# Reply Brief — Goodman v. Georgia > Briefs, arguments, decisions, and more. URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385016_0079%3A18 ## Record - **Collection:** Supreme Court brief - **Document type:** Reply Brief - **Published:** January 1, 2005 - **Citation:** 544 U.S. 1031 ## Text Nos. 04-1205 and 04-1236 Jn the Supreme Court of the Cinited States UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, PETITIONER if STATE OF GEORGIA, ET AL. TONY GOODMAN, PETITIONER 2. STATE OF GEORGIA, ET AL. ON WRITS OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT REPLY BRLEF FOR THE PETITIONER IN NO. 04-1203 PAUL D. CLEMENT Solicitor General Counsel of Record Department of Justice Washington, D.C. 20580-0001 (202) 514-2217 TABLE OF CONTENTS Page A. Prison administration is the relevant context ....... 1 B. Title II responds to a long history and a continuing problem of unconstitutional treatment of disabled prisoners .................... 2 1. Lane held that Section 5 legislation is DT sHiceddabessddedeeedneessesessctsoes 3 2. The record is substantial ..................0000. 4 3. The type of violation warrants congressional Dt sb eadieindnedhddes ébees6edteedsees dude 13 4. Title Il is not underinclusive .................. 15 C. Title II is reasonably tailored to remedying and preventing constitutional violations in EE cod veuedebnedeeesseenssssoseees 16 i che edn ec kbcbeeesuekdeoneeetenessee’s la TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Cases: Alabama v. United States, 304 F.2d 583 (1st Cir.), ED enc dcucesescenseccecesees a] Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., Ne 10 Anderson v. Martin, 375 U-S. 399 (1964) ........... 8 Armstrong v. Davis, No. 99-15152, 2000 WL 369622 (9th Cir. Apr. 11, 2003) .............. 18 Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 297 U.S. DT dddavbwediecawenbelaunsddddduséosones 18 Barnes v. Gorman, 536 U.S. 181 (2002) ............ 20 Baskin v. Brown, 174 F.2d 391 (9th Cir. LTE En Oe ee a] Beckford v. Irvin, 49 F. Supp. 2d 170 i ie dick tisedeeasaededseeeceredeses 1] Il Cases—Continued Page Benten v. Kessler, 505 U.S. 1084 (1992) .........66. 10 Bivens v. Sir Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971) ........ 20 Bliley v. West, 42 F.3d 101 (4th Cir. 1930) ........... s Board of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 661 U.S. S66 CORRE) ..cccccvcscccnscauuvennuenen 5,7 Bowman v. Beasley, 8 Fed. Appx. 175 (10th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 535 U.S. 1001 (2002) ......... 18 Brooks v. Horn, No. Civ.A. 00-03637, 2004 WL 764385 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 7, 2004) .............. 18 Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927)... . cece cece eees 8 Butler v. Thompson, 184 F.2d 526 (4th Cir. 1950) ....8 Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89 (1965) 2... 6.6.6 cee 8 Chapman v. King, 154 F.2d 460 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 327 U.S. 800 (1946) ...... cece cee cece eeeees 8 City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1007) ..ccccccccccccecsssccaueaneee nnn 6 City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 4738 U.S. 468 (1686) ... oc cccccsccsscesscauueneanenaee 4 City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156 (10GB) ..cccccccccccescceccesneesnennenea 10 Couvillion v. Michigan Parole Bd., No. 4:04-CV-130, 2005 WL 1036973 (W.D. Mich. May 4, 2005) ...........cceeeeeeeee 18 Cutter v. Wilkinson, 1258. Ct. 2113 (BOGE) 2. cccccccccseccesoucusaneanneeee 14, 18, 19 Davis v. Schnell, 81 F. Supp. 872 (S.D. Ala.), aff'd, 386 U.S. GBB (1968) .. nccccccccccsccvcsccces 8 DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189 (1989) .......cccecccccscees 18 Cases—Continued Page Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 EE LEE EOE EE EEE PEEP OTT T ST 10 Drueding v. Devlin, 380 U.S. 125 (1965) ............. S Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 (1994) ........... 17 Gates v. Rowland, 39 F.2d 1439 (9th Cir. 1994) .... 18 Guinn v. United States, 238 U.S. 347 (1915) ......... S Hamm v. Virginia State Bd. of Elections, 230 F. Supp. 156 (E.D. Va.), aff'd, 379 U.S. 19 (1964) ...... S Harrelson v. Elmore County, 859 F. Supp. 1465 EEE 11 Harris v. United States, 536 U.S. 545 (2002) ....... 18 Hicks v. Frey, 992 F.2d 1450 (6th Cir. 1993) ........ 11 Johnson v. California, 125 8. Ct. 1141 ELE SEES SELES D SE POPPE EPP E PTET 14, 18 Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 LESSEE LELES ESOT EPEPOTTOTT TTT 16 Lane v. Wilson, 307 U.S. 268 (1939) ................ s Lassiter v. Northampton County Bd. of Elections, ee ee io cccccccccccccess S _ Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343 (1996) .... 2... ........ 13 Lopez v. Monterey County, 525 U.S. 266 (1999) .... 10 McCardic_ &r parte, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506 (1869) ... 10 McDonald v. Key, 224 F.2d 608 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 895 (1955) ................. 8 McKune v. Lile, 586 U.S. 24 (2002) ................ 16 Miller v. King, 384 F.3d 1248 (11th Cir. 2004) ..... 2,5 Myers v. Anderson, 238 U.S. 368 (1915)... ......... s Cases—Costinued Page Navedo v. Maloney, 172 F. Supp. 2d 276 SED cccnnccccnddesdsedsmosencesenéhe 11 Nevada Dep't of Human Res. v. Hibbs, SP es Ce GE 000s + veccosscecuestccscs passim Nixon v. Condon, 286 U.S 713 (1982) ................ 8 Niron v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536 (1927) ............. 8 Oneisha v. Hopper, 171 F.3d 1289 (11th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1114 (2000) ........ 18 Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970) ...... 2.2.2... S Parkinson v. Columbia County Dist. Att'y, 679 N.Y.S.2d 505 (Sup. Ct. 1998) ................ 11 Pennsylvania Dep't of Corrs. v. Yeskey, Se eh GED vos dcnnccecnnesccecaseuecs 4, 16 Randolph v. Rodgers, 170 F.3d 850 (8th Cir. GED oedncesucsccéacsendndcnceseunececusesecs 18 Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971) «2... 6. ccc cece 9 Rice v. Elmore, 165 F.2d 387 (4th Cir. 1947), cert. denied, 333 U.S. 875 (1948) ...............55. & Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57 (1981) .............. 7 Schmidt v. Odell, 64 F. Supp. 2d 1014 (D. Kan. FREED ecceanpcceceneenonsednaesnseesonseansonns 11 Serrano v. Francis, 345 F.3d 1071 (9th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 43 (2004) ........... 11° Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944) ............. 8 South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301 GREED encicncecesccasscenscedsosnnsnnnsense 5, 6,8 Spicer v. Virginia, Dep't of Corrs., 66 F.3d 705 GEIGER GHEY conccnsecovtnaésasineseendassises 11 Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509 (2004) ........ passim Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1963)... ............ 8 Cases—Continued Page Thorn v. Richardson, No. 9577, 1971 WL 201 Ges Ce A EED cocasccccacccasedscess ) Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987) ......... 13, 14, 17 United States v. Gainey, 380 U.S. 63 (1965) .......... 5 United States v. Louisiana, 225 F. Supp. 353 (E.D. La. 1963), aff'd, 380 U.S. 145 (1965) .......... s United States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17 (1960) ......... 3 United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996) .... 7,9 Virginia, Ex parte, 100 U.S. 339 (1879) ........... 10 Weeks v. Chaboudy, 984 F.2d 185 (6th Cir. 1993) ... 11 Wilkinson v. Austin, 125 S. Ct. 2384 (2005) ........ 17 Constitution, statutes and regulations: U.S. Const.: Art I, $8 (Commerce Clause) .................... 5 TT dsicane : sdacbunseiadade 1, 11, 14, 15, 16 Amend. XIV Dal sadevebovennsedsecosensauseosecoanenseinnt ........... 19 H.R. Rep. No. 238, 92d Cong., Ist Sess. (1971) ....... ) H.R. Rep. No. 485, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. Pt. 3, GED Scccccccosedcndeséedoceddsccecescespescs 12 Kentucky Legis. Research Comm'n, Research Report No. 125: Mentally Retarded Offenders in Adult and Juvenile Correctional Institu- GGREEED svccdeodassacednsonésésccssconcses 11 IX Misceilaneous—Continued: Page John Monahan et al., “Prisoners Transferred to Mental Hospitals,” in Mentally Disordered Offenders: Perspectives from Law and Social Science (John Monahan & Henry J. Steadman PE abtddannddencbsdsesecuscsenhéseesess 11 Cathy Polter, Correctional Ass’n of N.Y., State of The Prisons: Conditions Inside DPE hecuceséeséesoudsedeucsuccées 12 S. Rep. No. 415, 92d Cong., Ist Sess. (1971) ......... 9 In the Supreme Court of the United States No. 04-1203 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, PETITIONER Vv. STATE OF GEORGIA, ET AL. No. 04-1236 TONY GOODMAN, PETITIONER VU. STATE OF GEORGIA, ET AL. REPLY BRIEF FOR THE PETITIONER IN NO. 04-1203 Neither respondents nor their amici ask this Court to overrule its recent decisions in Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509 (2004), and Nevada Department of Human Resources v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721 (2003). But, as evidenced by respon- dents’ heavy reliance (Br. 29, 32, 34, 35, 37-38 n.10) on the dissenting opinions in those cases, this Court’s holdings in Lane and Hibbs establish that Congress properly exercised its power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to apply Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. 12131-12165, to prisons. A. Prison Administration Is The Relevant Context The as-applied analysis of Congress’s Section 5 power that was prescribed by this Court in Lane, 541 U.S. at 530- 534, properly focuses on the “class of cases” and “variety of * * * constitutional guarantees” implicated by the States’ “administration of * * * the penal system.” /d. at 522, 525, 521. Neither respondents nor their amici make any effort to defend the court of appeals’ much narrower focus on the particular constitutional ciaim (the Eighth Amend- ment) that happened to be asserted in the first case that (1) 2 court decided involving prison administration. Miller v. King, 384 F.3d 1248, 1272 (11th Cir. 2004); Pet. App. 19a. And with good reason: Lane made clear that the relevant context for its as-applied analysis was not the individual constitutional claim raised in the complaint—the complaints in Lane raised no constitutional claims at all, Pet. App. 12- 28 (No. 02-1667)—but rather the entire “class of cases impli- cating the accessibility of judicial services.” 541 U.S. at 531. Moreover, the Court considered the full range of constitu- tional concerns relevant to that entire substantive category of governmental activity, including those not implicated by the plaintiffs’ own claims, such as the constitutional interest in access to the courts by civil litigants and jurors. That approach recognizes that Section 5 legislation (i) responds to and addresses not the isolated claims of future litigants, but broad “pattern[s]” of unconstitutional conduct by gov- ernment officials in the substantive areas in which they op- erate, Lane, 541 U.S. at 526, and (ii) may prophylactically “proscribe|[] facially constitutional conduct, in order to pre- vent and deter unconstitutional conduct,” Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 727-728. See U.S. Br. 11-16.’ B. Title If Responds To A Long History And A Continuing Prob- lem Of Unconstitutional Treatment Of Disabled Prisoners Respondents’ central argument (Br. 22-38) is that Con- gress lacked an adequate record of unconstitutional treat- ment of prisoners to apply Title II to the prison context. That is wrong for four reasons. 1. Lane held that Section 5 legislation is warranted. The short answer is that this Court held in Lane that the constitutional-predicate for Congress’s enactment of Title II as Section 5 legislationis “clear beyond peradventure.” ' Even if a narrower context were appropriate, respondents and their amici offer no response to the United States’ alternative argument (Br. 47-48) that, at a minimum, Title II is constitutional as applied to Goodman's allegations concerning actual violations of the Constitution (see Pet. App. 16a-18a). 3 541 U.S. at 529. In Lane, this Court surveyed a broad array of evidence beyond the context of access to the courts to support its determination that Congress passed Title II in response to an established record “of pervasive unequal treatment [of individuals with disabilities] in the administra- tion of state services and programs, including systematic deprivations of fundamental rights.” /d. at 524; see id. at 524-526 (discussing the history and evidence of discrimina- tion in, inter alia, voting, marriage, unjust commitment and institutionalization, public education, and the penal system). The Court then concluded that “the sheer volume of evi- dence demonstrating the nature and extent of unconstitu- tional discrimination against persons with disabilities,” id. at 528, combined with Congress’s express findings of dis- crimination in areas that are the exclusive or predominant domain of state governments, id. at 529; see 42 U.S.C. 12101(a)(3), “make[] clear beyond peradventure that inade- quate provision of public services and access to public facili- ties was an appropriate subject for prophylactic legislation,” Lane, 541 U.S. at 529. It was only in the next step of the Court’s Section 5 analysis—a separately designated section of the opinion assessing whether “Title II is an appropriate response to this history and pattern of unequal treatment,” -id. at 541 U.S. at 530—that the Court even discussed an as- applied approach or precedents like United States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17 (1960). The Court then restricted “the scope of that inquiry,” Lane, 541 U.S. 530, to the context of access to the courts, id. at 530-531. Respondents contend (Br. 20-21) that neither Congress nor this Court focused on the prison context. Quite the op- posite, Lane concluded that the “pattern of unequal treat- ment” identified by Congress includes “administration of * * * the penal system,” 541 U.S. at 525, and cited prison eases that documented that pattern, id. at 525 n.11. Con- gress also specifically found that “institutionalization” was d one “critical area{]” in which “discrimination * * * per- sists.” 42 U.S.C. 12101(a)(3). That targeted finding can naturally “be thought to include penal institutions.” Penn- sylvania Dep't of Corrs. v. Yeskey, 524 U.S. 206, 212 (1998). Indeed, Congress employed the same terminology in the Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act, 42 U.S.C. 1997 et seg., where it defined the “institutions” that house “insti- tutionalized persons.” to include a State or local “jail, prison, or other correctional facility,” or “a pretrial detention facil- ity,” 42 U.S.C. 1997(1)(B)(ii), (iii), and Subch. I-A (title).” 2. The record is substantial. Even were the Court to re-open Lane’s holding concerning the predicate for Con- gress’s exercise of its Section 5 power, ample evidence cor- roborates the appropriateness of applying Title II to pris- ons. See U.S. Br. 16-35; Goodman Br. 20-36; Paralyzed Vet- erans Br. 7-13; ADAPT Br. 9-22; American Ass’n on Mental Retardation Br. 15-20. Notably, while respondents criticize various pieces of evidence, they do not actually deny the reality of the Nation’s “history of unfair and often gro- tesque mistreatment” of persons with disabilities, City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 4382, 438 (1985), nor could they. U.S. Br. 16-17 & n.8. Nor do they deny the reality that Congress and the courts have, time and again, documented the unconstitutional treatment of disabled prisoners. See, e.g., U.S. Br. 24-32 & Add. A; see also R. Fleischner & M. Cutler, Annotated List of Cases Relating to Treatment for Persons with Mental IIl- ness in Prisons & Jails (Dec. 2002), at . Instead, respondents proffer a series of rules that would force this * See Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000cc-1(a) (same definition); 20 U.S.C. 6421(a)(2) and (3) (2000 & Supp. I 2002) (“institutionalization” includes “correctional facilities”); 42 U.S.C. 5633(a)(9)(A) and (F (i) (2000 & Supp. II 2002) (“institutionalization” of juvenile delinquents); 29 U.S.C. 701(aX(5); Yeskey, 524 U.S. at 209 (Title I] “unmis- takably includes State prisons and prisoners within its coverage”). 5 Court to disregard “the stuff of actual experience” that prompted congressional action, United States v. Gainey, 380 U.S. 63, 67 (1965), and constrain its review to an artifi- cial subset of judicially depurated material. Not one of re- spondents’ proposed rules for disallowing actual experience comports with controlling precedent or common sense.” First, respondents insist (Br. 35) that the Court must disregard all evidence of unconstitutional treatment by po- litical subdivisions of the States. Lane, in which both re- spondents had been denied access to “county courthouses,” 541 U.S. at 513-514, held the opposite, id. at 527 & n.16. Respondents rely (Br. 35) on the statement in Board of Trustees of the University of Alabama v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 369 (2001), that evidence of discrimination by local units of government should be discounted because Congress may subject them to damages suits without relying on its Section 5 power. But Lane distinguished Garrett on this point, not- ing that a rule disallowing evidence involving local govern- ment officials could not be reconciled with South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 312-315 (1966), or Hibbs. See Lane, 541 U.S. at 527-528 n.16. In addition, the employment provisions in Title I of the ADA at issue in Garrett inde- pendently sustainable under the Commerce Clause, so that “the sole purpose of reliance on § 5 [was] to place the States on equal footing with private actors with respect to their amenability to suit.” /d. at 528 n.16. Title II, by contrast, specifically focuses on the operations of state and local gov- ernments qua governments. Moreover, respondents and numerous other States have argued that Title II is not proper Commerce Clause legislation as applied to prisons, Miller, 384 F.3d at 1268 n.23; Nevada, Georgia, et al. Ami- cus Br. at 7-8, Pennsylvania Dep't of Corrs. v. Yeskey, (No. 97-634). This case thus draws into question the substantive * To the extent the Court considers it relevant, the appendix to this brief contains a case-by-case response to respondents’ appendix. 6 power of Congress to remedy and deter a documented pat- tern of unconstitutional treatment of disabled inmates by both States and local governments, regardless of whether the law is enforced through private damages actions, private injunctive actions, or by the United States itself. That makes the actions of local governments clearly relevant. See Lane, 541 U.S. at 527-528 n.16; City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 530-531 (1997); South Carolina, 383 U.S. at 308-313 (1966). Finally, respondents’ effort to distinguish Lane on this point fails for the additional reason that local jails, like local courthouses, often serve as arms of the state, and the inter- change of prisoners and shared use of facilities between state and local authorities is commonplace. See U.S. Br. 18 n.9. Under those circumstances, Congress’s enforcement power under Section 5, like the substantive protections of Section 1, can charge the States with some responsibility for the unconstitutional conduct of the political subdivisions that the States themselves created and empowered to act, and with which they coordinate prison programs and ser- vices. Second, respondents variously complain (Br. 25-26, 30- 31) that the testimony, reports, studies, and cases that sub- stantiate the problem of unconstitutional treatment of dis- abled prisoners came either too early or too late. Lane and Hibbs are to the contrary. In Lane, the Court expressly and repeatedly relied on material documenting unconstitu- tional treatment of the disabled that predated Title II by more than respondents’ proposed seven-year cutoff (Br. 26) or postdated its enactment. See 541 U.S. at 524-527 & nn.5- 14. For example, two of the cases the Court cited in Lane to “document a pattern of unequal treatment in * * * the penal system” postdated the ADA. /d. at 525 n.11. The Court did the same in Hibbs, relying on cases that predated the Family and Medical Leave Act, 29 U.S.C. 2601 et seq., a ee ~ 7 by more than a century and others, like United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996), that postdated its enactment, and legislative materials that also ran afoul of respondents’ seven-year cutoff. See Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 729-730, 733-734 & nn.3, 6-9. : Respondents, moreover, offer no rationale for their pro- posed head-in-the-sand approach to “the gravest and most delicate duty that this Court is called upon to perform.” Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 64 (1981). After all, evi- dence of unconstitutional treatment spanning a substantial breadth of time would seem to be the very definition of a “history and pattern” of constitutional violations. Garrett, 531 U.S. at 368. Moreover, with respect to information that predates the enactment of Title II, it would be an odd con- ception of federalism that considered Congress’s lengthy study of a problem and willingness to proceed incrementally to be marks against the law’s constitutionality. With re- spect to material that postdates Title II’s enactment, re- spondents fail to explain why evidence of an enduring prob- lem does not substantiate Congress’s finding of an anteced- ent problem. Indeed, the fact that violations continue to occur would seem to undermine respondents’ argument for discounting pre-enactment evidence, because it demon- strates that earlier laws, and even Title II, have not eradi- cated the problem. Third, respondents (Br. 34-35) and Tennessee argue (Amici Br. 14-18) that only final adjudications of constitu- tional violations by the States can support an exercise of Congress’s Section 5 power, and even then only if there are sufficiently numerous adverse court judgments to meet some unspecified adjudications-per-capita threshold (id. Br. 17-18), and if the legislation is targeted solely at adjudicated offending States (id. at 17). That argument is irreconcilable with precedent. The Court, for example, upheld nationwide bans on literacy tests and durational residency require- 8 ments after the Court had repeatedly affirmed the constitu- tionality of such procedures.’ Likewise, the Court broadly sustained the Voting Rights Act of 1965 in South Carolina, supra, even though there were far fewer than “40 cases” finding unconstitutional discrimination in voting, and then only by nine States “over decades” (id. 18), making the ratio of violations to the number of eligible African American and other minority voters (id. at 17-18) infinitesimally small.’ The argument also ignores that the absence of adjudi- cated violations may reflect the courts’ own failure to recog- nize the problem. See, e.g., Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927); see also Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 729 (noting that historical discrimination “is chronicled in—and, until recently, was sanctioned by—this Court’s opinions”). For example, Con- gress extended Title VII’s ban on gender discrimination to the States, Pub. L. No. 92-261, § 2, 86 Stat. 103 (1972), just four months after, “for the first time in our Nation’s history, this Court ruled in favor of a woman who complained that * Compare Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970) (upholding bans), with Drueding v. Devlin, 380 U.S. 125 (1965) (mem.) (upholding residency require- ments); Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89, 91 (1965) (same); Lassiter v. Nort- hampton County Bd. of Elections, 360 U.S. 45 (1959) (literacy test upheld). * We have found only 18 final judgments of unconstitutional voting discrimination by the States before 1965. See Anderson v. Martin, 375 U.S. 399 (1964); Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953); Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944); Lane v. Wilson, 307 U.S. 268 (1939); Niron v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73 (1932); Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536 (1927); Myers v. Anderson, 238 U.S. 368 (1915); Guinn v. United States, 238 U.S. 347 (1915); Alabama v. United States, 304 F.2d 583 (Sth Cir.), aff'd, 371 U.S. 37 (1962); McDonald v. Key, 224 F.2d 608 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 895 (1955); Butle: .. Thompson, 184 F.2d 526 (4th Cir. 1950); Baskin v. Brown, 174 F.2d 391 (4th Cir. 1949); Rice v. Elmore, 165 F.2d 387 (4th Cir. 1947), cert. denied, 333 U.S. 875 (1948); Chapman v. King, 154 F.2d 460 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 327 U.S. 800 (1946); Bliley v. West, 42 F.2d 101 (4th Cir. 1930); Hamm v. Virginia State Bd. of Elections, 230 F. Supp. 156 (E.D. Va.), aff'd, 379 U.S. 19 (1964); United States v. Louisiana, 225 F. Supp. 258, 396 (E.D. La. 1968), aff'd, 380 U.S. 145 (1965); Davis v. Schnell, 81 F. Supp. 872 (S.D. Ala.), affa, 336 U.S. 933 (1949). 9 her State had denied her the equal protection of its laws” in a non-employment case. Virginia, 518 U.S. at 532 (citing Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971)). Title VII's legislative record contains no specific data or findings regarding women employees in state or local governments,” and we have uncovered only one case before 1972 that actually found unconstitutional employment discrimination on the basis of gender by a State. See Thorn v. Richardson, No. 9577, 1971 WL 201 (W.D. Wash. 1971). Respondents’ and their amici’s approach also would re- quire overruling Hibbs. There, the Court rejected the dis- sent’s emphasis on Nevada’s own benefit policies, which predated the federal enactment, and instead found that Congress “could reasonably conclude” that nationwide re- medial legislation was justified, “no matter how generous petitioner’s own [policies] may have been.” 538 U.S. at 734.’ The Court reached that conclusion, moreover, despite the " See H.R. Rep. No. 238, 92d Cong., Ist Sess. (1971); S. Rep. No. 415, 92d Cong., Ist Sess. (1971); 118 Cong. Rec. 1840 (1972) (Sen Javits) (only “overall figures” for sex discrimination); id. at 1816-1819; id. at 4935. The isolated references to gender discrimination noted only that the Constitution prohibits such discrimination, S. Rep. No. 415, supra, at 10; 118 Cong. Rec. at 1816 (Sen. Williams); id. at 1412 (Sen Byrd). Congressional hearings on the 1972 amendments were equally silent. See Equal Employment Opportunities Enforcement Act of 1971: Hearings on S. 2215, S. 2617, & H.R. 1746 Before the Subcomm. on Labor of the Senate Comm. on Labor & Pub. Welfare, 92d Cong., Ist Sess. (1971); Equal Employment Opportunity Enforcement Procedures: Hearings on H.R. 1746 Before the Gen. Subcomm. on Labor of the House Comm. on Educ. & Labor, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971); Equal Employment Opportunity Enforcement Procedures: Hearings on H.R. 6228 & H.R. 13517 Before the Gen. Subcomm. on Labor of the House Comm. on Educ. & Labor, Vist Cong., Ist & 2d Sess. (1969-1970); Equal Employment Opportunities Enforcement Act: Hearings on S. 2453 Before the Subcomm. on Labor of the Senate Comm. on Labor & Pub. Welfare, 91st Cong., Ist Sess. (1969). * See also Lopez v. Monterey County, 525 U.S. 266 (1999); City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156, 174 (1980). 10 dearth of adverse final judgments against States for uncon- stitutional family-leave policies. Further amici’s adjudicated-violations-per-capita ap- proach cannot be squared with the original purpose of Sec- tion 5, which was not to leave the protection of liberties so completely dependent upon the same federal judiciary that, less than a decade earlier, had constricted congressional power to contain the spread of slavery, see Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506 (1869); Dred Scott v. Sand- ford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 436-452 (1857), or to relegate Congress to enforcing only those rights that the courts were already doing a good job of policing. Under Section 5, “i]t is not * * * the judicial power” but “the power of Con- gress which has been enlarged.” Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 345 (1879). Amici’s argument also overlooks that a single case against a State (especially a class action) may expose hundreds of constitutional violations, the worst of- fending cases may settle, and a central purpose of Section 5 legislation is to remedy and prevent the forms of discrimi- nation that are least amenable to courtroom proof, e.g., Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 736." In short, respondents’ focus (Br. 30) on the materials before Congress “in 1990” asks the wrong question. The appropriateness of Section 5 legislation turns upon whether a problem of unconstitutional treatment exists, not whether a long series of widely dispersed judicial adjudications or an elaborate legislative history exists. Fourth, respondents criticize (Br. 23-24) the lack of specificity in the testimony of a single witness before Con- gress, Cindy Miller of Massachusetts, who testified that * The insistence upon final judgments loses sight of the fact that a prelimi- nary injunction reflects the prisoner's “substantial likelihood of success on the merits,” Benten v. Kessler, 505 U.S. 1084, 1085 (1992) (per curiam), and a denial of summary judgment means that a reasonable factfinder—whether a judge, jury, or Congress—could find unconstitutional treatment of the prisoner, Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248-249 (1986). 11 “jailers rational|ize] taking away [inmates’] wheelchairs as a form of punishment as if that is different than punishing prisoners by breaking their legs.” Respondents insist that the “rehabilitation counselor|’s]” testimony must have re- ferred to the treatment of residents in a state mental health hospital rather than in a state prison. But it is not clear that respondents’ purported distinction is even meaningful. “(Rehabilitation counselor[{s]” routinely work in correc- tional facilities as well as mental health institutions, see, e.g., Spicer v. Virginia, Dep't of Corrs., 66 F.3d 705, 707 (4th Cir. 1995) (en banc), and in many States (including Massachusetts), mentally ill prisoners may serve their sen- tences within mental health institutions.” In addition, even if that one witness’s testimony were ambiguous, it would not alter the very specific judicial con- firmation of the same point (including a Massachusetts case)'’ and the sheer volume of other evidence of unconstitu- tional treatment. Respondent and their amici simply ignore * See U.S. Br. 32 n.27; Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 123, §§ 1, 13, 14, 18 (West 2003); Reply App., infra, 4a, 8a, lla, 23a; Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480 (1980); John Monahan, et al., “Prisoners Transferred to Mental Hospitals,” in Mentally Disordered Offenders: Perspectives from Law and Social Science 233-244 (John Monahan & Henry J. Steadman eds., 1983). See Navedo v. Maloney, 172 F. Supp. 2d 276 (D. Mass. 2001) (prisoner denied access to his wheelchair); see also Serrano v. Francis, 345 F.3d 1071 (9th Cir. 2003) (inmate in disciplinary unit denied wheelchair, forcing him to craw! around vermin and cockroach-infested floor), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 43 (2004); Hicks v. Frey, 992 F 2d 1450 (6th Cir. 1993) (paraplegic in disciplinary unit denied wheelchair); Weeks v. Chaboudy, 984 F.2d 185, 187 (6th Cir. 1993) (“squalor in which |prisoner| was forced to live as a result of being denied a wheelchair” violated the Eighth Amendment); Schmidt v. Odell, 64 F. Supp. 2d 1014 (D. Kan. 1999) (inmate deprived of wheelchair); Beckford v. Irvin, 49 F. Supp. 2d 170 (W.D.N.Y. 1999) (Eighth Amendment violated by same); Harrel- sow Vv. Elmore County, 859 F. Supp. 1465, 1466 (M.D. Ala. 1994) (paraplegic pri- soner denied use of a wheelchair and forced to craw] around cell); ef. Parkinson v. Columbia County Dist. Att'y, 679 N.Y.S.2d 505 (Sup. Ct. 1998) (Constitution violated where inmate was deprived of prosthetic leg for at least a year). 12 the evidence that (i) persons with disabilities are “deprived of medications while in jail,” H.R. Rep. No. 485, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. Pt. 3, at 50 (1990); (ii) “Kentucky Correc- tions offers no appropriate treatment to the retarded and subjects them to varied institutional abuse”;'’ (iii) “[mJedical care at best in most State systems barely scratches the sur- face of constitutional minima”;"* (iv) inmates with the most serious medical problems “get dumped” into higher security facilities regardless of whether their crimes or behavior warrant it;”* (v) “the confinement of inmates who are in need of psychiatric care and treatment * * * in the so called psychiatric unit of the Louisiana State Penitentiary consti- tutes cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment”;" (vi) mentally ill prisoners were de- prived of nutritional food because “mental cases don’t know what they eat anyway”;'’ and (vii) there have been repeated instances of deliberate abuse and gross medical maltreat- ment causing dangerous infections, maggot-infested wounds, and the deaths of disabled inmates, see U.S. Br. 24- '' Kentucky Legis. Research Comm'n, Research Report No. 125: Mentally Retarded Offenders in Adult and Juvenile Correctional Institutions at A-3 (1975). "AIDS and the Admin. of Justice: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Admin. of Justice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 100th Cong., Ist Sess. 39 (1987). Cathy Potler, Correctional Ass'n of N.Y., State of the Prisons: Condi- tions Inside the Walls 12-13 (1986); see J.A. 90; U.S. Br. 28-29. 4 Civil Rights for lnstitutionalized Persons: Hearings on H.R. 2439 & H.R. 5791 Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties, & the Admin. of Justice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 95th Cong., Ist Sess. 320-321 (1977). Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons: Hearings on 8. 1393 Before the Subcomm. on the Const. of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 95th Cong., Ist Sess. 234 (1977) (S. 1393 Hearings). _ erry et 13 25 & n.19. With respect to that evidence, the silence of re- sponderts and their amici speaks volumes." 3. The tupe of violations warrants congressional ac- tion. Rather than auswer that extensive evidence—the volume and specificity of which far exceeds the records in Lane and Hibbs—respondents argue (Br. 10-19) that it must all be ignored because the constitutional claims of pris- oners are subjected to rational-basis review. The premise is wrong. The rights of disabled prisoners to adequate med- ical care, humane conditions of confinement, protection from violence, and prison terms that are not lengthened or served under inordinately harsh conditions, see J.A. 90; U.S. Br. 21-30, are protected by more than the any-conceivable- rational-basis standard. Furthermore, prisoners have a “fundamental constitutional right of access to the courts” to challenge their convictions or conditions of confinement, Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 346 (1996), and the Constitu- tion’s protection of that right is at least as robust as the -~general public’s (7.e., Lane respondent Jones’s) right to ob- serve court proceedings. Indeed, because prison adminis- tration is an area in which the “government exerts a degree of control unparalleled in civilian society,” Cutter v. Wilkinson, 125 S. Ct. 2113, 2121 (2005), and deprives dis- abled inmates of the resources, freedom, and physical capac- ity to meet their own needs, the Constitution’s attentiveness to state conduct is heightened and pervasive. Respondents’ reliance (Br. 14-19) on Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987), misunderstands the operation of both Ps Respondents’ search (Resp. Br. 24 & n.8) of Westlaw’s (incomplete) computerized legislative history of the ADA reveals the pitfalls of artificially narrow, word-specific search requests. Respondents failed to look for the terms Congress employed. Had they searched for “jail,” “inmate,” or * correc- tional,” they would have found the specific consideration of Title IT's application to prison administration that they seek. See U.S. Br. 21-23, 28; 136 Cong. Rec. 17,039 (1990) (reproducing federal Bureau of Prisons’ guidance on the ~ management of HIV-positive prison inmates). 14 that standard and Title II. As this Court underscored just last Term, the Turner standard of review applies “only to rights that are inconsistent with proper incarceration.” Johnson v. California, 125 S. Ct. 1141, 1149 (2005). More- over, even when Turner calls for deference, it provides for more searching review than rational-basis scrutiny, as Turner itself demonstrates, see 482 U.S. at 94-99 (striking down marriage restrictions). Title II, moreover, does not mandate the creation of new programs or services. It re- quires only that qualified individuals with disabilities be afforded equivalent access to whatever programs and ser- vices the prison already offers, 42 U.S.C. 12132. When the State determines that certain accommodations of constitu- tional rights are perfectly consistent with incarceration, but makes them unavailable to qualified inmates with disabili- ties, the State’s action is not saved by Turner. Indeed, in that context, the judgments for which Turner suggests that deference is appropriate will rarely be implicated. Like- wise, the Court’s Eighth Amendment jurisprudence recog- nizes that the pervasive control the State exercises over prisoners imposes unique affirmative duties on the States and does not broadly permit the State to engage in any con- duct for which a rationale could be hypothesized. Respondents’ argument also misunderstands the func- tion of deferential judicial scrutiny under Turner. Turner recognizes that state action implicating and possibly violat- ing the Constitution is pervasive in prisons, but neverthe- less prescribes a measure of judicial restraint in evaluating prison policies out of concerns for both federalism and the separation of powers. However, both of those concerns have substantially reduced force when Congress acts under Sec- tion 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. Further, to transform Turner’s expression of judicial restraint and respect for the legislative process into a judicial sword that would preclude Congress from responding, under Section 5 of the Four- 15 teenth Amendment, even to a proven record of constitu- tional violations would get the Constitutioa’s structural principles exactly backwards. 4. Title I] is not underinclusive. Respondents contend (Br. 27-29, 31-33) that the extensive evidence of violations of disabled inmates’ Eighth Amendment rights must be dis- counted because the States were simultaneously violating the constitutional rights of non-disabled inmates, rendering Title Il “underinclusive[]” (id. at 44). That argument largely answers itself. It would be an odd version of feder- alism that deemed a congressional response to only one spe- cies of constitutional violations to be suspect, or that allowed States to insulate themselves from targeted Section 5 legis- lation by violating an even broader swath of constitutional rights. Congress, moreover, could reasonably conclude that Eighth Amendment violations disproportionately endanger the lives and physical safety of inmates with disabilities, given their often enhanced vulnerability to prison conditions in general, and to the deprivation of adequate medical care in particular. Congress, likewise, could (and did) conclude that the unconstitutional treatment of inmates with disabili- ties was an integral part of the broader problem of the States’ improper treatment of Americans with disabilities. Respondents’ companion argument (Br. 27-29) that Title II is unconcerned with Eighth Amendment violations be- cause they are not a form of “discrimination” is without ba- sis. The concepts of inequitable treatment and inhumane treatment overlap. When prison officials deny inmates with disabilities access to toilet facilities or subject them to a substandard diet because “mental cases don’t know what they eat anyway,” S. 1393 Hearings 234, they discriminate against disabled inmates with respect to the minimal condi- tions guaranteed by the Eighth Amendment. Indeed, this Court held in Lane that Title II enforces not just the consti- tutional prohibition on “irrational disability discrimination,” 16 but also remedies and prevents violations of “other basic constitutional guarantees.” 541 U.S. at 522 (citing cases implicating Eighth Amendment rights). And that aspect of Title II added to, rather than detracted from, its constitu- tionality. Beyond that, respondents’ observation (Br. 22-23) that Title II promotes mainstreaming overlooks that (i) Congress also unambiguously expressed its desire to com- bat discrimination in “institutionalization,” 42 U.S.C. 12101(a)(3); Yeskey, supra; (ii) Title II promotes the main- streaming of disabled prisoners within prison life; and (iii) the vast majority of disabled inmates “will eventually return to society,” McKune v. Lile, 536 U.S. 24, 36 (2002) (plural- ity), so that their inclusion in prison rehabilitative programs and other institutional services directly promotes their later transition into the mainstream of community life. C. Title Il Is Reasonably Tailored To Remedying And Prevent- ing Constitutional Violations in the Prison Context Respondents contend (Br. 38-44) that Title II is not con- gruent and proportional because it goes too “far beyond the Constitution’s requirements” (Br. 40). As an initial matter, that argument is hard to reconcile with respondents’ com- plaint eisewhere (Br. 27-29, 31-33, 44) that Title II is “underinclusive” because it does not address more constitu- tional violations committed by the States. In any event, while some applications of Title I] might provide stronger procedural and substantive protection than the Constitution mandates, Section 5 permits that. “Congress’ § 5 power is not confined to the enactment of legislation that merely parrots the precise wording of the Fourteenth Amendment.” Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 81 (2000). Rather, Congress may both remedy past violations of constitutional rights and enact “prophy- lactic legislation that proscribes facially constitutional con- duct, in order to prevent and deter unconstitutional con- duct,” Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 727-728. 17 Respondents and their amici also fail to show that the gap between the Constitution and Title II as applied to pris- ons is materially different from the gap between Title II and the various constitutional rights of access to the courts up- held in Lane. The features of Title II that this Court em- phasized in upholding its application to the courts apply with full force in the prison context. Title II does not im- pose inflexible commands, but rather requires only that States undertake “reasonable measures,” Lane, 541 U.S. at 531, and “reasonable” accommodations and modifications, id. at 5382; 42 U.S.C. 12131(2), to ensure only that otherwise “qualified individual|s]” with disabilities, 42 U.S.C. 12132, be afforded reasonable access to programs and services that the State independently has determined are consistent with incarceration. Title II does not require States to abandon their essential eligibility criteria for prison programs, to “fundamentally alter the nature of the service provided,” or to incur “undue financial or administrative burden|s].” Lane, 541 U.S. at 532; 28 C.F.R. 35.130(b)(7), 35.150(a)(3). Those requirements echo the general mandate of “reason- ableness” in prison regulations, Turner, 482 U.S. at 89; and the States’ obligations to refrain from imposing “atypical and significant hardship{s],” Wilkinson v. Austin, 125 S. Ct. 2384, 2395 (2005), and to provide “humane conditions of con- finement,” “adequate food, clothing, shelter, and medical care,” and “reasonable measures to guarantee [prisoners’] safety,” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994). Indeed, Title II's flexible commands are, if anything, a more reasonable anc “appropriate response to [a] history and pattern of unequal treatment,” Lane, 541 U.S. at 530, in the prison context than in the court-access context. First, to the extent Title II imposes affirmative duties of accom- modation on States, those duties are more congruent and proportional within pr'son walls, where (unlike most other contexts) affirmative obligations under the Constitution 18 itself are the rule, rather than the exception. See, e.g., DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189 (1989). Second, courts have been particularly re- ceptive to the need to provide an appropriate degree of def- erence to prison officials, even in applying statutory and constitutional standards that are facially more rigorous. See, ¢.g., Cutter, 125 S. Ct. at 2123, Johnson, 125 S. Ct. at 1152. And a number of courts have recognized that Title II’s terms permit reasonable deference to prison adminis- trators.'’ If doubt remains, courts should construe Title II to preserve its constitutionality. £.g., Harris v. United States, 536 U.S. 545, 555 (2002); Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288, 348 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring). Furthermore, Title II’s standards, see 42 U.S.C. 12134(b), largely mirror those that the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. 794 (2000 & Supp. II 2002), imposes upon the federal government, which operates the largest correc- tional system in the Nation, and all fifty States, which have voluntarily chosen to accept federal funding that triggers that Act’s requirements. If those standards failed to accord sufficient deference to the unique needs of the prison con- text or if, in fact, they “markled] the end of deference to State prison operations” that amici portend (Tenn. Br. 6), then presumably some evidence of those problems would have surfaced in the federal system or in the States in the decades since the Rehabilitation Act and Title I] were en- "See Bowman v. Beasley, 8 Fed. Appx. 175, 179 (4th Cir. 2001) (per curiam) (“wide deference”), cert. denied, 535 U.S. 1001 (2002); armstrong v. Davis, No. 99-15152, 2000 WL 369622, at *1 (9th Cir. Apr. 11, 2000) (mem.) (Turner-style deference); Oneisha v. Hopper, 171 F.3d 1289, 1300 (11th Cir. 1999) (en bane) (deferring to “penological concerns”), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1114 (2000); Randolph v. Rodgers, 170 F.3d 850 (8th Cir. 1999); Convillion v. Michigan Parole Bd., No. 4:04-CV-130, 2005 WL 1036973, at *6 (W.D. Mich. May 4, 2005); Brooks v. Horn, No. 00-03637, 2004 WL 764385, at *9 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 7, 2004); see also Gates v. Rowland, 39 F.3d 1439, 1447 (9th Cir. 1994) (applying Turver-style deference under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act). 19 acted.'* But neither respondents nor their amici cite any and, in fact, they all continue to accept federal funding for their prisons. All Title II does is extend those workable standards to every level of correctional facility and to each prisoner with a qualifying disability within a State. Amici’s concern (Br. 26) that Title II will “spur more prison litigation” suffers from the same flaws. Indeed, just last Term, the Court rejected the identical argument with respect to the protections for prisoners’ religious freedom required by the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act—protections that can potentially be invoked by every prisoner and that subject state justifications to statu- tory strict scrutiny, 42 U.S.C. 2000ce-1(a)(1) and (2). In Cutter, the Court saw “no reason to anticipate that abusive prisoner litigation will overburden the operations of state and local institutions,” and noted that the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PLRA), 42 U.S.C. 1997e, was “designed to inhibit frivolous filings.” 125 S. Ct. at 2124-2125. In fact, while the State of Washington now joins a brief labeling the PLRA a “facile assurance” (Tenn. Br. 25), Washington took a decidedly different view last Term when it told this Court that frivolous prisoner suits are “best addressed through legislation like the PLRA,” rather than the denial of sub- stantive civil rights protection. New York & Washington Amicus Br. at 16, Cutter v. Wilkinson (No. 03-9877). If, as Washington argued last year (id. at 2-3, 15), RLUIPA’s strict scrutiny standard is a workable and appropriately deferential standard for accommodating religion in prisons, it is hard to understand the insistence this year that Title II’s reasonableness standard is an unworkable standard for accommodating disabilities (unless accompanied by federal "Every State receives federal funding for its prisons. See Cutter, 125 S. Ct. at 2118-2119 n.4; FY 2004 Office of Justice Programs, Office on Violence Against Women & Office of Community Oriented Policing Services: Grants by State (visited Oct. 26, 2005) . 20 funding, at which point the standard apparently becomes acceptable again). Finally, amici argue (Br. 24-25) that allowing damages is not appropriate. But amici make no effort to explain why damages here—which echo the damages relief already avail- able against States under the Rehabilitation Act, Barnes v. Gorman, 536 U.S. 181, 184-187 (2002)—are less appropriate than they were under Title II in Lane, or under the Family and Medical Leave Act in Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 740. The “gravity of the harm” that past violations have caused, Lane, 541 U.S. at 523 —some of which have led to the physi- cal suffering and deaths of prisoners, see U.S. Br. 24-29 & Add. A and B—strongly counsels in favor of equivalent en- forcement authority in this context. Indeed, this Court has held that damages are an appropriate remedy to address the violation of constitutional rights in the cause of action created by Bivens v. Sir Unknown Named Agents of Fed- eral Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 395 (1971). A forti- ori, it is appropriate for Congress to make that same judg- ment in exercising its Section 5 power. * ke ke For the foregoing reasons, and for those stated in our opening brief, the judgment of the court of appeals should be reversed. Respectfully submitted. PAUL D. CLEMENT Solicitor General OCTOBER 2005 REPLY APPENDIX Detailed Annotation of Cases Evidencing the Problem of Unconstitutional Treatment of Individuals with Disabilities in Correctional Facilities ’ United States’ Case Assertions Response Balla v. Idaho * Conflates universal * See U.S. Reply Br. at 15-16. State Bd. of deficiencies in Corrs., 595 F. medical or * Court observed that psychiatric Supp. 1558 (D. psychiatric care with care at prison was “almost Idaho 1984) disability-based nonexistent,” 595 F. Supp. at 1568, discrimination. and that “the attitude of the Department with regard to psychiatric care can be described as deliberately indifferent,” ibid., with little or no care given to inmates with serious mental illnesses, id. at 1569. Failure to provide needed diet to diabetic had contributed to rendering him blind, id. at 1574-1575, and had contributed to another prisoner's seizures and to another's hospitalization for relapse of Crohn's Disease, ibid. er - (la) Respondents’ United States’ Case Assertions Response Battle v. ¢ Challenge to general | * See U.S. Reply Br. at 15-16. Anderson, prison conditions. 376F. Supp. 402 ° The court specifically noted that (E.D. Conflates universal half of the prison’s in-patient 1974), aff'd deficiencies in population was hospitalized for in part and medical or psychiatric reasons, that “there is rev'd in part on psychiatric care with no professional psychiatric staff other grounds, disabilit y-based available for treatment on a 993 F.2d 1551 discrimination regular basis,” and the “onl (10th Cir. 1993) treatment” is “sedation.” 376 F. (reversing only Inmates’ claims of Supp. at 415. The court's as to district deficient prison injunction included detailed court’s denial of conditions swept provisions concerning medical two motions to much more broadly care. See id. at 434. intervene) than mental health care, encompassing issues such as law library access and re Deficiencies in medical care were systemic. Court denied money damages. Bee v. Greaves, Not decided on the See U.S. Reply Br. at 5-6, 7-10, 15- 744 F.2d 1387 merits. 16; Tennessee v. Lane, 5A1 U.S. at (10th Cir. 1984), 527-528 n.16. cert. denied, County jail. 469U.S. 1214 Regardless of the fact that the (1985) Inmate’s forcible- inmate initially demanded medication claim medication, the issue was whether arose after he forcibly medicating him later was a initially requested non-exaggerated response to an medication. Court emergency situation, 744 F.2d at held that liberty 1395-1397, and the court found that interest in avoiding the evidence in the inmate’s favor unwanted treatment was sufficient to defeat summary is not absolute. judgment, ibid. Se eee 3a Respondents’ United States’ Case Assertions Response Bonner v. * Not decided on the * See U.S. Reply Br. at 7-10. Arizona Dep't merits. of Corrs., 714 F * While the court held that the deaf, Supp. 420 (D * Court rej mute, and Ariz. 1989) plaintiff inmate’s had no due process libert 17 argument that he in avoiding protective loc had a due process also held that the plaintiff had a’ liberty interest in constitutional interest in not being avoiding protective removed from the prison’s honor lockdown. dorm. 714 F. Supp. at 424-425. Court found a genuine issue of material fact as to whether “requir|ing| a deaf, mute, and vision-impaired inmate to navigate this legal miasma without a qualified interpreter” prevented him from ing the removed him from the dorm. /d. at 425; see id. at 423. Bonner v. Not decided on the * See U.S. Reply Br. at 7-10. Lewis, 857 merits. F.2d 559 (9th ¢ Though affirming the dismissal of Cir. 1988) Court affirmed certain of the inmate's claims, the grant of summary court made clear that a genuine judgment to issue of material fact existed as to defendant on “whether the denial of a qualified inmate’s equal sign language interpreter ion and prevented [the inmate] from ighth Amendment understanding the charges against claims. him or presenting his views,” 857 F.2d at 565, and it remanded for determination of whether the Due Process Clause had thus been violated, ibid. Sa da Respondents’ United States’ Case Assertions Response Burchett v. * Court contemplated | * Although the court found it Bower, 355 F. that inmate unnecessary to address the Supp. 1278 (D. receiving psychiatric constitutional right to treatment, it Ariz. 1973) treatment in state noted the uncontradicted mental hospital testimony that the plaintiff was could have hi mentally ill and that no psychiatric treatment treatment was available at the terminated and be prison, 355 F. Supp. at 128], and it returned to prison. enjoined defendants from transferring the inmate back to the prison without affording him due process, see id. at 1281-1283. The court also enjoined “any future unconstitutional application of the statute to Burchett,” id. at 1282. Cody v. Hil- Challenge to general See U.S. Reply Br. at 15-16. liard, 599 F. prison conditions. Supp. 1025 Though also addressing other (D.S.D. 1984), Conflates universal deficiencies in prison conditions, aff'd in part and deficiencies in the court found that inmates with rev'd in nert on medical or “serious psychiatric needs” were other nds, psychiatric care with not being treated by qualified 830 F.2d 912 disabilit y-based medical personnel; it concluded (8th Cir. 1987) discrimination. that mental health care was “an (en bane) (ap- especially grave deficiency” at the peal did not Eighth Circuit later prison. 599 F. Supp. at 1058-1059. encompass por- reversed court's tion of district holding that double- court's order celling was uncon- dealing with stitutional. Court medical and held that provisions psychiatric for inmates’ special care), cert. dietary needs were denied, ASS adequate. U.S. 906 (1988) Respondents’ United States’ Case Assertions Response Cortes- Non-disabled * See U.S. Reply Br. at 5-6, 15-16; Quinones v. inmates subjected to Lane, 5A1 U.S. at 527-528 n.16. Jiminez- conditions like Nettleship, 842 Goodman’s. Though the schizophrenic inmate F.2d 556 (ist died at the hands of fellow inmates, Cir. 1988), cert. District jail. the court upheld a jury finding denied, 488 that, by transferring him to the U.S. 823 (1988) Schizophrenic pri- overcrowded jail where he was soner was killed by killed and leaving him “unsegre- other inmates, not and without treatment for by state officials. is psychological problems for Prison was generally nearly four months,” Puerto Rico overcrowded. No prison officials exhibited deliberate claim of discrimi- indifference to his health and nation against safety. 842 F.2d at 559-560. decedent. Cummings v. Not decided on the See U.S. Reply Br. at 5-6, 7-10; Roberts, 628 merits. Lane, 5A1 U.S. at 527-528 n.16. F.2d 1065 (8th Cir. 1980) County jail. The court reversed sum judgment for the defendants not Inmate was not only on the inmate's claim of disabled when taken deliberate indifference to his into custody, but medical needs, but also on his suffered back injury claim that prison officials’ failure to while in detention. give him a wheelchair made it necessary for him to crawl on the floor. 628 F.2d at 1068. Delafose v. Claim at issue was The court held that disparate Manson, 385 F. more similar to Title treatment of the two groups Supp. 1115 (D. I employment- amounted to irrational Conn. 1974) discrimination claim: discrimination against mentally ill inmates hospitalized patients; the situation is not for physical ailments analogous to employment received “hospital discrimination because members of y” while inmates neither group were working. 385 pitalized for F. Supp. at 1116-1121. mental ailments did not. 7a 6a Respondents’ United States’ Case Assertions Response Doe v. * Not decided on the * See U.S. Reply Br. at 7-10. Coughlin, 697 merits. F. Supp. 1234 ¢ Though observing that other (N.D.N.Y. 1988) Court decided the constitutional challenges to similar case on privacy plans had failed, the court was grounds and noted unequivocal that involuntary that the same placement of an inmate in a challenge had been - dormitory designated for HIV- rejected when positive individuals—and thus brought under the involun disclosure of the Fourteenth inmate’s HIV-positive status— Amendment. violated his constitutional right to privacy, see 697 F. Supp. at 1236- 1241, and that the prison program operated “in a constitutionally impermissible manner,” id. at 1240. The court determined that “[tlhere is no acceptable reason why a prisoner must have his constitutional rights violated particularly in an incomplete program.” /d. at 1243. ~ Respondents’ United States’ Case Assertions Response Duran v. * Challenge to general | * See U.S. Reply Br. at 7-10, 15-16. Anaya, 642 F. prison conditions. Supp. 510 (D. NM. 1986) * Not decided on the merits. ¢ Conflates universal deficiencies in medical or psy- chiatric care with disability-based discrimination. ‘ Preliminary injunc- tion was to prevent certain staff reduc- tions, not to cease continuing constitu- tional harm. Court addressed harms to the entire prison population, not just disabled inmates. * Though no harm had yet occurred, the court made clear that judicial intervention was necessary to ensure “maintenance of minimal constitutional standards” in the areas of physical and mental health, and that “the level of psychiatric care being provided at this time, particularly to prisoners in need of acute care, is unacceptable by any conceivable measure or standard.” 642 F. Supp. at 526. The court noted that current programs “are deficient even now in a number of important res .” ibid. (emphasis added), and that the impact would be particularly severe for inmates with serious mental health problems, see id. at 516, 519. 9a Ra Respondents’ United States’ Case Assertions Response Eng v. Smith, Not decided on the * See U.S. Reply Br. at 7-10, 15-16. 849 F.2d 80 (2d merits. Cir. 1988) ¢ Though not deciding whether the Conflates universal “deliberate indifference” standard deficiencies in had been met, the court noted that medical or psy- the evidentiary record supported a chiatric care with finding of “systemic disability-based |constitutional| deficiencies” in the discrimination. prison’s mental health system, 849 F.2d at 82, and “deliberate Court declined to indifference to serious medical resolve whether needs, ibid. problems in prison’s mental health system rose to the level of “deliberat indifference” to inmates’ medical needs. Flakes v. Percu, Suit addressed The hospital's population included 511 F. Supp. conditions in a state convicted sex offenders in need of 1325 (W.D. Wis. hospital, not a specialized treatment, as well as 1981) prison. people convicted of crimes and transferred from prison. 511 F. Supp. at 1326. In addition, the hospital was in the process of conversion to a prison, and the state Division of Corrections shared responsibility for the facility. /bid. The court noted that confinement in a mental institution is “closely analogous to existence in many prisons, and much more stern and dreary than existence in many medium and light security correctional institutions.” /d. at 1333. Respondents’ United States’ Case Assertions Response Inmates of Challenge to general | * See U.S. Reply Br. at 15-16. Occoquan v. Barry, 717 F. Supp. 854 (D.D.C. 1989) prison conditions. Conflates universal deficiencies in medical or psy- chiatric care with disability-based discrimination. Non-disabled inmates subjected to conditions like Goodman's. Court found prison conditions unconstitutionally deficient in numerous respects, going far beyond treatment of disabled people. * Among a long litany of deficiencies, the court found that, by housing seriously mentally ill inmates in a cell block where they were locked in their cells 23 hours a day and received little treatment, 717 F. Supp. at 863-864, prison officials exhibited “deliberate indifference to their psychiatric health needs,” id. at 868. Inmates of the Allegheny County Jail v. Peirce, 487 F. Supp. 638 (W.D. Pa. 1980) Conflates universal deficiencies in medical or psychia- tric care with dis- ability-based dis- crimination. County jail. * See U.S. Reply Br. at 5-6, 15-16; Lane, 541 U.S. at 527-528 n.16. * Court found that the “provision of care to mentally ill inmates * * * is inadequate to the extent of ‘deliberate indifference,’ ” and listed numerous respects in which such care was “far below minimum standards.” 487 F. Supp. at 643. Respondents’ United States’ Case Assertions Response James v. ¢ Challenge to general | * See U.S. Reply Br. at 15-16. Wallace, prison conditions. 382 F. Supp. ¢ The court refused to dismiss the 1177 (M.D. Ala. | * Conflates universal plaintiffs’ claims, specifically 1974) deficiencies in noting their allegations that ~medical or psy- chiatric care with disability-based discrimination. members of the class were “incar- cerated in institutions having inadequate facilities and programs designed to meet the treatment and custodial needs of those with mental or emotional difficulties or with geriatric problems.” 382 F. Supp. at 1182. Johnson v. Hardin County, 908 F.2d 1280 (6th Cir. 1990) County detention center. Court held that county could not be liable because inmate had produced insufficient evidence of custom or policy of deliberate indifference to medical needs. See U.S. Reply Br. at 5-6; Lane, 541 U.S. at 527-528 n.16. Though holding that the county was not liable, the court upheld the jury’s finding that jail officials were liable for their deliberate indifference to the inmate’s medical needs. 908 F.2d at 1284. ‘Respondents’ United States’ Case Assertions Response Kendrick v. * Challenge to general | * See U.S. Reply Br. at 15-16; U.S. Bland, 5A1 F. prison conditions. Opening Br. at 40-41 (existing laws Supp. 21 (W.D. inadequate); Lane, 541 U.S. at 526 Ky. 1981) Inmates’ suit & n.15. encompassed a wide variety of prison * The court specifically noted “acts conditions. Case of brutality and cruel and inhuman demonstrates that punishment” committed against 7 existing remedies inmates suffering from severe were adequate mental impairments, 541 F. Supp. before ADA, at 25, attributing this to guards’ because court lack of “adequate, or apparently required prison to any, training in dealing with correct certain mentally disturbed inmates,” ibid. deficiencies The Rehabilitation Act section of pursuant to the consent decree addressed only Rehabilitation Act. “physical barriers to the handicapped.” /d. at 40. Knecht v. Institution at issue * lowa Security Medical Facility, Gilmen, 488 was state hospital, where inmates were held and F.2d 1136 (8th not prison; received certain drugs Cir. 1973) population included involuntarily, included not only people who had been civilly committed but also mentally civilly committed. ill inmates from jails. 488 F.2d at 1138. l2a l3a Respondents’ United States’ Case Assertions Response Laaman v. ¢ Challenge to general | * See U.S. Reply Br. at 15-16. Helgemoe, 437 prison conditions. : F. Supp. 269 * Though the court estimated the (D.N.H. 1977) * Conflates universal prevalence of mental illness in the deficiencies in prison based on national statistics, medical or it explained that “[t}his is due at psychiatric care with least in part to defendants’ failure disability-based to adequately diagnose the plaintiff discrimination. class so that no records exist,” and the court also found that “the * Case involved national statistics reflect the numerous incidence of mental illness at deficiencies in prison NHSP.” 437 F. Supp. at 276 n.1. conditions. Court's The prison lacked sufficient information about personnel to address inmates’ prevalence of mental “serious mental health care illness came from needs.” /d. at 324. national statistics. LaF aut v. * Federal prison. See Lane, 541 U.S. at 527-529 Smith, 834 - nn.16-17; Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 730- F.2d 389 (4th 732 (relying on cases and Cir. 1987) legislative history concerning federal-government discrimination). Eighth Amendment was violated when paraplegic inmate was placed in a cell with toilet facilities that he could use only by dragging himself across the floor. 834 F.2d at 392. Respondents’ United States’ Case Assertions Response Langley v. * Not decided on the * See U.S. Reply Br. at 7-10, 15-16. Coughlin, 715 merits. F. Supp. 522 * The court cited evidence of (S.D.N.Y. 1989) Conflates universal “repeated and systemic failures in deficiencies in the provision of health care medical or services to inmates with very psychiatric care with serious mental disorders,” 715 F. disability-based Supp. at 540, “dramatic failures to discrimination. meet even minimal professional standards in providing psychiatric Only a subclass of services,” ibid., and testimony plaintiffs complained that certain mentally ill inmates of deficient medical may be severely impacted by their care. Non-disabled proximity to other mentally ill inmates complained inmates, ibid. The court held that about being housed the evidence was “ample” to show with inmates who that the inmates “were injured by arguably were a failure to treat |their| serious disabled. medical needs,” that the “findings would suffice to justify a conclusion that plaintiffs’ rights were violated,” id. at 542, and that state officials were deliberately indifferent, id. at 540. Leach v. Shelby County Sheriff, 891 F.2d 1241 (6th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 932 (1990) * County jail. * See U.S. Reply Br. at 5-6; Lane, 5A1 U.S. at 527-528 n.16. * Court found policy or custom of deliberate indifference to the needs of paraplegic prisoners, including the plaintiff, who was not bathed regularly and who was forced to sit in his own urine for long periods of time. 891 F.2d at 1243, 1248. l4a Case Respondents’ Assertions United States’ Response Lee vy. McManus, 543 F. Supp. 386 (D. Kan. 1982) * Not decided on the merits. * See U.S. Reply Br. at 7-10. ¢ Preliminary injunction granted where paraplegic prisoner's catheter was not cleaned, and where he was forced to sit in bodily waste. 543 F. Supp. at 389-390. The court “wishe|d| to impress or defendants its distress” at plaintiff's treatment and officials’ passivity and complacency in the face of serious medical needs. /d. at 392. Lightfoot v. Walker, 486 F. Supp. 504 (S.D. Ill. 1980) * Challenge to general prison conditions. * Conflates universal deficiencies in medical or psychiatric care with disability-based discrimination. * Non-disabled inmates subjected to conditions like Goodman's. See U.S. Reply Br. at 15-16. Though addressing the prison’s overall health care system, the court noted that “epilepties, diabetics, asthmatics, hypertensives and |inmates with| cardiovascular problems, as well as psychiatrically disturbed inmates,” were held in “control cells”; these cells were infrequently observed, such that a prisoner could become ill and die “within minutes,” and conditions in the cells were “abysmal.” 486 F. Supp. at 511. Court also noted that prison officials had “recklessly failed in their duties to design and implement a mental health care delivery system which is capable of —s minimally required evels of adequate te health care.” Jd. at 525. CLO 1Sa , United States’ Case Assertions Response Littlefield v. * County jail. See U.S. Reply Br. at 5-6; Lane, Deland, 6Al 541 U.S. at 527-528 n.16. F.2d 729 (10th Cir. 1981) Finding constitutional i uacies in the treatment of ly ill prisoners. 641 F.2d at 732. Lynch vy. * County jails. See U.S. Reply Br. at 5-6; Lane, Baxley, 744 541 U.S. at 527-528 n.16. F.2d 1452 (11th | © This case is not Cir. 1984) relevant because it While the gravamen of plaintiffs’ was brought by complaint was the fact of their mentally ill confinement awaiting involuntary individuals civil commitment, the fact remains incarcerated in that this case found unconstitu- county jails while tional treatment in a prison setting awaiting civil by prison officials, which is an commitment aspect of prison administration proceedings, but that Title I] addresses. The case who were not in jail cited evidence that mentally ill for punishment. individuals were kept in unconstitutional conditions. _ ce 744 F.2d at 1460-1461 (prisons were plagued by overcrowding, safety hazards, lack of medical and mental health professionals, and without recreational facilities). Moreover, this case noted that the mentally ill have special requirements that were not met in Alabama prisens. /d. at 1458 (citing expert testimony showing that “jail is particularly harmful to those who are mentally ill.”). Those unconstitutional conditions would affect all mentally ill prisoners, not just those awaiting civil commitment proceedings. 17a Case United States’ Response Mackey v. Procunier, A77 F.2d 877 (9th Cir. 1973) See U.S. Reply Br. at 7-10. The evidence in this case “raise|d] serious constitutional questions respecting cruel and unusual punishment or impermissible tinkering with the mental processes” of a mentally ill prisoner. 477 F.2d at 878. Maclin v. Freake, 650 F.2d 885 (7th Cir. 1981) Not decided on the merits. See U.S. Reply Br. at 7-10. Paraplegic inmate established a genuine issue of material fact that he was denied access to physical therapy and that prison officials exhibited “deliberate indifference to [his] serious medical needs” that could violate the Eighth Amendment. 650 F.2d at 889. Mandel v. Doe, SAS F.2d 783 (11th Cir. 1989) County jail. Prisoner was injured when jumped off the bed of a work-detail pick-up truck. See U.S. Reply Br. at 5-6; Lane, 541 U.S. at 527-528 n.16. The fact that the inmate's disability was created while he was (and indeed may enhance) his claim that prison officials were a evidence presented Mee eet en aed pieecteheie ; ‘eal i . 888 F.2d at 789-790. The Eleventh Circuit found the indifference.” /d. at 787. Respondents’ United States Case Assertions Response Maynard v. ¢ Dismissed case ¢ Sufficient evidence of New Jersey, against State on constitutional violations to permit 719 F. Supp. Eleventh suit against state officials by the 292 (D.N.J. Amendment parents of a deceased state inmate 1989) grounds, but denied who alleged that prison officials motion to dismiss as were deliberately indifferent in to prison medical failing to diagnose and treat personnel. inmate's AiDS, instead offering him only throat lozenges and Tylenol and failing to investigate the cause of his collapse. 717 F. Supp. at 293-294, 296. Miranda v. * District jail * See U.S. Reply Br. at 5-6; Lane, Munoz, 770 541 U.S. at 527-528 n.16. F.2d 255 (1st Cir. 1985) * Court of appeals reversed grant of a directed verdict to four “supervisory officials in the Puerto Rico correctional system,” noting that evidence showed that the deep failings in medical treatment “were as much a matter of central administration policy as of local reaction,” such that a reasonable factfinder could hold them a 770 F.2d at 257, 261- 19a [Ra , United States’ Case Assertions Response Mitchell v. Challenge to general See U.S. Reply Br. at 5-6, 15-16; 4 utreiner, 421 prison conditions Lane, 5A1 U.S. at 527-528 n.16. IND D tia Conflates universal Evidence showed that mentally ill 1976) deficiencies in and disabled inmates were medical or subjected to particularly psychiatric care with distressing treatment. See 421 F. disability-based Supp. at 890 (“The Jail is entirely ical, or dental staff on Non-disabled the premises. Jail personnel with inmates subjected to only some first aid training conditions like arbitrarily decide whether inmates Goodman's. need treatment.”); id. at 891 (“As many as four or five County jail mentally disturbed inmates at a time are crowded into ‘Z’ cell. There is no shower in ‘Z’ cell. - Violently ill inmates are likewise into ‘Z’ cell with other mentally disturbed inmates.”). Mullen v. Federal prison. See Lane, 541 U.S. at 527-529 Smith, 738 nn.16-17; Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 730, F.2d 317 (8th 732. Cir. 1984) 4 United States’ Case Assertions Response Negron v. Not decided on the * See U.S. Reply Br. at 7-10. Preiser, 382 F. merits. eK * The court found sufficient evidence N.Y. 1974) Court entered - of mistreatment of mentaliy ill injunction to require inmates in isolation cells, see 382 ee F. Supp. at 540-541, to issue an refused injunction to monitor and Eighth Amendment document the conditions of violation on current confinement, id. at 542-543 record. (“Plaintiffs have demonstrated very serious questions going to the merits of this case, and the probability of serious and harm during the pendency of this litigation.”). Negron v. Challenge to general See U.S. Reply Br. at 7-10, 15-16; Ward, ty F. prison conditions. Lane, 5Al U.S. at 522-523. Supp. 748 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) Not decided on the Court found widespread violations merits. of the due ights of mentally ill inmates by withholding Due process psychiatric treatment as a form of violation, rather Pa. The ev 458 F. Supp. at 760- than discrimination The evidence was so strong on basis of mental that good faith immunity was illness. denied. /d. at 761-764. 20a Respondents’ United States’ Case Assertions Response Nelson v. ¢ Challenge to general | * See U.S. Reply Br. at 15-16. Collins, 455 F. prison conditions. Supp. 727 ¢ The court found Eighth (D.M.D. 1978), Conflates universal Amendment violations in use of aff'd and deficiencies in isolation cells, and that some remanded sub medical or “inmates whose bizarre behavior is nom. Johnson psychiatric care with the result of mental illness are v. Levine, 588 disability-based confined in the isolation area F.2d 1378 (4th discrimination. without adequate medical Cir. 1978) treatment.” 455 F. Supp. at 735. (remanding Non-disabled Prison ordered to adopt a only for judicial inmates subjected to procedure “by which prompt aad F approval of conditions like adequate medical review and care State's plan to Goodman's. is provided, including “psychiatric alleviate prison assistance.” /d. at 735. conditions) — ~~ Respondents" United States’ Case Assertions Response Newman v. * Challenge to general | * See U.S. Reply Br. at 15-16. Alabama, 349 prison conditions. F. Supp. 278 * The court stated that “[t)he fate of (M.D. Ala. * Conflates universal these many prisoners who are 1972), aff'd in deficiencies in mentally ill or retarded deserves part, 503 F.2d medical or special mention,” 349 F. Supp. at 1320 (5th Cir. psychiatric care with 24, and that “(mental illness and 1974), cert. disability-hased mental retardation are the most denied, 421 discrimination. prevalent medical problems in the U.S. 948 (1975) Alabama prison system, ibid. The court found that “the large majority of mentally disturbed inmates receive no treatment whatsoever,” and further cited both statistics and specific instances of mistreatment of mentally ill inmates. /d. at 284- 285. The court also found unconstitutional treatment of physically disabled patients, including wounds that became infested with maggots. /bid. This led the court to conclude that “[i|t is tautological that such care is constitutionally inadequate.” /d. at 264. Palmigiano vy. Garrahy, 443 F. Supp. 956 (DRI 1977 ) * Challenge to general prison conditions. ¢ Conflates universal deficiencies in medical or psychiatric care with disability-based discrimination. * Non-disabled inmates subjected to conditions like Goodman's. See U.S. Reply Br. at 15-16. In addition to general prison conditions, the court specifically noted that the “grossly inadequate system of medical care, including psychiatric care, afforded inmates is part of the intolerable totality of conditions” that violates the Eighth Amendment. 433 F. Supp. at YS3. 22a Respondents’ United States’ Case Assertions Response Parrish vy. * Court declined to ¢ The court determined that the Johnson, 800 consider Fourteenth state prison guard violated the F.2d 600 (6th Amendment claim Eighth Amendment by engaging Cir. 1986) because “the in a long series of “deviant acts,” Fourteenth including “|c|ausing a prisoner to Amendment sit in his own feces, assaulting a provides a prisoner prisoner with a knife, extorting with no greater food from a prisoner, verbally rotection than the abusing a prisoner,” and failing to vighth provide him with medical care, all Amendment.” of which was “exacerbated by |the prisoner's} paraplegic condition.” 800 F.2d at 605. The court declined to consider prisoner's substantive due process Fourteenth Amendment claim, finding such rights co-extensive with the Eighth Amendment. 800 F.2d at 604 n.5. Ramos vy. Challenge to general | * See U.S. Reply Br. at 15-16. Lamm, 689 prison conditions. F.2d 559 (10th ¢ In addition to problems in the Cir. 1980), cert. Conflates universal general condition of the prison and denied, 450 U.S. deficiencies in availability of medical care, the 1041 (1981) medical or court cited expert evidence that psychiatric care with 5%-10% of the inmates were disabilit y-based “seriously mentally ill,” another discrimination. 10%-25% “need treatment although they are not seriously ill,” Non-disabled and “{t}he lack of adequate inental inmates subjected to health services * * * contributes to conditions like inmate suffering and at times Goodman's. causes suicide and self-mutilation by inmates” sufficient to constitute an Eighth Amendment violation. 639 F.2d at 577-578. Respondents’ United States’ Case Assertions Response Ruiz v. Estelle, | * Challenge to general | * See U.S. Reply Br. at 15-16. 503 F. Supp. prison conditions. 1265 (S.D. Tex. ¢ The court cited evidence that 10%- 1980), aff'd in Non-disabled 15% of the prison population was part and rev'd inmates subjected to mentally retarded and that the in part, 679 conditions like failure to protect mentally F.2d 1115 (5th Goodman's. retarded inmates from abuse and Cir. 1982) physical harm, as well as the (reversing as to prisoners’ inability to understand the scope of the and participate in prison district court's disciplinary proceedings, violated remedy, but not the Eighth Amendment. 503 F. as to its finding Supp. at 1346. Moreover, the court of constitu- determined that the Texas tionally’ defi- Department of Corrections cient medical specifically violated the Eighth and psychiatric Amendment rights of physically care), cert. disabled prisoners by limiting denied, 460 U.S. access to wheelchairs, hearing 1042 (1983) aids, and other assistive devices, and by refusing wheelchair accessible cells, toilets, and shower facilities. /d. at 1340-1343 & nn.153-162. Paraplegic inmate was denied parole for failure to participate in inaccessible work programs. /d. at 1341 n.157. Sites v. Mentally disabled ¢ Besides the plaintiff's equal McKenzie, 423 inmates were protection claim based on F. Supp. 1190 seeking treatment differential treatment of inmates (N.D. W. Va. equal to that of who were civilly committed versus 1976) civilly committed mentally ill, or same treatment as similarly disabled non-prisoners. “*criminally’ insane,” the court separately found that the state regulation which precluded prisoners in mental institutions from parole eligibility denied them equal protection of the law and was “clear|ly| unconstitutional.” 423 F. Supp. at 1194-1195. - Respondents’ United States” Case Assertions Response Thompson v. * County jail. See U.S. Reply Br. at 5-6; Lane, Stephens, 247 F. Supp. 688 (E.D. Ark. 1965) disability discri- mination, and court only noted that two plaintiff. were forced to perform labor with serious physical handicaps. 24a Respondents’ United States’ Case Assertions Response Sykes v. Challenge to general See U.S. Reply Br. at 5-6, 15-16; Kreiger, 451 F. prison conditions. Lane, 5A1 U.S. at 527-528 n.16. Supp. 421 (N.D. Ohio 1975) Non-disabled The court stated that, in addition inmates subjected to to concerns regarding the general conditions like prison population, “[o}f equal Goodman's. importance and immediate concern to the Court is the plight of County jail. psychiatric inmates detained at Cuyahoga County Jail.” 451 F. Supp. at 425. The court found the jail had “a crisis evolving from the detention of inmates with advanced mental and emotional disorders” due to the lack of appropriate facilities, psychiatric care, procedures, and personnel. Ibid. Talley v. Not a claim for Lane, 5A1 U.S. at 522-523. The court found that injunctive relief was warranted on behalf of two inmates with “serious physical handicaps” who were required to do work beyond their physical capabilities, 247 F. Supp. at 687, and court “ha[d] no di Ity” finding Eighth Amendment violations, ibid. Court also found a lack of needed medical assistance. Ibid. City of Port- 541 U.S. at 527-528 n.16. land, 620 F. * Complaint stemmed Supp. 482 (D. from events sur- Plaintiff was locked up in a jail cell Me. 1985) rounding his arrest, even after officers learned that “he and the court noted really is a blind diabetic,” andthus that plaintiff was not no reasonable basis for detention incarcerated so that existed. 620 F. Supp. at 485. Case the Eighth Amend- also demonstrates a critical lack of ment did not apply. training and attention on the part of law enforcement officers to medical needs. /d. at 488 (holding that the State’s conduct shocked the conscience, constituting a violation of plaintiff's substantive due process rights). | Tillery v. * Challenge to general See U.S. Reply Br. at 15-16; Lane, Ownens, 719 F. prison conditions. 541 U.S. at 527-528 n.16. Supp. 1256 (W.D. Pa. 1989), | * Non-disabled in- Court specifically discussed at aff'd, 907 F.2d mates subjected to length the i uacy of 418 (3rd Cir. conditions like Good- psychiatric care for mentally ill 1990) man’s. prisoners, and found that it violated the Eighth Amendment, 719 F. Supp. at 1284-1290, 1302- 1306; and that acutely ill psychiatric patients are kept in “medieval conditions” in cells infested with roaches, id. at 1288, and “neither the cells nor the inmates are kept clean,” id. at 1289. Court found serious failures and deliberate indifference in medical care afforded inmates with epilepsy, diabetes, and AIDS, id. at 1299-1301, 1305. < Respondents’ United States’ Case Assertions Response Vitek v. Jones, No claim that ¢ Lane, 5A1 U.S. at 522-523. 445 U.S. 480 prisoners were being (1980) involuntarily ¢ Vitek demonstrates that, besides transferred to equal protection concerns, due mental hospital process considerations are because of implicated when mentally ill intentional, prisoners are transferred or when irrational other changes in the conditions of discrimination. confinement are made. 445 U.S. at 493-94. Waldrop v. Court granted The court found that the record Evans, 681 F. summary judgment permitted a reasonable factfinder Supp. 840 (M.D. to nine of the to conclude that two state officials Ga. 1988), aff'd, defendants, were deliberately indifferent to 871 F.2d 1030 including high plaintiff's serious mental illness. (11th Cir. 1989) ranking prison 681 F. Supp. at 853-855. administrators, in part, finding that the prison was adequately staffed with medical professionals. Respondents’ United States’ Case Assertions Response Wellman v. Challenge to general | * See U.S. Reply Br. at 15-16 Faulkner, 715 prison conditions. F.2d 269 (7th * In addition to general concerns Cir. 1983), cert. Conflates universal about the quality and availability of denied, 468 U.S. deficiencies in medical care, the court specifically 1217 (1984) medical or found that the State had not psychiatric care with “adequately staffed the psychiatric disability-based care component of Michigan City’s discrimination. medical care system,” and that there had been no staff Non-disabled a for over two years. inmates subjected to fendants’ medical expert saw conditions like this as "|t |he most obvious serious Goodman’s. deficiency in health care at Indiana State Prison” because, "without an on-site psychiatrist there is no one qualified to evaluate and treat psychiatric emergencies such as suicide and homicide candidates, or to follow patients who need to be maintained on long term psychotropic medications." 715 F.2d at 272. Court also found deliberate indifference in provision of colostomy bags. /d. at 274. 28a Respondents’ United States’ Case Assertions Response Williams v. ¢ Challenge to general See U.S. Reply Br. at 15-16. Edwards, 5A7 prison conditions. F.2d 1206 (5th The parties stipulated that there Cir. 1977) ¢ Conflates universal was “no psychiatric unit, deficiencies in although ‘|a|pproximately 40% of medical or the inmate population, or 1,360 psychiatric care with inmates, would benefit from disability-based psychiatric treatment.’ An area discrimination. of the cell block is used to house those for whom in-patient ¢ Non-disabled psychiatric care would be inmates subjected to appropriate. Those confined to conditions like the cell block are under Goodman's. supervision of correctional officers who have no medical training. ‘No notes, medical records or observations of the inmates confined to the o—- ic unit are recorded.’ e parties conclude this stipulation saying “The psychiatric unit is totally inappropriate for the co ment of a psychiatric patient.” 547 F.2d at 1217-1218. Court therefore affirmed district court holding of constitutional violations. /d. at 1218. ——— ~~ Case Ya v. Roach, 736 F. . 318 (D.D.C. 1990) * Not decided on the merits. ° District of Columbia jail. 541 U.S. at 527-528 n.16. positions in bed. It therefore determined that “it is clear to the Court that plaintiff is not receiving adequate medical services” for treatment of multiple sclerosis. 736 F. Supp. at 320. Young v. Harrie, 509 F. 1111 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) * Not decided on the merits. See U.S. Reply Br. at 15-16. Court found an uate basis for a reasonable r to conclude that the State had violated prisoner’s Eighth Amendment rights by failing for over sixteen months to provide him with a leg brace for him to walk. 509 F. Supp. at 1113-1114. --- Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385016_0079%3A18. Public record. Not legal advice.