# Amicus Curiae Brief — Randall v. Sorrell

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URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385016_0098%3A10

## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Amicus Curiae Brief
- **Published:** January 1, 2006
- **Citation:** 548 U.S. 230

## Text

Nos. 04-1528 and 04-1530 | ee:

L tod

In The OFFICE OF ~ #E SuERix

Supreme Court of the Anited States .

¢

NEIL RANDALL, et al.,
Petitioners,
Vv.
WILLIAM SORRELL, et al.,
Respondents.

VERMONT REPUBLICAN STATE COMMITTEE, et al.,

Petitioners,
v.

WILLIAM H. SORRELL, et al.,
Respondents.

+

On Petitions For A Writ Of Certiorari
To The United States Court Of
For The Second Circuit

+

BRIEF AMICUS CURIAE OF THE
SECRETARIES OF STATE OF NEW HAMPSHIRE,
OREGON AND WISCONSIN IN SUPPORT
OF GRANTING THE PETITIONS WITH REGARD
TO THE FIRST QUESTION PRESENTED

S

RICHARD E. SCHWARTZ

DANIEL T. BROWN

Counsel of Record

HEATHER MAJOR

Of Counsel

CROWELL & Morinc LLP

1001 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.

Washington, DC 20004-2595
June 15, 2005 (202) 624-2500

COCKLE LAW BRIEP PRINTING CO (800) 225-6964
OR CALL COLLECT (402) 342-2831

i

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES. .............ccccccccecsssessesesceeees
Ie CO nc ciiccncascciessbasicciniteeniiin 1
STATEMENT OF THE CASE ............0cccccccescsceseeseeees 2

REASONS FOR PARTIALLY GRANTING THE
MR REL ERNE STREET Tee 3
REI ARG LE SURREAL SM 12

ii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Page
CASES
Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200
AEE EE CELA LLG SEE CEL AEA DRE OEE EY TF Se 11
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) .0.......cccccccccceeeeeeeee passim
Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dept. of Health, 497 U.S.
RE SEES Sie eee ee A RN te 10
Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980)....................... 11.
Landell v. Sorrell, 382 F.3d 91 (2d Cir. 2004)........... 2,5, 11
McConnell v. Federal Election Comm’n, 540 U.S.
ee a ae I CI sicisss ctiteliiacstnicnscccschintbartinmenntentuiliotnss 10

New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262 (1932)........10

MISCELLANEOUS

Mark C. Alexander, Money in Political Campaigns
and Modern Vote Dilution, 23 Minn. J. of Law &

Ny See ccitierernticictibcicsnsniatesteccsiliinltanieriinininiinaiinins 6
Vincent Blasi, Free Speech and the Widening Gyre of
Fund-Raising, 94 COLUMBIA L. REV. 1281 (1994).......... 4,7

John Bonifaz, Brenda Wright, and Gregory Luke,
Challenging Buckley v. Valeo: A Legal Strategy,

33 Akron L. Rev. 39, 41 (1999) ..........:..sssscsccsssserscersreenes 7
Kelly Burton, Money, Politics and Campaign
I IG Diiccectichierianncscttneitisachibcicithdeipemenensertenenic 6

California Clean Election Campaign, Arizona -
Clean Elections Works! at http://www.caclean.
org/content/victories/az_works.php?path=content/
I SI oo rcc cain cscnsceccnctcnidbeiiosictedneenttuniteens 9

lil

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES — Continued

Beth Donovan, Constitutional Doubts Bedevil Hasty
Campaign Finance Bill, 51 Cong. Q. Wkly. Rep.

BN CIGD wicscsvitttipes cavcmsuninensss cantvijigniasinsecmsasnitibers

Beth Donavan, Constitutional Issues Frame Consti-
tutional Options, 51 Cong. Q. Wkly. Rep. 437

CRIB cncsciroinnisintsiastnencnscccstentntesanctigetneintinsaiesenamnasicin

Beth Donavan, Finance by Gutting Public Funding,

51 Cong. Q. Wkly. Rep. 1534, 1539 (1993)...............

Beth Donovan, House Takes First Big Step in Over-
hauling System, 51 Cong. Q. Wkly. Rep. 3246,

SIE ccerctetinsitinaseinschnsiciecisstiienintidiaaniotemnncdinezin

Beth Donovan, House Will Vote on Limits Nearly $1

Million in ’96, 51 Cong. Q. Wkly. Rep. 3091 (1993)...

Elizabeth Drew, Politics and Money: The New Road

a CII Ge CI tn etcsccnnccdactsdcsnactiennscrinimasinnie

Free Speech and Campaign Finance Reform:
Subcommittee Hearing on the Constitution Before
the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong.
Sess. 1 (1997) available at http-//www.house.gov.

I vicctcinieitisdinnceinetiihnittinidisninemnignnnsd

Ken Hechier, Financing Elections: West Virginia,
the States, and the Nation, 7 W. VA PUBLIC AF-
FAIRS REPORTER 3 (1990), at http://www.polsci.

wvu.edu/ipa/par/report_7_3.html.....................c0000

Paul S. Herrnson and Ronald A. Faucheaux,
Candidates Devote Substantial Time and Effort
to Fundraising, (July 7, 2000), at http://www.

bsos.umd.edu/gvpt/herrnson/reporttime.htm].........

iv
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES — Continued

Hoover Institution: Public Policy Inquiry, Campaign
Finance, State and Local Overview, at http//www.
campaignfinancesite.org/structure/states1.html
(last updated Sept. 20, 2004).......... Siscoctlinhdidsnccesthiabaantes 8

PETER LINDSTROM, CENTER FOR RESPONSIVE POLI-

TICS, CONGRESS SPEAKS: A SURVEY OF THE 100TH
5

CRRIIIIIED- BO C1 sccececscscostcctpiststiiebtlattleniee ei

1

INTEREST OF AMICI

Amici include the following Secretaries of State:
William M. Gardner, Secretary of State of New Hamp-
shire, Bill Bradbury, Secretary of State of Oregon, and
Douglas La Follette, Secretary of State of Wisconsin.’
Amici serve as the chief elections officers of their states,
which gives them extensive experience with the issues
raised in this case.

Amici seek review of the Second Circuit’s decision
because, although they believe that it is supported by this
Court’s holding in Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976), it is
contrary to similar decisions of the Sixth and Tenth
Circuits. As the chief elections officers in their states, they
are particularly concerned about the impact that the split
in the Circuits’ decision will have on the ability of States
and localities to enact effective reform measures sought by
their citizens and legislators. Moreover, Amici are con-
cerned about the detrimental impact that the split among
the Second, Sixth and Tenth Circuits will have on their
efforts to enact innovative campaign finance laws. As
discussed further below, the present uncertainty regarding
mandatory spending limits has a chilling effect on the
creativity of the State and local governments which should
be serving as laboratories of democracy.

If the Sixth and Tenth Circuits correctly interpreted
Buckley as imposing a per se ban on mandatory campaign
spending limits, Amici urge this Court to reconsider its
holding in Buckley and permit Vermont to demonstrate

* The parties have consented to the filing of this brief. Their letters
are on file with the Clerk of this Court. Pursuant to Rule 37.6, Amici
state that no counsel for any party has authored this brief in whole or
in part, and no person or entity made a financial contribution to the
preparation or submission of this brief.

2

that its campaign expenditure limits satisfy constitutional
requirements. If such a per se ban truly exists as a result
of Buckley that ban will stifle the creativity of States and
localities in this arena. As the Respondents demonstrate,
the circumstances that led this Court to enact that barrier
29 years ago have changed. This Court should reconsider
the extent of First Amendment limits on campaign expen-
diture laws.’

+

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

This case involves amendments to its campaign
finance laws enacted by the State of Vermont in 1997.
These amendments were adopted with the overwhelming
approval of bipartisan majorities of both houses of the
Vermont Legislature. See Landell v. Sorrell, 382 F.3d 91, 100
(2d Cir. 2004). The amendments have succeeded in “prevent-
ing the reality and appearance of corruption, and protecting
the time of candidates and elected officials.” Jd. at 124. As
the Landeil District Court found, and the Second Circuit
agreed, limits on campaign contributions alone have been
ineffective in achieving those goals in federal elections. Jd. at
116-125. The Second Circuit summarized additional ills
attributable to the lack of spending limits in our current
system of campaign finance. See id. at 115.

A split among the circuits exists on this important
issue. The Second Circuit, in this case, held that Buckley
does not crect a campaign spending limits barrier while
the Sixth and Tenth Circuits have held that such a barrier

” Amici also support the conditional cross-petitions of both William H.
Sorrell, et al., the Respondent-Conditional Cross Petitioner and Vermont
Public Interest Research Group, et al., Respondent-Intervenors-Conditional
Cross Petitioners.

3

exists. See Randall Petition for Certiorari at 22; Vermont
Republican State Committee (“VRSC”) Petition for Certio-
rari at 5-7. The importance of this issue is demonstrated
by studies that show the current degree of cynicism among
the population and diminishing voter turnout. Regardless
of the actual scope of Buckley’s holding, Amici urge this
Court to grant the Petition and remove the cloud over the
constitutionality of campaign spending limits.

S

REASONS FOR PARTIALLY
GRANTING THE PETITIONS

Amici urge granting the petitions with regard to the
first question presented for three reasons. The first is the
strong citizen desire for reform. That desire has expressed
itself in numerous reform efforts. While some State and
local legislative bodies have interpreted Buckley to allow
mandatory campaign spending limits, the available data
show that many have not enacted such limits because they
believe chat Buckley bars them. Second, this Court has
recognized the benefit of allowing state legislatures — as
the laboratories of democracy — to function as unfettered by
judicial constraints as reasonably possible. Third, whether or
not Buckley is correctly read to impose a per se barrier,
declaring now that no such barrie: exists will enable States
and localities to address the problem more effectively be-
cause more minds will come to bear on the issue.

1. There is a strong desire for reform and experimen-
tation in State and local governments. The results are
simple expressions of disappointment with the high cost of
campaigns and the perception of corruption that flows
from the realities of fund raising. This appetite becomes

4

apparent with attempts to enact campaign spending
limitations at the federal, State and local levels.

a. Politicians consider the fund-raising process
debilitating because it takes away time that could be spent
more valuably by serving their constituents. Politicians
and commentators alike believe that too much valuable
time is devoted to this ceaseless endeavor to raise funds.’
This problem presents itself at the federal and local levels.
At the state level, one study has shown that a majority of
candidates for statewide office spend at least one-quarter
of their time fund raising for their campaigns; nearly one-
third of candidates for state legislative office are similarly
preoccupied with fund raising.

In addition, numerous Congressmen have recounted
their fund raising experiences. For example, one Republi-
can Senator (unnamed) admitted, “I knew Congress well
before I came here, but I did not know the amount of time
consumed by fundraising and how that encroaches on your

* See Vincent Blasi, Free Speech and the Widening Gyre of Fund-
Raising, 94 COLUMBIA L. REV. 1281 (1994) (stating that candidates
spend too much time fund raising) fhereinafter Blasi, Free Speech)
citing, DAN CLAWSON ET AL., MONEY TALKS: CORPORATE PACS AND
POLITICAL INFLUENCE 79, 203-04 (1992); FRANK J. SORAUPF, INSIDE
CAMPAIGN FINANCE: MYTHS AND REALITIES 72-73, (1992); BROOKS
JACKSON, HONEST Grarr: BIG MONEY And THE AMERICAN POLITICAL
Process 69, 91-92, 108 (1990); Davip B. Mactesy & Canpice J.
NELSON, THE MONEY CHASE: CONGRESSIONAL CAMPAIGN FINANCE
Rerorm 43-45, 197 (1990); BuRDETT LOOMIS, THE NEW AMERICAN
POLITICIAN: AMBITION, ENTREPRENEURSHIP, AND THE CHANGING FACE OF
POLITICAL Lire 195-96 (1988); ExizaBpeTH Drew, POLITICS AND MONEY:
THE New ROAD TO CORRUPTION 96 (1983). Jd. at 1281 n.1.

* Paul S. Herrnson and Ronald A. Faucheaux, Candidates Devote
Substantial Time and Effort to Fundraising (July 7, 2000), at http-//
www.bsos.umd.edu/gvpt/herrnson/reporttime html.

5

ability to work here. It devours one’s time — you spend the
two or three years before your re-election fundraising. The
other years, you're helping others.” Likewise, former
House Majority leader Richard Gephardt has also ex-
plained that “[iJf you have the need to raise three or four
hundred thousand dollars, you’re taking an enormous
amount of the member’s time just to raise money.”

The costs of elections at both the Federal and State
levels have continued to skyrocket. This trend of rising
costs, while evident to the Buckley Court in 1976, has
continued to increase in the ensuing 29 years. The need for
politicians to spend huge sums to win elections raises the
perception of, and conditions for, corruption. Campaign
funds often come from special interest groups with legisla-
tive agendas. When politicians win elections with these
funds and then continue to receive financial backing from
these same special interest groups, these politicians are
likely to feel pressure to cater to these groups. See Lan-
dell, 382 F.3d at 117-118. Perhaps that is why the phrase
“special interest politics” has become so commonplace in
our national political discourse.

Similar to the problem with “special interest politics,”
a select few wealthy individuals and groups contribute the
majority of campaign finances and thus possess a concen-
tration of the political power. At least one commentator
has posited that this power concentration creates a form of

* Perer Liypstrom, CENTER FOR RESPONSIVE PoLiTics, CONGRESS
SPEAKS: A SURVEY OF THE 100TH ConGRESS 80 (1988).

* Elizabeth Drew, Politics and Money: The New Road to Corruption
51 (1983).

6

vote dilution and is “incompatible with the Constitution's
command of equality.”

Politicians routinely confirm that this problem is real.
For example, former Rep. Dan Glickman (D-Kan.) admits
that “[mJjoney has made it more difficult for Democrats to
define an economic agenda that is different from the
Republican agenda; we are taking from the same contribu-
tors.™ These very reasons are why Congress periodically
considers solutions to free candidates from excessive fund-
raising obligations.”

” Mark C. Alexander, Money in Political Campaigns and Modern
Vote Dilution, 23 Minn. J. of Law & Inequality 239, 244-45 (2005).

* Ken Hechier, Financing Elections: West Virginia, the States, and
the Nation, 7 W. VA PUBLIC AFFAIRS REPORTER 3 (1990), available at
http//www.polsci.wvu.edu/ipa/par/report_7_3 html] [hereinafter Hechier,
Financing Elections]. See also, Free Speech and Campaign Finance
Reform: Subcommittee Hearing on the Constitution Before the House
Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. Sess. 1 (1997) (attaching state-
ment of Gene Karpinski, Executive Director of U.S. Public Interest
Research Group stating “with this kind of influence accorded to big
money in our political system, the candidates and the political parties will
increasingly look alike on all issues of importance to moneyed inter-
ests”), available at http://www.house.gov judiciary/22226.htm [hereinaf-
ter Karpinski, Free Speech and Campaign Finance Reform).

* In 1993, Members of the House of Representatives frequently
commented on it. See, e.g, 139 Conc. Rec. H10656 (daily ed. Nov. 22,
1993) (remarks of Rep. Gejdenson); id. at H10665 (remarks of Rep.
Harman), id. at H10670 (remarks of Rep. Reed); id. at H10671 (re-
marks of Rep. Hughes); id. at H10672 (remarks of Rep. Beilenson); id.
at H10675 (remarks of Rep. Woolsey); Beth Donovan, House Takes First
Big Step in Overhauling System, 51 Conc. Q. WKLY. REP. 3246, 3248
(1993); Beth Donovan, House Will Vote on Limits Nearly $1 Million in
‘96, 51 Conc. Q. WKLY. REP. 3091 (1993). See also, Marcus & Babcock,
One Day in the Fundraising Trail: Dawn to Dusk/Chasing the Dollars,
THE Boston GLOBE, May 16, 1997 at Al, quoting U.S. Senator Robert
Byrd of West Virginia in a March 1997 Senate floor speech: “The
incessant money chase that permeates every crevice of our political

(Continued on following page)

7

b. To address this need, which is felt at the State and
loca] levels as much as at the federal level, various State
and local governments have enacted — or considered but
declined to enact - campaign spending limits. Since this
Court’s ruling in Buckley in 1976, however, legislatures
and legal scholars have often understood the first Amend-
ment as prohibiting per se mandatory campaign spending
limits regulation.” In January 1997, Senator Arlen Spec-
ter (of Pennsylvania) commented that fundamental cam-
paign finance reform remained impossible without
overturning Buckley." In advocating for campaign finance
reform, he further stated, “[mly concept of running for
elective office . . . is a matter of issues, a matter of tenacity,
a matter of integrity and how you conduct a campaign.””

system is like an unending circular marathon. And it is a race that
sends a clear message to the people: that it is money, money, money
that reigns supreme in American politics.”

* Indeed, in “Congressional deliberations, opposition to campaign
spending limits has most often been expressed in terms of constitu-
tional concerns.” See Blasi, Free Speech, supra note 2, at 1288, citing,
Beth Donovan, Constitutional Doubts Bedevil Hasty Campaign Finance
Bill, 51 Conc. Q. WKLY. Rep. 2215, 2217 (1993); Beth Donavan, Finance
by Gutting Public Funding, 51 Conc. Q. WKLY. REP. 1534, 1539 (1993);
Beth Donavan, Constitutional Issues Frame Constitutional Options, 51
CONG. Q. WKLY. REP. 437 (1993).

" Senator Specter also noted in his remarks on the floor of the
Senate that a growing group of prominent legal scholars have called for
the reversal of Buckley. 143 Conc. Rec. S557-01, S558 (daily ed. Jan.
21, 1997) (statement of Sen. Specter). See also Karpinski, Free Speech
and Campaign Finance Reform, supra note 7.

* 143 Cong. Rec. at S558, supra note 10.; see also, John C. Bonifaz,
Brenda Wright, and Gregory Luke, Challenging Buckley v. Valeo: A
Legal Strategy, 33 AKRON L. REV. 39, 41 (1999) (“Members of Congress
have introduced 11 bills since 1976 which would establish campaign
spending limits for federal elections.”) Further, the note cites the
following examples: S. 1684, 98th Cong. (1st Sess. 1983); S. 1185, 98th
Cong. (1st Sess. 1983); S. 59, 99th Cong. (1st Sess. 1985); H.R. 2473,

(Continued on following page)

8

He emphasized that running for office should not be a
simple function of money.

In spite of this adversity, the appetite for reform
remains strong, and State and local legislatures have
attempted to adopt reforms within the constraints of
Buckley's perceived per se barrier. For example, as noted
by The Hoover Institution:

¢ Since 1990, 30 states have radically changed
their campaign finance laws, 17 of them be-
tween 1995-98.

¢ From 1972-1996, 45 initiatives and/or refer-
enda, as well as charter amendments on elec-
tion reform, were placed on state ballots. In 36
of these cases, a majority of voters supported
enactment.

* 24 states, as of 1998, have statutes on the books
providing some sort of public financing for elec-
tion campaigns. Also, 12 states and New York
City have some form of expenditure limitation.

¢ What these various states — and many mu-
nicipalities - have in common is strong voter
sentiment for change, harnessed by diverse
grassroots coalitions and reform-minded legis-
lators.”

100th Cong. (ist Sess. 1987); H.R. 1456, 101st Cong. (1st Sess. 1988);
H. Res. 168, 103rd Cong. (ist Sess. 1993); H.R. 3571, 103rd Cong. (1st
Sess. 1993); H.R. 3651, 104th Cong. (2d Sess. 1996); H.R. 3658, 104th
Cong. (2d Sess. 1996); S. 1057, 105th Cong. (1st Sess. 1997); H.R. 77,
105th Cong. (1st Sess. 1997). Jd. at 41, n.17.

" Hoover Institution: Public Policy Inquiry, Campaign Finance,
State and Local Overview, at http//www.campaignfinancesite.org/structure
states1.html (last updated Sept. 20, 2004).

9

Various state and federal polls confirm that voters are
overwhelmingly in favor of more effective campaign
finance reform.

* Between 1976 to 1986, campaign spending in
West Virginia state Senate races increased an
average of 875% from approximately $155,000
to $1,511,000. In 1986, a sample of West Vir-
ginia voters were polled regarding whether
they believed “there should be a limit on how
much a person can spend on running for pub-
lic office.” 75.5% said yes, 16.8% said no, and
7.7% were undecided.”

* 64% of Arizonans support public funding for
campaigns (Arizona Republic poll, Oct. 2002)
and 66% specifically support Clean Elections
(KAET poll, June, 2002). 80% of Arizonans be-
lieve that contributions influence votes on
public policy (Behavior Research Center poll,
December, 2001).”

* Hechier, Financing Elections, supra note 5. In its 1990 sessions,
West Virginia’s House of Delegates “passed, by a vote of 86-14, a
constitutional amendment ‘to amend the State Constitution to permit
the Legislature to limit the amount of money which can be spent
advocating or opposing a nomination or election of any candidate, or the
passage or defeat of any issue, thing or item to be voted upon at public
election.’ The elation of supporters of the constitutional amendment,
scheduled to be placed on the general election ballot in 1990, was short-
lived, however. The state Senate quickly buried the amendment by
double referencing it to the Government Organization and Judiciary
Committees, where it died without further consideration despite frantic
and repeated efforts of the secretary of state to revive it.” Jd.

“ California Clean Election Campaign, Arizona - Clean Elections
Works! at http//www.caclean.org/content/victories/az_works.php?path=
content/victories/az_works.php&.

10

2. At various times and in various contexts, this
Court has espoused the value of deferring to the legislative
process to produce creative solutions to pressing social
problems. Indeed, it is a canon of this Court that such cases
should be decided narrowly. See McConnell v. Federal
Election Comm’n, 540 U.S. 93, 124 S. Ct. 619, 688 (2003).
Aside from a constraint on overbroad pronouncements, the
benefits to society that flow from allowing our legislatures
to conduct the business of policy making through law
weigh strongly in favor of clarifying that no per se barrier
exists. As Justice Brandeis famously observed:

To stay experimentation in things social and eco-
nomic is a grave responsibility. Denial of the
right to experiment may be fraught with serious
consequences to the Nation. It is one of the happy
incidents of the federal system that a single coura-
geous State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a
laboratory; and try novel social and economic ex-
periments without risk to the rest of the country.
This Court has the power to prevent an experi-
ment. We may strike down the statute which em-
bodies it on the ground that, in our opinion, the
measure is arbitrary, capricious or unreason-
able. ... But in the exercise of this high power, we
must ever be on guard, lest we erect our prejudices
into legal principles. If we would guide by the light
of reason, we must let our minds be bold.

New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932)
(dissenting opinion) (cited in Boy Scouts of America and
Monmouth Council v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 664 (2000)
(Stevens, J., dissenting). Cf. Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dept.
of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 292 (1990) (O’Connor, J., concur-
ring) (the “challenging task of crafting procedures for

11

safeguarding ... liberty interests is entrusted to the
‘laboratory’ of the states . . . in the first instance.”)

This Court should remove the artificial limit on States
and localities imposed by a per se prohibition on campaign
spending limits and, instead, make clear that the proper
standard of review of such legislation is and will be mean-
ingful scrutiny that is not “‘strict in theory, but fatal in
fact.’” Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200,
237 (1995) (quoting Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448,

519 (Marshall, J., concurring in judgment)).

3. The current split among the circuits on this
important issue demonstrates that it should be clarified by
this Court. By clarifying now that no per se barrier is
imposed by the First Amendment, this Court will be
opening an avenue of reform to the States and localities
eager to enact reform that they have avoided because of
the belief that Buckley imposes a per se barrier to cam-

paign spending limits.

Allowing the perception that the Sixth and Tenth
Circuits correctly interpreted Buckley deprives citizens
who reside within those Circuits of the creativity of the

State and local legislatures whose spending limits legisla-
tion would surely be struck down.

The perception of a per se barrier constrains the
legislative process in States and localities outside of those
circuits. The chilling effect that flows from the uncertainty
inherent in a circuit split is further compounded by the
fact that every panel of circuit judges that has considered
this issue has split on the question of whether Buckley
imposes a per se barrier. The decision by the Second
Circuit not to hear Landell en banc, alone, generated a 50-
plus page collection of concurrences and dissents for a type

—_

12

of decision typically disposed of with a single sentence.
This effect cannot be ignored, for it extends far beyond the

Tenth and Sixth Circuits.

Amici urge this Court to grant certiorari to decide
whether to free our State and local legislatures from the
constraints on their ability to experiment in the realm of
campaign finance reform that are the byproduct of the
belief that the First Amendment imposes a per se prohibi-
tion on campaign spending limits laws.

+

CONCLUSION

The petition for certiorari should be granted.

June 15, 2005

Respectfully submitted,

RICHARD E. SCHWARTZ

DANIEL T. BROWN a
Counsel of Record

HEATHER MAJOR

Of Counsel

CROWELL & MorING LLP

1001 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
Washington, DC 20004

(202) 624-2500

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385016_0098%3A10. Public record. Not legal advice.
