# Petition for Writ of Certiorari — CTS Corp. v. Waldburger, 134 S. Ct. 2175 (2014) (No. 13-339) > Briefs, arguments, decisions, and more. URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385015_0926%3A02 ## Record - **Collection:** Supreme Court brief - **Document type:** Petition for Writ of Certiorari - **Published:** January 1, 2014 ## Text Supt erhe Court, U.S. Fite D Sep 13 2013 3 3 3 9 OFFICE OF THE OLESK No. 13-___ IN THE Supreme Court of the Anited States CTS CORPORATION, Petitioner, PETER WALDBURGER, ET AL., Respondents. On Petition For Writ Of Certiorari To The United States Court Of Appeals For The Fourth Circuit PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI E. Thomison Holman Brian J. Murray ADAMS HENDON CARSON Counsel of Record CROW & SAENGER, P.A. Michael F. Dolan 72 Patton Avenue JONES DAY Asheville, NC 28801 77 West Wacker Drive, . Suite 3500 Richard M. Re Chicago, IL 60601 JONES Day (312) 782-3939 51 Louisiana Avenue, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20001 bymurray@jonesday.com SEPTEMBER 13, 2013 Counsel for Petitioner Ser ee ne ee ee QUESTION PRESENTED For certain state-law tort actions involving envi- ronmental harms, the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and _ Liability Act (CERCLA) preempts the state statute of limitations’ commencement date and replaces it with a delayed commencement date provided by federal law. Specif- ically, 42 U.S.C. § 9658 provides that if “the applica- ble limitations period for such an action (as specified in the State statute of limitations or under common law) provides a commencement date which is earlier than the federally required commencement date, such period shall commence at the federally required commencement date in lieu of the date specified in such State statute.” Jd. § 9658(a)(1). Section 9658, in turn, defines “applicable limitations period”—1.e., the state laws to which § 9658 applies—to “mean|] the period specified in a statute of limitations during which a civil] action referred to in subsection (a)(1) of this section may be brought.” Jd. § 9658(b)(2). In this case, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit deepened a split in the state and federal appellate courts by interpreting § 9658 to preempt not just state statutes of imitations but also state statutes of repose. A statute of limitations ex- tinguishes a claimant’s right to pursue a cause of ac- tion after a certain period of time following accrual, whereas a statute of repose abolishes a cause of ac- tion as to a particular defendant after a period of time, regardless of whether the claim has accrued. The question presented is: Did the Fourth Circuit correctly interpret 42 U.S.C. § 9658 to apply to state statutes of repose in addition to state statutes of limi- tations? i PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING The plaintiffs in this case are Respondents Peter Waldburger, Sandra Ratcliffe, Lee Ann Smith, Tom Pinner, IV, a/k/a Bud Pinner, IV, Hans Momkes, Wilma Momkes, Walter Dockins, Jr., Autumn Dockins, William Clark Lisenbee, Dan Murphy, Lori Murphy, Robert Aversano, Daniel L. Murphy, Laura A. Carson, Glen Horecky, Gina Horecky, Renee Rich- ardson, David Bradley, Byron Hovey, Ramona Hovey, Peter Tatum MacQueen, IV, Bethan MacQueen, Pa- tricia Pinner, Tom Pinner, III, a/k/a Buddy Pinner, III, and Madeline Pinner. The defendant is Petitioner CTS Corporation. il CORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT Petitioner CTS Corporation is a publicly held cor- poration. It does not have any parent corporations. GAMCO Asset Management, Inc., a wholly owned subsidiary of GAMCO Investors, Inc., owns 10% or more of CTS Corporation’s stock. 1V TABLE OF CONTENTS QUESTION PRESENTED ..................:ccecce-eeees PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING .................. TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ......................cccc00 ee EE stiptinnivncctenimiinnsaciniianiniinna JURISDICTION I. THE FOURTH CIRCUIT'S DECISION DEEPENS A CONFLICT IN THE STATE AND FEDERAL APPELLATE I]. THE FOURTH CIRCUIT'S DECISION RAISES AN IMPORTANT AND RECURRING I =GAL ISSUE................. Ii]. THE FOURTH CIRCUITS DECISION CONFLICTS WITH THIS COURT'S | _ SIRI SS ETON NR oar SN OER IV. THIS CASE PRESENTS AN IDEAL VEHICLE TO RESOLVE THE QUESTION PRESENTED..................... ET acicnscisisceiibsiitcindidsineisbpilianieeiientndansina APPENDIX A: Opinion of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit STATUTORY PROVISION INVOLVED.......... STATEMENT OF THE CASE ...........00........00 REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION Vv TABLE OF CONTENTS (continued) APPENDIX B: Opinion of the United States District Court for the Western District EERE Re i ae Ri 37a APPENDIX C: Memorandum and Recommen- dation of the United States District Court for the Western District of North RENEE Te eae RE lee EY RBM ea Ae Balas 40a vi TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Page(s) CASES A.S.1., Inc. v. Sanders, 835 F. Supp. 1349 (D. Kan. 1993)..................000 21 Abrams v. Ciba Specialty Chems. Corp., 659 F. Supp. 2d 1225 (S.D. Ala. 2009).......... 19, 21 Altria Grp., Inc. v. Good, I ia 27 Anderson v. United States, 669 F.3d 161 (4th Cir. 2011) ......cccccccceccceseseeeeeeees 19 Bates v. Dow Agrosciences LLC, i cctes 27 Bolick v. Am. Barmag Corp., 293 S.E.2d 415 (N.C. 1982) .................ccccccrees 23, 24 Bond v. United States, a a ealinintaninaens 19 Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Poole Chem. Co., 419 F.3d 355 (5th Cir. 20085) .............cccccccseee passim Cheswold Volunteer Fire Co. v. Lambertson Constr. Co., 489 A.2d 413 (Del. 1985) ........ccccccecesccseseceseeseeseees 24 Clark Cnty. v. Sioux Equip. Corp., 753 N.W.2d 406 (S.D. 2008) Coleman v. H.C. Price Co., No. 11-2937, 2013 WL 64613 I ae laa 21 Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, He SACRE 23 vil TABLE OF AUTHORITIES (continued) Evans v. Walter Indus., Inc., 579 F. Supp. 2d 1349 (N.D. Ala. 2008) ......... First United Methodist Church of Hyattsville v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 882 F.2d 862 (4th Cir. 1989) .................... 00 Fisher v. Ciba Specialty Chem. Corp., No. 03-0566, 2007 WL 2995525 I, Wn I, Th i ae German ex rel. Grace v. CSX Transp., Inc., 510 F. Supp. 2d 630 (S.D. Ala. 2007) ............ Gregory v. Ashcroft, Se SR SE NE chiciitnicisnsisiinsincactnelenitbesitiastiie Hillsborough Cnty. v. Automated Med. Labs., Inc., ee ee re Ci iainniaeeihstiinsias iittala In re Erickson, 815 F.2d 1090 (7th Cir. 1987).....................66. J.H. Westerman Co. v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co Bae Be Gs Rtn csctccints snccssssstncstnccee James Ferrera & Sons, Inc. v. Samuels, 486 N.E.2d 58 (Mass. App. Ct. 1985)............ Kucana v. Holder, a Lamb v. Wedgewood S. Corp., 302 S.E.2d 868 (N.C. 1983) ............. eee eeeeeeeees McDermott Int], Inc. v. Wilander, ee ee Ce ieticnccinnicscsnpncncsinvesescncsssnine eile 23 Vill TABLE OF AUTHORITIES (continued) McDonald v. Sun Oil Co., 423 F. Supp. 2d 1114 (D. Or. 2006)............ McDonald v. Sun Oil Co., 548 F.3d 774 (9th Cir. 2008) ...................... Mechler v. United States, No. 12-1183, 2013 BL 205882 Se BI, BRE: Bik SII erercctcciccccchaveectonionsnnte Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, BR ee PP OR iicccscnsccinesssunnsennasomecenten Molzof v. United States, SE SNES I Cc irincenecstenesnesascietnteiemesioons Moore v. Walter Coke, Inc., No. 2:11-cv-1391-SLB, 2012 WL 4731255 (N.D. Ala. Sept. 28, 2012).............0... eee. Neblett v. Hanover Inspection Serv., Inc., No. COA06-1676, 2007 WL 2701349 (N.C. Ct. App. Sept. 18, 2007) .................... Rapanos v. United States, EE Be Fe Ge rrecevcncencncscessntepeersseesevens Raygor v. Regents of the Univ. of Minn., Be CE Ce GR crcnsnccsesersessetmnvventwoowsetene Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., Se Se i Rintascrtcriecesercinessicnesncnnienes Rodriguez v. United States, 480 U.S. 522 (1987) (per curiam) ............... Safeco Ins. Co. of Am. v. Burr, | RR er en aee nano Cem ix TABLE OF AUTHORITIES (continued) Simmons v. United States, 421 F.3d 1199 (11th Cir. 2005) (per curiam)...... 20 Tipton & Young Constr. Co. v. Blue Ridge Structure Co., 446 S.E.2d 603 (N.C. Ct. App. 1994) ......cccccceeeeeees 7 United States v. Charter Int7 O1l Co., BB F.BG GIO (iat Cae. 1GBDG) ...0c.cccccccesccccecccscccscoveses 19 United States v. Kubrick, Ne ee eee i ciriiitincntanctrsntainisctvintaneancaccnciniian 24 Univ. Engg Corp. v. Perez, 451 So.2d 463 (Fla. 1984) (per curiam)............... 23 Waldburger v. CTS Corp., 2013 WL 3455775 (4th Cir. July 10, 2013)......... 20 Wilson v. McLeod Oil Co., 398 S.E.2d 586 (N.C. 1990) ...............ccccceeeeeeeeeeees 29 Wyoming v. Oklahoma, Se NI: I I iiiacxceensebshedetieenenpnenieiamedeiactiin 20 STATUTES a Ue MN icihciciccaiciticciiititinnsecepeeiieehiilaie 1 I ican et ipiedaicceeipenidndeceioaniela 20 i IIE sictinsiscennninimsinninnnonsicieninseaiueiiciaiiaiminiuiti 8 Be a I sini ceeicehecieiisaicsnceunniibainisigateneiionsieaiastaliial passim N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-52(16) ...............ccscccsssccsssece passim OTHER AUTHORITIES | Black’s Law Dictionary 1546 (9th ed. 2009).............. 9 54 C.J.S. Limitations of Actions § 4 (1987) ............ 23 x TABLE OF AUTHORITIES (continued) Page(s) H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 99-962, 2d Sess. 262, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3276 ........... 16, 26 Andrew P. Morriss & Roger E. Meiners, 7he Destructive Role of Land Use Planning, 14 Tulane Envtl. L. J. 95 (2000).....................0.... 19 Restatement (Second) of Torts § 899 (1979)........... 24 OPINIONS BELOW The decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit (Pet. App. la-36a) is reported at ___F.38d__ The unreported decision of the Unit- ed States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina (Pet. App. 37a-39a) is available at 2012 WL 380053. The unreported memorandum and recommendation of the magistrate judge (Pet. App. 40a-47a) is available at 2011 WL 7153937. JURISDICTION The Fourth Circuit issued its opinion reversing the district court’s final judgment on July 10, 2013. Pet. App. la. This Court’s jurisdiction rests on 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1). STATUTORY PROVISION INVOLVED The provision of the Comprehensive Environmen- tal Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA) at issue in this case provides in full: (a) State statutes of limitations for hazardous sub- stance cases (1) Exception to State statutes — In the case of any action brought under State law for personal injury, or property damages, which are caused or contributed to by exposure to any hazardous sub- stance, or pollutant or contaminant, released into the environment from a facility, if the applicable limitations period for such action (as specified in the State statute of limitations or under common law) provides a commencement date which is ear- her than the federally required commencement date, such period shall commence at the federally required commencement date in lieu of the date specified in such State statute. 2 (2) State law generally applicable — Except as provided in paragraph (1), the statute of limita- tions established under State law shall apply in all actions brought under State law for personal injury, or property damages, which are caused or contributed to by exposure to any hazardous sub- stance, or pollutant or contaminant, released into the environment from a facility. (3) Actions under section 9607 —- Nothing in this section shall apply with respect to any cause of action brought under section 9607 of this title. (b) Definitions — As used in this section— (1) Subchapter I terms — The terms used in this section shall have the same meaning as when used in subchapter I of this chapter. (2) Applicable limitations period — The term “applicable limitations period” means the period specified in a statute of limitations during which a civil action referred to in subsection (a)(1) of this section may be brought. (3) Commencement date — The term “com- mencement date” means the date specified in a statute of limitations as the beginning of the ap- plicable limitations period. (4) Federally required commencement date (A) In general — Except as provided in sub- paragraph (B), the term “federally required commencement date” means the date the plain- tiff knew (or reasonably should have known) that the personal injury or property damages re- ferred to in subsection (a)(1) of this section were caused or contmbuted to by the hazardous sub- stance or pollutant or contaminant concerned. 3 (B) Special rules — In the case of a minor or incompetent plaintiff, the term “federally re- quired commencement date” means the later of the date referred to in subparagraph (A) or the following: (i) In the case of a minor, the date on which the minor reaches the age of majority, as de- termined by State law, or has a legal repre- sentative appointed. (ii) In the case of an incompetent individual, the date on which such individual becomes competent or has had a legal representative appointed. 42 U.S.C. § 9658. STATEMENT OF THE CASE A. This case concerns 42 U.S.C. § 9658, a unique federal provision that engrafts a special federa/ com- mencement date onto the running of state statutes of limitations governing state causes of action. This federal intrusion into state procedural law applies to any state action for “personal injury, or property damages’ that arises from a “hazardous substance, or pollutant or contaminant, released into the environ- ment from a facility.” Jd. § 9658(a)(1). For these qualifying state-law actions, § 9658 preempts the state commencement dates that would have other- wise applied under the state statutes of limitations, and provides a federal commencement date. Specifi- cally, if the “applicable limitations period for such ac- tion (as specified in the State statute of limitations or under common law) provides a commencement date which is earlier than the federally required com- mencement date, such period shall commence at the federally required commencement date in lieu of the date specified in such State statute.” /d. And § 9658 defines the “applicable limitations period” that it co- vers as the “period specified in a statute of limita- tions during which” the qualifying state claims may be brought. Jd. § 9658(b)(2). The federal commencement date that § 9658 pro- vides for these state-law claims is an “enhanced dis- covery rule.” Pet. App. 34a. Like North Carolina, most states have statutes of limitations that begin to run when the plaintiffs “bodily harm” or “physical damage” “becomes apparent or ought reasonably to have become apparent to the” plaintiff. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-52(16). In place of these triggering events, § 9658 delays the commencement of the state stat- utes of limitations until “the plaintiff knew (or rea- sonably should have known) that the personal injury or property damages ... were caused or contributed to by the hazardous substance or pollutant or con- taminant concerned.” 42 U.S.C. 9658(b)(4)(A). Ac- cordingly, this federal discovery rule does not trigger the state statute of limitations until the plaintiff knows of (or reasonably should have known of) both the injury and the causal connection between the in- jury and the alleged hazardous substance at issue. B. According to the complaint’s allegations, over several decades, CTS of Asheville, Inc., operated a plant in Asheville, North Carolina, that manufac- tured electronic components. Pet. App. 5la. As part of the manufacturing process, CTS of Asheville used and stored various toxic solvents at the plant. /d. In 1983, CTS of Asheville was dissolved, and Petitioner CTS Corporation took over the plant’s operations un- der its Asheville Division. Jd. at 52a. CTS Corpora- tion operated the plant for two years, and eventually 5 sold the property in 1987. The buyer then sold the unimproved portion of the property to a developer that built houses on the mountainside overlooking the former plant site. Pet. App. 53a-54a. Respond- ents—a group of individuals that purchased houses on or near the former CTS property—‘“contend that their land and ground water is contaminated by the toxic chemicals . . . that CTS Corporation left at the Facility when it sold the property.” /d. at 41a. In February 2011, Respondents brought a one- count complaint against CTS Corporation alleging that it had violated North Carolina’s nuisance law. Id. at 55a-57a. Respondents sought monetary dam- ages and a judgment requiring CTS Corporation to engage in reclamation of the toxic solvents and reme- diation of the environment around the former plant site. /d. at 57a. CTS Corporation moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that North Carolina's 10-year statute of repose had eliminated Respond- ents’ nuisance claim long before they brought this sult. A magistrate judge recommended that the district court grant CTS Corporation’s motion to dismiss. Pet. App. 40a. The magistrate initially noted that a 3-year statute of limitations governs North Carolina nuisance claims, and begins to run once “bodily harm to the claimant or physical damage to his property becomes apparent or ought reasonably to have be- come apparent to the claimant.” Pet. App. 43a (quot- ing N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-52(16)). A 10-year statute of repose also applied to these claims, however, which indicates that “no cause of action shall accrue more than 10 years from the last act or omission of the de- fendant giving rise to the cause of action.” Pet. App. 6 44a (quoting N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-52(16)). Because “[t}he last possible act or omission by Defendant CTS Corporation that could give rise te a cause of action occurred in 1987 when it sold the property,” the mag- istrate reasoned, Respondents’ nuisance claim was “barred by the statute of repose contained in N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-52(16).” Jd. The magistrate rejected Respondents’ two argu- ments for avoiding this statute of repose. The magis- trate disagreed with Respondents’ contention that the 10-year statute of repose violated the North Caro- lina Constitution’s “open courts provision.” Pet. App. 44a. “North Carolina courts have upheld shorter statute[s] of repose{] for other causes of action,” the magistrate explained, and the 10-year limit is “not so short as to effectively abolish all potential claims.” Pet. App. 45a (citing Lamb v. Wedgewood S. Corp., 302 S.E.2d 868 (N.C. 1983)). More relevant here, the magistrate also rejected Respondents’ position that § 9658 engrafts its feder- ally mandated commencement date not simply onto North Carolina’s 3-year statute of limitations but also onto its 10-year statute of repose. Pet. App. 46a. Re- lying on the Fifth Circuit’s decision in Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railway Co. v. Poole Chemical Co., 419 F.3d 355, 362-63 (5th Cir. 2005), the magis- trate reasoned that “[t]he clear language of the stat- ute... 1s limited to a state’s statute of limitations,” not a state’s statute of repose. Pet. App. 46a. The magistrate noted the well-known substantive differences between the two types of statutes. On the one hand, “[a] statute of repose is a substantive limi- tation, and is a condition precedent to a party’s rnght to maintain a lawsuit.” Pet. App. 47a (quoting 7ip- ton & Young Constr. Co. v. Blue Ridge Structure Co., 446 S.E.2d 603, 605 (N.C. Ct. App. 1994)). On the other, a statute of limitations is a “procedural device that operates as a defense to limit the remedy availa- ble from an existing cause of action.” /d. (quoting First United Methodist Church of Hyattsville v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 882 F.2d 862, 865 (4th Cir. 1989)). The district court subsequently adopted the magis- trate’s recommendation and entered final judgment for CTS Corporation. Pet. App. 39a. The court de- scribed the “magistrate judge’s analysis of CERCLA’s preemption of state statutes of limitations, as op- posed to statutes of repose” as “accurate and well- reasoned.” Pet. App. 39a. And the court found the Ninth Circuit’s contrary holding—that CERCLA preempted both statutes of limitation and statutes of repose—to be “flawed.” /d. (disagreeing with McDon- ald v. Sun Oil Co., 548 F.3d 774, 778 (9th Cir. 2008)). Section 9658's plain language applies only to state statutes of lmitations, the court explained, so the “McDonald court created an ambiguity where none existed.” /d. C. A divided panel of the Fourth Circuit reversed. Pet. App. la. The majority held that “the discovery rule articulated in § 9658 .. . preempts North Caroll- na’s ten-year limitation” in N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-52(16). Pet. App. 2a. It began with a historical summary of how § 9658 came to be. Congress passed CERCLA in 1980 against the backdrop of well-publicized envi- ronmental disasters. Pet. App. 2a-3a. The majority thus described CERCLA as “a remedial statute” de- signed to abate hazardous-waste sites and to shift the costs of cleanup to responsible parties. Pet. App. 3a- 4a. After CERCLA’s enactment, Congress “estab- 8 lished a study group to examine the ‘adequacy of ex- isting common law and statutory remedies in provid- ing legal redress for harm .. . caused by the release of hazardous substances into the environment.” /d. at 4a (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 9651(e)(1)). The study group determined that environmental claims have long la- tency periods not suited for statutes of limitations running from the time of the defendant’s last act or from the plaintiff's exposure to harm. Pet. App. 4a- 5a. So, the study group recommended to the states that they “adopt the rule that an action accrues when the plaintiff discovers or should have discov- ered the injury or disease and its cause,” and “repeal . Statutes of repose which, in a number of states have the same effect as some statutes of limitation in barring [a] plaintiffs claim before he knows that he has one.” Pet. App. 5a (quoting Superfund Section 301(e) Study Group, 97th Cong., Injuries and Dam- ages from Hazardous Wastes-Analysis and Improve- ment of Legal Remedies pt. 1, at 241 (Comm. Print 1982)). In 1986, the majority explained, Congress in- tervened by passing § 9658 instead of waiting for the states to amend their state laws. /d. The majority next “review[ed] the concepts of limi- tations and repose.” Pet. App. 9a. It noted that both limit the amount of time that a :laintiff has to bring suit. A statute of limitations “bars claims after a specified period ... based on the date when the claim accrued (as when the injury occurred or was discov- ered),” and is designed to discourage plaintiffs from sitting on their rights while evidence is lost. Pet. App. 10a (quoting Black’s Law Dictionary 1546 (9th ed. 2009) (emphasis added)). A statute of repose, by contrast, “bar[s] any suit that is brought after a spec- ified time since the defendant acted. . . even if this 9 period ends before the plaintiff has suffered a result- ing injury” and before the claim accrues. /d. (quoting Black’s Law Dictionary at 1546 (emphasis added)). A statute of repose’s grant of substantive immunity is designed to balance the interests of plaintiffs and de- fendants by setting a time limit beyond which no lia- bility exists. /d. The majority concluded that the 10- year penod at issue in this case was a statute of re pose under these general definitions, as the North Carolina courts themselves had repeatedly held. Pet. App. 10a-1la. The majority then turned to § 9658's language. It conceded that the district court could reasonably in- terpret § 9658 not to reach statutes of repose because it mentioned the phrase “statute of limitations” five times and the phrase “statute of repose” zero times. Pet. App. lla-12a. Yet the majority ultimately con- cluded that the provision was ambiguous as to whether Congress meant the phrase “statute of lim1- tations” to encompass statutes of repose. Pet. App. lla. The majority reasoned that the statute of repose at issue here appears in a section of the North Caro- lina Code entitled “Limitations, Other than Real Property,” so it could be interpreted to fall within § 9658(a) because it was “specified in the State stat- ute of limitations or under common law.” Pet. App. l2a. The majority next noted that the statute of re- pose could be interpreted to qualify under § 9658(b)’s definition of “applicable limitations period” because it was a “period,” “specified in a statute of limitations,” “during which a civil action ... may be brought.” Jd. Finally, because the statute of repose began to run at the time of the defendant's last action, its “com- mencement period” was earler than the federal 10 commencement date and could be interpreted to trig- ger that delayed date. Pet. App. 12a-13a. To avoid the appearance that it was “stretching to find ambiguity in the text,” the majority provided two additional rationales to support its interpretation that the phrase “statute of limitations” could include “statute of repose.” Pet. App. 13a. It noted that “a historical analysis reveals that both scholars and courts have often used the terms interchangeably.” /d. Given this confusion, the majority found it proba- ble that Congress intended for statute of limitations to cover statutes of repose. /d. Additionally, the ma- jority opined that there is a “lack of internal con- sistency between § 9658's substantive provision (§ 9658(a)(1)) and its’ definitional provision (§ 9658(b)(2)). The substantive provision indicates that it applies to an “applicable limitations period” “as specified in the State statute of limitations or un- der common law.” The definition of “applicable limi- tations period,” by contrast, defines the phrase as “the period specified in a statute of limitations” with- out reference to the common law. Pet. App. 13a-14a. The majority thus noted that § 9658 failed to man1- fest a plain meaning when state common law (rather than state statutory law) establishes the relevant limitations period. /d. The majority resolved this perce’ved ambiguity by holding that § 9658 preempts the commencement dates in state statutes of repose. It relied on three factors. First, it cited the study group’s recommenda- tions—which were “equally concerned with statutes of repose and limitations, and with their effect of bar- ring plaintiffs’ claims before they are aware of them.” Pet. App. 14a. Second, it cited CERCLA’s “remedial” 11 nature, opting for a “broad interpretation” of “statute of limitations” to further the statute’s remedial goals. Id. at 15a. Third, it cited the Ninth Circuit’s McDon- ald decision, noting that it was “unpersuaded” by the Fifth Circuit’s contrary analysis regarding the plain meaning of § 9658's text. /d. at 16a. The majority concluded by suggesting that its hold- ing may “raise the ire” of “corporations and other en- tities” that rely on statutes of repose, but explained that it had not turned a “blind eye” to the policies that these statutes vindicate. /d. After all, the ma- jority noted, a plaintiff still must meet its burden of proof on the merits, which will prove more difficult as time passes. /d at 17a. And, while its holding effec- tively eliminated the statute of repose by starting it and the statute of limitations at the exact same time, the 3-year period still apphed so “defendants will not necessarily be endlessly subjected to the possibility of litigation.” /d. Finally, the majority expressed again that its holding comported with the study group’s recommendations. /d. Judge Davis, in a short concurrence, noted that § 9658's “plain language” need not establish an ambi- guity if other tools of statutory interpretation proved that an ambiguity existed. Pet. App. 18a. Judge Thacker dissented. Pet. App. 19a-37a. Be- ginning with § 9658's plain language, the dissent re- jected the majority’s argument that the phrase “stat- ute of limitations” was ambiguous in 1986 when Con- gress adopted § 9658. The dissent recognized the “modern vintage” of the differences between “statutes of limitations” and “statutes of repose.” Pet. App. 24a. But this did not help the majority. Historically, statutes of limitations were “considered, along with 12 other statutory time-bars, to provide repose to liti- gants and were thus, generally, statutes of repose.” Pet. App. 24a. In 1986, therefore, “the only possible ambiguity may have been the meaning of ‘statute of repose’ and whether that term had fully matured into its modern definition.” Pet. App. 26a. There had, by contrast, never been any ambiguity on the narrower scope of the phrase “statute of lmitations’—the phrase actually used by § 9658. In addition, the dissent noted that the majority’s holding made § 9658 unworkable. “Importantly, the commencement date is defined as the beginning of the period in which a civil action may be brought.” Pet. App. 29a (citing 42 U.S.C. § 9658(b)(2)-(3)). But statutes of repose hike North Carolina’s do not create a beginning point when a claim may be brought; they create an outer limit whether or not the claim could have been brought before that limit runs. /d As such, “[b]lecause North Carolina's statute of repose does not create the beginning of the applicable limita- tions period, § 9658 cannot graft neatly—or at all— onto the North Carolina statute of repose so as to preempt its enforcement.” /d. While recognizing that the court need not look to legislative history because the plain language must control, the dissent also asserted that the relevant legislative history supported its “conclusion that Congress was aware that statutes of limitations were a distinct category of time-bar sta’ utes and specifical- ly chose only to preempt those statutes and not other statutory time bars such as statutes of repose.” /d. at 29a. Specifically, the study group’s report on which the majority had relied expressly distinguished be- tween statutes of limitations and statutes of repose, 13 recommending changes to both types of statutes. Jd. at 3la. That the very recommendations underlying § 9658 distinguished these two kinds of statutes il- lustrates that Congress could not hav~ been confused about their separate meanings. /7 at 32a. The dissent bolstered this interpretation with two canons of statutory interpretation. For one, the dis- sent explained that “the role of legislative compro- mise” should play a part in § 9658's interpretation. Jd. at 32a. The study group recommended a host of procedural reforms to state tort claims, but Congress, through § 9658, adopted only the recommendation concerning statutes of limitations. /d. at 34a. By do- ing so, Congress struck “a balance between harmoniz- ing certain procedural matters in toxic tort cases and allowing states to continue to regulate their own sub- stantive areas of law.” /d. at 34a-35a. The majority frustrated this compromise (and the legislative in- tent) by departing from the plain language and ex- panding the reach of the statute. For another, this case “arises in the context of fed eral preemption,” so the long-standing presumption against preemption should apply. /d. at 35a “Just as [courts] presume ‘Congress does not cavalierly pre- empt state-law causes of action|[,|’ [the courts] should also presume that Congress does not cavalierly preempt state substantive rights to be free from those state-law causes of action.” Jd. (quoting Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996)). This general presumption weighed against giving § 9658 an overly broad preemptive effect. Pet. App. 35a-36a. Since issuing its decision, the Fourth Circuit has stayed its mandate pending this Court’s disposition of this petition for a writ of certiorari. 14 REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION The Court should grant CTS Corporation’s petition for a writ of certiorari. First, the Fourth Circuit’s de- cision deepens a split in the federal and state appel- late courts over whether 42 U.S.C. § 9658 applies on- ly to state statutes of limitations or also to state stat- utes of repose. Second, the Fourth Circuit’s decision raises a legal issue of great practical and intrinsic importance. The question presented arises with great frequency, often in cases where millions of dol- lars are at stake. And the question presented is also of intrinsic importance because it affects the federal- state balance of power in an area of traditional state regulation. Third, the Fourth Circuit's decision runs contrary to the plain statutory text and so conflicts with this Court’s settled principles of statutory inter- pretation. The decision below also defies this Court’s long-standing presumption against preemption by construing a supposedly ambiguous federal statute to invade a traditional area of state regulation. Fourth, and finally, this case provides an ideal vehicle for re- viewing this pure question of law, as it was decided on a motion to dismiss, and there is no dispute that the Respondents’ state claim would be eliminated under North Carolina’s statute of repose unless § 9658 preempts that state statute. I. THE FOURTH CIRCUITS DECISION DEEP- ENS A CONFLICT IN THE STATE AND FED- ERAL APPELLATE COURTS The Court should grant CTS Cor--oration’s petition for a writ of certiorari initially because several feder- al and state appellate decisions have reached differ- ent conclusions on the question whether 42 U.S.C. § 9658 preempts state statutes of repose. 15 A. On the one hand, the Fifth Circuit has held that “the plain language of § 9658 does not extend to stat- utes of repose.” Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. v. Poole Chem. Co., 419 F.3d 355, 362 (5th Cir. 2005). In that case, the plaintiff sued the defendant for cleanup costs resulting from the 2003 rupture of a chemical storage tank that had been previously in- stalled in 1988. See id. at 358. Because the plain- tiffs state claims were barred by Texas’s 15-year statute of repose, the plaintiff argued that § 9658 preempted that statute. See id. at 361. The Fifth Circuit rejected this argument, and affirmed the dis- missal of the suit. Jd. at 362-65. The court began with § 9658’s plain language, not- ing that the text covered only statutes of limitations and nowhere mentioned statutes of repose. /d. at 362. The “differences between statutes of limitations and statutes of repose,” the court reasoned, “are sub- stantive, not merely semantic.” Jd. A statute of limi- tations “extinguishes the right to prosecute an ac- crued cause of action after a period of time,” whereas a statute of repose “abolishes the cause of action after the passage of time even though the cause of action may not have yet accrued.” /d. at 363. Thus, stat- utes of limitations generally run from the date of the plaintiffs injury and, as they are triggered by an in- jury, generally toll this period until the plaintiff rea- sonably should have learned of that injury. Jd. “In contrast, awareness of injury is not a factor in deter- mining when the time period of a statute of repose starts to run,” as it is triggered by the defendant’s underlying conduct, whether or not the plaintiff's claim has accrued. Jd. 16 The Fifth Circuit next concluded that § 9658's plain language must control because no other factors illustrated an “express congressional intent to the contrary.” Jd. at 364. According to the court, “CERCLA’s legislative history indicates Congress in- tended for § 9658 to preempt a state statute of limita- tions that deprives a plaintiff who suffers a long- latency disease caused by the release of a hazardous substance of his cause of action, but not to preempt a state statute of repose” that is not at all tied to the plaintiff's injury. Jd. & nn.44-45 (citing H.R. Conf.. Rep. No. 99-962, 2d Sess. 262, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3276, 3354). In light of this legislative history, reading § 9658’s reference to “statutes of lim- itations” according to its terms “comports with a fun- damental principle of statutory construction— common sense.” Surlington, 419 F.3d at 364. The Supreme Court of South Dakota later adopted the Fifth Circuit’s interpretation of § 9658. See Clark Cnty. v. Sioux Equip. Corp., 753 N.W.2d 406, 417 (S.D. 2008). In Clark, the defendant installed a fuel- storage system on the plaintiffs property. The de- fendant completed the work in 1992, and the plaintiff brought suit in 2006 to recover the cleanup costs of a fuel leak several years earlier. See id. at 408-09. In response to the defendant’s argument that the state statute of repose had run, the plaintiff asserted that CERCLA preempted it. Relying on Burlington, see id. at 414-17, the South Dakota Supreme Court held that “the plain text controls.” Jd. at 417. “[T]he plain language of CERCLA only preempts state law when the applicable ‘state statute of limitations’ provides a commencement date that is earlier than the federally required commencement date,” the court noted, and “Congress failed to include substantively different 17 statutes of repose within this preemptive rule.” /d. at 417. B. The Ninth Circuit subsequently departed from the Fifth Circuit over whether § 9658 applies to state statutes of repose. See McDonald v. Sun Oil Co., 548 F.3d 774, 779 (9th Cir. 2008). In McDonald, the de- fendant sold property to the plaintiffs in 1976, and the plaintiffs learned in 2001 that the property might be contaminated with mercury. /d. at 778. The dis- trict court granted the defendant’s motion for sum- mary judgment on plaintiffs’ negligence claim, rely- ing on the Fifth Circuit's Burlington decision to hold that § 9658 does not apply to Oregon’s statute of re- pose. See McDonald v. Sun Oil Co., 423 F. Supp. 2d 1114, 1127 (D. Or. 2006). The Ninth Circuit re- versed, holding that “the term ‘statute of limitations’ in [§ 9658] is ambiguous and the legislative history of the section indicates that its meaning includes stat- utes of repose[.]” 548 F.3d at 797. The Ninth Circuit found § 9658 ambiguous as to whether the phrase “statute of limitations” includes “statutes of repose” because “a number of cases con- fused the terms or used them interchangeably” when Congress adopted the provision in 1986. Jd. at 781. As such, the Ninth Circuit criticized the Fifth Cir- cuit’s plain-meaning approach because it “failed to analyze the meaning of ‘statute of hmitations’ at the time [§ 9658] was adopted.” Jd. at 782. The court then turned to the legislative history, which “show[ed] that Congress’s primary concern in enact- ing [§ 9658] was to adopt the discovery rule in situa- tions where a plaintiff may lose a cause of action be- fore becoming aware of it[.]” Jd. at 783. Because this predicament was “most likely to occur where statutes 18 of repose operate,” the court held that such statutes should be included within § 9658 to further the sec- tion’s underlying purpose. /d. The Fourth Circuit’s fractured decision in this case has deepened this split of appellate authority—with the majority joining the Ninth Circuit’s side of the debate and the dissent joining the side of the Fifth Circuit and the Supreme Court of South Dakota. As explained above, supra at 11, in addition to the Ninth Circuit’s textual analysis and reliance on legislative history, the Fourth Circuit also chose a liberal con- struction of § 9658 because “Congress’s purpose in enacting CERCLA was remedial.” Pet. App. 14a. x~ x« * * The Court need not take CTS Corporation’s word for this substantial conflict in the appellate courts. District judges have repeatedly recognized it as well. As the District of Kansas recently noted, “[t]he cir- cults ... are split on the issue of whether § 9658 preempts state statutes of repose.” Mechler v. United States, No. 12-1183, 2013 BL 205882, at *8 (D. Kan. Aug. 2, 2013). Likewise, the Southern District of Al- abama has noted that “the Fifth Circuit in Burling- ton and the Ninth Circuit in McDonald’ “disagreed on the application of § 9658 to statutes of repose.” Abrams v. Ciba Specialty Chems. Corp., 659 F. Supp. 2d 1225, 1238 (S.D. Ala. 2009). Only this Court can now resolve this clear split of authority in the lower courts. Il. THE FOURTH CIRCUIT'S DECISION RAISES AN IMPORTANT AND RECURRING LEGAL ISSUE The Court should also grant CTS Corporation’s pe- tition because it raises an important and recurring 19 legal issue. To begin with, the stakes are often high in environmental tort cases, with millions of dollars routinely at issue. See, e.g., Burlington, 419 F.3d at 358 (noting that the alleged cleanup cost was $2.1 million); see also United States v. Charter Int7 O1l Co., 83 F.3d 510, 512 (1st Cir. 1996) (“Multiples of millions of dollars are involved in [CERCLA] settle- ments and the stakes are high, both for the public and for the parties involved”); Andrew P. Morriss & Roger E. Meiners, The Destructive Role of Land Use Planning, 14 Tulane Envtl. L. J. 95, 124-25 & n.108 (2000) (citing cases for the proposition that “each year some of the largest tort judgments in the nation are against invaders of private property” in environ- mental suits). And because governments can be CERCLA defendants, the question presented also impacts the public fisc. See Anderson v. United States, 669 F.3d 161, 165 (4th Cir. 2011); Simmons v. United States, 421 F.3d 1199, 1202 (11th Cir. 2005) (per curiam); see a/so Br. of United States as Amicus Curiae in Support of Appellee at 2, Waldburger v. CTS Corp., 2013 WL 3455775 (4th Cir. July 10, 2013) (No. 12-1290). Thus, many millions of dollars turn on the pure question of law presented here. The question presented also implicates the balance of power between the federal government and the states. The “federalist structure of joint sovereigns preserves to the people numerous advantages.” Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 458 (1991); see Bond v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2355, 2364-65 (2011). But, given the Supremacy Clause, “Congress may legislate in areas traditionally regulated by the States,” which is “an extraordinary power in a feder- alist system,” one that this Court “must assume Con- gress does not exercise lightly.” Gregory, 501 U.S. at 20 460. As such, the Court has repeatedly granted cer- tiorari to determine whether federal laws were un- ambiguously meant to intrude on state prerogatives. See, e.g., Raygor v. Regents of the Univ. of Minn., 534 U.S. 533, 544-45 (2002) (deciding whether 28 U.S.C. § 1367(d) should be interpreted to toll state statute of limitations against state actors); Gregory, 501 U.S. at 464-70 (deciding whether ADEA covers state judges); cf Wyoming v. Oklahoma, 502 U.S. 437, 451 (1992) (exercising discretion to accept original jurisdiction because case “implicates serious and important con- cerns of federalism” (citation omitted)). This case raises similar federalism concerns. Sec- tion 9658 undoubtedly invades the states’ traditional authority to establish the limits that govern their own tort actions. Cf Raygor, 534 U.S. at 544 (“allow- ing federal law to extend the time period in which a state sovereign is amenable to suit in its own courts at least affects the federal balance in an area that has been a historic power of the States”). The Fifth Circuit’s interpretation of § 9658 amounts to a minor encroachment by only delaying the beginning of the state statutes of limitations. The Fourth Circuit's “liberal construction” of § 9658, by contrast, dramati- cally increases the scope of this intrusion by effective- ly eviscerating state statutes of repose. See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-52. If § 9658 applies to start both the statute of limitations and the statute of repose at the same time (as the Fourth Circuit held), then the statute of limitations always will have run well be- fore the statute of repose, thereby making the latter a nullity. Whether right or wrong, the decision’s im- pact on traditional state prerogatives cannot be doubted and justifies the Court’s review. 21 Finally, the question presented arises frequently. The district courts, for example, consider this issue often and are even more divided than the appellate courts. In addition to the district court and magis- trate below, see Pet. App. 38a, 47a, several courts have adopted the Fifth Circuit’s view that § 9658 simply does not reach statutes of repose. See Clark, 753 N.W.2d at 415 (noting at the time that “[a]ll re- cent federal district courts agree[d]” with the Fifth Circuit); see, e.g., Coleman v. H.C. Price Co., No. 11- 2937, 2013 WL 64613, at *2-3 & n.3 (E.D. La. Jan. 4, 2013) (finding that § 9658 does not preempt statute of repose); McDonald, 423 F.Supp. at 1127 (same). Others have taken the Ninth Circuit’s approach. See Mechler, 2013 BL 205882, at *8-9; A.S.J, Inc. v. Sanders, 835 F. Supp. 1349, 1358 (D. Kan. 1993). indeed, district courts in Alabama have repeatedly disagreed over whether § 9658 applies to the very same statute of repose. Compare Evans v. Walter Indus., Inc., 579 F. Supp. 2d 1349, 1358-64 (N.D. Ala. 2008) (holding that § 9658 does not preempt Ala- bama’s statute of repose); German ex rel. Grace v. CSX Transp., Inc., 510 F. Supp. 2d 630, 633-34 (S.D. Ala. 2007) (same); with Moore v. Walter Coke, Inc., No. 2:11-cv-1391-SLB, 2012 WL 4731255, at *9-13 (N.D. Ala. Sept. 28, 2012) (holding that § 9658 preempts Alabama’s statute of repose); Abrams, 659 F. Supp. 2d at 1231-39 (same); Fisher v. Crba Spe- cialty Chem. Corp., No. 03-0566, 2007 WL 2995525, at *15 (S.D. Ala. Oct. 11, 2007) (same). Despite the frequency with which this legal issue arises, the typi- cally massive financial stakes involved often force settlement, thereby preventing many cases from reaching the courts of appeals. 22 In sum, both the importance of the question pre- sented and the frequency with which it arises confirm that certiorari should be granted in this case. Ill. THE FOURTH CIRCUITS DECISION CON- FLICTS WITH THIS COURT'S CASE LAW The Court should also grant certiorari because the Fourth Circuit’s decision conflicts with numerous principles that this Court has directed lower courts to follow when interpreting federal statutes. First, the Fourth Circuit’s holding that the phrase “statute of limitations” is ambiguous conflicts with the “cardinal rule of statutory construction” that plain statutory terms should carry their plain mean- ings. Molzof v. United States, 502 U.S. 301, 307 (1992); see, e.g., Safeco Ins. Co. of Am. v. Burr, 551 U.S. 47, 58 (2007) (interpreting the term “willful”); McDermott Int'l, Inc. v. Wilander, 498 U.S. 337, 342 (1991) (Qnterpreting the term “seaman”). This bed- rock principle has special force when the statutory term at issue is a legal term of art with a well-settled definition. See, e.g., Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 199 (1976). “In the absence of contrary indication, [the Court] assume|[s] that when a statute uses ... a term [of art], Congress intended it to have its established meaning.” McDermott Int?, 498 U.S. at 342. Yet the Fourth Circuit identified no legal authority indicating that the phrase “statute of limitations” had a legal meaning encompassing a statute of repose when Congress enacted § 9658 in 1986. Rather, the phrases “statute of limitations” and “statute of re- pose” were distinct terms of art that distinguished distinct types of provisions. Indeed, the case law re- peatedly used the phrase “statute of repose” to dis- 23 tinguish statutes of limitations from statutes “that begin ‘to run at a time unrelated to the traditional accrual of the cause of action.” Bolick v. Am. Barmag Corp., 293 S.E.2d 415, 418 (N.C. 1982); see JH. Westerman Co. v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 499 A.2d 116, 119 (D.C. 1985) (“A statute of repose differs from an ordinary statute of limitations in that the speci- fied time period begins to run not from the date on which a right of action accrues, but from another as- certainable date.”); James Ferrera & Sons, Inc. v. Samuels, 486 N.E.2d 58, 60 (Mass. App. Ct. 1985) (“There is a marked difference between a statute of hmitations and a statute of repose.”); Univ. Engg Corp. v. Perez, 451 So.2d 463, 465 (Fla. 1984) (per curiam) (“A statute of repose should be distinguished from a statute of limitations.”); Cheswold Volunteer Fire Co. v. Lambertson Constr. Co., 489 A.2d 413, 421 (Del. 1985) (“As a statute of repose is not a stat- ute of limitations within the meaning of Superior Court Civil Rule &(c), it need not be pleaded affirma- tively.”). The consensus view established by these cases was reflected in a well-known treatise: “Unlike an ordinary statute of limitations which begins run- ning upon accrual] of the claim, the period specified in a statute of repose begins when a specific event oc- curs, regardless of whether a cause of action has ac- crued or whether any injury has resulted.” 54 C.J.S. Limitations of Actions § 4, at 20-21 (1987) (emphases added). Even the study group whose recommenda- tions formed the basis for § 9658 recognized the dis- tinctions between the two types of statutes. Pet. App. 3la. Notably, however, § 9658 repeatedly identifies only statutes of limitations, not statutes of repose, as falling within its reach. The statute should have 24 been interpreted accordingly. See McDermott, 498 U.S. at 342. To reach its contrary conclusion that the phrases statute of limitations and statute of repose are fungi- ble, the Fourth Circuit suggested that “a historical analysis reveals that both scholars and courts have often used the terms interchangeably.” Pet. App. 13a. That is not so. As the dissent noted, Pet. App. 24a, courts had historically viewed “statute of repose” as the catch-all phrase covering different types of time bars, including statutes of limitations. See Bolick, 293 S.E.2d at 417 (noting that “the term ‘statute of repose’ has traditionally been used to en- compass statutes of limitation”); see, eg., United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 117 (1979) (referring to a statute of limitations as a statute of repose). But simply because the phrase statute of repose could be interpreted to cover statutes of limitations does not justify the Fourth Circuit’s converse holding that the phrase statute of limitations could be interpreted to cover statutes of repose. In ali events, in the decade immediately preceding § 9658’s enactment, courts had repeatedly used the phrase “statute of repose” in its narrower sense to de- fine the flurry of state laws that tied the running of the applicable time limit to the defendant’s actions rather than the claim’s accrual. See Lamb vy. Wedgewood South Corp., 302 S.E.2d 868, 872 (N.C. 1983) (“This statute, lke many others enacted throughout the nation, is a ‘statute of repose,’ which this Court has recognized constitutes a substantive definition of, rather than a procedural limitation on, rights.”); see also Restatement (Second) of Torts § 899 cmt. g (1979) (“In recent years special ‘statutes of re- 25 pose’ have been adopted in some states covering par- ticular kinds of activity... .”). Thus, far from consid- ering this background context in which Congress en- acted § 9658, the Fourth Circuit ignored it. Second, after improperly finding an ambiguity in the phrase “statute of limitations,” the Fourth Circuit improperly resolved that ambiguity by relying on CERCLA’s general purposes. As this Court has re- peatedly indicated, however, “no law pursues its purpose at all costs, and . . . the textual limitations upon a law’s scope are no less a part of its ‘purpose’ than its substantive authorizations.” Kucana v. Holder, 558 U.S. 233, 252 (2010) (citing Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 752 (2006) (plurality opinion)). In other words, “[djeciding what competing values will or will not be sacrificed to the achieve- ment of a particular objective is the very essence of legislative choice—and it frustrates rather than effec- tuates legislative intent simplistically to assume that whatever furthers the statute’s primary objective must be the law.” Hodriguez v. United States, 480 U.S. 522, 526 (1987) (per curiam); cf Jn re Erickson, 815 F.2d 1090, 1094 (7th Cir. 1987) (Easterbrook, J.) (“Finding the meaning of a statute is more like calcu- lating a vector (with direction and length) than it is like identifying which way the underlying ‘values’ or ‘purposes’ point (which has direction alone).”). As the dissent explained, Pet. App. 35a, the Fourth Circuit made exactly this mistake. The majority adopted the interpretation that allegedly furthered CERCLA’s “remedial” purpose, noting that the Fifth Circuit’s reading of statute of limitations “offers too narrow an approach and one that thwarts Congress’s unmistakable goal of removing barriers to relief from 26 toxic wreckage.” Pet. App. 15a. But it is unmistaka- bly clear that Congress did not seek to remove all of the state procedural barriers that the study group suggested should be removed, because it did not adopt most of them. See Pet. App. 32a. For example, the study group recommended modified evidentiary presumptions and liberal joinder rules—yet those proposals were not adopted. See rhid. So the Fourth Circuit was wrong to suggest that “whatever furthers [§ 9658’s] primary objective must be the law.” Aodri- guez, 480 U.S. at 526. Indeed, as the Fifth Circuit explained, see Burlington, 419 F.3d at 364 nn.44-45, the legislative history suggests that Congress was concerned only with some state statutes of limita- tions that begin to run on the plaintiffs injury rather than the plaintiffs discovery of the injury: “In the case of a long-latency disease, such as cancer, a party may be barred from bringing his lawsuit if the stat- ute of limitations begins to run at the time of the first injury—rather than from the time when the party ‘discovers’ that his injury was caused by the hazard- ous substance or pollutant or contaminant con- cerned.” H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 99-962, 2d Sess. 262, reprinted tn 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3276, 3354. Third, even if the phrase “statute of limitations” were ambiguous, the Fourth Circuit erred by ignoring the “presumption against preemption” when resolv- ing that ambiguity. See, e.g., Hillsborough Cnty. v. Automated Med. Labs., Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 715 (1985); Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947). That presumption against preemption “is consistent with both federalism concerns and the his- toric primacy of state regulation of matters of health and safety.” Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996). Under the presumption, “when the text 27 of a pre-emption clause is susceptible of more than one plausible reading, courts ordinarily ‘accept the reading that disfavors pre-emption.” A/tria Grp., Inc. v. Good, 555 U.S. 70, 77 (2008) (quoting Bates v. Dow Agrosciences LLC, 544 U.S. 431, 449 (2005)). Here, as the dissent observed, the “ability of a state to create a substantive right to be free from liability under its own state tort law is unquestionably a tra- ditional field of state regulation.” Pet. App. 35a; see, e.g., Raygor, 534 U.S. at 544; Hillsborough Cnty., 471 U.S. at 715. Section 9658 thus triggers the presump- tion against preemption, and the Fourth Circuit should have construed any ambiguity to avoid preemption. See Altria, 555 U.S. at 77. But the ma- jority did exactly the opposite. It relied on CERCLA’s remedial purpose to interpret all ambiguities in favor of preemption. When doing so, moreover, the Fourth Circuit did not even mention the presumption against preemption or offer an explanation why that presumption somehow does not apply here. Pet. App. 7a-16a. By flipping the presumption on its head, the Fourth Circuit again departed from this Court’s prec- edents on interpreting federal statutes. IV. THIS CASE PRESENTS AN IDEAL VEHICLE TO RESOLVE THE QUESTION PRESENTED Finally, this case presents an ideal vehicle for re- solving the question presented. As an initial matter, there is no dispute that the question presented is outcome dispositive on the facts alleged in the com- plaint. While disagreeing on whether § 9658 reaches state statutes of repose, the lower courts have uni- versally agreed that N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-52(16) would bar Respondents’ nuisance claim if § 9658 did not otherwise preempt that statute. Pet. App. 9a, 19a, 28 38a, 44a. That statute of repose runs from “the last act or omission of the defendant giving rise to the cause of action.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-52(16). And the complaint makes clear that CTS Corporation’s last conceivable act occurred in 1987—when it sold the relevant property—well over two decades before Re- spondents filed this suit in 2011. Pet. App. 53a-55a. Accordingly, Respondents suit may proceed only if the Fourth Circuit correctly interpreted § 9658 to preempt N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-52(16). There is also no dispute that N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1- 52(16) is a statute of repose rather than a statute of limitations. Every judge to have considered this question in this case has reached that conclusion. Pet. App. 10a, 19a, 38a, 44a. The North Carolina courts also agree. See, e.g., Wilson v. McLeod Oil Co., 398 S.E.2d 586, 597 (N.C. 1990) (finding claims to be barred “by the statute of repose found in § 1-52(16)” (emphasis added)); Neb/ett v. Hanover Inspection Serv., Inc., No. COA06-1676, 2007 WL 2701349, at *4 (N.C. Ct. App. Sept. 18, 2007) (same). So the Court need not worry about preliminary questions over whether the state statute under review falls on the “statute of repose” or “statute of limitations” side of the line. Rather, the Court can concern itself solely with the question whether § 9658 covers both kinds of statutes or reaches only statutes of limitation. Additionally, the procedural posture of this case—a final judgment after the grant of a motion to dis- miss—allows the Court to resolve the question in an efficient manner without having to confront any dis- puted issues of fact or side legal issues. Respondents’ complaint runs only nine pages. And their appeal in 29 the Fourth Circuit addressed only the legal question presented in this case. For these reasons, the Court could not ask for a better vehicle to resolve the important legal question presented on which the federal and state appellate courts have split. The question is outcome determi- native on the facts alleged, it arises at a stage with a small record, and it is the sole issue presented. CONCLUSION The petition for a writ of certiorari should be granted. 30 Respectfully submitted, E. Thomison Holman Brian J. Murray ADAMS HENDON CARSON Counsel of Record CROW & SAENGER, P.A. Michael F. Dolan 72 Patton Avenue JONES DAY Asheville, NC 28801 77 West Wacker Drive, Richard M. Re Suite S508 51 Louisiana Avenue, N.W. (312) 782-3939 Washington, D.C. 20001 bymurray@jonesday.com SEPTEMBER 13, 2013 Counsel for Petitioner APPENDIX la APPENDIX A United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit. No. 12—1290. Peter WALDBURGER; Sandra Ratcliffe; Lee Ann Smith; Tom Pinner, IV, a/k/a Bud Pinner, IV; Hans Momkes; Wilma Momkes; Walter Dockins, Jr.; Autumn Dockins; William Clark Lisenbee; Dan Murphy; Lori Murphy; Robert Aversano; Daniel L. Murphy; Laura A. Carson; Glen Horecky; Gina Horecky; Renee Richardson; David Bradley; Byron Hovey; Ramona Hovey; Peter Tatum MacQueen, IV; Bethan MacQueen; Patricia Pinner; Tom Pinner, III, a/k/a Buddy Pinner, III; Madeline Pinner, Plaintiffs— Appellants, Vv. CTS CORPORATION, Defendant—Appellee. United States of America, Amicus Supporting Appellee. Argued Jan. 30, 2013. Decided July 10, 2013. Before DAVIS, FLOYD, and THACKER, Circuit Judges. Reversed and remanded by published opinion. Judge Floyd wrote the majority opinion, in which Judge Davis joined. Judge Davis wrote a_ separate concurring opinion. Judge Thacker wrote a dissenting opinion. FLOYD, Circuit Judge: In 2009, Appellants David Bradley and Renee Richardson received unwelcome news: Their well water contained concentrated levels of trichloroethylene (TCE) and cis—1, 2—dichloroethane (DCE), both solvents that have carcinogenic effects. Not surprisingly, Bradley and Richardson, and twenty-three other landowners (collectively, “the landowners”), brought a nuisance action against Appellee CTS Corporation (CTS), the alleged perpetrator. Concluding that North Carolina’s ten- year limitation on the accrual of real property claims barred the suit, the district court granted CTS’s Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. Having reviewed the dismissal de novo, assuming that the facts stated in the complaint are true, Lambeth v. Bd. of Commis, 407 F.3d 266, 268 (4th Cir. 2005), we hold that the discovery rule articulated in §9658 of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Liability, and Compensation Act (CERCLA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675, preempts North Carolina’s ten-year limitation. Thus, we reverse and remand. I. In the 1960s and ’70s, the United States witnessed the repercussions of toxic waste dumping like it never had before. The Valley of the Drums! and Love ' The Valley of the Drums is a twenty-three acre site near Louisville, Kentucky, where a large number of waste-storing drums were deposited in the 1960s. The drums’ leakage and the lack of regulation at the site caused an environmental] disaster.: NPL Site Narrative for A.L. Taylor (Valley of the Drums), Envtl. Prot. Agency (Sept. 8, 1983), http:// www.epa.gov/superfund/ sites/npV/nar447.htm. 3a Canal]? disasters made headlines, urging Congress to pass legislation that granted some measure of redress. In response, in 1980, Congress passed CERCLA, an act aimed at promoting efficient and equitable responses to the fallout from hazardous waste. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. United States, 556 U.S. 599, 602 (2009). Because Congress passed the legislation during the closing hours of its ninety-sixth session, and only after it reached a compromise reflecting the “blending of three separate bills,” CERCLA is often criticized for its lack of precision. See, e.g., State of New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032, 1039-40 (2d Cir. 1985) (“In 1980, while the Senate considered one early version of CERCLA, the House considered and passed another. The version passed by both Houses, however, was an eleventh hour compromise put together primarily by Senate leaders and sponsors of the earlier Senate versions.” (citations omitted)); Artesian Water Co. v. New Castle Cnty., 851 F.2d 643, 648 (3d Cir. 1988) (“CERCLA is not a paradigm of clarity or precision. It has been criticized frequently for inartful drafting and numerous ambiguities attributable to its precipitous passage.”); see also Rhodes v. Cnty. of Darlington, 833 F. Supp. 1163, 1172—76 (D.S.C.1992) (providing a thorough recounting of CERCLA’s history). Regardless, it remains undisputed that CERCLA is a remedial 2 Love Canal is an area near Niagara Falls, New York. In the 1920s, it became a dumpsite for toxic chemicals. The extent of the site’s contamination was brought to light in the mid-1970s. Eckardt C. Beck, The Love Canal] Tragedy, Envtl. Prot. Agency (Jan. 1979), http://www.epa.gov/history/topics/lovecanal/ O1.html. 4a statute designed to (1) “establish a comprehensive response and financing mechanism to abate and control the vast problems associated with abandoned and inactive hazardous waste disposal sites” and (2) “shift the costs of cleanup to the parties responsible for the contamination.” Metro. Water Reclamation Dist. v. N. Am. Galvanizing & Coatings, Inc., 473 F.3d 824, 826-27 (7th Cir. 2007) (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 96-1016, pt. 1, at 22 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6119, 6120) Gnternal quotation marks omitted); see also Niagara Mohawk Power Corp. v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 596 F.3d 112, 120 (2d Cir. 2010) (“Enacted in response to New York’s Love Canal disaster, CERCLA was designed, in part, to ‘fensure] that those responsible for any damage, environmental harm, or injury from chemical poisons bear the costs of their actions.“ (footnote omitted) (quoting S. Rep. No. 96-848, at 13 (1980)). Evidently wary about the effectiveness of the Act’s final version, Congress immediately established a study group to examine the “adequacy of existing common law and statutory remedies in providing legal redress for harm ... caused by the release of hazardous substances into the environment.” 42 U.S.C. § 9651(e)(1). The Group consisted of twelve members designated by the American’ Bar Association, the American Trial Lawyers Association, the Association of State Attorneys General, and the American Law Institute. Jd. § 9651(e)(2). Among other “[rjecurring [i]Jssues in [h]azardous [wlaste {I}itigation,” it considered the effect that state limitations periods have on causes of action related to hazardous waste, noting that (1) injunes from such waste generally have “long latency periods, sometimes 20 years or longer” and (2) if a state 5a decrees that a cause of action will accrue upon a defendant's Jast act or a plaintiff's exposure to harm, the statute of limitations often will fully run and defeat a lawsuit before a plaintiff is aware of his injury. Superfund Section 301(e) Study Group, 97th Cong., Injuries and Damages from Hazardous Wastes~Analysis and Improvement of Legal Remedies pt. 1, at 28 (Comm. Print 1982). Purposing to “remove umreasonable procedural and other barriers to recovery in court ..., including rules relating to the time of accrual of actions,” sd. at 240, the Group issued the following recommendation: “that all states ... clearly adopt the rule that an action accrues when the plaintiff discovers or should have discovered the injury or disease and its cause,” id. at 241. Worth noting is that the Group did not confine its concerns simply to statutes of limitation: “The Recommendation is intended also to cover the repeal of statutes of repose which, in a number of states have the same effect as some statutes of limitation in barring [a] plaintiffs claim before he knows that he has one.” /d. Instead of waiting for individual states to amend their respective statutes, in 1986 Congress chose to “address[ ] the problem identified in the ... study,” H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 99-962, at 261, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3276, 3354, by enacting § 9658 of CERCLA: (a) State statutes of limitations for hazardous substance cases (1) Exception to State statutes In the case of any action brought under State law for personal injury, or property damages, which are caused or contributed to by exposure 6a to any hazardous substance, or pollutant or contaminant, released into the environment from a facility, if the applicable limitations period for such action (as specified in the State statute of limitations or under common law) provides a commencement date which is earlier than the federally required commencement date, such period shall commence at the federally required commencement date in lieu of the date specified in such State statute. (2) State law generally applicable Except as provided in paragraph (1), the statute of limitations established under State law shall apply in all actions brought under State law for personal injury, or property damages, which are caused or contributed to by exposure to any hazardous substance, or pollutant or contaminant, released into the environment from a facility. 42 U.S.C. § 9658. Per the section’s definition section, “applicable limitations period’ means the _ period specified in a statute of limitations during which a civil action referred to in subsection (a)(1) ... may be brought,” id § 9658(b)(2), “commencement date’ means the date specified in a statute of limitations as the beginning of the applicable limitations period,” id. § 9658(b)(3), and “federally required commencement date’. means the date the plaintiff knew (or reasonably should have known) that the personal injury or property damages referred to in subsection (a)(1) ... were caused or contributed to by the hazardous substance or pollutant or contaminant concerned.” Jd § 9658(b)(4)(A). Thus, if a state statute of limitations provides that the period in Ta which an action may be brought begins to run prior to a plaintiffs knowledge of his injury, § 9658 preempts the state law and allows the period to run from the time of the plaintiffs actual or constructive knowledge. And if a minor or incompetent plaintiff is involved, the period does not begin to run until the plaintiff reaches majority or competency or “has a legal representative appointed.” /d. § 9658(b)(4)(B). I. During the twenty-seven years since Congress passed § 9658, the amendment has no doubt served the goal of preserving claims that otherwise would have been defeated by state statutes of limitations. But it has also generated controversy. We address one such area of dispute here—namely, whether § 9658 preempts state statutes of repose. A. The site at issue in this case is in Asheville, North Carolina, where CTS formerly operated a fifty-four- acre plant.2. CTS “manufactures” and “disposes of” electronics and electronic parts, and from 1959 to 1985, it operated the Mills Gap Road Electroplating Facility (the Facility) in Asheville. At the Facility, CTS stored notable quantities of TCE and manufactured products using TCE, cyanide, chromium VI, and lead. In 1987, CTS sold the Facility to Mills Gap Road Associates. CTS had promised realtors that the property “ha[d] been rendered in an environmentally 3 CTS was formed in 1959 as CTS of Asheville, Inc. In 1983, CTS of Asheville, Inc., dissolved, but CTS continued to operate the Asheville plant as CTS Corporation, Asheville Division until 1985. 8a clean condition,” that “[t]o the best of [its] knowledge, no on-site disposal or otherwise wanton disposal methods were practiced at [the] facility,” and that as soon as “the existing inventory of materials contained in drums and other miscellaneous equipment within the plant [was] removed from the premises, no threat to human health or the environment [would] remain.” Mills Gap Road Associates eventually sold portions of the land to Bradley, Richardson, and others, and as noted above, Bradley and Richardson learned subsequent to their purchases that their land was contaminated. Thus, they joined with others who “live in the vicinity of [their] residence” to bring a nuisance claim. ‘The other property owners claim that they “have been and continue to be exposed to the CTS ... toxins via contact from air, land and water.” The landowners cite damages such as “diminution in the value of their real property” and fear “for their health and safety and that of their family members.” They request (1) a “judgment against [CTS] requiring reclamation of the 1,000,000 pounds of the toxic chemical contaminants” that belong to the corporation, (2) “remediation of the environmental harm caused by [CTS’s] toxic chemicals,” and (3) “monetary damages in an amount that will fully compensate them for all the losses and damages they have suffered, or. . . will suffer in the future.” B. In North Carolina, real property actiors are subject to a three-year statute of limitations per the “Limitations, Other than Real Property” section of the General Statutes. See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1—52; Crawford v. Boyette, 464 S.E.2d 301, 303 (N.C. App. 9a 1995). A real property action accrues when “physical damage to [a claimant’s] property becomes apparent or ought reasonably to have become apparent.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-52(16). Notably, however, a claimant’s actual or constructive knowledge of damage is not the only factor that regulates accrual. Nor does lack of such knowledge lend life to a claim indefinitely. Rather, § 1—52(16) prohibits a “cause of action [from] ... accru[ing}] more than 10 years from the last act or omission of the defendant giving rise to the cause of action.” Jd. Accordingly, once ten years have passed since a defendant’s last tortious act, claims for damages from such conduct become nonexistent, regardless of whether a claimant had knowledge of his harm within the ten-year window. Here, the last act or omission of CTS occurred in 1987, when it sold the Facility to Mills Gap Road Associates. Thus, when the landowners filed their nuisance action in 2011, CTS moved to dismiss, maintaining that North Carolina’s’ ten-year limitation on the accrual of real property actions barred the claim. The landowners countered, citing § 9658 of CERCLA as preemptive of North Carolina’s limitation. The magistrate judge rejected the landowners’ argument. The court reasoned that the ten-year limitation is a statute of repose and that because § 9658 mentions only statutes of limitations, it is inapplicable here. Thus, it recommended dismissal, and the district court adopted the recommendation. Il. Before analyzing the decision below, we briefly review the concepts of limitations and _ repose. Statutes of limitations and statutes of repose both 10a operate as limits on the amount of time that a plaintiff has to bring a claim. A statute of limitations is a “law that bars claims after a specified period .. . based on the date when the claim accrued (as when the injury occurred or was discovered).” Black's Law Dictionary 1546 (9th ed. 2009). As this Court has previously noted, such limitations serve defendants by “encourag[ing] prompt resolution of disputes by providing a simple procedural mechanism to dispose of stale claims.” First United Methodist Church of Hyattsville v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 882 F.2d 862, 866 (4th Cir. 1989). In contrast, a statute of repose “bar[s] any suit that is brought after a specified time since the defendant acted .. . even if this period ends before the plaintiff has suffered a resulting injury.” Black’s Law Dictionary 1546 (9th ed. 2009). Where repose is concerned, “considerations of the economic best interests of the public as a wh»le” are at play, and “substantive grants of immun) » based on a legislative balance of the respective mghts of potential plaintiffs and defendants [are] struck by determining a time limit beyond which liability no longer exists.” First United Methodist, 882 F.2d at 866. Here, North Carolina’s ten-year limitation bars lawsuits “brought after a specified time since the defendant acted,” Black’s Law Dictionary 1546 (9th ed. 2009), without regard for the plaintiffs knowledge of his harm, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1—52(16). As such, although North Carolina does not explicitly identify the hmitation as a statute of repose (or, for that matter, use the word “repose” anywhere in its statutes), we think the court below _ properly categorized it as such. Cf Robinson v. Wadford, 731 S.E.2d 539, 541 (N.C. Ct. App. 2012) (referring to the lla ten-year limitation in § 1—52(16) as a statute of repose); Tipton & Young Constr. Co. v. Blue Ridge Structure Co., 446 S.E.2d 603, 604 (N.C.Ct.App.1994) (same). A. Determining whether § 9658 affects the operation of North Carolina’s ten-year limitation is an exercise in statutory interpretation. When we interpret statutes, our goal is to effectuate Congress’s intent, United States v. Abdelshafi, 592 F.3d 602, 607 (4th Cir. 2010), and we accomplish this by first examining the text of the statute, Holland v. Big River Minerals Corp., 181 F.3d 597, 603 (4th Cir. 1999). If we find the meaning of the text plain, we accord it that meaning “[ajbsent ... clearly expressed legislative intent to the contrary.” Abdelshafi, 592 F.3d at 607 (quoting United States v. Bell, 5 F.3d 64, 68 (4th Cir. 1993)) (internal quotation marks omitted). If we determine that its meaning is ambiguous, however, we “look beyond the language of the statute to the legislative history for guidance.” Stiltner v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 74 F.3d 1473, 1482 (4th Cir. 1996) (en banc). Moreover, we determine whether a statute's language is plain “by reference to the language itself, the specific context in which that language is used, and the broader context of the statute as a whole.” Holland, 181 F.3d at 603 (quoting Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 341, (1997)) (internal quotation marks omitted). B. Here, we interpret a statute that is ambiguous. As noted by the district court, § 9658 uses the words “statute of limitations.” Indeed, the phrase and its plural form appear five times. See § 9658(a), (b)(2), 12a (b)(3). Noticeably absent is the phrase “statutes of repose.” Thus, a simple review of § 9658’s language could reasonably lead to a conclusion that its application is limited only to statutes of limitations. We agree with the court below that the text is susceptible to this interpretation. But we also think that the text lends itself to an alternate reading—one that includes repose limitations such as North Carolina’s. Per the text of § 9658, a state limitations period must meet two conditions before the federally required commencement date applies to a cause of action: (1) it must be an “applicable limitations period” that is “specified in the State statute of limitations or under common law” and (2) it must “provide{ ] a commencement date which is earlier than the federally required commencement date.” /d. § 9658(a)(1). For the following reasons, we think North Carolina’s ten-year limitation meets these conditions here. First, the ten-year bar is located with the statutes of limitations periods in a section titled, “Limitations, Other than Real Property.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1—52. As such, it is a limitations period “specified in the State statute of limitations or under common law.” See 42 U.S.C. § 9658(a)(1). Second, it is (1) a “period,” (2) “specified in a statute of limitations,” (3) “during which a civil action ... may be brought’; thus, it comports with the definition of “applicable limitations period.” See id. § 9658({b)(2). Finally, because the period begins to run when the defendant commits his last act, rather than when the plaintiff has knowledge of harm, its “commencement date .. . is earlier than the federally required commencement l3a date.” See id. § 9658(a)(1). Accordingly, we conclude that in spite of § 9658’s repeated use of the phrase “statute of limitations,” the text is susceptible to an interpretation that includes repose limitations such as North Carolina’s. In sum, we reckon § 9658’s text capable of at least two interpretations, preventing it from being straightforwardly categorized as “plain and unambiguous.” Lest we seem to be stretching to find ambiguity in the text, we make two additional observations. First, the terms “statute of limitations” and “statute of repose” have seen considerable development in their usage and meaning. Indeed, a historical analysis reveals that both scholars and courts have often used the terms interchangeably. See McDonald v. Sun, 548 F.3d 774, 781 & n. 3, n. 4 (9th Cir. 2008) (collecting cases and academic articles. that demonstrate a historical lack of distinction between the terms). Thus, in this context, Congress's choice to use “statute of limitations” is in no way dispositive as to whether it intended § 9658 to apply to statutes of repose. Rather, given the inconsistent manner in which the term has been used, it is entirely probable that in 1986, when Congress added § 9658 to CERCLA, it intended “statute of limitations” to include precisely the type of ten-year limitation that we are dealing with here. Second, § 9658 manifests a lack of internal consistency in its reference to an “applicable limitations period.” Subsection (a)(1) notes that such a period is “specified in the State statute of limitations or under common law,” but the definition of “applicable limitations period” and “commencement date” make no reference to common law. Thus, to the extent that a limitations period is established only under common law, § 9658 fails to l4a manifest a plain meaning applicable in such a circumstance. C. When the text of a statute is ambiguous, we “look to other indicia of congressional intent such as the legislative history” to interpret the statute. CGM, LLC, v. BellSouth Telecomms, Inc., 664 F.3d 46, 53 (4th Cir. 2011). As explained in Part I, supra, § 9658 was adopted by Congress to “address| } the problem identified in the . .. study [group report],” H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 99-962, at 261, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3276, 3354. The study group report was equally concerned with statutes of repose and limitations, and with their effect of barring plaintiffs’ claims before they are aware of them. Moreover, Congress’s purpose in enacting CERCLA was remedial. Blake A. Watson, Liberal Construction of CERCLA Under the Remedial Purpose Canon: Have the Lower Courts Taken a Good Thing Too Far?, 20 Harv. Envtl. L.Rev. 199, 286 (1996) (““CERLCA is not only more remedial than most legislative enactments, it is arguably the most remedial of all federal environmental statutes... .”). Indeed, [t]he Act is distinctive in the spectrum of federal environmental protection legislation in that the principal focus is remedial and corrective rather than regulatory. CERCLA does not set standards for prospective compliance by industry but essentially is a tort-like backward-looking statute designed to {clean up] expeditiously abandoned hazardous waste sites and respond to hazardous spills and releases of toxic wastes into the environment. lda Id. (quoting Wiliam Murray Tabb & Linda A. Malone, Environmental Law: Cases & Materials 637 (1992)). Moreover, § 9658 resulted from Congress’s additional attempts to ensure adequate remedies, and it furthers CERCLA’s remedial goals by preempting state limitation periods that would otherwise bar causes of action when harms lie dormant. We have observed that “CERCLA, as all remedial statutes, must be given a_ broad interpretation to effect its ameliorative goals.” First United Methodist, 882 F.2d at 867. When faced with a _ remedial statute, our interpretive charge is simple: Employ a “standard of liberal construction [to] accomplish [Congress’s] objects.” Urie v. Thompson, 337 U.S. 163, 180, (1949); see also Niagara Mohawk Power Corp., 596 F.3d at 132 (recognizing the need to liberally construe CERCLA to accomplish congressional objectives); see also Axel] Johnson, Inc. v. Carroll Carolina O1l Co., Inc., 191 F.3d 409, 416 (4th Cir. 1999) (same). In light of this charge, we reject a reading of § 9658 that excludes application of its provisions to North Carolina’s ten-year limitation. Such an interpretation may seem to be textually sound under one possible reading of the statute, but it offers too narrow an approach and one that thwarts Congress's unmistakable goal of removing barriers to relief from toxic wreckage. Refusing to apply § 9658 to statutes of repose allows states to obliterate legitimate causes of action before they exist. Because this is precisely the barrier that Congress intended § 9658 to address, we will not read the statute in a manner that makes it inapplicable in such a circumstance. Doing so cannot be termed an honest attempt to “effectuate | Congress’s intent.” l6a Accordingly, we hold that the federally required commencement date in § 9658 preempts North Carolina’s ten-year limitation on the accrual of real property claims. In so holding, we join the view articulated by the Ninth Circuit in McDonald v. Sun, in which the plaintiffs found themselves in_ circumstances remarkably similar to those of the landowners in this case. See 548 F.3d at 777-78, 783 (“[G]liven the ambiguity of the term ‘statute of limitations at the time of the adoption of § [9658], taken alongside the only evidence of Congressional intent, it is evident that the term ‘statute of hmitations’ in § [9658] was intended by Congress to include statutes of repose.”). Although the Fifth Circuit delineated an opposing view in Burlington Northern & Sante Fe Railway Co. v. Poole Chemical Co., 419 F.3d 355 (5th Cir.2005), we are unpersuaded by its reasoning. There, the plaintiffs had knowledge of their claim prior to expiration of the state statute of repose. Jd. at 359— 60, 364-65. Thus, as recognized by that court, the “case [did] not involve the delayed discovery ... which § 9658 was intended to address.” /d. at 364- 65. D. Our decision here will likely raise the ire of corporations and other entities that wish to rest in the security of statutes of repose, free from the threat of being called to account for their contaminating acts. They likely will cite the well-known policies underlying such statutes and asseverate that we have ignored them. But we are not ignorant of these policies, nor have we turned a blind eye to their importance. 17a Repose statutes do not exist simply to protect defendants; they also ensure that cases are processed efficiently. See United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 117 (1979) (“[S]tatutes of repose ... protect defendants and the courts from having to deal with cases in which the search for truth may be seriously impaired by the loss of evidence, whether by death or disappearance of witnesses, fading memories, disappearance of documents, or otherwise .”). And although our decision removes one potential time barrier to a plaintiffs claim, it does not relax his burden of proof. In cases with latent harms, necessary evidence will disappear as time passes, and intervening causes will complicate efforts to pin costs on one party. Even without the hindrance of an official repose statute, plaintiffs may not be able to establish a cause of action or recover damages. Furthermore, because our decision does nothing to diminish North Carolina’s requirement that plaintiffs bring claims within three years of discovery, defendants will not necessarily be endlessly subjected to the possibility of litigation. Finally, our stance goes no further than that contemplated by the study group that Congress commissioned. The Group foresaw that the “Jegislative balance of the respective rights of potential plaintiffs and defendants,” First United Methodist, 882 F.2d at 866, reflected in statutes of repose might in this circumstance need to tip in favor of plaintiffs: “The policy of repose expressed in the statute of limitations may be outweighed by the policy of affording the plaintiff a just opportunity to vindicate his rights.” Superfund Section 301(e) Study Group, 97th Cong., Injuries and Damages from Hazardous Wastes—Analysis and Improvement of Legal Remedies pt. 2, at 14 (Comm. 18a Print 1982). Accordingly, we reaffirm our conclusion that North Carolina’s ten-year limitation on the accrual of actions is preempted by § 9658 of CERCLA. In so holding, we simply further Congress’s intent that victims of toxic waste not be hindered in their attempts to hold accountable those who have strewn such waste on their land. IV. For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the district court’s order and remand the case so that the litigation can proceed. REVERSED AND REMANDED DAVIS, Circuit Judge, concurring: “Of course, determining whether a regulation or statute is ambiguous presents a legal question, which we determine de novo.” Humanoids Group v. Rogan, 375 F.3d 301, 306 (4th Cir. 2004). To say, as our good colleague says in dissent, that the majority’s legal conclusion that § 9658 is ambiguous must be “supported by the plain language of the statute itself,” post, at 26, finds no support in Supreme Court or Fourth Circuit authority. “Plain language” analysis does no such work. See Watt v. Alaska, 451 U.S. 259, 266 (1981) (“[T}he plain-meaning rule is rather an axiom of experience than a rule of law, and does not preclude consideration of persuasive evidence if it exists.”) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Moreover, in any event, as the majority opinion makes clear, “the meaning of statutory language, plain or not, depends on context.” Holloway v. United States, 526 U.S. 1, 7 (1999) (quotations omitted). Judge Floyd’s careful analysis is faithful to this important, overarching principle, and | am pleased to join his fine opinion in full. 19a THACKER, Circuit Judge, dissenting: With all due respect to my friends in the majority, ] must dissent. The majority essentially concludes § 9658 preempts two categories of state statutes: statutes of limitations and statutes of repose. However, in my view the plain and unambiguous language of §9658 indicates only statutes of limitations were intended to be preempted. Even if the preemptive effect of § 9658 were susceptible to two interpretations, a presumption’ against preemption would counsel that we should limit § 9658’s preemptive reach to statutes of limitations without also extending it to statutes of repose. The relevant legislative history underscores this plain reading of the statute, and a plain reading of § 9658 aligns with general, deferential principles of legislative compromise that counsel against a liberal reading of the statute. Accordingly, I would affirm. a Although this case arises in the context of federal preemption, at its core, it is about statutory interpretation. The key issue is whether the phrase “statute of limitations” as used in the 1986 amendments to the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 (“CERCLA”), Act of Oct. 27, 1986, Pub. L. No. 99— 499, 100 Stat. 1613 (“1986 Amendments”), and codified in 42 U.S.C. § 9658, preempts North Carolina’s 10-year statute of repose. A. Plain Meaning As in all matters of statutory interpretation, our starting point is an analysis of the statutory text. 20a Chris v. Tenet, 221 F.3d 648, 651 (4th Cir. 2000). We must begin by asking “whether the language at issue has a plain and unambiguous meaning g Robinson v. Shell Oi] Co., 519 U.S. 337, 340 (1997). This first step may also be our last: if the statutory language has a plain and unambiguous meaning, “we must apply the statute according to its terms.” Carcieri v. Salazar, 555 U.S. 379, 387 (2009). In determining whether the language has a plain and unambiguous meaning, “we consider the language itself, the specific context in which that language is used, and the broader context of the statute as a whole.” Johnson v. Zimmer, 686 F.3d 224, 232 (4th Cir.2012) (internal quotation marks omitted). If certain terms are undefined in the relevant statutory provisions, they “are typically interpreted as taking their ordinary, contemporary, common meaning.” /d. (internal quotation marks omitted). l. Language of Section 9658 CERCLA § 9658 governs actions under state law for damages from exposure to hazardous substances, and provides that generally, “the statute of limitations established under State law shall apply ..” 42 U.S.C. § 9658(a)(2). But the statute also provides the following exception to this general rule: (I]f the applicable limitations period for such action (as specified in the State statute of limitations or under common law) provides a commencement date which is earlier than the federally required commencement date, such period shall commence at the federally required commencement date in heu of the date specified in such State statute. 2la Id. § 9658(a)(1). Of critical import here, the statute defines the “applicable limitations period” as “the period specified in a statute of limitations during which a civil action referred to in subsection (a)(1) of this section may be brought.” Jd. § 9658(b)(2) (emphasis supplied). Similarly, the statute defines the state “commencement date” as “the date specified in a statute of limitations as the beginning of the apphcable limitations period.” Id. § 9658(b)(3) (emphasis supplied). The “federally required commencement date” provides an enhanced version of the traditional discovery rule and is defined as “the date the plaintiff knew (or reasonably should have known) that the personal injury or property damages.. were caused or contributed by the hazardous substance ....” Jd. § 9658(b)(4).!. Thus, § 9658 will preempt state law where a state statute of limitations begins to run before it would have run under the federally required commencement date. The key question then is whether the meaning of § 9658, by its reference to “statute of limitations,” is plain and unambiguous. The majority answers that question by concluding that the phrase “statute of limitations” is ambiguous, and thus encompasses both statutes of limitations and statutes of repose. Ante at 16 (determining that “ § 9658's text [is] capable of at least two interpretations, preventing it from being straightforwardly categorized as ‘plain 1 As opposed to a more traditional discovery rule that requires simply knowledge of the injury, the “federally required commencement date” requires both knowledge of the injury and its cause. Therefore, this dissent at times uses the term “enhanced discovery rule” to refer to the rule as expressed in the definition of “federally required commencement date.” 22a and unambiguous.’ ”). The majority’s conclusion, however, is not supported by the plain language of the statute itself. 2. Modern and Historical Context The difficulty presented in this case springs from the definitions of “statutes of limitations” and “statutes of repose” in use today versus their historical understanding. Today, we understand a statute of limitations, on the one hand, to be “a procedural] device that operates as a defense to limit the remedy available from an existing cause of action.” First United Methodist Church of Hyattsville v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 882 F.2d 862, 865 (4th Cir. 1989); see also Black’s Law Dictionary 1546 (9th ed. 2009) (defining statute of limitations as “A law that bars claims after a specified period; specif., a statute establishing a time limit for suing in a civil case, based on the date when the claim accrued (as when the injury occurred or was discovered).”). In other words, a statute of limitations “extinguishes the right to prosecute an accrued cause of action after a period of time.” Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Poole Chem. Co., 419 F.3d 355, 363 (5th Cir. 2005) (internal quotation marks omitted). Statutes of limitations typically begin to run either on the date of the plaintiffs injury, or on the date the injury is first discovered or should have been discovered with reasonable diligence. See id. A statute of repose, on the other hand, “creates a substantive right in those protected to be free from liability after a legislatively-determined period of time.” First United Methodist, 882 F.2d at 866; see 23a also Black’s Law Dictionary 1546 (9th ed. 2009) (defining statute of repose as “[a] statute barring any suit that is brought after a specified time since the defendant acted (such as by designing or manufacturing a product), even if this period ends before the plaintiff has suffered a resulting injury.”). A statute of repose “abolishes the cause of action after the passage of time even though the cause of action may not have yet accrued.” Surlington, 419 F.3d at 363 (internal quotation marks omitted). Statutes of repose typically begin to run after “the occurrence of some event other than the injury which gave rise to the claim|,]” McDonald v. Sun Oil Co., 548 F.3d 774, 779 (9th Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks omitted), such as an act by a defendant or the manufacture of a product, see Burlington, 419 F.3d at 363. The motivations behind statutes of limitations and statutes of repose are different as well. For example, “‘Is]tatutes of limitations are motivated’ by considerations of fairness to defendants and are intended to encourage prompt resolution of disputes by providing a simple procedural mechanism to dispose of stale claims.” First United Methodist, 882 F.2d at 866. Thus, they can be equitably tolled where, for example, a defendant fraudulently conceals a plaintiffs injury. /d. Statutes of repose are motivated by “considerations of the economic best interests of the public as a whole” and reflect “a legislative balance of the respective rights of potential plaintiffs and defendants struck by determining a time limit beyond which hability no longer exists.” Jd Thus, unlike statutes of limitations, statutes of repose are substantive grants of immunity from liability. Jd. 24a But this clear distinction between statutes of limitations and statutes of repose is of modern vintage. Historically, the phrase “statute of repose” encompassed a broad range of time-bar statutes that limited litigation, and “provided peace, or ‘repose,’ to potential litigants....". Wenke v. Gehl Co., 682 N.W 2d 405, 423 (Wis. 2004); see also id. (“Early treatise writers and judges considered time bars created by statutes of limitations, escheat and adverse possession as periods of repose. As the courts began to modify statutory limitations by applying the ‘discovery rule,’ legislatures responded by enacting absolute statutes of repose.” (emphasis omitted) (quoting Reynolds v. Porter, 760 P.2d 816, 819-20 (Okla. 1988))). Indeed, the earliest reference to “statutes of repose” in this circuit appears in Bart/ett v. Ambrose, 78 F. 839, 842 (4th Cir. 1897), in which we cited the Supreme Court’s language in Pillow v. Roberts, 54 U.S. 472, 13 How. 477 (1851), proclaiming, “[statutes of limitations] are statutes of repose, and should not be evaded by a forced construction.” Put simply, what we today would call statutes of limitations were historically considered, along with other statutory time-bars, to provide repose to litigants and were thus, generally, statutes of repose. These overlapping definitions, however, have evolved into the distinct definitions we have today. 3. “Statute of Limitations” in 1986 Using the dictionary definition of “statute of limitations” available to Congress in 1986, it is clear that there is no ambiguity as to the meaning of that term at the time § 9658 was enacted. The Fifth 25a Edition of Black's Law Dictionary (the “Fifth Edition”), the most recent edition available to Congress in 1986 at the time CERCLA was amended to include § 9658, had not yet adopted the separate, modern definitions for both “statutes of limitations” and “statutes of repose,” but was nonetheless in accord with our modern understanding where it mattered. The Fifth Edition of Black's Law Dictionary defined “statute of limitations” as follows: A statute prescribing limitations to the rnght of action on certain described causes of action or criminal prosecutions; that is, declaring that no suit shall be maintained on such causes of action, nor any criminal charge be made, unless brought within a specified period of time after the right accrued. Statutes of limitation are statutes of repose, and are such legislative enactments as prescribe the periods within which actions may be brought upon certain claims or within which certain rights may be enforced. In criminal cases, however, a statute of limitation is an act of grace, a surrendering by sovereign of its right to prosecute. Also sometimes referred to as “statutes of repose.” Black’s Law Dictionary 835 (5th ed. 1979).2. This definition is clearly restricted to time limitations that begin to run after the right to bring the cause of action accrues, that is, after the injury or its “ As noted, we now define a statute of limitations as “[a] law that bars claims after a specified period; specif., a statute establishing a time limit for suing in a civil case, based on the date when the claim accrued (as when the injury occurred or was discovered).” Black’s Law Dictionary 1546 (9th ed. 2009). 26a discovery, as opposed to after a predetermined period of time, regardless of whether the action otherwise accrues. It, thus, confirms that statutes of limitations were but a subset of statutes of repose and were therefore “sometimes referred to as ‘statutes of repose.” Jd. Notably, this definition does not adopt the inverse proposition that all statutes of repose are also statutes of limitation. Therefore, based on the definition available to Congress at the time of the 1986 Amendments, it is clear that Congress necessarily did not intend to include statutes of repose as within the definition of “statutes of limitations.” At the time of the enactment of § 9658 in 1986, then, the only possible ambiguity may have been the meaning of “statute of repose” and whether that term had fully matured into its modern definition. But Congress chose not to include “statute of repose” in § 9658, and thus we need not trouble ourselves with what Congress may have thought it meant. B. The North Carolina Statute After discerning the plain meaning of § 9658, we must decide whether that plain meaning preempts the application of North Carolina General Statute * Indeed, the study group commissioned by Congress to provide recommendations for the 1986 Amendments clearly understood statutes of repose to be different and distinct from statutes of limitations, as discussed infra, and other treatises recognized the distinction at least as early as 1987. See Black's Law Dictionary 1546 (9th ed. 2009) (quoting 54 C.J.S. Limitations of Actions § 4 (1987)). 27a § 1-52(16) to Appellants’ state law claim. As explained, in 1986, statutes of limitations were understood to be statutes that limited the right to maintain an action based on when the injured party accrued the right. North Carolina’s three-year statute of limitations is just such a restriction and is preempted by § 9658. North Carolina’s 10~year statute of repose is not; therefore, it survives beyond the 1986 Amendments. North Carolina General Statute § 1—52(16) contains both a statute of limitations and a statute of repose. The first sentence of § 1—52(16) provides a three-year statute of limitations for personal injuries and property damages based on a traditional form of the discovery rule. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1—52(16) (“Within three years an action ... for personal injury or physical damage to claimant’s property, the cause of action . . . shal] not accrue until bodily harm to the claimant or physical damage to his property becomes apparent or ought reasonably to have become apparent to the claimant, whichever event first occurs.”). Section 1—52(16) also clearly provides a substantive 10-year statute of repose that declares “no cause of action shall accrue more than 10 years from the last act or omission of the defendant giving rise to the cause of action.” /d. § 1-52(16). But only the three-year provision specifies a time period to bring a cause of action after the right has accrued by operation of the discovery rule. The 10— year provision specifies a time restriction regardless of whether the right to bring the cause of action could have otherwise accrued. Thus, only the former three- year provision falls within the definition of “statute of 28a limitations” available to Congress in 1986. See Black’s Law Dictionary 835 (5th ed. 1979) (defining “statute of limitations” as “[a] statute ... declaring that no suit shall be maintained ... unless brought within a specified period of time after the right accrued”). Therefore, only the three-year provision may be considered in order to determine North Carolina’s “applicable limitations period.” See 42 U.S.C. § 9658(b)(2) (defining “applicable limitations period” as “the period specified in a statute of limitations”). Section 9658 preempts state law where state law does not accord plaintiffs the benefit of the federally required commencement date found in § 9658(b)(4). Because North Carolina’s three-year provision imposes the earlier, traditional discovery rule to commence the applicable limitations period, and not the commencement date mandated by § 9658, § 9658 preempts North Carolina’s statute of limitations, but not its statute of repose. In contrast, although § 9658 is clearly applicable to preempt the running of North Carolina’s statute of limitations, any application to North Carolina’s statute of repose is untenable. A simple attempt to map § 9658 onto the North Carolina statute of repose illustrates the point. To trigger § 9658(a)(1), the state “commencement date” must be “earlier than the federally required commencement date.” 42 U.S.C. § 9658(a)(1) (“{I]f the applicable limitations period for such action (as specified in the State statute of limitations or under common law) provides a commencement date which is earlier than the federally required commencement date... .”). Importantly, the commencement date is defined as 29a the beginning of the period in which a civil action may be brought. See id. § 9658(b)(2)-(3).4 But the North Carolina statute of repose does not provide a beginning or “commencement date” as that term is defined. Rather, it provides an outer limit, after which no cause of action may accrue. Because North Carolina’s statute of repose does not create the beginning of the applicable limitations period, § 9658 cannot graft neatly—or at all—onto the North Carolina statute of repose so as to preempt its enforcement. C. Legislative History Given the plain meaning of the statute, we need not look to legislative history. But, even if we did, the legislative history of § 9658 also clearly supports the conclusion that Congress was aware that statutes of limitations were a distinct category of time-bar statutes and specifically chose only to preempt those statutes and not other statutory time bars such as statutes of repose. As a part of the initial enactment of CERCLA in 1980, Congress commissioned a study group of expert lawyers “to determine the adequacy of existing common law and statutory remedies in providing legal redress for harm to man and the environment caused by the release of hazardous substances into the environment... .” CERCLA, Pub. L. No. 96—510, § 301(e)(1), 94 Stat. 2767 (1980). The study group 4 The North Carolina statute of limitations establishes the beginning of that period as the point at which “bodily harm ... or physical damage . . . becomes apparent or ought reasonably to have become apparent... .” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1—52(16). 30a responded with a_ detailed report = and recommendations for improving remedies under CERCLA. See Superfund Section 301l(e) Study Group, 97th Cong., Injuries and Damages from Hazardous Wastes—Analysis and Improvement of Legal Remedies (Comm. Print 1982) (the “301(e) Report”). The 30l(e) Report contained ten categories of recommendations, the ninth of which included recommendations for “Statutes of Limitations.” The 301(e) Report outlined the rationale for implementing an enhanced discovery rule in CERCLA actions, id. at 28-30, and provided its recommendation, id. at 240— 41. The 301(e) Report’s recommendation with regard to statutes of limitations, in its entirety, was as follows: A small number of states still follow the so- called traditional rule that the cause of action accrues from the time of exposure. Another small number of states has not as yet clearly adopted either the traditional or the discovery rule. Since many of the hazardous wastes are carcinogens, mutagens, teratogens or substances with delayed impact on different organs or the central nervous system, the latency period for the appearance of injury or disease is likely to be extended for thirty years or more. In states that have not clearly adopted the discovery rule (i.e., that the cause of action accrues from the time the plaintiff discovered or reasonably should have discovered the injury or disease) the cause of action will usually be time barred when the plaintiff discovers his hurt. The Study Group recommends that all states that have not 3la already done so, clearly adopt the rule that an action accrues when the plaintiff discovers or should have discovered the injury or disease and its cause. The Recommendation is intended also to cover the repeal of the statutes of repose which, in a number of states have the same effect as some statutes of limitation in barring plaintiffs claim before he knows that he has one. Id. Two key takeaways can be culled from the 301(e) Report’s recommendation: (1) an enhanced discovery rule should apply to statutes of limitations; and (2) statutes of repose are separate and distinct from statutes of hmitations. First, the 301(e) Report clearly informed Congress that an enhanced discovery rule should apply to statutes of limitations in all states for injuries caused by hazardous substances. In essence, the 301(e) Report took the position that a plaintiffs statute of limitations should not begin to run until the plaintiff both discovers or should have discovered the injury, and realizes that his or her injury was caused by the hazardous substance. 301(e) Report at 241 (“The Study Group recommends that all states that have not already done so, clearly adopt the rule that an action accrues when the plaintiff discovers or should have discovered the injury or disease and its cause.”). Congress agreed. In enacting § 9658, Congress implemented this exact formulation of the discovery rule in its definition of the “federally required commencement date.” 42 U.S.C. § 9658(b)(4)(A).5 ®* The “federally required commencement date” is defined, in relevant part, as “the date the plaintiff knew (or reasonably 32a Second, the 301(e) Report put Congress on notice that statutes of limitations are distinct time-bars, separate from statutes of repose, even if they have the same effect. The 301(e) Report recommended to Congress not only that the aforementioned enhanced discovery rule should be applied to state statutes of limitations, but also recommended that state statutes of repose be repealed. 301(e) Report at 241 (“The Recommendation is intended also to cover the repeal of the statutes of repose which, in a number of states have the same effect as some statutes of limitation in barring plaintiffs claim before he knows that he has one.”). By the plain language of § 9658, Congress disagreed. Based on the 301(e) Report, Congress was clearly on notice that statutes of repose, separate and distinct from statutes of limitations, could prohibit recovery by certain plaintiffs, and yet chose to leave § 9658 completely replete of any reference to such statutes. D. Legislative Compromise The majority notes that CERCLA is a remedial statute and thus deserves broad construction to accomplish its objectives. Ante at 17. This is true. But the plain meaning of the statute and the role of legislative compromise restrain the application of the remedial canon of statutory interpretation. See 3550 Stevens Creek Assocs. v. Barclays Bank of Cal. 915 should have known) that the personal injury or property damages ... were caused or contributed to by the hazardous substance or pollutant or contaminant concerned.” 42 U.S.C. § 9658(b)(4)(A). 33a F.2d 1355, 1363 (9th Cir. 1990) (noting that even if courts give CERCLA a “broad interpretation to accomplish its remedial goals[,]” courts must nonetheless “reject a construction that [CERCLA] on its face does not permit, and the legislative history does not support.”); Blake A. Watson, Libera/ Construction of CERCLA under the Remedial Purpose Canon: Have the Lower Courts Taken a Good Thing too Far?, 20 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. 199, 300-01 (1996) (“It has been firmly established that the fact that a statute is ‘highly remedial in nature’ and ‘entitled to a liberal construction’ nevertheless ‘does not justify ignoring plain words of limitation.”) (quoting MacEvoy Co. v. United States, 322 U.S. 102, 107 (1944)); rd. at 301 (“[T]he remedial purpose canon has diminished utility when the interpretive issue focuses on provisions of CERCLA that are the product of compromise. Such compromises can be found in both CERCLA’s text and its enactment history.”).® In passing the 1986 Amendments, Congress did not arm toxic tort plaintiffs with every possible advantage nor remove every obstacle from their path to recovery. Rather, the 1986 Amendments reflected the process of legislative compromise based, in part, on the 301(e) Report’s analysis and recommendations. As mentioned, the 301(e) Report 6 Even if CERCLA, as enacted in 1980, was the product of an 1ith-hour compromise and, thus, also lends itself to a liberal construction for that reason as the majority seems to imply, ante at 4, 17—19, the provision at issue in this case, § 9658, was passed years later in 1986 after careful study and deliberation. The circumstances surrounding § 9658's passage certainly do not invite departure from its plain language. 34a was commissioned to evaluate existing statutory and common law remedies for environmental harms caused by hazardous substances and to provide corresponding recommendations. CERCLA, Pub. L. No. 96-510, § 301(e)(1), (4), 94 Stat. 2767 (1980). But Congress did not implement’ every recommendation supplied by the 301(e) Report. In fact, quite to the contrary. For example, in its “Ninth Recommendation,” the 301(e) Report recommended a variety of changes to actions arising under state law. 301l{e) Report, 240-51. The 301(e) Report recommended states adopt an enhanced discovery rule, id. at 241; repeal statutes of repose, id.; adopt liberal joinder rules for plaintiffs, id. at 242; adopt a system of joint and several lability with a de minimis exception, sd. at 243; adopt liberal joinder rules for defendants, id. at 244; implement their own evidentiary presumptions, id. at 245; and adopt a theory of strict liability for hazardous waste activities, 7d. at 245. Congress could have drafted the 1986 Amendments to implement any or all of the 301(e) Report’s recommendations by preempting state law wherever it fell short of the 301(e) Report’s recommendations. But the on/y revision affecting state law Congress chose to implement in the section exphicitly covering state procedural reform was the enhanced discovery rule via the federally required commencement date. See 1986 Amendments, Pub. L. No. 99—499, § 203, 100 Stat. 1613 (1986). Notably, Congress was given the opportunity to repeal statutes of repose, but chose not to. That § 9658 reaches state statutes of limitations but not statutes of repose strikes a balance between harmonizing certain procedural matters in toxic tort 35a cases and allowing states to continue to regulate their own substantive areas of law. It is the prerogative of Congress to strike that balance. See Hanford Downwinders Coalition, Inc. vy. Dowdle, 71 F.3d 1469, 1484 (9th Cir. 1995) (concluding that even when the application of a CERCLA provision leads to “harsh results{,]” courts should not disrupt Congress’s balancing of the interests involved). E. Presumption Against Preemption While at its most elemental this case concerns a matter of statutory interpretation, that task arises in the context of federal preemption. “Courts generally apply a presumption against preemption in fields the states traditionally regulate.” Nat? City Bank of Ind. v. Turnbaugh, 463 F.3d 325, 330 (4th Cir. 2006). Just as we presume “Congress does not cavalierly pre-empt state-law causes of action|[,]” Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996), we should also presume that Congress does not cavalierly preempt state substantive rights to be free from those state- law causes of action. Even “[{f]ederal laws containing a preemption clause {,]” such as § 9658, “do not automatically escape the presumption § against preemption.” /d. Rather, “[wljhere the text of a preemption clause is open to more than one plausible reading, courts ordinarily ‘accept the reading that disfavors pre-emption.’ “ /d. at 335 (quoting Bates v. Dow Agrosciences LLC, 544 U.S. 431, 449 (2005)). Here, the ability of a state to create a substantive right to be free from liability under its own state tort law is unquestionably a traditional field of state regulation. Therefore, the general presumption against preemption likewise weighs against giving 36a § 9658 overly broad preemptive effect. See Barnes ex rel. Barnes v. Koppers, Inc., 534 F.3d 357, 363 (5th Cir. 2008) (discussing the preemptive effect of § 9658 and noting that “fiJf the extent of Congress's preemptive intent is unclear, the presumption favors a finding of lmited preemption.”); see generally Marsh v. Rosenbloom, 499 F.3d 165, 178 (2d Cir. 2007) (concluding CERCLA did not preempt certain Delaware statutes in part because arguments in favor of greater monetary recovery “alone are insufficient to justify displacement of state law”). II. CERCLA and the 1986 Amendments clearly put a thumb on the scales in favor of assisting plaintiffs who may have suffered injuries due to _ toxic substances. But where Congress by plain and unambiguous language has indicated how much pressure it wishes to apply in that regard, it is not the duty of this court to press harder and shift that balance. Rather, it is the prerogative of Congress to strike that legislative compromise. In sum, because I believe the plain language of § 9658 preempts North Carolina’s statute of limitations, but not its statute of repose, | would affirm the decision of the district court. APPENDIX B UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA ASHEVILLE DIVISION WALDBURGER, et al., No. 1:11CV39 ) Plaintiffs. ) Judge : ; Graham C. Mullen ) ) CTS CORPORATION, Defendant. ) Feb. 6, 2012 ORDER This matter is before the court upon the memorandum and recommendation of United States Magistrate Dennis L. Howell, filed October 4, 2011. The parties were advised that pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C), written objections to the memorandum and recommendation must be filed within 14 days after service of the memorandum. The Plaintiffs timely filed an objection to the memorandum and recommendation on October 21, 2011, and the Defendant submitted a response to the objection on November 7, 2011. After an independent and thorough review of the magistrates memorandum, Plaintiffs’ objections thereto, and a de novo review of the record, the court concludes that the recommendation to grant Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss is correct and in 38a accordance with law. The court specifically notes that the magistrate judge’s analysis of CERCLA’s preemption of state statutes of limitations, as opposed to statutes of repose, is accurate and well- reasoned. The court has reviewed the Ninth Circuit’s holding to the contrary in McDonald v. Sun Oil Co., 548 F.3d 774, 782 (9th Cir.2008), in which the court held that CERCLA preempted the applicable statute of repose. The court finds the reasoning of that court to be flawed. The plain language of Section 9658 of CERCLA applies only to state statutes of limitations, not statutes of repose. If the language of a statute is clear, the Fourth Circuit has stated that “[o]ur inquiry into Congress’ intent is at an end, for if the language is plain and the statutory scheme is coherent and consistent, we need not inquire further.” William v. Gonzales, 499 F.3d 329, 333 (4th Cir. 2007). It appears that the McDona/d court created an ambiguity where none existed. Plaintiffs also rely on the Georgia district court’s decision in Jn re: Camp Lejeune, North Carolina’ Water Contamination Litigation, 1:11—md—02218 (September 29, 2011, N.D.Ga.), in support of their argument that CERCLA should preempt the statute of repose in this case. However, the court finds this case to be unpersuasive, particularly since the Camp Lejeune court did not hold that statutes of repose were necessarily preempted by § 9658, only that they could be based on the “factual circumstances of each plaintiffs claim.” Camp Lejeune, p. 23. Accordingly, the findings and conclusions of the magistrate are accepted and Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED. 39a iT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the memorandum and recommendation of the magistrate is hereby AFFIRMED. Signed: February 6, 2012 /s/ Graham C. Mullen Graham C. Mullen United States District Judge 40a APPENDIX C UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA ASHEVILLE DIVISION 1:llev39 WALDBURGER, et al., ) ) Plaintiffs. ) MEMORANDUM AND ) RECOMMENDATION Vv ) CTS CORPORATION, Defendant. ) Pending before the Court is Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss [# 7]. Plaintiffs brought this action against Defendant CTS Corporation asserting a single count of nuisance arising out of the alleged contamination of Plaintiffs’ property. Defendant now moves to dismiss the Complaint. The Court Recommends that the District Court GRANT the motion [# 7]. I. Background CTS of Asheville, Inc. was formed in 1959 to manufacture electronics. (Pls.’ Compl. 44 5 & 7.) CTS of Asheville operated a facility in the Asheville area called the Mills Gap Road Electroplating Facility (the “Facility”). Ud. 99.) As part of the process of manufacturing electronics, CTS of Asheville used various [Text truncated at 120,000 characters. The full text is on the page linked above.] --- Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385015_0926%3A02. Public record. Not legal advice.