# Amicus Curiae Brief — Arizona Free Enterprise Club's Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett

> Briefs, arguments, decisions, and more.

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385015_0642%3A20

## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Amicus Curiae Brief
- **Published:** January 1, 2010
- **Citation:** 562 U.S. 1060

## Text

Nos. 10-238 and 10. ols

In The , :
Supreme Court of the Anited States

ARIZONA FREE ENTERPRISE CLUB'S
FREEDOM CLUB PAC, ef al.,

etitloners,
-

KEN BENNETT, e¢ al.,

Respondents.

¢
JOHN MCCOMISH, et a/.,

Petitioners,

“
KEN BENNETT, et al.,
Respondents.
¢
On Writs Of Certiorari To The United States
Court Of Appeals For The Ninth Circuit
¢

BRIEF OF AMICUS CURIAE
CENTER FOR GOVERNMENTAL STUDIES
IN SUPPORT OF RESPONDENTS
¢
FREDRIC D. WoocHER*
STRUMWASSER & WoOoCHER LLP
10940 Wilshire Blvd., Suite 2000
Los Angeles, CA 90024
fwoocher@strumwooch.com
(310) 576-1233

ROBERT M. STERN
JESSICA A. Ley INSON
MARGARET C. MILLIGAN
HILARY L, _RAU
CENTER FOR GOVERNMENTAL STUDIES
10951 W. Pico Blvd... Suite 120
Los Angeles, CA 90064
jlevinson@cgs.org
(310) 470-6590 x 115

Counsel for Amicus Curiae Center for Governmental Studies

February 2011 *Counsel of Record

OCUOCKLE LAW BRIEF PRINTING OO (S00) 225.6084
OR CALL COLLECT 407) 342 2801

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page
I apaeseausucoressdeusaiiincwanian i
Cf ETRE TE aaa ne eT ORS BROT a lll
Interest of the Amicus Curiae .............c..cecee eee eees 1
NI Ol I i i cc sdnekeneienpmneunaddes 4
(EEE ESE ELAS SSR SE RN ERE SO 8 ONE AE 5
RR RD SII OTA ED RAE AER AEN Dee LO IIE 5

I. This Court Has Found that Public Cam-

Il.

paign Financing Programs Serve Vital
Governmental Interests .........................055

Studies Demonstrate that Public Cam-
paign Financing Programs Serve the
Important Governmental Interests Rec-
IE TF Ge GINIIET nines csv tcncencnicsasscicecese

A. Public Campaign Financing Reduces
the Deleterious Influence of Large
IN cc. tens niwpiebcanscamcceeansasten

B. Public Campaign Financing Promotes
First Amendment Values by Facili-
tating Public Discussion about Elec-
RUIN ncacdsenaxssocbasnalasishavansndeamtuliaiacines teieare

1. Public Campaign Financing Pro-
grams Promote Communication
between Candidates and the Elec-
SEE cticeutsibadsecusbarsesdesnmbiesksasasuuscests

to

Public Campaign Financing Pro-
grams Promote Public Discussion
and Awareness of Political Cam-
III cn cota dacsinannispue siskiamuiadiecntadd anaes

6

10

13

13

ul

TABLE OF CONTENTS ~ Continued
Page

C. Public Campaign Financing Facili-
tates and Enlarges Public Participa-
tion in the Electoral Process ............... 18

1. Public Campaign Financing En-
courages More Citizens to Get
Involved in Political Campaigns.... 19

2. Public Campaign Financing In-
creases the Number and Diversity
of Candidates Who Seek Office ...... 21

D. Public Campaign Financing Frees
Candidates from the Rigors of Fund-
PE lotdsncticccdunndncspustictidasdancenandacscehies 25

EES SCE ONT REE ATR TE LP LP 28

il

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page
CASES
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) ............0....... passim
Caperton v. A.T: Massey Coal Co., Inc., 129
| ____EERRSRERE ettnie aE RC cen 12

North Carolina Right to Life v. Leake, 523 F.3d
274 (4th Cir. 2008), certiorari denied sub
nom. Duke v. Leake, 129 S.Ct. 490 (2008).............. 12

Republican National Committee v. FEC, 487
F.Supp. 280 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (three-judge
court), 616 F.2d 1 (2d Cir.) (en banc) aff’d
mem., 445 U.S. 965 (1980) 5

BRIEFS

Brief of Amicus Curiae Center for Competitive
Politics in Support of Petitioners, McComish
v. Bennett, Nos. 10-238 and 10-239, at 2
PEE © cinievautianntmannenevseacteccinaieeidcsansiiie passim

OTHER AUTHORITIES

Marc BRESLOW ET AL., MONEY & POLITICS IM-
PLEMENTATION PROJECT, REVITALIZING DEMOC-
RACY: CLEAN ELECTION REFORM SHOWS THE
ID CID onc cocesccoccccsncocsasccscsosesouesenes 24, 26

CENTER FOR GOVERNMENTAL STUDIES, LOCAL
PUBLIC FINANCING CHARTS (2007) .........0... ccc cccceceeeee ee 3

CENTER FOR GOVERNMENTAL STUDIES, LOCAL
PUBLIC FINANCING CHARTS (2009) ..................0..008- 1,3

iN

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES —- Continued

Page
CENTER POR GOVERNMENTAL Srupies. MAPPING
PUBLIC FINANCING IN AMERICAN ELECTIONS
Ca Te abet tk nea urbacauocdtuuseuseceiccedinntnul 8
CENTER POR GOVERNMENTAL Stupies. MAPPING
PuRLIC FINANCING IN AMERICAN ELECTIONS
ee an cudwiesccidbinias 3
CENTER FOR GOVERNMENTAL STUDIFS. PUBLIC
FINANCING LAWS IN LOCAL JURISDICTIONS -
em TS ) rc cr rr 3
CENTER POR GOVERNMENTAL STUDIES. STATE
PUBLIC CAMPAIGN FINANCING Laws — SUMMARY
CHARTS (20085)................. LARS Re Os A es cite 3
CENTER POR GOVERNMENTAL STUDIES. STATE
PUBLIC FINANCING CHARTS (2007) ....0000000000000cccccee ee
CENTER FOR GOVERNMENTAL STUDIES. STATE
PUBLIC FINANCING CHARTS (2009) ..00000o.ooo.. ee
CITIZEN CAMPAIGN COMMISSION, Finst REPORT
TO THE City COUNCIL AND CITIZENS OF PorT-
cane det SANE ERTS seh RRURIAS 20
CITIZEN CAMPAIGN COMMISSION, SFCOND BILEN-
NIAL REPORT TO THE CITY COUNCIL AND CITI-
ZENS OF PORTLAND (2009) .................0.... 15, 16, 18, 26
THE CLEAN ELECTIONS INsTITUTS. THE Roap To
Vierory: CLEAN ELeeTIONS SHAPE 2002 AR?-
er catvacnaseckccanukeionne 22

Michael Clyburn, Pudlie Camipaign Financing:
The Path from Plutocracy to Pluralism,

7 SEATTLE J. FOR Soc. Just. 285 (2008)...... Zi. 20.

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES — Continued

Jason B. Frasco, Full Public Fundvig.
An Effective and Legaily Viable Model for
Campaign Finance Reform in the States,

92 CORNELL L. Rev. 733 (2007)......... ae 4 a

SasKA Horwity. Pustic CAMPAIGN FINANCING:
MICHIGAN -— Driving Towarkps ColLarsr”
(2008)

Oe eee Oe Pee eee eee eee eee eee eee eee ee ee eee eee eee eee eee ee eee

Theodore Lazarus, The Maine Clean Election
Act: Cleansing Pudiic Institutions of Private
Money, 34 Covum. dL. & Soc. PRogs. 79

Ee AEST = iis eA ie Ma OE Sas aoe ot te >

STEVEN M. LEVIN, CENTER POR GOVERNMENTAL
STUDIES, KEEPING IT CLEAN: PUBLIC FINANC.
ING IN AMERICAN ELECTIONS (2006) ...00...... i 4

STEVEN M. Levin, CENTER POR GOVERNMENTAL
STUMES, PUBLIC CAMPAIGN FINANCING: Wis-

CONSIN — SHOWING [Ts AGE (2008).....................

JESSICA LEVINSON, CENTER POR GOVERNMENTAL
STUDIES, PUBLIC CAMPAIGN FINANCING _ IN

FLorivpa: A PROGRAM SouRsS (2008) ....00....0........

JdessicA LEVINSON, CENTER FOR GOVERNMENTAL
STUDIES, PUBLIC CAMPAIGN FINANCING: NEW
JERSEY GOVERNOR — WEEDING OvT Bic Money
IN THE GARDEN StaTF (2008) .....

JESSICA LEVINSON, CENTER FOR GOVERNMENTAL
Stupies, PUBLic CAMPAIGN FINANCING: NEW
JERSEY LEGISLATURE — A Pitor Prourer TAkKFs
ig). SA eared nee icattes 2, & 2.

Page

ty
‘fy

14.15

Vil

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES — Continued
Page
JESSICA LEVINSON, CENTER POR GOVERNMENTAL
STUDIES, CAMPAIGN FINANCING IN) NORTH
CAROLINA JUDICIARY: BALANCING THE SCALES
(2009)........ ae ; weak! a oe

MAINE COMMISSION ON GOVERNMENTAL ETHics
AND Enrermon Practices, 2007 Stupy Re-
PORT: HAS Purtic FUNDING IMprovED MAINE
BLECTIONS? (2007) ...............:. ot CEP ECE RES 23, 24, 26

ANNA N. MEYER, CENTER FOR GOVERNMENTAL
Sruptes, Pustic CAMPAIGN FINANCING: MIN-
NESOTA — DAMMING BiG Money IN THE LAND
OF 10,000 LAKES (2008)

ty
St

MoLiy MILLIGAN, CENTER POR GOVERNMENTAL
STUDIES, LOOPHOLES, TRICKS AND FNpD Runs:
EVASIONS OF CAMPAIGN FINANCE LAWS AND A
Move: Law po Brock THEM (2009)... sc ubudlaccicadicall

Moity MIvtuicaAN, CENTER POR GOVERNMENTAI
STUDIES, Pustic CAMPAIGN FINANCING IN AL-
BUQUFERQUE: CITIVENS WIN WITH CLEAN MONEY
ee ED sacs cane esnceensdcdecuuccovee: 4, 8, 16, 26, 27

NeW YORK CITY CAMPAIGN FINANCE BOARD, NEW
YORKERS MAKE THEIR Volce HEARD — A RE
PORT ON THE 2009 ELFeCTIONS (2009)..........19. 21. 24

Hiiary Rac, CENTER FOR GOVERNMENTAL Srup
les, PusBLic CAMPAIGN FINANCING PORTLAND:
SHOULD “VOTER-OWNED Evecrions” SURVIVE?
(2010)...... . AE in op cabin ® aon? ei 1,8,

ty
r >
av

vu

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES — Continued

Page
PAUL RYAN, CENTER FOR GOVERNMENTAL STUD
IFS, Pourticatl. REFORM THAT Works: PUBLIC
CAMPAIGN FINANCING BLOOMS IN| ‘TUCSON
| aA es ee eee eh ene MTS
PAUL RYAN, CENTER POR GOVERNMENTAL Srup.
les, A STATUTE oF LIBERTY: How NEw York
City’s CAMPAIGN FINANCE LAW IS CHANGING
THE Fack oF LOCAL ELFCTIONS (2003)... ..2, 8, 22. 27
PAUL RYAN, CENTER POR GOVERNMENTAL Stup
IES, Deav ON ARRIVAL? BREATHING LiFe INTO
SUFPOLK CouNTY’s NEw CAMPAIGN FINANCE
REFORMS (2003) 2,8
Paul RYAN, CENTER POR GOVERNMENTAL Stub
iss, ON THE BRINK OF CLEAN: LAUNCHING SAN
FRANCISCO'S NeW CAMPAIGN FINANCE Re.
FORMS (2002) 2.8
PAUL RYAN, CENTFR POR GOVERNMENTAL Strup
IFS, Los ANGELES: ELEVEN YEARS oF RF-
PORM: MANY Sticcessrs, MORE TO RE DONE
nr eeerre: Oy fap) ee
ROBERT M. STERN & MOoLuy MiILiiGan, CENTER
FOR GOVERNMENTAL Stupieps, Moprr: Law on
PAYMENTS INFLUFNCING CANDIDATES AND
ELECTED OFFICIALS (2008) s

Ciara Torres-Spellisev and An Weisbard, Wihas
Albany Could Learn from New York City
A Model of Meaningful Campaign Finance
Reform in Action, 1 ALB. Gov'r L. Rev. 194
(2008)...

10,

24

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES — Continued

U.S. GAO, CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM: EARLY
EXPERIENCES OF TWo STATES THAT OFFER FULL
Pusuic FUNDING FoR PotrricaAl CANDIDATES
(2003)...

PETER WooLuury AND Tim, VeERCELLOTT, RUTGERS
EAGLETON INSTITUTE OF PoLwitics, Puriic
ArrTiTupes TOWARD THE CLEAN ELECTIONS
INITIATIVE: MONIPORING STUDY OF THE 2007
New Jersey CLEAN Ecections Pitot PrRovect
(2007)

Page

ro
to

INTEREST OF THE AMICUS CURIAE

The Center for Governmental Studies (CGS) is a
non-profit organization exempt from taxation under
Section 501.¢X%3) of the Internal Revenue Code. CGS’
mussion is to help civic organizations, decision
makers and the media strengthen democracy and
improve governmental processes by providing rigor
ous research, non-partisan analysis, strategie con
sulting and innovative models of pubhe information
and civic engagement.

CGS is uniquely situated to present this brief.
CGS has studied campaign finance laws, with a
specific focus on public campaign financing, for over
twenty-seven vears. Since 1983, CGS has researched,
analyzed and assessed the practical impacts of pubhie
campaign financing programs in twenty-three states
and sixteen local junsdictions throughout the nation.
See, e.g... CENTER FOR GOVERNMENTAL STUDIES, STATE
PUBLIC FINANCING CHARTS (2009) and CENTER POR Gov-
FRNMENTAL STUDIES, Local Pusiuic FINANCING CHARTS
(2009). CGS has published its research in dozens of re
ports’ and drafted several model campaign financing

This brief is filed with the wrntten consent of all parties
No counsel for a party authored this bmef in whole or in part,

and ne counsel! or party funded its preparation or submission
?

See MOLLY MILLIGAN, CENTER POR GOVERNMENTAL STUDIES,
Punic CAMPAIGN FINANCING IN ALBUQUERQUE CrrizeNs WIN WITH
CLEAN Monry Evections (2011) (hereinafter MiuiuiGan, CItTizENs
WIN]: Hicaky Rat. CENTER POR GOVERNMENTAL Stripes, Pusu
CaMPAIGN FYNANCING PORTLAND. SHOULD “Vorrr-OWNED ELECTIONS”
SURVIVE? (2010): dpssica LEVINSON, CENTER POR GOVERNMENTAL
(Continued on following page)

ty

STUDIES, CAMPAIGN FINANCING IN) NORTH CAROLINA JUD TARY
BALANCING THF SCALES (2009) [herernatter LEVINSON, BALANCING
THE ScALES], JESSICA LEVINSON, CENTER POR GOVERNMENTAL
Srupies, PURLIC CAMPAIGN FINANCING IN) FrLokIDA] A PROGRAM
Souks (2008) [hereinafter LevInsON, A PROGRAM SouKS): STEVEN
M Levin, CENTER POR GOVERNMENTAL Stupties, Pustic CAMPAIGN
FINANCING. WISCONSIN | SuHowine Irs Acre (2008) [hereinafter
Levin, Wisconsin!: dessica LEVINSON, CENTES SOK GOVERNMENTAL
Srupiss, PUsBLic CAMPAIGN FINANCING: NEW JPRSEY GOVERNOK -
Wreping Our Bio Money is rar GARDEN Stare (2008) [herein-
afler LEVINSON, NEW JRRSFY GOVERNOR]: Jpsstca LEVINSON,
CENTER FOR GOVERNMENTAL StTuDIFS, Pusuic CAMPAIGN FINANC
ING) New Jrasry Leoistature —- A Pivot Prayecr TAKES OFfr
(2008) jhereinatter Levinson, New Jbesty LeGisharcnr): ANNA
No Meyer, CENTERS POR GOVERNMENTAL Strupirs, Posie Can
PAIGN FINANCING MINNESOTA | DAMMING Big MoNFY IN THR LAND
OF 10,000 LAKES (2008), Sasua Horwitz, CENTER POR GOVERN
MENTAL Sropigs, Pusiac CAMPAIGN FINANCING: MICHIGAN
DRIVING ToWakiS CoLLapsr? (2008), STEVEN MM. LEVIN, CENTER
HOR GOVERNMENTAL STUDIES, KEEPING IT CLEAN: PUsiuic FINANC
ING IN AMERICAN ELPCTIONS (2006) [here mnafter LEVIN, KEEPING IT
CLEAN); Pau RYAN, CENTER POR GOVERNMENTAL STUDIES, Pour
cAL Rerorm Tuat Works) Pusnic CAMPAIGN FINANCING BLOOMS
IN Teeson (2003) (hereinafter RYAN, PUBLIC CAMPAIGN FINANCING
Brooms ino Tucson’; Paut Ryan. CENTER POR GOVERNMENTAL
Stupti¢s, A SvArUTF OF Liserkry:) How New York Citys CAMPAIGN
FINANCE LAW IS CHANGING THE Fack OF LOCAL ELPecTions (2003)
[hereinafter Ryan, A Strarcte op Linerty], Paut RYAN, CENTER
POR GOVERNMENTAL Stupiss, Dean ON ARRIVAL? BREATHING List
INDO SUPPOLAK COUNTY'S NeW CAaMPpalcon FINANCE REPORMS (2003)
thereafter Ryan, Deap ON Arnivat) Paul RYAN, CENTER POR
GOVERNMENTAL Stupies, On THE Brink oF CLEAN LAUNCHING
SAN FRANCISCO'S NEW CAMPAIGN FINANCE REPORMS (2002) [here-
inafler RyAN, ON THE BRINK OF CLEAN]: and Patt RYAN, CENTER
POR GOVERNMENTAL Stopes, Los ANGELES ELEVEN YPRARS oF
REeORM MANY Sttocesses, Morr po ke Done (2001) [herematter
Ryan, ELEVEN Years oF Reeors) All publications by the Center
for Gevernmental Studies are available online at http.
publications egs org

3

laws. CGS publishes an annually updated online
chart of state and local public financing laws and
provisions,’ as well as an online map of jurisdictions
with public campaign financing laws.” Based on its
research, CGS has concluded that pubhe campaign
financing laws promote public dialogue and involve
ment in the electoral process.

The present case concerns the constitutionality of
Arizona's pubhe campaign financing law, and specifi
cally the “trigger” clause in that law that provides
additional matching funds under certain circum-
stances. Therefore, this case directly implicates the
campaign finance interests and activities of the
amicus. This bref is meant only to elucidate the

* See MouLy Minuican, CENTER POR GOVERNMENTAL STUDIES.

LOOPHOLES, TRICKS AND END RUNS: EVASIONS OF CAMPAIGN
FINANCE Laws AND A Moper. Law to Block THEM (2009). Roserr
M Stern & MOLLY MILLIGAN, CENTER POR GOVERNMENTAI
Srupirs, Mopert Law ON PAYMENTS INFLUENCING CANDIDATES AND
ELECTED OFFICLALS (2008)

* CENTER POR GOVERNMENTAL Stupies, Srarke Pustuc FINaANc
ING CHARTS (2009). CENTER POR GOVERNMENTAL STUDIES, Local
PUBLIC FINANCING CHARTS (2009); CENTER POR GOVERNMENTAL
Srumes, State Purtic FINANCING CHARTS (2007); CENTER POR
GOVERNMENTAL STUDIES, Local PUBLIC FINANCING CHARTS (2007),
CENTER POR GOVERNMENTAL Stupiss, Pusuic FINANCING Laws IN
LOCAL JURISDICTIONS — SUMMAKY CHART (2005), and CENTER POR
GOVERNMENTAL StTupips, Srats Purtic CAMPAIGN FINANCING LAWS
~ SUMMARY CHARTS (2005)

* CENTER POR GOVERNMENTAL Srupirs, MAPPING PURLIC
FINANCING IN) AMERICAN ELECTIONS (2009) and CENTER FOR
GOVERNMENTAL Stumes, Marring PoRtic FINANCING IN AMERICAN
Eieerions (2007)

practical benefits of public campaign financing laws
in general. This amicus brief offers facts and argu-
ments not likely to be advanced in either Party's
filings, in an effort to assist the Court in its analysis

and decision.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

For three and a half decades, this Court has
recognized the fundamental importance of public cam-
paign financing programs to this nation’s democracy.
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1( 1976). Far from failing to
serve the important governmental goals articulated
in Buckley, as argued by amicus Center for Competi-
tive Politics (“CCP”), voluntary public financing pro-
grams on every level of government directly serve
those interests by: lessening the negative effects of
private campaign contributions; promoting and en-
larging public debate and participation in electoral
processes; and reducing the burden of private fund-
raising. The claim of CCP that there is a “lack of
evidence that [public campaign financing] laws bene-
fit the political system or reduce corruption” (Brief of
Amicus Curiae Center for Competitive Politics in Sup-
port of Petitioners, MeComuish v. Bennett, Nos. 10-238
and 10-239, at 2 “CCP Amicus”)) flies in the face of
substantial evidence to the contrary.

t

CCP attempts to justify this sweeping claim based on a
cursory discussion of only three jurisdictions: Arizona, Manne,
and New Jersey. CCP fails to address the sigmificant body of
(Continued on following page)

The purpose of this amicus brief is to highlight
for the Court the constitutional, beneficial impacts
that voluntary public campaign financing programs
have had throughout the nation. This brief explains
why public campaign financing laws with and with-
out matching funds provisions have a_ significant
history of serving governmental interests long found
to be important by this Court.

«

ARGUMENT
Introduction

More than thirty years ago, this Court in Buckley
upheld the constitutionality of public campaign
financing programs. Buckley remains the Court’s only
thorough examination of the constitutionality of such
programs. In Buckley, this Court correctly identified
important governmental interests served by volun-
tary public campaign financing programs.

evidence regarding the positive effects of the public financing
programs in these three jumsdictions or the dozens of other
jurisdictions that have implemented public financing programs
over the last forty years. CGS, on the other hand, bases its
conclusions on ever twenty-seven years of experience studying
public campaign financing programs in thirty-nine jurisdictions.

"In 1980, this Court summarily affirmed an en banc
decision of the Second Circuit upholding the constitutionalty of
the presidential public campaign financing program in Republi.
can National Committee v. FEC, 487 F Supp. 280 (SD.NLY
1979) (three-judge court), 616 F2d 1 (2d Cir) (en bane) aff'd
mem., 445 U.S. 955 (1980)

6

Over more than three decades, dozens of states
and localities have followed the Buckley holding by
enacting voluntary public campaign financing pro-
grams. Studies, academic research, and actual candi-
date experience demonstrate that voluntary public
campaign financing programs serve the important
governmental interests identified in Buckley: they
reduce the deleterious impact of large campaign con-
tributions on the political process; promote speech by
facilitating discussions about candidate campaigns;
increase public participation in the electoral process;
and reduce the burdens of private fundraising.

1. This Court Has Found that Public Campaign
Financing Programs Serve Vital Govern-
mentai Interests

In the Court’s seminal decision in the area of
campaign finance reform, this Court unequivocally
upheld a senes of statutes that created a voluntary
public campaign financing program for Presidential
election campaigns. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 85. The
public campaign financing program at issue in Buckley
provided taxpayer funds for party nominating con-
ventions, as well as for primary and general election
candidate campaigns. /d.

Buckley remains this Court’s only thorough
analysis of the constitutionality of public campaign
financing programs. The Court emphatically stated
that “Congress enacted |presidential public campaign
financing] in furtherance of sufficiently important

7

governmental interests....” Jd. at 95. Buckley held
that the voluntary Presidential public campaign
financing program was “a congressional effort, not to
abridge, restrict, or censor, but rather to use public
money to facilitate and enlarge public discussion and
participation in the electoral process, goals vital to a
self-governing people.” Jd. at 92-93 (emphasis added).
It concluded that the program “furthers, not abridges,
pertinent First Amendment values.” /d. at 93.

The Buckley Court noted that in enacting volun-
tary public campaign financing, “Congress was legislat-
ing for the ‘general welfare’ to reduce the deleterious
influence of large contributions on our political pro-
cess, to facilitate communication by candidates with
the electorate, and to free candidates from the rigors
of fundraising.” Jd. at 91. In the jurisdictions where
these programs have been enacted, these principles
have guided legislators and citizens, who have rati-
fied voluntary public campaign financing programs
with their votes.

* This Court found that public campaign financing was a
proper mechanism for reducing the burden on candidates that
comes “from the rmgors of soliciting private contributions.”
Buckley, 424 U.S. at 96.

8

II. Studies Demonstrate that Public Campaign
Financing Programs Serve the Important
Governmental Interests Recognized by this
Court

Relying on this Court’s decision in Buckley,
dozens of jurisdictions have enacted voluntary public
campaign financing programs. See CENTER FOR GOV.
ERNMENTAL STUDIES, STATE PUBLIC FINANCING CHARTS
(2009) and CENTER FOR GOVERNMENTAL STUDIES, LOCAL
PUBLIC FINANCING CHARTS (2009). CGS has extensively
studied and published detailed reports on the public
campaign financing programs in many of these juris-
dictions.” The evidence presented by CGS demon-
strates that, in practice, these programs do serve the
interests identified in Buckley as furthering the
values of the First Amendment.

There are two types of public campaign financing
programs: full public campaign financing programs
(a.k.a. “clean money” programs) and partial public
campaign financing programs. In both types of pro-
grams, candidates first qualify by raising a small num-
ber of initial qualifying contributions from private

* See MILLIGAN, CITIZENS WIN, supra note 2; RAv, supra note
2; LEVINSON, BALANCING THE SCALES, supra note 2; LEVINSON,
A PROGRAM Sours, supra note 2; LEVIN, WISCONSIN, supra note 2;
LEVINSON, NEW JERSEY GOVERNOR, supra note 2; LEVINSON, NEW
JERSEY LEGISLATURE, supra note 2; MEYER, supra note 2; Hor-
WITZ, supra note 2; RYAN, PUBLIC CAMPAIGN FINANCING BLOOMS IN
TUCSON, supra note 2; RYAN, A STATUTE OF LIBERTY, supra note 2;
RYAN, DEAD ON ARRIVAL?, supra note 2; RYAN, ON THE BRINK OF
CLEAN, supra note 2; and RYAN, ELEVEN YEARS OF REFORM, supra
note 2.

9

donors. In full public campaign financing programs,
qualifying candidates then receive a lump sum of
public funds to run their campaigns. In partial public
campaign financing programs, qualifying candidates
receive a match of public funds for the subsequent
private contributions they raise. The ratio of that
match varies by the jurisdiction. In both full and
partial public campaign financing systems, the juris-
diction may provide participating candidates with
additional funds based on expenditures by opponents
or independent groups.

Amicus CCP claims that there is an “absence of
any evidence” regarding the benefits of public cam-
paign financing laws (CCP Amicus at 4), ignoring
dozens of CGS reports and other academic research
that demonstrate such programs do in fact serve im-
portant governmental interests. These studies, based
on actual electoral experience over more than three
decades, provide clear evidence that public campaign
financing programs at all levels of government pro-
mote each of the important government interests
specifically identified by this Court in Buckley. First,
public campaign financing reduces the deleterious
effects of large campaign contributions. Second, pub-
lic campaign financing promotes and increases public
discussion. Third, public campaign financing pro-
motes public participation in elections. Fourth, public
campaign financing frees candidates from the consid-
erable burden of private fundraising. This amicus
brief discusses each of these important governmental

10

interests and demonstrates how each is specifically
served by public campaign financing

A. Public Campaign Financing Reduces
the Deleterious Influence of Large Con-
tributions

Amicus CCP fails to credit evidence that public
campaign financing systems reduce reliance on pmvate
contributions and increase the importance of smail-
dollar donors, thus providing a realistic alternative to
the corrupting potential of large private contmbnu-
tions. Ciara Torres-Spelliscy and An Weisbard, Wha?
Albany Could Learn from New York Citv: A Made!
f Meaningful Campaign Finance Reform in Action,
1 ALB. Gov't L. Rev. 194, 243 (2008). “Only public
funding can eliminate the special access afforded large
donors by those who rely upon them a political sur-
vival.” Theodore Lazarus, The Maitie Clean Election
Act: Cleansing Pubiic Institutions of ics Money,
34 Cotum. J.L. & Soc. Progs. 79, 128 (2000). Cand-
dates and members of the electorate have both stated
that public campaign financing programs can reduce
the potentially corrupting infingnee of money on the
political process, and that the programs have indeed
reduced the pernicious influence of private campaign
money on politics, notwithstanding the conclusory
claims of CCP to the contrary. CCP Amicus at 2, 5.

In New Jersey. for instance, Assemblywoman
Amy H. Handlin stated that without the public cam-
paign financing program, “!slome politicians would go

11

back to trading favors and votes in the never-ending
pursuit of campaign cash.” and that the result would
be that “ordinary voters would be marginalized again.”
LEVINSON, NEW JERSEY LEGISLATURE, supra note 2, at
17. Similarly, former New Jersey State Senator
William Schluter stated that with public campaign
financing, contributors are forced to influence peliti-
cians with their arguments. not their checks, and
that New Jersey's system of public campaign finane-
Ing Was “a gant step in changng the sturma that
New Jersey's political landscape has a ‘For Sale’ sign
on it.” Jad,

In Los Angeles. Councilmember Jan Perry re-
ported that the citw’s public campaign financing
“reduced [her] need to appeal to a particular special
interest group.” Perry further stated that the public
campaign financing program allowed her to rely more
on individual denations that came “without the spe-
cial interest strings.” RYAN, ELEVEN YEARS OF REFORM,
supra note 2, at 22

In Maine, the public campaign financing program
contributed to a decrease in the “aggregate levels of
direct-to-candidate pmvate contributions, one of the
mast powerful avenues of monetary influence in the
political system.” Jason B. Fraseo, Ful! Public Fund-
ing: An Effective and Legaliv Viable Model for Cam-
paign Finance Reform in the States. 92 Commer. L.
Rev. 733, 746 (2007). Overall, the public campaign
financing program “helped reduce Maine's elected offi-
cials’ dependence on large campaign donors. resulting
ina more effective and unencumbered democracy.” Jd

12

Stated another way, “(bly reducing the influence of
large contmbutions, [Maine's] Act reduces the increas.
ingly disproportionate influence of those able to make
such contributions and is thus more consistent with
the ‘one person, one vote’ ideal.” Lazarus, supra, at 79.

In 2002, North Carolina adopted a system of full
pubhe campaign financing for Court of Appeals and
Supreme Court candidates. The enactment of North
Carolina’s law was motivated by a fear that private
contributions toa judicial candidates would threaten
the imtegmty and independence of the judiciary — a
tear that this Court specifically recognized as a legit-
imate government concern in Caperion v. AT Massey
Coal Co., Ine., 129 S.Ct. 2252 (2009). North Caro-
lina’s program reduced the influence of private con-
tributions by making it unlawful for pubhely funded
candidates to raise more than 35 pereent of their
campaign funds in private contributions.” LEVINSON,
BALANCING THE SCALES, supra note 2, at 26.

* Notably, Nerth Carolina’s law contains a tngger similar
to the one at issue in this case That tngver provision was
upheld by the Fourth Circuit in North Carolina Right to Life:
Leake, 523 F3d 274 (4th Cir. 2008), oeveoran detied sud nom
Duke v Leake, LYS Ct 490 (D008)

13

B. Public Campaign Financing Promotes
First Amendment Values by Facilitating
Public Discussion about Elections

Additionally ignored by amicus CCP is the extent
to which voluntary public campaign financing pro
motes, facilitates and enlarges pubhe discussion
about the electoral process. Communication between
candidates and the electorate, and puble discussion
of elections generally, is enhanced in jurisdictions
that have enacted these programs This Court has
desembed the goal of enhancing public discussion
about the elections as “vital to a self-governing peo
ple.” Bucklev. 424 U.S. 92-93. The evndence demon-
strates that this goal is met in many jurisdictions
after voluntary public campaign financing programs
have been adopted. These are precisely the values the
First Amendment was designed to protect.

1. Public Campaign Financing Programs
Promote Communication between
Candidates and the Electorate

Once candidates qualify for public campaign
financing. the public funds thev receive either free
them from having to raise additional funds altogether
un full public campaign financing systems) or sup-
plement the funds they raise trom private contmbu-
tors Un partial public campaign financing systems)
Under either system, participating candidates consis-
tently report that public campaign financing enabi s
them to spend less time fundraising and more time
directly interacting with all of their constituents, not

l4

merely the narrow band of individuals (inside and
outside of the district) who can provide significant
financial support

CGS research shows that the 1985 partial public
campaign financing program) enacted in) Tucson,
Anzona, tor instance, facilitated increased contact
and discourse with the electorate. RYAN, CAMPAIGN
FINANCING BLOOMS IN TUCSON, supra note 2. at 14-16
Kathleen Detrick, former City Clerk of Tucson, stated
that “|Candidates] find that they [have to] go out
there pounding the streets and talking to people
about issues in order to get them to [ve a small-
dollar quahfving contributien).” Ja at 15. Echoing
that sentiment, Councilman Steve Leal reported that
the program “forces the candidate to have to talk toa
whole lot more people.” Jd

Candidates also reported increased discussion
with members of the electorate in New Jersey, which
experimented with a full public campaign financing
program in selected lemslative districts for general
elections in 2005 and 2007. Former New Jersey State
Assemblyman Bill Baron, who ran as a_ publicly
financed candidate, said the program was “the single
best thing [he had ever) participated im in politics.”
Levinson, New JERSEY LEGISLATURF, supra note 2, at
17. Barom highhghted that pubhe campaign financ-
ing gave him the freedom to interact fully with vot-
ers. Jd. at 17. Assemblywoman Amy H. Handlin, who
participated in the 2005 program, echoed Baron's

lo

sentiment, saying that the program put an emphasis
on face-to-face contact. /d. at 19-20."

The public campaign financing program in Port
land, Oregon is yet another example of a program
that facilitated candidate communication with the
electorate. In 2006, the Portland City Council decided
to experiment with a full pubhe campaign financing
program for candidates for citywide office. In 2008, all
six candidates who participated in Portland’s Cam-
paign Finance Fund reported that their participation
increased their opportunities to communicate directly
with voters. CITmeN CAMPAIGN COMMISSION, SECOND
BIENNIAL REPORT TO THE CiTy CoUNCIL AND CITVENS
OF PORTLAND (2009) (hereinafter Srconp BIENNIAL
Reporr}) at 16-17. Commissioner Amanda Fritz, for
instance, told the Portland Citizens Campaign Com-
mission, “Because I didn’t have to dial for dollars,
I had more time to try to meet as many Portlanders
as possible.” Jd) at 16. City Council candidate Jett

Despite (or perhaps ygnering) this evidence, CCP exphert
ly ates New Jersey's pilot program as a fatlure CCP Amicus at
67 CCPH's incorrect assertions about New Jersey's program have
been rebutted by Yale Professor Don Green, whe served as an
expert witness for Respondent. Professor Green, who has spent
decades studying Amencan politics and the election system in
particular, has testified that the two studies cited by CCP in
their Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals Anucus Bnet were “tunda-
mentally flawed and cannot support the purported conclusions ~
Declaration of Donald Green in Support of Defendant-Intervenor
Clean Elections Institute, Inc’s Opposition to Phantfls’ and
Maintift-Intervenors’ Motien for Summary Judgment, MeCornish
v. Bennett, No 08-1550, (9th Cir July 17, 2009)

16

Bissonette reported that the process of gathering
small qualifving contributions led to “some pretty
senious conversations [with voters].” Bissonnette em-
phasized that, because of the public campaign finane-
ings program, his communication with voters “|was
not} about the money. It was about the issues. It was
about the policies and the politics.” Jd. at 17."

CGS also found that the public campaign finance-
Ing program in Albuquerque, New Mexico, increased
interaction between participating candidates and the
electorate. Matt Brix, Policy Director of the Center for
Civic Policy, noted that in the 2009 city election,
Albuquerque's second election with public campaign
financing, “[thhe campaign consisted more of retail
politics — meet and greets, mailers, town hall meetings
with groups of voters, radio spots.” MILLIGAN, Crt
ZENS WIN, supra note 2, at 26. Councilor M. Debbie
O'Malley, an incumbent who ran as a publicly funded
candidate in 2007, echoed that sentiment, stating
that with public funding, “vou do a lot more outreach
and the voters have a lot more ownership of the
election process, because many of them have given
$5 to help get a candidate qualified.” Jd. at 23.

The Portland City Council adopted a pubhe campanrn
financing program in 2005 on a short-term basis; it was sched-
uled to sunset in ZOLO In 2010, durnng the midst of the reces-
sion, Portland voters narrowly declined to renew the program

4

ly

2. Public Campaign Financing Pro-
grams Promote Public Discussion
and Awareness of Political Cam-
paigns

In addition to increasing the discourse between
candidates and the electorate, public campaign finane-
ing programs facilitate and enlarge public discussion
more generally by increasing pubhe discussion and
awareness of electoral campaigns and specific can
didates

According to a 2007 poll by the Eagleton Institute
of Politics, voters in districts in New Jersey that
offered public campaign financing received more in-
formation about the elections from a greater vanety
of sources, including campaign literature, radio and
television ads, and news articles than voters state
wide." PETER WooLLEY AND ‘TIM VeRCELLOTTI, RUTGERS
EAGLETON INSTITUTE OF POLiTics, PUBLIC ATTITUDES
TOWARD THE CLEAN ELECTIONS INITIATIVE: MONITORING
Stupy oF THE 2007 New Jersey CLEAN ELECTIONS
Pitot PrRovrer (2007) at 17-21. Seventy percent of
voters in “clean elections districts” reported that they

* The Eagleton Institute poll found that among hkely voters
in New Jersey “clean elections” distncts, 82 percent received
campaign matenals in the mail, 55 percent received information
about legsiative races from radio or television advertisements,
and 74 percent received information about the legislative races
from news articles: Among likely voters statewide, 49 percent
received campaign materials in the mail, 43 percent received in-
formation from radio er television ads, and 56 percent received
information from news articles

18

had heard either “quite a lot” or “some” about the
legislative races in their districts compared with only

37 percent of voters statewide. Ja.

CGS found similar results in Portland. City Coun-
cil candidate Jim Middaugh explained that “| public
campaign financing] generated a lot of conversation
in the community ... [T]here isn’t anything else in
our civic fabric that gets people talking to one another
about City issues.” SECOND BIENNIAL REPORT, supra,
at 17

Some public campaign financing programs also
help foster a larger discussion about elections and
candidates by requiring candidates to debate each
other as a condition for accepting public funding."
Debates give voters additional opportunities to learn
about their local candidates’ political views and
qualifications.

C. Public Campaign Financing Facilitates
and Enlarges Public Participation in
the Electoral Process

Public campaign financing programs help to in-
crease public participation in two other fundamental
ways. First, public campaign financing promotes citi-
zen involvement in political campaigns by increasing

“ The public financing programs in Anzona, New Jersey,
Austin, Los Angeles, New Haven, New York City, and San
Francisco, for example, include provisions for candidate debates

19

the number and diversity of contributors. Second,
public campaign financing increases the number and
diversity of candidates who seek public office. This
impact has been repeatedly shown in various studies
that amicus CCP does not — because it cannot — rebut.

1. Public Campaign Financing Encour-
ages More Citizens to Get Involved in
Political Campaigns

Giving campaign contributions is one way for
members of the electorate to get involved in the
electoral process. In localities and states with public
campaign financing programs, there has typically
been an increase in the number and diversity of small
donations by candidates’ constituents.

For instance, Arizona adopted publhe campaign
financing in 2000, and the number of contmbutors
to Arizona gubernatorial campaigns more than tri-
pled from 1998 to 2002. LEVIN, KEEPING IT CLEAN,
supra note 2, at 11. New York City’s public campaign
financing program, in existence since 1988, has also
encouraged new donors to become involved in politi-
cal campaigns: in each of the last three city election
cycles, over half of the individuals who contributed to
city campaigns were first-time donors. NEW YORK Crry
CAMPAIGN FINANCE Boarkbp, NEw YORKERS MAKE THEIR
Voice Heard — A REPORT ON THE 2009 ELECTIONS
(2009) at 104-105. After Portland implemented a pub-
lic campaign financing program in 2005, participating
candidates reported an increase in the number of

20

individuals who made donations to their campaigns.
CITIZEN CAMPAIGN COMMISSION, FIRST REPORT TO THE
City COUNCIL AND CITIZENS OF PORTLAND (2007)
(hereinafter FiksT REPORT] at 19-20. Publicly funded
candidate Chris Iverson described Portland’s public
campaign financing program as a “tool of inspiration
to get people re-involved with politics,” explaining
that the implementation of public campaign financing
brought “people into the political process ... ” /d.
at 20-21.

Public campaign financing programs not only
lead to an increase in the number of small campaign
contributors, they also encourage political participa-
tion in the form of political donations across a more
geographically diverse cross-section of the electorate.
Publicly financed candidates in Portland’s 2006 elec-
tion, for example, relied on much broader and more
geographically diverse donor bases than their private-
ly funded opponents. Privately financed candidates
received most of their donations from downtown
Portland and a few other wealthy neighborhoods,
while publicly financed candidates relied on dona-
tions from all different areas of the city. FIRST REPORT,
supra, at 19-20.

New York City’s public campaign financing pro-
gram has had similar effects on the geographic dis-
tribution of campaign contributions. Historically, a
majority of contributions to New York City campaigns
have come from Manhattan donors, despite the fact
that Manhattan residents make up less than a quar-
ter of the city’s total population. However, since New

21
York City implemented its partial public campaign
financing program, it has seen a trend toward greater
geographical balance. Between 2001 and 2009, Man-
hattan’s share of contributions dropped from 68
percent to 53 percent. By contrast, Brooklyn’s and
Queens’ combined share of contributions rose from 25
percent in 2001 to 43 percent in 2009. Donor activity
increased almost six-fold in Flushing, a heavily Asian-
American neighborhood that is home to Queens’
Chinatown. NEW YorRK City CAMPAIGN FINANCE BOARD,
supra, at 109-110.

2. Public Campaign Financing In-
creases the Number and Diversity
of Candidates Who Seek Office

Public campaign financing programs are also
specifically designed to facilitate public participation
in the electoral process by encouraging more individ-
uals to run for public office, thus adding more speech
to the public discourse. “Public funding encourages
more candidates to seek public office by providing
them with the necessary means to communicate their
messages effectively.” Lazarus, supra, at 79.

In Arizona, for instance, there was a 24 percent
increase in the number of candidates participating in
the primary when one compares the first full elec-
tion after the implementation of public campaign
financing with the last year prior to the implementa-
tion. Michael Clyburn, Public Campaign Financing:
The Path from Plutocracy to Pluralism, 7 SEATTLE J.

22

FOR Soc. Just. 285, 302 (2008), citing THE CLEAN
ELECTIONS INSTITUTE, THE ROAD TO VicTory: CLEAN
ELECTIONS SHAPE 2002 ARIZONA ELECTIONS (2002). In
New York City, the combination of making additional
public funds available to run electoral campaigns and
implementing term limits drew record numbers of
candidates for city office in 2001. RYAN, A STATUTE OF
LIBERTY, supra note 2, at 21. In Arizona, the public
campaign financing system “encouraged some candi-
dates who would not have otherwise run for office,
particularly women, to run.” Frasco, supra, at 758. In
addition, a report by the U.S. General Accounting
Office (now known as the Government Accountability
Office) on the public campaign financing programs in
Arizona and Maine found that 55 percent of partici-
pating candidates considered public campaign financ-
ing a “great” or “very great” factor in their decision to
run for office in 2000. U.S. GAO, CAMPAIGN FINANCE
REFORM: EARLY EXPERIENCES OF TWO STATES THAT OF-
FER FULL PUBLIC FUNDING FOR POLITICAL CANDIDATES
(2003) at 4.

In addition to attracting a greater number of can-
didates, public campaign financing also encourages a
broader, more representative range of candidates to
seek public office. With the aid of public campaign
financing, candidates who do not have an existing
network of private contributors have an opportunity
to effectively convey their message to members of the
electorate. For example, Los Angeles City Council-
member Ed Reyes stated that the city’s public cam-
paign financing was crucial to his successful run for

23

office in 2001. RYAN, ELEVEN YEARS OF REFORM, supra
note 2, at 23. “[As a first generation American,] I don’t
have the traditional ties to the power groups or the
power structure. I literally came from the neighbor-
hood. Without public financing, I knew that I wouldn’t
have been able to throw a stone like in the David and
Goliath story. I probably would have been throwing a
pebble. With public financing, I knew I had a shot.”
Id. Similarly, Portland Commissioner Amanda Fritz
reported that the burden of fundraising would have
dissuaded her from running for office in 2008 had
public financing not been available. Fritz said, “I am
not very good at asking for money ... and I don’t
think that being good at asking for money should be a
prerequisite for serving on the City Council.” RAu,
supra note 2, at 12.

According to a 2006 survey by the Maine Commis-
sion on Governmental Ethics and Election Practices,
87 percent of first-time candidates who participated
in the state’s public financing program reported that
the availability of public funding was “very important
to their decision to run for office.” MAINE COMMISSION
ON GOVERNMENTAL ETHICS AND ELECTION PRACTICES,
2007 Stupy Report: HAS PUBLIC FUNDING IMPROVED
MAINE ELECTIONS? (2007) at 1. Such evidence directly
contradicts the contention that “government funding
goes to candidates who have already shown political
skill in the traditionally funded system.” CCP Amicus
at 8.

Public campaign financing programs also allow
more female and minority candidates to competitively

4

run for oMee. In Arizona, the number of Native
American and Latino eandidates nearly tripled be
tween 2000 and 2002 with the implementation of
public campaign financing. RYAN, KEEPING IT CLEAN,
supra note 2, at 7. Arizona's pubhe campaign finane
Ing system also encouraged more women to run tor
office. Fraseo, supra, at 758, citing Marc BRESLOW
er at., Money & Pouttics IMPLEMENTATION Provret,
REVITALIZING DeMocRACY: CLEAN ELecTION REPORM
Shows THE Way Forwarp (2002) at 25. In New York
City, minority representation on the City Council has
increased steadily since pubhe campaign financing
was implemented in 1989. Torres-Spellisey and Wets-
bard, supra, at 226. In POOL, the combination of
increased pubhe tunding and term limits resulted in
“an even more diverse group of candidates [for City
Couneil! than has tymeally been seen in the erty, in
cluding the emergence of new immigrant voices from
the Asian-American and Russian-American communt-
ties, AMong others.” LEVIN, KEEPING IT CLEAN, supra
note 2, at 7 In 2009, New York voters for the first
tume elected a majority of minority candidates to the
City Council New York Civy CAMPAIGN FINANCE
BOARD, supra, at 142. In Maine, 71 pereent of female
candidates who participated in the state’s public cam
paign financing program said that the availability of
public funding was “very important” to their decision
to run for office. MAINE COMMISSION ON GOVERNMEN
TAL ETHICS AND ELECTION PRACTICES, supra, at 1.

D. Public Campaign Financing Frees Can-
didates from the Rigors of Fundraising

“The ‘money chase’ is perhaps the most severe
pubhe harm intheted by [our current] campaign
finance regime. " Lavarus, supra, at 128. “When
candidates and elected oMeals spend the overwhelm
ing majority of their time on tundraising activities,
they inevitably spend the majority of ther time
addressing the concerns of donors.” Jd at 129. Accord-
ingly, state and local governments have an munportant
government interest in freeing candidates from the
rigors of fundraising.

Evidence trom academic studies and CGS reports
clearly shows that public campaign tinancing: pro
grams further an important governmental interest by
freeing candidates from the burden of “dialing tor
dollars.” “By freeing candidates from the time
consuming rigor of fundraising, any pubhe campaign
financing program will leave more time available for
public campaign financing-funded candidates to
debate the issues and interact with voters.” Clyburn,
supra, at 3808. CCP, however, does not reference and
Wives NO weight to the experiences of pubhely funded
candidates, even though actual candidate experiences
provide ample evidence that public financing programs
serve this important goal.

In Maine, for imstance, as a result of its voluntary
public campaign financing program, “candidates and
elected officials report that they are now able to spend

sigmiticantly more time reaching a larger number of

*s,°*
a

constituents instead of focusing on potential large
donors.” Frasco, supra, at 740. see also BRESLOW FT
AL. supra, at 26) MAINE COMMISSION ON GOVERNMEN
TAL ETHics AND ELECTION PRACTICES, supra, at 1
Similarly, publicly financed candidates im Arizona
spent more time with voters and less time fiund-
raising. Clyburn, supra, at 3138

The same phenomenon occurred in Portland,
Oregon. City Council candidate John Branam reported
that “[voters] appreciated the fact that [pubhe cam-
paign financing) afforded me the opportunity to spend
more time talking about the issues as compared to
dialing for dollars.” SECOND BIENNIAL REPORT, supra,
at 16-17. City Council candidate Charles Lewis lhke-
wise stated that the public campaign financing pro
xram “allowed me to spend more time reaching out
directly to voters and not to big money interests | was
able to spend the vast majority of my time meeting
and talking with the people of Portland, not seeking
large donations * /d

CGS tound that as a result of Albuquerque's 2005
public campaign financing law, candidates in that city
sang the praises of a system that allowed them to
spend more time meeting with all constituents, not
just those who could save campaign contributions
Incumbent Councilor Isaac Benton commented that
“there was a by difference (running as a participat-
ing candidate}, Not having to fundraise — 1 had more
time to focus on the issues.” MILLIGAN, CITIZENS Win,
supra note 2, at 32. Further, Councilor Dan Lewis,
Who suceesstally ran as a publhely funded challenger

cp™

im YOUR, stated, “LT like that the election was issue
onmented and there was no added pressure of fund
TAISINg. . I was able to focus on the message and
the issues rather than the fundraising.” Jd) at 32

CGS research shows that voluntary pubhe cam
paygn financing helped to alleviate the burden of
private fundraising ino other jurisdictions, as well,
including New York City and Tucson. Ryan, ASrarure
OF LIBERTY, supra note 2, at 20; Ryan, Pusuic Cam
PAIGN FINANCING BLOOMS IN TUCSON, supra note 2, at
19. As iw other jurisdictions, the Dacson program
allowed incumbents more time to lemslate because
less time was spent fundraising. Ja.

ee ee

yQ

~*

CONCLUSION

The expenence of the many jurisdictions that
have unmplemented pubhe campaign financing pro
grams demonstrates that such programs further the
values of the First Amendment ‘This powerful evi
dence supports the constitutionahty of such = pro
grams, Just as the Court found the program at issue
In Buckley to be constitutional, For the foregoing
reasons, We urge this Court to reaffirm the legislative
purposes, importance and constitutionality of pubhe
campaign financing programs, and to affirm the
holding of the Ninth Cireuit Court of Appeals
Respectfully submitted,

FrREpRIC D Woockes

STRUMWASSER & WoockeR LLP
ROBERT M. STERN

Jessica A. LEVINSON

MARGARET C.) MILLIGAN

Hinary L Rav

CENTER POR GOVERNMENTAL STUDIFS

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385015_0642%3A20. Public record. Not legal advice.