# Amicus Curiae Brief — Arizona Free Enterprise Club's Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett > Briefs, arguments, decisions, and more. URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385015_0642%3A21 ## Record - **Collection:** Supreme Court brief - **Document type:** Amicus Curiae Brief - **Published:** January 1, 2010 - **Citation:** 562 U.S. 1060 ## Text Nos. LO-288, 1-239 IN THE Supreme Const of the Uiited States ARIZONA FREE ENTERPRISE CLUB'S FREEDOM CLUB PAC, et al Petits le Is, \ KEN BENNETT. in his official capacity as Secretary of State of the State of Arizona, et al, Respondents JOHN MCCOMISH, et al. \ KEN BENNETT, in his offteral capacity as Secretary of State of the State of Arizona, et al, > ’ TOPL VFR FL eee Nes eehaliadae® On Writ of Certiorar to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit BRIEF OF THE COMMITTEE FOR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AS AMICUS CURIAE IN SUPPORT OF RESPONDENTS PACT M SMITH ( Drrnmse! of eS | Cree EEE Oe TUN UTM MIcHARL BO ODESANCTIS WATHERING A FALLOW JAMES C CON JENNER & Brock LEP 108M New York Avenue, NW Suite 800 Washington, DE YOO) (2OD) GAY GBOOO psmith. penner com February JU. 201] Afttorneus for Anmncus Curiae l TABLE OF CONTENTS TABLE OF AUTHORITIES INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT ARGUMENT II ARIZONA'S LAW FOSTERS MORE, NOP LESS, COMPETLETPION IN THE MARKETPLACE OF IDEAS A ti ARIZONA'S LAW COMPELLING Competition in baAeculive and Lemslative Elections, Like Competition in the Marketplace, Leads to Better Outcomes The Act Allows Merit. Not Momev. to Determine Outcomes bv Increasing Political Speech Overall SERVES AN ANTE CORRUPTION PURPOSE A 1 The Act Reduces Corporations’ Incentive to Fund Candidates to Obtain Political Access The Act Promotes Pubhe Contidence in Roth Elections and Corporations CONCLUSION ie ty 10 1] TABLE OF AUTHORITIES CASES Bucklev vo Valeo 424 US. 1 Ug se) S416 Caperton vi ATO Massev Coal ine. 1298 Cre VLA’ (Pood) ! Citizens l'nited 1 Federal Fleetion Comaussion, LOS. Ct S76 W010) 1. 4, 06,9 MeConnel! vo Federal Flection Commission. YALE. Supp. 2d 176 (DDC. 20038), ahd in part, SANUS. 938 (2008) |. : i2 McConnell vo Federal Election Commission. S4OU S AR oo. 210,01, 18 Red laon Broadcasting Co. vo Federal Communmeations Commission, 305 US 367 (1969) | 4 Speetrun Sports, Inc vw McQuillan. 506 US 447 (e939) 5 STATUTES Ariona’s Citivens Clean Eleetroms Aet. Ari Rev Stat § 10-940 ef sey OTHER AUTHORITIES Janet M. Box Steffensmerer, Ao J yrnarnc tnalivers of the Role of War Chests in Campaign Strategy, 40 AM. do Pot. Sel 352 (19908) Caampamn Arrance Aetorm, BUPPALO NEWS, Feb. 7, 2011 lo int (itv. Chamber Must Clear Arr. Rebuild Trust, ARIZONA REPUBLIC. Feb. 3. 2011 lo L475 CONG. Ree 43,248 (Apr. 2. zoo) 11 Richard S. Dunham, As Power Shiths. So Do fhe Dollars, BUSINESSWEEK, Apr 23, O07. | Re | Met at ROBERT KO Gore: Frat. MONrY MATTPRS CONSEQUENCES OF CAMPAIGN FINANCE RePORMUIN US) HouUsF ELRC PIONS (199890) | a 10 Bob Herbert, When Democracy Weakens, NY. Times, Feb. 12, 2011 Lo Gallup Poll, Nov 1921, 2OLO, avaeble at http) www pollingreport comvalues. htm li Chery] Korn, Zogby International, Comnauttee for Koonomre Development Qotober Business Leader Study (ct 20OL0), avarladle at http waw-eced org Mages content issues monevinpolitics 20 LO voxbypoll2Ol0 pdt scnssae be OS, BG, 27 Damelle Kurtzleben, 2020 Set Campaign Spending Records, US. News & Wor» REPORT, dan. 7, 2011 | s lan Lovett & Emme lachtblau.l 2’odirreea/ Netreat Draws Anger. INTL HERALD Trin, Feb. 1, 2011 34 15 lL. SANDY MAISEL, RETHINKING Pourrical REFORM. BEYOND SPENDING AND TERM Limirs (1894) lv MEGAN MoOoRF, NATIONAL INSTITUTE ON MONEY IN STATE Poulrics, CLEAN ELECTIONS, ARIZONA 2006 (2008), avatlable at http www followthemoney org press’ ReportView phiml’r oe). Candice J. Nelson, VMonev Matters, 85 AM Pot. Set REV. 2138 Q2001) (book review? PereR Quist, NATIONAL INSTITUTE ON MONEY IN Stare Pottrics, THE Rok oF MONEY AND INCUMBENCY IN| 2007-2005 STATE ELeertons (2010), available af http) www followthemoney org press ReportView phtml?’r=423 Press Release. CED. Semor Business Executes Back Campaign Finance Reform (Oct. 18, 2000). Burt Solomon, Forever Unclean. NATL J.. Mar. 18, 2000. US. Govr ACCOUNTABILITY Orrick, GAO 10-390. CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM EXPERIENCES OF Two STATES THA OFFERED Funt Pustic FUNDING POR POLITICAL CANDIDATES O10) Wrong Cheques, Hodsing Bets A Surge ee Corporate Money for the Democrats, THE ECONOMIST, Sept. TS, 2008 Ww QQ INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE: The Committee for Economic Development CCED” is a nonprofit, nonpartisan, and nonpolitical pubhe pohey organization directed by approximately “00 semor corporate executives and university leaders. Since its inception in 1942. its mission has been to engage the leadership of the corporate community to support poheies that wall) promote economic growth, CED is a leading advocate for business interests on issues ranging from health care to corporate povernance. The business leaders who serve as CED's trustees consistently have supported research, analysis, and advocacy regarding the ground rules for poltical elections. In addition to producing reports and organizing surveys, CED has filed amecus curiae bnefs in MeConnell +. Federal Election Commission, 540 US. 98 (2003), Caperton ve AT. Massev Coal Inc, 129 8S. Ct. 2252 (2009), and Crrvens United 1 Federal Election Commission, 130 8S. Ct. S76 (2010) CED's involvement stems from the conviction that competitive executive and legislative elections, along with an independent judiciary, further the interests of American business In this ammeus curne bmnet. CED seeks to counteract the allegation that pubhe finance triggers, hke those in Arizvena’s Citizens Clean Elections Act, > The parties have consented to the filhng of this bnef No counsel for a party authored this bref in whole or in part, and no counsel or party made a monetary contmbution intended to fund the preparation or submission of this brief No person other than afueus cure or us counsel made a monetary contribution to its preparation or submission ) burden corporate and other donors by compelling them to subsidize “competing” speech. Arivona’s pubhe finance trigger does not limit the expenditures by private individuals or corporations, nor does it compel their speech. Instead, it encourages more speech and more political competition, results that are entirely consistent with the First Amendment. CED's trustees beleve that the real danger here would be a decision invahdating Arizona’s use ot triggers, which would harm corporate interests by reducing genuine electoral competition, promoting an “arms race” mentality in electoral fundraising, and restoring the damaging perception of corruption between politicians and businesses that grew out of the AzScam scandal. Because this issue is eritically important. to businesses in Arizona and around the country, CED respectfully urges this Court not to disturb the carefully cratted public financing system Arizona has developed based on this Court’s prior decisions in this area. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT The interests of the business community are best served not only through robust economic competition but also through open competition in elections for executive and legislative offices. Elections should reflect a capitalist market where the best ideas win, an ideal best realized if more than one candidate can remain truly competitive. The trigger mechanism used in Arizona's Citizens Clean Elections Act, Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 16°940 ef seg.. promotes competition in public elections by providing a meaningful 3 opportunity to compete for candidates who opt to receive public campaign financing in lieu of private funding. The result is a welcome increase in speech, not a limitation on speech. The Act does not limit the speech of any candidate, or discriminate against candidates based on their identity. Nor does it discourage corporations from spending money to express their genuine electoral preferences. To the contrary, the funding trigger counteracts significant concerns about the role of corporations in elections that have only increased since this Court's decision in Citizens l’nited. The American business community suffers from the negative perception that corporate spending corrupts the political process. This problem is exacerbated by the prevailing perception § that donations are made in furtherance of a company’s arms race with competitors to secure political access, rather than to further a genuinely expressive objective. A successful public financing model like Arizona’s creates a compelling alternative to this type of arms race. ARGUMENT 1. ARIZONA’S LAW FOSTERS MORE, NOT LESS, COMPETITION IN THE MARKETPLACE OF IDEAS. The Citizens Clean Elections Act encourages the development and discussion of new ideas by inviting new voices to engage in the political dialogue in Arizona. In so doing, the Act accomplishes the First Amendment's aspiration to “secure the widest possible dissemination of information from diverse and antagonistic sources.” Buckley v. Valeo, 424 4 US 1,49 976). As the Court remarked in Buckles, an effort “not to abridge, restrict, or censor speech, but rather to use pubhe monev to facilitate and enlarge pubhe discussion and participation ino the electoral process” furthers First Amendment values that are vital to a self governing people. Za at 92-98 A. Competition in Executive and Legislative Elections, Like Competition in the Marketplace, Leads to Better Outcomes. This Court's First Amendment jurisprudence is rightfully focused on promoting an “uninhibited marketplace of ideas” Crtivens Unatted vo Fed Mlection Conn n. 180 8. Ct. S78, S96 (2010) (queting Virginia ve Aticks, S89 US. 113, 119 (2003), “Tt is the purpose of the First Amendment to preserve an uninhibited marketplace of ideas in which trath wall ultimately prevail’ and in which that marketplace is not monopolized. See Red Lion Broad vo Fed Commelns Comin, 38988 US. 867, 390 C1969). As business leaders. CED's trustees appreciate the importance of an uninhibited marketplace. it is the freedom of the marketplace that dmves Amerean Ingenuity and success 1n the business sector. Competition is the basis of our. system. ot commerce. Competition produces innovation and Motivation it testers new ideas and advances in technology. It creates wealth. Simply put, business competition is the backbone of our economy. — As business leaders, CED's trustees understand that sometimes the free market fails, and the government must step in te ensure competition. Not too long age, a? the Supreme Court explaimed one such important government regulation the Sherman Antitrust Act “The purpose of the Act is not to protect busimesses from the working of the market. i is to protect the pubhe trom the taillure of the market The law directs itself not oagamst conduct which ts competitive. even severely so, but against conduct which untairly tends to destrov competition itseit” Speetrun Sports, Ine vo MeQuillan, S06 US. 447, 458 (1998) Ttas this umque American approach—a free market svstem where the government works to promote competition that has led to unmatched Ingenuity and commerce in our country Like anv marketplace, the political marketplace must foster competition if woas to thrive. Anvena voters passed the Citizens Clean Elections Act in order to revive ats) political marketplace by encouraging participation in the political process and thereby decreasing the opportunities for corruption See MeConish vo Brewer, 2010 WL 2292218, at *1 (D. Ariz. dan. 20. 2010) The trigger system fosters political competition and pohtical speech ina uniquely efficient manner. In some races, a pubhe financing system in which a candidate receives only a fixed initial distribution fails to provide a realistic alternative to oa privately financed campanutn, because the fixed distribution will be too low to allow a publicly financed candidate to compete: mn other races, such a system will unnecessarily drain the pubhe treasury by giving candidates who opt im more money than they would need to accomplish the Act's woals. Arivena’s public financing trigger avoids this inefficieney through a careful calibration that allows candidates who do not wish to participate ino the i» puble svstem to spend as much as thev want, while at the same time providing a defined and limted amount of additional funding to candidates accepting pubhe financing to ensure that those candidates are not prevented from participating ino the political marketplace bv an opponent’s monopolivation of the UUPWaves The reality of our modern political svstem us that financial resources determine a candidate's ability to communicate a message to the public But ne one has a First Amendment right to have his or her ideas unchallenged. Qur political discourse must be an “open marketplace” Crtrvens Unmrred. 30S) Ct at SS4 When only one candidate has) sutherent financial resources to transmit his or her message broadly, there can be no open marketplace. As they are in the business markets, monopoles are a cancer on political markets The trigger mechanism provided bv the Citivvens Clean Elections Act responds in a narrowly drawn wav to this problem, consistent with the core goal ot the First Amendment. From a corporate perspective, such an agile and cost-effective mechanism is an obviously sound approach By placing neo limuat on one’s ability to spend, the law fosters competition while encouragins more speech about competing ideas and policies B. The Act Allows Merit, Not Money, to Determine Outcomes by Increasing Political Speech Overall. Pubhe finance laws enable ao wider array of individuals to enter mte, and compete im, evecutive - and lemslative elections and the open political dialogue surrounding them = Individuals whe would be Limited by comparatively low personal wealth, or relatively small donor networks, are able to become viable candidates, reaching manv more voters with their message than thev coulda wathout the ard of pubhe finaneing. See Lo SANDY MASEL. RETHINKING POLITICAL REPORM. BEYOND SPENDING AND TRRM Limits 37 (19984) (inding that financial obstacles are “the kev factor” limating potential candidates’ entry decisions) danet Mo Box StefYensmemer, A Ds nesnic Analvsis of the Role of War Chests ino Campaign Srratesv, 40 AM Pot Ser 342 Chea) (presenting evidence that incumbent campainzn “wari chests” deter quahtyv candidates) from running against incumbents) In Amvona, iw ois working more candidates have entered political races there since the advent of publhhe funding In 2OOG, there were 14 pereent more House candidates and 16 percent more Senate candidates than there were in 1989S, the last election before the Aet went into effect MEGAN Moorr, NATIONAL INSTIFUTE ON MONEY INO STATE Poutrics, CLEAN ELECTIONS, ARIZONA 2OOK 2 (2008), avavable at http www followthemoney org press ReportView phtml reas i&ext= 1 Furthermore, even candidates with the abilitv to run viable privately funded campaigns may opt inte public funding programs in order to free themselves from the pressure to tailor their messages to what donors and prospective donors want to hear US GOVT ACCOUNTABILITY OrRICE, GAO TO 390, CAMPAIGN FINANCE RePORM. EAPERIENCRS OF Two STATES THAT OFFERED FULL PUBLIC FUNDING POR POLITICAL CANDIDATES 27 @OTO) (citing, among the s most common reasons candidates stated tor partioipating ino pubhe financing program, “You did not want to feel obligated to special interest groups or lobbvasts.”” “Recewing publi funds allowed vou to spend more time discussing issues.” and “You belbeve the pubhe financing program promotes — the accountability of legislators to the public”) The percentage of legislative candidates participating: in Arnivona’s) public financing system has steadily increased since the Act's passage. from V6 percent in general elections in 2ZOOO to G4 percent in LOOS | Ju at 260 Whatever the purpose tor opting: into a publhe finance program, the result iw more, rather than less, speech Ariwona’s Citizens Clean Elections Act) provides those candidates choosing to opt inte the publhe financing svstem a more meaningtual opportunity to compete in the politeal arena than they would otherwise have. Campaign spending ts on the rise in Arivona, as of as across the country Danielle Kurtzleben, “LOLO Set Campaign Spending Records.” US. News & WoRLD Report, dan 7. 2011 Even after the implementation of the Citizens Clean Elections Aet, total campayin spending has continued to imerease. US GoW r ACCOUNTABILIPY Orrick, GAO LO 890, at 24 By providing pubiely financed candidates with addtional resources as needed based on the political feld, more intormation becomes available to a broader audience allowing the merits of each candidate's positions to drive the debate As this Court recently noted, the abilitw to speak freelv “is an essential mechanism of democracy, for i is the means to hold offictals accountable to the “a people” Ciazens United. 1380 S. Ct at SYS Arnivona’s pubhe funding trigger svstem ensures that entrenched pubhe offierals with whose donor networks few could compete — are subject — to competitive races and thus ultimately held accountable for ther pohev decisions and political stands Incumbents generally: emev oa large advantage oan campaign fundraising: due — to established fundraising and commumention networks, and as such tend to be capable. of outspending their opponents by substantial margins Phas combination is a nearly impossible barrier for political challengers to overcome. In the 2007-2008 state legislative election evele. for example, Incumbents across the country emoved a 4 percent success rate. candidates who emoved the dual advantages oof imeumbency and fundraising dominance produced a success rate of 96 percent PETER QUIST, NATIONAL INstirorke ON MONEY IN STATE Potties, THe Rouk oF Monrey AND INCUMBENCY IN 2OO7 2OOS STATE Errevrions (2010), avevadle at http www followthemoney org press Report View phtml’rs423 Pubhely financed challengers im Arivona, on the other hand, have won between 23 percent and 40 percent of legislative elections in each election vear since LOOO US.) Gover ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO 10 390, at S000 That is because an effective pubhe finaneciay oregame osursmificantly omatiyrates Incumbency advantages bv reducing barriers to challenger entry and therefore promoting genuine competition among ideas and among candidates See senerad/y ROBERT KOGOIDEL ET AL. MONEY MATTERS CONSFQUENCES OF CAMPAIGN FINANCE RERORM IN ld US. Housr ELReTIONS 70-01, 74 76 C999). soe also Candice | Nelson, Money Marters, 99 AM Pow Set REV PIS. VIS (OO) (book review? (noting that sumulations by Godel and his coauthors establish “that some form oof pubhe tunding.” meluding “through matehing funds.” “would help candidates of the minorty party, except at the very lowest levels of funding: ) Thus, the Act serves the First Amendment's fundamental purpose of publhe offieral accountabilitw by providing a meaningful opportunity tor new political vores and ideas to penetrate the dialogue ll. ARIZONA'S LAW SERVES A COMPELLING ANTE CORRUPTION PURPOSE. Bevond promoting open elections and the open exchange of ideas, the Act also provides an umportant constraint on real and perceived corruption. As this Court: recogmized ano MeConrne/, “many. corporate contributions lare! motivated by a desire for access to candidates and oa fear oot being placed at a disadvantage im the legislative process relative to other contmbutors, rather than bv ideological support tor the candidates and parties ~ 540 US at 124 25 In order to remain competitive in the marketplace, business leaders are forced into a veritable arms race of political spending That arms race harms business in two wavs. Directly, the pressure to donate drains corporate treasumes to fund candidates thev may or may not support. Indirectly, the pereetwed guid pro Quo with politiaans damages corporate standing among the Amenmean people Arivona’s law supports corporate interests, and the pubhe interest. bv 11 breaking the permeius evele of reluanee on private funding A. The Act Reduces Corporations’ Incentive to Fund Candidates to Obtain Poltical Access. In order to CHMSUPE BeCess regardless of the pohtical chmate, corporations must contmbute to both parties The competitwwe meed to maintain access to and avoid retribution from elected offers of both parties forces businesses to allocate valuable resources toward the political process Such coercion Is Inconsistent with the genuine expression of ideas. and roinforees the perception—and = often the unfortunate realitw that corporate donations are themselves ultimately business transactions In this environment, corporate campaign donations amount to nothing more than an admussion fee Pohticans openly acknowledge the connection between money and access Senator Carl Levin (D Mich) states “The parties advertise access t's blatant. Both parties doit” 147 CONG Ree. a3.248 (Apr. 2. 2001) To ensure access regardless of the political chmate, corporations must contribute to both parties In the 2000 election evele, 35 of the 50 largest soft} money donors gave to both parties, and 2S of the S0 gave more than $100,000 to both parties See MeConnell, 540 US) at W4 ni? Another netable trend is how corporate political spending tracks changes ain the partisan makeup of lesnslatures For example. in YOO8, business PACS Have SINCV SIN percent of their political donations to Repubheans | See Richard So Dunham. As Power le Shifts, So Do the Dollars, BUSINESSWEEK, Apr. 23, YOO7 Bat Democrats gained control of Congress that vear, and during the next campaign evele, tor the first time in two decades, corporate political donations were split evenly between the parties. See Mrtne Cheques. Hedging Bets A Surge on Corporate Monev for the Democrats, THe ECONOMIST, Sept. 18, 2008) “Darrell West. a vice president of the Brookings Institution, a think tank, says that because many corporations anticipate a victory tor Mr Obama, thev consider their mifts to Democrats an investment in them company’s future” lad As the VMoeConne?// Court recognized, this pattern Is Meonsistent with the genuine expression of ideas The record in MeConne// was replete with examples of cash for access See eg. MeConnel] vo Fed Ekvcaon Commn, 251 F. Supp. 2d 176. 555-60 WDC. 2008, alrdoin par, 540 US. 93 (2008). Declaration oof Gerald) Greenwald, Chairman KE merntus of Umted Airlines and CED trustee, © 12, MoConneld, 540 US. 8S (No 02-1674) CGreenwald Decl”) ClBlusiness leaders beheve—based 9 on expertence and with good reason that access (to politicians} gives them an opportunity to shape and affect governmental decision”). Press Release, CED, Senor Business Evecutives Baca Campaign Finance Reform (ect. 18, 2000) (showing that 75 6 of business leaders beheve political contributions give them an advantage in shaping legislation) The VeConnel/ record also showed the danger ot retribution for corporations that do not participate One Fortune S00) lobbyist deserbed corporate spending on political campaigns inoone simple word 13 “protection” Burt Solomon, Forever Unelean, NAVI Jd. Mar 18, 2000, at S58 C1f vou decline to give. youre taking ao risk of legislative retribution Compantes are scared that on some eritieal issue, thev ll get hosed) [tll happen quickly, in the dead of might") Thais Court also approvingly quoted Mr Greenwald's statement that “[blusiness and labor leaders beheve, based on their experience, that disappomnted Members, and their party colleagues, may shun or disfavor them because they have not contmbuted” MeConnel, 540 US. at WA ns (quoting Greenwald Decl.) The relationship between contmbutions and political access has had a protound effect on how corporations View political contributions = Ao recent poll of SOT business oprmon leaders confirmed that most beheved contributions served a non ideological function Wack of the following comes closest to vour own opumon about why corporate America contributes to pohtical campaigns” To gain aceess to influence the legislative process Da" o To avoid adverse legislative consequences Wha To promote a certarn ideological position LO’ o Chervl Korn, Zogby International, Committee for Kconomie Development October Business Leader Study (et LOL) (poll) results), avarlable at | http www cedorg images content issues monevinpol ics VOLO zogbypoll2OlO pdt, at S The volume of corporate political spending proves the point—for profit orgamivations would hardly allocate scarce resources without some anticipated return. = The histery of poltical corruption ino Arnvona offers a particularly glaring example of the potential for corruption when political contributions turn into business transactions B. The Act Promotes Pubhe Confidence in Both Elections and Corporations. The perception that) corporate donations are made primarily to gain political favor or favoritism undermines the puble’s faith in thew government and in their local and state businesses In a ZO10 Gallup poll, only L2 percent of respondents rated the honesty and ethieal standards of state officeholders ugh or verv high. For business executives, that number was only 15 pereent. Both groups barely eclipsed the approval rating of car salespeople (seven percent). Gallup Poll, Nov. 1921, 2010, avaladle at http) www pollingreport com values htm. The record in this case amply demonstrates why. Before the passage of the Act, Arizona citizens expenenced a string of political corruption scandals, including the V9. AgScam controversy that saw legislators stuffing bribes in gym bags and taking quid pro que donations to support gamblng — legislation MoComush, 611 F.3d 510, 514. Later, then-Governor Symington was forced to resign after being indicted for extorting a pension fund. As the Ninth Correuit 15 stated below, “the State's interest in eradicating the appearance of quid pro quo corruption to restore the electorate’s confidence 1n its system of government ts not ‘illusory, it is substantial and compelling.” a. at 525 (quoting Buck/ev, 424 ULS. at 26°27). Given the history of guid pro quo corruption in Arizona, and the appearance of corruption that noncompetitive, unmatched political donations creates, Arizona had a most compelling interest in enacting pubhe finance triggers. The pervasive behet that there is a “corporate stranglehold on American Democracy” has only increased since this Court's decision ino Citizens l’mted Bob Herbert, “When Democracy Weakens,” N.Y. Times, Feb. 12. 2011 (Cravens United “greatly enhanced the already overwhelming power of corporations in polities. ... When the game is rigged in vour favor, vou win.) see a/so, eg. “Campaign Finance Reform.” BUFFALO NekEws, Feb. 7, 2011 (deseribing the “infamous (Citizens United case that made it even easier for umons and corporations to bribe politicians”): “City, Chamber Must Clear Air, Rebuild Trust,” ARIZONA REPUBLIC, Feb. 3, 2011 (asserting that increased spending permitted by (vozens l'nited has spread “distrust” and “suspicion” between Scottsdale, Arizona residents and the Chamber of Commerce): lan Lovett & Eric Lichtblau, “Political Retreat Draws Anger,” INT'L HERALD TRIB., Feb. 1, 2011 (describing an anti-business protest in which the organizers depicted the target business leaders “as symbols of the ‘unbrndled corporate power that they maintain was loosed by a Supreme Court ruling last vear... .”). 16 American business leaders understand that the perception of corruption hurts their companies’ bottom lines. In a recent poll conducted for CED, two-thirds of business leaders said that the lack of transparency and oversight in corporate political activity puts corporations at legal msk and endangers corporate reputations. See Committee for Economie Development: October Business Leader Study, at 16. This Court has recognized the importance of combating those problems, and the value of effective public financing systems in doing so: “It cannot be gainsaid that public financing as a means of eliminating the improper influence of large private contributors furthers a significant governmental interest.” Buckley, 424 U.S. at 96. Pubhe finance triggers counteract this erosion of pubhe confidence in business. By creating a means to compete without relying on private contributions, such triggers ease both the perception that business interests control the political process and the coercive pressure on corporations to donate. Second, they create a realm free of coercive corporate political donations. The “sleaze ball” perception is bad for the political system, and as leaders of the business community, the CED trustees believe this perception is harmful to American businesses. By fostering competition while permitting unlimited donations outside the public financing program, the triggers in the Arizona law provide a cost-effective way to ensure competitive, free, and fair elections where public confidence in the political system and in corporations is bolstered. Moreover, when public policy decisions appear to be made on the basis of political contributions, 17 business planning becomes less effective, leading to a less efficient and productive economy. See Committee for Economic Development: October Business Leader Study (poll results) at 8-9 (48% of business leaders state that the level of pressure placed on them to make political contributions has increased since 2008, with 28% saying it has “increased a lot”; 29% describe the amount of money solicited as “excessive” and another 22% say it is “high, but not excessive”). Especially in these economic times, such “high” or “excessive” pressure to contribute is an unwelcome drain on corporate resources. As past and present executives of some of the nation’s largest companies, CED's trustees have direct experience with solicitations for financial support from party leaders, elected officials, and the officials’ influential backers. Their experience teaches a_ simple lesson: without innovative regulatory systems, corporate participation in elections is more transactional than ideological. The trigger component of Arizona’s public finance law gives corporations an alternative to a forced pressure to donate. If they truly wish to engage in political speech through campaign donations or independent expenditures, they may do so. But the incentive to coerce corporate political donations is_ greatly decreased. Free speech, free of coercion is the ultimate First Amendment goal. 1s CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons. avucus urges this Court to affirm the decision of the Ninth Cireuit and, In any event, not to restrict the abhaty of Arizona and other states to adopt practical measures designed to promote both open discourse and competition in executive and legislative elections Respeettuily submitted, PAUL MoSMiTH Counse! of Record MICHAL BO DESANCTIS KATHERINE AO PALLOW JAMES Co CON JENNER & BLOCK LLP 1029 New York Avenue, NW Suite 800 Washingten, DC 20001 (DOD) G8Y-GBO00 psnuth@ennercom ~~ February 22, 2011 Attornevs for Amicus Curiie --- Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385015_0642%3A21. Public record. Not legal advice.