# Record and brief — Chamber of Commerce of the United States v. Envtl. Prot. Agency > Briefs, arguments, decisions, and more. URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385015_0900%3A0 ## Record - **Collection:** Supreme Court brief - **Document type:** Record and brief - **Published:** January 1, 2013 - **Citation:** 571 U.S. 951 ## Text UPREME COURT F THE UNITED STATES No. 12-1272 Vide 12-1146, 12- 1248, 12-1254, 12-1268, 12-1269 Title: Chamber of Commerce of the United States, et al., Petitioners V Environmental Protection Agency, et al. Docketed: April 24, 2013 Linked with 12A871 Lower Ct United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit Case Nos. (09-1322, et al.) Decision Date: June 26, 2012 Rehearing Denied: December 20, 2012 Questions Presented ~~~Date~~~ ~~~~~~~Proceedings and Orders Mar 5 2013 Application (12A871) to extend ine time to file a petition for a writ of certioran from March 20, 2013 to April 19, 2013, submitted to The Chief Justice Mar 7 2013 Application (12A871) granted by The Chief Justice extending the time to file until April 19, 2013. Mar 14 2013 Application (12A909) to extend the time to file a petition for a wnt of certioran from March 20, 2013 to April 19, 2013, submitted to The Chief Justice. Mar 18 2013 Application (12A920) to extend the time to file a petition for a wnt of certioran from March 20, 2013 to April 19, 2013, submitted to The Chief Justice. Mar 20 2013 Application (12A909) granted by The Chief Justice extending the time to file until April 19, 2013. Mar 25 2013 Application (12A920) granted by The Chief Justice extending the time to file until April 19, 2013. Apr 19 2013 Petition for a writ of certioran filed. (Response due May 24, 2013) Apr 19 2013 Appendix of Chamber of Commerce of the United States, et al. filed. (Volumes I-V) May 8 2013 Consent to the filing of amicus cunae briefs, in support of either party or of neither party, received from counsel for Texas, and eight other states. May 9 2013 Response in support of the petition for writ of certioran from respondent Peabody Energy Corporation filed. May 13 2013 Consent to the filing of amicus curiae briefs, in support of either party or of neither party, received from counsel for Southeastem Legal Foundation, Inc., et al May 14 2013 Consent to the filing of amicus curiae briefs, in support of either party or of neither party, received from counsel for the Federal Respondent. May 14 2013 Letter of respondent National Environmental Development Association's Clean Air Project in support of petition May 16 2013 Order extending time to file response to petition to and including June 21, 2013, for all respondents. May 17 2013 Consent to the filing of amicus curiae briefs, in support of either party or of neither party, received from counsel for the State of Indiana May 21 2013 Waiver of right of respondent Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General of Florida to respond filed. May 23 2013 Bnef amici cunae of Scientists filed VIDED. May 24 2013 Brief amicus curiae of Institute for Trade, Standards and Sustainable Development filed. May 24 2013 Bnef amicus cunae of Mountain States Legal Foundation filed. May 24 2013 Brief amici curiae of Economists Thomas C. Schelling, Vernon L. Smith, and Robert W. Hahn filed. May 24 2013 Brief amici curiae of Administrative Law Professors, and The Judicial Education Jun 6 2013 Jun 7 2013 Jun 7 2013 Jul 12013 Jul 8 2013 Jul 22 2013 Jul 22 2013 Jul 22 2013 Aug 6 2013 Aug 7 2013 Oct 7 2013 Oct 15 2013 Oct 22 2013 Oct 24 2013 Oct 29 2013 Project filed. Order further extending time to file response to petition to and including July 22, 2013, for all respondents. Application (12A1181) to file consolidated brief in opposition in excess of word limits, submitted to The Chief Justice. Application (12A1181) to file consolidated brief in opposition in excess of word limits granted by The Chief Justice. The consolidated brief in opposition may not exceed 12,000 words. Application (13A35) to file consolidated brief in opposition in excess of word limits, submitted to The Chief Justice. Application (13A35) to file consolidated brief in opposition in excess of word limits granted by The Chief Justice. The consolidated brief in opposition may not exceed 11,000 words. Bnef of respondents Environmental Protection Agency, et al. in opposition filed VIDED. Brief of Environmental Organization respondents in opposition filed. VIDED. Brief of respondents New York, et al. in opposition filed. VIDED. Reply of petitioners Chamber of Commerce of the United States, et al. filed DISTRIBUTED for Conference of September 30, 2013. DISTRIBUTED for Conference of October 11, 2013. Petition GRANTED limited to the following Question: Whether EPA permissibly determined that its regulation of greenhouse gas emissions from new motor vehicles triggered permitting requirements under the Clean Air Act for stationary sources that emit greenhouse gases. The cases are consolidated and a total of one hour is allotted for oral argument. VIDED. Briefing proposal of the parties. VIDED Letter from Coalition for Responsible Regulation, Inc., et el. regarding briefing proposal. VIDED. Upon consideration of the letter of October 22, 2013, from counsel for petitioners in No. 12-1248 on behalf of the parties, the briefing proposal! set out in the letter is adopted with the exception that the briefs of petitioners shall not exceed 45,000 words in aggregate. The briefs of respondents in support of petitioners shal! not exceed 6,000 words each. The brief of the Solicitor General shall not exceed 15,000 words. The briefs of other respondents shall not exceed 10,000 words each. Reply briefs shall not exceed 18.000 words in aggregate. VIDED Nov 12013 Consent from petitioner Utility Air Regulatory Group to the filing of amicus curiae briefs in support of either party or neither party. VIDED. Nov 12013 The time to file joint appendix, petitioners’ briefs on the merits, and bnefs of respondents in support of petitioners is extended to and including December 9, 2013. VIDED Nov 12013 The time to file respondents’ bnefs on the merits is extended to and including January 21, 2014. VIDED Nov 12013 Consent to the filing of amicus curiae briefs, in support of either party or of neither party, received from counsel for the United States Federal Environmental Protection Agency, et al. VIDED. Nov 72013 Consent to the filing of amicus curiae briefs, in support of either party, or of neither party, received from counsel for Texas, et al. VIDED. Nov 8 2013 Consent to the filing of amicus curiae briefs, in support of either party or of neither party, received from counsel for Southeastern Legal Foundation, Inc., et al. VIDED. Nov 8 2013 Consent to the filing of amicus curiae briefs, in support of either party or of niether party, received from counsel for Coalition for Responsible Regulation, inc., et al. VIDED.11082013 Nov 12 2013 Consent to the filing of amicus curiae briefs, in support of either party or of neither party, received from counsel for American Chemistry Council, et al. VIDED. Nov 12 2013 Consent to the filing of amicus curiae briefs, in support of either party or of neither party, received from counsel for New York, California, et al. VIDED Nov 12 2013 Consent to the filing of amicus curiae briefs, in support of either party or of neither party, received from counsel for Environmental Organizations, Center for Biological Diversity, et al. VIDED. Nov 12 2013 Letter received from counsel for the Automobile Respondents. VIDED. Nov 19 2013 Consent to the filing of amicus curiae briefs, in support of either party or of neither party, received from counsel for Energy-intensive Manufacturers Working Group on Greenhouse Gas Regulation, et al. VIDED. Nov 21 2013 Consent to the filing of amicus curiae briefs, in support of either party or of neither party, recieved from counsel for The Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America, et al. VIDED. Nov 25 2013 SET FOR ARGUMENT ON Monday, February 24, 2014 Dec 92013 Consent to the filing of amicus curiae briefs, in support of either party or of neither party, received from counsel for the National Mining Association. VIDED. Dec 92013 Brief of respondents Coalition for Responsible Regulation, |nc., et al. in support of petitioners filed. VIDED. Dec 92013 Brief of petitioners American Chemistry Council, et al. filed. VIDED. Dec 92013 Brief of petitioners Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America, et al. filed. VIDED. Dec 92013 Brief of petitioners Southeastem Legal Foundation, Inc., et al. filed. VIDED. Dec 92013 Brief of petitioner Energy-intensive Manufacturers Working Group on Greenhouse Gas Regulation, et al. filed. VIDED Dec 92013 Brief of petitioners Texas, et al. filed. VIDED. Dec 92013 Joint appendix filed (5 volumes). (Statement of costs filed.) VIDED Dec 92013 Brief of petitioner Utility Air Regulatory Group filed. VIDED. Dec 12 2013 Brief amici curiae of Pacific Legal Foundation, et al. filed. VIDED. Dec 13 2013 Record received from U.S.C.A. DC Circuit. The record is electronic. Dec 16 2013 Brief amici curiae of States of Kansas, et al. filed. VIDED. Dec 16 2013 Brief amicus curiae of Peabody Energy Corporation filed. VIDED. Dec 16 2013 Brief amici curiae of Political Economists Henry N. Butler, et al. filed. VIDED Dec 16 2013 Bnef amici curiae of Economists Thomas C. Schelling, et al. filed. VIDED. Dec 16 2013 Brief amicus curiae of Committee for a Constructive Tomorrow filed. VIDED Dec 16 2013 Brief amicus curiae of American Civil Rights Union filed. VIDED. Dec 16 2013 Brief amici curiae of Texas Oil & Gas Association, et al. filed VIDED Dec 16 2013 Brief amicus curiae of Senator Mitch McConnell and Other Members of the United States Congress filed. VIDED. Dec 16 2013 Brief amicus curiae of Mountain States Lega! Foundation filed. VIDED. Dec 16 2013 Brief amici curiae of Five U.S. Senators filed. VIDED. Dec 16 2013 Brief amicus curiae of Center for Constitutional Jurisprudence filed. VIDED. Dec 16 2013 Brief amici cunae of State and Local Chambers of Commerce, and Other Business Associations. filed. VIDED. Dec 16 2013 Bnef amici curiae of Administrative Law Professors, et al. filed. VIDED (Distributed) Dec 16 2013 Bnef amicus curiae of American Road & Transportation Builders Association in support of neither party filed. VIDED. (Distributed) Dec 16 2013 Bnef amici curiae of Scientists and Economists filed. VIDED. (Distributed) Dec 20 2013 CIRCULATED. Jan 62014 Motion for divided argument and enlargement of time for oral argument filed by petitioners. VIDED. Jan 21 2014 Brief of respondent Environmental Protection Agency filed. VIDED. (Distributed) Jan 21 2014 Brief of respondents Environmental Organization respondents filed. VIDED. (Distributed) Jan 21 2014 Bnref of respondents New York, et al. filed. VIDED. (Distributed) Jan 27 2014 Motion for divided argument filed by petitioners GRANTED. and the time is divided as follows: 30 minutes for private party petitioners, 15 minutes for state petitioners, and 45 minutes for respondents. Jan 27 2014 Brief amici curiae of South Coast Air Quality Management District, et al. filed VIDED. (Distributed) Jan 27 2014 Brief amicus curiae of Institute for Policy Integrity at New York University Schoo! of Law filed. VIDED. (Distributed) Jan 28 2014 Brief amicus curiae of Calpine Corporation filed. VIDED. (Distributed) Jan 28 2014 Brief amicus curiae of American Thoracic Society filed. VIDED. (Distributed) Jan 28 2014 Brief amicus curiae of Constitutional Accountability Center filed. VIDED. (Distnbuted) Feb 13 2014 Reply of respondents Coalition for Responsible Regulation, Inc., et al. in support of petitioners filed. VIDED. (Distributed) Feb 14 2014 Reply of petitioners in Nos. 12-1248, 12-1254, 12-1268, and 12-1272 filed. VIDED. (Distributed) Feb 14 2014 Reply of petitioners Texas, et al. filed. VIDED. (Distributed) Feb 14 2014 Reply of petitioner Utility Air Regulatory Group filed. VIDED. (Distributed) Feb 24 2014 Argued. For private petitioners: Peter Keisler, Washington, D. C. For state petitioners: Jonathan F. Mitchell, Solicitor General, Austin, Tex. For respondents: Donald B. Verrilli, Jr., Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D. C. PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI RECORD 1 9 -19 79 Snare Con UE APR 19 2013 OFFICE OF THE Cr ea :¢ 3n the Supreme Court of the United States CHAMBER OF COMMERCE OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, STATE OF ALASKA, AND AMERICAN FARM BUREAU FEDERATION, Petitioners, v. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, ET AL., Respondents. ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI RACHEL L. BRAND ROBERT R. GASAWAY SHELDON GILBERT Counsel of Record National Chamber JEFFREY A. ROSEN, P.C. Litigation Center, Inc. JEFFREY BOSSERT CLARK 1615 H Street, NW ADITYA BAMZAI Washington, DC 20062 WILLIAM H. BURGESS (202) 463-5337 Kirkland & Ellis LLP 655 Fifteenth Street, N.W. MICHAEL C. GERAGHTY Washington, DC 20005 Attorney General robert.gasaway@kirkland.com STEVEN E. MULDER (202) 879-5000 State of Alaska 1031 W. 4th Avenue Counsel for Petitioner Anchorage, AK 99501 Chamber of Commerce of the (907) 269-5274 United States of America [Additional Counsel Listed on Signature Page] anata rene eetemneenl eaiidaiitldtintiadiennamtantateneeiemmnmenteennt innit WILSON-EPES PRINTING Co., Inc. — (202) 789-0086 — WASHINGTON, D.C. 20002 of Congress oo QUESTIONS PRESENTED The Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) promulgated a series of four broad-ranging and inter- connected rules to control emissions of greenhouse gases. In proposing the last rule in the sequence, EPA acknowledged that it would create a result “so contrary to what Congress had in mind — and that in fact so undermines what Congress attempted to ac- complish with the [statute’s] requirements — that it should be avoided under the ‘absurd results’ doc- trine.” App. 1837a. EPA nonetheless finalized the rule and then, in an attempt to cure the absurdity, rewrote codified limitations in the Clean Air Act. The questions presented are: 1. Whether, once an agency has identified absurd results produced by its construction of a complex statutory scheme as a whole, the agency may deem the identified absurdity irrelevant to the construction of some individual provisions within the scheme and a justification for rewriting others. 2. Whether EPA’s determination that greenhouse gases “may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or welfare” and otherwise are regulable under section 202(a)(1) of the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(1), was “not in accordance with law” or was “arbitrary, capricious, {and} an abuse of dis- cretion,” § 7607(d)(9)(A). 3. Whether EPA incorrectly determined that all “air pollutants” regulated by the agency under the Clean Air Act’s motor vehicle emissions provision, 42 U.S.C. § 7421(a)(1), must also be regulated under the Act's Prevention of Significant Deterioration of Air Quality and Title V programs when emitted from sta- tionary sources. ‘: RULE 14.1(b) STATEMENT Petitioners are the Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America, State of Alaska, and Amer- ican Farm Bureau Federation. The Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America was peti- tioner or petitioner-intervenor as to all of the chal- lenged agency actions addressed by the consolidated judgment below. The State of Alaska and the Ameri- can Farm Bureau Federation were petitioners and/or petitioner-intervenors in cases addressed by the con- solidated judgment below. Respondents herein, who were also respondents in the cases below, are the Environmental Protection Agency and the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency. Lisa P. Jackson held the office of Administrator until February 15, 2013, and Robert Perciasepe currently holds that office in an acting ca- pacity. Other parties who were petitioners in the cases addressed by the consolidated judgment below are the following: American Chemistry Council; Ameri- can Frozen Food Institute; American Fuel & Petro- chemical Manufacturers; American Iron and Steel In- stitute; American Petroleum Institute; Brick Industry Association; Clean Air Implementation Project; Corn Refiners Association; Glass Association of North America; Independent Petroleum Association of America; Indiana Cast Metals Association; Michigan Manufacturers Association; Mississippi Manufactur- ers Association; National Association of Home Build- ers; The National Association of Manufacturers; Na- tional Federation of Independent Business; National Oilseed Processors Association; North American Die Casting Association; Portland Cement Association; Specialty Steel Industry of North America; Tennessee Chamber of Commerce and Industry; Western States Petroleum Association; West Virginia Manufacturers Association; Wisconsin Manufacturers and Com- merce; Greg Abbott, Attorney General of Texas; Al- pha Natural Resources, Inc.; Michele Bachmann, U.S. Representative, Minnesota 6th District; Haley Bar- bour, Governor of the State of Mississippi; Marsha Blackburn, U.S. Representative, Tennessee 7th Dis- trict; Kevin Brady, U.S. Representative, Texas 8th District; Paul Broun, U.S. Representative, 10th Dis- trict; Dan Burton, U.S. Representative, Indiana 5th District; Glass Packaging Institute; Coalition for Re- sponsible Regulation, Inc.; Collins Industries, Inc.; Collins Trucking Company, Inc.; Commonwealth of Virginia; Competitive Enterprise Institute; Nathan Deal, U.S. Representative, Georgia 9th District; En- ergy-Intensive Manufacturers’ Working Group on Greenhouse Gas Regulation; Freedom Works; the Sci- ence and Environmental Policy Project; Georgia Ag- ribusiness Council, Inc.; Georgia Coalition for Sound Environmental Policy, Inc.; Georgia Motor Trucking Association, Inc.; Gerdau Ameristeel US Inc.; Phil Gingrey, U.S. Representative, Georgia 11th District; Great Northern Project Development, L.P.; Industrial Minerals Association—North America; J&M Tank Lines, Inc.; Kennesaw Transportation, Inc.; Steve King, U.S. Representative, Iowa 5th District; Jack Kingston, U.S. Representative, Georgia Ist District; Landmark Legal Foundation; Langboard, Inc.-MDF; Langboard, Inc.-OSB; Langdale Chevrolet-Pontiac, Inc.; The Langdale Company; Langdale Farms, LLC; Langdale Ford Company; Langdale Forest Products Company; Langdale Fuel Company; Mark R. Levin; John Linder, U.S. Representative, Georgia 7th Dis- trict; Louisiana Department of Environmental Quali- iv ty; Missouri Joint Municipal Electric Utility Commis- sion; National Cattlemen’s Beef Association; National Environmental Development Association’s Clean Air Project; National Mining Association; Ohio Coal As- sociation; Pacific Legal Foundation; Peabody Energy Company; Rick Perry, Governor of Texas; Tom Price, U.S. Representative, Georgia 6th District; Dana Rohrabacher, U.S. Representative, California 46th District; Rosebud Mining Co.; John Shadegg, U.S. Representative, Arizona 3rd District; John Shimkus, U.S. Representative, Illinois 19th District; South Carolina Public Service Authority; Southeast Trailer Mart, Inc.; Southeastern Legal Foundation, Inc.; State of Alabama; State of Nebraska; State of North Dakota; State of South Carolina; State of South Da- kota; State of Texas; Texas Agriculture Commission; Texas Commission on Environmental Quality; Texas General Land Office; Texas Public Utilities Commis- sion; Texas Railroad Commission; Utility Air Regula- tory Group; and Lynn Westmoreland, U.S. Repre- sentative, Georgia 3rd District. Intervenors for petitioners in cases addressed by the consolidated judgment below—other than peti- tioners herein—include Alpha Natural Resources, Inc.; American Frozen Food Institute; American Fuel & Petrochemical Manufacturers; American Petrole- um Institute; Arkansas State Chamber of Commerce; Associated Industries of Arkansas; Brick Industry Association; Coalition for Responsible Regulation, Inc.; Colorado Association of Commerce & Industry; Commonwealth of Kentucky; Corn Refiners Associa- tion; Glass Association of North America; Glass Packaging Institute: Governor of Mississippi Haley Barbour; Great Northern Project Development, L.P.; Idaho Association of Commerce and Industry; Inde- v pendent Petroleum Association of America; Indiana Cast Metals Association; Industrial Minerals Associa- tion North America; Kansas Chamber of Commerce and Industry; Langdale Farms, LLC; Langdale Fuel Company; Langdale Chevrolet-Pontiac, Inc; Langdale Ford Company; Langboard, Inc--MDF; Langboard, Inc.—OSB; Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality; Louisiana Oil and Gas Association; Michigan Manufacturers Association; Mississippi Manufactur- ers Association; National Association of Manufactur- ers; National Association of Home Builders; National Cattlemen’s Beef Association; National Electrical Manufacturers Association; National Environmental Development Association’s Clean Air Project; Nation- al Federation of Independent Business; National Mining Association; National Oilseed Processors As- sociation; Nebraska Chamber of Commerce and In- dustry; North American Die Casting Association; Ohio Coal Association; Ohio Manufacturers Associa- tion; Peabody Energy Company; Pennsylvania Manu- facturers Association; Portland Cement Association; Rosebud Mining Company; South Coast Air Quality Management District; Specialty Steel Industry of North America; State of Florida; State of Georgia; State of Indiana; State of Louisiana; State of Michi- gan; State of Nebraaka; State of North Dakota; State of Oklahoma; State of South Carolina; State of South Dakota; State of Utah; Steel Manufacturers Associa- tion; Tennessee Chamber of Commerce and Industry; Utility Air Regulatory Group; Virginia Manufactur- ers Association; Western States Petroleum Associa- tion; West Virginia Manufacturers Association; and Wisconsin Manufacturers & Commerce. Intervenors for respondents in cases addressed by the consolidated judgment below include Alliance of vi Automobile Manufacturers; Association of Global Au- tomakers; Center for Biological Diversity; City of New York; Commonwealth of Massachusetts; Con- servation Law Foundation; Environmental Defense Fund; Georgia ForestWatch; Global Automakers; In- diana Wildlife Federation; Michigan Environmental Council; Natural Resources Council of Maine; Natu- ral Resources Defense Council; National Wildlife Federation; Ohio Environmental Council; Pennsylva- nia Department of Environmental Protection; Sierra Club; South Coast Air Quality Management District; State of California; State of Connecticut; State of Delaware; State of Illinois; State of Iowa; State of Maine; State of Maryland; State of Minnesota; State of New Hampshire; State of New Mexico; State of New York; State of North Carolina; State of Oregon; State of Rhode Island; State of Vermont; State of Washington; Wetlands Watch; and Wild Virginia. RULE 29.6 STATEMENT No petitioner has a parent company, and no pub- licly-held corporation has a 10% or greater ownership interest in any petitioner. vil TABLE OF CONTENTS Page(s) QUESTIONS PRESENTED .............0.........cccceeeeeeeeeeeeee i BERR BG. DG) TAT IG cvccccccccccccccccescecesecesscescccess il LAAT TTT vil ey ctiniccncecesinesessnccnnstonsnmnsninnaioita vii Ee Ge I I iticccecsciccntcenenasiensnanenecsennse xii PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI.............. 1 I dics cscriaDaiaisininiiiinciideidutcienmananetdibnds 1 (TES aT eT 1 STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED.................. 1 TTT aisichindiinncinssnaeniiicatinaiiiidinnicahaadisiemaniiiiitansininalesindiniens 1 A. Statutory and regulatory framework.......... 4 i RI i sicinicitcasreeciniinticdigaribinaninniicise 7 REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION........ 17 1. EPA improperly deployed the “absurd I Se iui dicincturcneiaincncnititaninsinbiniicumanianinuweniis 18 II. EPA improperly failed to construe the CAA in a manner that would avoid the absurdity that resulted from its own IID, siiictenssisihtnnindsonicicnnitesinniasecmecsesess 21 A. EPA incorrectly construed section 202(a)(1)'s requirement that an air pollutant “reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or SITET" aeLeclinshtecicsnntclaiasicsncioenindnaiesinaicnisiniiclaspidebenndintds 21 B. EPA incorrectly determined that any “air pollutant” regulated pursuant to section 202(a) must also be regulated under the PSD program. ........................... 28 C. EPA incorrectly exercised its delegated authority in regulating In cesiasutihieblasipeiticandinitadipdlndababammdbiinmonniédeineuens 29 Ill. This case presents recurring questions of national importance. ...........................-.000++ 31 Se TIIIITIET snicinnussivishbnsdniitbicnetennaniinibaginnalabeninantidadnd 34 APPENDIX CONTENTS VOLUME I U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit Panel opinion, 684 F.3d 102 cc ateteinininhaitininedoniannnd la Judgment I atin eallaiatens 95a Order denying rehearing en banc RS EE 99a Statement of Chief Judge Sentelle, and Circuit Judges Rogers and Tatel, concurring in denial of rehearing en banc (Dec. 20, 2012)................... 103a Statement of Circuit Judge Brown, dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc (Dec. 20, 2012)................... 107a ix Statement of Circuit Judge Kavanaugh, dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc (Dec. 20, 2012)................... 133a Order denying panel rehearing it nat iealaiminncntiins 156a Order re: briefing in “Endangerment Rule” I I oa iscemcendeinibiitiideesbennanon 160a Order re: briefing in “Tailpipe Rule” cases Gs NUTT si crsiinsiettadliinetibesdiddsigsinbdeniiiiabinenanniines 164a Order re: briefing in “Timing Rule and Tailoring Rule” cases (Mar. 21, 2011).........................200- 168a Order re: briefing in “Historic Regulations” I iene 172a Order granting Motion for Coordination of Related Cases (Dec. 10, 2010)..................... 176a VOLUME II Federal Register Notices EPA, Endangerment and Cause or Contribute Find- ings for Greenhouse Gases Under Section 202(a) of the Clean Air Act; Final Rule, 74 Fed. Reg. 66,496 (Dec 15, 2009) ...........000.-. 180a EPA, Denial of the Petitions to Reconsider the Endangerment and Cause or Contribute Findings for Greenhouse Gases under Section 202(a) of the Clean Air Act; Final Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. 49,556 (Aug. 13, 2010) ............... 413a x EPA, Reconsideration of Interpretation of Regulations That Determine Pollutants Covered by Clean Air Act Permitting Programs; Final Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. 17,004 (Apr. 2, 2010).................. 598a VOLUME III EPA, Prevention of Significant Deterioration and Title V Greenhouse Gas Tailoring Rule; Final Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. 31,514 (June 3, 2010)................. 690a VOLUME IV EPA, Regulating Greenhouse Gas Emissions Under the Clean Air Act; Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 73 Fed. Reg. 44,354 (July 30, 2008).............. 1126a VOLUME V EPA, Prevention of Significant Deterioration and Title V Greenhouse Gas Tailoring Rule; Proposed Rule, 74 Fed. Reg. 55,292 (Oct. 27, 2009) ............. 1756a Statutes I I cia ss iniicticieitniennaiitamenidnnenindalitenibinditals 2097a Rs ics ssinsiitisrnesnlasticsalehetniniaiiehieanteipliatinaiaidbils Zilla a Ut Wie caieiitincsnctieenticininiiiieinshaapieabininialiatisiaibieies 2112a Se le Oe PD icceniivciniitninnninintaunsimnnsinidinineneds 2117a SIN, 0 GI ecitescnencsccensintsrestseititesecvntin A EEE ENT 42 U.S.C. §§ 7521(a)(1)-(3)......eccccsseseeseseseeseseeseees I I oo vccschcsstitetittnseinisscsenadsiioni Pk, cae 4B UBC. © TOD) At all events, were there any doubts about EPA’s interpretations of section 202(a)(1) or the relevant PSD and Title V statutes, EPA was bound to inter- pret one or all of them to avoid the absurdity that 31 would be produced by a contrary interpretation. Massachusetts does not compel a different result, but to the extent that the Court finds that it does, peti- tioners respectfully submit that the Court should re- visit some aspects of the decision. III. This case presents recurring questions of national importance. EPA’s GHG rulemakings have enormous economic consequences, and the agency’s interpretive method poses profound questions under the Constitution’s system of separation of powers. 1. There can be little doubt that “[t]his case is [ ] one of exceptional importance” with “massive real- world consequences.” App. 133a (Kavanaugh, J., dis- senting), As even the members of the panel that up- held the regulations recognized, “{t}he underlying pol- icy questions and the outcome of this case are un- doubtedly matters of exceptional importance.” App. 106a. Neither EPA nor any of its intervenors or ami- ct has questioned the staggering practical conse- quences of these rulemakings. Indeed, EPA avoided performing a cost-benefit analysis of the stationary source aspects of these rulemakings, perhaps hesitat- ing to find out how staggering those consequences re- ally are. EPA’s rulemakings establish a regulatory appa- ratus the likes, costs, and breadth of which have nev- er before been seen, effectively establishing EPA as a national zoning board with jurisdiction over the en- tire economy — for the first time ever imposing the CAA’s regulatory burdens so heavily and directly on States, industry, farms, convenience stores, hospitals, shopping malls, churches, even homes. 2. The rulemakings below pose profound ques- 32 tions under the Constitution’s separation of powers. If uncorrected, EPA’s new understanding of the ab- surdity canon as granting carte blanche for agency amendments to clear statutory text will establish a milestone in the relationship between the legislative and executive branches. As Judge Kavanaugh ob- served, “undue deference or abdication to an agency carries its own systemic costs. If a court mistakenly allows an agency’s transgression of statutory limits, then we green-light a significant shift of power from the Legislative Branch to the Executive Branch.” App. 152a-153a (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting). Whatever the magnitude of the threat to health or welfare posed by climate change, the threat surely does not justify an agency's wholesale rewriting of statutory provisions. No matter how important an agencys policy goals, the agency may not pursue means and ends not encompassed within its congres- sional delegation of authority — however fondly it may wish to press the square peg of a preferred regu- latory program into the nearest statutory round hole. “Where a statute provides the conditions for the exer- cise of governmental power, its requirements are the result of a deliberative and reflective process engag- ing both of the political branches.” Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 637 (2006) (separate opinion) (emphasis added). As the Framers recognized, the “failures of * * * regulation may be a pressing nation- al problem, but a judiciary that licensed extraconstitutional government with each issue of comparable gravity would, in the long run, be far worse.” Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Company Ac- counting Oversight Board, 130 S. Ct. 3138, 3157 (2010) (quotation marks, alterations, and citations omitted). 33 The willingness, perhaps eagerness, of unelected EPA officials to construe statutory language in a manner producing absurd results justifying agency- crafted, statutory amendments conflicts with the de- liberative governance our Framers envisioned. The Court’s review is needed to determine the legitimacy of EPA’s new understandings of its interpretive au- thority. 34 CONCLUSION The petition for a writ of certiorari should be granted. RACHEL L. BRAND SHELDON GILBERT National Chamber Litigation Center, Inc. 1615 H Street, NW Washington, DC 20062 (202) 463-5337 MICHAEL C. GERAGHTY Attorney General STEVEN E. MULDER State of Alaska 1031 W. 4th Avenue Anchorage, AK 99501 (907) 269-5274 ELLEN STEEN DANIELLE QUIST American Farm Bureau Federation 600 Maryland Ave., SW Washington, DC 20024 (202) 406-3600 April 19, 2013 Respectfully submitted, ROBERT R. GASAWAY Counsel of Record JEFFREY A. ROSEN, P.C. JEFFREY BOSSERT CLARK ADITYA BAMZAI WILLIAM H. BURGESS Kirkland & Ellis LLP 655 Fifteenth Street, N.W. Washington, DC 20005 robert.gasaway@kirkland.com (202) 879-5000 Counsel for Petitioner Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America DOUGLAS A. HENDERSON Troutman Sanders LLP 600 Peachtree Street, NE Atlanta, GA 30308 (404) 885-3479 JESSE K. MARTIN Troutman Sanders LLP 401 Ninth Street, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20001 (202) 274-2950 Counsel for Petitioner American Farm Bureau Federation APPENDIX RECORD 12 -1272 AND No. OFFICE OF THE CLERK | RIEF Sin the Supreme Court of the Gnited States FILED 1 Supreme Court, Us. APR 19 2013 } CHAMBER OF COMMERCE OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, STATE OF ALASKA, AND AMERICAN FARM BUREAU FEDERATION, Petitioners, Vv. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, ET AL., Respondents. ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT PETITIONERS’ APPENDIX VOLUME I OF V (1a-179a) RACHEL L. BRAND SHELDON GILBERT National Chamber Litigation Center, Inc. 1615 H Street, NW Washington, DC 20062 (202) 463-5337 MICHAEL C. GERAGHTY Attorney General STEVEN E. MULDER State of Alaska 1031 W. 4th Avenue Anchorage, AK 99501 (907) 269-5274 ROBERT R. GASAWAY Counsel of Record JEFFREY A. ROSEN, P.C. JEFFREY BOSSERT CLARK ADITYA BAMZAI WILLIAM H. BURGESS Kirkland & Ellis LLP 655 Fifteenth Street, N.W. Washington, DC 20005 robert.gasaway@kirkland.com (202) 879-5000 Counsel for Petitioner Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America [Additional Counsel Listed on Signature Page of Petition] (ERENT SA STRANI AR CL AE Beh ARIE ERRNO, ES, A SMAI TER AREA SE WiLson-EPes PRINTING CO., INC. — (202) 789-0096 -— WASHINGTON, D. C. 20002 Library of Conaress Law Library APPENDIX CONTENTS VOLUME I U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit Panel opinion, 684 F.3d 102 eae la Judgment ES ee nr 95a Order denying rehearing en banc I I Tic eaicacinhiepemenninninioennnien 99a Statement of Chief Judge Sentelle, and Circuit Judges Rogers and Tatel, concurring in denial of rehearing en banc (Dec. 20, 2012)................... 103a Statement of Circuit Judge Brown, dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc (Dec. 20, 2012)................... 107a Statement of Circuit Judge Kavanaugh, dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc (Dec. 20, 2012)................... 133a Order denying pane! rehearing I, SI ica niniidbiincnpeinneabinnennnindiatiieneies 156a Order re: briefing in “Endangerment Rule” I ical 160a Order re: briefing in “Tailpipe Rule” cases I ssa plamininsiaien 164a ‘i Order re: briefing in “Timing Rule and Tailoring Rule” cases (Mar. 21, 2011)......................00200 Order re: briefing in “Historic Regulations” re Order granting Motion for Coordination of Related Cases (Dec. 10, 2010).................... VOLUME I Federal Register Notices EPA, Endangerment and Cause or Contribute Findings for Greenhouse Gases Under Section 202(a) of the Clean Air Act; Final Rule, 74 Fed. Reg. 66,496 (Dec 15, 2009)................ EPA, Denial of the Petitions to Reconsider the Endangerment and Cause or Contribute Findings for Greenhouse Gases under Section 202(a) of the Clean Air Act; Final Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. 49,556 (Aug. 13, 2010) .............. EPA, Reconsideration of Interpretation of Regulations That Determine Pollutants Covered by Clean Air Act Permitting Programs; Final Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. 17,004 (Apr. 2, 2010)................. ili VOLUME II EPA, Prevention of Significant Deterioration and Title V Greenhouse Gas Tailoring Rule; Final Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. 31,514 (June 3, 2010)................ VOLUME IV EPA, Regulating Greenhouse Gas Emissions Under the Clean Air Act; Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 73 Fed. Reg. 44,354 (July 30, 2008).............. VOLUME V EPA, Prevention of Significant Deterioration and Title V Greenhouse Gas Tailoring Rule; Proposed Rule, 74 Fed. Reg. 55,292 (Oct. 27, 2009) .............. Statutes is siicsisinsenicecinccciniicensitei I ic sicsiensiaidsipmtepeiniiaian ESSER ee I I ocestececcctsecnenrnscciccnnvicsccensen Pe eae ee 42 U.S.C. §§ 7521(a)(1)-(3)......c.ceccececeecececessececeees GB UBL. © FERED cccceeveccccenvesssssssensesncseemnenesin GB UO BBAS. © FID ccceccenccevccsssesvesssensssesemnnnenannnns GB UES. © TED ecevecsceecsccsseesssenssveseremmamimantante 42 U.S.C. §§ 7607(d)(7)-(9) .................-ccececceseceees GB DIB. & FIGS ccccccresesecccssessmnessesesensmnnmmnenita Miscellaneous Motion for Coordination of Related Cases EF SS ee Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America’s Combined Petition for Panel Rehearing or for Rehearing en banc EF eer la UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS For The District of Columbia Circuit Argued February 28 and 29, 2012 Decided June 26, 2012 No. 09-1322 COALITION FOR RESPONSIBLE REGULATION, INC., ET AL., PETITIONERS Vv. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, RESPONDENT STATE OF MICHIGAN, ET AL., INTERVENORS Consolidated with 10-1024, 10-1025, 10-1026, 10-1030, 10-1035, 10-1036, 10-1037, 10-1038, 10-1039, 10-1040, 10-1041, 10-1042, 10-1044, 10-1045, 10-1046, 10-1234, 10-1235, 10-1239, 10-1245, 10-1281, 10-1310, 10-1318, 10-1319, 10-1320, 10-1321 On Petitions for Review of Final Actions of the Environmental Protection Agency Patrick R. Day, Harry W. MacDougald, and Jeffrey Bossert Clark argued the causes for Non-State Petitioners and Supporting Intervenors. With them on the briefs were John J. Burns, Attorney General, Office of the Attorney General of the State of Alaska, Steven E. Mulder, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Peter Glaser, Mark E. Nagle, Matthew Dukes, Paul D. Phillips, John A. Bryson, Ellen Steen, Eric Groten, John P. Elwood, James A. Holtkamp, Chet M. 2a Thompson, Robin S. Conrad, Rachel L. Brand, Sheldon Gilbert, Quentin Riegel, Jeffrey A. Rosen, Robert R. Gasaway, William H. Burgess, Sam Kazman, Hans Bader, Matthew G. Paulson, Harry Moy Ng, Michele Marie Schoeppe, Michael R. Barr, Alexandra M. Walsh, Adam J. White, Jeffrey A. Lamken, Timothy K. Webster, Roger R. Martella, Neal J. Cabral, Theodore Hadzi-Antich, Ashley C. Parrish, Cynthia A. M. Stroman, Scott C. Oostdyk, Gordon R. Alphonso, Shannon L. Goessling, Edward A. Kazmarek, F. William Brownell, Norman W. Fichthorn, Henry V. Nickel, and Allison D. Wood. Paul D. Clement, Mark W. DeLaquil, Andrew M. Grossman, and David B. Rivin, dr. entered appearances. E. Duncan Getchell, Jr., Solicitor General, Office of the Attorney General for the Commonwealth of Virginia, argued the cause for State Petitioners Texas and Virginia on Denial of Reconsideration of the Endangerment Finding and State Petitioners and Supporting Intervenors on Endangerment Finding Delegation Issues. With him on the briefs were Kenneth T. Cuccinelli, IT, Attorney General, Stephen R. McCullough, Senior Appellate Counsel, Charles E. James dJr., Chief Deputy Attorney General, and Wesley G. Russell, Jr., Deputy Attorney General. Greg Abbott, Attorney General, Office of the Attorney General for the State of Texas, Bill Cobb, Deputy Attorney General for Civil Litigation, J. Reed Clay, Jr., Special Assistant and Senior Counsel to the Attorney General, Jonathan F. Mitchell, Solicitor General, Michael P. Murphy, Assistant Solicitor General, Luther Strange III, Attorney General, Office of the Attorney General] for the State of Alabama, 3a Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Office of the Attorney General for the State of Florida, Gregory F. Zoeller, Attorney General, Office of the Attorney General for the State of Indiana, Jack Conway, Attorney General, Office of the Attorney General for the Commonwealth of Kentucky, James D. “Buddy” Caldwell, Attorney General, Office of the Attorney General for the State of Louisiana, Bill Schuette, Attorney General, Office of the Attorney General for the State of Michigan, John J. Bursch, Solicitor General, Neil D. Gordon, Assistant Attorney General, Gary C. Rikard, Jon Bruning, Attorney General, Office of the Attorney General for the State of Nebraska, Katherine J. Spohn, Special Counsel to the Attorney General, Wayne Stenehjem, Attorney General, Office of the Attorney General for the State of North Dakota, Margaret Olson, Assistant Attorney General, Scott Pruitt, Attorney General, Office of the Attorney General for the State of Oklahoma, Alan Wilson, Attorney General, Office of the Attorney General for the State of South Carolina, Marty Jackley, Attorney General, Office of the Attorney General for the States of South Dakota, Roxanne Giedd, Chief, Civil Litigation Division, Mark L. Shurtleff, Attorney General, Office of the Attorney General for the State of Utah, and Kenneth T. Cuccinelli, I, Attorney General, Office of the Attorney General for the Commonwealth of Virginia were on the briefs for State Petitioners and Supporting Intervenors. Robert D. Tambling, Assistant Attorney General, Office of the Attorney General for the State of Alabama, entered an appearance. 4a Christian J. Ward, Scott A. Keller, and April L. Farris were on the brief for amici curiae Scientists in support of Petitioners. Derek Schmidt, Attorney General, Office of the Attorney General for the State of Kansas, and John Campbell, Chief Deputy Attorney General, were on the brief for amicus curiae State of Kansas in support of Petitioners. Martin R. Levin, Michael J. O'Neill, Donald M. Falk, Mark S. Kaufman, Steven J. Lechner, and Richard P. Hutchison were on the brief for amici curiae Landmark Legal Foundation, et al. in support of Petitioners. Jon M. Lipshultz and Angeline Purdy, Attorneys, U.S. Department of Justice, argued the causes for respondent. With them on the brief were John Hannon, Carol Holmes, and Steven Silverman, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Attorneys. Thomas A. Lorenzen, Attorney, U.S. Department of Justice, entered an appearance. Carol Iancu, Assistant Attorney General, Office of the Attorney General for the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, argued the cause for State and Environmental MIntervenors in support. of respondents. With her on the briefs were Martha Coakley, Attorney General, William L. Pardee, Attorney Assistant General, Sean H. Donahue, Howard I. Fox, David S. Baron, Megan Ceronsky, Vickie L. Patton, Peter Zalzal, Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Office of the Attorney General for the State of California, Kathleen A. Kenealy, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Marc N. Melnick and Sa Nicholas Stern, Deputy Attorneys General, Joseph R. Biden, III, Attorney General, Office of the Attorney General for the State of Delaware, Valerie M. Satterfield, Deputy Attorney General, George Jepsen, Attorney General, Office of the Attorney General for the State of Connecticut, Kimberly P. Massicotte, Matthew I. Levine, Scott N. Koschwitz, Assistant Attorneys General, Lisa Madigan, Attorney General, Office of the Attorney General for the State of Illinois, Gerald T. Karr, Assistant Attorney General, Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Office of the Attorney General for the State of Iowa, David R. Sheridan, Assistant Attorney General, Douglas F. Gansler, Attorney General, Office of the Attorney General for the State of Maryland, Mary E. Raivel, Assistant Attorney General, Michael A. Delaney, Attorney General, Office of the Attorney General for the State of New Hampshire, K. Allen Brooks, Senior Assistant Attorney General, William J. Schneider, Attorney General, Office of the Attorney General for the State of Maine, Gerald D. Reid, Assistant Attorney General, Lori Swanson, Attorney General, Office of the Attorney General for the State of Minnesota, Jocelyn F. Olson, Assistant Attorney General, Gary K. King, Attorney General, Office of the Attorney General for the State of New Mexico, Stephen R. Farris, Assistant Attorney General, Eric T. Schneiderman, Attorney General, Office of the Attorney General for the State of New York, Michael J. Myers and Yueh-Ru Chu, Assistant Attorneys General, John Kroger, Attorney General, Office of the Attorney General for the State of Oregon, Paul Logan, Assistant Attorney-in-Charge, Robert M. McKenna, Attorney General, Office of the Attorney General for the State of Washington, Leslie R. Seffern, Assistant Attorney General, Peter F. 6a Kilmartin, Attorney General, Office of the Attorney General for the State of Rhode Island, Gregory S. Schultz, Special Assistant Attorney General, William H. Sorrell, Attorney General, Office of the Attorney General for the State of Vermont, Thea J. Schwariz, Assistant Attorney General, Christopher King, Assistant Corporation Counsel, Corporation Counsel for the City Of New York, Ann B. Weeks, Helen D. Silver, David Doniger, Meleah Geertsma, Morgan Butler, Frank W. Rambo, Joseph Mendelson IIT, Craig Holt Segall, and Joanne Spalding. Deborah Sivas, Douglas A. Ruley, Edward Lloyd, and Susan J. Kraham were on the brief for amici curtae America's Great Waters Coalition, et al. in support of respondent. James K. Thornton entered an appearance. No. 10-1073 COALITION FOR RESPONSIBLE REGULATION, INC., ET AL., PETITIONERS Vv. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, RESPONDENT AMERICAN FROZEN FOOD INSTITUTE, ET AL., INTERVENORS Consolidated with 10-1083, 10-1099, 10-1109, 10-1110, 10-1114, 10-1118, 10-1119, 10-1120, 10-1122, 10-1123, 10-1124, 10-1125, 10-1126, 10-1127, 10-1128, 10-1129, 10-1131, 10-1132, 10-1145, 10-1147, 10-1148, 10-1199, 10-1200, 10-1201, 10-1202, 10-1203, 10-1206, 10-1207, 7a 10-1208, 10-1210, 10-1211, 10-1212, 10-1213, 10-1216, 10-1218, 10-1219, 10-1220, 10-1221, 10-1222 On Petitions for Review of Final Agency Action of the Environmental Protection Agency Jonathan F. Mitchell, Solicitor General, Office of the Attorney General for the State of Texas, argued the cause for State Petitioners and Supporting Intervenor. With him on the briefs were Gregg Abbott, Attorney General, Bill Cobb, deputy Attorney General, J. Reed Clay, Jr., Special Assistant and Senior Counsel to the Attorney General, Michael P. Murphy and James P. Sullivan, Assistant Solicitors General, Luther Strange, Attorney General, Office of the Attorney General for the State of Alabama, Herman Robinson, Donald Trahan, Kathy M. Wright, Gary C. Rikard, John Bruning, Attorney General, Office of the Attorney General for the State of Nebraska, Katherine J. Spohn, Special Counsel, Wayne Stenehjem, Attorney General, Office of the Attorney General for the State of North Dakota, Margaret Olson, Assistant Attorney General, Alan Wilson, Attorney General, Office of the Attorney General for the State of South Carolina, J. Emory Smith, Jr., Assistant Deputy Attorney General, Marty dJackley, Attorney General, Office of the Attorney General for the State of South Dakota, Roxanne Giedd, Chief, and Kenneth T. Cuccinelli, II, Attorney General, Office of the Attorney General for the Commonwealth of Virginia. Mark W. DeLaquil, Earle D. Getchell, Jr., Assistant Attorney General, Office of the Attorney General for the Commonwealth of Virginia, Andrew M. Grossman, David B. Rivkin, 8a Jr., and Robert D. Tambling, Assistant Attorney General, Office of the Attorney General for the State of Alabama, entered appearances. F. William Brownell and Peter Keisler argued the causes for Non-State Petitioners and Supporting Intervenors. With them on the briefs were Norman W. Fichthorn, Henry V. Nickel, Allison D. Wood, Charles H. Knauss, Shannon S. Broome, Timothy K. Webster, Roger R. Martella, Eric Groten, Patrick R. Day, John A. Bryeon, Matthew G. Paulson, John P. Elwood, Paul D. Phillips, James A. Holtkamp, Shannon L. Goessling, Harry W. MacDougald, William H. Lewis, Jr., Ronald J. Tenpas, Gordon R. Alphonso, Edward A. Kazmarek, Chet M. Thompson, Neal J. Cabral, Scott C. Oostdyk, Richard P. Hutchison, John J. McMackin, Jr., Robin S. Conrad, Sheldon Gilbert, Michael W. Steinberg, Levi McAllister, Jeffrey A. Rosen, Robert R. Gasaway, Jeffrey Bossert Clark, William H. Burgess, Ashley C. Parrish, Cynthia A.M. Stroman, Ellen Steen, Leslie Sue Ritts, Peter Glaser, Mark E. Nagle, Terry J. Satterlee, Thomas J. Grever, Margaret Claiborne Campbell, Bryon W. Kirkpatrick, Quentin Riegel, Elizabeth Gaudio, Elizabeth Henry Warner, Harry Moy Ng, Michele Marie Schoeppe, Thomas J. Ward, and Peter H. Wyckoff. Mark A. Behrens, Paul D. Clement, Matthew Dukes, Virginia L. Hudson, and David B. Salmons entered appearances. Jonathan S. Massey was on the brief for amicus curiae Municipal Gas Commission of Missouri. John G. Horne, I, Samuel B. Boxerman and Leslie A. Hulse were on the brief for ~mici curiae the Commonwealth of Kentucky and the American 9a Chemistry Council in support of petitioners. Angus Macbeth entered an appearance. Amanda Shafer Berman and Perry M Rosen, Attorneys, U.S. Department of Justice, argued the causes for respondents. With them on the briefs were Howard Hoffman, Elliott Zenick, Brian Doster, and David Orlin, Counsel, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. Thomas A. Lorenzen and Kim N. Smaczniak, Attorneys, U.S. Department of Justice, and John D. Gunter, IIT and Michele L. Walter, Counsel, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, entered appearances. Sean H. Donahue and Michael J. Myers argued the causes for State and Environmental Intervenors in support of respondents. With them on the briefs were Vickie L. Patton, Pamela A. Campos, Megan Ceronsky, Petere Zalzal, Eric T. Schneiderman, Attorney General, Office of the Attorney General for the State of New York, Barbara D. Underwood, Solicitor General, Morgan A. Costello, Assistant Attorney General, Monica Wagner, Howard I. Fox, David S. Baron, Lisa Madigan, Attorney General, Office of the Attorney General for the State of Illinois, Gerald T. Karr, Assistant Attorney General, Joanne Spalding, Nathan Matthews, Craig Holt Segall, Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Office of the Attorney General for the State of California, Kathleen A. Kenealy, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Susan Durbin, Raissa Lerner, Marc N. Melnick, and Nicholas Stern, Deputy Attorneys General, Martha Coakley, Attorney General, Office of the Attorney General for the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, William L. Pardee and Carol Iancu, Assistant Attorneys General, David Doniger, Meleah Geertsma, 10a William J. Schneider, Attorney General,Office of the Attorney General for the State of Maine, Gerald D. Ried, Assistant Attorney General, Ann B. Weeks, Helen D. Silver, Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Office of the Attorney General for the State of Iowa, David R. Sheridan, Assistant Attorney General, Douglas F. Gansler, Attorney General, Office of the Attorney General for the State of Maryland, Mary Raivel, Deputy Attorney General, Michael A. Delaney, Attorney General, Office of the Attorney General for the State of New Hampshire, K. Allen Brooks, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Barbara Baird, William B.Wong, Peter F. Kilmartin, Attorney General, Office of the Attorney General for the State of Rhode Island, Gregory S. Schultz, Special Assistant Attorney General, Frank Rambo, Morgan Butler, Gary K. King, Attorney General, Office of the Attorney General for the State of New Mexico, Stephen Farris, Assistant Attorney General, John Kroger, Attorney General, Office of the Attorney General for the State of Oregon, Paul Logan, Assistant Attorney-in- Charge, Roy Cooper, Attorney General, Office of the Attorney General for the State of North Carolina, and J. Allen Jernigan and Marc Bernstein, Special Deputy Attorneys General. Kenneth P. Alex and Gavin G. McCabe, Deputy Assistant Attorneys General, Office of the Attorney General for the State of California, entered appearances. No. 10-1092 COALITION FOR RESPONSIBLE REGULATION, INC., ET AL., PETITIONERS Vv. lla ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, RESPONDENT LANGBOARD, INC. - MDF, ET AL., INTERVENORS em Consolidated with 10-1094, 10-1134, 10-1143, 10-1144, 10-1152, 10-1156, 10-1158, 10-1159, 10-1160, 10-1161, 10-1162, 10-1163, 10-1164, 10-1166, 10-1182 On Petitions for Review of Final Actions of the Environmental Protection Agency Peter Glaser argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the briefs were John P. Elwood, Eric Groten, Patrick R. Day, John A. Bryson, Shannon L. Goessling, Harry W. MacDougald, Paul D. Phillips, James A. Holtkamp, Edward A. Kazmarek, Chet M. Thompson, Sam Kazman, Hans Bader, Gordon R. Alphonso, Richard P. Hutchison, Neal J. Cabral, Scott C. Oostdyk, Ronald J. Tenpas, Michael W. Steinberg, Levi McAllister, John J. McMackin Jdr., Robin S. Conrad, Rachel L. Brand, Sheldon Gilbert, F. William Brownell, Norman W. Fichthorn, Henry V. Nickel, Allison D. Wood, Ashley C. Parrish, Cynthia A.M. Stroman, Mark E. Nagle, Michael Higgins, Ellen Steen, Timothy K. Webster, Roger R. Martella, Matthew G.Paulson, Charles H. Knauss, Shannon S. Broome, Quentin Riegel, Elizabeth Gaudio, Thomas J. Ward, Harry Moy Ng, and Michele Marie Schoeppe. Greg Abbott, Attorney General, Office of the Attorney General for the State of Texas, Bill Cobb, Deputy Attorney General for Civil Litigation, 12a Jonathan F. Mitchell, Solicitor General, J. Reed Clay Jr., Special Assistant and Senior Counsel to the Attorney General, Michael P. Murphy, Assistant Solicitor General, Luther Strange, Attorney General, Office of the Attorney General for the State of Alabama, Samuel S. Olens, Attorney General, Office of the Attorney General for the State of Georgia, John E. Hennelly, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Gary C. Rikard, Jon C. Bruning, Attorney General, Office of the Attorney General for the State of Nebraska, Katherine J. Spohn, Special Counsel to the Attorney General, Wayne K. Stenehjem, Attorney General, Office of the Attorney General for the State of North Dakota, Margaret Olson, Assistant Attorney General, Alan Wilson, Attorney General, Office of the Attorney General for the State of South Carolina, J. Emory Smith, dJr., Assistant Deputy Attorney General, Marty Jackley, Attorney General, Office of the Attorney General for the State of North Dakota, Roxanne Giedd, Chief, Civil Litigation Division, and Kenneth T. Cuccinelli, I, Attorney General, Office of the Attorney General for the Commonwealth of Virginia, were on the briefs for State Petitioners and Supporting Intervenor. Paul D. Clement, James W. Coleman, Wayne J. D'Angelo, Mark W. DeLaquil, E. Duncan Getchell Jr., Solicitor General, Office of the Attorney General for the Commonwealth of Virginia, Andrew M. Grossman, Virginia L. Hudson, David B. Rivkin Jr., and Robert D. Tambling, Assistant Attorney General, Office of the Attorney General for the State of Alabama, entered appearances. Samuel B. Boxerman and Leslie A. Hulse were on the brief for amicus curiae American Chemistry Council in support of petitioners. Angus Macbeth entered an appearance. 13a Eric G. Hostetler, Attorney, U.S. Department of Justice, argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief were John Hannon and Steven Silverman, Attorneys, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. Raymond B. Ludwiszewski argued the cause for intervenors Association of Global Automakers, et al. With him on the brief were Kathleen M. Sullivan, Sanford I. Weisburst, and William B. Adams. Gavin G. McCabe, Deputy Attorney General, Office of the Attorney General for the State of California, argued the cause for intervenor State of California. On the brief were Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Kathleen A. Kenealy, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Marc N. Melnick and Nicholas Stern, Deputy Attorneys General, Sean H. Donahue, Howard I. Fox, David S. Baron, Pamela Campos, Megan Ceronsky, Vickie L. Patton, Peter Zalzal, Joseph R. Biden, III, Attorney General, Office of the Attorney General for the State of Delaware, Valerie M. Satterfield, Deputy Attorney General, Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Office of the Attorney General for the State of Iowa, David R. Sheridan, Assistant Attorney General, Douglas F. Gansler, Attorney General, Office of the Attorney General for the State of Maryland, Roberta R. James, Assistant Attorney General, Lisa Madigan, Attorney General, Office of the Attorney General for the State of Illinois, Gerald T. Karr, Assistant Attorney General, William T. Schneider, Attorney General, Office of the Attorney General for the State of Maine, Gerald D. Reid, Assistant Attorney General, Martha Coakley, Attorney General, Office of the Attorney 14a General for the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, Carol Iancu, Tracy Triplett, and William L. Pardee, Assistant Attorneys General, Gary K. King, Attorney General, Office of the Attorney General for the State of New Mexico, Stephen R. Farris, Assistant Attorney General, John Kroger, Attorney General, Office of the Attorney General for the State of Oregon, Paul Logan, Assistant Attorney-in-Charge, William H. Sorrell, Attorney General, Office of the Attorney General for the State of Vermont, Thea J. Schwariz, Assistant Attorney General, Eric T. Schneiderman, Attorney General, Office of the Attorney General for the State of New York, Michael J. Myers and Yueh- Ru Chu, Assistant Attorneys General, Peter F. Kilmartin, Attorney General, Office of the Attorney General for the State of Rhode Island, Gregory S. Schultz, Special Assistant Attorney General, Robert M. McKenna, Attorney General, Office of the Attorney General for the State of Washington, Leslie R. Seffern, Assistant Attorney General, Christopher King, Assistant Corporation Counsel, Corporation Counsel for the City of New York, Joanne Spalding, Craig Holt Segall, David Doniger and Meleah Geertsma. Judith A. Stahl Moore, Assistant Attorney General, Office of the Attorney General for the State of New Mexico, and John D. Walke entered appearances. Richard E. Ayres, Jessica L. Olson, and Kristin L. Hines were on the brief for amicus curiae Honeywell International, Inc. in support of respondents. Richard L. Revesz, Michael A. Livermore, and Jennifer S. Rosenberg were on the brief for amicus curiae Institute for Policy Integrity at New York University School of Law in support of respondents. 15a No. 10-1167 AMERICAN CHEMISTRY COUNCIL, PETITIONER v. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY AND LISA PEREZ JACKSON, ADMINISTRATOR, U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, RESPONDENTS CHAMBER OF COMMERCE OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ET AL., INTERVENORS eee On Petitions for Review of a Final Action of the Environmental Protection Agency Timothy K. Webster, Roger R. Martella, Jr., James W. Coleman, William H. Lewis, dr., Ronald J. Tenpas, Charles H. Knauss, Shannon S. Broome, Bryan M. Killian, and Matthew G. Paulson were on the briefs for petitioners. Peter D. Keisler, Leslie A. Hulse, and Quentin Riegel entered appearances. Amanda Shafer Berman and Perry M. Rosen, Attorneys, U.S. Department of Justice, and Elliott Zenick and Howard J. Hoffman, Counsel, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, were on the brief for respondents. Jon M. Lipshultz, Senior Counsel, U.S. Department of Justice, entered and appearance. 16a Ann Brewster Weeks, Sean H. Donahue, Vickie Patton, Peter Zalzal, Joanne Spalding, Craig Segall, David Doniger, and Meleah Geertsma were on the brief of intervenors in support of respondents. David S. Baron, Pamela A. Campos, Colin C. O’Brien, and John D. Walke entered appearances. Vera P. Pardee, Brendan R. Cummings, and Kevin P. Bundy were on the brief for amicus curiae Center for Biological Diversity in support of respondents. Before: SENTELLE, Chief Judge; ROGERS and TATEL, Circuit Judges. Opinion for the Court filed PER CURIAM. PER CURIAM: Following the Supreme Court's decision in Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007)—which clarified that greenhouse gases are an “air pollutant” subject to regulation under the Clean Air Act (CAA)—the Environmental Protection Agency promulgated a series of greenhouse gas-related rules. First, EPA issued an Endangerment Finding, in which it determined that greenhouse gases may “reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or welfare.” See 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(1). Next, it issued the Tailpipe Rule, which set emission standards for cars and light trucks. Finally, EPA determined that the CAA requires major stationary sources of greenhouse gases to obtain construction and operating permits. But because immediate regulation of all such sources would result in overwhelming permitting burdens on permitting authorities and sources, EPA issued the Timing and Tailoring Rules, in which it determined that only the largest 17a stationary sources would initially be subject to permitting requirements. Petitioners, various states and industry groups, challenge all these rules, arguing that they are based on improper constructions of the CAA and are otherwise arbitrary and capricious. But for the reasons set forth below, we conclude: 1) the Endangerment Finding and Tailpipe Rule are neither arbitrary nor capricious; 2) EPA’s interpretation of the governing CAA provisions is unambiguously correct; and 3) no petitioner has standing to challenge the Timing and Tailoring Rules. We thus dismiss for lack of jurisdiction all petitions for review of the Timing and Tailoring Rules, and deny the remainder of the petitions. I. We begin with a brief primer on greenhouse gases. As their name suggests, when released into the atmosphere, these gases act “like the ceiling of a greenhouse, trapping solar energy and retarding the escape of reflected heat.” Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. at 505. A wide variety of modern human activities result in greenhouse gas emissions; cars, power plants, and industrial sites all release significant amounts of these heat-trapping gases. In recent decades “[a] well-documented rise in global temperatures has coincided with a _ significant increase in the concentration of [greenhouse gases] in the atmosphere.” Jd. at 504-05. Many scientists believe that mankind’s greenhouse gas emissions are driving this climate change. These scientists predict that global climate change will cause a host of deleterious consequences, including drought, 18a increasingly severe weather events, and rising sea levels. The genesis of this litigation came in 2007, when the Supreme Court held in Massachusetis v. EPA that greenhouse gases “unambiguous/ly]” may be regulated as an “air pollutant” under the Clean Air Act (“CAA”). Id. at 529. Squarely rejecting the contention—then advanced by EPA—that “greenhouse gases cannot be ‘air pollutants’ within the meaning of the Act,” id. at 513, the Court held that the CAA’s definition of “air pollutant” “embraces all airborne compounds of whatever stripe.” Id. at 529 (emphasis added). Moreover, because the CAA requires EPA to establish motor-vehicle emission standards for “any air pollutant . . . which may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or welfare,” 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(1) (emphasis added), the Court held that EPA had a “statutory obligation” to regulate harmful greenhouse gases. Id. at 534. “Under the clear terms of the Clean Air Act,” the Court concluded, “EPA can avoid taking further action only if it determines that greenhouse gases do not contribute to climate change or if it provides some reasonable explanation as to why it cannot or will not exercise its discretion to determine whether they do.” Id. at 533. The Court thus directed EPA to determine “whether sufficient information exists to make an endangerment finding” for greenhouse gases. Jd. at 534. Massachusetts v. EPA spurred a cascading series of greenhouse gas-related rules and regulations. First, in direct response to the Supreme Court's directive, EPA issued an Endangerment Finding for greenhouse gases. Endangerment and Cause or 19a Contribute Findings for Greenhouse Gases Under Section 202(a) of the Clean Air Act (“Endangerment Finding”), 74 Fed. Reg. 66,496 (Dec. 15, 2009). The Endangerment Finding defined as a single “air pollutant” an “aggregate group of six long-lived aan directly-emitted greenhouse gases” that are “well mixed” together in the atmosphere and cause global climate change: carbon dioxide, methane, nitrous oxide, hydroflourocarbons, perflourocarbons, and sulfur hexafluoride. Jd. at 66,536-37. Following “common practice,” EPA measured the impact of these gases on a “carbon dioxide equivalent basis,”"(COze) which is based on the gases’ “warming effect relative to carbon dioxide .. . over a specified timeframe.” Id. at 66,519. (Using the carbon dioxide equivalent equation, for example, a mixture of X amount of nitrous oxide and Y amount of sulfur hexafluoride is expressed as Z amount of COze). After compiling and considering a considerable body of scientific evidence, EPA concluded that motor-vehicle emissions of these six well-mixed gases “contribute to the total greenhouse gas air pollution, and thus to the climate change problem, which is _ reasonably anticipated to endanger public health and welfare.” Id. at 66,499. Next, and pursuant to the CAA’s requirement that EPA establish motor-vehicle emission standards for “any air pollutant . . . which may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or welfare,” 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(1), the agency promulgated its Tailpipe Rule for greenhouse gases. Light-Duty Vehicle Greenhouse Gas Emission Standards and Corporate Average Fuel Economy Standards; Final Rule (“‘Tailpipe Rule”), 75 Fed. Reg. 25,324 (May 7, 2010). Effective January 2, 2011, the Tailpipe Rule 20a set greenhouse gas emission standards for cars and light trucks as part of a joint rulemaking with fuel economy standards issued by the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA). Id. at 25,326. Under EPA’s longstanding interpretation of the CAA, the Tailpipe Rule automatically triggered regulation of stationary greenhouse gas emitters under two separate sections of the Act. The first, the Prevention of Significant Deterioration of Air Quality (PSD) program, requires state-issued construction permits for certain types of stationary sources—for example, iron and steel mill plants—if they have the potential to emit over 100 tons per year (tpy) of “any air pollutant.” See 42 U.S.C. § 7475; 7479(1). All other stationary sources are subject to PSD permitting if they have the potential to emit over 250 tpy of “any air pollutant.” Id. § 7479(1). The second provision, Title V, requires state-issued operating permits for stationary sources that have the potential to emit at least 100 tpy of “any air pollutant.” Jd. § 7602(j). EPA has long interpreted the phrase “any air pollutant” in both these provisions to mean any air pollutant that is regulated under the CAA. See Requirements for Preparation, Adoption, and Submittal of Implementation Plans; Approval and Promulgation of Implementation Plans (“1980 Implementation Plan Requirements”), 45 Fed. Reg. 52,676, 52,711 (Aug. 7, 1980) (PSD program); Prevention of Significant Deterioration and Title V Greenhouse Gas Tailoring Rule (“Tailoring Rule”), 75 Fed. Reg. 31,514, 31,553- 54 (June 3, 2010) (discussing history of Title V regulation and applicability). And once the Tailpipe Rule set motor-vehicle emission standards for greenhouse gases, they became a regulated pollutant 2la under the Act, requiring PSD and Title V greenhouse permitting. Acting pursuant to this longstanding interpretation of the PSD and Title V programs, EPA issued two rules phasing in stationary source greenhouse gas regulation. First, in the Timing Rule, EPA concluded that an air pollutant becomes “subject to regulation” under the Clean Air Act—and thus subject to PSD and Title V permitting—only once a regulation requiring control of that pollutant takes effect. Reconsideration of MInterpretation of Regulations That Determine Pollutants Covered by Clean Air Act Permitting Programs (“Timing Rule”), 75 Fed. Reg. 17,004 (Apr. 2, 2010). Therefore, EPA concluded, major stationary emitters of greenhouse gases would be subject to PSD and Title V permitting regulations on January 2, 2011—the date on which the Tailpipe Rule became effective, and thus, the date when greenhouse gases first became regulated under the CAA. Id. at 17,019. Next, EPA promulgated the Tailoring Rule. In the Tailoring Rule, EPA noted that greenhouse gases are emitted in far greater volumes than other pollutants. Indeed, millions of industrial, residential, and commercial sources exceed the 100/250 tpy statutory emissions threshold for COze. Tailoring Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. at 31,534-36. Immediately adding these sources to the PSD and Title V programs would, EPA predicted, result in tremendous costs to industry and state permitting authorities. See id. As a result, EPA announced that it was “relieving overwhelming permitting burdens that would, in the absence of this rule, fall on permitting authorities and sources.” Id. at 31,516. Departing from the CAA’s 100/250 tpy 22a emissions threshold, the Tailoring Rule provided that only the largest sources—those exceeding 75,000 or 100,00 tpy COsze, depending on the program and project ~«-ould initially be subject to greenhouse gas permitting. Jd. at 31,523. (The Tailoring Rule further provided that regulated sources must also emit greenhouse gases at leve's that exceed the 100/250 tpy emissions threshold on a mass basis. That is, they must emit over 100/250 tpy of actual pollutants, in addition to exceeding the 75,000/100,000 tpy carbon dioxide equivalent. Jd. at 31,523.) A mumber of groups—including states and regulated industries—filed petitions for review of EPA’s greenhouse gas regulations, contending that the agency misconstrued the CAA and otherwise acted arbitrarily and capriciously. This appeal consolidates the petitions for review of the four aforementioned rules: the Endangerment Finding, the Tailpipe Rule, the Timing Rule, and the Tailoring Rule. “The Clean Air Act empowers us to reverse the Administrator's action in rulemaking if it is arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with the law.” Med. Waste Inst. & Energy Recovery Council v. EPA, 645 F.3d 420, 424 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 7607(d)(9)(A)). Questions of statutory interpretation are governed by the familiar Chevron two-step: “First ... if the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter; for the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.” Chevron, U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984). But “if the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect 23a to the specific issue, the question for the court is whether the agency’s answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute.” Id. at 843. This opinion proceeds in several steps. Part Il explains why the Endangerment Finding was neither arbitrary nor capricious, while Part III does the same for the Tailpipe Rule. Turning to stationary source regulation, Part IV examines whether any petitioners may timely challenge EPA’s longstanding interpretation of the PSD statute. Because we conclude that they may, Part V addresses the merits of their statutory arguments, and explains why EPA’s interpretation of the CAA was compelled by the statute. Next, Part VI explains why petitioners lack standing to challenge the Timing and Tailoring Rules themselves. Finally, Part VII disj.oses of several arguments that have nothing to do with the rules under review, and thus are not properly before us. I. We turn first to State and Industry Petitioners’ challenges to the Endangerment Finding, the first of the series of rules EPA issued after the Supreme Court remanded Massachusetts v. EPA. In the decision ordering the remand, the Supreme Court held that EPA had failed in its statutory obligations when it “offered no reasoned explanation for its refusal to decide whether greenhouse gases cause or contribute to climate change.” Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. at 534. On remand, EPA compiled a substantial scientific record, which is before us in the present review, and determined that “greenhouse gases in the atmosphere may reasonably be anticipated both to endanger public health and to 24a endanger public welfare.” Endangerment Finding, 74 Fed. Reg. at 66,497. EPA went on to find that motor- vehicle emissions of greenhouse gases “contribute to the total greenhouse gas air pollution, and thus to the climate change problem, which is _ reasonably anticipated to endanger public health and welfare.” Id. at 66,499. State and Industry Petitioners challenge several aspects of EPA’s decision, including (1) EPA's interpretation of CAA § 202(a)(1), which sets out the endangerment-finding standard; (2) the adequacy of the scientific record supporting the Endangerment Finding; (3) EPA’s decision not to “quantify” the risk of endangerment to public health or welfare created by climate change; (4) EPA’s choice to define the “air pollutant” at iasue as an aggregate of six greenhouse gases; (5) EPA’s failure to consult its Science Advisory Board before issuing the Endangerment Finding; and (6) EPA’s denial of all petitions for reconsideration of the Endangerment Finding. We ultimately conclude that the Endangerment Finding is consistent with Massachusetts v. EPA and the text and structure of the CAA, and is adequately supported by the administrative record. A. Industry Petitioners contend that EPA improperly interpreted CAA § 202(a)(1) as restricting the Endangerment Finding to a science-based judgment devoid of considerations of policy concerns and regulatory consequences. They assert that CAA § 202(a)(1) requires EPA to consider, e.g., the benefits of activities that require greenhouse gas emissions, the effectiveness of emissions regulation triggered by 25a the Endangerment Finding, and the potential for societal adaptation to or mitigation of climate change. They maintain that eschewing those considerations also made the Endangerment Finding arbitrary and capricious. These contentions are foreclosed by the language of the statute and the Supreme Court’s decision in Massachusetts v. EPA. Section 202(a) of the CAA states in relevant part that EPA's Administrator shall by regulation prescribe (and from time to time revise) in accordance with the provisions of this section, standards applicable to the emission of any air pollutant from any class or classes of new motor vehicles or new motor. vehicle engines, which in his judgment cause, or contribute to, air pollution which may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or welfare. 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(1). This language requires that the endangerment evaluation “relate to whether an air pollutant ‘cause[s], or contribute[s}] to, air pollution which may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or welfare.” Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. at 532-33. At bottom, § 202(a)(1) requires EPA to answer only two questions: whether particular “air pollution”—here, greenhouse gases— “may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or welfare,” and whether motor-vehicle emissions “cause, or contribute to” that endangerment. These questions require a “scientific judgment” about the potential risks greenhouse gas emissions 26a pose to public health or welfare—not policy discussions. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. at 534. In Massachusetts v. EPA, the Supreme Court rebuffed an attempt by EPA itself to inject considerations of policy into its decision. At the time, EPA had “offered a laundry list of reasons not to regulate” greenhouse gases, including that a number of voluntary Executive Branch programs already provide an effective response to the threat of global warming, that regulating greenhouse gases might impair the President's ability to negotiate with “key developing nations” to reduce emissions, and that curtailing motor- vehicle emissions would reflect “an inefficient, piecemeal approach to address the climate change issue.” Id. at 533 (citations omitted). The Court noted that “these policy judgments .. . have nothing to do with whether greenhouse gas emissions contribute to climate change. Still less do they amount to a reasoned justification for declining to form a scientific judgment.” Id. at 533—34. In the Court’s view, EPA’s policy based explanations contained “no reasoned explanation for [EPA’s] refusal to decide” the key part of the endangerment inquiry: “whether greenhouse gases cause or contribute to climate change.” Id. at 534. As in Massachusetts v. EPA, a “laundry list of reasons not to regulate” simply has “nothing to do with whether greenhouse gas emissions contribute to climate change.” Id. at 533-34. The additional exercises State and Industry Petitioners would have 27a EPA undertake—e.g., performing a_ cost-benefit analysis for greenhouse gases, gauging the effectiveness of whatever emission standards EPA would enact to limit greenhouse gases, and predicting society's adaptive response to the dangers or harms caused by climate change—do not inform the “scientific judgment” that § 202(a)(1) requires of EPA. Instead of focusing on the question whether greenhouse gas emissions may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or welfare, the factors State and Industry Petitioners put forth only address what might happen were EPA to answer that question in the affirmative. As EPA stated in the Endangerment Finding, such inquiries “muddle the rather straightforward scientific judgment about whether there may be endangerment by throwing the potential impact of responding to the danger into the initial question.” 74 Fed. Reg. at 66,515. To be sure, the subsection following § 202(a)(1), § 202(a)(2), requires that EPA address limited questions about the cost of compliance with new emission standards and the availability of technology for meeting those standards, see infra Part III, but these judgments are not part of the § 202(a)(1) endangerment inquiry. The Supreme Court made clear in Massachusetts v. EPA that it was not addressing the question “whether policy concerns can inform EPA’s actions in the event that it makes such a finding,” 549 U.S. at 534—35, but that policy concerns were not part of the calculus for the determination of the endangerment finding in the first instance. The Supreme Court emphasized that it was holding “that EPA must ground its reasons for action or inaction in the statute.” Jd. at 535. The statute speaks in terms of endangerment, not in terms of policy, and EPA has complied with the statute. 28a State and Industry Petitioners insist that because statutes should be interpreted to avoid absurd results, EPA should have considered at least the “absurd” consequences that would follow from an endangerment finding for greenhouse’ gases. Specifically: having made an endangerment finding, EPA will proceed to promulgate emission standards under § 202(a)(1). Issuing those standards triggers regulation—under EPA’s PSD and @Title V programs—of stationary sources that emit greenhouse gases at levels above longstanding statutory thresholds. Because greenhouse gases are emitted in much higher volumes than other air pollutants, hundreds of thousands of small stationary sources would exceed those thresholds. This would subject those sources to PSD and Title V permitting requirements despite what Petitioners claim was Congress’s clear intent that the requirements apply only to large industrial sources. Petitioners assert that even EPA believed such overbroad regulation to be an absurd result, which it attempted to rectify by adopting the Tailoring Rule to raise the statutory thresholds, see infra Part V1. However “absurd” Petitioners consider this consequence, though, it is still irrelevant to the endangerment inquiry. That EPA adjusted the statutory thresholds to accommodate regulation of greenhouse gases emitted by stationary sources may indicate that the CAA is a regulatory scheme less- than perfectly tailored to dealing with greenhouse geses. But the Supreme Court has already held that EPA indeed wields the authority to regulate greenhouse gases under the CAA. See Massachusetts v. EPA. The plain language of § 202(a)(1) of that Act 29a does not leave room for EPA to consider as part of the endangerment inquiry the _ stationary-source regulation triggered by an endangerment finding, even if the degree of regulation triggered might at a later stage be characterized as “absurd.” State and Industry Petitioners next challenge the adequacy of the scientific record underlying the Endangerment Finding, objecting to both the type of evidence upon which EPA relied and EPA’s decision to make an Endangerment Finding in light of what Industry Petitioners view as significant scientific uncertainty. Neither objection has merit. 1. As an initial matter, State and Industry Petitioners question EPA’s reliance on “major assessments” addressing greenhouse gases and climate change issued by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), the U.S. Global Climate Research Program (USGCRP), and the National Research Council (NRC). Endangerment Finding, 74 Fed. Reg. at 66,510-11. These peer reviewed assessments synthesized thousands of individual studies on various aspects of greenhouse gases and climate change and drew “overarching conclusions” about the state of the science in this field. Id. at 66,511. The assessments provide data and information on, inter alia, “the amount of greenhouse gases being emitted by human activities”; their continued accumulation in the atmosphere; the resulting observed changes to Earth’s energy balance, temperature and climate at global and regional 30a levels, and other “climate-sensitive sectors and systems of the human and natural environment’; the extent to which these changes “can be attributed to human-induced buildup of atmospheric greenhouse gases’; “future projected climate change”; and “projected risks and impacts to human health, society and the environment.”/d. at 66,510—11. State and Industry Petitioners assert that EPA improperly “delegated” its judgment to the IPCC, USGCRP, and NRC by relying on these assessments of climate-change science. See U.S. Telecom Ass’n v. FCC, 359 F.3d 554, 566 (D.C. Cir. 2004). This argument is little more than a semantic trick. EPA did not delegate, explicitly or otherwise, any decision- making to any of those entities. EPA simply did here what it and other decisionmakers often must do to make a science-based judgment: it sought out and reviewed existing scientific evidence to determine whether a particular finding was warranted. It makes no difference that much of the scientific evidence in large part consisted of “syntheses” of individual studies and research. Even individual studies and research papers often synthesize past work in an area and then build upon it. This is how science works. EPA is not required to re-prove the existence of the atom every time it approaches a scientific question. Moreover, it appears from the record that EPA used the assessment reports not as substitutes for its own judgment but as evidence upon which it relied to make that judgment. EPA evaluated the processes used to develop the various assessment reports, reviewed their contents, and considered the depth of the scientific consensus the reports represented. 3la Based on these evaluations, EPA determined the assessments represented the best source material to use in deciding whether greenhouse gas emissions may be reasonably anticipated to endanger public health or welfare. Endangerment Finding, 74 Fed. Reg. at 66,510-11. It then reviewed those reports along with comments relevant to the scientific considerations involved to determine whether the evidence warranted an endangerment finding for greenhouse gases as it was required to do under the Supreme Court’s mandate in Massachusetts v. EPA. 2. Industry Petitioners also assert that the scientific evidence does not adequately support’ the endangerment Finding. As we have stated before in reviewing the science-based decisions of agencies such as EPA, “[a]lthough we perform a searching and careful inquiry into the facts underlying the agency’s decisions, we will presume the validity of agency action as long as a rational basis for it is presented.” Am. Farm Bureau Fed’n v. EPA, 559 F.3d 512, 519 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). In so doing, “we give an extreme degree of deference to the agency when it is evaluating scientific data within its technical expertise.” Jd. (internal quotation marks omitted). The body of scientific evidence marshalled by EPA in support of the Endangerment Finding is substantial. EPA’s scientific evidence of record included support for the proposition that greenhouse gases trap heat on earth that would otherwise dissipate into space; that this “greenhouse effect” warms the climate; that human activity is 32a contributing to increased atmospheric levels of greenhouse gases; and that the climate system is warming. Based on this scientific record, EPA made the linchpin finding: in its judgment, the “root cause” of the recently observed climate change is “very likely” the observed increase in anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions. Endangerment Finding, 74 Fed. Reg. at 66,518. EPA found support for this finding in three lines of evidence. First, it drew upon our “basic physical understanding” of the impacts of various natural and manmade changes on the climate system. For instance, EPA relied on evidence that the past half-century of warming has occurred at a time when natural forces such as solar and volcanic activity likely would have produced _ cooling. Endangerment Finding, Response to Comments (RTC) Vol. 3, at 20. Other evidence supports EPA’s conclusion that the observed warming pattern— warming of the bottommost layer of the atmosphere and cooling immediately above it—is consistent with greenhouse-gas causation. Id. EPA further relied upon evidence of historical estimates of past climate change, supporting EPA’s conclusion that global temperatures over the last half-century are unusual. Endangerment Finding, 74 Fed. Reg. at 66,518. Scientific studies upon which EPA relied place high confidence in the assertion that global mean surface temperatures over the last few decades are higher than at any time in the last four centuries. Technical Support Document for the Endangerment Finding (TSD), at 31. These studies also show, albeit with significant uncertainty, that temperatures at many individual locations were 33a higher over the last twenty-five years than during any period of comparable length since 900 A.D. Id. For its third line of evidence that anthropogenic emissions of greenhouse gases spurred the perceived warming trend, EPA turned to computer-based climate-model simulations. Scientists have used global climate models built on basic principles of physics and scientific knowledge about the climate to try to simulate the recent climate change. These models have only been able to replicate the observed warming by including anthropogenic emissions of greenhouse gases in the simulations. Endangerment Finding, 74 Fed. Reg. at 66,523. To recap, EPA had before it substantial record evidence that anthropogenic emissions of greenhouse gases “very likely” caused warming of the climate over the last several decades. EPA further had evidence of current and future effects of this warming on public health and welfare. Relying again upon substantial scientific evidence, EPA determined that anthropogenically induced climate change threatens both public health and public welfare. It found that extreme weather events, changes in air quality, increases in food- and water-borne pathogens, and increases in temperatures are likely to have adverse health effects. Id. at 66,497-98. The record also supports EPA’s conclusion that climate change endangers human welfare by creating risk to food production and agriculture, forestry, energy, infrastructure, ecosystems, and wildlife. Substantial evidence further supported EPA’s conclusion that the warming resulting from the greenhouse’ gas emissions could be expected to create risks to water resources and in general to coastal areas as a result 34a of expected increase in sea level. Id. at 66,498. Finally, EPA determined from substantial evidence that motor-vehicle emissions of greenhouse gases contribute to climate change and thus to the endangerment of public health and welfare. Industry Petitioners do not find fault with much of the substantial record EPA amassed in support of the Endangerment Finding. Rather, they contend that the record evidences too much uncertainty to support that judgment. But the existence of some uncertainty does not, without more, warrant invalidation of an endangerment finding. If a statute is “precautionary in nature” and “designed to protect the public health,” and the relevant evidence is “difficult to come by, uncertain, or conflicting because it is on the frontiers of scientific knowledge,” EPA need not provide “rigorous step-by-step proof of cause and effect” to support an endangerment finding. Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1, 28 (D.C. Cir. 1976). As we have stated before, “Awaiting certainty will often allow for only reactive, not preventive, regulation.” Id. at 25. Congress did not restrict EPA to remedial regulation when it enacted CAA § 202(a). That section mandates that EPA promulgate new emission standards if it determines that the air pollution at issue “may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or welfare.” 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(1). This language requires a precautionary, forward-looking scientific judgment about the risks of a particular air pollutant, consistent with the CAA’s “precautionary and preventive orientation.” Lead Indus. Ass’n, Inc. v. EPA, 647 F.2d 1130, 1155 (D.C. Cir. 1980). Requiring that EPA find “certain” endangerment of public health or welfare before regulating greenhouse gases 35a would effectively prevent EPA from doing the job Congress gave it in § 202(a)—utilizing emission standards to prevent reasonably anticipated endangerment from maturing into concrete harm. Cf. id. (“[RJequiring EPA to wait until it can conclusively demonstrate that a particular effect is adverse to health before it acts is inconsistent with both the [CAA]’s precautionary and preventive orientation and the nature of the Administrator's § statutory responsibilities. Congress provided that the Administrator is to use his judgment in setting air quality standards precisely to permit him to act in the face of uncertainty.”). In Massachusetts v. EPA the Supreme Court confirmed that EPA may make an endangerment finding despite lingering scientific uncertainty. Indeed, the Court held that the existence of “some residual uncertainty” did not excuse EPA’s decision to decline to regulate greenhouse gases. Massachusetis v. EPA, 549 U.S. at 534. To avoid regulating emissions of greenhouse gases, EPA would need to show “scientific uncertainty . . . so profound that it precludes EPA from making a reasoned judgment as to whether greenhouse gases contribute to global warming.” Jd. Clearly, then, EPA may issue an endangerment finding even while the scientific record still contains at least “some residual uncertainty.” Industry Petitioners have shown no more than thet. In the end, Petitioners are asking us to re-weigh the scientific evidence before EPA and reach our own conclusion. This is not our role. As with other reviews of administrative »roceedings, we do not determine the convincing force of evidence, nor the conclusion it should support, but only whether the conclusion 36a reached by EPA is supported by substantial evidence when considered on the record as a whole. See, e.g., New York v. EPA, 413 F.3d 3, 30 (D.C. Cir. 2005). When EPA evaluates scientific evidence in its bailiwick, we ask only that it take the scientific record into account “in a rational manner.” Am. Petroleum Inst. v. Costle, 665 F.2d 1176, 1187 (D.C. Cir. 1981). Industry Petitioners have not shown that EPA failed to do so here. C. State Petitioners, hcre led by Texas, contend that the Endangerment Finding is arbitrary and capricious because EPA did not “define,” “measure,” or “quantify” either the atmospheric concentration at which greenhouse gases endanger public health or welfare, the rate or type of climate change that it anticipates will endanger public health or welfare, or the risks or impacts of climate change. According to Texas, without defining these thresholds and distinguishing “safe” climate change from climate change that endangers, EPA’s Endangerment Finding is just a “subjective conviction.” It is true that EPA did not provide a quantitative threshold at which greenhouse gases or climate change will endanger or cause certain impacts to public health or welfare. The text of CAA § 202(a)(1) does not require that EPA set a precise numerical value as part of an endangerment finding. Quite the opposite; the § 202(a)(1) inquiry necessarily entails a case-bycase, sliding-scale approach to endangerment because “[djanger . . . is not set by a fixed probability of harm, but rather is composed of reciprocal elements of risk and harm, or probability and 37a everity.” Ethyl, 541 F.2d at 18. EPA need not establish a minimum threshold of risk or harm before determining whether an air pollutant endangers. It may base an endangerment finding on “a lesser risk of greater harm ... or a greater risk of lesser harm” or any combination in between. Id. Ethyl is instructive. There, EPA made an endangerment finding for airborne lead. During its endangerment inquiry, EPA initially tried to do what Texas asks of it here: find a specific concentration of the air pollutant below which it would be considered “safe” and above which it would endanger public health. Id. at 56. However, EPA abandoned that approach because it failed to account for “the wide variability of dietary lead intake” and lacked predictive value. EPA substituted a “more qualitative” approach, which relied on “predictions based on uncertain data” along with clinical studies. Id. at 56—57. This court upheld the endangerment finding that used that qualitative approach despite the lack of a specific endangerment “threshold.” In its essence, Texas’s call for quantification of the endangerment is no more than a specialized version of Industry Petitioners’ claim that the scientific record contains too much uncertainty to find endangerment. EPA relied on a substantial record of empirical data and scientific evidence, making many specific and often quantitative findings regarding the impacts of greenhouse gases on climate change and the effects of climate change on public health and welfare. Its failure to distill this ocean of evidence into a specific number at which greenhouse gases cause “dangerous” climate change is a function of the 38a precautionary thrust of the CAA and the multivariate and sometimes uncertain nature of climate science, not a sign of arbitrary or capricious decision-making. D. EPA defined both the “air pollution” and the “air pollutant” that are the subject of the Endangerment Finding as an aggregate of six greenhouse gases, which EPA called “well mixed greenhouse gases”: carbon dioxide (CO:), methane (CH), nitrous oxide (N2zO), hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs), perfluorocarbons (PFCs), and sulfur hexafluoride (SFs). Industry Petitioners argue that EPA’s decision to include PFCs and SFe in this group of greenhouse gases was arbitrary and capricious primarily because motor vehicles generally do not emit these two gases. No petitioner for review of the Endangerment Finding has established standing to make this argument. Industry Petitioners concede that EPA’s decision to regulate PFCs and SFs along with the other four greenhouse gases does not injure any motorvehicle-related petitioner. Nor has any non- motor-vehicle related petitioner shown an injury-in- fact resulting from EPA’s inclusion of these two gases in the six-gas amalgam of “wellmixed greenhouse gases.” At oral argument, Industry Petitioners asserted for the first time that certain utility companies—members of associations that petitioned for review of the Endangerment Finding—own utility transformers that emit SFe. However, they never demonstrated or even definitively asserted that any of these companies would not be subject to regulation or permitting requirements but for EPA’s decision to include SF as part of the “well-mixed greenhouse 39a gases” that are the subject of the Endangerment Finding. See Sierra Club u\EPA, 292 F.3d 895, 898- 900 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (requiring that a petitioner seeking review of agency action demonstrate standing by affidavit or other evidence if standing is not “self-evident” from the administrative record). Absent a petitioner with standing to challenge EPA’s inclusion of PFCs and SF in the “air pollution” at issue, this court lacks jurisdiction to address the merits of Industry Petitioners’ contention. E. EPA did not submit the Endangerment Finding for review by its Science Advisory Board (SAB). Industry Petitioners claim that EPA’s failure to do so violates its mandate to “make available” to the SAB “any proposed criteria document, standard, limitation, or regulation under the Clean Air Act” at the time it provides the same “to any other Federal agency for formal review and comment.” 42 U.S.C. § 4365(c)(1); see Am. Petroleum Inst., 665 F.2d at 1188. To begin with, it is not clear that EPA provided the Endangerment Finding “to any other Federal agency for formal review and comment,” which triggers this duty to submit a regulation to the SAB. EPA only submitted a draft of the Endangerment Finding to the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs pursuant to Executive Order 12,866. EPA contends that this was merely an informal review process, not “formal review and comment’—at least when compared with a statutory review-and-comment requirement in which other agencies are given the opportunity to provide written comments about the impacts of a proposed regulation on the reviewing agency's universe of responsibility. See, e.g., 49 U.S.C. 40a § 32902(j). Industry Petitioners failed to respond to this contention. In any event, even if EPA violated its mandate by failing to submit the Endangerment Finding to the SAB, Industry Petitioners have not shown that this error was “of such central relevance to the rule that there is a substantial likelihood that the rule would have been significantly changed if such errors had not been made.” 42 U.S.C. § 7607(d)(8); see Am. Petroleum Inst., 665 F.2d at 1188-89 (applying this standard to EPA’s failure to submit an ozone standard to the SAB). F. Lastly, State Petitioners maintain that EPA erred by denying all ten petitions for reconsideration of the Endangerment Finding. Those petitions asserted that internal emails and documents released from the University of East Anglia’s Climate Research Unit (CRU)}—a contributor to one of the_ global temperature records and to the IPCC’s assessment report—undermined the scientific evidence supporting the Endangerment Finding by calling into question whether the IPCC scientists adhered to “best science practices.” EPA’s Denial of the Petitions To Reconsider the Endangerment and Cause or Contribute Findings for Greenhouse Gases Under Section 202(a) of the Clean Air Act (“Reconsideration Denial”), 75 Fed. Reg. 49,556, 49,556—57 (Aug. 13, 2010). The petitions pointed to factual mistakes in the IPCC’s assessment report resulting from the use of non-peer-reviewed studies and several scientific studies postdating the Endangerment Finding as 4la evidence that the Endangerment Finding was flawed. Id. On August 13, 2010, EPA issued a denial of the petitions for reconsideration accompanied by a 360- page response to petitions (RTP). Jd. at 49,556. It determined that the petitions did not provide substantial support for the argument that the Endangerment Finding should be revised. According to EPA, the petitioners’ claims based on the CRU documents were exaggerated, contradicted by other evidence, and not a material or reliable basis for questioning the credibility of the body of science at issue; two of the factual inaccuracies alleged in the petitions were in fact mistakes, but both were tangential and minor” and did not change the key IPCC conclusions; and the new scientific studies raised by some petitions were either already considered by EPA, misinterpreted or misrepresented by petitioners, or put forth without acknowledging other new studies. Jd. at 49,557—58. 1. EPA is required to convene a proceeding for reconsideration of a rule if a party raising an objection to the rule can demonstrate to the Administrator that it was impracticable to raise such objection within such time or if the grounds for such objection arose after the period for public comment (but within the time specified for judicial review) and if such objection is of central relevance to the outcome of the rule. 42a 42 U.S.C. § 7607(d)(7)(B). For the purpose of determining whether to commence reconsideration of a rule, EPA considers an objection to be of “central relevance to the outcome” of that rule “if it provides substantial support for the argument that theregulation should be revised.” Reconsideration Denial, 75 Fed. Reg. at 49,561. State Petitioners have not provided substantial support for their argument that the Endangerment Finding should be revised. State Petitioners point out that some studies the IPCC referenced in its assessment were not peer-reviewed, but they ignore the fact that (1) the IPCC assessment relied on around 18,000 studies that were peer-reviewed, and (2) the IPCC’s report development procedures expressly permitted the inclusion in the assessment of some non-peer-reviewed studies (“gray” literature). Moreover, as EPA determined, the limited inaccurate information developed from the gray literature does not appear sufficient to undermine the substantial overall evidentiary support for the Endangerment Finding. State Petitioners have not, as they assert, uncovered a “pattern” of flawed science. Only two of the errors they point out seem to be errors at all, and EPA relied on neither in making the Endangerment Finding. First, as State Petitioners assert, the IPCC misstated the percentage of the Netherlands that is below sea level, a statistic that was used for background information. However, the IPCC corrected the error, and EPA concluded that the error was “minor and had no impact,” and the Endangerment Finding did not refer to the statistic in any way. Id. at 49,576—77. Second, the IPCC acknowledged misstating the rate at which 43a Himalayan glaciers are receding. EPA also did not rely on that projection in the Endangerment Finding. Id. at 49,577. State Petitioners also contend that a new study contradicts EPA’s reliance on a projection of more violent storms in the future as a result of climate change, but the study they cite only concerns past trends, not projected future storms. The record shows that EPA considered the new studies on storm trends and concluded that the studies were consistent with the Endangerment Finding. In sum, State Petitioners have failed to show that these isolated “errors” provide substantial support for their argument to overturn the Endangerment Finding. 2. State Petitioners’ further argument that EPA erred in denying reconsideration fails as well. These Petitioners claim EPA erred by failing to provide notice and comment before denying the petitions for reconsideration because EPA’s inclusion of a 360- page RTP amounted to aée “revision of the Endangerment Finding, and revision of a rule requires notice and comment. The RTP, however, appears to be exactly what EPA called it—a response to the petitions for reconsideration, not a revision of the Endangerment Finding itself. EPA certainly may deny petitions for reconsideration of a rule and provide an explanation for that denial, including by providing support for that decision, without triggering a new round of notice and comment for the rule. 44a Ill. State and Industry Petitioners contend that in promulgating the Tailpipe Rule, EPA relied on an improper interpretation of CAA § 202(a)(1), and was arbitrary and capricious in failing to justify and consider the cost impacts of its conclusion that the Rule triggers stationary-source regulation under the PSD and Title V provisions. They do not challenge the substantive standards of the Rule and focus principally on EPA’s failure to consider the cost of stationary-source permitting requirements triggered by the Rule. Positing an absurd-consequences scenario, Petitioners maintain that if EPA had considered these costs it “would have been forced” to exclude carbon dioxide from the scope of the emission standards, to decline to issue greenhouse gas emission standards at all, or “to interpret the statute so as not to automatically trigger stationary source regulation.” Industry Tailpipe Br. 17; see also Industry Tailpipe Reply Br. 8-9. Both the plain text of Section 202(a) and precedent refute Petitioners’ contentions. A. Section 202(a)(1) provides: The Administrator shall by regulation prescribe ... standards applicable to the emission of any air pollutant from any class or classes of new motor vehicles or new motor vehicle engines, which in his judgment cause, or contribute to, air pollution which may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or welfare. 4Sa 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(1). By employing the verb “shall,” Congress vested a non-discretionary duty in EPA. See Sierra Club v. Jackson, 648 F.3d 848, 856 (D.C. Cir. 2011). The plain text of Section 202(a)(1) thus refutes Industry Petitioners’ contention that EPA had discretion to defer issuance of motorvehicle emission standards on the basis of stationary-source costs. Neither the adjacent text nor the statutory context otherwise condition this clear “language of command,” id. (citation omitted). Having made the Endangerment Finding pursuant to CAA § 202(a), 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a), EPA lacked discretion to defer promulgation of the Tailpipe Rule on the basis of its trigger of stationary-source permitting requirements under the PSD program and Title V. The Supreme Court’s decision in Massachusetts v. EPA compels this interpretation of Section 202(a)(1). “If EPA makes a finding of endangerment, the Clean Air Act requires the [a]gency to regulate emissions of the deleterious pollutant from new motor vehicles.” 549 U.S. at 533. “Under the clear terms of the Clean Air Act, EPA can avoid taking further action only if it determines that greenhouse gases do not contribute to climate change or if it provides some reasonable explanation as to why it cannot or will not exercise its discretion to determine whether they do.” Id. (emphasis added). In the Endangerment Finding, EPA determined that motor-vehicle emissions contribute to greenhouse gas emissions that, in turn, endanger the public health and welfare; the agency therefore was in no position to “avoid taking further action,” id., by deferring promulgation of the Tailpipe Rule. Given the non-discretionary duty in Section 202(a)(1) and the limited flexibility available under 46a Section 202(a)(2), which this court has held relates only to the motor-vehicle industry, see infra Part III.C, EPA had no statutory basis on wach it could “ground fany] reasons for” further inaction, Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. at 535. The plain text of Section 202(a)(1) also negates Industry Petitioners’ contention that EPA had discretion to defer the Tailpipe Rule on the basis of NHTSA’s authority to regulate fuel economy. The Supreme Court dismissed a near-identical argument in Massachusetts v. EPA, rejecting the suggestion that EPA could decline to regulate carbon-dioxide emissions because the Department of Transportation (DOT) had independent authority to set fuel- efficiency standards. Id. at 531-32. “[T]hat DOT sets mileage standards in no way licenses EPA to shirk its environmental responsibilities,” because EPA’s duty to promulgate emission standards derives from “a statutory obligation wholly independent of DOT's mandate to promote energy efficiency.” Jd. at 532. Just as EPA lacks authority to refuse to regulate on the grounds of NHTSA’s regulatory authority, EPA cannot defer regulation on that basis. A comparison of the relevant statutes bolsters this conclusion. Compare 49 U.S.C. § 32902(f) (“When deciding maximum feasible average fuel economy ... , the Secretary of Transportation shall consider .. . the effect of other motor vehicle standards of the Government on fuel economy ... .”), with 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a) (including no such direction). Nor, applying the same reasoning, was EPA required to treat NHTSA’s proposed regulations as establishing the baseline for the Tailpipe Rule. Furthermore, the Tailpipe Rule provides benefits above and beyond those resulting from NHTSA’s fuel economy 47a standards. See, e.g., Tailpipe Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. at 25,490 (Table III.F.1-2), 25,636 (Table IV.G.1-4). Petitioners’ related contentions regarding the PSD permitting triggers are addressed in Part V. B. Turning to the APA, Industry Petitioners contend, relying on Small Refiner Lead Phase-Down Task Force v. EPA, 705 F.2d 506, 525 (D.C. Cir. 1983), and Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1 (D.C. Cir. 1976), that EPA failed both to justify the Tailpipe Rule in terms of the risk identified in the Endangerment Finding and to show that the proposed standards “would meaningfully mitigate the alleged endangerment,” Industry Tailpipe Br. 35. Instead, they maintain that EPA “separated these two integral steps,” id. at 11, and “concluded that it had no obligation to show ... ‘the resulting emissions control strategy or strategies will have some significant degree of harm reduction or effectiveness in addressing the endangerment,” id. at 11—12 (quoting Endangerment Finding, 74 Fed. Reg. at 66,508). These contentions fail. Petitioners’ reliance on Small Refiner, 705 F.2d at 525, is misplaced; the court there laid out guidelines for assessing EPA’s discretion to set numerical standards and Petitioners do not challenge the substance of the emission standards. In Ethyl, 541 F.2d at 7, the court assessed the scope of EPA's authority, under CAA § 211(c)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 1857f- 6c(c)(1) (1970) (currently codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 7545(c)(1)), to regulate lead particulate in motor-vehicle emissions. The court rejected the argument that the regulations had to “be premisedupon factual proof of actual harm,” Ethyl, 48a 541 F.2d at 12, and instead deferred to EPA's reasonable interpretation that regulations could be based on a “significant risk of harm,” id. at 13. Nothing in Ethyl implied that EPA’s authority to regulate was conditioned on evidence of a particular level of mitigation; only a showing of significant contribution was required. EPA made such a determination in the Endangerment Finding, concluding that vehicle emissions are a significant contributor to domestic greenhouse gas emissions. See, e.g., Endangerment Finding, 74 Fed. Reg. at 66,499. Further, in the preamble to the Tailpipe Rule itself, EPA found that the emission standards would result in meaningful mitigation of greenhouse gas emissions. For example, EPA estimated that the Rule would result in a reduction of about 960 million metric tons of COze emissions over the lifetime of the model year 2012-2016 vehicles affected by the new standards. See Tailpipe Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. at 25,488— 90. Other precedent is likewise unhelpful to Petitioners: in Chemical Manufacturers Association v. EPA, 217 F.3d 861, 866 (D.C. Cir. 2000), “nothing in the record” indicated that the challenged regulatory program would “directly or indirectly, further the Clean Air Act’s environmental goals,” whereas here the record is fulsome, see supra Part II. C. Petitioners also invoke Section 202(a)(2) as support for their contention that EPA must consider stationary-source costs in the Tailpipe Rule. Section 202(a)(2) provides: Any regulation prescribed under paragraph (1) of this subsection .. . shall take effect 49a after such period as the Administrator finds necessary to permit the development and application of the requisite technology, giving appropriate consideration to the cost of compliance within such period. 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(2). State Petitioners maintain the reference to compliance costs encompasses those experienced by stationary sources under the PSD program, while Industry Petitioners maintain stationary-source costs are a relevant factor in EPA’s Section 202(a)(1) rulemaking. This court, however, has held that the Section 202(a)(2) reference to compliance costs encompasses only the cost to the motor-vehicle industry to come into compliance with the new emission standards, and does not mandate consideration of costs to other entities not directly subject to the proposed standards. See Motor & Equip. Mfrs. Ass’n, Inc. v. EPA, 627 F.2d 1095, 1118 (D.C. Cir. 1979). D. Petitioners’ remaining challenges to the Tailpipe Rule fail as well. In Part II, the court rejects the contention that the Tailpipe Rule fails due to flaws in the underlying Endangerment Finding. The record also refutes Industry Petitioners’ suggestion that EPA “employed a shell game to avoid,” Industry Tailpipe Reply Br. 9 (capitalization removed), responding to comments regarding stationary-source costs. Industry Tailpipe Br. 19—20; see also Industry Tailpipe Reply Br. 14—15. EPA adequately responded to “significant comments,” 42 U.S.C. § 7607(d)(6)(B). See, e.g., Tailpipe Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. at 25,401—02; Tailpipe Rule, Response to Comments at 7-65 to 7- 50a 69. And, assuming other statutory mandates provide a basis for judicial review, see Industry Tailpipe Br. 21—22 (listing mandates); see, e.g., Small Refiner, 705 F.2d at 537—39, the record shows EPA’s compliance, see Tailpipe Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. at 25,539—42, and that EPA was not arbitrary and capricious by not considering stationary-source costs in its analyses. See, e.g., Michigan v. EPA, 213 F.3d 663, 689 (D.C.Cir. 2000); Mid-Tex Elec. Coop., Inc. v. FERC, 773 F.2d 327, 341-42 (D.C. Cir. 1985). EPA's economic impact assessment conducted pursuant to CAA § 317, 42 U.S.C. § 7617, does not provide grounds for granting the petitions because Petitioners’ contentions that EPA, “[iJn defiance of these requirements, . . .refused to estimate or even consider the costs of the [Tailpipe Rule] for stationary sources,” Industry Tailpipe Br. 22, are no more than another attempt to avoid the plain text of Section 202(a). See also 42 U.S.C. § 7617(e). IV. We turn next to the stationary source regulations. As noted supra in Part I, EPA’s interpretation of the CAA requires PSD and Title V permits for stationary sources whose potential emissions exceed statutory thresholds for any regulated pollutant—including greenhouse gases. Industry Petitioners now challenge EPA's longstanding interpretation of the scope of the permitting requirements for construction and modification of major emitting facilities under CAA Sections 165(a) and 169(1), 42 U.S.C. §§ 7475(a) & 7479(1) (‘the PSD permitting triggers”). EPA maintains that this challenge is untimely because its interpretation of the PSD permitting triggers was set forth in its 1978, 1980, and 2002 Rules. Sla In 1978, EPA defined “major stationary source” as a source that emits major amounts of “any air pollutant regulated under the [CAA}.” Part 51l- Requirements for Preparation, Adoption, and Submittal of Implementation Plans; Prevention of Significant Air Quality Deterioration § (“1978 Implementation Plan Requirements”), 43 Fed. Reg. 26,380, 26,382 (June 19, 1978). Industry petitioners’ challenge to the 1978 Rule in Alabama Power Co. uv. Costle, 636 F.2d 323 (D.C. Cir. 1980) reflected their understanding that EPA would apply the PSD permitting program to both pollutants regulated pursuant to National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS) and other regulated pollutants. See Br. for Industry Petrs on Regulation of Pollutants other than Sulfur Dioxide and Particulates, No. 78- 1006 (and consolidated cases) (Dec. 19, 1978) at 10, 12. In the 1980 Rule, EPA highlighted that to be subject to PSD review, a “source need only emit any pollutant in major amounts (i.e., the amounts specified in [CAA § 169(1)]) and be located in an area designated attainment or unclassifiable for that or any other pollutant.” 1980 Implementation Plan Requirements, 45 Fed. Reg. at 52,711 (emphasis in original). EPA explained that “any pollutant” meant “both criteria pollutants, for which national ambient air quality standards have been promulgated, and noncriteria pollutants subject to regulation under the Act.” Jd. The same explanation of EPA’s interpretation appeared in the 2002 Rule. Prevention of Significant Deterioration and WNonattainment New Source Review, 67 Fed. Reg. 80,186, 80,239-40, 80,264 (Dec. 31, 2002). 52a CAA Section 307(b)(1) provides that a petition for review of any promulgated nationally applicable regulations: “shall be filed within sixty days from the date notice of such promulgation . . . appears in the Federal Register, except that if such petition is based solely on grounds arising after such sixtieth day, then any petition for review ... shall be filed within sixty days after such grounds arise.” 42 U.S.C. § 7607(b)(1). The exception encompasses the occurrence of an event that ripens a claim. See Chamber of Commerce v. EPA, 642 F.3d 192, 208 n.14 (D.C. Cir. 2011); Am. Rd. & Transp. Builders Ass’n v. EPA, 588 F.3d 1109, 1113 (D.C. Cir. 2009). EPA acknowledges this precedent, but maintains that the “new grounds” exception is narrow and inapplicable bevause Industry Petitioners’ challenge to EPA's interpretation of the PSD permitting triggers is based on legal arguments that were available during the normal judicial review periods for the 1978, 1980, and 2002 Rules, and the “new ground” on which they now rely is a factual development, namely the regulation of greenhouse gases by the Tailpipe Rule. This is correct so far as it goes, but fails to demonstrate that Industry Petitioners’ challenge is untimely. Industry Petitioners point out that two petitioners—the National Association of Home Builders ( NAHB ) and National Oilseed Processors Association ( NOPA ) — have newly ripened claims as a result of the Tailpipe Rule, which had the effect of expanding the PSD program to never-regulated sources: 53a * NAHB’s members construct single family homes, apartment buildings, and commercial buildings. According to the Vice President of Legal Affairs, prior to the Tailpipe Rule, no member of NAHB was a major source of any regulated pollutant, and thus no member was ever required to obtain a PSD permit. Decl. of Thomas J. Ward, Vice President of Legal Affairs for NAHB, 4 6 (May 10, 2011). Since the Tailpipe Rule rendered greenhouse gases a regulated pollutant, it is now certain that NAHB members that engage in construction projects that emit greenhouse gases in major amounts will have to obtain PSD permits sometime in the future. Jd. at 47 7, 8. Indeed, EPA estimated that 6,397 multifamily buildings and 515 single family homes would trigger PSD review annually absent the Tailoring Rule. See Prevention of Significant Deterioration and Title V Greenhouse Gas Tailoring Rule; Proposed Rule (‘Proposed Tailoring Rule”), 74 Fed. Reg. 55,292, 55,338 (Oct. 27, 2009). * NOPA’s members are large companies that monthly produce millions of tons of vegetable meals and over a billion pounds of oils from oilseeds, such as soybeans. See, e.g., NOPA, January 2012 Statistical Report (Feb. 14, 2012) available at www.nopa.org; NOPA, February 2012 Statistical Report (Mar. 14, 2012), available at www.nopa.org. According to the Executive Vice President of Regulatory Affairs, NOPA members operate facilities that are major sources of criteria pollutants 54a and, [Text truncated at 120,000 characters. The full text is on the page linked above.] --- Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385015_0900%3A0. Public record. Not legal advice.