of a district to its area, and the smallest circle score, which compares the ratio of space in the district to the space in the smallest circle that could encompass the district. App. 178. 10 LEAGUE OF UNITED LATIN AMERICAN CITIZENS v. PERRY Opinion of STEVENS, J. Plan 1374C on the grounds that it violated §2 of the Vot- ing Rights Act and that it constituted an unconstitutional partisan gerrymander. A three-judge panel—two of whom also were members of the Balderas court—rejected these challenges, over Judge Ward’s partial dissent on the §2 claims. See Session, 298 F. Supp. 2d 451. Responding to plaintiffs’ appeals, we remanded for reconsideration in light of Vieth, 541 U.S. 267. See 543 U.S. 941 (2004). In a characteristically thoughtful opinion written by Judge Higginbotham, the District Court again rejected all challenges to the constitutionality of Plan 1874C. See Henderson, 399 I. Supp. 2d 756. It correctly found that the Constitution does not prohibit a state legislature from redrawing congressional districts in the middle of a census cycle, see id., at 766, and it also correctly recognized that this Court has not yet endorsed clear standards for judg- ing the validity of partisan gerrymanders, see id., at 760- 762. Because the District Court’s original decision, and its reconsideration of the case in the light of the several opin- ions in Vieth v. Jubelirer, are successive chapters in the saga that began with Balderas, it is appropriate to quote this final comment from that opinion before addressing the principal question that is now presented. The Balderas court concluded: “Finally, to state directly what is implicit in all that we have said: political gerrymandering, a purely par- tisan exercise, is inappropriate for a federal court drawing a congressional redistricting map. Even at the hands of a legislative body, political gerrymander- ing is much a bloodfeud, in which revenge is exacted by the majority against its rival. We have left it to the political arena, as we must and wisely should. We do so because our role is limited and not because we see gerrymandering as other than what it is: an abuse of power that, at its core, evinces a fundamental distrust Cite as: 548 U.S. (2006) ll Opinion of STEVENS, J. of voters, serving the self-interest of the political par- ties at the expense of the public good.” App. to Juris. Statement 209a-—210a (footnote omitted). The unique question of law that is raised in this appeal is one that the Court has not previously addressed. That narrow question is whether it was unconstitutional for Texas to replace a lawful districting plan “in the middle of a decade, for the sole purpose of maximizing partisan advantage.” Juris. Statement in No. 05-276, p. i. This question is both different from, and simpler than, the principal question presented in Vieth v. Jubelirer, in which the “‘lack of judicially discoverable and manageable stan- dards” prevented the plurality from deciding the merits of a statewide challenge to a political gerrymander. 541 U.S., at 277-278. As the State points out, -“in’ every _ political- gerrymandering claim the Court has considered, the focus has been on the map itself, not on the decision to create the map in the first place.” Brief for State Appellees 33. In defense of the map itself, rather than the basic decision whether to draw the map in the first place, the State notes that Plan 1374C’s district borders frequently follow county lines and other neutral criteria. At what the State de- scribes as the relevant “level of granularity,” the State correctly points out that appellants. have not even at- tempted to argue that every district line was motivated solely for partisan gain. Ibid. See also ante, at 11 (opinion of KENNEDY, J.) (noting that “partisan aims did not guide every line” in Plan 13874C). Indeed, the multitude of “granular” decisions that are made during redistricting was part of why the Viet) plurality concluded, in the context of a statewide challenge to a redistricting plan promulgated in response to a legal obligation to redistrict, that there are no manageable standards to govern 12 LEAGUE OF UNITED LATIN AMERICAN CITIZENS v. PERRY Opinion of STEVENS, J. whether the predominant motivation underlying the entire redistricting map was partisan. See 541 U.S., at 285. But see id., at 355 (BREYER, J., dissenting) (arguing that there are judicially manageable standards to assess statewide districting challenges even when a plan is en- acted in response to a legal obligation to redistrict). - Unlike Vieth, the narrow question presented by the statewide challenge in this litigation is whether the State's decision to draw the map in the first place, when it was under no legal obligation to do so, was permissible. It is undeniable that identifying the motive for making that basic decision is a readily manageable judicial task. See Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 341 (1960) (noting that plaintiffs’ allegations, if true, would establish by circumstantial evidence “tantamount for all practical purposes to a mathematical demonstration,” that redis- tricting legislation had been enacted “solely” to segregate voters along racial lines); cf. Personnel Administrator of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 276-280 (1979) (analyzing whether the purpose of a law was to discriminate against women). Indeed, although the Constitution places no per se ban on midcycle redistricting, a legislature’s decision to redistrict in the middle of the census cycle, when the legislature is under no legal obligation to do so, makes the judicial task of identifying the legislature’s motive simpler than it would otherwise be. As JUSTICE BREYER has pointed out, “the presence of midcycle redistricting, for any reason, raises a fair inference that partisan machina- tions played a major role in the map-drawing process.” Vieth, 541 U.S., at 367 (dissenting opinion). The conclusion that courts can easily identify the motive for redistricting when the legislature is under no legal obligation to act is reinforced by the record in this very case. The District Court’ unambiguously identified the sole purpose behind the decision to promulgate Plan 1374C: a desire to maximize partisan advantage. See Cite as: 548 U. S. (2006) 13 Opinion of STEVENS, J. Session, 298 F. Supp. 2d, at 472 (It was clear from the evidence” that Republicans “‘decided to redraw the state’s congressional districts solely for the purpose of seizing between five and seven seats from Democratic incum- bents’” (quoting amicus brief filed in Vieth v. Jubelirer); 298 F. Supp., at 470 (“There is little question but that the single-minded purpose of the Texas Legislature in enact- ing Plan 1374C was to gain partisan advantage”). It does not matter whether the District Court’s description of that purpose qualifies as a specific finding of fact because it is perfectly clear that there is more than ample evidence in the record to support such a finding. This evidence in- cludes: (1) testimony from state legislators; (2) the proce- dural irregularities described above that accompanied the adoption of Plan 1374C, including the targeted abolition of the longstanding two-thirds rule, designed to protect. the rights of the minority party, in the Texas Senate; (3) Plan 1374C’s significant departures from the neutral districting criteria of compactness and respect for county lines; (4) the plan’s excessive deviations from prior districts, which interfere with the development of strong relationships between Members of Congress and their constituents; and (5) the plan’s failure to comply with the Voting Rights Act. Indeed, the State itself conceded that “|t}he overwhelming evidence demonstrated that partisan gain was the moti- vating force behind the decision to redistrict in 2003.” State Post-Trial Brief 51. In my judgment, there is not even a colorable basis for contending that the relevant intent—in this case a purely partisan intent®*—cannot be °The State suggests that tn the process of drawing districts the archi- tects of Plan 1374C frequently followed county lines, made an effort to keep certain entire communities within a given district and otherwise followed certain neutral principles. But these facts are not relevant to the narrow question presented by these cases: Neutral motivations in the implementation of particular features of the redistricting do not qualify the solely partisan motivation behind the basic decision to adopt l4 LEAGUE OF UNITED LATIN AMERICAN CITIZENS v. PERRY identified on the basis of admissible evidence in the record.4 Of course, the conclusions that courts are fully capable of analyzing the intent behind a decision to redistrict, and that desire for partisan gain was the sole factor motivating the decision to redistrict at issue here, do not resolve the question whether proof of a single-minded partisan intent is sufficient to establish a constitutional violation. On the merits of that question, the State seems to as- sume that our decision in Upham v. Seamon, 456 U.S. 37 (1982) (per curiam), has already established the legisla- ture’s right to replace a court-ordered plan with a plan drawn for purely partisan purposes. JUSTICE KENNEDY ultimately indulges in a similar assumption, relying on Upham for the proposition that “our decisions have as- sumed that state legislatures are free to replace court- mandated remedial plans by enacting redistricting plans of their own.” Ante, at 9. JUSTICE KENNEDY recognizes that “|jjudicial respect for legislative plans, however, cannot justify legislative reliance on improper criteria for districting determinations.” /bid. But JUSTICE KENNEDY then incorrectly concludes that the singular intent to an entirely unnecessary plan in the first place. 4As noted above, rather than identifying any arguably neutral rea- sons for adopting Plan 1374C, the record establishes a purely partisan single-minded motivation with unmistakable clarity. Therefore, there is no need at this point to discuss standards that would guide judges in enforcing a rule allowing legislatures to be motivated in part by parti- san considerations. but which would impose an “obligation not to apply too much partisanship in districting.” Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267. 286 (2004) (plurality opinion). Deciding that 100% is “too much” is not only a manageable decision, but, as explained below, it is also an obviously correct one. Nonetheless. it is worth emphasizing that courts do, in fact, possess the tools to employ standards that permit legisla- tures to consider partisanship in the redistricting process, but which do not allow legislatures to use partisanship as the predominant motiva- tion for their actions. See Part LV, infra. Cite as: 548 U.S. (2006) 15 Opinion of STEVENS, J. maximize partisan advantage is not, in itself, such an improper criterion. Ante, at 11. - This reliance on Upham overlooks critical distinctions between the redistricting plan the District Court drew in Upham and the redistricting plan the District Court drew in Balderas. The judicial plan in Upham was created to provide an interim response to an objection by the Attor- ney General that two contiguous districts in a plan origi- nally drafted by the Texas Legislature violated §5 of the Voting Rights Act. We concluded that, in fashioning its interim remedy, the District Court had erroneously “sub- stituted its own reapportionment preferences for those of the state legislature.” 456 U.S., at 40. We held that when judicial relief was necessary because a state legisla- ture had failed “‘to reapportion according to federal consti- tutional jor statutory] requisites in a timely fashion after having had an adequate opportunity to do so,” the federal court should, as much as possible “‘follow the policies and preferences of the State,” in creating a new map. Z7d., at. 41 (quoting White v. Weiser, 412 U.S. 783, 794-795 (1973)). We did not suggest that federal courts should honor partisan concerns, but rather identified the relevant state policies as those “‘expressed in statutory and consti- tutional provisions or in the reapportionment plans pro- posed by the state legislature, whenever adherence to state policy does not detract from the requirements of the Federal Constitution.” Upham, 456 U.S., at 41 (quoting White, 412 U.S., at 794—795). Because the District Court in Upham had exceeded its authority in drawing a new districting map, we made clear that the legislature was aathorized to remedy the §5 violation with a map of its own choosing. See 456 U.S., at 44. Upham, then, stands only for the proposition that a state legislature is author- ized to redraw a court-drawn congressional districting map when a district court has exceeded its remedial au- thority. Upham does not stand for the proposition that, 16 LEAGUE OF UNITED LATIN AMERICAN CITIZENS v. PERRY Opinion of STEVENS, J. after a State embraces a valid, neutral court-drawn plan by asking this Court to affirm the opinion creating that plan, the State may then redistrict for the sole purpose of disadvantaging a minority political party.. Indeed, to conclude otherwise would reflect a fundamen- tal misunderstanding of the reason why we have held that state legislatures, rather than federal courts, should have the primary task of creating apportionment plans that comport with federal law. We have so held because “a state legislature is the institution that is by far the best situated to identify and then reconcile traditional state policies” with the requirements of federal law, Finch, 431 U.S., at 414-415, not because we wish to supply a domi- nant party with an opportunity to disadvantage its politi- cal opponents. Indeed, a straightforward application of settled constitutional law leads to the inescapable conclu- sion that the State may not decide to redistrict if its sole motivation is “to minimize or cancel out the voting strength of racial or political elements of the voting popu- lation,” Fortson, 379 U.S., at 439 (emphasis added). The requirements of the Federal Constitution that limit the State’s power to rely exclusively on partisan prefer- ences in drawing district lines are the Fourteenth Amendment's prohibition against invidious discrimina- tion, and the First Amendment's protection of citizens - from official retaliation based on their political affiliation. The equal protection component of the Fourteenth Amendment requires actions taken by the sovereign to be supported by some legitimate interest, and further estab- lishes that a bare desire to harm a politically disfavored group is not a legitimate interest. See, e.g., Cleburne v. ’ Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 447 (1985). Similarly, the freedom of political belief and association guaranteed by the First Amendment prevents the State, absent a compelling interest, from “penalizing citizens because of their participation in the electoral process, . . . Cite as: 548 U.S. (2006) 17 Opinion of STEVENS, J. their association with a political party, or their expression of political views.” Vieth, 541 U.S., at 314 (KENNEDY, J., concurring in judgment) (citing Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347 (1976) (plurality opinion)). These protections embod- ied in the First and Fourteenth Amendments reflect. the fundamental duty of the sovereign to govern impartially. E.g., Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 265 (1983); New York City Transit Authority v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568 (1979). The legislature’s decision to redistrict at issue in this litigation was entirely inconsistent with these principles. By taking an action for the sole purpose of advantaging Republicans and disadvantaging Democrats, the State of Texas violated its constitutional obligation to govern impartially. “Ifa State passed an enactment that declared ‘All future apportionment shall be drawn so as most to burden Party X’s rights to fair and effective representa- tion, though still in accord with one-person, one-vote principles, we would surely conclude the Constitution had been violated.” Vieth, 541 U.S., at 812 (KENNEDY, J., concurring in judgment). II Relying solely on Vieth, JUSTICE KENNEDY maintains that even if legislation is enacted based solely on a desire to harm a politically unpopular minority, this fact is insul- ficient to establish unconstitutional partisan gerryman- dering absent proof that the legislation did in fact burden “the complainants’ representative rights.” Anite, at 11. This conclusion—which clearly goes to the merits, rather than the manageability, of a partisan gerrymandering claim—is not only inconsistent with the constitutional requirement that state action must be supported by a legitimate interest, but also provides an insufficient re- sponse to appellants’ claim on the merits. JUSTICE KENNEDY argues that adopting “the modified 18 LEAGUE OF UNITED LATIN AMERICAN CITIZENS v. PERRY Opinion of STEVENS, J. sole-intent test” could “encourage partisan excess at the outset of the decade, when a legislature redistricts pursu- ant to its decennial constitutional duty and is then im- mune from the charge of sole-motivation.” Ante, at 12-13, But this would be a problem of the Court’s own making. As the decision in Cox v. Larios, 542 U.S. 947, demon- strates, there are, in fact, readily manageable judicial standards that would allow injured parties to challenge excessive (and unconstitutional) partisan gerrymandering undertaken in response to the release of the decennial census data.© See also Vieth, 541 U.S., at 328-339 (STEVENS, J., dissenting); id., at 347-3853 (SOUTER, d., joined by GINSBURG, J., dissenting); id., at 365-367 (BREYER, J., dissenting). JUSTICE KENNEDY’s concern about a heightened incentive to engage in such excessive partisan gerrymandering would be avoided if the Court were willing to enforce those standards. In any event, JUSTICE KENNEDY’s additional require- ment that there be proof that the gerrymander did in fact burden the complainants’ representative rights is clearly satisfied by the record in this litigation. Indeed, the ‘See Larios v. Cox, 300 F. Supp. 2d 1320, 13842-1353 (ND Ga. 2004) (per curiam). In Cox, the three-judge District Court undertook a searching review of the entire record in concluding that the population deviations in the state legislative districts created for the Georgia House and Senate after the release of the 2000 census data were not driven by any traditional redistricting criteria, such as compactness or preserving county lines, but were instead driven by the impermissible factors of regional favoritism and the discriminatory protection of Democratic incumbents. If there were no judicially manageable stan- dards to assess whether a State's adoption of a redistricting map was based on valid governmental objectives, we would not have summarily affirmed the decision in Cox over the dissent of only one Justice. See 542 U.S. 947; id., at 951 (SCALIA, J.. dissenting). In addition, as Part Il] of thé Court's opinion and this Part of my opinion demonstrate, assessing whether a redistricting map has a discriminatory impact on the opportunities for voters and candidates of a particular party to influence the political process is a manageable judicial task. Cite as: 548 U.S. (2006) 19 - Opinion of STEVENS, J. Court’s accurate exposition of the reasons why the changes to District 28 diluted the voting rights of Latinos who remain in that district simultaneously explains why those changes also disadvantaged Democratic voters and thus demonstrates that the effects of a political gerrymander can be evaluated pursuant to judicially manageable standards. In my judgment the record amply supports the conclu- sion that Plan 1374C not only burdens the minority party in District 23, but also imposes a severe statewide burden on the ability of Democratic voters and politicians to influ- ence the political process.° In arguing that Plan 1374C does not impose an uncon- stitutional burden on Democratic voters and candidates, the State takes the position that the plan has resulted in an equitable distribution of political power between the State’s two principal political parties. The State empha- sizes that in the 2004 elections—held pursuant to Plan 1374C—Republicans won 21 of 32, or 66%, of the congres- sional seats. That same year, Republicans carried 58% of ihe vote in statewide elections. Admittedly, these num- bers do suggest that the State’s congressional delegation was “roughly proportional” to the parties’ share of the statewide vote, Brief for State Appellees 44, particularly in light of the fact that our electoral system tends to produce a “seat bonus” in which a party that wins a majority of the vote generally wins an even larger majority of the seats, see Brief for Alan Heslop et al. as Amici Curiae (describing the seat. bonus phenomenon). Cf. ante, at. 12 (opinion of KENNEDY, J.) (arguing that, compared to the redistricting plan challenged in Vieth, “Plan 1374C can be seen as Although the burdened group at issue in this litigation consists of Democratic voters and. candidates, the partisan gerrymandering analysis throughout this opinion would be equally applicable to any “politically coherent group whose members engaged in bloc voting.” Vieth, 541 U.S... at 347 (Souter, J., joined by Ginsburc. J.. dissenting). 20 LEAGUE OF UNITED LATIN AMERICAN CITIZENS v. PERRY Opinion of STEVENS, J. making the party balance more congruent to statewide party power’). That Plan 1374C produced a “roughly proportional” congressional delegation in 2004 does not, however, an- swer the question whether the plan has a discriminatory effect against Democrats. As appellants point out, whether a districting map is biased against a_ political party depends upon the bias in the map itself—in other words, it depends upon the opportunities that the map offers each party, regardless of how candidates perform in a given year. And, as the State’s expert found in this litigation, Plan 1374C clearly has a discriminatory effect in terms of the opportunities it offers the two principal political parties in Texas. Indeed, that discriminatory effect is severe. According to Professor Gaddie, the State’s expert, Plan 1374C gives Republicans an advantage in 22 of 32 con- gressional seats. The plaintiffs’ expert, Professor Alford, who had been cited favorably by the Balderas Court. as having applied a “neutral approach” to redistricting in that litigation, App. to Juris. Statement 207a, agreed. [le added that, in his view, the only surprise from the 2004 elections was “how far things moved” toward achieving a 22-to-10 pro-Republican split “in a single election year,” id., at 226a (declaration of John R. Alford, Ph.D.).‘ But this 22-to-10 advantage does not depend on Republicans winning the 58% share of the statewide vote that they 7In the 2004 congressional elections, Republicans won 21 of the 2u seats that had been designed to favor Republicans in Plan 1371C. One Democratic incumbent, Representative Chet Edwards, narrowly de- feated (with 51% of the vote) his nonincumbent Republican challenger in a Republican-leaning district; Edwards outspent his challenger. who lacked strong ties to the principal communities in the district. Republ- cans are likely to spend more money and find a stronger challenger in 2006, which will create a “very significant chance” of a Republican defeating Edwards. App. to Juris. Statement 224a, 226a. Cite as: 548 U.S. (2006) 21 ‘ Opinion of STEVENS, J. received in 2004. Instead, according to Professor Gaddie, Republicans would be likely to carry 22 of 32 congressional seats if they won only 52% of the statewide vote. App. 216, 229. Put differently, Plan 1374C ensures that, even if the Democratic Party succeeds in convincing 10% of the people who voted for Republicans in the last statewide elections to vote for Democratic congressional candidates,* which would constitute a major electoral shift, there is unlikely to be any change in the number of congressional seats that Democrats win. Moreover, Republicans would still have an overwhelming advantage if Democrats achieved full electoral parity. According to Professor Gaddie’s analysis, Republicans would be likely to carry 20 of the 32 congressional seats even if they only won 50% (or, for that matter, 49%) of the statewide vote. /d., at 216, 229-230. This demonstrates that Plan 1374C is inconsistent with the symmetry standard, a measure social scientists use to assess partisan bias, which is un- doubtedly “a reliable standard” for measuring a “bur- den... on the complainants’ representative rights,” ante, at 11 (opinion of KENNEDY, J.). The symmetry standard “requires that the electoral system treat similarly-situated parties equally, so that each receives the same fraction of legislative seats for a particular vote percentage as the other party would re- ceive if it had received the same percentage.” Brief for Gary King etal. as Amici Curiae 4—5. This standard is widely accepted by scholars as providing a measure of partisan fairness in electoral systems. See, e.g., Tufte, The Relationship Between Seats and Votes in Two-Party Systems, 67 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 540, 542-543 (1973); Cel- ®If 10% of Republican voters decided to vote for Democratic candidates, and if there were no other changes in voter turnout or preferences, the Republicans’ share of the statewide vote would be reduced from 58% to 52%. be to LEAGUE OF UNITED LATIN AMERICAN CITIZENS v. PERRY Opinion of STEVENS, J. man & King, knhancing Democracy Through Legislative Redistricting, 88 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 541, 545 (1994); Thompson, Election Time: Normative Implications of Temporal Properties of the Electoral Process in the United States, 98 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 51, 58, and n. 7 (2004); Eng- strom & Kernell, Manufactured Responsiveness: The Impact of State Electoral Laws on Unified Party Control of the Presidency and House of Representatives, 1840-1940, A9 Am. J. Pol. Sci. 531, 541 (2005). Like other models that experts use in analyzing vote dilution claims, compliance with the symmetry standard is measured by extrapolating from a sample of known data, see, e.g., Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 53 and n. 20 (1986) (discussing ex- treme case analysis and bivariate ecological regression analysis). In this litigation, the symmetry standard was not simply proposed by an amicus to this Court, it was also used by the expert for plaintiffs and the expert for the State in assessing the degree of partisan bias in Plans 1151C and 1374C. See App. 34-42 (report of Professor Alford); id., at 189-1938, 216 (report of Professor Gaddie). Because, as noted above, Republicans would have an advantage in a significant majority of seats even if the statewide vote were equally distributed between Republi- cans and Democrats, Plan 1374C constitutes a significant departure from the symmetry standard. By contrast, based on Professor Gaddie’s evaluation, the Balderas Plan, though slightly biased in favor of Republicans, provided markedly more equitable opportunities to Republicans and Democrats. For example, consistent with the symmetry standard, under Plan 1151C the parties were likely to each take 16 congressional seats if they won 50% of the statewide vote. See App. 216. Plan 1374C then, clearly has a discriminatory impact on the opportunities that Democratic citizens have to elect candidates of their choice. Moreover, this discriminatory effect cannot bé dismissed as de minimis. According to the Cite as: 548 U.S. (2006) 23 Opinion of STEVENS, J. State’s expert, if each party receives half the statewide vote, under Plan 1374C the Republicans would carry 62.5% (20) of the congressional seats, whereas the Democ- rats would win 37.5% (12) of those seats. In other words, at. the vote distribution point where a politically neutral map would result in zero differential in the percentage of seats captured by each party, Plan 1374C is structured to create a 25% differential. When a redistricting map im- poses such a significant disadvantage on a_ politically salient group of voters, the State should shoulder the burden of defending the map. Cf. Brown v. Thomson, 462 U.S. 835, 842-843 (1983) (holding that the implementa- tion of a redistricting plan for state legislative districts with population deviations over 10% creates a prima facie case of discrimination under the Equal Protection Clause, thus shifting the burden to the State to defend the plan); Larios v. Cox, 300 F. Supp. 2d 1320, 1339-1340 (ND Ga.) (per curiam), summarily aff'd, 542 U.S. 947 (2004) (same, but further pointing out that the “‘ten percent rule’” is not a safe harbor, and concluding that, under the circum- stances of the case before it, a state legislative districting plan was unconstitutional even though population devia- tions were under 10%). At the very least, once plaintiffs have established that the legislature’s sole purpose in adopting a plan was partisan—as plaintiffs have estab- lished in this action, see Part II, supra—such a severe (liscriminatory effect should be sufficient to meet any additional burden they have to demonstrate that the redistricting map accomplishes its discriminatory purpose.° *JusTICE KENNEDY faults proponents of the symmetry standard for not “providing a standard for deciding how much partisan bias is too much,” ante. at 13. But it is this Court, not proponents of the symme- try standard, that has the judicial obligation to answer the question of how much unfairness is too much. It would, of course, be an eminently manageable standard for the Court to conclude that deviations of over 24 LEAGUE OF UNITED LATIN AMERICAN CITIZENS v. PERRY Opinion of STEVENS, J. The bias in Plan 1374C is most striking with regard to its effect on the ability of Democratic voters to elect candi- dates of their choice, but its discriminatory effect. does not end there. Plan 1374C also lessens the influence Democ- ratic voters are likely to be able to exert over Republican lawmakers, thus further minimizing Democrats’ capacity to play a meaningful role in the political process. Even though it “defies political reality to suppose that members of a losing party have as much political influence over... government. as do members of the victorious party,” Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 170 (1986) (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), the Court has recognized that “the power to influence the political process is not limited to winning elections,” id., at 132 (plurality opinion); see also Georgia v. Ashcroft, 539 U.S. 461, 482 (2003). In assessing whether members of a group whose candidate is defeated at the polls can none- theless influence the elected representative, it is “impor- tant to consider ‘the likelihood that candidates elected without decisive minority support would be willing to take the minority’s interests into account.” /d., at 482 (quoting Gingles, 478 U.S., at 100 (O'Connor, J., concurring in judgment)). One justification for majority rule is that elected officials will generally “take the minority’s inter- ests into account,” in part because the majority recognizes 10% from symmetry create a prima facie case of an unconstitutional gerrymander, just as population deviations among districts of more than 10% create such a prima facie case. Or, the Court could conclude that a significant departure from symmetry is one relevant factor in analyzing whether. under the totality of the circumstances, a district- ing plan is an unconstitutional partisan gerrymander. See n. 11, infra. At any rate. proponents of the symmetry standard have provided a helpful (though certainly not talismanic) tool in this type of litigation. While I appreciate Justice KENNEDY’s leaving the door open to the use of the standard in future cases, see ante, at 13. I believe it 1s the role of this Court, not social scientists. to determine how much partisan dominance is too much. Cite as: 548 U.S. (2006) 25 Opinion of STEVENS, J. that preferences shift. and today’s minority could be tomor- row’s majority. See, e.g., L. Guinier, Tyranny of the Ma- jority 77 (1994); J. Ely, Democracy and Distrust 84 (1980); cf. Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson, (Oct. 24, 1787), reprinted in Republic of Letters 502 (J. Smith ed. 1995) (arguing that “[t]he great desideratum in Gov- ernment is... to modify the sovereignty as that it may be sufficiently neutral between different parts of the Society” and thus prevent a fixed majority from oppressing the minority). Indeed, this Court has concluded that our system of representative democracy is premised on the assumption that elected officials will seek to represent their constituency as a whole, rather than any dominant faction within that constituency. See Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 648 (1993). Plan 13874C undermines this crucial assumption that congressional representatives from the majority party (in this case Republicans) will seek to represent their entire constituency. “When a district obviously is created solely to effectuate the perceived common interests of one racial group, elected officials are more likely to believe that their primary obligation is to represent only the members of that group, rather than-their constituency as a whole.” Ibid. Shaw's analysis of representational harms in the racial gerrymandering context applies with at least as much force in the partisan gerrymandering context be- cause, in addition to the possibility that a representative may believe her job is only to represent the interests of a dominant constituency, a representative may feel more beholden to the cartographers who drew her district than to the constituents who live there. See Vieth, 541 U.S., at 329-331 (STEVENS, J., dissenting). In short, Plan 1374C reduces the likelihood that Republican representatives elected from gerrymandered districts will act as vigorous advocates for the needs and interests of Democrats who reside within their districts. 26 LEAGUE OF UNITED LATIN AMERICAN CITIZENS v. PERRY Opinion of STEVENS, J. In addition, Plan 1374C further weakens the incentives for members of the majority party to take the interests of the minority party into account, because it locks in a Republican congressional majority of 20—22 seats, so long as Republicans achieve at least 49% of the vote. The result of this lock-in is that, according to the State's ex- pert, between 19 and 22 of these Republican seats are safe seats, meaning seats where one party has at least a 10% advantage over the other. See App. 227—228 (expert re- , port of Professor Gaddie). Members of Congress elected from such safe districts need not worry much about the possibility of shifting majorities, so they have little reason to be responsive to -political minorities within their district.!° 10Safe seats may harm the democratic process in other ways as well. According to one recent article co-authored by a former Chairman of the Federal Election Commission, electoral competition “plainly has a positive effect on the interest and participation of voters in the electoral process.” Potter & Viray, Election Reform: Barriers to Participation, 36 U. Mich. J. L. Reform 547, 575 (2003) (hereinafter Potter & Viray); see also L. Guinier, Tyranny of the Majority 85 (1994). The impact of noncompetitive elections in depressing voter turnout is especially troubling in light of the fact that voter participation in the United States lags behind. often well behind, participation rates in other democratic nations. Potter & Viray 575-576, and n. 200. In addition, the creation of safe seats tends to polarize decisionmaking bodies. See, e.g.. Clingman v. Beaver, 544 U.S. 581, 620 (2005) (StevENs, J., joined by GINSBURG, J.. dissenting) (noting that safe districts can “increase the bitter partisanship that has already poisoned some of those [legislative] bodies that once provided inspiring examples of courteous adversary debate and deliberation’); Cox, Partisan Gerrymandering and | )isaggre- gated Redistricting, 2001 S. Ct. Rev. 109, 130 (arguing that “safe seats produce more polarized representatives because, by definition, the median voter in a district that is closely divided between the two major parties is more centrist than the median voter in a district domimated by one party’): Raviv, Unsafe Harbors: One Person, One Vote and Partisan Redistricting, 7 U. Pa. J. Const. L. 1001, 1068 (2005) (arguing that safe districts encourage polarization in decisionmaking bodies because representatives from those districts have to cater only to voters Cite as: 548 U.S. (2006) 27 In sum, | think it is clear that Plan 1374C has a severe burden on the capacity of Texas Democrats to influence the political process. Far from representing an example of “one of the most significant acts a State can perform to ensure citizen participation in republican _ self- governance,” ante, at 9 (opinion of KENNEDY, J.), the plan guarantees that the Republican-dominated membership of the Texas congressional delegation will remain constant notwithstanding significant pro-Democratic shifts in public opinion. Moreover, the harms Plan 1374C imposes on Democrats are not “hypothetical” or “counterfactual,” id., at 13, simply because, in the 2004 elections, Republi- cans won a share of seats_roughly proportional to their statewide voting strength. By creating 19-22 safe Repub- lican seats, Plan 1374C has already harmed Democrats because, as explained above, it significantly undermines the likelihood that Republican lawmakers from those districts will be responsive to the interests of their Democ- ratic constituents. In addition, Democrats will surely have a more difficult time recruiting strong candidates, and mobilizing voters and resources, in these safe Republican districts. Thus, appellants have satisfied any requisite obligation to demonstrate that they have been harmed by the adoption of Plan 1874C. Furthermore, as discussed in Part Il, supra, the sole intent motivating the Texas Legislature’s decision to replace Plan 1151C with Plan 1374C was to benefit Re- publicans and burden Democrats. Accordingly, in terms of both its intent and effect, Plan 1374C violates the sover- eign’s duty to govern impartially. from one party). See generally Issacharoff & Karlan, Where to Draw the Line? 153 U. Pa. L. Rev. 541. 574 (providing data about the large percentage of safe seats in recent congressional and state legislative elections. and concluding that “|njoncompetitive elections threaten both the legitimacy and the vitality of democratic governance’). 28 LEAGUE OF UNITED LATIN AMERICAN CITIZENS v. PERRY Opinion of Stevens, J. “When a State adopts rules governing its election ma- chinery or defining electoral boundaries, those rules must serve the interests of the entire community. If they serve no purpose other than to favor one seg- ment—whether racial, ethnic, religious, or political— that may occupy a position of strength at a particular point in time, or to disadvantage a politically weak segment of the community, they violate the constitu- tional guarantee of equal protection.” Aarcher, 462 U.S., at 748 (STEVENS, J., concurring) (citation omitted). Accordingly, even accepting the Court's view that a ger- rymander is tolerable unless it in fact burdens the minor- ity's representative rights, | would hold that Plan 1374C is unconstitutional?! ! IV Even if | thought that Plan 1374C were not unconstitu- tional in its entirety, | would hold that the cracking of District 24—which, under the Balderas Plan, was a major- ity-minority district that consistently elected Democratic Congressman Martin Frost—was unconstitutional. Read- "In this litigation expert testimony provided the principal evidence about the effects of the plan that satisfy the test JUsTice KENNEDY would impose. In my judgment, however. most statewide challenges to an alleged gerrymander should be evaluated primarily by examining these objective factors: (1) the number of people who have been moved from one district to another, (2) the number of districts that are less compact than their predecessors, (3) the degree to which the new plan departs from other neutral districting criteria, including respect for communities of interest and compliance with the Voting Rights Act, (4) the number of districts that have been cracked in a manner that weakens an opposition party incumbent. (5) the number of districts that include two incumbents from the opposite party. (6) whether the adoption ef the plan gave the opposition party, and other groups. a fair opportunity to have input in the redistricting process. (7) the number of seats that are likely to be safe seats for the dominant party. and (8) the size of the departure in the new plan from the symmetry standard. Cite as: S48 US. (2006) 2 Opinion of Stevens, J ily manageable standards enable us to analyze both the purpose and the -effect of the “granular” decisions that produced the replacements for District 24. Applying these standards, which | set forth below, | believe it is clear that the manipulation of this district for purely partisan gain violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments. The same constitutional principles discussed above concerning the sovereign’s duty to govern impartially inform the proper analysis for claims that a particular district is an unconstitutional partisan gerrymander. We have on several occasions recognized that a multimember district is subject to challenge under the Fourteenth Amendment if it operates “‘to minimize or cancel out the voting strength of racial or political elements of the voting population.” F.g., Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735, 751 (1973) (emphasis added); Burns v. Richardson, 384 U.S. 73, 88 (1966). There is no constitutionally relevant distinction between the harms inflicted by single-member district gerrymanders that minimize or cancel out the voting strength of a political element of the population and the same harms inflicted by multimember districts. In both situations, the State has interfered with the voter's constitutional right to “engage in association for the ad- vancement of beliefs and ideas,” NAACP vy. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 460 (1958). I recognize that legislatures will always be aware of politics and that we must tolerate some consideration of political goals in the redistricting process. See Cousins v. City Council of Chicago, 466 F.2d 8380, 847 (CAT 1972) (Stevens, J., dissenting). However, | think it is equally clear that, when a plaintiff can prove that a legislature's predominant motive in drawing a particular district was to disadvantage a politically salient group, and that the decision has the intended effect, the plaintiffs constitu- tional rights have been violated. See id., at 859-860. Indeed, in Vieth, five Members of this Court explicitly 30 LEAGUE OF UNITED LATIN AMERICAN CITIZENS v., PERRY Opinion of STEVENS, J. recognized that extreme partisan gerrymandering violates the Constitution. See 541 U.S., at 307, 312-316 (KENNEDY, J., concurring in judgment); id., at 317-318 (STEVENS, J., dissenting); id., at 343, 8347-3852 (SOUTER, J., joined by GINSBURG, J., dissenting); id., at 356-857, 366- 367 (BREYER, J., dissenting). The other four Justices in Vieth stated that they did not disagree with that conclu- sion. See id., at 292 (plurality opinion). The Vieth plural- ity nonetheless determined that there were no judicially manageable standards to assess partisan gerrymandering claims. /d., at 305-306. However, the following test, which shares some features of the burden-shifting stan- dard for assessing unconstitutional partisan gerrymander- ing proposed by JUSTICE SOUTER’s opinion in Vieth, see id., at 348-351, would provide a remedy for at least the most blatant unconstitutional partisan gerrymanders and would also be eminently manageable. First, to have standing to challenge a district as an un- constitutional partisan gerrymander, a plaintiff would have to prove that he is either a candidate or a voter who re- sided in a district that was changed by a new districting plan. See id., at 327-328 (STEVENS, d., dissenting) (dis- cussing United States v. Hays, 515 U.S. 737 (1995)). See also 641 U.S., at 347-348 (SOUTER, J., joined by GINSBURG, J., dissenting) (citing //ays). A plaintiff with standing would then be required to prove both improper purpose and effect. With respect to the “purpose” portion of the inquiry, | would apply the standard fashioned by the Court in its racial gerrymandering cases. Under the Court's racial gerrymandering jurisprudence, judges must analyze whether plaintiffs have proved that race was the predomi- nant factor motivating a districting decision such that other, race-neutral districting principles were subordi- nated to racial considerations. If so, strict scrutiny ap- plies, see, e.g., Vera, 517 U.S., at 958-959 (plurality opin- ion), and the State must justify its districting decision by Cite as: 548 U.S. (2006) 31 Opinion of STEVENS, J. establishing that it was narrowly tailored to serve a com- pelling state interest, such as compliance with §2 of the Voting Rights Act, see Aing v. Illinois Bd. of Elections, 979 F. Supp. 619 (ND Ill. 1997), affd, 522 U.S. 1087 (1998); Vera, 517 U.S., at 994 (O'Connor, J., concurring).!? How- ever, strict scrutiny does not apply merely because race was one motivating factor behind the drawing of a major- ity-minority district. Jd., at 958-959 (plurality opinion); see also Easley v. Cromartie, 532 U.S. 234, 241 (2001). Applying these standards to the political gerrymandering context, | would hold that, if a plaintiff carried her burden of demonstrating that redistricters subordinated neutral districting principles to political considerations and that their predominant motive was to maximize one party's power, she would satisfy the intent prong of the constitu- tional inquiry.'’ Cf. Vieth, 541 U.S., at 349-350 (SOUTER, J., joined by GINSBURG, J., dissenting) (discussing the importance of a district's departures from traditional districting principles in determining whether the district is an unconstitutional gerrymander). With respect to the effects inquiry, a plaintiff would be required to demonstrate the following three facts: (1) her ‘andidate of choice won election under the old plan; (2) her JUSTICE BREYER has authorized me to state that he agrees with JUSTICE SCALIA that compliance with §5 of the Voting Rights Act is also a compelling state interest. See post, at 9. | too agree with JUSTICE SCALIA on this point. I31f, on the other hand, the State could demonstrate, for example. that the new district was part of a statewide scheme designed to apportion power fairly among politically salient groups. or to enhance the political power of an underrepresented community of interest (such as residents of an economically distressed region). the State would avoid liability even if the results of such statewide districting had predictably partisan effects. See generally Vielh, 541 U.S. at 351-352 (SourTeR, J.. joined by GiInspura, J., dissenting) (discussing legitimate interests that a State could posit as a defense to a prima facie case of partisan gerrymandering). 7 32 LEAGUE OF UNITED LATIN AMERICAN CITIZENS v, PERRY Opinion of STEVENS, J. residence is now in a (district that is a safe seat for the opposite party; and (8) her new district is less compact than the old district. The first two prongs of this effects inquiry would be designed to measure whether or not the plaintiff has been harmed, whereas the third prong would be relevant because the shape of the gerrymander has always provided crucial evidence of its character, see Karcher, 462 U.S., at 754-758, 762-763 (STEVENS, J., concurring); see also Vieth, 541 U.S., at 348 (SOUTER, J., joined by GINSBURG, J., dissenting) (noting that compact- ness is a traditional districting principle, which “can be measured quantitatively”). Moreover, a safe harbor for more compact districts would allow a newly elected major- ity to eliminate a prior partisan gerrymander without fear of liability or even the need to devote resources to litigat- ing whether or not the legislature had acted with an im- permissible intent. If a plaintiff with standing could meet the intent and effects prong of the test outlined above, that plaintiff would clearly have demonstrated a violation of her consti- tutional rights. Moreover, I do not think there can be any colorable claim that this test would not be judicially man- ageable. Applying this test to the facts of this case, | think plain- tiffs in new Districts 6, 24, 26, and 32—four of the districts in Plan 1374C that replaced parts of Balderas District 24—can demonstrate that their constitutional rights were violated by the cracking of Balderas District 24. First, | assume that there are plaintiffs who reside in Districts 6, 24, 26, and 32, and whose homes were previously located in Balderas District 24.'' Accordingly, | assume that there "This assumption is justified based on counsel's undisputed repre- sentations at oral argument. See Tr. Oral Arg. 35. However, if there were any genuine dispute about whether there are plaintiffs whose residences were previously located in Balderas District 24, but which are now incorporated into Districts 6, 24, 26, and 32, a remand would Cite as: 548 U.S. (2006) 33 Opinion of STEVENS, J. are plaintiffs who have standing to challenge the creation of these districts. Second, plaintiffs could easily satisfy their burden of proving predominant partisan purpose. Indeed, in this litigation, the State has acknowledged that its predomi- nant motivation for cracking District 24 was to achieve partisan gain. See State Post-Trial Brief 51-52 (noting that, in spite of concerns that the cracking of District 24 could lead to Voting Rights Act liability, “[t]he Legislature . chose to pursue, a political goal of unseating Con- gressman Frost instead of following a course that might have lowered risks |of such liability]”). The District Court agreed with the State’s analysis on this issue. In the District Court, plaintiffs claimed that the creation of District 26 violated the Equal Protection Clause because the decision to create District 26 was motivated by unconstitutional racial discrimination against black voters. The District Court rejected this argument, concluding that the State's decision to crack Balderas District 24 was driven not by racial prejudice, but rather by the political desire to maximize Republican advantage and to “remove Congressman Frost,” which required that Frost “lose a large portion of his Democratic constituency, many of whom lived in a predominately Black area of Tarrant County.” Session, 298 F. Supp. 2d, at 471. That an impermissible, predominantly partisan, pur- pose motivated the cracking of former bistrict 24 is fur- ther demonstrated by the fact that, in my judgment, this cracking caused Plan 1374C to violate §5 of the Voting Rights Act, 42 U.S. C. §1973e. The State's willingness to adopt a plan that violated its legal obligations under the Voting Rights Act, combined with the other indicia of partisan intent in this litigation, is compelling evidence be appropriate to allow the District Court to address this issue 34 LEAGUE OF UNITED LATIN AMERICAN CITIZENS v. PERRY Opinion of STEVENS, J. that politics was not simply one factor in the cracking of District 24, but rather that it was an impermissible, pre- dominant factor. Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act “was intended ‘to insure that that [the gains thus far achieved in minority political participation] shall not be destroyed through new [discriminatory] procedures and techniques.” Beer vy. United States, 425 U.S. 130, 140-141 (1976) (quoting S. Rep. No. 94-295, p. 19 (1975) (alteration in Beer)). ‘To effectuate this goal, §5 prevents covered jurisdictions, such as Texas, from making changes to their voting procedures “that would lead to a retrogression in the position of racial minorities with respect to their effective exercise of the electoral franchise.” Georgia, 539 U.S., at 477 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). In other words, during the redistricting process, covered jurisdictions may not “leave minority voters with less chance to be effective in electing preferred candidates than they were” under the prior districting plan. See id., at 494 (SOUTER, ¢J., dissent- ing). By cracking Balderas District 24, and by not offsetting the loss in black voters’ ability to elect preferred candi- dates elsewhere, Plan 1374C resulted in impermissible retrogression. Under the Balderas Plan, black Americans constituted a majority of Democratic primary voters in District 24. According to the unanimous report authored by staff attorneys in the Voting Section of the Department of Justice, black voters in District 24 generally voted cohe- sively, and thus had the ability to elect their candidate of choice in the Democratic primary. Section 5 Recommen- dation Memorandum 33 (Dec. 12, 2003), available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/nation/documents/ texasDOJmemo.pdf (all Internet materials as visited June 21, 2006, and available in Clerk of Court's case file). Moreover, the black community's candidates of choice could consistently attract sufficient crossover voting from Cite as: 548 U.S. (2006) 35 Opinion of STEYE™S, J. nonblacks to win the general election, even though blacks did not constitute a majority of voters in the general elec- tion. /d., at 33-34. Representative Frost, who is white, was clearly the candidate of choice of the black community in District 24, based on election returns, testimony of community leaders, and “scorecards” he received from groups dedicated te advancing the interests of African- Americans. See id., at 35. As noted above, in Plan 1374C, “the minority commu- nity in [Balderas District] 24 [was] splintered and sub- merged into majority Anglo—districts in the Dallas-Fort Worth area.” /d., at 67. By dismantling one district where blacks had the ability to elect candidates of their choice,'® and by not offsetting this loss of a district with another district where black voters had a similar opportunity, Plan 1374C was retrogressive, in violation of §5 of the Voting Rights Act. See id., at 31, 67-69. Notwithstanding the unanimous opinion of the staff attorneys in the Voting Section of the Justice Department that Plan 1374C was retrogressive and that the Attorney General should have interposed an objection, the Attorney General elected to preclear the map, thus allowing it to In the decision below, the District Court concluded that black vot- ers did not in fact “control” electoral outcomes in District 24. See Session v. Perry, 298 F. Supp. 2d 451. 498 (2004). Even assuming, as JUSTICE KENNEDY concludes, see ante, at 34, that the District Court did not commit reversible error in its analysis of this issue, the lack of “control” might be relevant in analyzing plaintiffs vote dilution claim under §2, but it is not relevant in evaluating whether Plan 13714C is retrogressive under §5._ It is indisputable that. at the very least, Balderas District 24 was a strong influence district for black voters. that is. a district where voters of color can “play a substantial, if not decisive, role in the electoral process.” Georgia v. Ashcroft, 539 U.S. 161, 482 (2003). Accordingly. by dismantling Balderas District 21, and by failing to create a strong influence district elsewhere, Plan 13714C was retrogressive. See 539 U_S.. at 182 (explaining that, ia deciding whether a plan is retrogressive, “a court must examine whether a new plan adds or subtracts ‘influence districts ”). 36 LEAGUE OF UNITED LATIN AMERICAN CITIZENS v. PERRY Opinion of STEVENS, J. take effect. We have held that, under the statutory scheme, voters may not directly challenge the Attorney General's decision to preclear a redistricting plan, see Morris v. Gressette, 432 U.S. 491 (1977), which means that the Attorney General’s vigilant enforcement of the Act is critical, and which also means that plaintiffs could not bring a §5 challenge as part of this litigation.’ However, judges are frequently called upon to consider whether a redistricting plan violates §5, because a covered jurisdic- tion has the option of seeking to achieve preclearance by either submitting its plan to the Attorney Genera! or filing a declaratory judgment action in the District Court [Text truncated at 120,000 characters. The full text is on the page linked above.] --- Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385016_0212%3A1. Public record. Not legal advice.