# Amicus Curiae Brief — Castle Rock v. Gonzales

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URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385016_0035%3A15

## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Amicus Curiae Brief
- **Published:** January 1, 2005
- **Citation:** 545 U.S. 748

## Text

~ 4
——"

No. 04-278 —

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

“= es

TOWN OF CASTLE ROCK, COLORADO,
Petitioner,

JESSICA GONZALES, individually and as next best iciend of her
deceased minor children, REBECCA GONZALES, KATHERYN GONZALES,
and LESLIE GONZALES,

Respondents.

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES
COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

BRIEF OF INTERNATIONAL LAW SCHOLARS AND
WOMEN’S, CIVIL RIGHTS AND HUMAN RIGHTS
ORGANIZATIONS AS AMICI CURIAE
IN SUPPORT OF RESPONDENTS

JENNIFER K. BROWN* RHONDA COPELON

MAYA RAGHU ANDREW FIELDS

LEGAL MOMENTUM INTERNATIONAL WOMEN’S

395 Hudson Street HUMAN RIGHTS LAW CLINIC
New York, New York 10014 City University of New York
(212) 925-6635 School of Law

65-21 Main Street
Flushing, New York 11367
(718) 340-4163

*Counsel of Record

Counsel for Amici Curiae
February 9, 2005

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page
BABEL GF Als TRRIRs 8 Bie ccccccesccscccnsitnsenessensessnctneoanes il
INTEREST OF AMICT CURIA ....0ccccccccocssoccscneseovssccesee l
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT ...............c:ccccssesseeeesseneees l
PP TIINGE casciicistinsenisnitttiniinndisgeaiemidienttenanicnmetaiil 3
L. COMPARATIVE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW

PROVIDE STRONG PERSUASIVE AUTHORITY
FOR INTERPRETING THE CONSTITUTIONAL
ISSUES BEFORE THIS COURT. ...........cccccccccceeeeeeeeees 3

IL. THE RIGHT OF WOMEN AND CHILDREN TO
PROTECTION FROM AND __ EFFECTIVE
REMEDIES FOR GENDER-BASED VIOLENCE,
INCLUDING DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, HAS
EVOLVED AS A CUSTOMARY NORM OF
I DIG, ciccitiictsiaicnbchinciinnsstinilinaienssala 6

Ill. AS A STATE PARTY TO THE ICCPR, THE
UNITED STATES’ COMMITMENT TO ENSURE
THE PROTECTION OF WOMEN AND
CHILDREN FROM GENDER AND DOMESTIC
VIOLENCE PROPERLY INFORMS’ THIS
COURT’S INTERPRETATION OF THE DUE
PROCESS CLAUSE AND THE AVAILABILITY _
OF A REMEDY UNDER 42 U.S.C. § 1983. ......... 21

il
CONCLUSION. ..0cccsscscsecscsssssnseeseshiscessosssonsoatocansmssntonte 29
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
FEDERAL CASES
Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002) .......ccccccecceereeeees 4
Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986) .......:ccsccceeeees 3
DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of
Social Services, 489 U.S. 189 (1989) ....ccccccccccseseereeeeeees 6
District of Columbia v. Carter, 409 U.S. 418
( 19°73).........coceceesessecesessnesnestenminnmanann 27
Fernandez v. Wilkinson. 505 F. Supp. 787 (D.
Kam. 1960) ....... ES | see 13,14

International Covenant on Civil and Political
RE 8S GF eee passim

Observations of State Parties under article 40(5)
of the Convention, United States of America,
CCPR A/50/40/Vol. 1, Amnex VI Pt. 4.0..0...ccccceceeeeee 26

Protocol to the African Charter on Human and
Peoples’ Rights on the Rights of Women in
Africa, 2d Ord. Sess. of the Assemb. of the Union ...... 14

Report of the Special Rapporteur on Violence

Against Women. its causes and cons es,

U.N. ESCOR, Hum. Rts. Comm., 53” Sess., U.N.

SOG. AAT SO TAGE (BDU F Piccccccccccenccsesentincsssenttiasioiass 17

Report of the Special Rapporteur on Violence

Against Women, its causes and consequences,

U.N. ESCOR, Hum. Rts. Comm., 54" Sess., U.N.

Det. BACN A/199B/S4 (1996) .ccccccccccccocsccssecececsscescesssoocs 17

Resolution Adopted by the General Assembly,
U.N. GAOR, 33rd Special Sess, U.N. Doc.
RIS CD vertccrciatclicinainitltittaniatingsnismsiniiass 18

Resolution adopted by the General Assembly,
Elimination of Domestic Violence Against

Women, U.N. GAOR, 58th Sess., U.N. Doc.

RE OSE GD seniccsinrniititninnintitindinaitinitiindinsipaicdis 16

ix

Summary of Record of the 1405th Meeting:
United States of America, U.N. GAOR, Hum. Rts.
Comm., 53rd Sess., U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/SR.1405

United Nations . evelopment Fund for Women,
Bringing Equal.ry Home: Implementing the

Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination Against Women (Illana Landsberg-
Rl OG. TTD cccccsescenttinicsccstescensssesicenmmnscenenctentessasinats 5

United Nations High Commissioner for Human
Rights, Economic and Social Council Decision,
U.N. ESCOR, 1994 Sub. Sess., 42nd Plen. Mig.,

U.N. Doc. E/DEC/1994/254 (1994) ......cccccccersereenees 16-17
United Nations High Commissioner for Human

Rights, Status of Ratifications of the Principal
International Human Rights Treaties (2004) .....9, 11, 12

Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A.

~ Res. 217A (III), U.N. GAOR, 3” Sess. U.N. Doc.

BIB CI eccoctccncecescnmcscosctninivissassneacsscstinsinennieninmanieties 8
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 1155
FE, FIG cceccussensectncsesonnstnsccervectzcenituapenntngiins 10, 11, 22
Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action,

World Conference on Human Rights, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF. 157/24 (Part 1) (1993) .......ccccccsseseeesenenenennees 17

Violence Against Women: Report of the Secretary
General, U.N., GAOR, 59th Sess., U.N. Doc.
RIT) CO a niccsscinvinsssnssenectnesstecnensicsmnsenmnenretnmsanases 18

~~

Violence Against Women in the Family: Report of

the Special Rapporteur on Violence Against

Women, its causes and consequences, U.N.

ESCOR, Hum. Rts. Cu.nm., 55" Sess., U.N.
Doc.E/CN.4/RES/1999/42 (1999) ........ccccccccesseseeseeeeenes 17

World Health Organization, World Report of
Violence and Health (Etienne G. Krug et al., eds.
Sp cacernscccvunnsactesisenvesaneiniinhieceiinatiitibubiinsibaitednin 18,27

OTHER
Joan Fitzpatrick, The Significance and

Determination of Customary International Human
Rights Law: Relevance of Customary

_ International Norms to the Death Penalty in the

i

United States, 25 Ga. J. int'l & Comp. L. 165
CORSET BOWED niemiomsstsitstntaiicnttnctititiphaiinspaabibiiciianssniiaipeites 26

Ruth Bader Ginsburg & Deborah Jones Merritt,
Affirmative Action: An International Human

Rights Dialogue, Address at the Fifty-First

Cardozo Memorial Lecture (Feb. 11, 1999), in 21
Se a, SEs. ee re i iipintitesieniccebaveccttictarhindanseed 4

Martin S. Flaherty, History Right?: Historical
Scholarship, Original Understanding, and

Treaties as "Supreme Law of the Land,” 99

Colum. L. Rev. 2095 (1999)... cccceseeees CE 25

Louis Henkin, Foreign Affairs and the United
States Constitution (2d ed. 1996)........ccccccceccceeeceeseeeseees 25

xi

Louis Henkin, Two Hundred Years of
Constitutional Confrontations in the D.C. Courts,
SPCR SiR sc cerninicnsnncishitindnsgtadatiiighncinanitiia 25

Sandra Day O'Connor, Federalism of Free
Nations, 28 N.Y.U. J. Int'l L. & Pol. 35 (1997)............ 22

Sandra Day O’ Connor, Keynote Address Before

the Ninety-Sixth Annual Meeting of the American
Society of International Law (Mar. 16, 2002), in

96 Am. Soc’y Int’l L. Proc. 348 (2002)............ccccccceeeeee: 5

John Quigley, Judge Bork is Wrong: The
Covenant is the Law, 71 Wash. U. L.Q. 1087

Restatement of the Law (Third), Foreign Relations
Law of the United States (1987) ........ccccccceseeeeeees 7, 8, 22

Elizabeth M. Schneider, Battered Women and
Feminist Lawmaking (2000)............ Spenemnsenemnssnocstoeserent 6

David Sloss, Non-Self-Executing Treaties:
Exposing a Constitutional Fallacy, 36 U.C. Davis
Se BEND, B Gate cicacccccssbssitiinnunatnisepdimcniganantibenisinaieae 25

INTEREST OF AMICI] CURIAE

Amici curiae are international law scholars and
women’s, civil rights and human rights organizations,’ all
of whom recognize the world consensus that women and
children have a fundamental human right to state
protection from and remedies for domestic violence.
Amici urge the Court to consider this strongly persuasive
international authority to determine that Ms. Gonzales has
a federal civil rights remedy for the Castle Rock police’s
violation of her right to due process in its enforcement of
the mandatory restraining order issued by a Colorado
court against her estranged husband, which led to her
husband’s murder of their three girls.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

Ms. Gonzales’ brief explains that the police failure
to accord her due process in the enforcement of the
protective order violated her constitutional right to due
process of law. We concur in, but do not address, the
legal arguments she makes. Rather, we explain that the
principles expressed in the evolved international
customary norm of protection from and remedies for
domestic violence, as well as our obligations as a State
Party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political

' Names and statements of interest of the individual amici are set
forth in the attached Appendix. Letters from the parties consenting to
the filing of amicus curiae briefs in this case are on file with the
Clerk of Court. This brief was authored by the amici and counsel
listed on the front cover, and was not authored in whole or in part by
counsel for a party. No one other than amici or their counsel made
any monetary contributions to the preparation or stbmission of this
brief.

>)
—

Rights (“ICCPR”),? should inform this Court’s
consideration of the due process question at hand so as to
grant Ms. Gonzales a federal remedy against the Town of
Castle Rock.

This Court has repeatedly acknowledged that
international and comparative law may be persuasive
sources of authority for questions arising under our own
Constitution. As it did in Lawrence v. Texas, 539 US.
558 (2(03), this Court may appropriately consider the
opinions of foreign jurisdictions in determining the scope
of the Due Process Clause, and should also give due
weight ’o other international sources of law. /nfra Point 1.

International human rights developments in recent
decades have resulted in the emergence of a worldwide
consensus that women and children have a fundamental
human nght to be protected from family violence, and to
have effective remedies when such protection fails. This
consensus is so powerful that it represents an evolved
norm of customary international law -- a norm that
provides additional persuasive authority to support a
determination by this Court that Ms. Gonzales’ due
process nghts were violated. /nfra Point II.

Finally, the United States has ratified the ICCPR,
a treaty whose terms are now recognized to encompass
States Parties’ obligations to ensure persons, particularly
women and children, the right to freedom from domestic
violence. Recognizing Ms. Gonzales’ right of action
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is both consistent with the federal
obligations undertaken by ratifying that treaty and with

* International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for
signature Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force Mar.
23, 1976) (“ICCPR”).

3

the federalism understanding that accompanied it. /nfra
Point III.

For these additional reasons, the decision of the
Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals should be affirmed.

ARGUMENT
L.

COMPARATIVE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW
PROVIDE STRONG PERSUASIVE AUTHORITY
FOR INTERPRETING THE CONSTITUTIONAL
ISSUES BEFORE THIS COURT.

This Court’s recent jurisprudence has affirmed
that international and comparative law provide valuable
interpretive guidance in areas of constitutional law. In
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 576-78 (2003), this
Court overruled its own precedent in Bowers v. Hardwick,
478 U.S. 186 (1986), which held that the due process
liberty interest in the United States Constitution did not
encompass the right of homosexuals to engage in private,
consensual, intimate conduct. The Court noted that the
reasoning in Bowers had been explicitly rejected by the
European Court of Human Rights and that “{o]ther
nations, too, have taken action consistent with an
affirmation of the protected right of homosexual adults to
engage in intimate, consensual conduct” such that the
right “has been accepted as an integral part of human
freedom in many other countries.” Lawrence, 539 U.S. at
576-77. See also Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 344
(2003) (Ginsburg, J., concurring, joined by Breyer, J.)
(noting that the Court’s opinion with regard to affirmative
action “accords with the international understanding of
the office of affirmative action” reflected in international

4

treaties). Similarly, in Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304,
316 n.21 (2002), this Court examined the opinions of “the
world community” to support its conclusion that
execution of persons with mental retardation would
offend the standards of decency required by the Eighth
Amendment. And in Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S.
702 (1997), in ruling thet the State of Washington’s
statute prohibiting assisted suicide was not invalid on its
face under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, the Court noted that Canada, Great Britain,
New Zealand and Australia had rejected efforts to
establish a fundamental right to assisted suicide. /d. at
718.16.

International and foreign law rulings on
constitutional issues facing the Court “cast an empirical
light on the consequences of different solutions to a
common legal problem.” Printz v. United States, 521
U.S. 898, 977 (1997) (Breyer, J., dissenting). As Justice
Ginsburg has observed, “comparative analysis
emphatically is relevant to the task of interpreting
constitutions and enforcing human nights.” Ruth Bader
Ginsburg & Deborah Jones Merritt, Affirmative Action:
An International Human Rights Dialogue, Address at the
Fifty-First Cardozo Memorial Lecture (Feb. 11, 1999), in
21 Cardozo L. Rev. 253, 282 (1999). And as Justice
O’Connor has stated: “While ultimately we must bear

* See also Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 830-31 (1988)
(Stevens, J.) (looking to opinions of “other nations that share our
Anglo-American heritage” and “leading members of the Western
European community” as aids to deciding Eighth Amendment
question); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 521-23 (1966)
(considering law enforcement “experience . . . [in] other countries” in
interpreting Fifth Amendment); New York v. United States, 326 U.S.
572, 584 n.S (1946) (looking to constitutional experiences of other
countries to help decide scope of federal taxation power).

norms); Vishaka v. State of Rajasthan, {1997} 6 S.C.C. 241, # 5-10
(India) (determining that the Indian Constitution's guarantee of
equality women should be interpreted nm light of “global

!
i

6

Wisdom gleaned from the opinions of judicial
colleagues in foreign jurisdictions, together with a
developed international consensus mandating state
protection from and remedies for domestic violence, can
assist this Court in reaching sound conclusions under
domestic law. This is particularly true here, given that the
recent and rapid crystallization of the human right of
women and children to state protection from gender-based
violence is a worldwide phenomenon which post-dates
this Court’s 1989 decision in DeShaney v. Winnebago
County , Department of Social Services, 489 U.S. 189
(1989).°

THE RIGHT OF WOMEN AND CHILDREN TO
PROTECTION FROM AND _~ EFFECTIVE
REMEDIES FOR GENDER-BASED VIOLENCE,
INCLUDING DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, HAS
EVOLVED AS A CUSTOMARY NORM OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW.

In recent decades, international human rights
treaties and other authoritative international agreements
have underscored the systemic and grave nature of
domestic violence and given rise to an evolved
customary norm of international law that recognizes the
nght of persons, particularly women and children, to
protection from and compensation for such violence.
This Court recently reaffirmed that customary

* See generally Elizabeth M. Schneider, Battered Women and
Feminist Lawmaking 53 (2000) (“{clompared with the history of
women’s nghts struggles in the United States and around the world,
the development of feminist approaches to international human rights
is @ recent phenomenon” that “has exploded” in the last twenty
years).

7
international law, or the “law of nations,” is part of the
“laws” of the United States pursuant to Article III, section
2, clause 1 of the U.S. Constitution. Without reaching
the question whether the norm concerning family violence
would sustain a cause of action under the standards this
Court recently set forth in the context of the Alien Tort
Claims Act, see Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 124 S. Ct.
2739, 2765-66 (2004), this Court can, and should,
consider the abundant evidence of this norm as at least
highly persuasive authority that merits deep
a cn

Customary international law constitutes “specific,
universal and obligatory” “customs and usages of
civilized nations.” Sosa, 124 S. Ct. at 2766-67. It “results
from a general and consistent practice of states followed
by them from a sense of legal obligation.” Restatement of
the Law (Third), Foreign Relations Law of the United
States § 102(2) (1987). Under established principles,
evidence tending to show customary international human
rights law ipcludes:

[1] virtually universal participation of states
in the preparation and adoption of
international agreements recognizing human
nights principles generally, or particular

* Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 124 S. Ct. 2739, 2764-65 (2004) (“For
two centuries we have affirmed that the domestic law of the United
States recognizes the law of nations”); The Paguete Habana, 175
U.S. 677, 700 (1900) (“International law is part of our law, and must
be ascertained and administered by the courts of justice of appropnate
junsdiction, as often as questions of mght depending upon it are duly
presented for their determination.”). See also The Nereide, 13 U.S. (9
Cranch) 388, 423 (1815).

nghts principles as international law;

[4] action by states to conform their national
law -er practice to standards or principles
declared by international bodies; [and]

[5] invocation of human rights principles in
national policy, in diplomatic practice, in
international organization activities and

Id. § 701, Reporter's Notes § 2. See also Statute of the
International Court of Justice, art. 38, 59 Stat. 1055, 3
Bevans | 179 (1945).

As to the first category, over the last two decades,
as the United Nations has expounded upon the basic
international human rights recognized in the United
Nations Charter’ and the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights* in the 1940s, it has made clear that these rights
encompass the nght of women and children to be free
from violence, including domestic violence, and that

’ See U.N. Charter, arts. 1(3), 55(c), 56.

* The 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights states that “{a)ll
are equal before the law and are entitled without any discrimination to
equal protection of the law,” and “[e}veryone has the right to an
effective [domestic] remedy . . . for acts violating the fundamental
nghts granted { } by the constitution or by law.” Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A (III), UN. GAOR, 3”
Sess., arts. 3-8, 12, 16-19, 22-24 at 71, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948).

pe

9

nations have an affirmative obligation to protect that
right

At least three widely-ratified international human
rights treaties recognize the right to state protection from
compelling evidence of an emergent international norm.
These are the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights (“ICCPR”) (ratified by 152 states), the
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination Against Women (“CEDAW”) (ratified by
177 states), and the Convention on the Rights of the Child
(“CRC”) (ratified by 192 states).°

within its territory . . . the rights recognized in the present
Covenant.” Art. 2(1) (emphasis added).'' Although the

February 6, 2005) (“Status of Ratifications”).
138 Cong. Rec. $4781-01 (daily ed. Apr. 2, 1992).
'' The obligation to “ensure” involve. tak{ing] the necessary steps . .
. to give effect to the[se) rights”; “ensur{ing] an effective remedy . . .
cod ty ab ® Po mage one Ae
— mined be: ~~ jedicial, atministreti lagistative

10

night to protection from domestic and gender-based
violence is not explicit in the ICCPR, the Human Rights
Committee has recognized since the early 1990s,'? and

States Parties hav accepted,'’ that the ICCPR applies to

Comment No. 3). See also Compilation, Hum. Rts. Comm., Genera/
Comment No. 18: Non-Discrimination (37th Sess. 1989) | 9
(“discrimination . . . by public authorities, by the community, or by
private persons or bodies”); Compilation, Hum. Rts. Comm., General
Comment No. 20: Article 7 (Prohibition of Torture, or Other Cruel,
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment) (44th Sess. 1992) ¢
2 (requires state protection against torture and ill treatment, “whether
inflicted by people acting in their official capacity, outside their
official capacity or in a private capacity”).

The Human Rights Committee has identified protection from
vanous forms of violence and subordination in the family as implicit
under various articles of the ICCPR, including articles 6, 7, 12, 18
and 24 that protect the rights to: life; freedom from torture or cruel,
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment; liberty of movement
and freedom to choose one’s residence; freedom of thought,
conscience, and religion; and the nghts of children to protection
without discrimination. Compilation, Hum. Rts. Comm., General
Comment No. 28. Article 3 (The equality of rights between men and
women) (68th Sess. 2000) Ff 10, 11, 14, 16, 21. Since the early
1990s violence against women, including domestic violence, has been
a frequent subject of monitoring and reporting by States Parties to the
ICCPR. See. eg, Hum. Rts. Comm. Concluding
Observations/Comments, available at
http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf (last visited February 6, 2005).
Significantly, the General Assembly’s Declaration on the
Elimination of Violence Against Women reflects a universally
accepted interpretation of the ICCPR as a source of the state
obligation to prohibit gender-based violence, in public and private
life. Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against Women:
Resolution, G.A. Res. 104, U.N. GAOR, 48" Sess., Agenda Item 111,
at preamble, art. 3, U.N. Doc. A/Res/48/104 20 (1993). See generally
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, art. 31,
U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 39/27 at 289 (1969), 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 (“Law of
Treaties”) (a treaty is interpreted according to the “ordinary meaning”
of its terms in their “context|s) and in light of its object and purpose”;
moreover, subsequent agreements, state practice and relevant rules of
international law are principal sources of interpretation). See United

An international treaty broadly focused on the
rights of women, CEDAW" condemns “discrimination
against women in all its forms” and requires parties to
“ensure through competent national tribunals and other
public institutions the effective protection of women
against any act of discrimination.”’” The United Nations
Committee charged with interpreting CEDAW
(“CEDAW Committee”) stated that “gender-based
violence [including specifically within PR a
relationships} is a form of discrimination that seriously
inhibits women’s ability to enjoy rights and freedoms”
and recommended that States Parties “ensure that laws
against family violence and abuse . . . give adequate
protection to women.’ The CEDAW Committee
reminded States Parties that CEDAW calls on them to
eliminate discrimination against women by state and
private actors, and that states may be liable for private

States v. Yousef, 327 F.3d 56, 95 n.28 (2d Cir. 2003) (United States
has only signed the Law of Treaties; nonetheless, “the U.S.
oenaas ot iano eng Deo Cine Ge geaien Gis ‘ie Comenten
. the authoritative guide to current treaty law and practice’”).
* Convention on Ge Biindaston of Al Poms of Dinstndeien
Against Women, opened for signature Dec. 18, 1979, G.A. Res.
34/180, 34 U.N. GAOR, 34th Sess., Supp. No. 46, at 193, U.N. Doc.
A/34/46 (1979) (entered into force Sept. 3, 1981) (“CEDAW”). The
United States has signed but not ratified CEDAW. See Status of
Ratifications, supra. As a signatory to CEDAW, the United States “is
obliged to refrain from acts which would defeat [its] object_and
purpose.” See Law of Treaties, supra, art. 18.
* CEDAW, supra, art. 2(c).
'* Compilation, CEDAW Comm., General Recommendation No. 19:
Violence Against Women (\\th Sess. 1992) 9 1. See also
Compilation. CEDAW Comm., General Recommendation No. 12:
Violence Against Women (8th Sess. 1989).
"" Id. 424%).

12

—_

acts of violence if they fail to act with “due diligence” to
prevent, investigate, or punish such violence."
Accordingly, state efforts to provide legal and social
protection against gender-based violence have been a
consistent focus of the CEDAW Committee’s monitoring
of state reporting.”

The Convention on the Rights of the Child
(“CRC”Y® requires further protection from domestic
violence for children. See art. 6 (requiring States Parties
to ensure “the survival and development of the child”);
art. 19 (“states Parties shall take all appropriate
legislative, administrative, social and educational
measures to protect the child from all forms of physical or
mental violence, injury or abuse . . . while in the care of
parent(s), legal guardian(s) or any other person who has
the care of the child”). Under Article 2, States Parties are
required to “ensure” the nghts in the CRC “without
discrimination of any kind, irrespective of the child’s . . .
sex.” The Committee on the Rights of the Child has said
that States Parties must “ensur{e] that all domestic
legislation is fully compatible with the Convention and

* Compilation, CEDAW Comm., General Recommendation No. 19,
supra, ¥9. This CEDAW Committee recommendation calls on States
Parties to ensure that laws against family violence and other forms of
gender-based violence are adequate, id. 4 24(b); to provide effective
complaint procedures and remedies, including compensation, id. 4
24); and to provide criminal penalties and civil remedies in case of
domestic violence, id. ¢ 24(r\i).

* See Committee on the Elimination of Violence Against Women,

Concluding Observations/Comments, available at
http. www_unhchr.ch/tbs doc nsf (last visited February 6, 2005).

** Convention on the Rights of the Child, opened for signature Nov.
20, 1989, G.A. Res. 44/25, Annex, Supp. No. 49, at 167, U.N. Doc.
A/44/49 (1989) (entered into force Sept. 2, 1990). Only the United
States and Somalia have signed but not ratified this Convention. See
Status of Ratification, supra.

13

that the Convention’s principles and provisions can be
directly applied and appropriately enforced.””'

Considering the second type of evidence of
customary human rights law, regional treaties and
declarations also show development of the universal
consensus that states must respect and enforce the right to
protection from gender-based violence, including
domestic violence. Several regional treaties, including
the Inter-American Convention on the Prevention,
Punishment and Eradication of Violence Against Women
(Convention of Belém do Para”),” the Convention for the
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms

*! Compilation, Comm. On Rts. Of Child, General Comment No. 5:
General Measures of Implementation of the Convention on the Rights
of the Child (34" Sess. 2003) 4 1.

Inter-American Convention on the Prevention, Punishment and
Eradication of Violence Against Women, opened for signature June
9, 1994, 33 LL.M. 1534 (entered into force Mar. 5, 1995)
(“Convention of Belém do Para”). The Convention of Belém do Para
has been ratified by 31 out of 34 Inter-American states, not including
the United States. See Inter-American Commission of Women,
Status of Signing and Ratification of the Convention of Belém do
Para, available at
http://www.oas.org/cim/English/Laws.Rat.Belem.htm (last visited
February 6, 2005). Nonetheless, the United States’ membership in
the Organization of American States and its adherence to the
American Declaration on the Rights and Duties of Man
(“Declaration”) c’sligate it_to promote the right to protection from
gender-based ana domestic violence, as the Convention of Belém do
Para is based on the rights articulated in the Declaration and the
American Convention on Human Rights, which the United States has
signed. American Convention on Human Rights, opened for
signature Nov. 22, 1969, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123 (entered into force July,
18, 1978); see also Advisory Opinion OC-1/82 of Sept. 24, 1982, 4
41, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) No.1 (1982).

14

(“European Convention”), 23 and the Protocol on the
Rights of Women in Africa to the African Charter on
Human and Peoples’ Rights (“African Protocol’ [a
recognize women’s right to be free from gender-based
violence, including domestic violence; that states must
undertake “due diligence” to prevent, investigate, and
punish such acts of violence, whether perpetrated by a
State or private actor; and to provide com compensation and
legal recourse for victims of such violence.”

Likewise, the Council of Europe’s Committee of
Ministers has issued a Recommendation reaffirming its
“determination to combat violence against women” and
“recognis[ing] that states have an obligation to exercise
due diligence.”*° The Committee of Ministers further
reaffirmed a 1986 European Parliament Resolution
recommending that member states ensure victims receive
compensation and consider, inter alia, the use of
protective orders.’

** Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, opened for signature Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222
(entered into force Sept. 3, 1953).
** Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on
the Rights of Women in Africa, opened for signature July 11-August
13, 2003, 2d Ord. Sess. of the Assemb. of the Union, available at
http://www | .umn.edu/humanrts/africa/protocol=women2003.html
(last visited February 6, 2005).
** See Convention of Belém do Para, supra, arts. 3, 4, and 7;
European Convention, supra, arts. 1, 8, and 13; African Protocol,
supra, arts. 4 and 8.

© Comm. of Ministers Recommendation Rec(2002)5 to Member
States on the Protection of Women Against Violence, at 3, 5, Comm.
of Ministers, 794" meeting of the Ministers’ Deputies, Council of
Europe (Apr. 30, 2002).
” Id., App. A, F 36, 58. See also European Parliament Resolution on
Violence Against Women, § 13, Eur. Parl. Doc. A2-44186, 1986 O.J.
(C176) 23 (July 14, 1986) (calling on national authorities to “ensure
that, in cases where the facts of violence have been established,

15

The “general assent of nations” to the night to
protection against family violence is demonstrated by
United Nations consensus documents, the third type of
evidence of customary human rights law.”* In particular,
the 1993 General Assembly Declaration on the
Elimination of Violence Against Women, adopted by
consensus, is specific and comprehensive, not only
recognizing the right to protection from family violence,

victims receive appropriate compensation for any pecuniary, physical,
psychological, moral and social damage suffered,” to consider
“enabl[ing] the judiciary to adopt, as interim measures aimed at
protecting victims, the banning of a perpetrator from contacting,
communicating with or approaching the victim, residing in or
entering certain defined areas” and “to ensure improvements in

training of police officers dealing with . . . reports of sexual
violence,” including requiring the police “to respond actively when
requests of help are received”’).

* While technically not bindifig under the United Nations Charter,
widely accepted General Assembly Declarations and Resolutions may
constitute authoritative statements of the world community and thus
contribute to the development of custom. See Filartiga v. Pena-Irala,
630 F.2d 876, 883 (2d Cir. 1980):

[Declarations] specify with great precision the
obligations of member nations under the Charter . .
{and constitute] a formal and solemn instrument,
suitable for rare occasions when principles of great
and lasting importance are being enunciated .
Thus, a Declaration creates an expectation of
adherence, and insofar as the expectation is gradually
justified by State practice, a declaration may by
custom become recognized as laying down rules
binding upon the States.

(internal quotations and citations omitted). See also Fernandez v.
Wilkinson, 505 F. Supp. 787, 796 (D. Kan. 1980) (“There are a great
number of other international declarations, resolutions, and
recommendations. While not technically binding, these documents
establish broadly recognized standards.”).

16

but also calling upon states, in specific terms, to exercise
due diligence.” The United Nations General Assembly
subsequently adopted a detailed Resolution that “requires
States to take serious action to protect victims and prevent
domestic violence.”””

The United Nations also has undertaken many
other initiatives to encourage states to ensure the right to
protection from and remedies for domestic violence. For
example, in 1994, the United Nations Commission on
Human Rights appointed the first U.N. Special
Rapporteur on Violence Against Women to analyze and
document the phenomenon, and hold governments
accountable for violations against women. See U.N. High
Comm’r for Human Rights Econ. and Soc. Council
Decision, U.N. ESCOR, 1994 Sub. Sess., 42nd Plen.

** Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against Women, supra
note 13, arts. 1, 2 (recognizing the right to be free from violence, and
that “violence against women” includes “[p]hysical, sexual and
psychological! violence occurring in the family, including battering”);
art. 4 (calling upon states to “pursue by all appropriate means and
without delay a policy of eliminating violence against women,”
including “exercis[ing] due diligence to prevent, investigate and, in
accordance with national legislation, punish acts of violence against
women, whether those acts are perpetrated by the State or private
persons”).

Resolution adopted by the General Assembly, Elimination of
Domestic Violence Against Women, U.N. GAOR, 58th Sess., ¥ 1(d),
U.N. Doc. A/Res/58/147 (2004). The Resolution stresses “that States
have an obligation to exercise due diligence . . . and to provide
protection to the victims,” id. ¢ 5, including specifically, to
“establish{] adequate legal protection against domestic violence”;
“ensure greater protection for women, inter alia, by means of, where
appropnate, orders restraining violent spouses from. entering the
family home”; “establish and/or strengthen police response protocols
and procedures”; and “take measures to ensure the protection of
women subjected to violence, access to just and effective remedies,
inter alia, through compensation and indemnitication and healing of
victims.” Jd. ¥ 7(a), (e), (i), (j).

17

Mtg., U.N. Doc. E/DEC/1994/254 (1994). Her Reports
have been the basis for the Commission’s annual
resolutions emphasizing states’ obligations to eliminate
violence against women in all contexts, including in the
home.”'

Moreover, United Nations World Conferences
have condemned gender violence as a human rights
violation and called for international and national
remedies, in particular, the 1993 Vienna World
Conference on Human Rights” and the 1995 Fourth
World Conference on Women in Beijing.”®

*' For Reports on domestic violence in the home, see Integration of
the Human Rights of Women and the Gender Perspective: Violence
Against Women, Report of the Special Rapporteur on Violence
Against Women, its causes and consequences, U.N. ECOR, Hum.
Rts. Comm. 59" Sess., U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2003/75 (2003) (“2003
Special Rapporteur Report’), Violence Against Women in the Family:
Report of the Special Rapporteur on Violence Against Women, its
causes and consequences, U.N. ESCOR, Hum. Rts. Comm., 55"
Sess., U.N. Doc.E/CN.4/RES/1999/42 (1999); Report of the Special
Rapporteur on Violence Against Women, its causes and
consequences, U.N. ESCOR, Hum. Rts. Comm., 54” Sess., U.N.
Doc. E/CN.4/1998/54 (1998); Report of the Special Rapporteur on
Violence Against Women, its causes and consequences, U.N. ESCOR,
Hum. Rts. Comm., 53 Sess., U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1997/47 (1997).

2 The Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action recognized
gender violence as a human rights violation and triggered system-
wide as well as national reforms designed to eliminate gender
violence and advance the human rights of women. Vienna
Declaration end Programme of Action, World Conference on Human
Rights, at ¢ 18, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 157/24 (Part I) (1993).

8 Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action, Fourth World
Conference on Women, at Annex I, ch. IV $¥ 125-30, U.N. Duc.
A/CONF.177/20 and A/CONF.177/20/Add.1 (1995). Significantly,
the consensus Beijing Platform included the elimination of all forms
of violence against women as one of its twelve strategic objectives,
and called for states to ensure the right of women to be free from
violence by, inter alia, providing “women who are subjected to

18

The emergence of an international customary
norm is further illustrated by the rapid, world-wide reform
of laws and practices to provide protection against gender
and domestic violence, the fourth category of relevant
evidence. Recent international surveys indicate that states
are adopting a range of protective measures, including
protective orders, to prevent domestic violence,’ and that
there is increasing recognition of the importance of
effective enforcement of restraining orders such as that at
issue here.*®

Finally, the decisions of international human
rights courts and commissions determining that women’s
international human rights were violated by state failure
to provide or enforce fair and effective protections against
gender-based violence, including domestic violence,
provide the fifth type of evidence for this customary
human rights norm.

violence with access to the mechanisms of justice and . . . to just and
effective remedies for the harm they have suffered.” Jd. at 4 125(h).
The United Nations reaffirmed its commitment to eliminating
violence against women as outlined in the Beijing Declaration and
Platform in the Resolution Adopted by the General Assembly ¥ 2,
U.N. GAOR, 33rd Special Sess, U.N. Doc. A/RES/S-23/2 (2000).

* See generally Violence Against Women: Report of the Secretary
General, U.N., GAOR, 59th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/59/281 (2004)
(“Sec 'y Gen. VAW Report”); 2003 Special Rapporteur Report, supra;
World Health Organization, World Report of Violence and Health
105 (Etienne G. Krug et al., eds. 2002) (“WHO World Report”).

* See, e.g., 2003 Special Rapporteur Report, supra, at 4 1857; WHO
World Report, supra, at 105; Sec'y Gen. VAW Report, supra, at ¥ 65
(“Women victims of violence, or women who are at risk of repeated
acts of violence in the home, should have immediate means of redress
and protection, including protection or restraining orders, access to
legal aid, and shelters staffed with personnel who are sensitive to
victims’ needs.”’).

19

In M.C. v. Bulgaria, 2003-1 Eur. Ct. H.R. 646 %
185-87 (2004), the European Court of Human Rights held
that Bulgaria violated the rights of a 14-year-old alleged
rape victim to be free from inhuman or degrading
treatment and to privacy guaranteed under Articles 3 and
8 of the European Convention by failing to investigate the
alleged rapes fully and effectively.°° The court awarded
M.C. compensation for “distress and psychological
trauma,” resulting “at least partly from the shortcomings
in the authorities’ approach” to the criminal investigation.
Id. 7 191, 194.

Likewise, in Maria da Penha Maia Fernandes v.
Brazil, in Annual Report. of the Inter-American
Commission on Human Rights, Case No. 12.051, Inter-
Am. C.H.R. 704, OEA/Ser. L/V/IL.111 doc. 20 rev. (Apr.
16, 2001), the Inter-American Commission on Human
Rights concluded that Brazil had violated Ms. Fernandes’
rights under the Convention of Belém do Para, arts. 3 and
4, by delaying for more than 15 years the prosecution of
her abusive husband for her attempted murder, noting that
“this violation form{ed] a pattern of discrimination
evidenced by the condoning of domestic violence against
women in Brazil through ineffective judicial action.” /d.
§ 3. The Commission therefore recommended “prompt

*© The court concluded that “the approach taken by the investigator
and prosecutors in the case fell short of the requirements inherent in
the States’ positive obligations — viewed in the light of the relevant
modern standards in comparative and international law - to establish
and apply effectively a criminal-law system punishing al! forms of
rape and sexual abuse.” M.C. v. Bulgaria, 2003-1 Eur. Ct. H.R. 646 4
187 (2004). The court further acknowledged that “[wJhile the choice
of the means to secure compliance with [international human nghts
law] . . . is in principle within the State’s margin of appreciation,
effective deterrence against grave acts such as rape, where
fundamental values and essential aspects of private life are at stake,
requires efficient criminal-law provisions.” /d. 4 150.

20

and effective compensation for the victim, and the
adoption of measures at the national level to eliminate
tolerance by the State of domestic violence against
women.” /d.

Taken together, these international and regional
treaties and other documents evidencing state practice
establish that state failure to provide effective protection
from domestig violence is recognized as a “specific,
universal and obligatory” violation of human rights
throughout the world, see Sosa, 124 S. Ct. at 2766-67,
that gives rise to a right to compensation. This
international consensus, reflecting an evolved customary
norm of international law, lends further and compelling
support for interpreting the Due Process Clause to permit
Ms. Gonzales to pursue her federal civil rights claim in
this case.

” See also Airey v. Ireland, 32 Eur. Ct. H.R. (Ser. A) $7 9, 24, 28
(1979) (holding that Ireland violated right to access to court for a
decree of separation from woman's abusive and alcoholic husband by
failing to provide her with legal aid to do so); MZ v. Bolivia, in
Annual Report of the Inter-American Commission of Human Rights,
Case No. 12.350, Inter-Am. C.H.R. 121, OEA/Ser. L/V/11.114 doc. 5
rev. (Oct. 10, 2001) (determining that, if the allegations concerning
the judicial overturning of a rape conviction in the face of
overwhelming evidence were true, violations of the Inter-Amencan
Convention by Bolivia would be established); cases cited supra note
4.

III.

AS A STATE PARTY TO THE ICCPR, THE
UNITED STATES’ COMMITMENT TO ENSURE

CLAUSE AND THE AVAILABILITY OF A
REMEDY UNDER 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

The United States’ ratification of the ICCPR,
which largely parallels the Bill of Rights,”* supports the
Court’s determination in this case that the police deprived
Ms. Gonzales and her children of due process in their

As a ratified treaty, the ICCPR constitutes “a ‘Law
of the Land’ under the Supremacy Clause, Art. VI, Cl. 2,
of the Constitution,” see U.S. v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 230
(1942), which implements the fundamental international

* United States Senate Report on Ratification of the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, S. Exec. Rep. No. 102-23, at
2 (1992) (“The rights guaranteed by the Covenant are similar to those
guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution and the Bil! of Rights”).

As discussed below, the Senate's reservations, understandings and
declarations to the ICCPR do not undermine, but rather support, this
Court's authori’ \o consider the treaty as persuasive authority.

22

principle of pacta sunt servunda that “every treaty in
force is binding upon the parties to it and must be
performed by them in good faith.” Law of Treaties,
supra, art. 26. As Justice O'Connor has noted, “domestic
courts should faithfully recognize the obligations imposed
by international law. The Supremacy Clause of the
United States Constitution gives legal force to foreign
treaties, and our status as a free nation demands faithful
compliance with the law of free nations.” Sandra Day
©’Connor, Federalism of Free Nations, 28 N.Y.U. J. Int'l
L. & Pol. 35, 42 (1997).

Under both ICCPR article 50 and international
law, the United States may, as a federal state, relegate
different functions to its constituent parts, but
concurrently it must ensure that the treaty is fully
effective throughout its territory.*' Consistent with this
obligation, the U.S. Senate did not take a reservation to
ICCPR art. 50.° Rather, it ratified the ICCPR with the

* See also Exec. Order No. 13,107, 63-Fed. Reg. 68,991 § 1 (Dec.10,
1998) (stating that “[ijt shall be the policy and practice of the
Government of the United States . . . fully to respect and implement
its obligations under the international human nghts treaties to which
it is a party, including the ICCPR”).

“ ICCPR, supra, art. 50 provides: “The provisions of the present
Covenant shal] extend to all parts of federal States without any
limitations or exceptions.” See generally Law of Treaties, supra, art.
27 (“A party may not invoke the provisions of its internal law as
justification for its failure to perform a treaty.”); id. art. 29 (“{ujniess
a different intention appears from the treaty . . . a treaty is binding
upon each party in respect of its entire territory”); The Restatement of
the Law (Third), Foreign Relations Law of the United States § 207(b)
(1987) (a federal state “is responsible for any violation of its
obligations under international law resulting from action or inaction
by the government or authorities of any political subdivision of the
state”).

“ The Senate considered a reservation to article $0 “not necessary...
since the intent is not to modify or limit U.S. undertakings under the

23

following express understanding (the “federalism
understanding”’):

That the United States understands that this
Convention shall be implemented by the
Federal Government to the extent that it
exercises legislative and judicial jurisdiction
over the matters covered therein, and
otherwise by the state and local
governments; to the extent that state end
such matters, the Federal Government shall
take measures appropriate to the Federal
system to the end that the competent
authorities of the state or local governments
may take appropriate measures for the
fulfillment of the Convention.

Understanding III(5), U.S. Reservations, Declaration,
Understandings, and Proviso, International Covenant on .
Civil and Political Rights, 138 Cong. Rec. $4781-01
(1992).

The Senate explained, as did the Admuinistration’s
1994 Report to the United Nations Human Rights
Committee (the “1994 Report”), that this understanding
was intended “to emphasize domestically that there is no
intent to alter the constitutional balance of authority
between the State and Federal governments” and “to
signal to our treaty partners that the U.S. will implement

” §. Exec. ~<A N 102-23 at 18.

24

as appropriate."*? When presenting the 1994 Report to
the Human Rights Committee, the U.S. spokesperson
stated that while federalism concerns would not permit
the federal government to obligate the states to undertake
particular action -- such as “dictat{ing] the basic form or
internal workings of state government” -- federal
responsibility did extend to “enforcfing] uniform
standards for the respect of civil and political rights."“*

The Senate also attached a non-self-executing
declaration as to ICCPR articles 1-27, stating:

For reasons of prudence, we recommend
including a declaration that the substantive
provisions of the Covenant are not self-
executing. The intent is to clarify that the
Covenant will not create a private cause of
action in U.S. courts .. . . [E]xisting U.S.
law generally complies with the Covenant;
hence, implementing legislation is not
contemplated.

S. Exec. Rep. No. 102-23 at 18-19 (emphasis added).

” S. Exec. Rep. No. 102-23 at 19-20 (emphasis added). See also
Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties Under Article
40: Initial Reports of States Parties Due in 1993: United States of
America, Hum. Rts. Comm., Annex Il, 4 I-Ill, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/81/Add.4 (1994).

“ Summary of Record of the 1405th Meeting: United State- of
. America, U.N. GAOR, Hum. Rts. Comm., 53rd Sess. ¢ 10, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/SR.1405 (1995) (emphasis added). Significantly, the
Human Rights Committee noted “with satisfaction the assurances of
the [United States] Government that its declaration regarding the
federal syst is not a reservation and is not intended to affect the
international obligations of the United States.” Concluding
Observations of the Human Rights Committee: United States of
America, U.N. GAOR, Hum. Rts. Comm. % 266-304, U.N. Doc.
A/S0/40, CCPR/C/79/Add.50 (1995).

25

Given this Senate recognition of the relevance of
existing U.S. law to the rights protected by the ICCPR,
and the Senate commitment to employ “appropriate
legislative, executive and judicial means, federal or state
as appropriate” in service of the ICCPR, S. Exec. Rep.
No. 102-23 at 19-20, it is reasonable to assume that the
Senate contemplated that achieving compliance with the
treaty’s terms could require the use of already-existing
domestic rights and remedies, and moreover, in light of
the federalism understanding, that such remedies could
include federal civil rights remedies.*°

In considering the weight that the ICCPR
commands in this context, it is useful to recognize that the
non-self-executing declaration does not undermine this
Court’s authority to consider the ICCPR in deciding this

section 1983 claim.“ In reporting to the Human Rights
eaation the United States stated: “The ([self-
executing] distinction is one of domestic law only; in
either case, the treaty remains binding on the United
States as a matter of international law.”
HRI/CORE/1/Add.49: United States of America, 4 138

” This reading of the non-self-executing declaration is entirely
consistent with this Court's ruling in Sosa that by virtue of the non-
self-executing declaration “the [Covenant] did not itself create
a 124 S. Ct. at 2767

She « The ay” of such declarations has been sharply- criticized,
however, including on constitutional grounds. See, ¢.g., Louis
Henkin, Foreign Affairs and the United States Constitution 201-03
(2d ed. 1996); Louis Henkin, Two Hundred Years of Constitutional
Confrontations in the D.C. Courts, 90 Geo. L. J. 725, 733-34 (2002);
Martin S. Flaherty, History Right?: Historical Scholarship, Original
Understanding, and Treaties as “Supreme Law of the Land,” 99
Colum. L. Rev. 2095 (1999); David Sloss, Non-Self-Executing
Treaties: Exposing a Constitutional Fallacy, 36 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 1,
45-76 (2002); John Quigley, Judge Bork is Wrong: The Covenant is
the Law, 71 Wash. U. L.Q. 1087, 1101-1102 (1993).

26

(August 1994). The United States representative affirmed
this view in response to the Human Rights Committee’s
concerns regarding the declaration, stating: “[t]o clarify
an apparent misunderstanding, the courts [of the United
States} could refer to the Covenant and take gu’ isrce
from [the Covenant] even though it was noi svif
executing. What the Covenant could not do was provide
a cause of action.” Summary of Record of the 1405th
Meeting: United States of America, UN. GAOR, Hum.
Rts. Comm., 53rd Sess. § 8, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/SR.1405
(1995) (Remarks of Conrad Harper).*’ Thus, the non-
self-executing declaration neither nullifies the binding
nature of the ICCPR nor the appropriateness of federal
judicial attention to the treaty; nor does it disturb the
fundamental principle, embodied in the Supremacy
Clause, that absent irreconcilable conflict, international
law carries great weight in the interpretation of domestic
law.

* See also Observations of State Parties under article 40(5) of the
Convention, United States of America, CCPR A/50/40/Vol. 1, Annex
VI Pt. 4 (if a state party “lacks any means under its domestic law by
which Covenant rights may be enforced. . . such an approach would
not, of course, be consistent with the fundamental principle of pacta
Sunt servunda”).

* The principle, most often discussed in relation to customary
international law, applies with at least equal rigor to treaty
commitments. See Weinberger v. Rossi, 56 U.S. 25, 32 (1982) (“It
has been a maxim of statutory construction since the decision in
Murray v. The Charming Betsy, 2 Cranch 64, 118 [6 U.S. 64, 118]
(1804), that ‘an act of congress ought never to be construed to violate
the law of nations, if any other possible construction remains. . . . . a
see also Joan Fitzpatrick, The Significance and Determination of
Customary International Human Rights Law: Relevance of
Customary International Norms to the Death Penalty in the United
States, 25 Ga. J. Int'l & Comp. L. 165, 179-180 (1995/1996)
(explaining that courts should interpret constitutional norms
consistently with international norms because “(njot only does this
approach help insure the international law-abiding character of the

27

Turning to the case before this Court, here,
Colorado sought to protect Ms. Gonzales and her children
from domestic violence through a mandatory restraining
order. Colorado failed in its obligations only when the
police failed to accord her due process in enforcing the
order.” In light of our treaty obligations and the
federalism understanding, it is appropriate for this Court
to interpret the Constitution to require due process in the
enforcement of a mandatory protective order and a
remedy under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Section 1983
jurisdiction does not supplant the states, but “interpose[s]
the federal courts . . . to protect the people from
unconstitutional action under color of state law,” Mitchum
v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 242 (1972), and to provide a
balanced means of “at least indirect federal control over
the unconstitutional actions of state officials.” Ngiraingas
v. Sanchez, 495 U.S. 182, 189 (1990) (citing District of
Columbia v. Carter, 409 U.S. 418, 428 (1973)). Thus,
considering the ICCPR in these circumstances not only
supports a remedy for Ms. Gonzales, but also encourages
future enforcement of protective orders on the local level
consistent with our international commitment. Just as
federal courts adjudicate section 1983 claims against local
officials and entities when they fail to accord positive

United States, it helps to avoid a clash between two important
interpretive principles — that statutes should be construed where
possible, to be consistent with the Constitution and with international
law”).
” This breakdown of legal protection from domestic violence at the
police level is not unique to Colorado or the United States.
According to the World Health Organization, internationally, “{a)fter
support services for victims, efforts to reform police practice are the
next most common form of intervention against domestic violence . .
. . when training alone proved largely ineffective in changing police
behaviour, efforts shifted to seeking laws requiring mandatory arrest
for domestic violence and policies that forced police officers to take a
more active stand.” WHO World Report, supra, at 105.

28

federal due process protections to those accused of taking
life,” so it would be consistent to the task of preserving
life, and precious family relationships, to do so here.

In sum, by recognizing federal civil rights
jurisdiction to provide an effective remedy for the due
process violation and resultant unspeakable violence
suffered by Ms. Gonzales and her children, this Court will
“give[] legal force” to this treaty and will also signal to
the world that the United States takes seriously its treaty
and international legal commitments.

® See, e.g, Mayer v. City of Chicago, 404 U.S. 189 (1991) (indigent
access to appeal in quasi-criminal cases); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372
U.S. 335 (1963) (right to counsel).

ao -

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, as well as those stated
in the brief for Respondents, the decision of the court
below should be affirmed.

Respectfully submitted,

Jennifer K. Brown* Rhonda Copelon¢
Maya Raghu Andrew Fields
Legal Momentum International Women’s
395 Hudson Street Human Rights Law Clinic
New York, N.Y. 10014 City University of New
(212) 925-6635 York

School of Law
*Counsel of Record 65-21 Main Street

Flushing, N.Y. 11367

(718) 340-4163

February 9, 2005

¢ Counsel wish to acknow’zdge the contributions of the
interns in the International Women’s Human Rights Law
Clinic to this brief.

l
NAMES AND STATEMENTS OF INTEREST
OF AMICI CURIAE

Organizations

The Allard K. Lowenstein International Human
Rights Clinic (the “Clinic”) is a Yale Law School
program that gives students first-hand experience in
human rights advocacy. The Clinic undertakes numerous
litigation and research projects on behalf of human rights
organizations and individual victims of human rights
abuses. The Clinic’s work is based on the human rights
standards contained in international customary and
conventional law, at the core of which is the prohibition
against discrimination. Since the Clinic began more than
ten years ago, its students have worked on a number of
lawsuits and other projects designed to combat racial,
gender, ethnic and other kinds of discrimination. In recent
years, the Clinic has focused increasing attention on
efforts to ensure respect for international human rights
standards in the United States.

Amnesty International USA is the U.S. section of
Amnesty International, a Nobel Prize-winning
organization with more than 1.8 million members,
supporters and subscribers in over 150 countries and
territories throughout the world. Amnesty International’s
mission is to undertake research and action focused on
preventing and ending grave abuses of the rights to
physical and mental integrity, freedom of conscience and
expression, and freedom from discrimination, within the
context of its work to promote all human rights. Amnesty
International is privately funded and is independent of any
political ideology or economic interest.

2

The Center for Constitutional Rights (“CCR”) is a
non-profit legal and educational organization dedicated to
advancing and protecting the rights guaranteed by the
United States Constitution and the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights. CCR has successfully litigated many
important international human rights cases since 1980,
including Filartiga v. Pena-lrala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir.
1980), and currently represents the plaintiffs in Doe v.
Unocal, Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum, Bowoto v.
Chevron and Saleh v. Titan.

Center for Women’s Global Leadership (“Global
Center”), a project of Douglass College, Rutgers
University (New Brunswick) has developed and
facilitated women's leadership for women's human rights
and social justice worldwide since 1989. The Global
Center has advocated the recognition of women’s human
rights, and, in particular, violence against women, in
international, regional and national contexts and has
played a major role at various United Nations meetings
addressing human rights norms and intergovernmental
and national implementation of commitments relating,
inter alia, to states’ obligations to prevent, punish and
eliminate violence against women.

Federation International de Droits de L’Homme
(“FIDH”) is an _ international nongovernmental
organization for the defense of the human rights enshrined
in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948.
Created in 1922, it has its central office in Paris, France
and includes 89 national affiliates throughout the world,
including in the United States of America. FIDH enjoys
consultative status with the United Nations, UNESCO,
the European Council and observer status with the
African Commission of Human and Peoples’ Rights.
FIDH participates in the defense of human rights through,

3

inter alia, sponsoring human rights missions and through
advancing rights in intergovernmental as well as national
courts and tribunals.

Human Rights Advocates (“HRA”) is a human
rights organization based in Berkeley, California
dedicated to promoting and protecting international
human rights. HRA participates actively in the work of
various United Nations human nghts bodies and is a fully
United Nations. HRA seeks to advance the panoply of
human rights issues, including the nghts of the child and
women’s rights, among others, through the United
Nations system, by participation in _ international
conferences, and through participation in litigation and
other activities in the United States.

International Women’s Human Rights Law Clinic
(“IWHR”), founded in 1992, is an educational project of
the City University of New York School of Law
dedicated to promoting the international human nghts of
women and to implementation internationally, regionally
and in the United States. [WHR is recognized for its
expertise in the gender dimensions of international human
rights and international criminal law as well as in
constitutional issues ©, domestic es of
human nights.

Legal Momentum advances the nghts of women
and girls by using the power of the law and creating
innovative public policy. Legal Momentum advocates in
the courts, Congress and state legislatures, as well as with
unions and private business, to improve the protection
afforded victims of domestic violence, and is a leading
authority on the rights of immigrant victims of such
violence. As with its amicus curiae brief in the cases

. +

Grutter v. Bollinger and Gratz v. Bollinger, Legal
Momentum here seeks to provide the Court with relevant,
persuasive authority from international and comparative
law that is relevant to the constitutional **-.-es at hand.
National E ic and Social Rights Initiati
(“NESRI”), founded in 2003 and located in New York
City, promotes a cultural and political commitment to a
human rights vision for the United States that ensures
dignity and access to the basic resources needed for

human development and civic_ participation. NESRI
develops expert materials on human rights issues and
works to strengthen legal standards in applying human
nghts to the United States.

International Human Rights Scholars And Experts
Willhiam J. Aceves, California Western School of Law

Deborah Anker, Harvard Immigration and Refugee
Clinical Program, Harvard Law School

Kelly Dawn Askin, Yale Fellow and Fulbright New
Century Scholar

Charlotte Bunch, Rutgers University-New Brunswick

Carolyn Patty Blum, Boalt Hall (emeritus), University of
California (Berkeley)

Douglass W. Cassel, Center for International Human
Rights, Northwestern University School of Law

Jamie Chuang, Washington College of Law, American
University .

Roger Clark, Rutgers Law School-Camden

5

Rebecca J. Cook, Faculty of Law, University of Toronto
Radhika Coomaraswamy, United Nations Special
Rapporteur on Violence Against Women (1994-2003),
Colombo, Sri Lanka

Martha Davis, New England School of Law

Connie de la Vega, University of San Francisco School of
Law

Alda Facio, Concertacion Inter-Americana de las Mujeres

Activistas para Los Derechos Humanos, San Jose, Costa
Rica

George E. Edwards, Program in International Human
Rights Law, Indiana University School of Law

Stephanie Farrior, Pennsylvania State University,
Dickinson School of Law

Sid Harring, City University of New York School of Law

Deena R. Hurwitz, International Human Rights Law
Clinic, University of Virginia School of Law

Scott T. Johnson, Attorney at Law, Santa Monica,
Californi

Jules Lobel, University of Pittsburgh Law School

Bert Lockwood, Urban Morgan Institute for Human
Rights. University of Cincinnati
Beth Lyon, Villanova University School of Law

6

Dorean Marguerite Koenig, Thomas M. Cooley Law
School

Smita Narula, Center for Human Rights and Global
Justice, New York University School of Law

Sarah H. Paoletti, International Human Rights Clinic,
Washington College of Law

Karen Parker, International Human Rights Attorney, San
Francisco, CA

Jordan J. Paust, University of Houston Law Center

Sir Nigel Rodley, Chair, Human Rights Centre,
University of Essex, Colchester, United Kingdom

Meg Satterthwaite, Center for Human Rights and Global
Justice, New York University School of Law

Martin Scheinin, Abo Akademi University, Institute for
Human Rights, Abo/Turku, Finland

Beth Stephens, Rutgers-Camden School of Law
Penny M. Venetis, Rutgers School of Law — Newark

Wendy Webster Williams, Georgetown University Law
Center

Richard J. Wilson, Washington College of Law,
American University

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385016_0035%3A15. Public record. Not legal advice.
