# Amicus Curiae Brief — San Remo Hotel, LP v. City and County of San Francisco

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URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385016_0037%3A19

## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Amicus Curiae Brief
- **Published:** January 1, 2005
- **Citation:** 545 U.S. 323

## Text

Ps
— CETICE OF THE Cuca, |
No. «4-340 —

In The

Supreme Court of the United States
October Term, 2004

SAN REMO HOTEL L.P., THOMAS FIELD,
ROBERT FIELD, AND T&R INVESTMENT CORP.,

Petitioners,

V.

CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO, DEPARTMENT
OF CITY PLANNING, CITY PLANNING COMMISSION,
BOARD OF PERMIT APPEALS, BOARD OF SUPERVISORS
OF THE CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO,

Respondents.

On Writ Of Certiorari
To The United States Court Of Appeals For The Ninth Circuit

BRIEF OF AMICUS CURIAE
NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF HOME BUILDERS
IN SUPPORT OF THE PETITIONERS

MARY V. DiCRESCENZO KENNETH B. BLEY

DUANE J. DESIDERIO (Counsel of Record)

THOMAS J. WARD Cox, CASTLE & NICHOLSON, LLP

THE NATIONAL ASSOCIATION 2049 Century Park East, 28th FI.
Or HOME BUILDERS Los Angeles, CA 90067

1201 15th Street, NW. (310) 284-2231

Washington, D.C. 20005
(202) 266-8200

Attorneys for The National Association of Home Builders

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page (s)
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT ............................... 2
BIE -acesisa tesictilinidalnidintideba initiate he a 3

COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL (ISSUE PRECLUSION)
SHOULD NOT BAR FEDERAL COURT
ADJUDICIATION OF A FIFTH AND
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT TAKINGS

SE acces cnsereienttinciubalonesedapeaicicbainiasindninsinnmsinsaie 3

THE PROCEDURE SET FORTH IN

WILLIAMSON COUNTY, WHICH REQUIRES A
TAKINGS CLAIMANT TO FIRST SEEK JUST
COMPENSATION IN STATE COURT IN

ORDER TO RIPEN A FEDERAL ACTION,
SHOULD BE ELIMINATED...................c0cessseseeseseee 7

A. Landowners Bear a Staggering Burden by
Being Forced to Litigate Their Takings Cases
Fk RES eS See 8

B. Williamson County’s State Court Element has
been Resoundingly Criticized by Congress, the
Courts, Academics, and Even Planners............... 9

C. Nothing in the Constitution Requires that State
Court Litigation Precede Federal Adjudication
on the Merits of a Takings Claim...................... 13

Re Et RN sdiaigobadisasieasidiheds 16

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases Page (s)

Armstrong v. United States,

SOS UB. GD CI GG GD. ncccnccscececsesctisciinspnsncnssseianaia 6
Ashcroft v. ACLU, 535 U.S. 564 (2002), aff'd and
remanded by 124 S.Ct. 2783 (2004) .0.0....cccccceeeeeeeeees 16

Balbirer v. Austin, 790 F.2d 1524 (11th Cir. 1986)......... 6

Bender v. Williamsport Area Sch. Dist.,
BTS U.S. FIR CIGD) .nnncecsscsssoisassicebssiseslesieaiaanieaniaae 3

City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd.,
DEO UB. GET (EDGR vascccccncrcivnsonisnisisstosunniieceaen nanan 4

City of Chicago v. Int'l Coll. of Surgeons,
Dade Uh BIO (BOW T Pacctnsnyastesiniveinvedsuatianeeaaen 12,15

Cumberland Farms, Inc. v. Town of Groton,
Fw Fl ge) ms ee eS 5

DLX, Inc. v Commonwealth of Kentucky, 381 F.3d 511
Le | NEN a +

England v. La. State Bd. of Med. Exam'rs,
BID UB. 409 (IDB) ..cs<.-inesccotsasccessssatpinheneuniioniea

First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of
Ag TERE ie Fe COMB ccticosscinscipsoriedercuaianniaan 11-12

Hensler v. City of Glendale, 876 P.2d 1043
(Cal. 1994), cert. denied, $13 U.S. 1184 (1995).......... 4

ws
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES (cont.

Cases Page (s)

Kenmen Eng'g v. City of Union, 314 F.3d 468

CRS Bee ecosctcincnsinneenetvcticiitibideassiasatenRedceainandaad 6
Kottschade v. City of Rochester, 319 F.3d 1038 (8" Cir.),

cert. denied, 124 S.Ct. 178 (2003) ..........cccccccccceeeeeeeee 13
Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis,

GED ULE. SIC iictaicinsceaesecbiciciicnsepisuttindactainnbiiasiatins 15
Lucas v. §.C. Coastal Council,

SOB UG. OGGD CGP cciessenisicdctecsdiesssictasntnnttdentininintasaal 8
Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973) ....cccccccccccceeees 16
Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978).....15
Mount San Jacinto Cmty. Coll. Dist. v. Superior Court,

11 Cal. Rptr.3d 465 (Cal. App. 2004) ooo... ees 5
Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622 (1980).....15
Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606 (2001)............. 3

Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City,
43568 UB, 0OB CUB GED ccccinrcsnnactinnttntinicatsinsaaiaadenal 3,14

Rekhi v. Wildwood Indus., Inc., 61 F.3d 1313
(7G Car Fe ccncnccacctsinntnndceniahicndhenaidanitiinediaeimiaieniiensd 6

San Remo Hotel, L.P. v. San Francisco City & County,
366 P.36 BOBS COBB cccccisccncennticvininsentieain passim

Vv

Santini v. Conn. Hazardous Waste Mgmt. Serv.,
342 F.3d 118 (2d Cir. 2003), cert. denied,
vii leh |. 5-6

Suitum v. Tahoe Reg 'l Planning Agency,
ky. Ue ee rene en eee Rs 8

Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v.
Tahoe Reg 'l Planning Agency,

Fe es De I acticstpicniencsnaiccidainitninaliotia 3,6, 15
Towtaaated ¥. Salt, STE U.S. ZFS ..0000.s.sesvsvesesessscosesessessoves 3
Williamson County Reg 'l Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton

Me Lt he) ee: passim
Yee v. City of Escondido, 503 U.S. $19 (1992).............. 15

Statutes and Bills

28 U.S.C. § 1441(a)......... vistaesilbiiatie iciansaaneihenpnitiniaaialiteltl 12

Private Property Rights Implementation Act,
I I cdacbeenlieieanioaiel 10

Private Property Rights Implementation Act,
H.R. 2372, §2(e 4) (2000)... ek ane Dee are 10

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES (cont.)

Page (s)
Other

13A Wright, Miller & Cooper, Federal Practice and
Procedure, § 3532.1, Ripeness, Sources of Doctrine, 123
GE Fe cenercuicisaincncistiguiiniinntndpiieibaaittinicenadtatiensiaciaas 5

American Planning Ass’n, Brief Amicus Curiae,
Suitum v. Tahoe Reg 'l Planning Agency,
Seas SEs IED sscccsstnctbhnteninssierigplsnibcadhibicadadiaiamtiats 11-12

American Planning Ass’n,.Brief Amicus Curiae,
Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning
PS 8 eee aman 10-11

Michael M. Berger and Gideon Kanner, Shell Game! You
Can't Get There from Here: Supreme Court Ripeness
Jurisprudence in Takings Cases at Long Last Reaches

the Self-parody Stage,
Gf a eA 12, 15

Peter A. Buchsbaum, Should Land Use be Different?
Reflections on Williamson County, in Taking Sides on
Takings Issues: Public and Private Perspectives,
(A.B.A. 2002; Thomas E. Roberts, ed.) .............000006: 9

John J. Delaney and Duane J. Desiderio, Who Will Clean
Up the “Ripeness Mess"? A Call for Reform So Takings
Plaintiffs Can Enter the Federal Courthouse,
og GR en 9

vi

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES (cont.)
Page (s)

Robert H. Freilich, The Public Interest is Vindicated:
City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes,
CR OR Re eee ee 9

Timothy J. Kassoum, The Ripeness Doctrine and the
Judicial Relegation of Constitutionally Protected
Property Rights, 29 Cal. West. L. Rev. 1 (1992).... 9-10

Prof. Daniel R. Mandelker, Testimony before the
U.S. House of Representatives, Judiciary Committee,
reprinted in 3\ Urb. Law. 234 (1999).000000 ee. 9

Gregory Overstreet, Update on the Continuing and
Dramatic Effect of the Ripeness Doctrine on Federal
Land Use Litigation, 20 Zoning & Plan. L. Rep. 17
CUTIRIEFE scucannscscinepndannin tasentesestieissbaniinnns iikdildadadilietiic i tala 9

Thomas E. Roberts, Ripeness and Forum Selection in
Fifth Amendment Takings Litigation, || J. Land Use
9 GR RE ee CE 9-10

Glenn P. Sugamelh, “7akings” Bills Threaten People,
Property, Zoning and the Environment,
Fe Ce. CR. CIF Ce ctsicsiitistbiniediniatiie ides 15

Gordon S. Wood, The Radicalism of the American
Revolution 324 (First Vintage Books ed. 1993).... 16-17

BRIEF OF AMICUS CURIAE NATIONAL
ASSOCIATION OF HOME BUILDERS IN SUPPORT
OF THE PETITIONERS

The National Association of Home Builders
(“NAHB”) has received the parties’ written consent to file
this brief as amicus curiae in s of the petitioners, and
letters of consent are filed with the Clerk of the Court.!

THE NAHB’S INTEREST ARISES FROM ITS
MEMBERS’ CONCERNS AS TO THEIR ABILITY
TO BRING AN ACTION IN FEDERAL COURT
CLAIMING A TAKING UNDER THE FIFTH AND
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS

The NAHB represents over 220,000 builder and
associate members throughout the United States. Its
members include people and firms that construct and
supply single family homes as well as apartment,
condominium, commercial and industrial builders, land
developers and remodelers. It is the voice of the American
shelter a It is, therefore, concerned with a
procedure which effectively strips the federal courts of any
role in the judicial review process when a takings claim is
asserted.

The NAHB has appeared before the Court as an
amicus curiae or as “of counsel” in a number of cases
involving the rights and remedies of landowners who have
been adversely affected by governmental actions. These
include: Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (1980); San
Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621
( 198 1); Williamson C. a Reg 1 Planning Comm'n vy.
Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172 (1985); MacDonald, Sommer
& Frates v. Yolo County, 477 U.S. 340 (1986); First

1 No counsel for any of the parties authored rT | ~ of this
bref. No person or entity other than the NAHB has made
me Am ree he contribution to the preparation or submission
of this brief.

tw

English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale vy.
County of L.A., 482 U.S. 304 (1987), Nollan v. Cal. Coastal
Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987)2; Lucas v. S.C. Coastal
Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992), Dolan v. City of Tigard,
512 U.S. 374 (1994); Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of
Commun. for a Great Or., 515 U.S. 697 (1995); Suitum v.
Tahoe Reg 'l Planning Agency, 520 U.S. 725 (1997), City of
Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd., 526 U.S.
687 (1999), Palazzolo-¥=Rhedelsland, 533 U.S. 606
(2001); Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook County v. United
States Army Corps of Eng 'rs, 531 U.S. 159 (2001); Tahoe-
Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency,
§35 U.S. 302 (2002), Borden Ranch P'Ship v. United States
Army Corps of Eng’rs, 537 U.S. 99 (2002), City of
Cuvahoga Falls v. Buckeye Cmty. Hope Found., 538 U.S.
188 (2003); S. Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist. v. Miccosukee Tribe
of Indians, 124 §.Ct. 1537 (2004); Kelo v. City of New
London, 843 A.2d 500 (Conn. 2004), cert. granted, 125
S.Ct.27 (2004); and Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 363
F.3d 846, cert. granted, 125 S.Ct. 314 (2004).

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

Collateral estoppel (issue preclusion) should not
apply when a landowner is required to assert a takings
claim in state court in order to ripen its federal claim
because it effectively denies a federal forum to a plaintiff
asserting a federal claim for relief. It is not mandated by
anything in Williamson County nor does it represent good

policy.

Indeed, good policy calls for eliminating the state
litigation prong of Williamson County all together.
Landowners should be allowed to assert their federal
constitutional claims in federal court in the first instance.

2 The Court’s opimon cited the NAHB’s brief. (483 US. at
840)

ARGUMENT
I.

COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL (ISSUE PRECLUSION)
. SHOULD NOT BAR FEDERAL COURT
ADJUDICATION OF A FIFTH AND FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENT TAKINGS CLAIM

This Court has, with a few exceptions not applicable
to the case at bar, characterized the jurisdiction of
regulatory takings as requiring

“... ‘essentially ad hoc, factual
inquiries,’ Penn Central, 438 U.S., at 124,
designed to allow ‘careful examination and
weighing of all the relevant circumstances.’
Palazzolo, 553 U.S., at 636 (O’CONNOR, J.,
peony» al Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council,
Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 535 U.S.
302, 322 (2002).

A takings claim alleges that governmental action
requires the pa t of just compensation under the
mandate of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. Those
claims frequently turn on the facts peculiar to the case.

“How the facts are found will often dictate the
decision of the federal claims. ‘It is the
typical, not the rare, case in which
constitutional claims turn upon the resolution
of contested factual issues.’ Townsend v. Sain,
372 U.S. 293, 312.” England v. La. State Bd.
of Med. Exam'rs, 375 U.S. 411, 416-417
(1964).

To the same effect, Bender v. Williamsport Area Sch. Dist.,
475 U.S. 534, 542 n. 5 (1986) (“We have ao
recognized the importance of the facts and the fact finding
process in constitutional adjudication.”’).

If the Ninth Circuit's decision ts allowed to stand, it
will effectively strip the federal courts of any role in the
elaboration of takings jurisprudence because of the overlap
between staie court interpretations of state constitutional
protection: against uncompensated takings on the one hand,
and simiiar federal law on the other. DLX, Inc. v.
Commonwealth of Kentucky, 381 F.3d 511, 521 (6th Cir.
2004). Indeed, that was the situation in the case at bar. San
Remo Hotel L.P. v. San Francisco City and County, 364
F.3d 1088, 1094 (2004). However, there are significant
differences between the manner in which facts are found in
federal and state courts.

More particularly, an action brought under 42
U.S.C. § 1983 — the mechanism used by the plaintiffs here
(364 F.3d at 1093) — requires that factual issues regarding
the government's /iability for a taking must be determined
by a jury:

“[WJe hold that the issue whether a
landowner has been deprived of all
economically viable use of his property 1s a
predominantly fact question. As our implied
acknowledgement of the procedure’ in
Williamson County, supra, suggests, In actions
at law otherwise within the purview of the
Seventh Amendment, this question is for the
jury.” City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at
Monterey, Ltd., 526 U.S. 687, 720-721 (1999).

On the other hand, a landowner who brings an

inverse condemnation action in the State of California has a

right to a jury trial “but that right is limited to the question

: damages.” Hensler v. City of Glendale, 876 P.2d 1043,

1052 (Cal. 1994), cert. denied, 513 U. S. 1184 (1995).
More specifically,

“In both eminent domain and inverse
condemnation proceedings, the issue of just
compensation is to be tried to the jury. All
other questions of fact, or of mixed fact and
law, are to be tried ... without reference to a

jury. Consistent with this rule, the court,
rather than the jury, typically decides
questions concerning the preconditions to
recovery of a particular compensation, even if
the determination turns on contested issues of
fact.” Mount San Jacinto Cmty. Coll. Dist. v.
Superior Court, 11 Cal.Rptr.3d 465, 469 (Cal.
App. 2004) [internal quotation marks and
citations omitted; italics in the original].

See also, Cumberland Farms, Inc. v. Town of Groton, 808
A.2d 1107, 1123-24 (Conn. 2002) (landowner had no right
to a jury trial on issues of liability in inverse condemnation
case). Thus, while Del Monte Dunes held that takings
claimants have a Seventh Amendment nght to a jury trial in
the federal courts, the states do not extend a similar night.

Moreover, the resemblance between the state
procedure element mandated by Williamson County, and
abstention, is obvious. Both would defer (or even outright
relinquish) federal court jurisdiction in favor of state court
adjudication:

“Ripeness becomes closely mingled
with abstention doctrines when deference rests
on the prospect of some future state court
proceeding rather than an ongoing eo
13A Wright, Miller & Co ederal
Practice and Procedure, § 3532.1, Ripeness,
Sources of Doctrine, 123 (2d ed. 1984).

The Second Circuit relied on the resemblance
between ripeness and abstention in Santini v. Conn.
Hazardous Waste Mgmt. Serv., 342 F.3d 118, 128-129 (2d
Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 125 S.Ct.104 (2004). Santini held
that a landowner who was, after all, involuntarily in state
court litigating a takings claim, could preserve his right to
have a federal court adjudicate his federal takings hen b A
filing a reservation — similar to that called for in in Engla
Santini was based on the evident unfairness of first forcing

a landowner into state court in order to ripen his federal
claim, and then holding that the act of ripening the federal
claim also barred it. (342 F.3d at 130.)

The plaintiffs in the case at bar made use of a
Santini reservation because they “specifically reserved
their federal claims for adjudication in federal court,
pursuant to England ...” (San Remo, 364 F.3d at 1093.)
However, the Ninth Circuit just as specifically reyected the
use of that procedure. (id. at 1095.)

In light of the procedure set forth by this Court in
Williamson County, the position taken by the Second
Circuit states the better policy. Santini requires the takings
claimant to first seek compensation in state court but,
having done so, then allows a full and free adjudication of
that claim —-including factual determinations — under
federal law im a federal court.

Finally, there is simply no jurisdictional bar to the
reservation procedure used by the plaintiffs here and
endorsed by the Second Circuit. Neither res judicata (claim
preclusion) nor collateral estoppel (issue preclusion) 1s
jurisdictional, each of them is an affirmative defense which
may be waived. Kenmen Eng’g v. City of Union, 314 F.3d
468, 479 (10th Cir. 2002) (res judicata); and Rekhi v.
Wildwood Indus., Inc., 61 F.3d 1313, 1317 (7th Cir 1995)
(collateral estoppel). | Moreover, whether or not the
preclusion doctrines may be triggered im any case 1s a
matter of judicial discretion? In fact, all of the Circuits
which have considered the question, including the Ninth
Circuit in the case at bar (364 F.3d at 1094), have held that
an appropriate reservation “will suffice to defeat claim
preclusion in a subsequent federal action.” DLX, Inc.,
supra, 381 F.3d at 523 n. 9.

3 See, e.g., Balbirer v. Austin, 790 F.2d 1524, 1526 (11th Cir.
1986) (“We note at the outset that application of collateral
estoppel in a particular case is a matter of tnal court
discretion ... but that this court [on appeal] exercises plenary
review over the rules governing collateral estoppel’).

“[CJonsiderations of fairness and justice” must
support any takings analysis. Twhoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at
333. See also, Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49
(1960)(the Fifth Amendment bars “forcing some people
alone to bear the public burden which, in all fairness,
should be borne by the public as a whole.”) It is neither fair
nor just to tell a property owner, “Go to state court before
you come to federal court,” and then after she pursues that

rocedure, say “Sorry. You can’t get into federal court
cause the state court already decided your case.” The
Ninth Circuit’s decision should be reversed.

THE PROCEDURE SET FORTH IN WILLIAMSON
COUNTY, WHICH REQUIRES A TAKINGS
CLAIMANT TO FIRST SEEK JUST
COMPENSATION IN STATE COURT IN ORDER TO
RIPEN A FEDERAL ACTION, SHOULD BE
ELIMINATED

The requirement that a landowner first assert a
takings claim in state court rests on prudential ripeness
principles. Thus, Williamson County does not present a
jurisdictional bar to a federal court determination of
whether a taking has occurred and, if so, what just
compensation should be awarded. In Suitum, this Court
stated:

“The only issue presented is whether
Suitum’s claim of regulatory taking of her land
in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments is ready for judicial review under
prudential ripeness principles. There are two
independent prudential hurdles to a regulatory
takings claim brought against a state entity in
federal court. Williamson County ...
explained that a plaintiff must demonstrate that
she has both received a ‘final decision
regarding the application of the [challenged]
regulations to the pr at issue’ from ‘the
government entity charged with implementing

8

the regulations,’ id. at 186, and sought
‘compensation through the procedures the
State has provided for doing so,’ id., at 194.”
Suitum v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 520
U.S. 725, 733-734 (1997) emphasis supplied;
[footnote omitted].

Similarly, in Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505
U.S. 1003, 1012-1013 (1992), this Court held that the
landowner had “properly alleged Article III] injury in fact”
and proceeded to a determination on the merits. It did so
even though a permit procedure had been implemented
while state court litigation was ongoing, because this Court
did not think it fair to apply the prudential requirement of
finality set forth in Williamson County.

A. Landowners Bear a Staggering Burden by Being
Forced to Litigate Their Takings Cases in State
Court First.

The cost to the landowner of having to detour
through state court litigation should give this Court pause.
The plaintiffs in the case at bar initially filed their § 1983
action in federal court in May 1993. (San Remo, 364 F.3d
at 1093.) They will have a decision on jurisdiction by
mid-2005. Twelve years, and still counting, with no
decision by a federal court on the merits in sight.

Unfortunately, the resemblance to abstention is also
apparent in terms of the time necessary to obtain federal
resolution. Forty years ago, Justice Douglas voiced his
unhappiness with the delay resulting from abstention,
noting that eight and ten year periods between initiation and
resolution of a lawsuit were not unheard of. England,
supra, 375 U.S. at 425-429 (Douglas, J., concurring). As a
result, although not raised by the parties, he argued that it
was time for this Court, sua sponte, to reevaluate the
abstention doctrine. (id. at 423.)

Professor Daniel R. Mandelker, one of the leading
academics of the land use bar and typically an advocate on
dehalf of local government on land use issues, in his

testimony to Congress, referred to a survey of federal
district court cases involving takings claims between 1990
and 1997 and found that 81% of them were decided on
procedural grounds and never reached the merits.
Testimony of Dantel R. Mandelker Before the Judiciary
Committee, U.S. House of Representatives, reproduced at
31 Urb. Law. 234, 236-237 (1999) (“Mandelker
Testimony”).

__ That same survey also determined that litigation
which did result in an opinion on the merits by a Court of
Appeals took, on the average, 9.6 years. John J. Delaney &
Duane J. Desiderio, Who Will Clean Up the “Ripeness
Mess”? A Call for Reform So Takings Plaintiffs Can Enter
the Federal Courthouse, 31 Urb. Law. 195, 205 (1999).

B. Williamson County’s State Court Element has
been Resoundingly Criticized by Congress, the
Courts, Academics, and Even Planners.

Put simply, Williamson County’s state court
procedure is a disaster. Commentators have derided the
problems spawned by Williamson County as “worse than
mere chaos,”* “absurd,”5 “nonsense,” “riddled with

4 Robert H. Freilich, The Public Interest is Vindicated: City of
Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes, 31 Urb. Law 371, 387 (1999).

5 Gregory Overstreet, Update on the Continuing and Dramatic
Effect of the Ripeness Doctrine on Federal Land Use
Litigation, 20 Zoning & Flan. L. Rep. 17, 27 (1997).

© Peter A. Buchsbaum, Should Land Use be Different?
Reflections on Williamson County, in Taking Sides on

Takings Issues: Public and Private Perspectives 480
(A.B.A. 2002; Thomas E. Roberts, ed.).

10

obfuscation and inconsistency,”’ a “Kafkaesque maze,”®
and “a fraud or hoax on landowners,” just to name a few.

On two occasions, the House of Representatives
passed bills (by substantial margins) that would have
dispensed with Williamson County's state court procedure
element.'” In reaching that conclusion, the House Judiciary
Committee received testimony from Professor Mandelker
who declared that his review of lower federal court
decisions showed a “wholesale abdication of federal
jurisdiction in law suits where issues are raised concerning
the constitutional validity of land use regulation,” because
“federal judges have distorted the Supreme Court's ripeness
precedents to achieve [the] undeserved and unwarranted
result [of] avoiding the vast majority of takings claims on
their merits.” Mandelker Testimony, 31 Urb. Law. at 236-
237. His conclusion, and testimony, was that the “state
court first” requirement should be eliminated.

7 Mandelker Testimony, 31 Urb. Law. at 236.

8 Timothy J. Kassouni, The Ripeness Doctrine and the
Judicial Relegation of Constitutionally Protected Property
Rights, 29 Cal. West. L. Rev. 1, 51 (1992).

9 Thomas E. Roberts, Ripeness and Forum Selection in Fifth
Amendment Takings Litigation, 11 J. Land Use & Envtl. L.
37, 71 (1995).

10 See H.R. 1534, 105" Cong. Private Property Rights
Implementation Act of 1997 (passed House on Oct. 22, 1997,
by vote of 248-178) (§2(e)(3): “[A] final decision shall not
require the party seeking redress to exhaust judicial remedies
provided by any State ....”); H.R. 2372, 106" Cong., Private
Property Rights Implementation Act of 2000 (passed House
on Mar. 16, 2000, by vote of 226-182) (§2(e)(4): “[A] case is
ripe for adjudication even if the party seeking redress does
not exhaust judicial remedies provided by any State ....”).
Both bills are available at the Library of Congress's

“Thomas” website, http://thomas.loc.gov/ (last visited Jan.
20, 2005).

Even the American Planning Association
(“APA”),'' which submitted an amicus curiae brief on
behalf of the Tahoe Regional Planning Agency in Suitum
(No. 96-243), believed that the ripeness requirement set
forth in Williamson County was wrong; the heading to its
fifth argument in that brief states:

“THE COURT SHOULD ELIMINATE THE
SECOND PRONG OF THE RIPENESS
DOCTRINE REQUIRING THE LAND-
OWNER TO HAVE SOUGHT AND BEEN
DENIED JUST COMPENSATION
THROUGH AVAILABLE STATE PRO-
CEDURES AND ALLOW LANDOWNERS
WITH REGULATORY TAKINGS CLAIMS
TO PURSUE THEIR FEDERAL REMEDY
= eo COURT.” APA Suitum Amicus
r. at 23.

The brief goes on to explain why the APA took the
position it did:

“Amicus curiae submits that the rule the
takings plaintiffs must first sue in state court
for compensation under the federal constitution
is incorrect. When this Court first adopted the
ripeness rules, there was no remedy for

compensation in federal courts. | this
Court adopted mpeness rules to avoid deciding
whether a federal compensation 1s
available. In the absence of a l

compensation remedy, it perhaps made sense

'! The APA has described itself as “the oldest and largest
organization devoted to advancing state
planning,” and its constituents i
Sed ae ne canes Get So Lapa of adverts
land use are minimized.” APA Amicus Br., Tahoe-Sierra
Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, (No.

1?

to require takings plaintiffs to seek a state
compensation remedy first.

“This situation has now changed. In
1987, in First English Evangelical Lutheran
Church v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U. S.
302 (1987), this Court held that a remedy for
compensation in takings cases 1s available
under the federal constitution. Federal courts
should not require takings plaintiffs to go to
court to seek compensation before taking
advantage of this federal remedy.” APA
Suitum Amicus Br. at 25-26.

Aside from the serious policy implications that arise
from the state court procedures element, commentators
have noted that Williamson County's second element 1s
difficult, 1f not impossible, to reconcile with the holding in
City of Chicago v. Int'l Coll. of Surgeons, 522 U.S. 156
(1997).'° The upshot of College of Surgeons is that a
municipal defendant, sued by a landowner for a taking and
other constitutional violations, may remove that case to
federal court. (522 U.S. at 164-66). Yet the pertinent
federal statute allows removal from state court only if the
plaintuff could have filed the case in federal court in the first
instance. See 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). How can that be? How
can it be that a takings plaintiff must file his case 1m state
court first (as Williamson County purportedly requires), but
then a municipal defendant has the option to game the
system and control jurisdiction by removing to federal court
(under College of Surgeons)? Yet, that plaintiff apparently
could not have filed in federal court initially, so the removal

12 The Williamson County/C. ollege of Surgeons conundrum 1s
fully explained in Michael M. Berger and Gideon Kanner,
Shell Game! You Can't Get There from Here: Supreme
Court Ripeness Jurisprudence in Takings Cases at Long Last
oe the Self-parody Stage, %6 Urb. Law. 671, 676-682
(2004).

13

statute should presumably not apply (but College of
Surgeons holds removal is appropriate in_ these
circumstances). It hurts just to think through this problem.

Reams of articles will be written on this dilemma,
and everyone involved—municipalities, property owners,
and the federal judiciary—will spend years scratching their
heads on whether, and how, Williamson County and
College of Surgeons can be reconciled. The Eighth Circuit
described the situation as an “anomalous ... in
Supreme Court juri e.” Kottschade v. City of
Rochester, 319 F.3d 1038, 1041 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 124

S.Ct. 178 (2003).

In the end, landowners who want to assert a takings
claim deserve to know whether, and under what
circumstances, they can access a federal forum for their
constitutional grievances. Respectfully, the only way to
have those questions completely and fairly answered 1s for
this Court to now re-consider Williamson County's state
court detour procedure and tackle it head-on.!>

C. Nothing in the Constitution Reguires that State
Court tion Precede Federal Adjudication
on the of a Takings Claim.

It must be noted that just compensation can only be
awarded after a taking has been found. That does not
represent a problem when a governmental entity has taken

13 Asa tical matter, the only realistic opportunity the Court
will have to directly address the state court procedures
element from Williamson County is in a case postured such
as the one at bar. In the current jurisprudential climate, it
would border on malpractice for an attorney to direct his
client to file a takings claim in federal court initially. This is
especially so in light of the Kottschade case, where the
property owner filed initially mm federal court but the Eighth
Circuit required him to repair to state court. As the Eighth
Circuit concluded, resolution of the Williamson
County/College of conundrum “is for the Supreme
Court to say, not us.” (319 F.3d at 1038.)

i4

possession of land, whether by a physical invasion or by
formal condemnation proceedings, ause there is no
question that a taking has occurred. The only issue left in
such a situation 1s to decide the amount of just
compensation to which the landowner ts entitled. However,
things are not so simple when a landowner alleges that a
regulatory taking has occurred. In that case, the first issue
is whether a taking has occurred at all. This Court’s
discussion in Williamson County on the state compensation
procedure ripeness issue focused entirely on the recovery of
just compensation; it says not a word about whether a
regulatory taking had actually occurred. (473 U.S. at 194-
196.)

However, the resulting detour through the state
courts means that the issue of whether a regulatory taking
has occurred must be litigated by the landowner in the state
court proceeding.'+ As it now stands, based on this Court's
statement in Williamson County that the Fifth Amendment
proscnbes only taking without sust compensation (473 U.S.
at 194), there 1s no federal jurisdiction to determine whether

14 And yet another puzzle arises. A state inverse condemnation
lawsuit begins by determining whether the government is
liable for a taking in the first place. In that suit, the state tnal
court must review the validity and assess the vag! of the
municipality's underlying conduct. Yet, in Williamson
County, this Court held that “[e})xhaustion of review
procedures 1s not required” of § 1983 takings claimants, they
do not have to exhaust “administrative and judicial
procedures by which an injured party may seek review of an
adverse decision ...” (473 U.S. at 194 n. 13; 193). But thar
is an integral part of a state inverse condemnation action -
the taking claimant seeks review of an adverse land use
decision. Indeed, applying the polestar test from Penn
Central and conducting an “ad hoc” inquiry into the facts
necessanly entails review of the underlying government
action. How could the factors from Penn Central — the
character of the government's action, the economic |! of
the regulation, and the property owner’s investment-backed
expectations (see 438 U.S. at 124) — be considered by a state
court unless wt reviewed the underlying land use decision?

15

a taking has occurred in an as-applied context where facts
are of paramount 1 . At the same time, a facial
attack — which presents only a question of law — claiming a
taking can be brought directly in a federal court. Yee v.
City of Escondido, 503 U.S. 519, 533-534 (1992).'5

Of course, the NAHB recognizes that, for takings
purposes, the Constitution is infringed only when just
compensation is not paid after a taking has occurred. But,
nothing in the Constitution requires that a state court must
issue some kind of certification that one of its
municipalities owes a landowner for a taking. “You can
read the Fifth Amendment forward, backward, upside-down
or sideways, and you will not find that requirement

here.” Berger and Kanner, Shell Game!, supra, 36
Urb. Law. at 696. A federal court is as well-equipped as a
state court to interpret the Fifth Amendment, determine that
a municipality has committed a takin q
pa t of just compensation to avoid a constitutional
infraction. '©

Finally, doomsday cries that federal court review
will unduly interfere with local ee ring hollow.
E.g., Glenn P. Sugameli, “7akings” Bills Threaten People,
Property, Zoning and the Environment, 31 Urb. Law. 177
(1999). Federal courts decide matter of local concern all of
the time in a variety of parochial contexts. Consider, as one

1S The Court has remarked on the “uphill battle” facing a
takings plaintiff who brings a facial challenge. TJahve-
Sierra, 535 U.S. at 321, quoting from Keystone Bituminous
Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 495 (1987).

16 “{A] case containing claims that local administrative action
violates federal law ... is within the jurisdiction of federal
district courts.” College of Surgeons, 522 U.S. at 163.
There 1s nothing ing about that point. Section
1983 states that those acting “under color of state law” must
pay when they commit actions that infringe the federal

* constitution — and that includes municipalities. See Owen v.
wy Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 636-637 (1980), Monell
v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978).

and order the

16

example, the standards for determining whether speech 1s
obscene and therefore loses First Amendment protections.
From the Nixon Administration up through the current
Bush Administration, it has been well-established that
whether an artistic or literary work is obscene is determined
by “contemporary community standards” and definitions
under the “applicable state law.” Miller v. California, 413
U.S. 15, 24 (1973). See also Ashcroft v. ACLU, 535 US.

564 (2002), aff'd and remanded by 124 S.Ct. 2783 (2004) -

(whether on-line materials are harmful to minors will
depend in part on “local community standards”). There has
never been a requirement that a state court must first
determine what those “local community standards” are, as a
ripening prerequisite to federal court adjudication of a First
Amendment claim.

This would be a much simpler judicial world if this
Court were to review its holding in Williamson County and
make clear that a landowner could, if it wished, go directly
to federal court to have a determination made whether, first,
a taking had occurred and then, second, what just
compensation should be awarded.

| |
CONCLUSION

According to the dean of historians of the American
Revolution, an independent judiciary is embedded as an
essential part of the constitutional scheme to preserve

property rights:

“Placing legal boundaries around issues such
as property rights ... had the effect of
isolating these issdes from popular tampering,
partisan debate, and the clashes of interest-
group politics. Some things, including the
power to define property and _ interpret
constitutions, became matters not of political
interest to be determined by legislatures but of
the ‘fixed principles’ of law to be determined
by judges.” Gordon S. Wood, The Radicalism

17

of the American Revolution 324-25 (First
Vintage Books ed. 1993).

Slamming the doors of the federal courthouse shut
on land owners — to the extent that virtually none of the
lower federal courts interpret the Just Compensation Clause
or adjudicate the merits of takings claim — cannot be
countenanced under the Founders’ vision.

| per pry the NAHB contends that both good
policy and this Court’s prior opinions require that neither
res judicata nor collateral estoppel apply when a landowner
is forced to begin litigation in state court in order to ripen a
federal takings claim. The Santini reservation used by the
Second Circuit would at least allow a federal court to
adjudicate the federal takings claim.

The NAHB further contends that it is time for this
Court to reconsider — and to abandon — the requirement that
a landowner first seek co sation through state litigation
procedures before its federal takings claim is ripe for
adjudication in federal court.

In short, the requirement of initial state court
litigation should have no preclusive effect whatsoever on
subsequent takings litigation in federal court or, better yet,
the requirement should be entirely eliminated.

Dated: January 24, 2005

Respectfully submitted,

Mary V. DiCRESCENZO

DUANE J. DESIDERIO

THOMAS J. WARD

THE NATIONAL ASSOCIATION
OF HOME BUILDERS

1201 15th Street, N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20005

(202) 266-8200

KENNETH B. BLEY

(Counsel of Record)
Cox, CASTLE & NICHOLSON, LLP
2049 Century Park East, 28th Fl.
Los Angeles, CA 90067
(310) 284-2231

Attorneys for The National Association of Home Builders

AMICUS CURIAE
BRIEF

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(2) JAN 2 4 2005

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No. 04-340 wa «|

In the Supreme Court of the United States

SAN REMO HOTEL, L.P.., ET AL.
Petitioners
v.

CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO,
CALIFORNIA, ET AL.

Respondents

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

BRIEF AMICI CURIAE FOR ELIZABETH J.
NEUMONT (AND ALL OTHERS SIMILARLY
SITUATED) IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONERS

ERIC GRANT

ATTORNEY AT LAW
Suite 100
8001 Folsom Boulevard
Sacramento, California 95826
(916) 388-0833

Counsel for Amici Curiae

473 U.S. 172, 194-97 (1985), which mandates that property
owners exhaust state judicial remedies before pursuing fed-

eral claims for just compensation in federal court, should be

es.
“+> ‘
f <v*
to - ——
3
/ ee eS eee a

Pi

at

ii
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
ee es cco s din dave necsede ecden i
ee EE. dg coc bkcsbeeses betes iv
INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE ...........0005 ceues 1
I ok eee hd Oe is ues wmeeeed 2
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT ............. ee Pee 3
FREE gre SCE gs ge Se 4
I. In Creating the State Procedures Require-
ment, Williamson County Deviated Sharply
from the Established Understanding of the
Just Compensation Clause ..............6...5.5. 4
A. At Issue Here Is the Right to Recover
Just Compensation for Takings of Pri-
vate Property for Public Use ................ 4
B. It Was Always the Law That the Right
to Recover Just Compensation Accrues
at the Time of the Taking .................. 5
Il. In Creating the State Procedures Require-
ment, Williamson County Built a House on
SES cae ecucduceessecmecese 8
A. The Requirement Was Fabricated Without
Benefit of Serious Briefing or Argument ...... 9
B. The Requirement Rests Principally on Tvo
Flawed Analogies to Inapposite Decisions .... 10
1. Ruckelshaus v. MonsantoCo............ 11
DS Mo’ seb eet ¥eseees meee 13
C. The Requirement Finds No Support in the
Principle That the Amendment Proscribe
Only Takings Without Just Compensation .... 14

il

TABLE OF CONTENTS—Continued

Ill. The State Procedures Requirement Has Other
Defects that Show Its Doctrinal Incoherence. ..... 16

A. The Requirement Is Inconsistent with the

No-Exhaustion-of-Remedies Rule Govern-

Page

ing Other Federal Rights .................. 16
B. The Requirement Is in Practice Ignored
by State Courts and by this Court........... 18
C. The Requirement Invites Disrespect for
State Courts by Treating Them as Mere
Stations on the Read to Federal Court ....... 20
iT cpseney dpsceehe 6a De a adg ewe 22

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases

Alliance of Descendants of Texas
Land Grants v. United States,
37 F.3d 1478 (Ped. Cir. 1904) ..........62e-eeee.

Armstrong v. United States,
Be es GD’ vddeocccaneds dedecesbek Koves

City of Chicago v. International College
of Surgeons, 522 U.S. 156 (1997) ................

City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes,
BOG, Ge Was Ge GED 6 cd ctnedceuceentectaces

Commonwealth v. DLX, Inc.,
BG. Ware Ge Gh GE occ ccteccceceetcescece

Creppel v. United States,
41 F.3d 627 (Fed. Cir. 1994) .....6.....ecceeeees

DLX, Inc. v. Kentucky,
381 F.3d 511 (6th Cir. 2004) ..............0065.

Dolan v. City of Tigard,
Sa DE SPO GED eve vetéenescaseésvuduencese

Eastern Enterprises v. Apfel,
SO Wis GG cccccuceccccedddcnctestennl

Eide v. Sarasota County,
908 F.2d 716 (11th Cir. 1990),
cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1120(1991) ...............

First English Evangelical Lutheran
Church v. County of Los Angeles,

482 U.S. 304 (1987) .................7..+. passim

Expense Board v. College Savings Bank,
Ge eas Ge GD vc ccncndccudeuoecs 4c htnkde

v

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

| Page

Greenfield Mills, Inc. v. Macklin,

961 F.3d 934 (7th Cir. 2004) ..... cece ccc ccndens 7
Grubb v. Public Utilities Commission,

Re PSS Serer Pret. * 21
Hudson v. Palmer,

a eee ee ee ee 13
Inupiat Community of Arctic Slope v.

United States, 680 F.2d 122 (Ct. Cl.),

cert. denied, 459 U.S. 969 (1982) ...............4.. 7
Jacobs v. United States,

RR RE Reena Se a SE AEE ye 5
Jacobs Wind Electric Co., Inc. v.

Department of Transportation,

G36 Se. 3d 1333 (Pla. 1908) ..... ccc ccc ccc ccees 18
Kavanau v. Santa Monica Rent Control

Board, 941 P.2d 851 (Cal. 1997),

cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1077 (1998) ............ 18-19
Lawrence v. Texas,

ot ee ee 2, 22-23
Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council,

— ft 0 UD ee 19, 21
Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council,

404 S.E.2d 895 (S.C. 1991),

rev'd, 506 U.S. 1008 (1902)... 0c ccc ccc cecccces 20
Mayhew v. Town of Sunnyvale,

fk s | |, errr 19

” Neumont v. Monroe County, Florida,

242 F. Supp. 2d 1265 (S.D. Fla. 2002),
appeal docketed, No. 04-13610-EE
(11th Cir. July 22,2004) .......... 2. cece ceeeeee 1

vi
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued
Page
Palazzolo v. Rhode Island,
RE RS Ree ee ee y 1, 19, 21
Palazzolo v. State, 746 A.2d 707 (RI.
2000), affd in part, rev'd in part,
Se ee OED - Kec uctscebucdseauabenes 19-20
Parratt v. Taylor,
' f ! & free 13-14
Patsy v. Board of Regents,
Ge ee ED pctndvdscdcécdusksesaue 16-18
Payne v. Tennessee,
Se Ge, EE 64 ok pan teeneantabeadbaues 2, 22
Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc.,
Ge es BOE édb ocd oudde Ktveséuuweeue 20-21
Richardson v. City & County
of Honolulu, 124 F.3d 1150
(9th Cir. 1997), cert. denied,
§25 U.S. 871, 921, 1018 (1996) ..............6.. 22
Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co.,
ff ) kee 11-12, 14-15
San Diego Gas & Electric Co. v. City
of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621 (1981) .............. 7-8
Seaboard Air Line Ry. Co. v. United
& §! & |: Berry 6
Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida,
See a SGD ccuecuaseséseneseeeansesees 2
Soriano v. United States,
ee Cs OED . ov vcccudciurnescone eds 6, 16

Stafford Ordinance Corp. v. United
States, 108 F. Supp. 378 (Ct. Cl. 1952) ............ 7

vii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

Page

Steel Improvement & Forge Co. v.

Unitec' States, 355 F.2d 627

St Ge SD on cc cdiuocudeetoutasWaendeeenanne 7
Steffel v. Thompson,

| 16-17, 21, 23
Tafflin v. Levitt,

Ge ers GOED bus dakddccictewicehetseees’ 21
Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council v.

Tahoe Regional Planning Agency,

SE CED ccocoteusndéiadescuseuneas 14
United States v. Causby,

PUEDE cv cduccccbuasnceeeuceténen 11
United States v. Clarke,

Ge GED n.cenc veces snaseddbveséeden 6,8
United States v. Dickinson,

Sd SPEED ccccccccsdesdinecustésensas 6
United States v. Dow,

Es DEED cuccveek cbecccsenknecucdane 6,8
United States v. Rogers,

SP a 1: WEED. whee curasedcivecesssdénavat 6
Willi County Regional Planni

Commission v. Hamilton Bank,

Gs BED cvaccedhdcnbetsvsnchin passim
Yee v. City of Escondido,

ER OED cdscdcoadccdedtseadtovsenes 10
Younger v. Harris,

Ge Ws BE GUND ccccccccccccesscs Jaap? eee: 20

vill

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

Page
Statutes, Legislative Materials,
and Court Rules

Be ee ED oc cunvbdcbudccenpebsncdsaebeasi 17

DED 6s ubaceck evawaceueeudas Guneeacauesees 11
GU OED 6a ncddkinecduuacneedeenanueieestan 17
Private Property Rights Implementation

Act of 1997, H.R. 1534, 105th Cong. ............. 17
Private Property Rights Implementation

Act of 2000, H.R. 2372, 106th Cong. ............. 17
H.R. Rep. No. 106-518 (2000) ............... 17, 20-21
a Gams TGS ae 6c tccstcccsedecivedsureus 1

SED cc cuccecee’éesuvescsessuakenuseeee 1

Other Authorities

Michael M. Berger & Gideon Kanner,

Shell Game! You Can't Get There

from Here, 36 URB. LAW. 672 (2004) ............. 16
Brief for Respondent in Williamson

SSG bc cncteiadternnsas Vedakseaul 10
Brief for the United States as Amicus

Curiae Supporting Petitioners in

Williamson County (No. 84-4) .................. 10
Transcript of Argument in Williamson

County (No. 84-4), 1985 U.S. TRANS

Ee CPG GE, ED 0 cna oo bne sedkesdieuahnd ts 10

1

INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE

Amici curiae are a certified class of property owners in
Monroe County, Florida, who are currently litigating a fed-
eral takings claim in the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh
Circuit. See Neumont v. State of Florida, No. 04-13610-EE
(appeal docketed July 22, 2004). Like petitioners (and thou-
sands of other property owners across the nation), amici are
facing “ripeness” arguments by a governmental defendant
who seeks to avoid federal adjudication of a federal consti-
tutional claim. In particular, despite class members having
filed at least two actions in state court concerning the reg-
ulatory action for which they now seek just compensation,
amici have been denied their day in federal court because
they have assertedly failed to satisfy the “state procedures”
requirement of Williamson County Regional Planning Com-
mission v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172, 194-97 (1985). See
Neumont v. Monroe County, Florida, 242 F. Supp. 2d 1265,
1274 (S.D. Fla. 2002) (dismissing amici's federal claims for
just compensation “because plaintiffs have failed to exhaust
their state remedies”).

Accordingly, for themselves and their fellow property
owners around the country, amici file this brief to explain
that Williamson County’s state procedures requirement was
wrong in its inception and is wrong today. As such, it ought
to be scrapped in its entirety.

Amici’s counsel represented the petitioner in Palazzolo
v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606 (2001), and he has filed num-
erous briefs in takings cases in this Court and in the lower
courts, both federal and state.’

' Pursuant to this Court’s Rule 37.2(a), all parties have consented
to the filing of this brief. Letters evidencing such consent have
been filed with the Clerk of the Court.

Pursuant to Rule 37.6, amici curiae affirm that no counsel for
any party authored this brief in whole or in part and that no per-
son or entity made a monetary contribution for the preparation or
submission of this brief.

2

+

INTRODUCTION

This Court granted certiorari to consider a particular
matter (issue preclusion) arising from Williamson County’s
mandate that a property owner “ripen [its] federal Takings
claim” in state court before litigating that claim in federal
court. Pet. for Cert. at i. Amici curiae respectfully submit
that consideration of this issue is like rearranging the deck
chairs on a legal Titanic. As explained at length herein, the
“state procedures” requirement of Williamson County “was
not correct when it was decided, and it is not correct today”;
therefore, the requirement “ought not to remain as binding
precedent.” Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2004). In
a word, it should be overruled.

Amici acknowledge that the Court rarely overrules a
prior decision without full briefing of that point by the par-
ties. But as set forth in Part II of the Argument below, the
state procedures requirement was not one of the questions
presented in Williamson County, and so that requirement
was fabricated without any serious briefing or argument.
Accordingly, it is not surprising that the state procedures
requirement deviated sharply from the established under-
standing of the Just Compensation Clause and that it has
generated massive doctrinal incoherence. No subsequent
decision of this Court has defended the state procedures re-
quirement, and virtually no one in the academy will defend
it either as a theoretical matter. And for good reason—the
requirement is indefensible, a jurisprudential embarrass-
ment that ought to be discarded as soon as possible.

As the Court has repeatedly stated, when “governing
decisions are unworkable or are badly reasoned, this Court
has never felt constrained to follow precedent.” Seminole
Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 63 (1996) (quoting Payne v.
Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 827 (1991)). Therefore, now is the
time to overrule the unworkable and badly reasoned state
procedures requirement of Williamson County.

3

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

1. Itis important to comprehend the precise federal
right at issue in cases within the sweep of the state proce-
dures requirement. The property owner in such cases sues
to enforce a right to recover just compensation for a taking.
That right, and the corresponding obligation of the govern-
ment to pay just compensation, was always understood to
accrue or arise at the time of the taking, and not later. In
asserting that the right and the obligation accrued at some
later point after the denial of state-law remedies in a state
court, Williamson County deviated sharply from the estab-
lished understanding of the Just Compensation Clause.

2. The state procedures requirement was not one of
the questions presented in Williamson County, and so it re-
ceived only the most cursory treatment in the briefing and
argument. Not surprisingly, therefore, the requirement is
poorly reasoned. It rests principally on two flawed analo-
gies to inapposite decisions that decree the unavailability
of (1) equitable relief against compensable takings, and of
(2) relief under the Due Process Clause for random and un- -
authorized deprivations of property, neither of which is re-
motely at issue. Nor can the requirement be justified by the
principle that the Fifth Amendment proscribes only takings
without just compensation, which supports a no-equitable-
relief rule but not exhaustion of state judicial remedies.

3. The state procedures requirement has other de-
fects that show its doctrinal incoherence. Among these are
that the requirement is really an exhaustion mandate that
conflicts with the no-exhaustion-of-remedies rule governing
other federal rights, as twice recognized in bills passed by
the House of Representatives. In addition, the requirement
is in practice ignored by state courts (anc by this Court in
cases originating from state courts), even though it logically
should apply in those fora. Finally, though touted as pro-
moting local decisionmaking, the requirement affirmatively
invites disrespect for state courts by treating them as mere
stations on the road to federal court.

4

ARGUMENT

For the following reasons, the Court should overrule
the state procedures requirement fabricated in Williamson
County Regional Planning Commission v. Hamilton Bank,
473 U.S. 172, 194-97 (1985).

I. In Creating the State Procedures Require-
ment, Williamson County Deviated Sharply
from the Established Understanding of the
Just Compensation Clause.

The question presented focuses on the preclusive effect
vel non of the “state court proceeding that was required to
ripen [petitioners’] federal Takings claim.” Pet. for Cert. at
i. That petitioners had to “ripen” that claim by proceeding
in state court is, of course, a consequence of this Court’s
decision in Williamson County. The “state procedures” re-
quirement of that decision—so called to distinguish it from
the “final decision” requirement, which is not at issue here
—decreed that a property owner must “seek compensation
through the [state-law] procedures the State has provided
for doing so” before presenting to a federal court a federal
claim for just compensation. 473 U.S. at 194.

A. At Issue Here Is the Right to Recover
Just Compensation for Takings of Pri-
vate Property for Public Use.

In fabricating the state procedures requirement, the
Williamson County opinion referred to a property owner’s
claiming or suffering “a violation of the Just Compensation
Clause.” 472 U.S. at 194-95; accord id. at 195 n.13 (refer-
ring to a “constitutional violation” stemming from a taking).
While it is not unusual to use the term violation in a loose
sense in connection with a claim for just compensation, this
terminology obscures the true “nature of the constitutional
right” at issue. Jd. Property owners who seek just compen-
sation in court under the Fifth Amendment are not claim-
ing “constitutional violations” in the sense that they sue to
enjoin or remedy state action that violates or transgresses

5

constitutional norms.’ Rather, as the Court articulated in
First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los
Angeles, these property owners sue to enforce the govern-
ment’s “constitutional obligation to pay just compensation”
along with their corresponding “right to recover just com-
pensation.” 482 U.S. 304, 315 (1987) (quoting Armstrong v.
United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960), and Jacobs v. United
States, 290 U.S. 13, 16 (1933)). Thus, the owners are pur-
suing a monetary remedy that ‘s “grounded in the Consti-
tution itself.” Id. at 315; accord id. at 316 (“the Court has
frequently repeated the view that, in the event of a taking,
the compensation remedy is required by the Constitution”).°

B. It Was Always the Law That the Right
to Recover Just Compensation Accrues
at the Time of the Taking.

When does the government’s constitutional obligation
to pay just compensation arise? Or, to ask the same thing,
when does a property owner’s claim for just compensation
accrue? The answer is that the taking, the obligation of the
taker to pay just compensation, and the owner’s claim for
‘compensation come into being simultaneously, as this Court
and the lower federal courts consistently held for decades
prior to Williamson County. This Court has explained:

? In certain circumstances, of course, one may allege a “violation”
of the Takings Clause and ask a court’s aid in enjoining that vio-
lation. A typical example is the allegation that a statute effects
an uncompensated taking and that just compensation is not even
potentially available. See, e.g., Eastern Enterprises v. Apfel, 524
U.S. 498, 538 (1998) (plurality opinion) (concluding that “the Coal
Act’s allocation of liability to Eastern violates the Takings Clause,
and that [the statute] should be enjoined as applied to Eastern”).

* A three-Justice plurality in City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes,
Ltd., 526 U.S. 687, 710 (1999), suggested that the property owner
“sought not just compensation per se but rather damages for the
unconstitutional denial of such compensation.” Yet the plurality’s
analysis did not turn on the distinction between that view and a
view of the case “as a simple suit for just compensation.” Id.

6

When a taking occurs by physical invasion, .. .
the usual rule is that the time of the invasion con-
stitutes the act of taking, and “[it] is that event
which gives rise to the claim for compensation
and fixes the date as of which the land is to be
valued... .”

United States v. Clarke, 445 U.S. 253, 258 (1980) (quoting
United States v. Dow, 357 U.S. 17, 22 (1958)).

Numerous decisions of this Court state essentially the
same rule using slightly different phraseology. In United
States v. Dickinson, 331 U.S. 745 (1947), the Court rejected
the government’s argument that Dickinson’s reclamation of
a portion of property previously taken by flooding rendered
him ineligible to be paid for the original taking: “[N]o use
to which Dickinson could subsequently put the property by
his reclamation efforts changed the fact that the land was
taken when it was taken and an obligation to pay for it then
arose.” Id. at 751 (emphasis added). In Soriano v. United
States, 352 U.S. 270, 275 (1957), the Court affirmed as time-
barred the dismissal of petitioner’s claim against the gov-
ernment “for just compensation for supplies . . . taken from
him... during the Japanese occupation of the Philippines.”
As it rejected petitioner’s argument that the hostilities tol-
led the applicable statute of limitations, the Court agreed
that petitioner’s compensation claim “accrued at the time of
the taking.” Id.; accord United States v. Rogers, 255 U.S.
163, 169 (1921) (“Having taken the lands of the [claimants],
it was the duty of the government to make just compensa-
tion as of the time when the owners were deprived of their
property.”); Seaboard Air Line Ry. Co. v. United States, 261
U.S. 299, 306 (1923) (same).*

* The law in the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit and the
old Court of Claims is the same. See Alliance of Descendants of
Texas Land Grants v. United States, 37 F.3d 1478, 1481 (Fed. Cir.
1994) (“A claimant under the Fifth Amendment must show that
the United States, by some specific action, took a private property

7

The foregoing cases involved physical takings rather
than regulatory takings, but that distinction makes no dif-
ference in this context. Thus, the Court of Appeals for the
Federal! Circuit applies the above-described rule to regula-
tory takings claims. See Creppel v. United States, 41 F.3d
627, 633 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (applying rule to a claim that the
EPA effected a regulatory taking by blocking a reclamation
project). Moreover, nothing in Williamson County’s discus-
sion of state procedures hinges on the physical/regulatory
distinction: the opinion purports to rest on “the nature of
the constitutional right” in general, 473 U.S. at 195 n.13,
not the nature of a specifically regulatory taking. See, e.g.,
Greenfield Mills, Inc. v. Macklin, 361 F.3d 934, 958 & n.28
(7th Cir. 2004) (applying the state procedures requirement
to physical takings, in accord with other courts of appeals).

In any event, the limited discussion in this Court re-
garding the accrual of regulatory takings claims confirms
the coincidence of taking and duty to pay compensation. In
San Diego Gas & Electric Co. v. City of San Diego, 450 U.S.
621, 623 (1981), the Court ruled that it lacked jurisdiction
to address the question presented—whether “a State must
provide a monetary remedy to a landowner whose property
allegedly has been ‘taken’ by a regulatory ordinance.” But
writing for four Justices—and commanding the substantial
agreement ofa fifth, see id. at 633-34 (Rehnquist, J., concur-

interest for a public use without just compensation. Therefore, a
claim under the Fifth Amendment accrues when that taking ac-

tion occurs.”); Inupiat Community of Arctic Slope v. United States,

680 F.2d 122, 127 (Ct. Cl.) (holding that because the “alleged act
of taking was the Settlement Act, the takings claims “accrued on
... the date on which the Settlement Act became effective”), cert.
denied, 459 U.S. 969 (1982); Steel Improvement & Forge Co. v.
United States, 355 F.2d 627, 631 (Ct. Cl. 1966) (“It is axiomatic
that a cause of action for an unconstitutional taking accrues at
the time the taking occurs.”); Stafford Ordinance Corp. v. United
States, 108 F. Supp. 378, 381 (Ct. Cl. 1952) (holding that a “claim
accrues in requisitioning property at the time of the actual taking
of the property.”).

ring)—Justice Brennan would have reached that question
and answered it in the affirmative, see id. at 653-60 (Eren-
nan, J., dissenting). His analysis was grounded in part on
the recognition that “[a]s soon as private property has seen
taken, ... ‘the self-executing character of the constitutional

provision with respect to just compensation’ is triggeved.” _

Id. at 654 (quoting Clarke, 445 U.S. at 257). When Justice
Brennan’s dissent later became law in First English, and
the Court expressly reaffirmed “the self-executing character
of the constitutional provision with respect to just compen-
sation,” 482 U.S. at 315, the Court necessarily reaffirmed
as well that this constitutional provision is triggered “[a]s
soon as private property has been taken.”

In short, it was the consistent rule of this Court and
the lower federal courts for many decades that the consti-
tutional obligation to pay just compensation arises, and the
claim for just compensation accrues, at the time of the tak-
ing. Whether stated that the event of taking “gives rise to
the claim for compensation,” Dow, 357 U.S. at 22; Clerke,
445 U.S. at 258, or that the obligation to pay just compen-
sation is triggered “[a]s soon as private property has been
taken,” San Diego Gas, 450 U.S. at 654 (Brennan, J. dis-
senting), the rule was well-established. In asserting that a
property owner’s monetary claim under the Just Compen-
sation Clause does not accrue “until just compensation has
been denied” by the state judicial system, 473 U.S. at 195
n.13, Williamson County deviated sharply from the tradi-
tional understanding of that Clause.

II. In Creating the State Procedures Require-
ment, Williamson County Built a House on
Jurisprudential Sand.

Did such a sharp deviation from decades of consistent
constitutional interpretation come after sustained reflection
in the face of compelling new authority? Was the state pro-
cedures requirement forged in the fires of intensive and ex-
tensive doctrinal reassessment in light of developments in

9

the law of just compensation? In a word, mo. In fact, quite
the opposite: as explained below, the requirement was fab-
ricated without benefit of serious briefing or argument, and
it rests principally on flawed analogies to inapposite cases,
as well as other misreadings of precedent.

A. The Requirement Was Fabricated Without
Benefit of Serious Briefing or Argument.

In the Court’s own words, it granted certiorari in the
Williamson County case to decide “whether Federal, State,
and Local governments must pay money damages to a land-
owner whose property allegedly has been ‘taken’ temporar-
ily by the application of government regulations.” 473 U.S.
at 185. The attorneys general of 19 states and territories,
together with the Solicitor General of the United States, the
National Association of Counties, the City of New York, and
the City of St. Petersburg, Florida, joined the petitioner in
urging the Court to reverse the court of appeals’ judgment
in favor of the property owner on two alternative grounds:
“that a temporary regulatory interference with an investor’s
profit expectation does not constitute a ‘taking,’” and “that
even if such interference does constitute a taking, the Just
Compensation Clause does not require money damages as
recompense.” Jd. at 175 (emphases added). Four profes-
sional and public-interest organizations filed amicus curiae
briefs urging affirmance of the judgment. See id. at 174.

In the end, all of this briefing was for naught, because
the Court did not decide the questions presented. Instead,
Williamson County left the temporary takings issue “for an-
other day,” as it concluded that the property owner’s claim
for just compensation was “premature.” Jd. at 186; cf. First
English, 482 U.S. at 310 (deciding the issue after observing
that Williamson County, among other cases, had left it un-
decided). The conclusion that the just compensation claim
was premature rested primarily on the Court’s applying the
rule that a regulatory takings claim “is not ripe until the
government entity charged with implementing the regula-
tions has reached a final decision regarding the application

10

of the regulations to the property at issue.” Id.; see also id.
at 186-94 (explicating this “final decision” requirement).

Logically, the opinion could have stopped at that point,
but it did not. Instead, the opinion put forth a “second rea-
son [why] the taking(s] claim is not yet ripe,” namely, that
the property owner “did not seek compensation through the
procedures the State has provided for doing so.” Id. at 194.
Of the twelve merits briefs filed in Williamson County, only
the Solicitor General’s amicus brief—and only in a single
paragraph in its Summary of Argument—argued for any-
thing approaching this “second reason.” See Brief for the
United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at
10; see also Brief for Respondent at 39 (responding to point
in two short paragraphs). Furthermore, although the “state
procedures” issue did arise very briefly at oral argument in
Williamson County, the Solicitor General’s representative
refused even to give an unequivocal answer to the question
whether “a property owner would have to follow judicial re-
view remedies as well for [regulatory action] to ripen into a
taking.” 1985 U.S. TRANS LEXIS 76, at *25-26 (Feb. 19,
1985); see also id. at *26 (“I think it tends to blend in with
the question of whether there should be abstention on the
state law question of whether the commission had properly
applied state law.”).

B. The Requirement Rests Principally on Two
Flawed Analogies to Inapposite Decisions.

There are very good reasons why the Court “ordinarily
do[es] not consider questions outside those presented in the
petition for certiorari,” and why the Court disregards that
rule “only in the most exceptional cases.” Yee v. City of Es-
condido, 503 U.S. 519, 535 (1992). The “state procedures”
aspect of Williamson County is a perfect illustration of such
reasons. Given that the questions presented did not even
touch on state judicial remedies and that the matter did not
receive serious briefing or argument, it is no surprise that
the fabrication of the state procedures requirement rested
principally on two flawed analogies to inapposite decisions.

11

1. Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co.

First, the opinion cited Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co.,
467 U.S. 986, 1016-20 (1984), for the notion that “takings
claims against the Federal Government are premature until
the property owner has availed itself of the process provided
by the Tucker Act.” 473 U.S. at 195. From this notion, the
opinion purported to draw an analogy: “Similarly, if a State
provides an adequate procedure for seeking just compensa-
tion, the property owner cannot claim a violation of the Just
Compensation Clause until it has used the procedure and
been denied just compensation.” Granting that the analogy
is not wholly implausible, the premise is wholly bogus. If
“takings claims” are meant in this passage to refer to mone-
tary claims for just compensation for completed takings of
private property—the very claim that the property owner
asserted in Williamson County—then the cited passage in
Monsanto did not even consider such claims, let alone de-
clare them “premature” until after the property owner had
sued the United States under the Tucker Act.*

In Monsanto, a company sued in federal district court
“seeking injunctive and declaratory relief from the operation
of” various provisions of the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, -
and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA), alleging that “all of the chal-
lenged provisions effected a ‘taking’ of property without just
compensation, in violation of the Fifth Amendment.” 467
U.S. at 998-99 (emphasis added). Having concluded that
some of the challenged provisions might conceivably operate
to take the company’s property in some circumstances, the
Court proceeded to consider (in the passage later cited by

* The Tucker Act grants subject matter jurisdiction to the Court
of Federal Claims to hear “any claim against the United States
founded upon ... the Constitution.” 28 U.S.C. § 1491(aX1). This
grant authorizes the Court of Federal Claims to adjudicate mone-
tary claims against the United States for just compensation. See,
e.g., United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 267 (1946) (“If there is
a taking, the claim is ‘founded upon the Constitution’ and within
the jurisdiction of the Court of Claims to determine.”).

12

Williamson County) whether that conclusion supported the
requested injunctive relief. Monsanto ruled that it did not,
based on the established rule that “le]quitable relief is not
available to enjoin an alleged taking of private property for
public use . . . when a suit for compensation can be brought
against the sovereign subsequent to the taking.” Jd. at 1016
(emphasis added); see also id. at 1017-19 (concluding that
such a suit could be brought under the Tucker Act). Thus,
the company’s request for equitable relief under the Fifth
Amendment was not merely premature, it was not avail 1ble
at all. In other words, there was nothing the company could
do to “ripen” its claim for equitable relief; that claim simply
had no merit, period.

What about a Tucker Act suit against the government
in the Court of Federal Claims? Could such a suit be called
a prerequisite to asserting a monetary claim against the gov-
ernment for just compensation for a taking of property? No,
as the Monsanto decision confirms, a Tucker Act suit is the
assertion of a claim for just compensation: “whatever taking
may occur is one for public use, and a Tucker Act remedy is
available to provide Monsanto with just compensation.” Jd.
at 1020; accord supra note 5. So if Williamson County were
correct that a property owner must “availl[) itself of the pro-
cess provided by the Tucker Act” before pursuing its claim
for just compensation, 473 U.S. at 195, then it would be the
rule that a property owner must essentially bring a Tucker
Act suit before bringing a Tucker Act suit. In other words,
an owner’s Tucker Act suit for just compensation would be
“premature” until the property owner had brought a Tucker
Act suit for just compensation. Jd. Obviously, this reductio
ad absurdum deserves no respect, and Monsanto provides
no reasoned basis for the state procedures requirement.®

* Although the no-equitable-relief rule could be applied to claims
against state and local governments, it has no relevance for the
state procedures aspect of Williamson County, which makes prop-
erty owners “seek compensation through the procedures the State
has provided for doing so.” 473 U.S. at 194 (emphasis added).

13

2. Parratt v. Taylor

The fabrication of the state procedures requirement in
Williamson County also rested on the supposed analogy be-
tween takings of private property “without just compensa-
tion” and deprivations of property “without due process of
law.” The Court relied on Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527
(1981), which it described as having “ruled that a person de-
prived of property through a random and unauthorized act
by a state employee does not state a claim under the Due
Process Clause merely by alleging the deprivation of prop-
erty.” 473 U.S. at 195. In such circumstances, “the State’s
action is not ‘complete’ in the sense of causing a constitu-
tional injury ‘unless or until the State fails to provide an ad-
equate postdeprivation remedy for the property loss.’” Id.
(quoting Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 532 n.12 (1984)).
Then, another purported analogy: “Likewise, because the
Constitution does not require pretaking compensation, and
is instead satisfied by a reasonable and adequate provision
for obtaining compensation after the taking, the State’s ac-
tion here is not ‘complete’ until the State fails to provide ad-
equate compensation for the taking.” Jd.

This analogy has two fatal flaws.’ First, it provides no
support for the go-first-to-state-court requirement actually
imposed by the second prong of Williamson County. When
a state does indeed “provide an adequate postdeprivation
remedy for the property loss” as contemplated by Parratt,
the deprived property owner does not pursue that state-law
remedy before suing in federal court under the Due Process

” One should really say two fatal flaws in addition to the one that
the Court itself acknowledged: “The analogy to Parratt is imper-
fect because Parratt does not extend to situations . . . in which the
deprivation of property is effected pursuant to an established state
policy or procedure.” 473 U.S. at 195.14. By definition, a taking
is always effected pursuant to an established state policy or pro-
cedure, for if the relevant injury to property results from a truly
“random and unauthorized act by a state employee,” the property
owner has suffered a tort, not a taking.

14

Clause: To the contrary, the property owner must pursue
the state-law remedy instead of suing in federal court. As
Williamson County put it, the owner who has such a remedy
categorically “does not state a claim under the Due Process
-Clause.”-473 US. at 195. If the analogy with the Just Com-
pensation Clause were valid, the property owner having a
state-law remedy for just compensation categorically could
not state a claim under the Just Compensation Clause in
any court. Obviously, no one believes that, then or now.

“econd, and more important, the specific notion that
“the State’s action [in respect to a taking] is not ‘complete’
until the State fails to provide adequate compensation for
the taking,” id., is flatly contrary to the Court’s sustained
and reasoned consideration of the matter in First English.
There, the Court held that the government’s taking of prop-
erty, without more, gives rise to an “obligation to pay just
compensation” on the part of the government, and a corres-
ponding “right to recover just compensation” on the part of
the owner. 482 US. at 315. While a postdeprivation rem-
edy might allow the government to escape liability for a de-
nial of procedural due process (as in Parratt), once a taking
has occurred, governmental liability for just compensation
is inescapable: “no subsequent action by the government
can relieve it of the duty to provide compensation.” Id. at
321 (emphasis added). This formulation has continued to
command the Court’s assent. See Tahoe-Sierra Preservation
Council v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302,
328 (2002) (quoting passage and opining that “nothing that
we say today qualifies [that] holding” of First English).

C. The Requirement rinds No Support in the
Principle That the Amendment Proscribes

Only Takings Without Just Compensation.

Along with flawed analogies to Monsanto and Parratt,
Williamson County relied on the uncontroversial principle
that the “Fifth Amendment does not proscribe the taking of
property; it proscribes taking without just compensation.”
473 U.S. at 194. Indeed, this principle was so significant

15

that the opinion both reiterated and emphasized the point:
“because the Fifth Amendment proscribes takings without
Just compensation, no constitutional violation occurs until
just compensation has been denied.” Jd. at 195 n.13.

Both of these propositions are quite true; both are also
quite irrelevant to whether property owners must seek just
compensation in state court under state law. As explained
in Part I.A above (pp. 4-5), property owners who seek just
compensation under the Fifth Amendment are neither seek-
ing to “proscribe” (i.e., enjoin) takings nor asserting “consti-
tutional violations.” Instead, they are asserting a federal
“right to recover just compensation,” the monetary remedy
that is “grounded in the Constitution itself.”

To put the point another way, the principle that the
Fifth Amendment proscribes (only) those takings that are
without just compensation leads not to the state procedures
requirement but rather to the rule (reiterated in Monsanto)
that “[e]quitable relief is not available to enjoin an alleged
taking of private property for public use . .. when a suit for
compensation can be brought against the sovereign subse-
quent to the taking.” 467 U.S. at 1016, discussed at supra
note 6 and accompanying text. That is, the “proscribes tak-
ings without just compensation” point cited by Williamson
County is a fine basis for rebuffing property owners who ask
federal courts to enjoin state regulatory programs; however,
it is no basis at all for rebuffing property owners who ask
federal courts to award just compensation.

* First English, 482 U.S. at 315. There is no tension between First
English and principle that the Fifth Amendment proscribes tak-
ings without just compensation. To the contrary, in the sentence
immediately preceding the opinion’s reiteration that takings trig-
ger the “constitutional obligation to pay just compensation,” First
English emphasized that the Fifth Amendment “is designed not
to limit the governmental interference with property rights per se,
but rather to secure compensation in the event of otherwise proper
interference amounting to a taking.” 482 U.S. at 315.

16

Ill. The State Procedures Requirement Has Other
Defects that Show Its Doctrinal Incoherence.

If Williamson County’s state procedures requirement
was not correct when it was decided, then it is also defective
in additional ways that hev- come to light in the past two
decades. Other amici hav» ce :cribed many of these defects:
the requirement is fundamentally unfair (the present case,
for example, has consumed twelve years without a resolu-
tion on the merits, and amici began their own state-court
actions nearly ten years ago); it is irreconcilable with City of
Chicago v. International College of Surgeons, 522 U.S. 156
(1997); and it spawns litigation about litigation instead of
promoting resolution of federal constitutional claims on the
merits. Two longtime and respected advocates in this Court
have exhaustively catalogued the depths to which William-
son County has brought takings procedure. See Michael M.
Berger & Gideon Kanner, Shell Game! You Can’t Get There
from Here, 36 URB. LAW. 672 (2004). In the following sec-
tions, amici discuss three other defects.

A. The Requirement Is Inconsistent with the
No-Exhaustion-of-Remedies Rule Govern-
ing Other Federal Rights.

The intended effect of Williamson County’s state pro-
cedures requirement is to remit property owners with what
had long been described as “accrued” federal claimis for just
compensation, Soriano, 352 U.S. at 275, to state courts to
pursue remedies under state law. This result is anomalous
on its face, and it is especially jarring in light of the Court’s
long-standing and firm refusal, with respect to other federal
claims asserted pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, to “require[]
exhaustion of state judicial . . . remedies, recognizing the
paramount role Congress has assigned to the federal courts
to protect constitutional rights.” Steffel v. Thompson, 415
U.S. 452, 472-73 (1974) (emphasis added), quoted in Patsy
v. Board of Regents, 457 U.S. 496, 500 (1982). In practice,
therefore, the state procedures requirement has effectively
caused the Just Compensation Clause, “as much a part of

17

the Bill of Rights as the First Amendment or [the] Fourth
Amendment, [to] be relegated to the status of a poor rela-
tion,” notwithstanding the Court’s protestations to the con-
trary in Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 392 (1994).

The House of Representatives views the state proce-
dures requirement as an “exhaustion” mechanism applying
only to claims for just compensation, and has twice passed
bills to eliminate it.? The House Judiciary Committee’s re-
port on the latter bill made clear that the non-exhaustion
provision had as its target Williamson County’s state pro-
cedures requirement because the House viewed the require-
ment as a kind of exhaustion-of-judicial-remedies rule that
was rejected in Steffel, Patsy, and many other decisions of
this Court. See H.R. Rep. No. 106-518, at 13 & n.3 (2000).
The committee report explained that the “combined effect of
Williamson County, and the application of issue and claim
preclusion [as presented in this case], is to drive out of Fed-
eral court virtually all Federal claims for just compensation
for takings of private property by local governments.” Jd. at
13. As a result of the state procedures requirement, then,
“property rights are procedurally disadvantaged compared
to other civil rights.” Jd. (section heading).”

® See Private Property Rights Implementation Act of 1997, H.R.
1534, 105th Cong., § 2 (adding 28 U.S.C. § 1343(eX3) to provide
that property owners seeking to enforce the Just Compensation
Clause pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 need not “exhaust judicial
remedies provided by any State or territory”); Private Property
Rights Implementation Act of 2000, H.R. 2372, 106th Cong., § 2
(adding 28 U.S.C. § 1343(e)4) to provide that claims for just com-
pensation asserted pursuant to § 1983 are “ripe for adjudication
even if the party seeking redress does not exhaust judicial reme-
dies provided by any State or territory”).

© If the present brief echoes the language of the cited committee
report, that is because the report echoes the language of the Brief
Amicus Curiae of Pacific Legal Foundation authored and filed by
present amici’s counsel in Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educa-
tion Expense Board v. College Savings Bank, 527 U.S. 627 (1999).

18

B. The Requirement Is in Practice Ignored
by State Courts and by this Court.

If the state procedures requirement truly derives from
the “nature” of the federal right to just compensation—as
opposed to being merely a “procedural scheme under which
claims may be heard in federal courts,” Patsy, 457 U.S. at
501—then the requirement necessarily governs regardless
of the judicial forum in which the federal right is asserted.
That is, under the logic of Williamson County, “a property
owner cannot claim a violation of the Just Compensation
Clause” even in state court until it has used the “procedure
for seeking just compensation” provided by the state. 473
U.S. at 195. In other words, no federal claim for just com-
pensation may be presented to a state court unless and until
the property owner has fully (and unsuccessfully) litigated
his state-law claim for compensation (in the state judicial
system).

This precept follows unassailably from the state pro-
cedures requirement; this precept is also uniformly ignored
both by state courts themselves and by this Court. As for
state courts, amici are aware of none that refuses to adjudi-
cate federal claims for just compensation on the ground that
they are premature until a property owner has pursued to
completion all claims for compensation under state law. To
the contrary, it is not difficult to cite numerous examples of
state judicial systems that will hear and determine federal
claims for just compensation before state-law compensation
claims have been fully litigated."

" See, e.g., Jacobs Wind Electric Co. v. Department of Transporta-
tion, 626 So. 2d 1333, 1337 (Fla. 1993) (contemplating that a pat-
ent holder would assert its claims under the Just Compensation
Clause along with its claims under the state analogue thereto and
under state common law); Kavanau v. Santa Monica Rent Control
Board, 941 P.2d 851, 855 (Cal. 1997) (observing that the property
owner brought a claim for “just compensation’ in the form of lost
rental income and interest” under both “article I, section 19 of the
California Constitution and the Fifth Amendment of the United

19

As for this Court, consider the last two pure regulatory
takings cases it has entertained on certiorari to state courts.
In Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003,
1009 (1992), the Court observed that following enactment
of the relevant state statute, “Lucas promptly filed suit in
the South Carolina Court of Common Pleas, contending that
the Beachfront Management Act’s construction bar effected
a taking of his property without just compensation.” Even
though the Court postponed its discussion of the merits to
address whether Lucas had satisfied Williamson County’s
“final decision” requirement, see id. at 1010-14, the Court
was not concerned in the least whether Lucas had also sat-
isfied Williamson County's “state procedures” requirement
by litigating to completion whatever state-law claims for
compensation he might have prior to asserting his federal
claim for just compensation.

Likewise, in Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606,
611 (2001), the Court observed that following proceedings
before the state Coastal Resources Management Council,
Palazzolo “sued in state court, asserting the Council’s appli-
cation of its wetlands regulations took the property without
compensation in violation of the Takings Clause of the Fifth
Amendment.” Again, while the Court addressed the final
decision requirement at length, see id. at 618-26, it gave no
attention to the state procedures requirement. In contrast
to Williamson County, the Court certainly did not go out of
its way to assure itself that, before Palazzolo first asserted
his federal claim for just compensation, he did indeed “seek

States Constitution”), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1077 (1998); Mayhew
v. Town of Sunnyvale, 964 S.W.2d 922, 930 (Tex. 1997) (finding
ripe the plaintiff's “just compensation takings claims” brought at
the same time “under the United States Constitution and Texas
Constitution”); Palazzolo v. State, 746 A.2d 707, 711 (R.I. 2000)
(observing that plaintiff “brought an inverse condemnation action”
that asserted “a taking of his property for which he was entitled
to compensation pursuant to the United States and Rhode Island
Constitutions”), affd in part, rev’d in part, 533 U.S. 606 (2001).

20

compensation through the procedures the State has provid-
ed for doing so.””

Amici point out these anomalies not to urge the state
courts to be more eager in rebuffing federal takings claims
on procedural grounds (or this Court to be more vigilant in
exercising its certiorari jurisdiction) but rather to highlight
the profound impact to state courts that would result from
applying the state procedures requirement to the limits of
its ineluctable logic. As explained in the following section,
that impact also includes the fostering of an institutional
disrespect for state courts.

C. The Requirement Invites Disrespect for
State Courts by Treating Them as Mere
Stations on the Road to Federal Court.

In a letter expressing its (unsuccessful) opposition to
passage by the House of a bill eliminating the state proce-
dures requirement, see supra note 9 and accompanying text,
the Department of Justice cited “‘a proper respect for State
functions’” in arguing that “State courts are as capable as
Federal courts in adjudicating local land use cases.” H.R.
Rep. No. 106-518, at 37, 42 (quoting Younger v. Harris, 401
U.S. 37, 44 (1971)). These arguments naturally evoke the
decisions of this Court that call for a “proper respect for the
ability of state courts to resolve federal questions presented
in state-court litigation.” Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 481

” Tn fact, neither Lucas nor Palazzolo litigated state-law claims to
completion prior to asserting their federal claims. It is doubtful
whether Lucas even asserted a state-law claim at all, the majority
opinion of the South Carolina Supreme Court being devoid of any
references to such a claim. See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal
Council, 404 S.E.2d 895 (S.C. 1991); but cf. id. at 907 (Hartwell, J.,
dissenting) (“Having determined that application of the Act con-
stitutes a taking under the Constitution of the United States, it is
not necessary to examine whether it constitutes a taking under
the South Carolina Constitution.”). Palazzolo did assert a state-
law claim—at the same very time as he asserted his federal claim.
See Palazzolo v. State, 746 A.2d 707, 711 (R.I. 2000).

21

U.S. 1, 14 (1987). Amici concur with the Department that
this respect should influence the Court’s thinking about the
state procedures requirement. As set forth below, however,
the requirement actually invites disrespect for state courts
and their ability to resolve federal questions.

It has long been recognized that, notwithstanding “the
paramount role Congress has assigned to the federal courts
to protect constitutional rights,” Steffel, 415 U.S. at 473, as
a general matter “the state and federal courts have concur-
rent jurisdiction of suits of a civil nature arising under the
Constitution and laws of the United States.” Grubb v. Pub-
lic Utilities Commission, 281 U.S. 470, 476 (1930); accord,
e.g., Tafflin v. Levitt, 493 U.S. 455, 459 (1990). Monetary
claims arising under the Just Compensation Clause are en-
compassed by this general rule, and state courts routinely
adjudicate such federal claims against state and local gov-
ernments. See, e.g., Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1010-32 (reviewing
South Carolina courts’ disposition of such claim); Palazzolo,
533 U.S. at 617-32 (reviewing Rhode Island courts’ disposi-
tion of such claim).

Consider a procedural regime in which both the state
courts and the lower federal courts adjudicate the federal
claims for just compensation respectively presented to each.
Property owners who agree with the Justice Department’s
prediction that “State courts are likely to be as sympathetic
to local property owners as Federal courts,” H.R. Rep. No.
106-518, at 37, will naturally gravitate toward the former;
those who disagree, the latter. Each court system will de-
velop federal takings law subject to this Court’s review and,
significantly, without interference from the other. Such a
regime would not only yield more efficient decisionmaking,
it would also truly show that “proper respect for ability of
state courts to resolve federal questions presented in state-
court litigation” enunciated in Pennzoil Co., 481 U.S. at 14.

By contrast, consider the regime created by the state
procedures requirement of Williamson County. Under that
regime, federal courts consider state courts not as parallel

22

departments of a dual sovereign but rather as “hurdles” to
be overcome on the road to resolution of claims by federal
courts. E.g., Richardson v. City & County of Honolulu, 124
F.3d 1150, 1165 (9th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 871,
921, 1018 (1998); Eide v. Sarasota County, 908 F.2d 716,
720-21 (11th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1120 (1991).
Moreover, federal courts send property owners packing off
to state courts to litigate state-law claims they do not wish
to pursue and to obtain rulings that may have absolutely no
consequence in subsequent federal proceedings.” Forcing
pointless detours to state courts to litigate sideshow issues
demonstrates affirmative disrespect for those courts rather
than the requisite proper respect.

+

CONCLUSION

As the Court recently reiterated, the doctrine of stare
decisis is “not .. . an inexorable command.” Lawrence, 539
U.S. at 577 (quoting Payne, 501 U.S. at 828). It is, instead,
“a principle of policy” that must yield when the rationale of
a prior decision “does not withstand careful analysis.” Jd.
As this brief has shown, the state procedures requirement
of Williamson County does not withstand such analysis: it
was fashioned in circumstances that warrant no confidence
its soundness, and “precedents before and after its issuance
contradict its central holding.” Id. Though state and local
governments “rely” on it as a ready means to exhaust those

® DLX, Inc. v. Kentucky, 381 F.3d 511, 515-16 (6th Cir. 2004), is
a very recently reported example. The property owner spent four
years fulfilling the state procedures requirement in the Kentucky
Circuit Court, the Kentucky Court of Appeals, and the Kentucky
Supreme Court. See Commonwealth v. DLX, Inc., 42 S.W.3d 624
(Ky. 2001). At the end of this marathon, the state courts denied
compensation under state law based on “the operation of a state
procedural rule without analogue in federal law,” 351 F.3d at 520
—a ruling that advanced resolution of the owner’s federal claim
for just compensation not a single bit, see id. at 516-26.

23

property owners having temerity enough to assert federal
claims for just compensation, “there has been no individual
or societal reliance on [the state procedures requirement] of
the sort that could counsel against overturning its holding
once there are compelling reasons to do so.” Id.

This last point is crucial, for we may expect a chorus
from respondents and their amici about how the state pro-
cedures requirement is a pillar of Western Civilization and
how overruling it will usher in a new Dark Ages. We think
this chorus is largely driven by the desire of governments
and their allies to narrow the substantive scope of regula-
tory takings law. Although that desire is understandable
and, in the proper case, a legitimate litigating position, we
trust that Members of this Court will resist the temptation
to treat the state procedures requirement as a stand-in for
disputing the substantive reach of the Just Compensation
Clause. Whether that Clause affords broad relief to regu-
lated property owners, narrow relief, or even no relief at all
ought not to matter here: consistent with “the paramount
role Congress has assigned to the federal courts to protect
constitutional rights,” Steffel, 415 U.S. at 473, the answers
to that question should be resolved in federal court without
requiring exhaustion of state-law remedies in state court.

For these reasons, the state procedures requirement of
Williamson County should be overruled, and the judgment
of the court of appeals should be reversed.

DATED: J»,auary, 2005.
Respectfully submitted,

ERIC GRANT

ATTORNEY AT LAW
Suite 100
8001 Folsom Boulevard
Sacramento, California 95826
(916) 388-0833

. Counsel for Amici Curiae

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385016_0037%3A19. Public record. Not legal advice.
