# Amicus Curiae Brief — DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno

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URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385016_0105%3A39

## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Amicus Curiae Brief
- **Published:** January 1, 2006
- **Citation:** 547 U.S. 332

## Text

36) “OT paeD

Nos. 04-1704, 04-1724
—BEE-S - 2005
pies CrP MEME COUNT
Supreme Court of the United Seas oo

¢

DAIMLERCHRYSLER CORP., et al.,

Petitioners,

Vv.

CHARLOTTE CUNO, et al.,
Respondents.

and

WILLIAM W. WILKINS,
Tax Commissioner etc., et al.,

Petitioners,
v.

CHARLOTTE CUNO, et al.,

Respondents.
.

On Writs Of Certiorari To The
United States Court Of Appeals
For The Sixth Circuit

¢

BRIEF OF AMICUS CURIAE
WAYNE COUNTY, MICHIGAN,
IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONERS

¢

EDWARD M. THOMAS
Wayne County

Corporation Counsel
*MELVIN BUTCH HOLLOWELL
ALLEN BROTHERS, PLLC
Attorneys for Wayne County
400 Monroe St., Ste. 220
Detroit, MI 48226
(313) 962-7777
Attorneys for Petitioners
*Counsel of Record

|

COCKLE LAW BRIEF PRINTING CO. (800) 225-6964 >
OR CALL COLLECT (402) 342-2831

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ..............:...ccccessseesecssereeeeees ii
INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE.....0000...........cceeeeeeeees 1
STATEMENT OF THE CASE ...................:csseesseesseteseeees 2
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT ...................c.:sessseesseeseeeees 3
SITET scibiecttibinsnivinttiapiiniapisintnininbinintamssieesieamaniubedin 5

I. THIS COURT DOES NOT SIT AS A SUPER-
LEGISLATURE DECIDING STATE POLICY,
THUS, RESPONDENTS CANNOT INVOKE
THIS COURT'S JURISDICTION TO IMPOSE
POLICY ON THE STATES ...0000..........ccesssseesnees 5

II. RESPONDENTS LACK STANDING TO CHAL-

LENGE OHIO’S TAX CREDIT STATUTE BE-

. CAUSE RESPONDENTS’ INJURIES ARE

CONJECTURAL AND NOT LIKELY TO BE
REDRESSED BY A FAVORABLE DECISION... 9

Ill. THE SIXTH CIRCUIT HAS MISAPPLIED
LONGSTANDING PRECEDENT IN THE AREA
OF INTERSTATE COMMERCE, AS THE TAX
INCENTIVES PROVIDED BY OHIO, AND BY
JURISDICTIONS LIKE WAYNE COUNTY DO
NOT CONSTITUTE AN UNDUE BURDEN ON
INTERSTATE COMMERCE, IN VIOLATION
OF THE DORMANT COMMERCE CLAUSE.... 12

SD be cilentatriiigeitnetvinensdonsneiiienecinevescinnttiinwhantaietis 15
SE SIP CUEED cr vcnscscnsnsecevsvecsotuiensesesossonsntenitities 15

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Page
CASES
ASARCO v. Kadish, 490 U.S. 605 (1989)............c ec cceeeeeeees 10
Boston Stock Exchange v. State Tax Comm’n, 429

Ss I OP nsncciinsnhnincigsenpecntduiesiniliaiasnebetiegs 11, 12, 13, 14
Caterpillar, Inc. v. Department of Treasury, 488

SL Sk EE. HITT ocincnasceppnisinntdicandduandlinbersoubenghdan 14
Cuno v. DaimlerChrysler, Inc., 154 F. Supp. 1196

_____ | EASED EONS SEAS DRDO ONIN PMI CRE CORN OO IE POMP PNM 2,3
Cuno v. DaimlerChrysler, Inc., 386 F.3d 738 (6th

AI vsicinicsidienscissivenildbainnineatitininiinciatiecitnniiiiatidetelaia ted tehseradas 3
DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 126 S. Ct. 36 (2005)......... 3
DeShaney v. Winnebago Co. Dep't of Social Services,

Ne Se CAD scchinmccicindalitdisiniptisinidatanindsibiidicnbasnigeiceni 2
Day-Brite Lighting v. State of Missouri, 342 U.S.

SE TID witacishiiadbtiipisiaininhaiindbiapatbinidelinimiens int i nica inlatichimbaidiiaiy 5
Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580 (1952)................ 5
H.P. Hood & Sons v. DuMond, 336 U.S. 525 (1949)......... 12
James v. Strange, 407 U.S. 128 (1972) .0.0.0 eee 5, 6
Kowalski v. Tesmer, 543 U.S. 125 (2004)..............0...0.0.. 9,11
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992).....9, 10
Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005)... ceeeeeee 15
Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp. of Bay View, 395

SR I GUT ceshadkcindinilasitascsitcieipiecie Ad alent 5

CONSTITUTION AND STATUTES
Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 5733.33 ...........:ccccccesecesereeesseees ablecaa

ill

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES — Continued

Page
Tee SR, GS Ti asics ccticndecsocccen soonasonaeagpananansonssiphing passim
SP: SR, II, TEY saticisacinccccastincdnintivccicabiaiiiilihetiitadulbssnicnsin 2
Wayne County Charter, § 5.181 00.00.00... eeceecceeseeseeees 1

1

INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE’

Wayne County is the largest county in Michigan, with
a population of over two million. It was once headquarters
to all of “The Big Three.” Petitioner DaimlerChrysler is
headquartered in an adjacent county. Wayne County is
still headquarters to Ford Motor Co. and General Motors
Corp. Many of the Big Three manufacturing facilities,
along with the facilities of Petitioner DaimlerChrysler
Corp., are located in Wayne County, in part, because of tax
incentives enacted by both the Michigan legislature and
Wayne County government.

Wayne County, has the power to levy property taxes
and the power to enact tax incentives like the incentives
being challenged in this case. (Wayne County Charter,
§ 5.181). Not surprisingly, given Wayne County’s promi-
nence in the world’s automotive and manufacturing
history, it is the policy of Wayne County to capture and
encourage industrial and economic growth.

Wayne County has a vital interest in assuring that
disgruntled citizens, such as Respondents, not be allowed
to use the courts to overrule the legislative and policy
decisions of duly elected lawmakers. If the decision of the
Sixth Circuit is allowed to stand in this case, persons from
inside and outside the jurisdiction — regardless of injury or
motive — will have the imprimatur of this Court to attack
the self-governance principles inherent in a republican
form of government. The separation of powers requires

' Under Supreme Court Rule 37.6, amicus curiae state that no
counsel for a party has written this brief in whole or in part, and no
entity or person, other than the amicus curiae, has made a contribution
to the preparation or submission of this brief.

2

that Respondents — and, indeed, all citizens — effect policy
decisions through their elected officials, and not through
the Court.’

¢

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

In 1998, Toledo, Ohio —- which is only 20 miles from
the southern border of Wayne County — and two local
school districts provided a $281 million tax incentive to
DaimlerChrylser to encourage it to continue its manufac-
turing presence in those communities. The Ohio statutory
scheme permitting the investment tax credit was enacted
“to encourage industrial investment and development in
Ohio, particularly in economically troubled areas.” Cuno v.
DaimlerChrysler, Inc., 154 F.Supp. 1196, 1198, 1201
(2001). The Ohio economy like Michigan’s is heavily
reliant on the manufacturing and automobile industries,
and has suffered through an exodus of jobs.

Respondents, plaintiffs below, filed a law suit chal-
lenging the constitutionality of the incentives under the
Commerce Clause and the Equal Protection Clause of the
United States Constitution. Respondents are individual
residents of Ohio, individual residents of Michigan, two
Ohio small businesses, and one not-for-profit Ohio corpo-
ration. Respondents do not allege any specific injury as a
result of the Ohio investment tax credit statute but,
rather, seek to “free all the states from the necessity of
engaging in escalating competition over incentives that
deprives all of them of needed revenues, while gaining a

* See DeShaney v. Winnebago Co. Dep't of Social Services, 489 U.S.
189, 203 (1989).

3

meaningful competitive edge for none.” (Op. Cert. at 6).
Respondents further argue that investment tax credits are
bad public policy (Op. Cert. at 6).

The United States District Court for the Northern
District of Ohio found that the challenged statute’s_pur-
pose “constitutes a legitimate state interest that clearly
has a rational nexus” to the tax credit. Jd. at 1201. The
court found that “[njotwithstanding Plaintiffs’ innovative
arguments” Ohio’s investment tax credit does not violate
the Commerce Clause. /d.

A panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the
Sixth Circuit held that the investment tax credit statute
(Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 5733.33) is unconstitutional under
the Dormant Commerce Clause of the United States
Constitution because “the tax credit involves state regula-
tion of interstate commerce through its power to tax” even
though the investment tax credit “is equally available to
in-state and out-of-state businesses.” Cuno v. Daimler-
Chrysler, Inc., 386 F.3d 738, 743, 746 (6th Cir..2004). The
court did not address standing.

This Court granted certiorari and directed the parties
to brief the following question: whether Respondents have
standing to challenge Ohio’s investment tax credit, Ohio
Rev. Code Ann. § 5733.33. DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno,
126 S. Ct. 36 (2005).

«

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
I

This Court does not sit as a “super-legislature” to
second-guess the desirability of statutes. The states may,

4

“within extremely broad limits,” experiment with different
economic philosophies. Thus, even if this Court were to
find Ohio’s tax statutes unwise or ineffective, this Court is
still obligated by the Constitution to tolerate what it may
regard as a legislative mistake. Founded in 1796, before
Michigan was admitted to the Union, amicus Wayne
County’s experience is that tax incentives are both effec-
tive and necessary. Wayne County maintains that it is
good government to utilize tax resources for economic
viability.

II

Respondents lack standing to challenge the constitu-
tionality of Ohio’s tax incentive statutes because Respon-
dents have not suffered an “injury in fact” as a result of
those statutes nor is it likely that their alleged grievances
would be redressed by a favorable decision of this Court.

Ill

The Sixth Circuit has misapplied longstanding prece-
dent in the area of interstate commerce, as the tax incen-
tives provided by Ohio, and by jurisdictions like Wayne
County do not constitute an undue burden on interstate
commerce, in violation of the Dormant Commerce Clause.

+

5

ARGUMENT
I

THIS COURT DOES NOT SIT AS A SUPER-
LEGISLATURE DECIDING STATE POLICY,
THUS, RESPONDENTS CANNOT INVOKE
THIS COURT’S JURISDICTION TO IM-
POSE POLICY ON THE STATES

The question before this Court is not whether the
Ohio tax incentive statute is wise or unwise, desirable or
undesirable. James v. Strange, 407 U.S. 128, 133 (1972).
Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp. of Bay View, 395 U.S.
337, 339 (1969). The question before this Court is not what
economic philosophy Ohio should or should not embrace.
Id. The question before this Court is not whether Ohio’s
statute is effective or ineffective. The sole question before
this Court is whether the statute is constitutional. James,
407 US. at 133.

This Court has repeatedly held that it does not sit as
“a super-legislative body.” Sniadach, 395 U.S. at 339. Day-
Brite Lighting v. State of Missouri, 342 U.S. 421, 423
(1952). But, rather, “state legislatures have constitutional
authority to experiment with new techniques ... [and]
they may within extremely broad limits control practices
within the business-labor field so long as specific constitu-
tional prohibitions are not violated.” Jd. Indeed, this Court
need not concur in those legislative policies to hold the
enactments constitutional. Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342
U.S. 580, 590 (1952). Judicially this Court is obligated by
the Constitution to tolerate what it may regard as a
legislative mistake. Jd. Misguided laws may nonetheless
be constitutional. James, 407 U.S. at 133.

6

Thus, it is Respondents’ considerable burden to prove,
not that tax incentive statutes are unwise, but that they
are unconstitutional. Jd.

A. Tax Incentives Are Vital to Wayne County’s
Economy

Wayne County is the largest county in the State of
Michigan and the eleventh largest in the nation. It is
comprised of 44 cities, including Detroit. It is historically,
and culturally fused with the automobile industry and
heavy manufacturing. There have been thoughtful efforts
to diversify the economy by working to attract and develop
business growth in high technology, service, tourism,
entertainment, and health care industries. But Wayne
County is the home of the automobile. Wayne County’s
citizens work in its factories, and Wayne County’s economy
rises and falls with the number of cars purchased by
consumers.

For 30 years Wayne County’s economy has been in
serious decline. Its unemployment rate of six percent is
the highest in the nation. A recent study conducted by the
Initiative for a Competitive Inner City, indicates that
Wayne County's largest city, Detroit, lost more jobs be-
tween 1995 and 2003 than any other large American city.
Detroit has 400,000 fewer jobs today than it had in 1970.

As a result of these economic challenges, Wayne
County and other similarly situated municipalities have
needed to employ a strategy to assist the businesses that
are already located in Wayne County and to attract new
ones. One of those strategies is providing tax incentives to
those businesses in return for job creation.

7

Michigan Public Act 198 of 1974 allows a 50 percent
reduction in local property taxes to businesses for the
renovation expansion, or new construction of manufactur-
ing plants in Michigan. Wayne County is eligible to grant
abatements under this statute, and has done so with
success. Overall, this program has resulted in the creation
of 500,000 new jobs and the creation of 1.3 million jobs
throughout Michigan.

Michigan Public Act 328 of 1998 is targeted at “dis-
tressed” communities, abating all (100%) new personal
property taxes in designated geographic areas. Wayne
County has taken advantage of this for businesses within
its boundaries.

Michigan Public Act 146 of 2000, known as the obso-
lete Property Rehabilitation Act, encourages the redevel-
opment of obsolete buildings by freezing taxes on the
property for up to 12 years.

Tax Increment Finance Authority Districts have been
established in Wayne County to capture and re-invest
taxes for the development of projects such as Ford Field,
home of the Detroit Lions, and the Detroit Tigers’ Stadium
known as Comerica Park. Both stadiums have created
thousands of jobs in the county and metro region.

Other tax incentives have been employed with success
by Wayne County, such as the “Brownfield” program which
encourages the development of sites that are contraindi-
cated. Up to $1 million in credits are available.

A newer program created by the state, called the
Michigan Economic Growth Authority, provides tax incen-
tives for development in the areas of high technology and
research and development.

8

‘ These programs are the life-blood of Wayne County’s
job retention efforts. Wayne County must be able to utilize
these tools to survive in an increasingly tough economic
climate.

Many business, which are automotive suppliers or
automotive related, would prefer to be physically proxi-
mate to the auto companies based in Wayne County. Being
close to the customer provides economies of scale for
distribution and supply. But these suppliers and automo-
tive related companies, which form the backbone of Wayne
County’s job base, will locate elsewhere if the overall] cost
of doing business is lower elsewhere. Taxes are not the
only factor, but they are certainly a key factor.

The use of tax incentives to preserve Wayne County’s
job base is not an abstract economic theory, it is a means
to assist County citizens from the crisis of losing a job, and
the devastation that flows from it including lost homes,
health care, and the ability to buy groceries.

Wayne County is, therefore, committed to utilizing
these tax incentives as one effective tool in preserving its
economic base and way of life.

There are a number of factors that a company takes
into account when deciding whether doing business in a
particular locale makes sense. Some of those factors
include: the availability of workers; the opportunity to
grow; the regulatory environment; competition; access to
health care; location; and taxable costs of doing business.
There are other important, non-bottom line factors which
are considered, such as quality of life issues.

It is Wayne County’s economic development experi-
ence that the taxable cost of doing business rates high on

9

the list, and must be addressed if Wayne County is to be
competitive with other regions and the world market.

Il

RESPONDENTS LACK STANDING TO
CHALLENGE OHIO’S TAX CREDIT STAT-
UTE BECAUSE RESPONDENTS’ INJURIES
ARE CONJECTURAL AND NOT LIKELY TO
BE REDRESSED BY A FAVORABLE DECI-
SION

The doctrine of standing asks whether a litigant is
entitled to have a federal court resolve his grievance.
Kowalski v. Tesmer, 543 U.S, 125, ___, 125 S. Ct. 564, 567
(2004). The party invoking federal jurisdiction bears the
burden of establishing that jurisdiction. Lujan v. Defend-
ers of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992). Thus, since
Respondents here invoked the jurisdiction of this Court,
Respondents bear the burden of establishing that they
have standing. Jd.

A. Respondents Lack Article III Standing

This Court has held that the “irreducible constitu-
tional minimum” of standing contains three elements:

1. “Injury in fact” of a legally protected interest that
is, concrete and particularized, actual or imminent, and
not conjectural or hypothetical;

2. A causal connection between the injury and the
challenged action, an injury which is not the result of the
independent action of a third party; and

10

3. An injury that will likely, not speculatively, be
redressed by a favorable decision of the court. U.S. Const
art. III, § 1. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560-561.

Here, Respondents cannot establish any of these
required elements. Respondents are individual residents
of Ohio, individual residents of Michigan, two Ohio small
businesses, and one not-for-profit Ohio corporation. Comp.
4 2-6. The Ohio Respondents allege that, as a result of
the tax credit, the revenues of their state have diminished
and that the tax credit impermissibly and disproportion-
ately shifts the tax burden to them. Comp. {{ 22, 40, 42.

In a similar case, this Court refused to confer standing
on state taxpayers, who alleged that a state statute
governing mineral leases “deprived the school trust funds —
of millions of dollars thereby resulting in unnecessarily
higher taxes.” This Court held that the taxpayers lacked
standing because “even if the first part of the assertion
were correct ... it is pure speculation whether the lawsuit
would result in any actual tax relief for respondents.”

ASARCO v. Kadish, 490 U.S. 605, 613, 614 (1989).

This Court went on to say, “[t]he possibility that
taxpayers will receive any direct pecuniary relief from this
lawsuit is ‘remote, fluctuating and uncertain’ ... and
consequently the claimed injury is not ‘likely to be re-
dressed by a favorable decision.’” Jd.

Like the taxpayers in ASARCO, the Ohio taxpayers,
in the case before the Court today, lack standing because
their lawsuit rests on conjecture and their claimed injury
would not likely be redressed by a favorable decision. /d.
Similarly, the Michigan Respondents’ lawsuit rests on even
greater speculation: that they lost “economic opportunity
in the form of jobs” because of the Ohio tax credit. Comp.

11

¥ 42. The Michigan Respondents speculate that, -had
DaimlerChrysler not expanded in Ohio, it would have
expanded in Michigan and given Respondents a chance at
jobs. That speculation does not even come close to an
“injury in fact,” caused by the challenged tax credit, which
would likely be redressed by a favorable decision.

B. Respondents Lack Standing To Raise The
Rights Of Others

An alternative threshold question of standing asks if
Respondents have standing to raise the rights of others.
Kowalski, 125 S. Ct. at 567. A party seeking third-party
standing must show: first, that the party asserting the
right has a “close” relationship with the person who
possesses the right; and, second, that there is a “hin-
drance” to the possessor’s ability to pretect his own inter-
est. Id. Here, Respondents have alleged no such cause of
action or no such relationship.

Further, the right to complain that a state law dis-
criminates in violation of the Commerce Clause belongs to
those against whom the law discriminates. Boston Stock
Exchange v. State Tax Comm’n, 429 U.S. 318, 321 n. 3
(1977). Here, Respondents lack third-party standing
because they do not allege that the tax credit discrimi-
nates against them. Jd.

12

Ill

THE SIXTH CIRCUIT HAS MISAPPLIED
LONGSTANDING PRECEDENT IN THE
AREA OF INTERSTATE COMMERCE, AS
THE TAX INCENTIVES PROVIDED BY
OHIO, AND BY JURISDICTIONS LIKE
WAYNE COUNTY DO NOT CONSTITUTE AN
UNDUE BURDEN ON INTERSTATE COM-
MERCE, IN VIOLATION OF THE DORMANT
COMMERCE CLAUSE

This Court has held that under the Federal Economic
Clause, a state (and by extension a political subdivision
thereof such as Wayne County) may enact its own philoso-
phy towards business taxation. Jd. In Boston Stock Ex-
change, this Court explained that, “Our decision today
does not prevent the States from structuring their tax
systems to encourage the growth and development of
intrastate commerce and industry. Nor do we hold that a
state may not compete with other states for a share of
interstate commerce; such competition lies at the heart of
a free trade policy. We hold only that in the process of
competition no state may discriminatorily tax the products

manufactured or the business operations performed in any
other state.” Jd. at 336-337.

In H.P. Hood & Sons v. DuMond, 336 U.S. 525 (1949),
Justice Robert Jackson articulated the Court’s position on
state regulation and the national economy. For the Court,
he wrote, “The Commerce Clause is one of the most prolific
sources of national power and an equally prolific source of
conflict with legislation of the state. While the Constitution
vests in Congress the power to regulate commerce among
the states, it does not say what the states may or may not
do in the absence of congressional action. [Perhaps] even

13

more than by interpretation of its written word, this Court
has advanced the solidarity and prosperity of this Nation
by the meaning it has given to these great silences of the
[Constitution].”

The “great silence” created by the Founding Fathers
in the Commerce Clause, has long meant that the states,
and municipalities like Wayne County, have great freedom
to enact economic programs to benefit businesses within
its boundaries, where Congress has not “spoken” in some
pre-emptive fashion, so long as the economic program does
not affirmatively discriminate against foreign cérpora-
tions. This great silence has come to be known as the
Dormant Commerce Clause theory.

The “Dormant Commerce Clause” theory has been
used to strike down undue burdens on interstate com-
merce. But such a burden was not found in Boston Stock
Exchange where tax incentives for intrastate benefits was
applied.

In the case before the Court today, the Sixth Circuit
cited Boston Stock Exchange but misapplied it by holding
that Ohio’s tax incentive was discriminatcry.

On the contrary, Ohio, like Wayne County, and like
other jurisdictions throughout the country, is constitution-
ally permitted to provide such tax incentives to businesses
within its borders because it has not imposed a tax burden
on products or business operations on a company in
another state. Taxing discrimination in this sense would
require some steps to actively hinder a company or prod-
uct line in another state, while creating the intrastate
advantage, and there is no evidence of that type of undue
tax burden on out-of-state businesses in this case.

14

Significantly, the Sixth Circuit’s decision is expressly
contrary to the leading state law case in the Sixth Circuit,
decided by the Michigan Supreme Court in Caterpillar,
Inc. v. Department of Treasury, 488 N.W. 2d 182 (Mich.
1992). In the Caterpillar case, the Michigan Department of
Treasury extended a capital acquisition deduction to
Caterpillar and other qualifying businesses for personal
property located within the state. Under-this Michigan
economic program, even if the business applying for the
tax deduction was headquartered in another state, the
company’s personal property located in Michigan triggered
the benefit. Jd. at 186.

The Michigan Supreme Court considered, with de-
tailed care, the precedents of this court, explaining that
the Michigan tax incentive program at issue was proper in
its promotion of intrastate commerce, while at the same
time, not being a discriminatory burden on interstate
commerce. Jd. at 192.

Caterpillar is consistent with this Court’s rulings in
Boston Stock Exchange, and other decisions cited herein. It
is entirely consistent with the tax incentive offered by the
state of Ohio to Petitioner DaimlerChrysler, and it is
consistent with the economic development and tax incen-
tive priorities of Wayne County.

Making Wayne County more business friendly, is not
illegal under the Dormant Commerce Clause. Businesses
that want to come into Wayne County from other counties
or states or countries, for that matter, have the equal right
to apply for these tax incentives.

¢

15

CONCLUSION

The Constitution sets forth, and rests upon, innova-
tive principles original to the American experience such as
federalism and a proven balance in political mechanisms
through separation of powers. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S.
551 125 S. Ct. 1183, 1200 (2005).

Respondents’ remedy lies in using those political
mechanisms to change the laws that Respondents disagree
with. Respondents’ remedy does not lie in the courts.

¢

RELIEF REQUESTED

Wayne County respectfully requests that this Court
reverse the decision of the Sixth Circuit.

Respectfully submitted,

EDWARD M. THOMAS
MELVIN BUTCH HOLLOWELL

December 5, 2005

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385016_0105%3A39. Public record. Not legal advice.