# Respondents Brief — Shell Oil Co. v. United States (Nos. 07-1607, 07-1601)

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Respondents Brief
- **Published:** January 1, 2009

## Text

alte Fe -ssome Us

\\v Nos. 07-1601 and 07-1607 err
1601 07-1 Océ , 2 2008
In Whe OF THE CLERK
Joupreme Court of the Anite States

BURLINGTON NORTHERN & SANTA FE RAILWAY
COMPANY, UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD COMPANY,

Petitioners,
V.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al.
*

SHELL O11. COMPANY,

Petitioner,
V.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al.
*

On Writs Of Certiorari To The United States
Court Of Appeals For The Ninth Circuit

¢

BRIEF FOR THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
°

EDMUND G. BROWN JR.
Attorney General of the State of California
JAMES HUMES
Chief Assistant Attorney General
MANUEL M. MEDEIROS
State Solicitor General
GORDON BURNS
Deputy Solicitor General
KEN ALEX
Senior Assistant Attorney General
Counsel of Record
DONALD A. ROBINSON
Supervising Deputy Attorney General
ANN RUSHTON
JANILL L. RICHARDS
Deputy Attorneys General
1515 Clay Street, 20th Floor
P.O. Box 70550
Oakland, CA 94612-0550
Telephone: (510) 622-2137
Fax: (510) 622-2270
Counsel for the State of California,
Department of Toxic Substances Control

COCKLE LAW BRIEF PRINTING CU (800) 225-6964
UR CALL COLLECT (402) 342-248)!

Ja

eu"

QUESTIONS PRESEN'TED

1. Whether the court of appeals correctly af-
firmed the district court’s determination that peti-
tioner Shell Oil Company is liable under Section
107(aX(3), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a\(3), of the Comprehen-
sive Environmental Response, Compensation, and
Liability Act of 1980 (“CERCLA”), 42 U.S.C. § 9601 et
seq., as an entity that arranged for disposal of haz-
ardous substances.

2. Whether the court of appeals properly held
petitioners Shell Oil Company and The Burlington
Northern and Santa Fe Railway Company and Union
Pacific Railroad Company jointly and severally liable
under CERCLA for the response costs of the United
States and California governments, based on the
court’s determination that neither petition’r satisfied
its evidentiary burden of providing a reasonable basis
to apportion liability.

ll

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page
iio sear vasdeannasecnuadiinnsonnbipebeiaiibn 1
Be II cc avncesnosnacnacencedennnnnessnnnsonsen 19
cintetntnibdiiateccrenercipinmeqennemajninninniitin 23

I. Shell arranged for disposal of a hazardous
substance and therefore is a liable party

i iccidinticsesennsecinenidipteeveniadiinaneds
A. Arranger liability under CERCLA is

B.

broadly construed based on the facts
surrounding the transaction.................

An entity is liable as an arranger when
it knows that disposal of a hazardous
substance is an inherent and inevita-
ble part of the transaction.....................

Shell is liable as an arranger under
CERCLA because it owned the hazard-
ous substance, arranged the proce-
dures for the transfer, and knew that
disposal on delivery was an inevitable
result of its arrangements.....................

Shell’s reading of arranger liability is
contrary to CERCLA’s broad scheme....

1. Arranger liability under CERCLA
does not require a specific intent to
dispose of hazardous waste..............

2. The Solid Waste Disposal Act’s defi-

nition of “disposal,” does not limit
CERCLA arranger liability..............

23

25

26

28

32

32

Il.

ill

TABLE OF CONTENTS — Continued

Page

While liability under CERCLA may be
apportioned based on evidence of divisibil-
ity of harm, the Railroads and Shell failed
to establish a factual basis for apportion-

A. The court below applied the proper
standards of review ..............ccceeceeeeseeeees

B. Because the Railroads and Shell pre-
sented no evidence on divisibility of
harm, the record is insufficient to sup-
port a reasonable basis for apportion-
EF I decienenstenstcctianiinnpidaptarmeres

1. While liability under CERCLA gen-
erally is joint and several, a respon-
sible party may establish that
liability may be apportioned consis-
tent with the Restatement’s com-
mon law principles ...........................

2. Apportionment is appropriate where
a responsible party can show dis-
tinct harm, successive injuries, or
divisible harm, except where injus-
tice to plaintiff will result ................

3. The Railroads and Shell introduced,
and the record contained, no evi-
dence to support apportionment......

a. There is no basis in the record
to apportion the Railroads’ li-
SE siccpicaliciicicnnpsniabaibbagictaimadiladdaicituiopire

36

36

38

38

41

48

iv

TABLE OF CONTENTS -— Continued
Page

b. There is no basis in the record to
apportion Shell’s liability ........... 53

c. By taking equity into considera-
tion, the district court wrongly

conflated apportionment of harm
with allocation of damages......... 58

a 60

Vv

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Page
CASES
3550 Stevens Creed Associates v. Barclays Bank
of California, 915 F.2d 1355 (9th Cir. 1990).....27, 31
Akzo Coatings, Inc. v. Aigner Corp., 881
F. Supp. 1202 (N.D. Ind. 1994)... 42, 43
AM Int'l, Inc. v. International Forging Equip.
Corp., 982 F.2d 989 (6th Cir. 1993) 0.00.2... 31
Amcast Indus. Corp. v. Detrex Corp., 2 F.3d 746
CAE FID pan ccnicnncntnutionssninnndibinnutensciisiaciiaianiiiainin 30, 31

Anderson v. Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564 (1985) ....... 37
Ass’n of Battery Recyclers, Inc. v. United States

EPA, 208 F.3d 1047 (D.C. Cir. 2000)....................... 35
Aviall Servs., Inc. v. Cooper Indus., Inc., 312

ey EE SI iicccscccnsccnenunenisepebbdadiibatadiaetai 38
Cadillac Fairview/Cal., Inc. v. United States,

41 F.BG GES (Otin Car. 1GD4}) .......cccccccccccccccccccscosccscees 25
Carson Harbor Village, Ltd. v. Unocal Corp.,

BIO F.BS SSS COCR CAw. BOOT) .nccccccccsccccsccccescsccscccccesses 5
Catellus Dev. Corp. v. United States, 34 F.3d

TEI, SINE sic nsccescsennstabinistiapntasaibeniemeiadl 26, 27
Chem-Nuclear Systems, Inc. v. Bush, 292 F.3d

ee Wa I in icnscnsnnctipnaicundgisnuiiiaieialanas 5, 6, 46
Coeur D’Alene Tribe v. Asarco, Inc., 280 F. Supp. 2d

1094 (D. Idaho 2003)......................eeeeee 43, 55, 56, 57

Cooper Industries, Inc. v. Aviall Services, Inc.,
Se rs re PEs ccnsccnccnnctdesselasdncdieumiadienael 6, 38, 59

vi

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES — Continued
Page

Courtaulds Aerospace, Inc. v. Huffman, 826
F. Supp. 345 (E.D. Cal. 1993) ...............eeeeeeeeeeee 21, 27

Dayton Indep. School Dist. v. United States
Mineral Products, Inc., 906 F.2d 1059 (5th

EEE ESSE SDR AU RO 31
Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co. v. City of Lodi, 302

I I, ED. ss cia cmmmnannntndeseneseccoess 5
Florida Power & Light Co. v. Allis Chalmers

Corp., 893 F.2d 1313 (11th Cir. 1990).............000..... 20
Florida Power & Light Co. v. Allis Chalmers

Corp., 85 F.3d 1514 (11th Cir. 1996).........0..0.......... 27
Freeman v. Glaxo Wellcome, Inc., 189 F.3d 160

ENE SON 25, 27
General Electric Co. v. AAMCO Transmissions,

Inc., 962 F.2d 281 (2d Cir. 1992)................0.. cece. 31
In +. Bell Petroleum Servs., 3 F.3d 889 (5th Cir.

Slits eedinihiieianateacnitietnciinemtesbtbntnecedsannesenee passim
Kamb v. United States Coast Guard, 869

F. Supp. 793 (N.D. Cal. 1994) .................ceeeseseeeeeeees 43
Mathews v. Dow Chemical Co., 947 F. Supp.

Sa scscelliesnenssenesane 20

Metro. Water Reclamation Dist. of Greater
Chicago v. North American Galvanizing &

Coatings, Inc., 473 F.3d 824 (7th Cir. 2007)........... 20
Morton Int'l v. A.E. Staley Mfg. Co., 343 F.3d
G69 (Sd Cir. ZOOS).............ccccccccccccoese 24, 25, 26, 27, 34

O’Neil v. Picillo, 883 F.2d 176 (1st Cir. 1989)...... 41, 46

vil

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES — Continued

Page
Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1
iti haa aiid iailallaiaeititasiaheideaisiieinvetapensii 3
Pneumo Abex Corp. v. High Point, Thomasville
& Denton R.R., 142 F.3d 769 (4th Cir.) .............0.... 25
Redwing Carriers, Inc. v. Saraland Apartments,
94 F.3d 1489 (11th Cir. 1996)........... eee eceeeeees 26
South Florida Water Mgmt. Dist. v. Montalvo,
84 F.3d 402 (11th Cir. 1996)... ee eeee eens 25
United States v. Aceto Agricultural Chemicals
Corp., 872 F.2d 1373 (8th Cir. 1989) .............. passim
United States v. Alcan Aluminum Corp., 990
IE Ca vciicsicticnisnnctsmiseniucesscénushabet 5, 46
United States v. Alcan Aluminum Corp., 964
I, cela cedeepenneanenat 7
United States v. Atlantic Research Corp.,
US. ef SL _, : RROD Te EOT NT 59

United States v. Bestfoods, 524 U.S. 51 (1998)...... 3, 20
United States v. Broderick Investment Co., 862

Bie I OEE GED GAINS BPE cecccesisecccsscndccssescisocvesesen 43
United States v. Burlington N. R.R. Co., 200

NS a
United States v. Chem-Dyne Corp., 572

F. Supp. 802 (D.C. Ohio 1983) .................... 38, 39, 40
United States v. E.l. DuPont De Nemours &

Co., 432 F.3d 161 (3d Cir. 2005)...................cecceeeee eee 7

United States v. Hercules, Inc., 247 F.3d 706
I IED cisccistivinesnceisainiidiinindianinniadisselpadiasepndaiaiid passim

Vill

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES — Continued

Page
United States v. Kayser-Roth Corp., 910 F.2d 24
5 LED at are SPer aie NON COON 5
United States v. Monsanto Co., 858 F.2d 160
ll 5, 6, 38, 47, 58
United States v. Rohm & Haas Co., 2 F.3d 1265
EI SIRS AT AR CURR RT aT eS 6, 58
United States v. Shell Oil Co., 294 F.3d 1045
acetal lalallala ital 20, 26
United States v. Taylor, 487 U.S. 326 (1998)............. 37
United States v. TIC Inv. Corp., 68 F.3d 1082
ET ann a eee” eae ee ear ES 26
United States v. Township of Brighton, 153
F.3d 307 (6th Cir. 1998) ..................csssscsseceeeoes passim
United States v. Township of Brighton, 282
en I I se cc tcurespmaibonenens 22
Zands v. Nelson, 779 F. Supp. 1254 (S.D. Cal.
LPS RE A CRO ae el Ne aOR ee SUERTE 35
STATUTES
42 U.S.C.
TT RON enien ee tere 24, 33, 35
TEMPERA aN SEO MIE Rr Tn 35
RTT LASS BME SO SS SIRES Ee 24, 33, 35
ECT TERT RON EEE TT 4
A eae aren Menem EHErenS Cv 6, 59
EE tee ee meer passim

ix

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES — Continued

Page
TT i oii ennnsisnddennebeeieanininstekinsasinsneeillal 10
iii csc anceiedeipeibdeleneisasctniboniibaniibing 10, 25
ssc cade sc onindcredcsebosimaiiosichanesiedadoentiinenenlail 4
a a eesanleleseumeianeieiennn 4
SIN hit setchiniietiashnnnssetinainbenapteenimbideetiinteahebiganiaanid 6
ST isidindensdnteeverisnederestoctpnsnartynensetnenieel 6, 13, 59
ERT ae aOR 6, 59
California Health and Safety Code
a senihithlllaneme min enublinil 3
in nicisuced deh paemnblkaimbdimbiewecisimabinbtanaienaindeiniiii 3
Sita heinrich a bangrigtendebasiebonsininemidnninsiaeatnniinabintl 3
§ 58009.......... isliesigpnsbiehdiaaigietelittidedundinbaniipsadnmiibiiniaadiaiaieas 4
CouRT RULES
EL, SiiICTTID 1 winssnsosesecdeanpuntsonedediiiasaspnucditinnant 56
OTHER AUTHORITIES
I a cicnicinsicdiniasgiancitonnintbuomendsinnensoniibaens 4
126 Cong. Rec. H11787 (Dec. 3, 1980) ................. ee 39
126 Cong. Rec. S14964 (Nov. 24, 1980)................00... 39
H.R. Rep. No. 253, 99th Cong., lst Sess., pt. 3
SRN SEE CRA NS A a De EE 3
Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1613 ..........0 ee 3
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 433A............... passim

Restatement (Second) of Torts § 433B........... 40, 47, 58

x

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES — Continued

Page
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 434.......0...00000..0.c.... 37
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 875......................0... 40
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 881...................000000- 39

Webster’s Third New International Dictionary
a TUITE ccscscnescvsiesisioseseennenctousesnssionooed 33, 34

1

STATEMENT

The Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation, and Liability Act (“CERCLA”) author-
izes states and the United States to take prompt
action to protect the public and the environment from
the harm caused by the release or threatened release
of hazardous substances into the environment.
Rather than requiring that costs associated with
these actions be borne by the government and ulti-
mately the taxpayers, CERCLA authorizes states and
the United States to recover their cleanup expenses
from the parties responsible for the contamination.

As of March 31, 1998, the Department of Toxic
Substances Control of the State of California (“Cali-
fornia”) had expended more than $400,000 to clean up
hazardous substances in the soil and ground water at
a former agricultural chemical storage and distribu-
tion facility in Arvin, California, and the United
States Environmental Protection Agency had spent
significantly more. (Pet. App. at 158a-59a, 230a-31a.)'
The operator of the facility, Brown and Bryant, Inc.
(“Brown and Bryant”), is now insolvent and defunct.
The governments brought cost-recovery actions
pursuant to CERCLA Section 107(a), 42 U.S.C.
§ 9607(a) against The Burlington Northern and Santa
Fe Railway Company, and Union Pacific Railroad

' Unless otherwise noted, all references to “Pet. App.” are to
the appendix in the petition for a writ of certiorari filed by
petitioners The Burlington Northern and Santa Fe Railway
Company and Union Pacific Railroad Company.

2

Company (“Railroads”), which owned the western
portion of the facility during a period when releases
occurred, and Shell Oil Company (“Shell”), which sold
and arranged for the shipment of large quantities of
chemicals that, as Shell was well aware, were rou-
tinely spilled during delivery at the facility. After a
bench trial, the district court found the Railroads
strictly liable under CERCLA as owners of the facility
at the time of disposal (Pet. App. 187a) and Shell
strictly liable as having arranged for the disposal of
hazardous substance. (Jd. at 218a.)

The district court declined to impose joint and
several liability on the Railroads or on Shell, though
it noted that as a result of their “‘scorched earth,’ all-
or-nothing approach to liability,” neither “offered
helpful arguments to apportion liability.” (Ud. at
236a.) Instead, the court “independently” created a
set of calculations based on a series of assumptions,
assigning 9% liability to the Railroads and 6% liabil-
ity to Shell, leaving the governments to bear 85% of
their cleanup costs. (Jd. at 237a, 252a, 256a.)

The court of appeals affirmed in part, holding
that Shell was strictly liable as an “arranger” due to
its control over, and knowledge of, the chemical
transfer process and resulting disposal through
leaking and spilling, and reversed in part, holding
that the Railroads and Shell did not establish suffi-
cient facts to support apportionment and therefore
were jointly and severally liable. (Pet. App. 1a-57a.)

3

1. Congress enacted CERCLA in 1980 in re-
sponse to the serious environmental and health
dangers posed by property contaminated by hazard-
ous substances. United States v. Bestfoods, 524 U.S.
51, 55 (1998). The two goals of CERCLA, as amended
by the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization
Act of 1986 (“SARA”), Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat.
1613, are “to provide for clean-up if a hazardous
substance is released into the environment or if such
release is threatened” and “to hold responsible parties
liable for the costs of these clean-ups.” H.R. Rep. No.
253, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 3, at 15 (1985). Con-
gress broadly defined the categories of parties poten-
tially liable for the cost of such cleanups. ““The
remedy that Congress felt it needed in CERCLA is
sweeping: everyone who is potentially responsible for
hazardous-waste contamination may be forced to
contribute to the costs of cleanup.” Bestfoods, 524
U.S. at 56 n.1 (quoting Pennsylvania v. Union Gas
Co., 491 U.S. 1, 21 (1989) (plurality opinion.)).

California, through its Department of Toxic
Substances Control,’ is authorized to clean up sites

* The Department of Toxic Substances Control (“DTSC”) is
an environmental enforcement agency of the State of California
authorized under the California Hazardous Substance Account
Act to respond to the release or threatened release of hazardous
substances and to imminent or substantial endangerments
to the public health, safety or the environment (see California
Health and Safety Code §§ 25300 et seg.), and to recover
costs expended on such activities under state or federal law.
Cal. Health & Saf. Code §§ 25358.3, 25360; Cal. Health & Saf.

(Continued on following page)

4

contaminated by hazardous substances. See 42 U.S.C.
§ 9604(d). California may then recover its response
costs from responsible parties through an action
under CERCLA Section 107(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a).

To establish a prima facie case under CERCLA
for recovery of its costs, California must establish
four elements: (1) a “release or threatened release” (2)
of a “hazardous substance” (3) from a “facility” (4)
which “causes the incurrence of response costs.” 42
U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4). California must then establish
that a defendant falls within at least one of the four
enumerated classes of responsible parties: (1) the
owner and operator of a facility, (2) the owner or
operator of a facility at the time of any disposal of a
hazardous substance, (3) any person who arranged
for the disposal or treatment of hazardous sub-
stances, or (4) any person who accepts any hazardous
substances for transport to disposal or treatment
facilities. 42 U.S.C. §9607(a). Except for narrow
defenses specifically defined at 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b),
responsible parties are strictly liable for all response
costs incurred by the federal or state government that
are not inconsistent with the national contingency
plan. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4).°

Code § 5/009, as added by Gov. Reorg. Plan No. 1 of 1991 (May
17, 1991); 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a).

* The national contingency plan, which specifies procedures
for preparing and responding to contamination, is codified at 40
C.F.R. pt. 300.

5

Courts of appeals consistently have held that
CERCLA liability is joint and several, except where a
responsible party can prove that the harm is divisi-
ble. See, e.g., Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co. v. City of Lodi,
302 F.3d 928, 945 (9th Cir. 2002); Chem-Nuclear
Systems, Inc. v. Bush, 292 F.3d 254, 260 (D.C. Cir.
2002); Carson Harbor Village, Ltd. v. Unocal Corp.,
270 F.3d 863, 871 (9th Cir. 2001); United States v.
Hercules, Inc., 247 F.3d 706, 717 (8th Cir. 2001);
United States v. Township of Brighton, 153 F.3d 307,
318 (6th Cir. 1998); United States v. Alean Aluminum
Corp., 990 F.2d 711, 721-22 (2d Cir. 1993); United
States v. Kayser-Roth Corp., 910 F.2d 24, 26 (1st Cir.
1990); United States v. Monsanto Co., 858 F.2d 160,
167, 171-72 (4th Cir. 1988).

In analyzing divisibility of harm in CERCLA
Section 107(a) actions, the lower courts have followed
the Restatement (Second) of Torts, which provides
that damages may be apportioned amongst responsi-
ble parties where a party establishes either distinct
harms or divisibility resting on a “reasonable basis
for determining the contribution of each cause to a
single harm.” Restatement (Second) of Torts § 433A;
see, e.g., Monsanto, 858 F.2d at 171-72; In re Bell
Petroleum Servs., 3 F.3d 889, 895-97 (5th Cir. 1993);
Brighton, 153 F.3d at 318; Hercules, 247 F.3d at 717.
Responsible parties have the burden of demonstrat-
ing divisibility by evidence that is “concrete and
specific.” Hercules, 247 F.3d at 717-18. When respon-
sible parties cannot prove distinct harms or divisibil-
ity, joint and several liability governs, and each party

6

is liable for the full amount of the costs incurred.
Chem-Nuclear, 292 F.3d at 260-61; Monsanto, 858
F.2d at 172-73; Hercules, 247 F.3d at 717-19.

At the liability stage, apportionment of responsi-
ble parties’ liability to the government for environ-
mental cleanup costs must be based on proof of
divisibility of harm; equitable considerations are
relevant only in the contribution stage where a court
may allocate damages amongst parties held responsi-
ble for the contamination. Parties subject to joint and
several liability for reimbursement of cleanup costs
may seek contribution from other responsible parties
under Section 113 of CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9613.
Contribution is available to parties that have re-
solved their liability to the United States or a state or
that have been sued under Section 106 or 107 of
CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9606, 9607. 42 U.S.C.
§ 9613(f(3)(B); Cooper Industries, Inc. v. Aviall Ser-
vices, Inc., 543 U.S. 157, 165-66 (2004). In any contri-
bution phase of litigation, which involves allocation
only amongst responsible parties, the courts consis-
tently have held that equitable considerations may be
taken into account. 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(1) (in contri-
bution action, court may allocate response costs
among liable parties using equitable factors that
court determines are appropriate); see Hercules, 247
F.3d at 718; Brighton, 153 F.3d at 318-19; Bell Petro-
leum, 3 F.3d at 901. Considerations of fairness as
between responsible parties are not, however, proper at
the liability stage. See United States v. Rohm & Haas
Co., 2 F.3d 1265, 1280-81 (3d Cir. 1993), overruled on

7

other grounds by United States v. E.I. DuPont De
Nemours & Co., 432 F.3d 161, 162-63 (3d Cir. 2005)
(en banc); United States v. Alcan Aluminum Corp.,
964 F.2d 252, 270 n.29 (3d Cir. 1992).

2. In 1960, Brown and Bryant commenced
operation of an agricultural chemical storage and
distribution business on a 3.8-acre parcel (the “B&B
parcel”). (Pet. App. 85a.) In 1975, Brown and Bryant
expanded its operations by leasing a 0.9-acre parcel
owned by the Railroads that adjoined the B&B parcel
to the west (the “Railroad parcel”). (/d.) Brown and
Bryant ceased operating the facility in 1988 or 1989;
the company is now insolvent. (/d. at 83a-84a, 129a.)

The Brown and Bryant facility stored and dis-
tributed numerous chemicals, including the Shell
products D-D and Nemagon (soil fimigants contain-
ing hazardous substances), and non-Shell products,
including various pesticides and the weed killer
dinoseb. (Pet. App. 88a.) During their transfer and
storage, and in the course of maintaining and clean-
ing out equipment, hazardous chemicals routinely
spilled and leaked onto both parcels. (Jd. at 92a-96a.)
Brown and Bryant “used the leased [Railroad] parcel
as part of its total agricultural chemical operations.”
(Id. at 86a.) Spills and leaks on the Railroad parcel
occurred when, for example, gauges on D-D rig tanks
broke (which taey “regularly” did when a hard wind
blew), causing “the contents of a half-filled tank” to
“slowly spill on the ground” (id. at 9l1a-92a); employees
rinsed out mobile “nurse” tanks or checked their filters,
or the nurse gauges broke (id. at 92a); employees

8

transferred D-D to two-ton “bobtail” trucks (id. at
93a); employees washed chemicals off the warehouse
apron and hosed out the warehouse (id. at 94a); and
drums of stored material leaked to the ground. (Jd. at
95a.) Wherever it was located, “the corrosive D-D
caused rubber seals on pumps and valves to fail
suddenly and unexpectedly, causing big leaks.” (/d. at
115a.) Spill and leaks on the B&B parcel occurred in
similar ways (see, e.g., id. at 92a, 11la (rinsing out
“nurse” tanks on a “wash rack”)) and, in addition, in
the process of delivering chemicals (described below).
(Id. at 119a-24a.)

The B&B parcel was graded toward a pond
located in the southeast portion of the site. (/d. at
95a.) A pipe allowed the water on the Railroad parce]
also to drain to the pond. Over the course of the
facility’s operation, spills and leaks created a single
plume of ground water contaminated by hazardous
substances that threatened municipal drinking water
supplies. (/d. at 145a-46a; 174a; 237a-38a; 245a-46a.)

3. To protect public health and the environ-
ment, the California and federal governments began
to clean up the contamination at the facility pursuant
to their authority under CERCLA and, in so doing,
incurred substantial remediation costs at the site. (Jd.
at 229a-23la.) The governments filed suit against
Brown and Bryant, the Railroads, and Shel] seeking
reimbursement of investigation and cleanup costs
pursuant to CERCLA Section 107(a), 42 U.S.C.
§ 9607(a). In 2003, after a bench trial, the district

9

court issued its Amended Findings of Fact and Con-
clusions of Law. (Jd. at 82a-262a.)

a. The district court held that the govern-
ment plaintiffs established a prima facie case of
CERCLA liability against both the Railroads and
Shell. Ud. at 176a-83a (Railroads); id. at 208a-19a
(Shell).) The court determined that the “entire Arvin
plant (both parcels)” constituted a single “facility,”
and Brown and Bryant’s operations released hazard-
ous substances to the environment throughout the
facility. (id. at 172a-74a.) According to the district
court, there was evidence of contamination relating to
both parcels. (/d. at 174a.) The court found that the
pond, a sump on the B&B parcel that was connected
to the pond, and a dinoseb spill area on the B&B
parcel “were and are the primary sources of the
ground water contamination at the Site.” (/d. at 104a,
see also id. at 25la.) The court further found, how-
ever, that “[i]t is not within the realm of science to
quantify the contribution from the Railroad parcel
over the ground surface or through focused infiltra-
tion that has reached the ground water under the
Site” and that the contamination for each parcel could
not be exactly quantified. (/@ at 112a.) Accordingly,
the district court found that the resulting ground
water plume “poses an indivisible threat of leaching
and diffusing contaminants to lower groundwater
suitable for drinking.” Ud. at 172a; see id. at 174a.)

10

The district court held that the Railroads were
liable under CERCLA as owners of a facility at the
time of disposal of hazardous substances, (id. at 176a-
83a); see CERCLA § 107(aX(2), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(2),
and that Shell was liable as a party that had “ar-
range([d] for disposal” of hazardous substances, noting
that “disposal” under CERCLA includes any leaking or
spilling of a hazardous substance. (/d. at 208a-19a); see
CERCLA § 107(a)(3), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(3).

The district court found that Shell had the au-
thority under the conditions of sale to determine the
means and methods of delivery and unloading of the
D-D, that Shell “was an active participant in the D-D
shipment, delivery and receiving process at Arvin
with knowledge that spills and leaks of hazardous D-
D were inherent and inevitable,” and that such spills
and leaks “occurred throughout the period Shell sold
D-D” to Brown and Bryant. (Jd. at 204a.) The district
court noted that in the early 1960s Shell began to
require its distributors, including Brown and Bryant,
to cease buying D-D in barrels and purchase in bulk
in order to ensure that they had adequate supplies of
the chemicals on hand. (/d. at 115a.) The “bulk stor-
age prescribed by Shell ... was intended to and did
economically benefit Shell.” (Jd.) The bulk purchase of
the chemicals required Brown and Bryant to main-
tain large storage tanks and necessitated the use of
hoses to transfer the chemicals from the delivery
trucks to the tanks. (/d. at 119a-24a.) Shell deter-
mined and arranged for the means and methods of

11

delivery to the site, including hiring tanker trucks;
Shell required the trucks to have specific equipment
for unloading the chemical. (/d. at 114a-15a, 120a,
123a.) Shell owned the chemicals at the time it made
these arrangements. (Jd. at 124a-25a, 211la.) For most
of the relevant time period, the trucking companies
that were contracted by Shell performed the actual
unloading of chemicals, rather than Brown and
Bryant personnel. (Jd. at 208a-09a.) It was only after
20 years, in the early 1980s that Shell directed that
the unloading should be done by Brown and Bryant
employees. (Jd. at 209a.) Shell specified the proce-
dures for unloading the chemical from the trucks
and for storing the chemicals at the site. (/d. at 208a-
09a.)

In transferring the D-D from truck to tank, the
transporter placed a bucket under the hose connec-
tion. Ud. at 119a.) When the transfer was complete,
the transporter would drain the hoses into a bucket
and the contents would be dumped either into a
Brown and Bryant tank maintained for “dregs” or
back into the tanker truck. (/d. at 120a.) Spills often
occurred during this process. (/d. at 119a-20a.) At
times, the hoses overflowed the buckets, the buckets
tipped over, or the hose would be tossed on the
ground and residual material would drain from the
hose. (/d. at 121a.) Further, feeding the hose into the
trucks’ hose tubes would cause leaks onto the ground.
(Id.) The court found that “spills were inherent in the
delivery process that Shell arranged, and always

12

occurred, in differing degrees of magnitude.” (/d. at
119a; see id. at 209a.)

Shell knew that spills routinely occurred during
the process it prescribed, and therefore reduced the
purchase price of the chemical D-D in an amount, the
district court concluded, that was linked to such loss.
Ud. at 122a-24a.) “However characterized, there was
a monetary allowance to Brown and Bryant for
product Shell expected to be lost in the process of
delivery and storage.” (Jd. at 122a.) In addition, the
district court noted the control that Shell asserted
throughout the delivery process. For instance, if it
was determined that the facility was inadequately
maintained for receiving and storing the D-D, by
contract Shell had the right to require the truck to
return to the terminal; the court held that under
these circumstances, legal title would not pass to
Brown and Bryant, but would remain with Shell. (/d.
at 21la-12a.)

b. Having found the Railroads and Shell
liable, the district court next addressed whether each
should be held jointly and severally liable for the
governments’ response costs, noting “each defendant
bears the burden of proof on apportionment.” (/d. at
232a.) As a result of the Railroads’ and Shell’s deci-
sion to deny all liability, the court found that “no
party has specifically documented the relative contri-
butions of contamination from either parcel” (id. at
248a), and that there is “no evidence to quantify the
difference in volume of the releases” from the Rail-
road and Brown and Bryant parcels. (/d. at 252a.)

13

The district court expressed frustration at the lack of
evidence addressing divisibility of harm, noting the
Railroads’ and Shell’s “scorched earth,” all-or-nothing
approach to liability. Ud. at 236a.) It observed that
neither the Railroads nor Shell “offered helpful
arguments to apportion liability” (id.), and that they
“effectively abdicated providing any helpful argu-
ments to the court.” (/d. at 236a-37a.) Rather than
holding the Railroads and Shell jointly and severally
liable as a result of their having failed to carry their
burden, the district court instead held that the Rail-
roads’ and Shell’s failure of proof “left the court to
independently perform the equitable apportionment
analysis demanded by the circumstances of the case.”
(Id. at 236a-37a.)

As authority for conducting an “equitable appor-
tionment,” the court cited CERCLA Section 113(f(1),
42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(1), which governs allocation of
damages as amongst liable parties in a contribution
action. (ld. at 239a.) The court prefaced its inquiry
with the observation that the “contribution from the
Railroad parcel” to the “indivisible” plume was “incal-
culable.” (id. at 237a-38a.) The court nonetheless
created a multi-part equation by which, in its view,
the Railroads’ “several liability may be roughly calcu-
lated.” Ud. at 251a.)

First, the court noted that the surface area of the
Railroad parcel was 19% of the total site surface. (/d. )
Second, it noted that the Railroads’ 13-year lease to
Brown and Bryant constituted 45% of the site’s total
29 years of operation. (/Jd.) The court next observed

14

that Nemagon and dinoseb were stored on the Rail-
road parcel, and summarily concluded that these two
chemicals, “contributed to */s of overall Site contami-
nation.” (Id.) The district court acknowledged that
“(t]here is no evidence to quantify the difference in
volume of the releases” but concluded that “based on
the considerable evidence of the relative levels of
activity and number of releases on the two parcels,
the Railroad parcel could not have contributed to
more than 10% of the volume or mass of the overall
site contamination resulting from Brown and Bry-
ant’s hazardous substance-release producing activi-
ties as the sole site operator and owner of over 80% of
the site.” (Id. at 252a.) The court then multiplied the
three percentages, stating that “if 19% is multiplied
by 0.45 (13 years of storage on Railroad parcel use/28
years of [Brown and Bryant] operations) and multi-
plied by */s (dinoseb and Nemagon contamination) the
relative figure of 6% is reached.” (Jd.) Finally, the
court adjusted the Railroads’ liability, “[aJllowing for
calculation errors up to 50%,” to 9%. (Id.)

Turning to Shell, the district court first acknowl-
edged that “Shell did not present evidence how its
products’ contribution to the contamination at the
Arvin facility can be apportioned.” (Jd. at 252a.) The
court nonetheless attempted to “roughly calculate”
(id. at 253a) the amount of D-D spilled during the 23
years of Shell-controlled deliveries. (/d. at 253a-57a.)
The starting point of the calculation was the amount
of D-D that Shell sco!d to Brown and Bryant during
that time period. (Jd. at 253a, 89a-90a.) The record

15

contained sales data only for six years. (Jd.) For one
of those years, the total gallons sold were substan-
tially less than the other five, causing the court to
conclude that that year was “statistically aberra-
tional.” (Jd. at 253a.) Based on the remaining five
years of sales data, the court assumed that for each of
the 23 years, delivery trucks arrived at the site with
an average of 122,390 gallons. (/d. at 254a.) The court
further assumed transport by 4,500 gallon trucks,
yielding 27 delivery loads of D-D per year. (Id.) The
court then assumed a typical spill scenario at delivery
of three gallons per load, yielding 81 gallons spilled at
delivery (27 x 3) and 122,309 gallons being placed
into bulk storage (122,390 - 81) each year. (Jd.) Over
the 23-year period, based on the court’s assumptions,
1,863 gallons were spilled at delivery. (Jd.)

The court then created a series of spill assump-
tions for each stage of operations at the Brown and
Bryant facility, including the transfer of D-D from
bulk storage to bobtail trucks, D-D rigs, and nurse
tanks; washing of bobtails; checking of nurse tank
filters; rinsing of nurse tanks; and checking filters
on D-D rigs. Ud. at 254a-56a.) At each step, the
court made assumptions about equipment capacity,
average size of spills, and regularity of cleaning and
maintenance. (/d. at 254a-56a.) Dividing 1,863 gal-
lons (the assumed D-D spills at delivery) by 31,212
(the total assumed D-D spills), the court concluded
that Shell was responsible for approximately 6% of
the spills at the facility, and therefore should be
severally liable for 6% of the total site response costs.

16

(Id. at 256a-57a.) The district court made no findings
linking this assumed spill volume to the soil or
ground water contamination at the site.

The district court found Brown and Bryant
jointly and severally liable. However, Brown and
Bryant is insolvent; the defunct company cannot

contribute to the governments’ cleanup costs. (Jd. at
129a and 24 1a.)

4. Shell appealed the district court’s holding
that it was liable as an “arranger” under CERCLA.
(id. at lla-12a.) The governments appealed the
district court’s apportioning of liability to Shell and
the Railroads and its rejection of joint and several
liability. (Id. at lla.) The governments asserted on
appeal that joint and several liability should have
been imposed on Shell and-the Railroads because
they had not presented sufficient evidence at trial to
justify the apportionment of liability. (/d. at 1la-17a.)
The court of appeals affirmed in part and reversed in
part. (/d. at la-57a.)

a. The court of appeals affirmed the district
court’s ruling that Shell is a liable party under
CERCLA as one that “arranged for disposal” of
hazardous substances. (/d. at 47a-55a.) The court
observed that “arranger” liability extends not only to
direct arrangements for disposal of hazardous sub-
stances, but also to arrangements in which such
disposal is a foreseeable byproduct of, but not the
purpose of, the transaction. (Jd. at 48a-50a.) The court
also noted that CERCLA’s definition of “disposal”

17

includes the processes of “spilling” and “leaking.” (/d.
at 50a-5la.) The court of appeals noted that the
district court had focused on several aspects of Shell’s
involvement with the Brown and Bryant site. These
included: the frequency of spills at the site; Shell’s
arrangement of delivery and choice of carrier; Shell’s
encouragement of the bulk delivery method, which
necessitated transfers of large quantities of chemicals
causing spills and corrosion leaks; and Shell’s pur-
chase price rebate that the district court found “was
linked to loss from leakage.” (Jd. at 53a-54a.) Conse-
quently, the court of appeals held that Shell “had
sufficient control over, and knowledge of, the transfer

process to be considered an ‘arranger’” under
CERCLA. (/d. at 55a.)

b. The court of appeals reversed the district
court’s determination of divisibility and held Shell
and the Railroads jointly and severally liable. (Jd. at
19a-47a.) The court held that while liability under
CERCLA generally is joint and several, “{iJn line with
every circuit that has addressed the issue ... appor-
tionment is available at the liability stage” under
appropriate circumstances. (Jd. at 20a-21a.) The court
next addressed whether the particular harm at issue
is, by its nature, too unified for apportionment — that
is, whether, as a matter of law, apportionment would
be unavailable based on the facts of this case. Ud. at
36a.) Reviewing this question de novo, it agreed with
the district court that the harm was capable of appor-
tionment. (/d. at 36a.)

18

The court of appeals relied on the apportionment
analysis of Restatement (Second) of Torts Section
433A (Pet. App. at 22a-26a), which provides that
damages may be apportioned where there are distinct
harms or where there is a “reasonable basis for
determining the contribution of each cause to a single
harm.” Restatement (Second) of Torts § 433A(1)(b).
The court held that equitable considerations are not
appropriate for purposes of apportioning liability
among responsible parties at the liability stage. (Pet.
App. at 30a-34a.)

With respect to the Railroads, it held that the
district court’s apportionment calculation, based
solely on percentage of land area, duration of owner-
ship, and leakage volumes, lacked a reasonable basis
in the record. (id. at 37a-44a.) The court of appeals
also held that the district court erred in assigning a */s
fraction to represent the types of hazardous sub-
stances on the Railroad parcel because all three
chemicals (D-D, Nemagon and dinoseb) were on the
Railroad parcel at some time. (/d. at 42a.)

With respect to Shell, the court of appeals held
that the evidence produced at trial was insufficient
to determine Shell’s proportional share of the site
contamination. (/d. at 44a-47a.) The court held that
the evidence did not provide a reasonable basis to
sustain the district court’s conclusions because the
site was contaminated with a number of chemicals,
and because Shell had failed to introduce any evi-
dence from which a court could identify the percent-
age of contamination that was attributable to its

"

19

leaked chemicals. The court of appeals also held that
the district court’s calculations for the leakage of
Shell chemicals at the site were far too speculative to
provide a basis for apportioning liability. Ud. at 45a-
46a.)

Because Shell and the Railroads took an all-or-
nothing approach to liability and failed to sustain
their burden of proof to support an apportionment of
liability, the court of appeals reversed the district
court’s “equitable apportionment” and imposed joint
and several liability. Ud. at 47a.)

Shell and the Railroads petitioned for rehearing
en banc. Eight judges dissented from the order deny-
ing rehearing. (Jd. at 57a.) The dissenting judges
were of the view that the court’s decision placed
arranger liability on Shell as a “mere seller.” (/d. at
60a-61a.) The dissent agreed that the Restatement
test should apply to apportionment of liability, but
opined that the court of appeals applied the test in an
overly stringent manner and characterized the dis-
trict court’s apportionment calculations as “meticu-
lous.” Ud. at 60a.)

e

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

In the wake of the environmental disaster at
Love Canal, Congress created CERCLA and its very

20

expansive liability scheme.‘ Unequivocally, Congress
intended that hazardous contamination be remedi-
ated and that the costs be borne by responsible par-
ties. This case raises two straightforward issues
concerning CERCLA liability — the scope of arranger
liability and the availability of apportionment in the
absence of evidence of divisibility of harm based on
considerations of equity.

It is well established that “arranger liability”
under CERCLA is not limited to situations where the
defendant has entered into a contract that focuses on
the disposal of hazardous substances, such as the
disposal of spent product or contaminated drums.
While California and Shell agree that arranger
liability does not apply to entities that merely sell or
ship product containing hazardous substances that
are eventually disposed of through the attenuated
actions of the recipient, under CERCLA, “disposal”
includes the spilling and leaking of hazardous sub-
stances to the environment. Arranger liability includes
actions that go well beyond merely sending away
hazardous waste with the specific intention that it be
dumped. See, e.g., United States v. Shell Oil Co., 294
F.3d 1045, 1054-55 (9th Cir. 2002); Florida Power &
Light Co. v. Allis Chalmers Corp., 893 F.2d 1313,
1318 (llth Cir. 1990); Mathews v. Dow Chemical

* See Metro. Water Reclamation Dist. of Greater Chicago v.
North American Galvanizing & Coatings, Inc., 473 F.3d 824,
826-27 (7th Cir. 2007); United States v. Bestfoods, 524 U.S. 51,
55 (1998).

21

Co., 947 F.Supp. 1517, 1519-20 (D. Colo. 1996);
Courtaulds Aerospace, Inc. v. Huffman, 826 F. Supp.
345, 347-48, 353-54 (E.D. Cal. 1993).

In this case, Shell’s arraigement with Brown and
Bryant led to, and resulted in, spilling and leaking of
agricultural chemicals at the facility. Shell knew that
leaks and spills of the chemicals were inherent in its
prescribed procedures, (Pet. App. 209a) — so much so
that it gave the facility credit for product lost in
delivery and storage. (See id. at 122a.) Shell, in effect,
charged Brown and Bryant only for the chemicals
that were actually placed into Brown and Bryant’s
tanks and not for chemicals spilled in delivery.

As determined by the trier of fact, and fully
supported by the record in this case, Shell arranged
for and controlled the transportation and delivery of
hazardous substances to the Brown and Bryant
facility with the expectation that a portion of the
hazardous substances routinely would be spilled (and
therefore disposed of) onto the ground in the course of
the transactions. Under CERCLA’s broad scope,
Shell’s actions constitute arranger liability even
though disposal was not the central focus of the
transaction.

Shell, held lable as an arranger, and the Rail-
roads, held liable as owners at the time of disposal,
bear the burden of establishing a basis for appor-
tionment of harin in order to avoid joint and several
liability. Neither met its burden in this case.

22

There is no dispute that if adequate information
is available, divisibility may be established by rele-
vant geographic, volumetric, or chronological evi-
dence. (Pet. App. 24a.) See Hercules, 247 F.3d at 719;
Bell Petroleum, 3 F.3d at 895-96; United States v.
Township of Brighton (“Brighton II”), 282 F.3d 915,
919-20 (6th Cir. 2092). The court of appeals narrowly
held “that, in this case, Shell and the Railroads failed
to show that expert testimony and other evidence
establishes a factual basis for making a reasonable
estimate that will fairly apportion liability.” (Pet.
App. 24a (internal quotation omitted).)

There is no dispute that the harm in this case, in
theory, was capable of apportionment had Shell and
the Railroads elected to present evidence (e.g., expert
opinion testimony based on data and on the types of
assumptions that experts are authorized to make).
They did not. The record below reflects Shell’s and
the Railroads’ strategic choice to assume — as the
district court and court of appeals both observed — a
“scorched earth” and “all-or-nothing” approach to
liability. (Pet. App. 236a, 15a.) As the district court
observed, “[nJeither party offered helpful arguments
to apportion liability.” Ud. at 236a.)

The district court erroneously believed that it
was required sua sponte to apportion the damages,
even in the absence of evidence. This led to the court’s
complex calculations, consisting of a series of assump-
tions that the court multiplied together, resulting in
small fractions of liability for both Shell and the
Railroads. The district court based its assumptions on

23

its best guesses, notwithstanding the complicated
chemistry of the site, the convoluted history of dis-
posal, the many possible pathways to contamination,
and the literally dozens of open questions concerning
virtually every aspect of the harm. It also believed, in
error, that equity required it to divide the harm,
confusing apportionment of liability to the govern-
ment with allocation of damages as amongst respon-
sible parties. The district court’s unprecedented
approach runs counter to the law that places the
burden of proof for apportionment on parties held
liable under CERCLA and allows for considerations of
equity only in contribution actions as between liable
parties.

On the record before this Court, Shell and the
Railroads have failed to provide a reasonable basis for
divisibility. As a result, both are subject to joint and
several liability.

e

ARGUMENT

I. Shell Arranged for Disposal of a Hazard-
ous Substance and Therefore Is a Liable
Party Under CERCLA

Shell asks this Court to rewrite CERCLA to limit
arranger liability to parties that possess a hazardous
substance and make arrangements specifically in-
tended to dispose of it as a hazardous waste. The
plain language of CERCLA and 25 years of case law

24

make clear that arranger liability is not so narrowly
construed.

Under CERCLA, arranger liability is a fact-
intensive determination in which the court must look
beyond the defendant’s characterization to whether
the transaction, in fact, involves an arrangement for
“disposal.” See Morton Int'l v. A.E. Staley Mfg. Co.,
343 F.3d 669, 677 (3d Cir. 2003). CERCLA defines,
“disposal” to encompass not only intentional discard-
ing, but also inadvertent or incidental leaking and
spilling. See 42 U.S.C. §9601(29); 42 U.S.C.
§ 6903(3).

As the district court determined, and the court of
appeals affirmed, the record supports the findings
underlying Shell’s liability as an arranger. For exam-
ple, Shell owned and possessed the chemical D-D at
the time it arranged for delivery to Brown and Bry-
ant; controlled the procedures for shipment, delivery,
and unloading of the chemical at the Brown and
Bryant site; knew that spills were an inevitable
consequence of the delivery and unloading procedures
and that spills were in fact occurring throughout the
entire period of the sale to Brown and Bryant; knew
that some portion of the chemical was being spilled
before it could be transferred to Brown and Bryant’s
control or ownership; and even reduced the price of
the shipment to account for those spills. Under these
circumstances, Shell arranged for disposal of a haz-
ardous substance.

25

A. Arranger Liability Under CERCLA Is
Broadly Construed Based on the Facts
Surrounding the Transaction

A responsible person under CERCLA includes
“any person who, by contract, agreement, or other-
wise arranged for disposal or treatment ... of haz-
ardous substances owned or possessed by such
person, by any other party or entity, at any facil-
ity....” 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a\(3). Although “arranged
for” is not specifically defined in the statute, courts
have broadly interpreted the phrase in order to
effectuate CERCLA’s direction that companies re-
sponsible for introducing hazardous waste into the
environment bear the costs of the cleanup. See
Morton, 343 F.3d at 676; United States v. Aceto Agri-
cultural Chemicals Corp., 872 F.2d 1373, 1380 (8th
Cir. 1989). The determination of “arranger liability” is
a fact-intensive inquiry that must be made in light of
the totality of circumstances. See Pneumo Abex Corp.
v. High Point, Thomasville & Denton R.R., 142 F.3d
769, 775 (4th Cir. 1998); South Florida Water Mgmt.
Dist. v. Montalvo, 84 F.3d 402, 407 (11th Cir. 1996);
Cadillac Fairview/Cal., Inc. v. United States, 41 F.3d
562, 566 (9th Cir. 1994).

Courts, of course, are not bound by a defendant’s
characterization of the transaction as a mere sale of a
useful product, and look beyond that characterization
to determine whether the transaction amounts to an
arrangement for treatment or disposal of a hazardous
substance. Morton, 343 F.3d at 677; Freeman v. Glaxo
Wellcome, Inc., 189 F.3d 160, 164 (2d Cir. 1999); Aceto,

26

872 F.2d at 1381-82. Here, as discussed below, the
district court found on the evidence that Shell’s
actions involved significantly more than the mere
sale of a useful product; Shell knew that its actions
would result in the spilling and leaking of a hazard-
ous substance on delivery.

B. An Entity Is Liable as an Arranger
When It Knows That Disposal of a
Hazardous Substance Is an Inherent
and Inevitable Part of the Transaction

There is no dispute that arranger liability arises
when a defendant enters into a transaction in which
the central purpose is to dispose of a hazardous
waste. (Shell Br. 18-19); see United States v. Shell Oil
Co., 294 F.3d at 1054 (referring to this as “direct”
arranger liability). Shell’s conduct falls outside of
such “direct” arranger liability.

The courts have, however, recognized that ar-
ranger liability also arises in a broader context in
which disposal of hazardous wastes is not the direct
purpose of the transaction. Catellus Dev. Corp. v.
United States, 34 F.3d 748, 752-53 (9th Cir. 1994);
Aceto, 872 F.2d at 1381; Redwing Carriers, Inc. v.
Saraland Apartments, 94 F.3d 1489, 1512 (11th Cir.
1996); United States v. TIC Inv. Corp., 68 F.3d 1082,
1088 (8th Cir. 1995). Rather, an entity with control
over a process that it knows can or will result in the

release of hazardous substances is an arranger.
Morton, 343 F.3d at 676. As the Third Circuit noted,

27

proof of a defendant’s knowledge that haz-
ardous waste can or will be released in the
course of the process it has arranged for, pro-
vides a good reason to hold a defendant re-
sponsible because such proof demonstrates
that the defendant knowingly (if not person-
ally) contributed to the hazardous-waste con-
tamination. Thus general knowledge that
waste disposal is an inherent or inevitable
part of the process arranged for by the de-
fendant may suffice to establish liability.

Morton, 343 F.3d at 678. Thus, under CERCLA, the
government need not prove a specific intent to dis-
pose of hazardous substances as waste in order to
establish arranger liability.

Arranger liability is not without limit. The courts
routinely have distinguished cases where the evi-
dence shows that the defendant sold a useful, though
hazardous, product without any knowledge or control
concerning the ultimate disposal of that product, see,
e.g., Freeman, 189 F.3d at 164; 3550 Sievens Creek
Associates v. Burclays Bank of California, 915 F.2d
1355, 1362 (9th Cir. 1990); Florida Power & Light Co.
v. Allis Chalmers Corp., 85 F.3d 1514, 1520 (11th Cir.
1996), from those cases where the defendant know-
ingly set into action a chain of circumstances that led
directly to disposal as an inherent part of the transac-
tion, even though disposal was not necessarily the
purpose of the transaction, see, e.g., Aceto, 872 F.2d at
1381; Catellus, 34 F.3d 752-53; Courtaulds, 826
F. Supp. at 353. The first set of facts gives rise to
arranger liability, while the second does not.

28

A manufacturer that sells a useful product and
knowingly ioads it into a leaking tanker truck has
made an arrangement that will lead inevitably to
disposal of some portion of its product as a hazardous
waste. Similarly, a manufacturer that establishes and
controls the method of delivery of its useful product in
a manner that it knows will inevitably result in some
portion of the product being spilled and disposed
during the transfer, has arranged for the disposal of a
hazardous waste. Neither can escape liability under
CERCLA simply by claiming that the purpose of the
transaction was merely to sell a useful product.

C. Shell Is Liable as an Arranger Under
CERCLA Because It Owned the Haz-
ardous Substance, Arranged the Pro-
cedures for the Transfer, and Knew
that Disposal on Delivery Was an In-
evitable Result of Its Arrangements

Shell characterizes its actions in sending D-D to
the Brown and Bryant facility as merely an innocent
arrangement for the sale of a useful product. Shell’s
characterization is belied by the district court’s de-
tailed findings, which are supported by abundant
evidence of Shell’s involvement. Shell entered into
transactions with Brown and Bryant knowing that
large amounts of chemicals in Shell’s possession
(“hazardous substances” under CERCLA) would
routinely spill and leak onto the ground before they
were placed into Brown and Bryant’s bulk tanks for
use.

29

As the Brief for the United States discusses in
detail, it is undisputed in the record that Shell was
deeply involved in the delivery process. Under the
contracts of sale, Shell determined and arranged for
the means and methods of delivery of D-D to the site,
including hiring the tanker trucks and requiring
them to have specific equipment for unloading the D-
D into bulk storage. (Pet.App. at 114a-15a, 119a-20a,
124a.) Shell owned the chemical at the time these
arrangements were made. (Jd. at 124a-25a, 211a.)
Shell required the facility to follow certain procedures
in unloading the trucks and storing the chemical on-
site. Id. at 208a-09a.) At one point, Shell changed the
delivery process from sealed drums to bulk delivery,
requiring Brown and Bryant to use large storage
tanks that necessitated the transfer of the D-D with
hoses and resulted in leaks from the transfer process
and storage tanks. (/d. at 114a-15a, 119a-22a, 209a.)
Shell knew that spills were inherent in the process
that it dictated for transporting and unloading the
chemicals (id. at 122a-24a), and took into account
those spills by providing for a “monetary allowance to
{Brown and Bryant] for product Shell expected to be
lost in the process of delivery and storage.” (Jd. at
122a.)

Finally, legal title of the Shell chemical did not
pass automatically to Brown and Bryant when the
delivery truck entered the site. (/d. at 124a.) Thus, if
the transporter found that Brown and Bryant’s
facility was not adequately maintained for receiving
and storing the D-D, Shell could order the tanker

30

truck to return to the terminal. (/d. at 124a, 21la-
12a.)

Under these circumstances, Shell is significantly
more than a mere seller that relinquished control
over its products upon delivery and before any spill
occurred. This is not a case, as posited in the dissent
to the denial of en banc review, in which “sellers of
chemical products will be saddled with the entire
clean-up cost of a facility contaminated in part with
their products, even if they lacked control over the
products spilled following the sale.” (/d. at 80a.)
Rather, under CERCLA’s well-recognized rules of
arranger liability, Shell controlled the method of
delivery of its product in a manner that it knew
would result — and was resulting — in spills of haz-
ardous substances as part of the process of delivery to
the buyer. Indeed, Shell even paid for the spilled
chemicals, charging Brown and Bryant only for what
did not spill. 7d. at 122a.)

The result here is not contrary to Amcast Indus.
Corp. v. Detrex Corp., 2 F.3d 746, 751 (1993), the case
upon which Shell most heavily relies. In Amcast, a
manufacturer of trichloroethylene (“TCE”) sold it to a
customer and delivered it either in its own trucks or
by hiring a common carrier. In both cases, spills
resulted from the delivery of the chemical. The Sev-
enth Circuit held that the manufacturer was liable as
the owner of a facility under CERCLA when it deliv-
ered the TCE in its own trucks, but was not liable as
an arranger when it contracted with a common
carrier to deliver the chemical. Amcast, 2 F.3d at 751.

31

In Amcast, apart from hiring the transporter,
there is no suggestion that the TCE manufacturer
exercised control over the method of delivery of the
chemical, adjusted the price of the chemical due to
spillage, or retained legal control and ownership of
the chemical such that it could refuse to off-load the
chemical if the facility was not adequately prepared
to cooperate in the transfer and handling of the
chemical. Here, the district court found that the
facts demonstrate Shell's significant level of control
over the delivery process and its knowledge and
anticipation of spills, as well as Shell’s ability to
preclude the transfer process if it so chose.

The other cases relied on by Shell underscore the
facts that establish Shell’s arranger liability. Unlike
the cases Shell cites, this case does not raise the
specter of imposing arranger liability on a product
manufacturer solely because there is ultimately a
disposal after the product has served its useful pur-
pose, (see 3550 Stevens Creek, 915 F.2d at 1362-65;
Dayton Indep. School Dist. v. United States Mineral
Products, Inc., 906 F.2d 1059, 1065 (5th Cir. 1990);
General Electric Co. v. AAMCO Transmissions, Inc.,
962 F.2d 281, 287-88 (2d Cir. 1992)); or on a seller for
a disposal that occurs decades after sale of a useful
product due to a third party’s negligence, (see
Freeman, 189 F.3d at 164); or on a seller of a facility
storing a useful product where disposal occurs after
deterioration of the facility, (see AM Int'l, Inc. v.
International Forging Equip. Corp., 982 F.2d 989, 999
(6th Cir. 1993)). Here, the disposal occurred due to

32

procedures controlled by the seller, before the product
could even be transferred to the physical control of
the buyer, and the seller had full knowledge that such
disposal would occur.

In the CERCLA context, courts have long distin-
guished between those cases where a party has
merely made a sale of a useful product (recognizing
that some disposal likely will occur eventually after
the product is used), and those cases where the seller
has attempted to “close its eyes” to disposals that are
inherent in its arrangement. See Aceto, 872 F.2d at
1380. Shell asks this Court to permit Shell to close its
eyes to disposals of hazardous waste that were inher-
ent in the arrangements that it made for transfer of
its materials and that were well-known to it.
CERCLA does not permit Shell to escape liability for
the inevitable results of its own arrangements.

D. Shell’s Reading of Arranger Liability Is
Contrary to CERCLA’s Broad Scheme

1. Arranger Liability Under CERCLA
Does Not Require a Specific Intent
to Dispose of Hazardous Waste

Ignoring decades of court opinions and the un-
equivocal intent of Congress for an expansive reading
of CERCLA liability provisions, Shell contends that
the statutory terminology “arranged for treatment or
disposal of a hazardous substance” must be read
narrowly pursuant to a dictionary definition to apply
only when the defendant affirmatively intends to

33

dispose of a hazardous waste. (Shell Br. at 18-19.)
Under Shell’s reading, a manufacturer could entirely
escape CERCLA liability if it sold a hazardous chemi-
cal as a useful product and knowingly loaded the
chemical for delivery into a corroded and leaking
tanker truck, and the truck spilled the chemical on
the delivery site, as long as the manufacturer did not
own the truck that spilled the substance, did not
“intend to dispose of hazardous waste,” and merely
intended to save money by hiring a cheap transporter.
This argument distorts CERCLA’s purpose to hold
parties responsible for the costs of remediating the
contamination they cause, regardless of their specific
intent. See Aceto, 872 F.2d at 1378-82, 1384 (arranger
liability arises when spills are “inherent” in the
formulation process and “waste is generated and
disposed of contemporaneously with the process”).

Further, taking Shell’s dictionary analysis to its
logical conclusion leads to an inconsistent result.
Shell acknowledges that CERCLA incorporates the
definition of “disposal” contained in the Solid Waste
Disposal Act (““SWDA”). 42 U.S.C. § 9601(29). Under
the SWDA, disposal is defined as “the discharge,
deposit, injection, dumping, spilling, leaking, or
placing ... of any ... hazardous waste into or on any
land” so that it “may enter the environment... .” 42
U.S.C. § 6903(3) (emphasis added). One of the pri-
mary dictionary definitions of “leaking” is “to enter or
escape through a hole, crevice, or other opening, usually
by a fault or mistake.” Webster’s Third New Interna-
tional Dictionary Unabridged (2002). Similarly, “spill”

34

is defined as “to cause or allow to pour, splash, or fall
out and be wasted, lost or scattered.” Jd. Inherent
within the plain meaning of the terms “leak” and
“spill,” therefore, is the notion of mistake, inadver-
tence, or lack of intentionality. Interpreting the

phrase “arrange for” narrowly, as Shell requests,

creates a statutory construction problem, as it would
read “spilling” and “leaking” out of the definition of
arranger liability, even though Congress expressly
chose to include it.

Shell argues that under the plain language of the
statute, arranger liability applies only to an entity
that affirmatively intends to dump waste into the
environment. As the Third Circuit noted in Morton,
343 F.3d at 676, the “dictionary definition of ‘arrange’
does not shed much light on the proper scope of
liability” under CERCLA. Instead, the only reason-
able reading of the statutory language is that “ar-
range for disposal” encompasses liability for an entity
that makes arrangements concerning a hazardous
substance, knowing that such arrangements will lead
to the leak or spill of that substance, thus resulting in
the disposal of a hazardous substance before it can be
used. Shell’s actions satisfy this definition.

2. The Solid Waste Disposal Act’s
Definition of “Disposal” Does Not
Limit CERCLA Arranger Liability

Shell argues that because the D-D was not a
hazardous waste at the time Shell shipped it to

35

Brown and Bryant, it was a useful product and not a
waste, and, therefore, any spill of D-D in the process
of delivery cannot give rise to arranger liability. While
CERCLA identifies disposal of “hazardous sub-
stances” as the basis for liability, it also incorporates
the definition of “disposal” from the Solid Waste
Disposal Act (““SWDA”). See 42 U.S.C. § 9601(29). The
SWDA concerns “wastes” rather than “substances,”
and defines “disposal” as “the discharge, deposit,
injection, dumping, spilling, leaking, or placing ... of
any hazardous waste into or on any land ... ” 42
U.S.C. § 6903(3).

Under the SWDA, waste is “any garbage, refuse,
sludge from a waste treatment plant, water supply
treatment plant, or air pollution control facility and
other discarded material ....” 42 U.S.C. § 6903(27)
(emphasis added). As such, a “discarded material”
may begin as a useful product and become a waste
upon being discarded, disposed of, thrown away, or
abandoned. At the point of being discarded, it is no
longer a useful product and becomes a waste. Ass’n of
Battery Recyclers, Inc. v. United States EPA, 208 F.3d
1047, 1052 (D.C. Cir. 2000); see also Zands v. Nelson,
779 F. Supp. 1254, 1262 (S.D. Cal. 1991) (gasoline
entering soil is no longer useful and therefore consti-
tutes solid waste for purpose of SWDA).

Stated another way, arranger liability under
CERCLA applies to hazardous substances once they
are disposed of, necessarily becoming waste, and at-
taches when the responsible partly arranges for that
disposal, even though, at the time of the arrangement,

36

the substance has not yet become a waste. As a
result, Shell’s SWDA-based argument provides no
exemption. The hazardous substance, Shell’s D-D,
was a useful product when it was in transport to
Brown and Bryant, and that portion that was placed
into Brown and Bryant’s storage tanks continued to
be useful, available for ayricultural application. The
D-D that spilled during delivery to the tanks, how-
ever, became a hazardous waste as defined under the
SWDA as soon as it touched the ground, never having
reached the storage tanks. As such, the spilling and
leaking of D-D during delivery constitutes disposal of
a hazardous substance under CERCLA.

II. While Liability Under CERCLA May Be
Apportioned Based on Evidence of Divisi-
bility of Harm, the Railroads and Shell
Failed to Establish a Factual Basis for
Apportionment

A. The Court Below Applied the Proper
Standards of Review

In line with all cases that have addressed the
issue, the court of appeals acknowledged that appor-
tionment generally is available in CERCLA cases at
the liability stage and, further, that the harm at issue
in this case theoretically was capable of apportion-
ment. (Pet. App. 20a-21la.) The question presented,
however, is whether the Railroads and Shell “submitted
evidence sufficient to establish a reasonable basis for
the apportionment of liability.” (dd. at 36a.) The court of
appeals reviewed the district court’s deter:mination

37

consistent with the law of other circuits and the
Restatement. See, e.g., Bell Petroleum, 3 F.3d at 896
(question whether harm is capable of apportionment
is question of law; actual apportionment of damages
is a question of fact); Hercules, 247 F.3d at 718-19;
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 434 cmt. d.

The Railroads and Shell contend that the court
of appeals did not apply a clear error standard in
reviewing the district court’s findings. (Shell Br. 49;
Railroads Br. 39.) A reviewing court must, of course,
defer to the fact finder’s determinations on matters
involving credibility. See, e.g., Anderson v. Bessemer
City, 470 U.S. 564, 575 (1985) (factual findings enti-
tled to substantial deference, reversed only for clear
error). The court of appeals did, in fact, defer to the
trial court’s factual findings. It accepted, for example,
the district court’s determinations that the Railroads
owned 19% of the site and that spills regularly oc-
curred on delivery of D-D. The court of appeals held
merely that the trial court’s independent cobbling
together of various anecdotal facts and unsupported
assumptions to make a case for “equitable appor-
tionment” of liability was not authorized by law. This
was well within a reviewing court’s role. See United
States v. Taylor, 487 U.S. 326, 337 (1998) (where
judgment constitutes application of law to facts,
reviewing court must undertake more substantive
scrutiny to ensure judyment is supported by legal
factors); Restatement (Second) Torts § 434 cmt. d.

38

B. Because the Railroads and Shell Pre-
sented No Evidence on Divisibility of
Harm, the Record Is Insufficient to
Support a Reasonable Basis for Appor-
tionment of Liability

1. While liability under CERCLA gen-
erally is joint and several, a re-
sponsible party may establish that
liability may be apportioned con-
sistent with the Restatement’s
common law prirmciples

Under CERCLA, “[lJiability is strict and is typi-
cally joint and several.” Hercules, 247 F.3d at 715.
CERCLA does not directly address the availability of
apportionment of liability. See 42 U.S.C. § 9607. The
circuits that have addressed these questions have
looked to common law principles of tort in general,
and the Restatement in particular, for guidance as to
when and how to impose joint and several liability
under § 9607(a). See, e.g., Aviall Servs., Inc. v. Cooper
Indus., Inc., 312 F.3d 677, 684 (5th Cir. 2002) (holding
that apportionment of CERCLA liability is matter of
federal common law), rev'd on other grounds, Cooper
Industries, Inc. v. Aviall Services, Inc., 543 U.S. 157
(2004); United States v. Burlington N. R.R. Co., 200
F.3d 679, 697 (10th Cir. 1999) (same); Brighton, 153
F.3d at 329 (same); Monsanto Co., 858 F.2d at 171
(same).

Circuit court discussions of apportionment rou-
tinely start with citation to United States v. Chem-
Dyne Corp., 572 F. Supp. 802 (D.C. Ohio 1983). In

39

Chem-Dyne, the United States sued 24 defendants
that had allegedly generated or transported hazard-
ous substances located at the Chem-Dyne facility.
Defendants sought a determination that they could
not be held jointly and severally liable. Jd. at 804.
The Chem-Dyne court held that while express lan-
guage holding CERCLA responsible parties jointly
and severally liable had been removed from the final
legislation, id. at 806, (citing 126 Cong. Rec. S14964
(Nov. 24, 1980) and 126 Cong. Rec. H11787 (Dec. 3,
1980)) this did not mean that CERCLA prohibited
joint and several liability. Jd. at 807. Rather, the court
reasoned, “the term was omitted in order to have the
scope of liability determined under common law
principles, where a court performing a case by case
evaluation of the complex factual scenarios associated
with multiple-generator waste sites will assess the
propriety of applying joint and several liability on an
individual basis.” Jd. at 808.

The Chem-Dyne court further held that the scope
of liability should be interpreted according to a feder-
ally created uniform common law informed by the
Restatement (Second) of Torts, id. at 809-10. Summa-
rizing, the Chem-Dyne court noted:

|Wjhen two or more persons acting inde-
pendently caused a distinct or single harm
for which there is a reasonable basis for divi-
sion according to the contribution of each,
each is subject to liability only for the portion
of the total harm that he has himself caused.
Restatement (Second) of Torts, §§ 433A, 881

40

(1976).... But where two or more persons
cause a single and indivisible harm, each is
subject to liability for the entire harm.
Restatement (Second) of Torts, §875....
Furthermore, where the conduct of two or
more persons liable under § 9607 has com-
bined to violate the statute, and one or more
of the detendants seeks to limit his liability
on the ground that the entire harm is capa-
ble of apportionment, the burden of proof as
to apportionment is upon each defendant. Jd.
at § 433B.... These rules clearly enumerate
the analysis to be undertaken when applying
42 U.S.C. § 9607 and are most likely to ad-
vance the legislative policies and objectives
of the Act. :

Id. at 810.

Shell and the Railroads agree with Chem-Dyne
and the court below that the appropriate starting
point for the rule of apportionment applicable to
CERCLA cases is Section 433A of the Restatement
(Second) of Torts. (Shell Br. 37; Railroads Br. 6; Pet.
App. 24a); see, e.g., Hercules, 247 F.3d at 716 n.9, 717;
Bell Petroleum, 3 F.3d at 895; Chem-Dyne, 572
F. Supp. at 810. Section 433A provides for the appor-
tionment of damages where a defendant can show
either (1) “distinct harms” or (2) a “reasonable basis
for determining the contribution of each cause to a
single harm.” Hercules, 247 F.3d at 717 (quoting
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 433A). “Damages for
any other hari cannot be apportioned among two or
more causes.” Restatement (Second) of Torts § 453A(2)

41

As the Hercules court notes, however, the Restate-
ment test is not a perfect fit in CERCLA cases and
must be harmonized to fit that law. Jd. “Thus, for
example, although the Restatement contemplates
that plaintiffs bear the burden of proving causation,
in a CERCLA case, once the government has estab-
lished the four essential elements of liability the
burden shifts to the defendant to demonstrate, by a
preponderance of the evidence, that there exists a
reasonable basis for divisibility.” Hercules, 247 F.3d at
717 (citing Brighton, 153 F.3d at 318 and O’Neil v.
Picillo, 883 F.2d 176, 182 (1st Cir. 1989)).

2. Apportionment is appropriate where
a responsible party can show distinct
harm, successive injuries, or divisi-
ble harm, except where injustice to
plaintiff will result

Because Shell and the Railroads rely in part on
the examples in the Restatement where apportion-
ment is allowed, California will reiterate those exam-
ples, and their underlying policies, and apply them to
scenarios that occur in CERCLA cases.

Distinct harms. The Restatement first discusses
the concept of “distinct harms”

which, by their nature, are more capable of
apportionment. If two defendants independ
ently shoot the plaintiff at the same time,
amd one wounds him in the arm and the
other in the leg, the ultimate result may be a
badly damaged plaintiff in the hospital, but

*

42

it is still possible, as a logical, reasonable,
and practical matter, to regard the two
wounds as separate injuries, and as distinct
wrongs. The mere coincidence in time does
not make the two wounds a single harm, or
the conduct of the two defendants one tort.

Restatement (Second) of Torts § 433A cmt. b.

Where there are discrete harms flowing from
discrete acts, the Restatement allows a court sizable
latitude to divide those harms, notwithstanding
imprecision. “There may be difficulty in the appor-
tionment of some elements of damages, such as the
pain and suffering resulting from the two wounds, or
the medical expenses, but this does not mean that
one defendant must be liable for the distinct harm
inflicted by the other.” Restatement (Second) of Torts
§ 433A cmt. b. For distinct harms, the common law
allows for apportionment by “a rough estimate which
will fairly apportion such subsidiary elements of
damages.” Apportionment by “rough estimate” applies
only to “distinct harms” presumably on the stated
policy ground that a defendant should not be held
liable for a completely separate harm caused by
another. See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 433A
emt. b.

In the CERCLA context, a defendant may shew
“distinct harm” by establishing, for example, relevant
“geographical considerations.” Hercules, 247 F.3d 717
(citing Akzo Coatings, Inc. v. Aigner Corp., 881
F. Supp. 1202, 1210 (N.D. Ind. 1994), clarified on
reconsid., 909 F. Supp. 1154 (N.D. Ind 1995) and

43

United States v. Broderick Investment Co., 862
F. Supp. 272, 277 (D. Colo. 1994)). Distinct harms
may be shown where, for example, a site consists of
discrete, non-contiguous areas of contamination, see,
e.g., Akzo Coatings, 881 F.Supp. at 1210; Kamb uv.
United States Coast Guard, 869 F. Supp. 793, 798
(N.D. Cal. 1994), or where there are separate and
distinct plumes of ground water contamination ema-
nating from separate releases, see Broderick, 862
F. Supp. at 277; see also Brighton, 153 F.3d at 320
(remanding matter to trial court to determine if
CERCLA apportionment available based on a show-
ing that defendant’s “operating activities were com-
pletely limited to a discrete and measurable section of
the property, and that the releases onto or from that
section represented a discrete and measurable
harm”). Where the harm cannot be “fingerprinted to
determine its exact source” the “distinct harms” rule
is inapplicable. Coeur D’Alene Tribe v. Asarco, Inc.,
280 F. Supp. 2d 1094, 1120 (D. Idaho 2003) (finding
no distinct harms where mine tailings from numerous
operations combined over a period of years to create
environmental! pollution in basin).

Successive injuries. The Restatement next allows
for apportionment in the case of successive injuries. It
states:

The harm inflicted may be conveniently sev-
erable in point of time. Thus if two defen-
dants, independently operating the same
plant, pollute a stream over successive
periods, it is clear that each has caused a

44

separate amount of harm, limited in time,
and that neither has any responsibility for
the harm caused by the other.

Restatement (Second) of Torts § 433A cmt. c.

In the case of a successive injury, a court is able
to compare “apples to apples” because each defendant
has engaged in the same activity, causing substan-
tially the same type of harm. The case of Bell Petro-
leum is illustrative. In that case, releases of
hazardous substances from a chrome plating shop
over a six-year period, under the successive tenure of
three different operators, contaminated a nearby
aquifer. Bell Petroleum, 3 F.3d at 892-93. The Fifth
Circuit noted that “(t]he chromium entered the
ground water as the result of similar operations by
three parties who operated at mutually exclusive
times” and that, therefore, “it is reasonable to assume
that the respective harm done by each of the defen-
dants is proportionate to the volume of chromium-
contaminated water each discharged into the envi-
ronment.” /d. at 903.

In Bell Petroleum, one of the defendant operators,
Sequa, “introduced expert testimony regarding a
volumetric approach to apportionment” by calculating
the total amount of chromium that had been intro-
duced into the environment by each of the operators,
collectively and individually, in part based on electri-
cal usage records. Jd. at 904. Sequa also introduced
evidence of chrome flake purchases during each
operator’s tenure, the value of the chrome-plating

45

done by each, summaries of sales, and various wit-
nesses regarding the rinsing and wastewater disposal
practices and the amount of chrome-plating activity
conducted by each defendant operator. Jd. at 903-04.
On these facts, the Fifth Circuit held that Sequa had
by expert testimony and other evidence established a
factual basis for making a reasonable estimate that
would fairly apportion liability. Jd. at 903.

Divisible harm. Finally, the Restatement allows
for apportionment where there is “divisible harm.”
This category of harms differs from “distinct harms”
discussed above; these harms, “while not so clearly
marked out as severable into distinct parts, are still
capable of division upon a reasonable and rational
basis, and of fair apportionment among the causes
responsible.” Restatement (Second) of Torts § 433A
cmt. d. The Restatement includes the following oft-
cited example of trespassing cattle:

Thus where the cattle of two or more owners
trespass upon the plaintiff’s land and de-
stroy his crop, the aggregate harm is a lost
crop, but it may nevertheless be upportioned
among the owners of the cattle, on the basis
of the number owned by each, and the rea-
sonable assumption that the respective harm
done is proportionate to that number. Where
such apportionment can be made without in-
justice to any of the parties, the court may
require it to be made.

Restatement (Second) of Torts § 433A cmt. d. The
Restatement includes a second example, more easily

46

applied to releases of hazardous substances: “Thus
where two or more factories independently pollute a
stream, the interference with the plaintiff’s use of the
water may be treated as divisible in terms of de-
gree....” Id. Unlike the “rough estimate” allowed
where there are truly “distinct harms,” however, the
Restatement provides that liability in the case of
harms that are merely “divisible” be apportioned
“among the owners of the factories, on the basis of
evidence of the respective quantities of pollution
discharged into the stream.” /d.

As the courts have recognized, “divisible harm” is
“perhaps the most difficult type of harm to conceptu-
alize.” Bell Petroleum, 3 F.3d at 895. In many cases
“where wastes of varying (and unknown) degrees of
toxicity and migratory potential commingle,”
CERCLA defendants simply will be unable to prove
divisibility. O’Neil, 883 F.2d at 178-79; see also Chem-
Nuclear, 292 F.3d at 260 (source of at least 80 drums
of hazardous waste could not prove by preponderance
of the evidence that it sent no other drums to site,
held joint and severally liable for cleanup of entire
site). Still, a responsible party may be able to show
divisibie harm, even in a complex CERCLA case. For
example, a defendant held liable with many others
for waste sent to a site may be able to establish that
the harm resulting from its waste can be distin-
guished based on “proof disclosing the relative toxic-
ity, migratory potential, degree of migration, and
synergistic capacities of the hazardous substances at
the site.” See Alcan, 990 F.2d at 722.

47

Where a defendant presents “no evidence, how-
ever, showing a relationship between waste volume,
the release of hazardous substances, and the harm at
the site,” the defendant has not met its burden to
show divisible harm. Monsanto, 858 F.2d at 172. In
those circumstances, the default of joint and several
liability must control. A court should not make an
“‘arbitrary apportionment for its own sake.’” Hercu-
les, 247 F.3d 717 (quoting Restatement (Second) of
Torts § 433A cmt. i.) As the comments to the Re-
statement explain, the burden of proving that the
harm is capable of apportionment is placed on the
defendant to avoid “injustice”:

In such a case the defendant may justly be
required to assume the burden of producing
that evidence [supporting apportionment], or
if he is not able to do so, of bearing full re-
sponsibility. As between the proved tortfea-
sor who has clearly caused some harm, a~d
the entirely innocent plaintiff, any hardship
due to lack of evidence as to the extent of the
harm should fall upon the former.

Restatement (Second) Terts § 433B cmt. d.°

* In a similar vein, the Restatement notes that “[e)xceptional
cases” may “arise in which injustice to the plaintiff may result”
from apportionment. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 433A cmt.
h.

It may, for example, appear that one of two tortfeasors

is so hopelessly insolvent that the plaintiff will never

be able to collect from him the share of the damages

allocated to him ....In such cases the application of
(Continued on following page)

48

3. The Railroads and Shell intro-
duced, and the record contained,
no evidence to support apportion-
ment

In this case, the district court purported to ap-
portion sua sponte the governments’ harm —- their
response costs — based on various geographic, volu-
metric and chronological considerations. As noted
above, these attributes may allow for apportionment
of CERCLA response costs where they are relevant to
dividing the harm, and where they are supported by
evidence. In this case, however, the district court’s
calculations were not based on evidence showing that
the harms were distinct, severable based on time, or
otherwise divisible on a reasonable and rational
basis. At bottom, the district court engaged in an
equitable allocation, an exercise not properly part of
an apportionment determination.

the rule stated in Clause (b) would mean that the in-
nocent plaintiff would be forced to bear the share of
the loss due to the defendant from whom he could not
collect the damages, and the liability of the other tort-
feasor would be reduced accordingly. Nothing in this
Section, or in the Comments, is intended to say that
the court may not, in a case where justice requires it,
refuse to apply the rule stated in Clause (b).

Id. As discussed in the Statement, the operator of the facility,
Brown and Bryant, is insolvent, and the governments therefore
will not be able to collect from it.

49

a. There is no basis in the record
to apportion the Railroads’ li-
ability

The Railroads’ relationship to the site does not fit
neatly into any of the categories allowing apportion-
ment set forth in the Restatement. The district court
identified no distinct harms related to California’s
response costs, such as geographically discrete areas

of contamination located in segregated areas.°

Rather, as the district court found, the Railroad
parcel and the B&B parcel constituted one facility;
the Railroad parcel was connected to the pond on the
B&B parcel by a pipe, and the contaminants of con-
cern — D-D, Nemagon and dinoseb — were released on
both parcels. The resulting ground water plume was
“indivisible.” Ud. at 172a, 174a.) The district court
expressly found that “[t]here is no evidence to quan-
tify the difference in volume of the releases” from the
two parcels. (/d. at 252a.) The court found that “[iJt is

* The district court found that there was a “hot spot” of
dinoseb contamination on the B&B parcel resulting from a 1983
tank leak. (Pet. App. 137a.) EPA spent $1.3 million on the “hot
spot.” (Pet. App. 253a.) The district court determined that Shell
was not liable for any part of the response cost. related to the
dinoseb spill cleanup, (id.), a determination that the govern-
ments did not appeal. (Pet. App. at 56a-57a.) The district court
did not make findings related to the dinoseb “hot spot” in ruling
on the Railroads’ liability. To California’s knowledge, the Rail-
roads did not argue in their petition for certiorari that the
district court’s failure to exclude costs related to the dinoseb “hot
spot” constituted error.

50

not within the realm of science to quantify the contri-
bution from the Railroad parcel over the ground
surface or through focused infiltration that has
reached the groundwater under the Site.” (Jd. at
112a.)

California and the United States incurred costs
related to soil and ground water investigation and
remediation of the entire site, including both parcels,
and neither Shell nor the Railroads presented evi-
dence at trial to divide those response costs as be-
tween the parcels. Under these circumstances, the
fact that the Railroad parcel constituted 19% of the
site is legally irrelevant to the harm at issue — the
response costs incurred by the State and federal
governments related to soil and ground water con-
tamination. California is aware of no case where a
court has apportioned liability in a CERCLA 107
action based only on the relative area of a portion of a
site containing commingled contaminants and with-
out any evidence establishing distinct harins.

Neither does this case present an example of
successive liability, conveniently severable by succes-
sive site operators taking over operation of the same
facility at successive points in time. Rather, it in-
volves liability that arises from the parties’ different
and distinct roles at the site; their liability is not
successive, but runs concurrently.

Although, as they did below, the Railroads have
taken an all-or-nothing approach in their briefs to
this Court, it may be argued that the Railroads’

51

hability should be no greater than what it would have
been under a successive liability scenario. That is, if
the Railroads assumed the operation of the Brown
and Bryant facility for the period of the 13-year lease,
they might arguably show that they should be held
liable only for the contamination that occurred in
those years, which constitutes 45% of the site’s 29-
year period of operation.

This argument is appealing, but fails for the
simple reason that, unlike the defendant chrome
plate shop operator in Bell Petroleum, the Railroads
chose not to attempt to “prove up” the volumes of
releases in each year of operation. The limited evi-
dence in the record, specifically, the five years of data
for the delivery of the single chemical D-D, suggest
that, in fact, operations, and therefore releases,
cannot be presumed to be substantially similar over
the entire period of the facility’s operation. (See Pet.
App. at 89a-90a, 253a-54a.) Accordingly, the district
court had no basis to apportion based on volumetric
or chronological data. The Railroads suggest that
Brown and Bryant took greater care in later years to
reduce releases. (Railroads Pet. 45.) This qualitative
observation, however, does not allow a court to make
any reasonable inference about the quantity of re-
leases that occurred in any given year, especially
since it is untethered to the volume of chemicals
actually delivered, stored, and distributed from the
site.

52

Divisibility of harm, similarly, is inapplicable in
this case. All chemicals, including D-D, were present
and released on all parts of the site, albeit in varying
volumes. As discussed in the Statement, numerous
activities, including the storage of chemicals and the
washing of equipment, trucks and the warehouse,
took place on the Railroad parcel. The Railroads’
connection to the facility flows from its lease to
Brown and Bryant. Because it is impossible to char-
acterize the activities of Brown and Bryant on the
western portion of its facility as severable from those
on the eastern portion, it is also impossible to sever
the Railroad parcel from the B&B parcel for purposes
of apportionment. Stated simply, the district court’s
arbitrary assignment of a value of ?/s based on the fact
that Nemagon and dinoseb were stored on the Rail-
road parcel — ignoring that D-D repeatedly was
spilled on the Railroad parcel — has no rational con-
nection to the rule of divisible harin.

The district court’s error on each of these as-
serted bases for apportionment was compounded by
the fact that the court multiplied each ungrounded
factor, at each step of the faulty equation, dramati-
cally reducing the Railroads’ fractional share of
liability. The court of appeals was correct to find the
district court’s unprecedented apportionment exercise
to be clear error.

53

b. There is no basis in the record
to apportion Shell’s liability

As discussed above, to arrive at an “equitable”
apportionment of harm for Shell, the district court
used gross sales data for the chemical D-D available
for five’ of 23 years that Shell delivered chemicals to
the site. It then used a series of court-created calcula-
tions to arrive at a ratio of D-D that spilled or leaked
on delivery, as compared to D-D that spilled or leaked
in all other aspects of Brown and Bryant’s operations.
The court calculated the percentage at 6% and appor-
tioned liability to Shell accordingly.

As with the case relating to the Railroads, there
is no evidence that the harm related to Shell’s actions
as an “arranger” is distinct from the other harms at
the facility.” The hazardous constituents in the D-D
spilled during delivery mixed and commingled with
the D-D that spilled: and leaked everywhere else
throughout the Brown and Bryant facility over the
long period that the facility was in operation. Nor
is this a case of successive injuries involving succes-
sive operators; the spills that are related to Shell’s

' As discussed in the Statement, the district court chose to
disregard D-D sales data for 1986 because the amount during
that year (26,000 gallons), in the court’s view “is so significantly
less than in other years as to be statistically aberrational.” (Pet
App. 253a.) Whether the five remaining years of data were
aberrational when compared to the other 18 years of chemical
delivery cannot be determined on the record.

* For a discussion of the dinoseb “hot spot,” see footnote 6,
supra.

54

delivery arrangement with Brown and Bryant oc-
curred contemporaneously with Brown and Bryant’s
operation.

As with the Railroads, it is possible that Shell
could have provided evidence that, at most, it should
be held liable oniy for the years during which it
arranged for delivery of chemicals — 23 of the site’s 29
years of operation (79%) — but Shell chose for strate-
gic reasons to deny all liability and net present evi-
dence relating to apportionment. The sole question,
then, is whether there was evidence in the record
sufficient to show that the harin was divisible based
on a “reasonable and rational basis” — i.e., “evidence of
the respective quantities of pollution discharged ...”
Restatement (Second) Torts § 433A cmt. d.

As the district court itself noted before proceed-
img to apportion liability, “Shell did not present
evidence how its products’ contribution to the con-
tamination at the Arvin facility can be apportioned.”
(Pet. App. 252a.) Believing that it was required to
engage in an apportionment notwithstanding Shell’s
failure of proof (id. at 237a), the district court made
its best guess at how much D-D was delivered every
year for the 23-year period that Shell acted as an
“arranger” based on five years of chemical sales
data (122,390 gallons per year); based on some gen-
eral evidence of delivery truck capacities (~4,500
gallons), its best guess at how many deliveries per
year were required to deliver the chemical (27); and
its best guess about how much chemical spilled on
average during each delivery (three gallons) based on

7 “—
"|

55

testimony that “a few cupfuls to five gallons” spilled
on every delivery, to arrive at a numerator for its
ratio (23 x 27 x 3 = 1,863 gallons spilled during
delivery).

The court then assumed that it could identify
every other activity on the Brown and Bryant site
that resulted in releases of the D-D after the chemical
was placed into the bulk tanks (e.g., transfer of D-D
from bulk storage to bobtails; transfer of D-D to rigs;
and checking of nurse tank filters); and made a series
of factually unsupported assumptions about both the
regularity of the relevant events (e.g., assumed that
bobtails were washed out 70% of the time) and the
amount of D-D that spilled or leaked at each point
(e.g., in transferring D-D from the bulk tank to the
bobtails, though “[t)he spills are not quantified ... it
is assumed that spills ranged from a cup to [a] quart”)
to arrive at the denominator for its ratio. As noted
above, the district court concluded: “The percentage of
D-D spills resulting from Shell deliveries is calculated
by dividing 1,863 gallons (the D-D spilled through
Shell controlled deliveries) by 31,212 gallons (the
total amount of D-D spills) to equal approximately
6%.”

The district court’s sua sponte, back-of-the-
envelope apportionment in this case stands in
marked contrast to that in Asarco, 280 F. Supp. 2d
1094 (D. Idaho 2003), a case cited by Shell. In Asarco,
defendant mining companies, Asarco and Hecla,
along with other mining companies released tailings
containing hazardous metals into the Coeur D’Alene

an

56

Basin over the period of many years. The parties to
the litigation retained experts to calculate the
amount of tailings released by the various companies’
ore milling. Jd. at 1104. The experts investigated the
operations of 22 mills, representing 97-98% of the
mining production in the basin. Jd. at 1105. By evalu-
ating the tonnage of material that went into each mill
as compared to the concentrate produced, historical
information on milling methods, and the type of
concentrate used, the experts estimated the total
tailings released into the basin at 64,390,000 tons,
and that Asarco’s and Hecla’s contributions were 22%
and 31% respectively. Jd. The Asarco court rightfully
noted that “estimating releases is not an exact sci-
ence” and acknowledged that “[dlivisibility of the
common harm to the Basin based on causation using
volumetric calculations may not be the ‘perfect’
method of divisibility”; based on the expert testimony,
the court held it to be “reasonable based on the his-
torical facts available in this particular case.” Jd. at
1120.

California acknowledges that in Asarco, the
parties’ experts on tailing releases necessarily esti-
mated recovery rates since there were no detailed
company records setting out this information. Jd. at
1120. The experts, however, relied on historical
evidence of milling methods in making these esti-
mates. Jd. at 1105 n.9. The evidence for divisibility
did not consist of assumptions or best guesses made
by the trier of fact, but of expert testimony, which
satisfied the requirements of Rules 702 through 706

}
|

57

of the Federal Rules of Ewidence.” The Asa@rco case
thus does not stand for the proposition that a trial
court can create its own expert evidence where defen-
@ants have failed to introduce it." The district court’s
reliance on speculation, based on its own unsupported
assumptions, constitutes clear error. The court of
appeals properly did not allow the district court’s best
guesses to substitute for evidence that would support
apportionment.

Shell contends that any rule that would deny it
apportionment in this case effectively amounts to

* Requiring evidence in the form of expert testimony rather
than allowing the trier of fact to rely on unsupported assump-
tions affords the plaintiff the opportunity to counter such
testimony with that of its own experts. California and the
United States were denied that opportunity in this case.

°° A court may, of course, make certain limited and sup-
ported assumptions in apportioning liability. Taking the Re-
statement’s example of the trespassing cattle, it may be
reasonable for a court to assume (unless there is contrary
evidence) that the cows are of a similar size and weight and tend
to behave in similar ways such that each owner is liable to the
injured farmer in proportion to the number of cows. See
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 433A cmt. d. This is eminently
reasonable where the mechanism of harm is the action of a
group of wayward cows on a single occasion, but it does not
sanction the degree of speculation in which the district court
engaged in this case. Nothing suggests that a court could, for
example, apportion the crop damage for 30 years of trespass by
assuming that the average farm has 5 cows, 5 sheep, and 5 pigs
on any given year, and the average animal escapes 3 times per
year, a cow tends to eat a pound of grain on each escape, a sheep
'/2 pound, and a pig '/s pound, and so on.

ee SS

58

mandatory joint and several liability. (Shell Br. 32.)
This argument is unsupported. In this case, the court
of appeals did mo more than apply the long-
established “rule placing the burden of proof as to
apportionment upon the defendant... .” Restatement
(Second) ef Torts § 433B cmt. d. As the Restatement
provides, the reason for the rule, which is consistent
with the purposes underlying CERCLA, is to avoid
the injustice of leaving the plaintiff to bear the costs
of harm that “has combined with similar harm”
inflieted by ethers. Jd. “In such a case, the defendant
may justly be required to assume the burden of
producing that evidence, or if he is net able te do so, of
bearing full responsibility.” Id. (emphasis added). The
same rule should apply where, as here, a defendant
chose to take an all-or-nothing approach to liability
and chese aot to submit evidence supporting appor-
tionment. California and the taxpayers should not
bear the lion’s share of the cost of the har:n for which
Shell anc the Railroads are responsible.

ce. By taking equity into considera-
tion, the district court wrongly
conflated apportionment of harm
with allocation of damages

The circuit courts of appeals have recognized that
apportionment under the Restatement and CERCLA
Section 107 is not governed by considerations of
equity, but rather by principles of causation o. harm.
See, e.g., Hercules, 247 F.3d at 718; Brighton, 153 F.3d
at 319; Monsanto, 858 F.2d at 171 n.22; Rohm &

59

Haas Co., 2 F.3d at 1280. CERCLA does not, however,
ignore equity. Rather, Congress expressly allowed
parties that have resolved their liability to the United
States or a state or that have been sued under
Section 106 or 107 of CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9606,
9607, to seek contribution from others that are liable
or potentially liable. 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(3)B); Cooper
Industries, Inc. v. Aviall Services, Inc., 543 U.S. at
165-66. The statute expressly provides that “[iJn
resolving contribution claims, the court may allocate
response costs among liable parties using such equi-
table factors as the court deems appropriate.” 42

U.S.C. § 9613(f)(1).

As this Court has noted, a defendant in a Section
107(a) suit can “blunt any inequitable distribution of
costs by filing a § 113(f) counterclaim.” United States
v. Atlantic Research Corp., U.S. , 127 S. Ct.
2331, 2339 (2007). California expresses no opinion
about whether the district court’s assumptions and
best guesses might have been appropriate in a contri-
bution proceeding where response costs would be
divided equitably as between Shell and the Railroads.
The law is clear, however, that such considerations
have no place in apportioning harm, with the result
that California, and its citizens, having no connection
to the Brown and Bryant site and having benefitted
in no way from its operation, bear 85% of the site
cleanup costs.

60

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, California respectfully
requests that the Court affirm judgment of the court
of appeals.

Dated: December 22, 2008
Respectfully submitted,

EDMUND G. BROWN JR.

Attorney General of the
State of California

JAMES HUMES

Chief Assistant Attorney General

MANUEL M. MEDEIROS

State Solicitor General

GORDON BURNS

Deputy Solicitor General

KEN ALEX

Senior Assistant
Attorney General

Counsel of Record

DONALD A. ROBINSON

Supervising Deputy
Attorney General

ANN RUSHTON

JANILL L. RICHARDS

Deputy Attorneys General

Counsel for the State of
California, Department of
Toxic Substances Control

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385015_0098%3A16. Public record. Not legal advice.
