# Amicus Curiae Brief — Decker v. Northwest Environmental Defense Center

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URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385015_0744%3A28

## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Amicus Curiae Brief
- **Published:** January 1, 2013
- **Citation:** 568 U.S. 1118

## Text

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Nos. 11-338 anu 11-347

3n the Supreme Court of the United States

DouG DECKER, in his official capacity as
Oregon State Forester, et al.,

Petitioners,

Vv.
NORTHWEST ENVIRONMENTAL DEFENSE CENTER, et ail.,
Respondents.

GEORGIA-PACIFIC WEST, INC., et al.,

Petitioners,

v.
NORTHWEST ENVIRONMENTAL DEFENSE CENTER, et al.,
Respondents.

On Writs of Certiorari to the United States Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

BRIEF FOR AMICUS CURIAE CHAMBER OF
COMMERCE OF THE UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONERS

ROBIN S. CONRAD ROBERT R. GASAWAY
RACHEL L. BRAND Counsel of Record
SHELDON GILBERT JEFFREY BOSSERT CLARK
NATIONAL CHAMBER ADITYA BAMZAI
LITIGATION CENTER, INC. AARON L. NIELSON
1615 H Street, NW KIRKLAND & ELLIS LLP
Washington, DC 20062 655 Fifteenth Street, NW
(202) 463-5337 Washington, DC 20005
(202) 879-5000
September 4, 2012 rgasaway@kirkland.com

9
WILSON-EPES PRINTING Co., INC. — (202) 789-0096 — WASHINGTON, D.C. 20002

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page
TABLE OF AUTHORITIBG.....................sccssscsseccesees il
INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE ................0.c000c0000 1
DUFREPEARES CF RE TUIOIIS D cccecccsccscccvscsssevescossonnsaness 2
DEPRESS, ccecesesisesesesepnmncsinntimesennbeginaimeniadiail 5

I. COURTS ADJUDICATING CITIZEN
SUITS UNDER THE CLEAN WATER
ACT LACK JURISDICTION TO
INVALIDATE AGENCY RULEG..................... 6

Il. THE LINE BETWEEN “INVALIDATING”
A RULE AND “INTERPRETING” IT
MUST BE DILIGENTLY ENFORCED. .......... 9

lil. THE NINTH CIRCUIT EXCEEDED ITS
JURISDICTION BY INVALIDATING
THE SILVICULTURAL RULE IN THIS
CPS EIOT GFE s coccecenscoccsesnnnsunenntaneniumsinndiinstiiinn 14

A. The Silvicultural Rule
Unambiguously Exempts Logging
Ditches And Culverts From
NPDES Permitting Requirements. ..... 14

B. EPA Cannot Read The
Silvicultural Rule To Mean
Something Other Than What Its
RE UD CII cnccccccsccvnevssctinansebienniiaes 19

A

C. The Ninth Circuit's
“Interpretation” Of The
Silvicultural Rule In Fact
Invalidates The Rule. .......................66- 22

ET TN ae 25

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page(s)

Cases
Adamo Wrecking Co. v. United States,

ee iatiniceinniabiciiiniiehamniedcaniteeniaibianis 8, 9, 11
Auer v. Robbins,

AN I iittala 19
Cajun Elec. Power Coop., Inc. v. FERC,

O34 F'.26 1138 (D.C. Cie. 1GB2) .....cccccccocccceccccscess 19
Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res.

Def. Council, Inc.,

ee ee i iitnidcniciepricisasinniiinntinniiainsinial 20
Christensen v. Harris Cnty.,

ee a EE iinciissichtinsiisncteisinadhishaiieiivesnenbiiaidibinia 19
Christopher v. Smithkline Beecham Corp.,

8 een 20, 21
Comcast Corp. v. FCC,

ee ee Cs TEs SE cccctensncecnnsocnncnsinenennnnie 13
Envtl. Def. v. Duke Energy Corp.,

Ff 060U0d)6ll"d ee 3, 9, 22, 23, 25
Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Enutl.

Servs. (TOC), Inc.,

ee Se IT ic csncssintisisnnciedannsutadiiniiianiensinned 8, 12

Harrison v. PPG Indus., Inc.,
IRENE na eaeee Ronen mennE ener Et 7,9

lV

INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca,

a ees Ge Ce iiictientcsnenntnscasenvsnassecnniee

Leatherman v. Tarrant Cnty. Narcotics
Intelligence & Coordination Unit,

ee Se Ce ccienicsinnnnicinntonnseimenssene

Lubrizol Corp. v. Train,

547 F.2d 310 (6th Cir. 1976)..................6

Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife,

ee GF ND QD ccccncecnccescccccccncecnnenseenes

Maier v. EPA,

114 F.3d 1032 (10th Cir. 1997)................

Middlesex Cty. Sewerage Auth. v. Natl Sea
Clammers Ass'n,

GD TA. B Gi etccccceccceccsscecscncscsscecesscesen

Nat'l Ass’n of Home Builders v.
Defenders of Wildlife,

ee Rs ED ee ievaievccansessunsnensscasesvongnes

NetworkIP, LLC v. FCC,

548 F.3d 116 (D.C. Cir. 2008)..................

NRDC v. EPA,

512 F.2d 1351 (D.C. Cir. 1975)................

NRDC o. EPA,

571 F.3d 1245 (D.C. Cir. 2009)................

Nw. Envtl. Def. Ctr. v. Brown,

640 F.3d 1063 (9th Cir. 2011)..................

Vv

Old Dominion Elec. Coop., Inc. v. FERC,

518 F.3d 43 (D.C. Cir. 2008)............................... 20
Paper Inst., Inc. v. EPA,

oe fog. i Eee: 7
Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't,

gt EE eee ean Ee 12
Talk Am., Inc. v. Michigan Bell Tel. Co.,

ee ee i I iinrnintirncimnitsinnatttiiegaaniddinnpeld 22
Telecomms. Research & Action Ctr. v. FCC,

750 F.2d 70 (D.C. Cir. 1984) ............. 0. cccec cece eee eeee 12
United States v. Ethyl Corp.,

761 F.2d 1153 (Sth Cir. 1985)......................c.ccce00- 8
United States v. Kubrick,

ios eaidisiatiianiialiaian 10
Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. FDIC,

$10 F.3d 202 (D.C. Cir. BOOB) ........cccccoccccccccscccece 20
Statutes
I TTT cin cisisicciniteiaieansiniieandigienibeeianbeumin 10, 12
Se TEEN: Tin AI cinsstesncsinciienesesiaeiibciigepiianhtsianiadiiemnnaieansediiautiiidans 12
Be i Oe a iicnctiencterisihepantinsinnnininlinniinapnadaninnniniiainiaieniion 10
UG Me I is crararincsctreriniinnneniiannieniiinbniiaianaeit 10
Be es Se I ois ciicsicinninsnrcianinnddiinesnnininpieandeiamneaniidanaia 3, 7

33 U.S.C. § 1369(b).................... 2, 3, 6, 7, 9, 13, 21, 25

ee ice tcctnntnictternimnimeniinnimeniia 10
RES SEES EET ESS RET 10
kL ae Anarene 10
I 10
Rules

a ie OD creicececcnrecestenemnncssenesnensanientia 14, 15
Gk ie SPE ceccnnnscnssnncnetennsonecssentnins 2,4, 14, 15
Other Authorities

R. STACCIOLI,
THE ROADS OF THE ROMANS (2003) ................----+ 16

INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE*

The Chamber of Commerce of the United States
of America (the “Chamber”) is the world’s largest
business federation. It directly represents 300,000
members and indirectly represents the interests of
over three million business, trade, and professional
organizations of every size, in every sector, and from
every region of the country. Over 96% of the
Chamber’s members are small businesses with 100
or fewer employees. One of the Chamber’s primary
functions is to represent the interests of its members
by filing amicus briefs in cases implicating issues of
vital concern to American business.

This case presents an important question
regarding the jurisdiction of federal courts under the
Clean Water Act (“CWA”) and other statutes
enforced by citizen suit provisions: whether a court
hearing a “citizen suit” brought pursuant to the CWA
can invalidate an Environmental Protection Agency
(“EPA”) regulation in the guise of interpreting it.
The rule-of-law principles at stake in answering that
question are of central importance to the Chamber’s
members, especially given the frequency with which
citizen suit provisions appear in the United States
Code. Countless companies have _ structured
important elements of their businesses around the
plain text of EPA’s Silvicultural Rule (40 C.F.R.

* The parties have consented to the filing of this brief, and
their letters of consent are on file with the Clerk. In accordance
with Rule 37.6, Amicus states that no counsel for any party has
authored this brief in whole or in part, and no person or entity,
other than Amicus, its members, and ita counsel, made a
monetary contribution intended to fund the preparation or
submission of this brief.

2

§ 122.27(b)(1)), or other, similar agency rules
enforced by citizen suit provisions. The profound
implications for Chamber members of any decision
upending settled regulatory expectations underscore
the Chamber’s strong interest in ensuring that the
Ninth Circuit’s decision is carefully examined and
appropriately corrected.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction.
Where Congress has set the bounds of a federal
court’s power, Article III demands that those bounds
be respected. In resolving the case below, however,
the Ninth Circuit violated that elementary principle
of law by invalidating the EPA’s longstanding
Silvicultura] Rule in the context of adjudicating this
citizen suit. Because courts sitting to hear citizen
suits enjoy jurisdiction only to enforce EPA’s rules,
not to invalidate them, the decision below must be
vacated, and the case remanded with instructions to
dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

Congress enacted two distinct jurisdictional
provisions for suits involving EPA’s_ rules
implementing the National Pollutant Discharge
Elimination System’s permitting program. One of
the provisions, 33 U.S.C. § 1369(b), gives federal
appellate courts exclusive jurisdiction to review the
lawfulness of EPA’s NPDES rules. See id.
§§ 1369(b)(1)(E)-(F). In these direct review actions,
EPA is a respondent and review generally must be
sought within 120 days of a rule’s promulgation. See
id. § 1369(b)(1)(G). By statute, Congress has decreed
that review of an NPDES rule can only be sought
under Section 1369(b)(1). Such a rule “shall not be

3

subject to judicial review in any civil ... proceeding
for enforcement.” Id. § 1369(b)(2).

The second jurisdictional provision, 33 U.S.C.
§ 1365(a), allows federal district courts to adjudicate
citizen suits. Citizen suits are not subject to Section
1369(b)’s 120-day time limit, and EPA need not be a
party to the litigation.

The reason for this marked contrast between
Sections 1369(b) and 1365(a) is that the two
provisions serve different functions. Section 1369(b)
provides for review of the lawfulness of EPA’s rules;
Section 1365(a) serves to ensure the rules are
properly enforced. Accordingly, as this Court
unanimously acknowledged in the analogous Clean
Air Act (“CAA”) context, “an attack on the validity of
the regulation ... [cannot] be raised in an
enforcement proceeding.” Envtl. Def. v. Duke Energy
Corp., 549 U.S. 561, 572 (2007).

Here, the Ninth Circuit ignored the line
separating these two jurisdictional provisions. No
party disputes that the _ Silvicultural Rule
implements EPA’s NPDES permitting program.
That means that under Section 1369(b)(1), the
Silvicultural Rule itself may be reviewed only: (i) ina
circuit court; (ii) in a case in which EPA is a
respondent; and (iii) if review is timely sought. But
not one of those conditions was met in this case.
This suit was commenced in district court under
Section 1365(a); the EPA was not made a party to
the litigation; and this suit was filed decades after
the Silvicultural Rule’s adoption. The Ninth Circuit
thus had jurisdiction only to ensure that the district
court properly enforced the Silvicultural Rule—not to
examine its lawfulness vel non.

4

Unfortunately, the Ninth Circuit did more than
enforce the Silvicultural Rule; it invalidated it.
Specifically, the Ninth Circuit held that “runoff from
logging roads that [is] collected in a system of
ditches, culverts, and channels” requires an NPDES
permit. Nw. Envitl. Def. Ctr. v. Brown, 640 F.3d
1063, 1079-80 (9th Cir. 2011). The Rule, however,
says the opposite—that “site preparation,” “surface
drainage,” and “road construction and maintenance”
are all activities that do not require a permit. 40
C.F.R. § 122.27(b)(1). Because the Silvicultural Rule
is unambiguous, not even EPA has discretion to read
it any other way.

The dispositive issue for this case thus does not
involve the scope of EPA’s authority but the entirely
distinct question of the scope of the district court’s
jurisdiction to review—and potentially’ to
invalidate—EPA regulations. The point here is that
Congress withheld from the district courts any
jurisdiction to review or revise the Silvicultural Rule
when adjudicating citizen suits. The Ninth Circuit's
decision to the contrary dispenses with the Clean
Water Act’s jurisdictional limitations; discards
Congress’s carefully drawn review regime; gives
district courts review authority that they have
heretofore lacked; and upsets the stability of
comparable rules and review provisions. If allowed
to stand, the Ninth Circuit decision would subject
countless Chamber members and other regulated
parties to new degrees of legal uncertainty across the
entire swath of the Code of Federal Regulations
provisions that are subject to enforcement via citizen
suits. To restore certainty to the operation of the
Clean Water Act and similar statutory regimes, the
Ninth Circuit’s decision should be vacated and the

5

case remanded with instructions to dismiss for want
of subject matter jurisdiction.
ARGUMENT

The Ninth Circuit’s “invalidation by
interpretation” approach has serious consequences
for the stability of settled regulatory understandings
under the NPDES permitting regime and other
regulatory regimes enforced by citizen suits. The
Ninth Circuit’s wholesale willingness to replace
congressional limitations on when, where, and how
regulations may be challenged with an uncertain
regime in which courts may invalidate regulations
long after their promulgation and through sleight of
hand can only undermine the stability of the law.
The Chamber’s members have strong interests in
ensuring that all regulated parties play on an even
field defined by settled rules of the road for seeking
judicial review of agency enactments. Only through
adherence to such settled rules will judicial review
determinations be orderly, predictable, and capable
of allowing businesses to responsibly plan their
affairs.

The decision below deprives regulated parties
throughout the Ninth Circuit of these most basic and
essential rule-of-law benefits. The Silvicultural Rule
is unambiguous: no NPDES permit is required for
ditches and culverts that drain water off the surface
of logging roads. Nonetheless, the Ninth Circuit
declined to give the Rule the only reading its text
reasonably permits. The Ninth Circuit’s decision
thus discarded core limitations on review of agency
action and deprived Chamber members of the
benefits of the previously settled understanding of
the Silvicultural Rule and other similar rules.

6

I. COURTS ADJUDICATING CITIZEN SUITS
UNDER THE CLEAN WATER ACT LACK
JURISDICTION TO INVALIDATE AGENCY

RULES.

Congress has limited how, when, and where
review of EPA rules implementing the NPDES

permitting program can be obtained.

Under the CWA, review of an NPDES rule can be
had “in the Circuit Court of Appeals of the United
States for the Federal judicial district in which [the
applicant] resides or transacts business,” and “within
120 days ... or after such date only if such
application is based solely on grounds which arose
after such 120th day.” 33 U.S.C. § 1369(b)(1); see
also NRDC v. EPA, 571 F.3d 1245, 1269 (D.C. Cir. :
2009) (“[Under the CAA, t]he triggering date was
July 2, 1979, when the EPA .... unequivocally
asserted its authority to exempt new sources from
permitting requirements under section VI. Thus, the
petitioners’ challenge to such authority in this case
comes almost thirty years late and we are precluded
from considering it.”).

Congress left no doubt that judicial review of EPA
rulemakings under Section 1369(b) is exclusive:
“Action of the Administrator with respect to which
review could have been obtained under paragraph
(1) of this subsection shall not be subject to judicial
review in any civil or criminal proceeding for
enforcement.” 33 U.S.C. § 1369(b)(2); see also
Middlesex Cty. Sewerage Auth. v. Natl Sea
Clammers Ass’n, 453 U.S. 1, 14 (1981) (“Where
review could have been obtained under this
provision, the action at issue may not be challenged
in any subsequent civil or criminal proceeding for

7

enforcement.”) (citing 33 U.S.C. § 1369(b)(2)); Paper
Inst., Inc. v. EPA, 882 F.2d 287, 288 (7th Cir. 1989)
(“Because the [CWA] bars review in enforcement
proceedings of actions that could have been reviewed
earlier, 33 U.S.C. § 1369(b)(2), careful lawyers must
apply for judicial review of anything remotely
resembling a reviewable order.”). As a result, subject
to due process limitations, “any agency action that
was reviewable in the courts of appeals cannot be
challenged in an enforcement proceeding, whether or
not review was actually sought.” Harrison v. PPG
Indus., Inc., 446 U.S. 578, 605 (1980) (emphasis
added).

Relatedly, federal district courts’ jurisdiction to
entertain citizen suits is also carefully circumscribed
by statute. Section 1365(a) of the Clean Water Act
provides that district courts enjoy jurisdiction only
“to enforce ... an effluent standard,” not to adjudicate
whether a standard is lawful. 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a);
see also Maier v. EPA, 114 F.3d 1032, 1036-39 (10th
Cir. 1997) (explaining that Section 1365(a) cannot be
used to challenge a rule’s validity).

As this Court has explained in a criminal
prosecution under the CAA:

The narrow inquiry to be addressed by the
court ... is not whether the Administrator
has complied with appropriate procedures
in promulgating the regulation § in
question, or whether the particular
regulation is arbitrary, capricious, or
supported by the administrative record.
Nor is the court to pursue any of the other
familiar inquiries which arise in the

8

course of an administrative review
proceeding.

Adamo Wrecking Co. v. United States, 434 U.S. 275,
285 (1978); see also United States v. Ethyl Corp., 761
F.2d 1153, 1157 (5th Cir. 1985) (applying Adamo
Wrecking Co. in the civil context).

Congress’ decision to cabin the scope of citizen
suits in the Clean Water Act and other statutes is
understandable, both as a matter of prudence and as
a matter of constitutional principle. As members of
the Court have remarked, private enforcement of
public law raises “[djifficult and fundamental
questions ... in view of the responsibilities committed
to the Executive by Article II of the Constitution of
the United States.” Friends of the Earth, Inc. v.
Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 197
(2000) (Kennedy, J., concurring); see also Lujan uv.
Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 576-77 (1992)
(holding in a citizen suit case that Congress could not
allow private prosecution of any and all violations of
federal law because that would infringe on “the Chief
Executive’s most important constitutional duty, to
‘take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed,’ Art.
II, § 3”). If read too broadly, citizen suit provisions
could enable every court of competent jurisdiction to
dip its own interpretive oar into agencies’ most
important regulatory waters—thus undermining the
uniformity, predictability and even legitimacy of the
resulting administrative regimes.

In short, Congress clearly and wisely established
Section 1369(b) as the exclusive vehicle for obtaining
judicial review of EPA _ regulations, while
establishing Section 1365(a) citizen suits as a vehicle

9

for enforcing—but not for reviewing—such
regulations.

II. THE LINE BETWEEN “INVALIDATING” A
RULE AND “INTERPRETING” IT MUST BE
DILIGENTLY ENFORCED.

Against the backdrop of these different review
provisions, the line between “invalidating” a rule and
“enforcing” it must be diligently policed. Most
importantly, the judicial inquiry into the distinction.
between a rule’s enforcement and its invalidation
must go beyond mere labels.

As the Court has recognized, provisions for
funneling challenges to rulemakings quickly into
court serve important functions. So long as they are
interpreted consistent with due process, such
provisions, including Section 1369(b)(2) of the CWA,
properly ensure that regulations are “uniformly
applied” and “quickly reviewed by a single court
intimately familiar with administrative procedures.”
Adamo Wrecking Co., 434 U.S. at 284.

Indeed, as the United States’ briefing explained
in Duke Energy, such provisions “avoid[] inconsistent
results and forum shopping, provide[] speedy and
authoritative review in a court of appeals with
particular expertise in the relevant area, and
ensure{] that regulated entities are _ treated
consistently throughout the country, thus ensuring a
level playing field for the regulated community.”
Brief for the United States as Respondent
Supporting Petitioners, Duke Energy, 549 U.S. 561
(No. 05-848) (2006 WL 2066660) (July 21, 2006), at
18 (citing Harrison, 446 U.S. at 593; NRDC v. EPA,
512 F.2d 1351, 1356-57 (D.C. Cir. 1975); Lubrizol
Corp. v. Train, 547 F.2d 310, 317 (6th Cir. 1976)).

10

Accordingly, any failure to police the line between
“invalidation” and “interpretation” of a rule would
unsettle doctrine far beyond the boundaries of this
case—and create confusion in the application of
timing, exclusive jurisdiction, and remedial rules in a
variety of administrative law contexts.

In particular, failing to police this jurisdictional
line would subject Chamber members to challenges
to agency rulemakings and orders brought long after
the end of the specified review period. Importantly,
the Clean Water Act is by no means alone in
establishing comparatively short deadlines for
judicial review of agency rulemakings. See, e.g., 47
U.S.C. § 402(b) (Federal Communications
Commission: 30 days); 42 U.S.C. § 7607(b) (CAA: 60
days); 42 U.S.C. § 300j-7(a) (Safe Drinking Water
Act: 45 days); 42 U.S.C. § 6976(a)(1) (Resource
Conservation and Recovery Act: 90 days); 30 U.S.C.
§ 1276(a)(1) (Surface Mining Control and
Reclamation Act: 60 days); 28 U.S.C. §§ 2342, 2344
(numerous agencies including Atomic Energy
Commission, Surface Transportation Board, and
Federal Maritime Commission: 60 days).

Like statutes of limitations, such judicial review
deadlines often serve to bar litigation of the merits of
otherwise valid legal challenges. See, e.g., United
States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 125 (1979) (“It goes
without saying that statutes of limitations often
make it impossible to enforce what were otherwise
perfectly valid claims. But that is their very purpose

...). The larger point, however, is that Congress
weighed the costs and benefits of time-barring
otherwise meritorious claims against the costs and
benefits of creating stability and certainly in a

11

particular regulatory regime. Cf., Adamo Wrecking
Co., 434 U.S. at 284 (explaining that Congress
intended rulemakings in the environmental context
to be “quickly reviewed by a single court intimately
familiar with administrative procedures’). The
balance struck by Congress in these provisions
creates clear, well-defined avenues for bringing
challenges to regulations, while permitting regulated
parties to know the rules and plan their businesses
accordingly.

Citizen suit provisions, by very nature, divide the
authority to promulgate rules from the authority to
enforce them in ways that threaten to undermine
statutorily specified judicial-review windows.
Outside the citizen suit context, the promulgator and
enforcer of agency regulations is typically one and
the same entity—the agency itself. In those
circumstances, if an agency comes to question the
wisdom of its own regulations, all it need do is take
proper steps to amend them. Under citizen suit
provisions, by contrast, private citizens, as agency
outsiders, are authorized to enforce but not to amend
agency regulations. This partial authority often
leads to situations where these outside enforcers find
they may enforce but may not challenge regulations
with which they fundamentally disagree.

The bottom line is that, under any regime like the
Clean Water Act, the coupling of a short window for
review with a perpetual opportunity for private
enforcement sorely tempts citizen litigants to dress
up time-barred challenges to the validity of
regulations as permissible actions seeking to enforce
them. These incentives to engage in a sleight of
hand (which, as explained below, are nicely

12

exemplified by the proceedings in this case) are
precisely why a too-expansive compass for citizen
suits undermines statutory review deadlines,
unsettles the law, and upsets the well founded
expectations of the business community.

In addition to specifying short time windows for
challenging agency rulemakings, Congress also often
provides that review of rulemakings occurs
exclusively in particular courts, such as the courts of
appeal. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 2343 (“The venue of a
proceeding under this chapter is in the judicial
circuit in which the petitioner resides or has its
principal office, or in the United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit.”)
(applying to review of orders of agencies listed in 28
U.S.C. § 2342). Because of the “institutional
differences between trial and appellate courts,”
Congress's express statement “as to the particular
type of court it wants to review agency action, ...
should not be set aside lightly.” NetworkIP, LLC uv.
FCC, 548 F.3d 116, 121 (D.C. Cir. 2008); Telecomms.
Research & Action Ctr. v. FCC, 750 F.2d 70, 78 (D.C.
Cir. 1984) (“Appellate courts develop an expertise
concerning the agencies assigned them for review.
Exclusive jurisdiction promotes judicial economy and
fairness to the litigants by taking advantage of that
expertise. In addition, exclusive jurisdiction
eliminates duplicative and potentially conflicting
review, and the delay and expense incidental
thereto.”) (citation omitted).

Citizen suits by contrast are brought almost
uniformly in the district courts. See Laidlaw, 528
U.S. at 173; Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’,
523 U.S. 83, 88 (1998). Allowing parties to challenge

13

the NPDES regulations and similar agency rules
through citizen suits would mean that district courts,
not appellate courts, would evaluate the lawfulness
of such rules in the first instance—contrary to
Congress's entrustment of such review to the courts
of appeal. See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. §§ 1369(b)(1)-(b)(2). In
view of the heavy reliance of regulated parties on the
special review competence of appellate courts, there
is no reason to think that Congress intended to
permit forum substitutions in cases involving
challenges to agency rulemakings under the Clean
Water Act and other statutory regimes that involve
regulatory enforcement through citizen suits.

Finally, in ordinary administrative law cases, if a
court invalidates a rule, it typically vacates the rule
and remands to the agency for further proceedings.
See, e.g., Comcast Corp. v. FCC, 579 F.3d 1, 9 (D.C.
Cir. 2009) (“[W]e have not hesitated to vacate a rule
when the agency has not responded to empirical data
or to an argument inconsistent with its conclusion.”);
see also id. at 10 (Randolph, J., concurring) (arguing
that “whenever a_ reviewing court finds an
administrative rule or order unlawful,’ the
Administrative Procedure Act requires the court to
vacate the agency’s action”). Under this common
procedure, regulated parties like Chamber members
receive an opportunity to submit a new round of
comments in connection with the agency remand and
obtain the benefit of orderly, transparent agency
decisionmaking in the wake of the instigating
judicial review decision.

By contrast, invalidation-by-interpretation review
acts to short-circuit and muddy up the typical agency
remand process. In response to such an invalidation,

14

an agency may well choose to retain the federal
court’s rewriting of the regulation or to reject it—at
least outside the circuit in which the review decision
was issued. Such an outcome would greatly
prejudice regulated parties by undermining the
regularity of administrative practice, the uniformity
of agency regulations, and the statutory review
scheme enacted by Congress.

Ill. THE NINTH CIRCUIT EXCEEDED ITS
JURISDICTION BY INVALIDATING THE
SILVICULTURAL RULE IN THIS CITIZEN
SUIT.

Here, the Ninth Circuit claimed only to enforce
EPA’s regulation and not to invalidate it. But a
simple examination of the Rule, perusal of the Ninth
Circuit opinion, and comparison between the Rule’s
operation before and after the Ninth Circuit’s review
decision shows without doubt that the Rule has been
nullified.

A. The Silvicultural Rule Unambiguously
Exempts Logging Ditches And Culverts
From NPDES Permitting Requirements.

The Silvicultural Rule distinguishes between
“(sjilvicultural point sources,” which are “subject to
the NPDES permit program,” 40 C.F.R. § 122.27(a),
and “non-point source silvicultural activities,” which
do not require an NPDES permit, id. § 122.27(b)(1).

Specifically, the rule provides in relevant part:
(a) Permit requirement. Silvicultural
point sources, as defined in this section,

are point sources subject to the NPDES
permit program.

15

(b) Definitions. (1) Silvicultural point
source means any discernible, confined
and discrete conveyance related to rock
crushing, gravel washing, log sorting, or
log storage facilities which are operated in
connection with silvicultural activities and
from which pollutants are discharged into
waters of the United States. The term
does not include non-point source
silvicultural activities such as nursery
operations, site preparation, reforestation
and subsequent cultural treatment,
thinning, prescribed burning, pest and fire
control, harvesting operations, surface
drainage, or road construction and
maintenance from which there is natural
runoff.

Id. §§ 122.27(a)-(b)(1) (emphasis added).

In three ways, the Rule establishes that ditches
and culverts draining water from logging roads
“operated in connection with silvicultural activities”
do not qualify as point sources and are hence exempt
from NPDES permitting requirements.

First, the Rule expressly defines the scope of a
“silvicultural point source” in a manner that does not
include drainage ditches and culverts for roads.
Under the Rule, a “discernible, confined and discrete
conveyance[]}”—such as a ditch or culvert—is a
“silvicultural point source” subject to a permit
requirement only if it is “related to rock crushing,
gravel washing, log sorting, or log storage facilities.”
By implication, conveyances not “related to rock
crushing, gravel washing, log sorting, or log storage
facilities” are not “point sources subject to the

16

NPDES permit program.” See, e.g., Leatherman uv.
Tarrant Cnty. Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination
Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 168 (1993) (applying the
expressio unius canon). The Rule thus expressly
defines the scope of silvicultural point sources in a
way that excludes ditches and culverts made for
logging roads.

Second, ditches and culverts for logging roads fall
within the scope of the Rule’s express NPDES permit
exemption for certain categories of conduct dubbed
“non-point source silvicultural activities.” These
exempted activities include, inter alia, “site
preparation, ... surface drainage, [and] road
construction and maintenance from which there is
natural runoff.”

Given the reality of silvicultural operations, the
codified exemptions for “site preparation,” “surface
drainage,” and “road construction and maintenance
from which there is natural runoff’ necessarily
exempt from NPDES permitting all water
management activities associated with rainwater
runoff from logging roads—such as the use of
ditches, culverts, and the like. Since at least the
time of the Romans, road builders have recognized
that well-functioning roads require that rainwater be
drained away from road surfaces and into drainage
ditches. See, e.g., R. STACCIOLI, THE ROADS OF THE
ROMANS 108 (2003) (“[T]he top surface of the
roadway was normally curved or slightly pitched to
allow rainwater to flow toward the drainage ditches
on the sides and to prevent it from stagnating.”).
This drainage requires channeling rainwater away
from roads and nearby areas. Hence, under most
topographical conditions, it is practically impossible

17

to build well-constructed logging roads without also
building accompanying ditches and culverts.

Accordingly, part of properly constructing and
maintaining logging roads is properly constructing
and maintaining ditches and culverts to ensure that
the roads’ inevitable periodic inundation does not
cause a wash out—a fact that the United States itself
recognized before the District Court in this litigation.
See U.S. Amicus Brief, Nw. Envtl. Def. Ctr. v. Brown,
No. 3:06 CV-01270, at 16-17 (D. Or. filed Dec. 6,
2006) [“U.S. D.Ct. Br.”] (“NECD’s interpretation of
section 122.27 ignores the plain language of the
regulation. The regulation refers to ‘road
construction and maintenance. It is practically
impossible to construct and maintain a road without
including systems for the control of precipitation
through ditches, culverts and the like. Otherwise,
the roads would wash out. These structures are an
integral part of forest roads and reading them as
outside the scope of the regulation does not make
sense because it defeats the plain language of the
regulation.”).

Simply put, if building logging-road ditches
always required NPDES permits, then building
logging roads themselves would practically always
require such permits, because the latter can almost
never be properly constructed without the former.
Under that assumption, the Silvicultural Rule’s
express exemption for logging road “construction and
maintenance” would be rendered largely
meaningless. See U.S. D.Ct. Amicus Br. at 16
(accepting NEDC’s “interpretation would render the
second sentence of the rule superfluous”). That
surely is no way to read a regulation. See, e.g., Nati

18

Ass’n of Home Builders v. Defenders of Wildlife, 551
U.S. 644, 669 (2007) (rejecting “reading [that] would
render the regulation entirely superfluous’).

Third, even assuming that the Silvicultural
Rule’s references to “site preparation,” “surface
drainage,” and “road construction and maintenance”
were not sufficient, of themselves, to capture logging-
road ditches, the Rule’s listing of exempted activities
is notably non-exhaustive. The Silvicultural Rule
expressly provides that other activities “such as” the
listed activities are exempted from NPDES
permitting requirements. Indeed, the use of a
phrase like “such as” to introduce the non-exclusive
list of non-point sources is particularly notable in
light of the use of an exclusive list to define
“silvicultural point sources.” Given that ditches and
culverts are part and parcel of preparing sites,
draining surfaces, and constructing and maintaining
roads, drainage from these structures must also be
included within the category of “non-point source
silvicultural activities.” Having adopted a non-
exhaustive list of exempted activities, EPA may not
give the Silvicultural Rule so narrow a reading that
the rule no longer accomplishes its evident purposes.

The upshot is that, even leaving aside the fact
that EPA has always said that the Silvicultural Rule
exempts ditches that direct runoff away from logging
roads—thus precluding EPA from claiming deference
for an interpretive reversal at this late date—the
Rule itself leaves no doubt as to its meaning.

19

B. EPA Cannot Read The Silvicultural Rule
To Mean Something Other Than What Its
Plain Text Says.

Given the foregoing, it is apparent that even EPA
has no discretion to read the Silvicultural Rule as
the Ninth Circuit did. See, e.g., Christensen v. Harris
Cnty., 529 U.S. 576, 588 (2000) (“Auer deference is
warranted only when the language of the regulation
is ambiguous.”) (citing Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452,
461 (1997)). Here, as in Christensen, to “defer to the
agency’s position would be to permit the agency,
under the guise of interpreting a regulation, to create
de facto a new regulation.” 529 U.S. at 588.

Nonetheless, at the petition stage, the United
States refused to acknowledge that the Silvicultural
Rule always unambiguously exempted logging-road
ditches and culverts. Instead, the United States
argued that the Silvicultural Rule is ambiguous, but
that EPA’s position as articulated in its amicus brief
is entitled to deference as to the Rule’s
interpretation. See CVSG Brief at 12. While the
United States ultimately reaches the _ correct
outcome—that the Ninth Circuit erred—its analysis
is plainly wrong. Contrary to the United States’
current position, the Silvicultural Rule contains no
ambiguity.

The United States’ characterization of the
Silvicultural Rule as ambiguous deserves no
deference. At the outset, the question whether a
statute or regulation is ambiguous is for this Court
to decide. “An agency is given no deference at all on
the question whether a statute is ambiguous ....”
Cajun Elec. Power Coop., Inc. v. FERC, 924 F.2d
1132, 1136 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (Silberman, J., joined by

20

Ginsburg, R.B., J., and Thomas, J.); see also Old
Dominion Elec. Coop., Inc. v. FERC, 518 F.3d 43, 48
(D.C. Cir. 2008) (same); Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v.
FDIC, 310 F.3d 202, 205-06 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (same);
see generally Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res.
Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984) (‘If,
however, the court determines Congress has not
directly addressed the precise question at issue, the
court does not simply impose its own construction on
the statute ....”) (emphasis added).

No less importantly, the United States’ shifting
positions in this Litigation undermine any agency
deference that the EPA might otherwise be entitled
to claim. See Christopher v. Smithkline Beecham
Corp., 132 S. Ct. 2156, 2167-68 (2012) (refusing to
defer to an _ interpretation that upended a
“longstanding practice”); INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca,
480 U.S. 421, 446, n.30 (1987) (refusing to defer to an
interpretation due to “the inconsistency of the
positions the [agency] has taken”).

Before the district court, EPA argued, in addition
to a call for deference, that the Silvicultural Rule’s
“language” is “plain” and that the “validity” of the
rule could not be litigated in a “citizen suit.” U.S.
D.Ct. Br. at 10; see also id. at 16-17 (“[RJjeading
[ditches, culverts and the like] as outside the scope of
the regulation does not make sense because it
defeats the plain language of the regulation.”). In
the Ninth Circuit, the United States initially took
the same position: the Silvicultural Rule exempts
logging-road ditches from NPDES permitting
requirements; any challenge to the Rule is
jurisdictionally barred; and, in any event, the EPA is
entitled to deference. See JA Vol. I at 27 (“This rule

21

categorically defines stormwater runoff from forest
roads and harvesting activities as nonpoint
sources.”); JA Vol. I at 28 (“NEDC, having not
challenged the silvicultural rule within the time
frame provided by the statute, cannot now challenge
the rule some thirty years later.”) (discussing
33 U.S.C. § 1369(b)); JA Vol. I at 29 (“Should this
Court nevertheless consider NEDC’s improper and
untimely challenge, this Court should defer to EPA’s
reasonable interpretation of the CWA to not require
regulation of stormwater runoff from forest roads as
point sources.”).

Only in its 2011 Ninth Circuit brief in response to
the panel’s questions did the government perform its
pirouette. In that brief, not only did the United
States newly seek to concede all jurisdictional
objections, it also dropped any argument that the
Silvicultural Rule’s text is plain. Instead, the
government solely argued that the rule is ambiguous
but that the Ninth Circuit should have deferred to
the EPA’s interpretation of it. See JA Vol. I at 53
(“Where EPA promulgates an ambiguous regulation
and (as here) subsequently offers an interpretation of
that regulation in an amicus brief,’ that
interpretation is entitled to a high level of deference
under Auer ....”). The government repeated this
newly minted position in its certiorari briefing. See,
e.g., CVSG Br. at 12.

This Court has recognized that agencies face
perverse incentives propelling them toward crafting
ambiguous rules when they are asked—as they are
every day—to implement statutes through
regulations. See Smithkline Beecham, 132 S. Ct. at
2168 (“Our practice of deferring to an agency’s

22

interpretation of its own ambiguous regulations
undoubtedly has important advantages, but this
practice also creates a risk that agencies will
promulgate vague and open-ended regulations that
they can later interpret as they see fit, thereby
‘frustrat[ing] the notice and predictability purposes
of rulemaking.”’) (quoting Talk Am., Inc. v. Michigan
Bell Tel. Co., 131 S. Ct. 2254, 2266 (2011) (Scalia, J.,

concurring)).

This case illustrates a related danger. Even
where a regulation itself is not ambiguous, an agency
might well strain to manufacture a false, post hoc
ambiguity and thereby create administrative
flexibility that allows the agency to dispense with
notice and comment before effecting regulatory
changes. We see here just such a tidy morality play.
In the proceedings below, the EPA first nobly
resisted and then meanly succumbed to the
omnipresent temptation to claim _ regulatory
ambiguity and the additional degrees of interpretive
freedom that accompany it. The Court should see
the agency’s course of action for what it is—and
respond by ensuring that such efforts to manufacture
artificial ambiguity are not rewarded.

C. The Ninth Circuit’s “Interpretation” Of
The Silvicultural Rule In Fact Invalidates
The Rule.

As this Court unanimously recognized in Duke
Energy, a party cannot “attack ... the validity of [a]
regulation ... in an enforcement proceeding.” 549
U.S. at 572. Duke Energy remanded the Fourth
Circuit decision then under consideration, because
that decision could “only be seen as an implicit
declaration that the PSD regulations were invalid as

23

written.” Jd. at 573. While “no precise line runs
between a purposeful but permissible reading of the
regulation adopted to bring it into harmony with the
[enforcing court’s] view of the statute, and a
determination that the regulation as written is
invalid,” there are cases, such as Duke Energy, where
the only way to describe what the court has done is
invalidation. Id.

A careful review of the Ninth Circuit’s opinion
below confirms that here, as in Duke Energy, the
Court of Appeals outright invalidated the agency
rule at issue. To be sure, the Ninth Circuit
attempted to walk an interpretive tightrope by
drawing a fine distinction between direct runoff from
logging roads—which concededly does not constitute
a point source—and logging-road runoff “channeled
and controlled through a ‘discernible, confined and
discrete conveyance’ in a system of ditches, culverts,
and channels.” Nw. Envtl. Def. Ctr., 640 F.3d at
1079. According to the Ninth Circuit, “challenged
and controlled” runoff, in contrast to direct runoff,
does constitute a point source. See id. But this
proffered distinction, aside from its novelty, runs
headlong into the Silvicultural Rule’s text. It results
in a rule that means something fundamentally
different from what the Rule plainly says.

The ultimate, and acknowledged, rationale for the
Ninth Circuit’s reading of the Rule was the court’s
belief that the Clean Water Act mandates the
tenuous distinction it found itself attempting to
draw. To its credit, the Ninth Circuit forthrightly
acknowledged that its “interpretation” of the Rule
“does not reflect the intent of EPA.” The Ninth
Circuit nonetheless adopted this “interpretation” out

24

of a belief that EPA’s regulation, as written, was an
invalid application of the statute. See, e.g., id. at
1080 (“{[T}here are two possible readings of the
Silvicultural Rule. The first reading reflects the
intent of EPA in adopting the Rule. Under this
reading, the Rule exempts all natural runoff from
silvicultural activities ... irrespective of whether, and
the manner in which, the runoff is_ collected,
channeled, and discharged into protected water. If
the Rule is read in this fashion, it is inconsistent
with § 502(14) and is, to that extent, invalid. The
second reading does not reflect the intent of EPA, but
would allow us to construe the Rule to be consistent
with the statute.”) (emphasis added).

Remarkably, the Ninth Circuit also acknowledged
that its judgment would require the EPA—not even
a direct party to the case—to act affirmatively to
create a new NPDES “permitting process” for
silvicultural activities. According to the Ninth
Circuit:

Until now, EPA has acted on the
assumption that NPDES permits are not
required for discharges of pollutants from
ditches, culverts, and channels that collect
stormwater runoff from logging roads.
EPA has therefore not had occasion to
establish a permitting process for such
discharges. But we are confident, given
the closely analogous NPDES permitting
process for stormwater runoff from other
kinds of roads, that EPA will be able to do
so effectively and relatively expeditiously.

Id. at 1087.

25

While becoming in its own way, the Ninth
Circuit’s candor is fatal to the viability of its decision.
A decision premised on the rejection of “the intent of
EPA” and requiring the creation of a brand new EPA
“permitting process” can hardly be said to be
enforcing—as opposed to invalidating—a preexisting
EPA regime that lacks such a process.

There is at the end of the day no way to read the
Ninth Circuit's decision other than as invalidating
the Silvicultural Rule. The judgment below is
therefore ultra vires and should be vacated. See
Duke Energy, 549 U.S. at 573; 33 U.S.C.

§§ 1369(b)(1)-(b)(2).

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the
Court of Appeals should be vacated and the case
remanded with instructions to dismiss for want of
subject matter jurisdiction.

Respectfully submitted,
ROBIN S. CONRAD ROBERT R. GASAWAY*
RACHEL L. BRAND Counsel of Record
SHELDON GILBERT JEFFREY BOSSERT CLARK
NATIONAL CHAMBER ADITYA BAMZAI
LITIGATION CENTER, INC. AARON L. NIELSON
1615 H Street, NW KIRKLAND & ELLIS LLP
Washington, DC 20062 655 Fifteenth St., N.W.
(202) 463-5337 Washington, DC 20005

(202) 879-5000
rgasaway@kirkland.com

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385015_0744%3A28. Public record. Not legal advice.
