# Amicus Curiae Brief — Marshall v. Marshall > Briefs, arguments, decisions, and more. URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385016_0101%3A17 ## Record - **Collection:** Supreme Court brief - **Document type:** Amicus Curiae Brief - **Published:** January 1, 2006 - **Citation:** 547 U.S. 293 ## Text On Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit BRIEF OF AMICUS CURIAE WASHINGTON LEGAL FOUNDATION IN SUPPORT OF RESPONDENT (202) 588-0302 Los Angeles, CA 90017 (213) 694-1200 Counsel for Amicus Curiae Date: January 20, 2006 QUESTION ADDRESSED BY AMICUS CURIAE The question addressed by amicus curiae is: Whether a bankruptcy court lacks jurisdiction in a civil proceeding where the subject matter of the action falls within the exclusive in rem jurisdiction of a probate or other state -court. “i pes oS Sa. Al af £4 tare 2s Sean Hy ed >e fing e i ‘, 4) bg Pe iat, Pe, ae Cage Mthen eo, - —— s & . al 2 = lo Ob) Cae ; i ie ee om ae Dee Ff els i TABLE OF CONTENTS INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE .......0..:ssccssescsssssssorsscesseees l SEAT Ree CPE BORIS CAI iecccscecccccccccsccsssorsovevensercnscciezses 2 SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT......0........cccecsesercesseeesseesenees 4 PETUINTE cstbiicthlccitsetindinncestninedidinisibenidincasntbecvibistetiniesiosse 7 I, Il. Il. ALL COURTS THAT EXERCISE JN REM JURISDICTION DO SO EXCLUSIVELY ............. 7 THE DOCTRINE OF PRIOR EXCLUSIVE JURISDICTION APPLIES TO ALL JN REM AND QUASI IN REM PROCEEDINGB.................. 8 A. The Doctrine of Prior Exclusive Jurisdiction Promotes Harmonious Cooperation Among Federal and State Courts..........................sceceesees 8 B. Neither 28 U.S.C. § 1334 Nor the Bankruptcy Code Abrogate the Doctrine of Prior Exclusive Jurisdiction As It Applies to In Rem State Court Proceedings Involving IED GRIIIII vaigiccintasttishissniccnarniderectpentonepoene 10 THE SCOPE AND EFFECT OF A PROBATE COURT’S EXCLUSIVE JN REM JURISDICTION MUST BE EXPANSIVE ENOUGH TO GRANT EFFECTIVE RELIEF “AGAINST THE WORLD ............ccscsescssssvesseeee 15 A. A Court’s Exclusive /n Rem Jurisdiction Is Not Limited Solely to Disposition of the IIE Adnscvsiisntnnaictabsdngieiscananntdbennbendbachindsihis 15 IV B. In Gelston v. Hoyt, this Court Answered the Question Presented On Appeal In Fee GRID as cticccconscvienpatsencapevntniitiniapatibichincimiiiaaaté 19 IV. THE CONCERNS RAISED BY THE UNITED STATES AS AMICUS CURIAE IN SUPPORT OF THE PETITIONER ARE MISPLACED AND DO NOT WARRANT DEVIATION FROM THE UNIFIED PRINCIPLES THAT GOVERN JN REM PROCEEDINGB...............0006. 23 RAR II OW sornccosrscivonenecessosecsctsconsiivcsneneniabvonipebsiinaningiiiel 27 Vv TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Cases American Home Products Corp. v. Collins, cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 1823 (2005) ................c..000000 a Ankerbrandt v. Richards, TS Sa ae ae er 14 California v. Deep Sea Research, Inc., TET NEE IS NR aR 13,17 Case of Broderick's Will, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 503 (1874)... ceceeeeeeeeees passim Cohen v. De La Cruz. TESTE Rs REE Oe NEE 12 Covell v. Heyman, ETT ET TELL ESET A 7, 8, 12 Gardner v. New Jersey, EIST a A a 15, 16 Gelston v. Hoyt, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 246 (1818) ................ccccccceeeeeees passim Haddock v. Haddock, ETS TE I Se aaa 13 Hagan v. Lucas, Be TE BEI ccncccescssncceccenecsnsonesegensensssconnns 8 Hartford Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Union Planters Bank, N.A., ET 11 In re French, 139 B.R. 476 (Bankr. D.S.D. 1992) .0.........ccccccceceeeees 13 Lincoln Property Co. v. Roche, TO ace l vi Markham vy. Allen, a : GIs ctencesinciiniadssennsiddathadtiniaadsdeiitaiiidd 24, 25 Marshall v. Marshall, BR SEE me seeees 4 Mooney v. Harlin, Ln, EE PIE Se eeaee™ 7 Moser v. Pollin, ee ee Be etintiahieccccinnapitbinicencccssitindnnininuns 23 Patterson v. Shumate, ee Fe titi dienntenthadinimsiinccithtasihdiiemcinninchtinibiinede 10 Penn General Casualty Co. v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania ex rel. Schnader, Se TTI citinclrignsccsientnitmsnnaninsitinemeanemniabiinionaen 5, 8,9 Pennsylvania Pub. Welfare Dep't v. Davenport, eh I ceihrcnccnciliicetiinnttiatnittnancintdniinssiiniinast 12 Princess Lida of Thurn and Taxis v. Thompson, EE a 9,15 Slay Warehousing Co., Inc. v. Modern Boats, Inc. (In re Modern Boats), 775 F.2d 619 (5™ Cir. 1985) ...c.cccccccscsscesessesseeseeneeees 13,14 Taylor v. Carryl, 61 U.S. (20 How.) 583 (1858)................ccccccessereeenesesenees 9 Tennessee Student Assistance Corp. v. Hood, Oe Ss Se identtcnsecsntniiemncentimmennsiins passim United States v. Bank of New York & Trust Co., EE Re ee passim United States v. One 1985 Cadillac Seville, ee ae 0 ly ee aitecertictnrnntnnsececentccieeees 5,9 Waterman v. Canal-Louisiana Bank & Trust Co., ee ee Fee ictachinincenediditiaticncisiiteinsintsnansizcanal 6,17, 18 Vil White v. White (In re White), oe gg EE ae eee 13 Williams v. State of North Carolina, BOF ERs ee Ce restintancensnditenicstnsstesiccieenccsecmambatinte 13 Williams v. State of North Carolina, eI xstntareienentninnedlicctnnsinciahanansdatineaeacaien 13 Statutes ee ees Se ccncaricncsemnenctguiiinteanttiniieniamiiaanaiiattdinns 12 ae se Oe eiitatciciiticicartihincaneinstinindhcnntilpibapinsuiitectintipeanialac 12 ie ME icin ierredicinidnestensiiiliabinepcenitieiaiineessieatiniiaibwaniis 13 ee icvernovitasseninatehiaistiiietiiicindsibindapapniai 10, 11 ie Se ictraerciciernarctidinpsmanpnstnitipiemenieitin 11 Tex. Prob. Code Ann. §§ SA(b), 5(F) ...cccccccccccsecsesseteceeeeneeven 7 Legislative History H.R. Rep. No. 95-595, 95" Cong., 1* Sess. 310 (1977), as reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. Fy GIT caccnsncrnenctneccsncsveeeensinsnincenaneieentinencsneseaesnnen 12 Other Authorities | Brian Greene, The Elegant Universe (1999) .............ccc00000-00+ 4 Rules RD PD cccctincescesnineteaseapeeninniiaiecdinsitintiiuae l PE RED > UND censcrsenincecnapinpenrcuniipiintitimmseninieligipsiaeien 14 BRIEF OF AMICUS CURIAE WASHINGTON LEGAL FOUNDATION IN SUPPORT OF RESPONDENT Amicus curiae Washington Legal Foundation (“WLF”) respectfully submits that the judgment of the court of appeals should be affirmed. ! INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE WLF is a nonprofit public interest law and policy center based in Washington, D.C., with thousands of suppevicrs na- tionwide. WLF regularly appears before federal and state courts to promote economic liberty, free enterprise, and a limited and accountable government. WLF has filed briefs in this Court and elsewhere addressing the limitations upon the scope of jurisdiction to be exercised by federal and state courts. See, e.g., Lincoln Property Co. v. Roche, 126 §S. Ct. 606 (2005); American Home Products Corp. v. Collins, cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 1823 (2005). WLF fully supports the position of E. Pierce Marshall (“Respondent”) that this Court should affirm the Ninth Cir- cuit’s j»4gment and hold that, under the probate exception, the fede. .l district court lacked jurisdiction to hear this case. WLIF writes separately to address the broader implications of the challenge by Vickie Lynn Marshall (“Petitioner”) to the probate exception; specifically, the negative impact upon the orderly and effective administration of justice in the exercise by both federal and state courts of in rem jurisdiction. The touchstone of in rem jurisdiction, and its effective exercise, is the exclusive jurisdiction granted to one court over the res, |! Pursuant to this Court’s Rule 37.6, WLF states that this brief was not authored in whole or in part by counsel for any party, and that no person or entity other than WLF or its counsel, contributed monetarily to the preparation or submission of this brief. Letters consenting to the filing of this brief have been submitted to the Clerk. 2 without interference by other courts. The unduly restrictive reading of the probate exception advanced by Petitioner con- tradicts nearly two centuries of judicial precedent that were designed to avoid “unseemly and disastrous conflicts” be- tween federal and state courts of the kind that have unfortu- nately occurred in this case. STATEMENT OF THE CASE Petitioner married J. Howard Marshall II (“Decedent’’) in 1994. Decedent died in 1995. ER2 95. Prior to his death, Decedent conveyed and transferred most of his property to a living trust established under a written trust instrument. ER 1018, 2623. He also left a series of wills, the last of which (the “Will”) left all of his property to the Trust to be distrib- uted after his death in accordance with the terms of the Trust. ER 510, 514-16. (The Will and Trust are cotestvaty § re- ferred to as the “Estate Plan’’). Prior to Decedent’s death, Petitioner commenced pro- ceedings in the probate court for the state of Texas, seeking a declaration concerning the Trust’s validity and alleging that Respondent tortiously interfered with her property rights with respect to Decedent’s assets. ER 4615-17, 5620. After De- cedent died, Petitioner filed a further application seeking a declaration that Decedent died intestate. ER 816-18. Re- spondent opposed the application and sought to admit the Will in the Texas probate court. ER 836-45. Petitioner thereafter contested the Will, challenged the validity of the Estate Plan, and pursued her claim against Respondent - all in the Texas probate court proceeding that she commenced. ER 1319-31, 2863-65, 5523-31. A five month jury trial took place in 2000 and 2001, ER 4706, and on March 7, 2001, the jury returned its verdict upholdir.,, the validity of the Trust 2 The term “ER” refers to certain “excerpts of record” filed in the Ninth Circuit pursuant to that Court's local rules. 3 and Will and rejecting the various claims seeking recoveries at odds with Decedent’s Estate Plan. ER 3719, 3735. An initial probate judgment was entered by the Texas probate court on August 15, 2001, ER 4001, and the second amended final probate judgment was entered on December 7, 2001, which admitted the Will to probate, and found both the Will and the Trust to be genuine and valid and not the product of improper conduct. ER 4717. In January 1996, while the Texas probate proceeding was pending, Petitioner filed a voluntary bankruptcy petition in California. ER 2642. Five months after filing for bank- ruptcy, she commenced a civil proceeding against Respon- dent in bankruptcy court. ER 948-49. The new lawsuit in- volved the same subject matter as the controversies to be de- termined by the Texas probate court, requiring consideration of issues such as the Decedent’s intent concerning disposi- tion of his assets and the validity of the Estate Plan. Com- pare ER 948-49 with ER 2863-65. The bankruptcy court ul- timately issued a decision finding that Petitioner had an ex- pectancy of a substantial portion of Decedent’s wealth, and after concluding that Respondent interfered with that expec- tancy, awarded approximately $450 million to the Petitioner. App. 198-99. Respondent appealed to the federal district court. App. 148-99. There, the court concluded that the civil proceeding _was non-core, and therefore reviewed de novo the bankruptcy court’s decision. App. 171-87. The district court ultimately awarded Petitioner about $88.5 million, concluding that De- cedent’s signature on the Trust was falsified, that the Estate Plan did not reflect Decedent’s true intentions, and that Re- spondent had interfered with Decedent’s intent to give Peti- tioner an alleged gift by engaging in illegitimate “estate 3 “App.” refers to the Appendix to Petition for Writ of Certiorari. 4 planning transactions for [Decedent].” ER 65, 73; App. 78- 136, 194-46. Upon further appeal, the Ninth Circuit vacated the district court’s judgment, finding that the “probate exception” ap- . plies in bankruptcy cases. App. 1-38. The Ninth Circuit based its ruling in part on the exclusive in rem jurisdiction of probate courts that has a binding effect “upon the whole world,” including United States district courts, of determina- tions made by the probate court. Because Petitioner’s claim that Decedent intended to give her a gift “went to the very essence of the testamentary instruments executed by J. How- ard Marshali II in his lifetime,” App. 35, the Ninth Circuit found her claims to be “‘in substance nothing more than a thinly veiled will contest” and a “disguised attack” on the Trust and the disposition of the property under the Trust. App. 31, 36-37. Petitioner filed a petition for a writ of certiorari to the Ninth Circuit, which this Court granted. Marshall v. Mar- » shall, 126 S. Ct. 35 (2005). SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT In The Elegant Universe, author Brian Greene describes the quest by physicists for more than half a century to formu- late a unified theory of physics, known as “string theory,” that reconciles the apparent conflict between the theories of general relativity and quantum mechanics. Brian Greene, The Elegant Universe 15 (1999). In the universe of law where courts exercise in rem juris- diction, there already exists such a unified theory. The fun- damental principles of that “theory” have been developed by the Court over two centuries, and include the following: First, the exercise by a court of in rem jurisdiction is al- ways exclusive. This reflects the need to promote harmoni- ous cooperation among courts and “[t]o avoid unseemly and disastrous conflicts in the administration of our dual judicial 5 system.” Penn General Casualty Co. v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania ex rel. Schnader, 294 U.S 189, 195 (1935). Second, in order to resolve potential conflicts among courts seeking to exercise in rem jurisdiction, this Court has developed the doctrine of “prior exclusive jurisdiction.” That doctrine imposes a prudential limitation on the jurisdiction of courts in proceedings where another court has previously ex- ercised in rem jurisdiction over the res. United States v. Bank of New York & Trust Co., 296 U.S. 463, 478 (1936); United States v. One 1985 Cadillac Seville, 866 F.2d 1142, 1145 (9"" Cir. 1989)(citing Penn General Casualty, 294 U.S. at 195). Third, because of the nature of in rem proceedings as “one against the world,” the limitation on the jurisdiction of other courts, whether exercised in rem or in personam, ap- plies to all disputes that “come incidentally in controversy” with the “same subject matter” as that adjudicated in the in rem proceeding. Gelston v. Hoyt, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 246, 315 (1818). Such relief is necessary to avoid “col!s#teral” and “indirect” attacks on the exclusive exercise of in rem juris- diction. /d. at 313. This Court recognized more than a century ago that the “continued prevalence” of the probate exception can be at- tributed to the nature of probate actions as in rem proceed- ings. Case of Broderick’s Will, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 503, 509 (1874). A probate action is, however, but one of many kinds of proceedings that are based upon the principles of in rem jurisdiction. Accordingly, the Petitioner’s efforts to limit the application of the probate exception, if successful, would have negative implications for all federal and state courts that depend upon their in rem jurisdiction to grant relief that is effective “against the world.” The Court anticipated this very peril when it warned in Gelston v. Hoyt, nearly two centuries ago, about the “mis- chievous consequences” that would result if decisions by courts with exclusive in rem jurisdiction were subject to “in- 6 direct” or “collateral” attack. Jd. at 313. In Gelston, the Court held that a state court lacked jurisdiction to hear de- fenses to a tort action where such defenses were premised on adjudication of questions related to forfeiture and seizure that were subject to the exclusive in rem jurisdiction of the fed- eral admiralty court. /d. at 313-14. The same reasoning ap- plies to this case — namely, the federal districi court lacks ju- risdiction to hear a civil proceeding involving subject matter that falls within the exclusive in rem jurisdiction of the Texas probate court. The United States, as amicus curiae supporting the Peti- tioner, has raised concerns that the Ninth Circuit’s decision, if affirmed, will deprive federal courts of jurisdiction to de- termine such matters as the tax liability of a decedent’s es- tate. That concer is wholly misplaced. The exclusive in rem jurisdiction vested in probate courts does not equate to the wholesale elimination of the concurrent in personam ju- risdiction of federal courts “to establish a debt or a right to share in property, and thus to obtain an adjudication which might be had without disturbing the control of the state court.” United States v. Bank of New York & Trust Co., 296 U.S. at 478; see also Waterman v. Canal-Louisiana Bank & Trust Co., 215 U.S. 33, 44 (1909). It does, however, prevent federal courts from interfering with state probate actions, whether directly by contesting probate of a will or indirectly in the manner pursued by Petitioner. As for the concern of the United States Trustee Program (the “Program’’) that recognition of a “broad probate excep- tion” could interfere with the ability of bankruptcy courts to administer debtors’ estates expeditiously, the Program has it backwards. As a practical matter, restrictions on the effec- tive exercise of in rem jurisdiction by courts, if generally ap- plied in bankruptcy and other in rem proceedings, would have a more widespread and deleterious impact on the bank- ruptcy system than would application of the probate excep- tion in the fewer number of cases where the jurisdiction of probate courts and bankruptcy courts intersect. - ARGUMENT I. ALL COURTS THAT EXERCISE IN REM JURISDICTION DO SO EXCLUSIVELY As this Court has recognized for nearly two centuries, probate proceedings are actions in rem. E.g., Gelston vy. Hoyt, 16 U.S. at 315; Case of Broderick’s Will, 88 U.S. at 509.4 Indeed, the “continued prevalence” of the probate ex- ception has been attributed by this Court to the manner in which the probate of a deceased person’s estate “partakes, in some degree, of the nature of a proceeding in rem.” Broder- ick’s Will, 88 U.S. at 509. Accordingly, the general princi- ples of law governing in rem jurisdiction apply to probate matters. Both federal and state courts exercising in rem jurisdic- tion are granted exclusive jurisdiction over the res to be ad- ministered. 5 This rule has been regularly applied in jurisdic- tional disputes between federal and state courts involving - property that has been seized or attached, where this Court has consistently held that property cannot be subject to two jurisdictions. Covell v. Heyman, 111 U.S. 176, 181-82 (1884). In Covell v. Heyman, the Court explained the effect of one court’s jurisdiction over the property upon the juris- diction of the other: {[W]hen one takes into its jurisdiction a spe- cific thing, that res is as much withdrawn from the judicial power of the other as if it had 4 Probate proceedings under Texas law are no exception to this rule. E.g., Mooney v. Harlin, 622 S.W.2d 83, 85 (Tex. 1981). 5 See TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. §$§ SA(b), S(F\“Any cause of action appertaining to estates or incident to an estate shall be brought in a statu- tory probate court” rather than in the district court, including “All matters relating to the collection, settlement, partition and distribution of estates of deceased persons”). 8 been carried physically into a different territo- rial sovereignty. To attempt to seize it by a foreign process is futile and void. Id. at 182. The exclusive in rem jurisdiction of courts “is a principle of comity with perhaps no higher sanction...” /d. This Court has long recognized that “[a] most injurious conflict of jurisdiction would be likely often to arise between the federal and state courts if the final process of the one could be levied on property which had been taken by the process of the other.” Hagan v. Lucas, 35 U.S. (10 Pet.) 400, 403 (1836). More recently, in Penn General Casualty, 294 U.S 189, this Court reaffirmed that where two suits before a federal and state court are in rem or quasi in rem, “the jurisdiction of one court must of necessity yield to that of the other” in order “{t]o avoid unseemly and disastrous conflicts in the admini- stration of our dual judicial system.” /d. at 195. Il. THE DOCTRINE OF PRIOR EXCLUSIVE JURISDICTION APPLIES TO ALL IN REM AND QUASI IN REM PROCEEDINGS A. The Doctrine of Prior Exclusive Jurisdiction Promotes Harmonious Cooperation Among Federal and State Courts The need to avoid conflicts and promote harmonious co- operation between federal and state courts led to the devel- opment by this Court of the doctrine of “prior exclusive ju- risdiction.” Under this principle, applicable to both federal and state courts, “the court first assuming jurisdiction over the property may maintain and exercise that jurisdiction fo the exclusion of the other... .” United States v. Bank of New York & Trust Co., 296 U.S. at 477 (emphasis added). The doctrine reflects “the discharge of the long-recognized duty of this court to give effect to such ‘methods of procedure as shall serve to conciliate the distinct and independent tribunals of the States and of the Union, so that they may co-operate as 9 harmonious members of a judicial system coextensive with the United States.’” /d. at 477-78 (quoting Taylor v. Carryl, 61 U.S. (20 How.) 583, 595 (1858)).® The doctrine of prior exclusive jurisdiction has never been restricted to cases where property has been seized under judicial process, but rather “applies as well where suits are brought to marshal assets, administer trusts, or liquidate es- tates, and in suits of similar nature, where, to give effect to its jurisdiction, the court must control the property.” Jd. at 477. In Princess Lida of Thurn and Taxis v. Thompson, 305 U.S. 456 (1939), for example, the doctrine was applied in a dis- pute specifically involving a trust. The trustees had filed an account of the trust in the Court of Common Pleas for Penn- sylvania. Certain of the beneficiaries brought suit in equity in federal district court against the trustees, alleging misman- agement of the trust and seeking removal of the trustees and an accounting and repayment of the estate’s losses. The trus- tees sought to enjoin the beneficiaries from continuing the federal lawsuit. Concluding that the Common Pleas Court “could not effectively exercise the jurisdiction vested in it, without a substantial measure of control of the trust funds,” this Court held that the jurisdiction of the Common Pleas Court was guasi in rem and thus exclusive, and that the fed- eral district court was without jurisdiction of the suit brought before it. /d. at 467 (emphasis added). 6 The doctrine has been explained as one that is not a constitutional limitation upon the jurisdiction of federal courts, but rather “a prudential limitation applied by the Supreme Court in the interest of judicial har- mony.” United States v. One 1985 Cadillac Seville, 866 F.2d 1142, 1145 (9th Cir. 1989). Although a prudential limitation, the Ninth Circuit has held that, under this Court’s well established precedent, a federal court lacks discretion te accept jurisdiction and “must yield to a prior state pro- ceeding.” /d. (citing Penn General Casualty Co., 294 U.S. at 195). 10 B. Neither 28 U.S.C. § 1334 Nor the Bankruptcy Code Abrogate the Doctrine of Prior Exclusive Jurisdiction As It Applies to Jn Rem State Court Proceedings Involving Non-Debtor Assets Petitioner suggests in her brief that Congress, when it en- acted 28 U.S.C. § 1334 in 1978, as amended in 1984, in- tended to overrule the doctrine of prior exclusive jurisdiction and confer federal district courts with jurisdiction over prop- erty subject to pre-existing in rem proceedings. That reading of section 1334 finds no support in the statute’s plain lan- guage, or elsewhere. Petitioner incorrectly relies upon section 1334(b), which provides: Notwithstanding any Act of Congress that confers exclusive jurisdiction on a court or courts other than the district courts, the district courts shall have original but not exclusive ju- risdiction of all civil proceedings arising un- der title 11, or arising in or related to cases under title 11. 28 U.S.C. § 1334(b). Notably, subsection (b) refers to “any Act of Congress that confers exclusive jurisdiction” but makes no mention of “state law” that confers exclusive juris- diction. /d. (emphasis added). Given the use of the phrase “state law” elsewhere in section 1334 (specifically, subsec- tion (c)), the absence of any reference to “state law” in sec- tion 1334(b), when coupled with the explicit reference to “any Act of Congress,” is telling. If anything, it indicates a deliberate intention not to provide district courts with origi- nal jurisdiction over proceedings otherwise subject to the ex- clusive in rem jurisdiction of state courts. E.g., Patterson v. Shumate, 504 U.S. 753, 758 (1992)(when Congress meant to refer to state law under the Bankruptcy Code, it used the term “state law‘). ll Nor does subsection (e) of section 1334 support Peti- tioner’s argument. Section 1334(e) grants the district court exclusive jurisdiction over “all of the property, wherever lo- cated, of the debtor as of the commencement of such case, and of property of the estate.” 28 U.S.C. § 1334(e). How- ever, the case at issue does not involve the district court’s exercise of jurisdiction over the res of the Petitioner. Here, the Petitioner confuses the in rem and in personam jurisdic- tion granted to federal courts in bankruptcy cases. The civil action in which Petitioner has brought her claims against Re- spondent is not an in rem proceeding as it relates to her bank- ruptcy proceeding, but rather a chose in action in which the district court purported to exercise in personam jurisdiction over Respondent. Merely because her personal claims (to the extent they exist) may be property of the estate does not con- vert the civil proceeding against Respondent into one that is in rem.’ The only res in dispute is Decedent’s probate estate, and Petitioner’s claim that she was entitled to receive that property upon Decedent’s death. Those are matters subject to the exclusive in rem jurisdiction of the Texas probate court. Given that the res in dispute is not the property of the debtor or the estate, section 543 of the Bankruptcy Code would not apply. That provision appears to constitute the only statutory exception under the Bankruptcy Code to the doctrine of prior exclusive jurisdiction. Section 543 requires 7 Indeed, if a debtor's ownership of a chose in action was itself suffi- cient to create exclusive in rem jurisdiction over civil proceedings brought to pursue those claims, then bankruptcy courts would have exclu- sive jurisdiction over every one of those civil proceedings. One need look no further than the plain language of section 1334(b), which pro- vides that such jurisdiction is “original but not exclusive,” to reject that premise. 28 U.S.C. § 1334(b)emphasis added); see Hartford Underwrit- ers Ins. Co. v. Union Planters Bank, N.A., 530 U.S. 1, 7 (2000)(requiring that statute be interpreted based upon its plain language). 12 a “custodian” of property of the debtor or the estate not to take action with respect to such property and to turn it over to the bankruptcy trustee. 11 U.S.C. § 543. The term “custo- dian” is defined under section 101(11) of the Bankruptcy Code to include state court receivers, trustee or assignees un- der a general assignment for the benefit of creditors. 11 U.S.C. § 101(11). The legislative history to secu 101(11) explains that custodian is defined to mean a “prepetition liq- — uidator of the debtor’s property,” or other court officers that perform functions “substantially similar to those of a receiver or trustee.” H.R. Rep. No. 95-595, 95" Cong., 1 Sess. 310 (1977)(emphasis added), as reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6267. The proceeding before the Texas probate court obviously does not fall within the scope of section 543, as it involved administration of the Decedent's property (not the debtor’s) and has no “custodian” within the meaning of sec- tion 101(11). Other than section 543, which affects only the priority of exclusive jurisdiction and in any event is not applicable to this case, there is no indication in the language of section 1334, the Bankruptcy Code, or elsewhere that Congress sought to depart from the doctrine of prior exclusive jurisdic- tion. In other cases, this Court has presumed that Congress continued “‘past bankruptcy practice absent a clear indication that Congress intended . . . a departure... .’”” Cohen v. De La Cruz, 523 U.S. 213, 221 (1998)(quoting Pennsylvania Pub. Welfare Dep't v. Davenport, 495 U.S. 552, 563 (1990)). As noted above, the doctrine of prior exclusive jurisdiction has been applied for more than a century and has been recog- nized by this Court as “a principle of comity with perhaps no higher sanction.” Covell v. Heyman, 111 U.S. at 182. Thus, one would expect something more explicit from Congress (comparable to Section 543) if it intended to deviate from those principles in any respect. Indeed, the underpinning of that doctrine, i.e., that prior possession of the res determines whether a court’s jurisdic- tion lies, was reinforced in a recent case involving the exer- 13 cise of in rem jurisdiction. In California v. Deep Sea Re- search, Inc., 523 U.S. 491 (1998), the Court held that the Eleventh Amendment did not preclude the federal court from exercising its exclusive in rem admiralty jurisdiction to adju- dicate the State of California’s claim to a shipwreck. /d. at 507-08; 28 U.S.C. § 1333 (granting federal courts jurisdic- tion exclusive of states over admiralty cases). But the Court expressly based its ruling on the fact that the State of Cali- fornia did not have possession of the res, and distinguished other prior opinions of this Court on that very basis. /d. at 504 (“[iJn this case, unlike in Treasure Salvors, DSR asserts rights to a res that is not in the possession of the State’). The fact that the Court’s decision turned on the state’s non- possession of the res suggests that the doctrine of prior ex- clusive jurisdiction retains its vitality even where Congress has otherwise granted, by statute, exclusive in rem jurisdic- tion to a federal court. 3 Petitioner cites to three cases where she contends courts have, since enactment of section 1334, rejected the doctrine of prior exclusive jurisdiction and permitted federal courts to exercise jurisdiction notwithstanding prior “in rem” proceed- ings. White v. White (In re White), 851 F.2d 170, 172-74 (6" Cir. 1988)(prior divorce proceeding); Slay Warehousing Co., Inc. v. Modern Boats, Inc. (In re Modern Boats), 775 F.2d 619, 620 (5" Cir. 1985)(prior admiralty proceeding); /n re French, 139 B.R. 476, 482 (Bankr. D.S.D. 1992)(prior di- vorce proceeding). Each of those cases are inapposite. Two of them involved prior divorce proceedings, which have been found by this Court not to constitute in rem proceedings to which the world is a party. E.g., Williams v. State of North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287, 297 (1942)(citing Haddock v. Had- dock, 201 U.S. 562 (1906)) (“[t}he historical view that a pro- ceeding for a divorce was a proceeding in rem [citation omit- ted] was rejected by the Haddock case’’); Williams v. State of North Carolina, 325 U.S. 226, 232 (1945)(“insofar as a di- vorce decree partakes of some of the characteristics of a de- cree in rem, it is misleading to say that all the world is party 14 to a proceeding in rem”).8 The third case, Modern Boats, 775 F.2d at 610, involved a prior federal admiralty proceed- ing which, under the plain language of section 1334(b) grant- ing original jurisdiction “notwithstanding any Act of Con- gress,” does not preclude the exercise of original federal ju- risdiction by the district court. Finally, Petitioner points to Rule 1016 of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure, under which the death of a debtor “shall not abate a liquidation case under chapter 7 of the Code.” FepD. R. BANKR. P. 1016. Of course, that rule is entirely in accord with the doctrine of prior exclusive juris- diction. Where a debtor files for bankruptcy protection and then subsequently dies, the federal district court has prior (and thus exclusive) jurisdiction over the res, i.e., the prop- erty of the debtor’s estate. Accordingly, the doctrine of prior exclusive jurisdiction remains applicable state probate proceedings, and has not been abrogated either by section 1334 or the enactment of the Bankruptcy Code. Resolution of the appeal thus turns on the scope and effect of the Texas probate court’s exclusive in rem jurisdiction, addressed infra. 8 Indeed, the fact that divorce proceedings are not in rem distinguishes this case from Ankerbrandt v. Richards, 504 U.S. 689 (1992), upon which Petitioner heavily relies. 15 Hil. THE SCOPE AND EFFECT OF A PROBATE COURT’S EXCLUSIVE IN REM JURISDICTION MUST BE EXPANSIVE ENOUGH TO GRANT EFFECTIVE RELIEF “AGAINST THE WORLD” A. A Court’s Exclusive Jn Rem Jurisdiction Is Not Limited Solely to Disposition of the Property An in rem proceeding is “one against the world,” ena- bling a court with jurisdiction over the res to “determine all claims that anyone, whether named in the action or not, has to the property or thing in question.” Tennessee Student As- sistance Corp. v. Hood, 541 U.S. 440, 448 (2004). In one of the earlier cases applying the “probate exception,” this Court has described the nature of a proceeding in rem as one “in which all persons in the world who have any interest are deemed parties, and are concluded as upon res judicata by the decision of the court having junsdiction.” Broderick’s Will, 88 U.S. at 509. By its very nature, the relief available under an in rem proceeding is not narrowly limited to disposition of the res. In order to grant relief “against the world,” the court must be able to “effectively exercise the jurisdiction vested in it.” Princess Lida of Thurn and Taxis v. Thompson, 305 U.S. at 466-67. In Princess Lida, for example, the Court held that, where a state court was vested with exclusive guasi in rem jurisdiction over a trust, the federal district court lacked ju- risdiction over an action charging the trustees with misman- agement of the trust estate and seeking, as a remedy, to re- move the trustees, require them to file an account of the trust and post a bond. /d. at 467-68. Likewise, in Gardner v. New Jersey, 329 U.S. 565 (1947), the Court held that if the reorganization court lacked the power to deal with tax liens of a state, “the assertion by the State of a lien would pull out chunks of an estate from the reorganization court and transfer a part of the struggle over the corpus into tax bureaus and other state tribunals.” /d. at 16 577. That result would “fly in the teeth” of the exclusive ju- risdiction granted to the reorganization court. /d. This Court explained that exclusive jurisdiction over the debtor and its property: is not limited to the prevention of interference - with the use of the property by the trustee; it “extends also to the adjudication of questions respecting the title.” [Citations omitted]. It is the exclusive jurisdiction of the reorganization court which gives it power to preserve the railway as a unit and as a going concern and to prevent it from being divided up and dismem- bered piece-meal. Id.9 The scope and effect of a court’s exclusive in rem juris- diction can apply to an in personam action before another court. For example, this Court held in Hood that a discharge of a debt by a bankruptcy court, although an in rem proceed- ing, “‘operates as an injunction’ against creditors who com- mence or continue an action against the debtor in personam to recover or to collect a discharged debt... .” Hood, 541 © U.S. at 447, 448 n.4. That injunction over in personam ac- tions is necessary for a bankruptcy court exercising in rem jurisdiction to administer the res effectively, without interfer- ence by other courts. Even when faced with constitutional challenges to a court’s exclusive in rem jurisdiction, this Court has consis- tently confirmed the expansive authority of such courts to grant “relief against the world.” Most recently in Hood, this 9 To be clear, unlike in Gardner, the dispute between Petitioner and Re- spondent in this case is not over the title of any property of the debtor's estate, but rather goes to the entitlement of the parties to the res of Dece- dent's estate. 17 Court concluded that the bankruptcy court’s in rem jurisdic- tion was binding on the State of Tennessee, even where there was no waiver of the state’s sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amendment. /d. at 448 (“(uJnder our longstanding precedent, States, whether or not they choose to participate in the proceeding, are bound by a bankruptcy court’s discharge order no less than other creditors”); see also California v. Deep Sea Research, Inc.; 523 U.S. at 507-08 (Eleventh Amendment held not to bar federal in rem jurisdiction over claims of California to a shipwreck, at least where the res was not in the State’s possession). Similarly, in Broderick's Will, this Court explained that in rem jurisdiction is binding even upon parties that (in what would otherwise violate due process) never received notice of the proceeding: The world must move on, and those who claim an interest in persons or things must be charged with knowledge of their status and condition, and of the vicissitudes to which they aré subject. This is the foundation of all ~< judicial proceedings in rem. Broderick’s Will, 88 U.S. at 519. Given that the exclusive jurisdiction of in rem proceed- ings applies to states with Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity and parties without any notice of the proceeding, there seems no basis to except from that expansive reach an individual such as the Petitioner who is neither a sovereign nor unaware of (and who in fact commenced and was a party to) the pending probate proceeding. Petitioner relies upon Waterman vy. Canal-Louisiana Bank & Trust Co., 215 U.S. 33 (1909), but that decision ac- tually supports the Respondent. In Waterman, the complain- ant, a niece of the decedent, sought an accounting in federal court of a probate estate, and also sought to cause the execu- tor to recognize her legacy under the will and pay the residue 18 of the estate over to her. /d. at 42. With respect to her re- quest for an accounting of the probate estate, the Court held that the federal district court lacked jurisdiction to hear that request, concluding that such relief would interfere with the probate court’s jurisdiction to “determin[e] the amount of the residue arising from the settlement of the estate in the court of probate.” Jd. at 46. The Court did find that the federal court had jurisdiction to establish complainant’s interest in her legacy and her right to recover from any residue of the estate not previously distributed. It did so, however, only after explicitly noting that the complainant “does not seek to set aside the probate of the will, which the bill alleges was duly established and admitted to probate in ‘the proper court of the state.” Id. at 46 (emphasis added). Given the absence of any direct or indirect challenge to the will, or whether its terms reflected the decedent’s testamentary interest, and “be- cause of the facts presented in the bill,” the Court held that the federal district court’s exercise of jurisdiction in that lim- ited circumstance would not interfere with the “ordinary set- tlement of the estate” or the possession of the estate in the hands of the executor. /d. Even so, the Court made clear that the federal district court lacked jurisdiction to determine the amount of the residue arising from the settlement of the es- tate in the court of probate, leaving that determination to the exclusive jurisdiction of the state probate court. /d. Thus, the limited claim which the Court allowed the complainant in Waterman to adjudicate in federal court- did not interfere with the probate court’s ability to grant effective in rem relief “against the world.” In contrast, Petitioner’s claims against Respondent, which are premised on the asser- tion that Decedent intended to grant a portion of his estate to Petitioner, indisputably interfere with the Texas probate court’s exercise of its jurisdiction. 19 B. In Gelston v. Hoyt, this Court Answered the Question Presented On Appeal In This Case Petitioner urges an unduly narrow view of in rem juris- diction that ignores well settled precedent of this Court. The very question concerning the extent to which a court’s exclu- sive in rem jurisdiction deprives another court of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the in rem proceeding was specifi- cally addressed in an opinion written by Justice Story nearly 200 years ago, Gelston v. Hoyt, 16 U.S. 246 ~ In Gelston, the petitioners, acting under color of United States law, seized a ship from the respondent. Because the seizure for the forfeiture was under United States law, the federal district court had exclusive in rem jurisdiction to de- termine whether the seizure was “rightful or tortious.” /d. at 312. The district court ruled in favor of the respondent, find- ing the seizure to have been unjustified and ordered the ship returned. The respondent then brought suit for trespass and conversion against the petitioners in the state court of New York. In defense against the action, the petitioners sought to offer, as justification for the trespass or in mitigation of dam- ages, evidence to prove their right of seizure. The state court refused to consider that evidence and entered judgment in favor of the respondent; the supreme court of the state of New York effirmed. In affirming the judgment of the state court, and finding that the state court could not “entertain and decide the ques- tion of forfeiture in this case,” id. at 312, this Court based its decision upon the exclusive in rem jurisdiction vested in the federal court: This is a seizure for a forfeiture under the laws of the United States, and, consequently, the right to decide upon the same, by the very terms of the statutes, exclusively belongs to the proper court of the United States; and it depends upon its final decree, proceeding in rem, whether the seizure is to be adjudged 20 right or tortious. If a sentence of condemna- tion be pronounced, it is conclusive, that a for- feiture is incurred; if a sentence of acquittal, it is equally conclusive against the forfeiture; and in either case, the question cannot be liti- gated in another forum. Id. at 312 (emphasis added). This Court explained that the reasonableness of the doctrine “results from the very nature of proceedings in rem” and the need to avoid “mischievous consequences”: The decree of the court acts upon the thing in controversy, and settles the title of the prop- erty itself, the right of seizure, and the ques- tion of forfeiture. If its decree were not bind- ing upon the world upon the points which it professes to decide, the consequences would be most mischievous to the public. In case of condemnation no good title to the property could be conveyed, and no justification of the seizure could be asserted under its protection. In case of acquittal, a new seizure might be made by any other persons /oties quoties for the same offence, and the claimant be loaded with ruinous costs and expenses. Id. at 313 (emphasis added). Although the Court noted that the above reasoning applies even where a court of competent jurisdiction lacks exclusive jurisdiction, it found such reason- ing to apply “with greater force to a court of exclusive juris- diction; since an attempt to re-examine its decree, or deny its conclusiveness, is a manifest violation of its exclusive au- thority.” /d. Justice Story’s opinion answers the question presented to this Court by Petitioner. In Gelston, the Court found to be impermissible the attempt by petitioners to raise, as a defense of the state court action, the right of seizure and question of forfeiture. That defense was recognized as nothing more i—_ 21 than an “indirect” and “collateral” attack on the district court’s exclusive in rem jurisdiction: It is doing that indirectly, which the law itself prohibits to be done directly. It is, in effect, impeaching collaterally, a sentence which the law has pronounced to be valid until vacated or reversed on appeal by a superior tribunal. Id. (emphasis added). Accordingly, this Court found that by virtue of the federal district court’s decree of acquittal, “the seizure is established conclusively to be tortious, and the party is entitled to his full damages for the injury.” /d. at 314. In Gelston, this Court premised its decision on the exclu- sivity and nature of a court’s in rem jurisdiction, and not merely upon principles of res judicata. This is evident from the Court’s holding that the exclusive jurisdiction of an in rem proceeding applied to the petitioners whether or not they were deemed to have been parties to that proceeding: In legal propriety, therefore, he cannot be deemed a stranger to the decree in rem; he is at all events a privy, and as such must be bound by a sentence which ascertains the sei- zure to be tortious. But if he were a mere stranger, he would still be bound by such sen- tence, because the decree of a court of compe- tent jurisdiction in rem is, as to the points di- rectly in judgment, conclusive upon the whole world. Id. at 320 (emphasis added). Leaving no room for doubt that the teachings of Justice Story apply to this case, the Court expressly recognized in Gelston that the principles and reasoning set forth therein would apply with equal force to probate proceedings: 22 [N]o principle of general law seems better set- tled, than that the decision of a court of a pe- culiar and exclusive jurisdiction must be com- pletely binding upon the judgment of every other court, in which the same subject matter comes incidentally in controversy. It is famil- iarty known in its application to the sentences of ecclesiastical courts, in the probate of wills and granting of administrations of personal estate; to the sentences of prize courts in all matters of prize jurisdiction; and to the sen- tences of courts of admiralty and other courts acting in rem, either to enforce forfeitures or to decide civil rights. Id. at 315 (emphasis added). In the instant case, as in Gelston, the claims asserted in Petitioner’s lawsuit against Respondent “come incidentally in controversy” with the “same subject matter” as that adjudi- cated by the Texas probate court, and thus constitute the kind of “indirect” and “collateral” attack on the probate court’s jurisdiction that this Court refused to allow in Gelston. Al- though the Ninth Circuit did not cite Gelston v. Hoyt in its opinion, its reasoning closely parallels that of Justice Story nearly two centuries ago. The Ninth Circuit expressly cited to the general principles governing in rem jurisdiction and the binding effect “upon the whole world,” including United States district courts, of determinations by a court with such jurisdiction. App. 34-35. According to the Ninth Circuit, Petitioner’s claim that Decedent intended to give her a gift “went to the very essence of the testamentary instruments executed by J. Howard Marshall Il in his lifetime.” App. 35. Likewise, her claims that Respondent engaged in transactions which “wrongfully depleted the trust and estate of J. Howard Marshall” were claims that, if successfully brought in probate court, would have resulted in a money judgment against Re- spondent and in favor of “the estate of J. Howard Marshall II.” App. 35. Finding that her claims were “‘in substance 23 nothing more than a thinly veiled will contest,” App. 31 (quoting Moser v. Pollin, 294 F.3d 335, 340 (2d Cir. 2002)), the Ninth Circuit concluded: We agree with the contention of E. Pierce Marshall that the probate exception to federal court jurisdiction applies in this case because Vickie Lynn Marshall’s claims were simply a disguised attack on J. Howard Marshal II’s 1982 trust, as amended, and on the postmor- tem disposition of his property as provided in the trust. App. 36-37 (emphasis added). Petitioner’s civil proceeding against Respondent proves Justice Story to have been clairvoyant when he warned about the “mischievous consequences” that would result if courts exercising in rem jurisdiction were made subject to “indi- rect,” “collateral,” “disguised” or “thinly veiled” attacks. Probate courts are granted exclusive jurisdiction in order to grant the relief “against the world” necessary to enable their effective exercise of jurisdiction ovér the res. A rule that permits indirect or collateral challenges to that jurisdiction will undermine the principles that are essential to in rem ju- risdiction and lead to the very “injurious and unseemly con- flict” among federal and state courts that those principles were specially designed to avoid. IV. THE CONCERNS RAISED BY THE UNITED STATES AS AMICUS CURIAE 1N SUPPORT OF THE PETITIONER ARE MISPLACED AND DO NOT WARRANT DEVIATION FROM THE UNIFIED PRINCIPLES THAT GOVERN IN REM PROCEEDINGS. In its brief filed as amicus curiae in support of the peti- tioner, the United States argues for reversal of the Ninth Cir- cuit’s decision. The United States raises two concerns with respect to the Ninth Circuit’s interpretation of the probate * 24 exception: first, that it will deprive federal courts of jurisdic- tion to decide disputes over federal tax liability; and second, that it could interfere with the ability of the bankruptcy sys- tem to administer debtors’ estates expeditiously, fairly and efficiently. The first concern raised by the United States is mis- placed, as illustrated by the Court’s decision in United States v. Bank of New York :& Trust Co., 296 U.S. 463. In that case, the United States brought suit in federal district court seeking an accounting and delivery of funds in the possession of New York’s superintendent of insurance. /d. at 470. Based upon the object of the suits, which was “to take the property from the depositaries and from the control of the state court, and to vest the property in the United States to the exclusion of all those whose claims are being adjudicated in the state pro- ceedings,” the Court properly held that the federal district court lacked jurisdiction. /d. at 478. In so holding, however, the Court recognized that the actions were not brought “merely to establish a debt or a night to share in the prop- erty.” Jd. at 478. This Court’s decision in United States v. Bank of New York & Trust Co. was specifically cited in Markham y. Allen, 326 U.S. 490 (1946), where the Court held in the context of the probate exception that “federal courts of equity have ju- risdiction to entertain suits ‘in favor of creditors, legatees and heirs’ and other claimants against a decedent’s-esiate ‘to es- tablish their claims’ so long as the federal court does not in- terfere with the probate proceedings or assume general juris- diction of the probate or control of the property in the cus- tody of the state court.” /d. at 494. Thus, the Ninth Circuit’s decision below, if affirmed, will not necessarily defeat the in personam jurisdiction of a federal court to adjudicate the fed- eral tax liability of a decedent’s estate, where the United States does not also request the federal district court to cause the turnover or other disposition of such estate property, nor otherwise seek to interfere with the probate court’s exclusive 25 jurisdiction in a manner contrary to principles established in Gelston, Markham, Hood and other decisions of this Court.!° Nor should the United States or the Program be con- cerned that this Court’s recognition of a “probate exception” consistent with the Ninth Circuit’s opinion below would im- pair the ability of bankruptcy courts to administer bankruptcy estates expeditiously, fairly, and efficiently. In seeking to allow federal court jurisdiction to intrude upon the exclusive in rem jurisdiction of probate courts, the United States fails to give due consideration to the more prevalent harm to the bankruptcy system that could result if the exclusive in rem ~ jurisdiction of bankruptcy courts were vulnerable to the same kind of indirect attacks that Petitioner has launched against the exclusive in rem jurisdiction of the Texas probate court. In Hood, this Court recognized the fundamental impor- tance of a bankruptcy court’s broad in rem jurisdiction in providing a debtor with the fresh start that is a central pur- pose of bankruptcy law: A bankruptcy court is able to provide the debtor a fresh start in this manner, despite the lack of participation of all of his creditors, be- cause the court’s jurisdiction is premised on the debtor and his estate, and not the creditors. Hood, 541 U.S. at 447. The same principle applies in pro- bate proceedings, where broad in rem jurisdiction is also nec- 10 The concurrent jurisdiction of federal district courts and probate courts to adjudicate the validity and amount of claims against a decedent's estate is analogous to the concurrent jurisdiction of federal and state courts to adjudicate the validity and amount of claims against a debtor’s estate in bankruptcy. But just as a state court clearly lacks jurisdiction to grant a bankruptcy discharge or confirm a plan of reorganization, or adjudicate whether a bankruptcy court properly discharged a debt or confirmed a plan, a federal court lacks jurisdiction to adjudicate the intent of a dece- dent under a will or trust. 26 essary to provide complete settlement of a probate estate “against the world”: The public interest requires that the estates of deceased persons, being deprived of a master, and subject to all manner of claims, should at once devolve to a new and competent owner- ship; and, consequently, that there should be some convenient jurisdiction and mode of proceeding by which this devolution may be effected with least chance of injustice or fraud; and that the result attained should be firm and perpetual. ... These objects are gen- erally accomplished by the constitution and powers which are given to probate courts, and the modes provided for reviewing their pro- ceedings. And one of the principal reasons assigned by the equity courts for not entertain- ing bills on questions of probate is, that the probate courts themselves have all the powers and machinery necessary to give full and ade- quate relief. Broderick’s Will, 88 U.S. at 509-10. As explained supra, the principles of in rem jurisdiction that this Court has developed over the past two hundred years has not only enabled bankruptcy, probate and other courts to exercise their in rem jurisdiction more effectively, but also has been characterized by this Court as essential to preserve harmony and cooperation among federal and state courts. Given those policy imperatives, the specific conterns raised by the United States as amicus curiae, even if they were germane, should nevertheless yield to the invaluable benefits achieved through a unified theory of in rem jurisdiction that is designed to avoid “injurious conflicts” among courts. One need look no further than the history of this case, and the conflict that arose between the federal bankruptcy court and 27 state probate court, to remind us of the larger importance of those principles. CONCLUSION The judgment of the court of appeals should be affirmed. January 20, 2006 Respectfully submitted, SIDNEY P. LEVINSON Counsel of Record HENNIGAN, BENNETT & DORMAN LLP 601 S. Figueroa Avenue Suite 3300 Los Angeles, CA 90017 (213) 694-1200 DANIEL J. POPEO PAUL D. KAMENAR WASHINGTON LEGAL FOUNDATION 2009 Massachusetts Ave., N.W. Washington, D.C. 20036 (202) 588-0302 Counsel for Amicus Curiae --- Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385016_0101%3A17. Public record. Not legal advice.