# Amicus Curiae Brief — Wagnon v. Prairie Band Potawatomi Nation

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URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385016_0052%3A03

## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Amicus Curiae Brief
- **Published:** January 1, 2005
- **Citation:** 546 U.S. 95

## Text

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"24 2004
No. 04-631 - | a
In The

Supreme Court of the United States

STEPHEN RICHARDS,
in his official capacity as Secretary,

Kansas Department of Revenue,
Petitioner,

Vv.

PRAIRIE BAND POTAWATOMI NATION,
Respondent,

On Petition for Writ of Certiorari

to the United States Court of Appeals
For the Tenth Circuit

BRIEF AMICUS CURIAE OF MULTISTATE TAX
COMMISSION IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONER

FRANK D. KATZ, General Counsel
(Counsel of Record)

MULTISTATE TAX COMMISSION

444 No. Capitol Street, N.W. #425

Washington, D.C. 20001

(202) 624-8699

I.

II.

Ill.

CONCLUSION

TABLE OF CONTENTS

APPLYING THE WHITE MOUNTAIN
APACHE TRIBE BALANCING-OF-
INTERESTS TEST TO OFF-RESERVA-
TION TRANSACTIONS IS CONTRARY

TO THIS COURT'S FIRM PRECEDENT...

THE UNCERTAINTY FROM APPLYING
THE BALANCING TEST OFF
RESERVATION THREATENS STATE
TAX ADMINISTRATION, STATE TAX
REVENUES AND _— STATE-TRIBAL

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THE PRESENT CASE, ALONG WITH
THE CASE OF HAMMOND V. COEUR
D'ALENE TRIBE, PRESENT THE
COURT WITH AN OPPORTUNITY TO
BRING CLARITY AND CERTAINTY
WITH REGARD TO INDIAN TAXATION

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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Page
Cases:

Cotton Petroleum Co. v. New Mexico,

GBD UE. BD CRG cocecccccdsccscocesoncssessemeens 6,9
Hammond v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe, U.S. Sup. Ct.

Pe. BEGG. cccccccocccncccctecesedsucessieunaaan 10, 11
McClanahan v. Arizona Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S.

BBS CH Ue cocecoccccodsoseisindsensacsseameianaaaan 2, 5, 6, 7
Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U.S. 145

TEDW Gil ccccccccsccosccsccssosesonsennseusesuanademanias 3, 5, 7
Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Chickasaw Nation,

SRS US, GE Ce ceccecccevecesacisssecnnmnenian 4,5,9
Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. United States,

SAD CB. GD COs cccccccccsdscdanisensnendadieaneenmnn 5
Oregon Dep't of Fish & Wildlife v. Klamath Indian

Tribe, 473 U.S. 753 (1GGB5) ...ccccccccccccccccccccccsecs 9

Rodey, Dickason, Sloan, Akin & Robb, P.A. v.
Revenue Division, 107 N.M. 399, 759 P.2d 186

TG ccoccocccsccoccsseccuconsedestebsasneennsenaaniaianananal 5
Sac and Fox Nation v. Pierce, 213 F.3d 566

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The Kansas Indians, 72 U.S. (5 Wall.)

TEE CRETE cocecececcesscossesncssonieaseamennsaauaiaaaindl 5
Trotter v. Tennessee, 290 U.S. 354 (1933) ......... 5

United States Steel Corp. v. Multistate Tax
Comm'n, 434 U.S. 452 (1978).......ccccceceeeeeeeees 1

iii

Warren Trading Post Co. v. Arizona Tax Comm'n,

SBO U.S. GES (1LGSB) ...ccccccvceccccccccscscccscscccccecees 6
Washington v. Confederated Tribes of Colville

Indian Reservation, 447 U.S. 134 (1980)......... 9
White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker,

448 U.S. 136 (1980) ............008 3, 4, 6, 7, 8, 10
Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S..(6 Pet.) 515

SIE acccunsdnescesdenceseccecseccecccesesencveceosoeccoccccoeces 2

Statutes and Legislative Material:
MULTISTATE TAX COMPACT, RIA ALL STATES TAX

GUIDE 4 701 et seq., p. 657 (2001) .............. 1,2
TITLE II of Pus. L. No. 86-272, 73 Stat. 555, 556

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BRIEF AMICUS CURIAE OF MULTISTATE TAX
COMMISSION IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONER!

INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE

The Multistate Tax Commission is the adminis-
trative agency of the MULTISTATE Tax Compact. See
RIA ALL STATES TAX GUIDE @ 701 et seq., p. 657
(2001). Twenty-one States have legislatively estab-
lished full membership in the Compact. In addition,
five States are sovereignty members, eighteen States
are associate members and three states are project
members.? This Court upheld the validity of the
Compact in United States Steel Corp. v. Multistate
Tax Comm'n, 434 U.S. 452 (1978).

Historically, the Compact evolved out of concern
of the States and multistate taxpayers about pro-

posed federal legislation to regulate state tax sys-

‘No counsel for any party authored this brief in whole or
in part. Only Amicus Multistate Tax Commission and its
member States through the payment of their membership
fees made any monetary contribution to the preparation or
submission of this brief. This brief is filed by the Commis-
sion, not on behalf of any particular member State. Finally,
this brief is filed pursuant to the consent of the parties.

2 The COMPACT parties are Alabama, Alaska, Arkansas,
California, Colorado, District of Columbia, Hawaii, Idaho,
Kansas, Maine, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana,
New Mexico, North Dakota, Oregon, South Dakota, Texas,
Utah and Washington. The Sovereignty members are Flor-
ida, Kentucky, Louisiana, New Jersey and Wyoming. The
Associate members are Arizona, Connecticut, Georgia, IIli-
nois, Maryland, Massachusetts, Mississippi, New Hamp-
shire, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsyl-
vania, South Carolina, Tennessee, Vermont, West Virginia
and Wisconsin. Project members are lowa, Nebraska and
Rhode Island.

2

tems that followed recommendations of the Willis
Committee. The States’ initial interest in forming
the ComPACT was to safeguard state taxing author-
ity—an essential governmental power for States to
fulfill their constitutional role—from federal en-
croachment.

Preserving state taxing sovereignty under our vi-
brant federalism remains a key purpose of the
Commission. When States seek to tax transactions
on Indian lands, tribes are a third concentric sover-
cign whose interests must properly be considered.
Sorting out which sovereign has authority to impose
tax on what transactions inevitably requires line
drawing. The brighter the lines, the more adminis-
trable the tax, the fewer the conflicts and the lower
compliance burdens on taxpayers and tax agencies.

The territorial component of sovereignty has
been a key factor in forging bright-line rules. For
over 170 years, the Court has imposed a bright-line
standard that States have no jurisdiction over Indi-
ans on their sovereign lands unless Congress ex-
pressly authorizes it.4 With regard to off-reservation
transactions, the Court has likewise relied on a
clear demarcation—that tribal sovereignty ends at
the reservation boundary. “Absent express federal
law to the contrary, Indians going beyond reserva-

5 The Willis Committee, a congressional study of State
taxation of interstate commerce sanctioned by TiTLe II of
PuB. L. 86-272, 73 Stat. 555, 556 (1959), made extensive
recommendations as to how Congress could regulate State
taxation of interstate and foreign commerce.

* E.g. McClanahan v. Arizona Tax Commission, 411 U.S.

164, 168-69 (1973); Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.)
515, 557 (1832).

tt

——

I

3

tion boundaries have generally been held subject to
nondiscriminatory state law otherwise applicable to
all citizens of the State.” Mescalero Apache Tribe v.
Jones, 411 U.S. 145, 148-149 (1973).

State authority to tax non-Indians for transac-
tions with Indians on tribal reservations raises more
difficult issues. The non-Indian taxpayer is within
the State and under state authority. Yet the trans-
actions are with Indians on tribal lands, and there-
fore implicate tribal sovereignty. With sensitivity to
both sovereigns, the Court has developed a complex
and nuanced balancing test to determine whether
States may impose tax in these cases. The analysis
calls for a “particularized inquiry into the nature of
the state, federal, and tribal interests at stake... ."
White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S.
136, 145 (1980).

In the instant case, Kansas sought to impose fuel
tax on non-Indian distributors for receiving gasoline
off the reservation. The bright-line rule from Mesca-
lero Apache Tribe should have controlled. The Tenth
Circuit's erroneous use of the uncertain balancing
test of White Mountain clouds this bright line and
impacts the Commission's interest in protecting

state sovereignty in two ways.

First, the Tenth Circuit's holding jeopardizes the
unambiguous rules that define state authority with
regard to reservations. Bright-line rules allow good
relations to flourish between States and tribes and
pretermit disputes and litigation between them.

This strong preference for bright-line rules has
been pursued by the States in this Court even against
the immediate interests of other States. In Oklahoma

4

Tax Comm'n v. Chickasaw Nation, 515 U.S. 450, 460
(1995), this Court noted that eleven States urged the
retention of the “legal incidence’ test” with regard to
taxation that impacts Indians and Indian tribes in In-
dian country, even though another State had urged
adoption of more uncertain “economic reality” rule
which might have furthered its cause in that litigation.
The Court noted that the eleven States had favored the
test because it “provide[s}] a reasonably bright-line
standard which, from a tax administration perspective,
responds to the need for substantial certainty as to the
permissible scope of state taxation authority.” Id.

Second, the holding jeopardizes state authority
to tax off-reservation transactions. States depend
upon tax revenues to run their governments. Sub-
jecting off-reservation transactions that may subse-
quently impact Indian tribes to the inexact balanc-
ing test will substantially impair States’ ability to
impose taxes. The decision below deprived Kansas of
tax revenue it rightfully expected from a tax imposed
on a non-Indian distributor receiving fuel off the
reservation merely because the gasoline was later
sold to a tribal retailer.

ARGUMENT
I

APPLYING THE WHITE MOUNTAIN
APACHE TRIBE BALANCING-OF-
INTERESTS TEST TO OFF-RESERVA-
TION TRANSACTIONS IS CONTRARY
TO THIS COURT'S FIRM PRECEDENT.

This Court's jurisprudence governing state au-
thority to tax Indians and activities on Indian lands
may fairly be divided into three areas, two of which

5

are pillars of certainty controlled by bright-line rules
modifiable only by explicit congressional action. The
third area is governed by the flexible and indefinite
balancing-of-interests test.

States have long been barred from taxing Indians
for on-reservation activity absent explicit permission
from Congress. Chickasaw Nation; McClanahan; The
Kansas Indians, 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 737, 757 (1866).

States have long been permitted to tax off-
reservation activity, whether conducted by Indians
or others, absent express preemption by Congress.
Long-standing precedent holds that tax exemptions
are not granted by implication in recognition of the
crucial importance of taxation to the very existence
of each governmental entity. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n
v. United States, 319 U.S. 598, 606 (1938); Trotter v.
Tennessee, 290 U.S. 354, 356 (1933). States may
tax activities off-reservation, even if they involve or
affect Indians, “[aJbsent express federal law to the
contrary.” Mescalero Apache Tribe, 411 U.S. at 145.
See also Rodey, Dickason, Sloan, Akin & Robb, P.A.
v. Revenue Division, 107 N.M. 399, 759 P.2d 186
(1988), appeal dismissed, 490 U.S 1043 (1989) (pre-
emption by implication doctrine inapplicable to tax
on legal services performed off reservation for tribe). —

These two per-se rules, one barring state taxa-
tion and the other permitting it in the absence of
express congressional action, provide a certainty
that furthers state tax administrability.

When States seek to tax non-Indians on reserva-
tion transactions with Indians, however, competing
interests of three concentric sovereigns are in-

6

volved.5 The State is asserting jurisdiction over its
citizens for activity in its territory. The tribe is as-
serting jurisdiction over its territory and has legiti-
mate concerns about the economic affect on its
members. And all are subject to the supreme sover-
eignty of the federal government and Congress's ex-
pansive authority under the Indian Commerce
Clause. Recognizing that three competing sover-
eignty interests must be weighed in allocating gov-
ernmental authority in these cases, the Court aban-
doned an absolutist approach in favor of a more
flexible implied-preemption standard in Warren
Trading Post Co. v. Arizona Tax Comm'n, 380 U.S.
685 (1965) and McClanahan, 411 U.S. at 172. The
Court further transformed this implied-preemption
analysis into a malleable balancing-of-interests test
in White Mountain. Under this approach the Court

examine|s] the language of the relevant fed-
eral treaties and statutes in terms of both
the broad policies that underlie them and
the notions of sovereignty that have devel-
oped from historical traditions of tribal in-
dependence. This inquiry is not dependent
on mechanical or absolute conceptions of
state or tribal sovereignty, but has called for
a particularized inquiry into the nature of
the state, federal, and tribal interests at
stake, an inquiry designed to determine
whether, in the specific context, the exercise
of state authority would violate federal law.

5 See Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico, 490 U.S.
163, 188 (1989) (“There are, therefore, three different gov-
ernmental entities, each of which has taxing jurisdiction
over all of the non-Indian [on-reservation] wells.”)

7
White Mountain, 448 U.S. at 144-45.

The implied-preemption balancing test has been
confined exclusively to reservation activities consis-
tent with the territorial limits of tribal sovereignty. In
McClanahan, the Court referenced “Indian sover-
eignty” as “a backdrop against which the applicable
treaties and federal statutes must be read.” 411
U.S. at 172. In White Mountain, the Court noted the
“unique historical origins of tribal sovereignty” as
the reason for using an adaptable, implied-pre-
emption standard in these cases, 448 U.S. at 143,
and affirmed that geography matters.

The Court has repeatedly emphasized that
there is a significant geographical compo-
nent to tribal sovereignty, a component
which remains highly relevant to the pre-
emption inquiry.

Id. at 151. Significantly, the Court in White Moun-
tain reaffirmed the Mescalero Apache Tribe bright
line that off the reservation and outside the bounda-
ries of tribal sovereignty an express congressional
statement of tax exemption is required. 448 U.S. at
144, n. 11. In each case, tribal sovereignty, which
exists only over tribal territory, has been the con-
ceptual basis for the implied preemption analysis.

Applying the balancing test to off-reservation
transactions also makes no practical sense. The
State's interest should virtually always predominate
with regard to any off-reservation transaction. The
erroneous application of the balancing test below
highlights this fact. The Tenth Circuit improperly
focused on an activity the State did not tax—the re-
tail sale on the reservation—rather than on the ac-

8

tivity it did tax—the receipt of gasoline by the dis-
tributor in Troy, Kansas. State roads radiating out
from Troy include the very state roads that carried
the distributor's gasoline, along with many of the
tribal casino’s customers, to the reservation. The
State’s interest in obtaining road fund revenues for
its 60 mile portion of this trip formidably predomi-
nates over tribal interest in funding the 1% mile
reservation portion.

The Tenth Circuit's decision below flouts this
Court's firm precedent by applying the implied-
preemption balancing test to off-reservation activity.

THE UNCERTAINTY FROM APPLYING THE
BALANCING TEST OFF RESERVATION
THREATENS STATE TAX # £=ADMINI-
STRATION, STATE TAX REVENUES AND
STATE-TRIBAL RELATIONS.

The Tenth Circuit decision, if left unchecked,
threatens dire consequences for state tax admini-
stration. By applying the vagaries of the balancing
test where it should not have—to a transaction that
occurred off the reservation where the gasoline dis-
tributor received the gasoline—the decision greatly
expands uncertainty about state taxing authority.
Any tax imposed on a transaction that may ulti-
mately have an economic consequence on a reserva-
tion will be subject to challenge. How can taxpayers
know whether items on which they have paid tax
will subsequently be resold or used on a reserva-
tion? Under the Tenth Circuit’s ruling, does the
creation of a tribal casino insulate from taxation any
off-reservation purchase for the casino, or for any

——_

9

related enterprise, or for any enterprise which can
claim a benefit from the casino? Will state tax im-
posed on all off-reservation purchases by tribal enti-
ties be subject to defeasance?

The unpredictability of the balancing test is well
reflected by comparing the Tenth Circuit’s decision
below, balancing state and tribal interests in the
tribe’s favor, with its earlier decision in Sac and Fox
Nation v. Pierce, 213 F.3d 566 (10% Cir 2000), cert.
denied, 531 U.S. 1144 (2001), balancing seemingly
indistinguishable interests in the State’s favor.

Moreover, the manner in which the Tenth Circuit
applied the balancing test will acerbate uncertainty.
It balanced interests without reference to a single
federal law that might—even by implication—
preempt state authority to tax. This would leave
every decision to the unfettered judgment of each
trial court, unhinged from federal law. This Court
has explicitly rejected such generalized use of con-
gressional acts that advance tribal sovereignty and
promote economic development as an all-purpose
justification for preempting any state action that
might have an adverse economic affect on tribes.
Cotton Petroleum, 490 U.S. at 183, n. 14; Washing-
ton v. Confederated Tribes of Colville Indian Reserva-
tion, 447 U.S. 134, 155 (1980).

Additionally, this extension of the balancing test
will impact state regulatory authority. The “particu-
larized inquiry” of White Mountain applies to state
regulatory, as well as state tax, authority. Chicka-
saw Nation, 515 U.S. at 458 (“We have balanced
federal, state and tribal interests in diverse contexts,
notably in assessing state regulation that does not
involve taxation.”) See also Oregon Dep't of Fish &

10

Wildlife v. Klamath Indian Tribe, 473 U.S. 753, 765
(1985). States impose many regulations on the off-
reservation manufacture of goods and provision of
services. A tribe, employing the Tenth Circuit's rea-
soning, can presumably challenge a regulation un-
der White Mountain balancing standards to the ex-
tent that it has what the tribe perceives as an unto-
ward impact on tribal interests.

Judging tax authority based on balancing inter-
ests can provide needed flexibility when demands of
three conflicting sovereigns must be satisfied. The
unprecedented and unwarranted extension of that
test to State tax authority over off-reservation activi-
ties subject only to federal and state sovereignty,
however, will cause great uncertainty and turmoil.

THE PRESENT CASE, ALONG WITH THE
CASE OF HAMMOND V. COEUR D'ALENE
TRIBE, PRESENT THE COURT WITH AN
OPPORTUNITY TO BRING CLARITY AND
CERTAINTY WITH REGARD TO INDIAN
TAXATION MATTERS.

Your amicus respectfully suggests that Idaho's
pending petition for certiorari in Hammond v. Coeur
d'Alene Tribe, No. 04-624, provides the court with
an opportunity to reinforce the two pillars of cer-
tainty in Indian taxation matters. The instant case
is properly controlled by the requirement of express
congressional preemption, clearly lacking here. The
Hammond case is properly controlled by express
congressional permission, there provided by the
Hayden-Cartwright Act which authorizes state taxa-
tion of “licensed traders” on "United States military

ll

or other reservations,” a combined terminology that
uniquely refers to Indian reservations. Hammond
also implicates the off-reservation bright-line stan-
dard in the first issue presented: whether a federal
court may, despite an express allocation by the state
legislature of the legal incidence of the motor fuels
tax to a distributor, nonetheless deem the incidence
of the tax to be borne by the retailers.

Hammond serves as a suitable companion to the
present case, and consideration and resolution of
the cases together would be of benefit to the States,
to the tribes, and to the public.

CONCLUSION

The decision below radically departs from this
Court's jurisprudence governing state authority to
tax off-reservation activity. It threatens the ability of
States to raise revenues. It reduces certainty in
state tax administration and stability in state-tribal
relations. Let stand, the decision will permit contra-
dictory lower court decisions, which will serve to en-
courage litigation. Your amicus respectfully requests
that the Court grant the Petition and issue a writ of
certiorari to the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Cir-
cuit.

Respectfully submitted,

Frank D. Katz, General Counsel
Counsel of Record

MULTISTATE TAX COMMISSION

444 No. Capitol Street, N.W., #425

Washington, D.C. 20001

(202) 624-8699

November 24, 2004

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385016_0052%3A03. Public record. Not legal advice.
