# Respondents Brief — Alaska v. Southeast Alaska Alaska Conservation Council (No. 07-990)

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Respondents Brief
- **Published:** January 1, 2009

## Text

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IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

COEUR ALASKA, INC.,

Petitioner,

¥.

SOUTHEAST ALASKA CONSERVATION COUNCIL, ET AL.,
Respondents.

STATE OF ALASKA

Petitioner,

Vv.

SOUTHEAST ALASKA CONSERVATION COUNCIL, ET AL.,

Respondents.

On Writs of Certiorari to the
United States Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit

BRIEF FOR RESPONDENTS SOUTHEAST
ALASKA CONSERVATION COUNCIL, SIERRA
CLUB, AND LYNN CANAL CONSERVATION

THOMAS 8S. WALDO
Counsel of Record

EARTHJUSTICE

325 Fourth Street

Juneau, AK 99801

(907) 586-2751

Counsel for Respondents

ScoTT L. NELSON
PUBLIC CITIZEN

LITIGATION GROUP
1600 20™ St., NW
Washington, DC 20009
(202) 588-1000

Nos. 07-984, 07-990 7 ~ 2008
CLERK

> oa
Anne

QUESTION PRESENTED

Does the Army Corps of Engineers have authority
under section 404 of the Clean Water Act to grant a
“fill material” permit for an industrial process waste-
water discharge from a newly constructed ore benefi-
ciation mill, when the discharge is prohibited by a
new source performance standard adopted by the

Environmental Protection Agency under section 306
of the Act?

ll
PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDINGS

Respondents Southeast Alaska Conservation
Council, Sierra Club, and Lynn Canal Conservation
concur in the State of Alaska’s statement of the Par-
ties to the Proceedings.

RULE 29.6 STATEMENT

Respondents Southeast Alaska Conservation
Council, Sierra Club, and Lynn Canal Conservation
have no parent companies, subsidiaries, or affiliates
that have issued shares to the public.

iil

TABLE OF CONTENTS
ty OR 8 8 hy: ee i
PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDINGS ......................... il
Bee BD Ee IIIS Eon csc ccccccesscsccccccccccscscosesscoseess il
GI td ccnccscassssscccsecscocecccossccesens ill
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ...................................06 vi
STATUTES AND REGULATIONS
Nees snesiacscnannacl 1
EE en ee 1
a eessntaceasiensnbenaeuads 2
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT .................... cece eeeeee eens 20
a scdindiasbinsantonese 23
I. UNDER THE PLAIN LANGUAGE OF
THE CLEAN WATER ACT, THE
CORPS LACKS AUTHORITY TO PER-
MIT WASTEWATER DISCHARGES
FROM SOURCES SUBJECT TO EPA
PERFORMANCE STANDARDS. .................. 23
A. Section 306(e) Prohibits Any
Wastewater Discharge from the
EES REE ceo ee Oe 23
B. There Is No Conflict Between
Section 306(e) and Section 404................. 26
C. Section 306(e) Has No Imphed
Exception for Fill Material....................... 29
1. Courts Should Rarely Infer
EEG EL te eR 31

II.

iv

2. Sections 306 and 404 Reflect a
Deliberate Choice by Congress
Not to Include the Exception
Sought by the Corps............................ 32

3. Sections 301 and 306 Have
Independent Effect and Do Not
Depend on Other Provisions to
ied iadinisdinstintbcsevveessvese 33

4. Neither Section 402 nor Section
307 Establishes an Implied

Exception to Section 306(e)................. 36
5. The Ninth Circuit Correctly
Interpreted Section 301(a). ................. 38

D. The Language and History of the Act
Demonstrate That Congress
Intended Wastewater Discharges
from Ore Beneficiation Mills to Be
Governed by Section 402 Permits. ........... 40

E. Exempting Wastewater Discharges
Containing Solids from Effluent
Limitations Would Undermine
Congressional Goal. .........................ccce0 44

IF THE CLEAN WATER ACT WERE
AMBIGUOUS, THE COURT SHOULD
DEFER TO THE INTERPRETATION
STATED BY THE HEADS OF BOTH
AGENCIES UPON PROMULGATION

OF THE 2002 FILL RULE. .........................-. 46

Vv

A. The Agencies’ Regulations Reveal
that Some Discharges Meeting the
Definition of “Fill Material” Are
Subject to Effluent Limitations and
sg 46

B. EPA Intended the Effluent
Limitations for Ore Beneficiation
Mills to Be Applied in Permits
Under Section 402, Not 404. .................... 49

C. When the Agencies Adopted Their
New Definition of Fill Material in
2002, They Did Not Intend to
Change Past Practice...................0.ccccccceees 55

D. The Regas Memo Could Not Change
the Agencies’ Authoritative
Interpretation Published in the
NE IE cncciccsitinininnndinviianneanienimndaien 58

SO AT Ciincntisstosnnvscvtiinmeninenipinaiccndiineitiiaaaal 60
FE IED ecesicncmsisevecerenscsensccnitesetntcnmmecaiiaiainaaall la

: |

vl

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Page(s)

CASES
Alaska Prof'l Hunters Ass'n v. FAA,

177 F.3d 1030 (D.C. Cir. 1999) ..............cccceeeeeees 59
Andrus v. Glover Const. Co.,

446 U.S. 608 (1980) ............... "RLSEOE SO ae OEE 31-32
Auer v. Robbins,

I sc scnnsoseoosnonsesocsonsss 58
Chem. Mfrs. Ass’n v. NRDC,

I... cnccnccnenecesevccoovaccers 6
Chevron, U.S.A. v. NRDC,

467 U.S. 837 (1984) .............00.. cece eee 17, 20, 23, 46
E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Train,

450 UB. 113 (1977) ..........0............-. 6, 7, 24, 31, 34
Garberding v. Jenkins,

io 8. ccsnacesecsvesosconseuens 59
Gonzales v. Oregon.,

RE TS 59
Helvering v. Hammel,

i ccenesvonseens 21

Hillsborough County v. Automated Med.
Labs., Inc.,
i cipslonesaonosousnaes 58

Kalur vu. Resor,
I OS, BID ED vccccccscsccecesscocccescese 41

vl

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

Page(s)
Kentuckians for the Commonwealth v.
Rivenburgh,
317 F.3d 425 (4th Cir. 2003) ................... 11, 44, 52

Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm
Mut. Auto. Ins. Co..,
I cbomennabinainile 18, 55, 58

Nat'l Ass’n of Home Builders v. Defenders of
Wildlife,
a ii cial eceesanccndmntonedt 29

Nat'l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Gulf
Power Co..,
IER ree 28

Ohio Valley Envtl. Coal. v. U.S. Army Corps
of Eng'rs,
No, 3:05-0784, 2007 WL 2200686
i ar ek, ey Us SED... caccesencesesesenes 54

Radzanower v. Touche Ross & Co.,
ee snimainnenne 49

Reserve Mining Co. v. EPA,
514 F.2d 492 (8th Cir. 1975)................. 42, 43, 51

S.D. Warren Co. v. Maine Bd. of Envtl. Prot.,
gE SEE A ee 37

Thomas Jefferson Univ. v. Shalala,
I i lscnccanetuibomseness 58

TRW Inc. v. Andrews,
i 31

vill

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

Page(s)

United States v. Mead Corp.,

a a ae nN 59
United States v. Oakland Cannabis Buyers'

Coop.,

I A ai sciccmettstabodeoeia 31, 32
United States v. Pa. Indus. Chem. Corp.,

ee 40, 41
United States v. Republic Steel Corp.,

a cc cnssccnduswonsndsvocssoncneonads 41
United States v. Rutherford,

Oe TE in 18, 21, 31, 32
STATUTES
Administrative Procedure Act,

a socnssmmionensenelte 58
Rivers and Harbors Act § 10,

ai a lai diaciacleentanpeegdilatie 41
Refuse Act,

I acini ecetciinliis aeagaiciiasnianel 22, 40

Federal Water Pollution Control Act
Amendments of 1972 (“Clean Water Act”)

as amended:
§ 101(a)(1), 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(1)
Pees lew eens Rota hwrere 5, 21, 30, 32, 44

ix

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

Page(s)
§ 301(a), 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a)
‘ideanedbiiadibaniitladiiats 7, 33, 34, 35, 38, 39
§ 301(b), 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b)................. 6, 7, 30, 34
§ 301(c), 33 U.S.C. § 181 166)...............ccccccccsceescee 35
§ 301(e), 33 U.S.C. § 1311(e)............... 7, 17, 26, 34
§ 301(f), 33 U.S.C. § 13811(f) ................cccccesseceeees 33
§ 301(h), 33 U.S.C. § 1311Q)) ......................0eeeees 35
§ 301), 33 U.S.C. § 1311Q))................ecceceeeeee 33, 35
§ 301¢k), 38 U.S.C. § 13110%)................0cccescecceses 35
ry ee Pes BD BIND BUD csesececccccercceesccccsecceses 33
§ 301(m), 33 U.S.C. § 1311(m) .......................00. 35
© BOi¢m), BB UBC. & LBL RG) ..0...0..ccccccccccccsescesss 35
§ 301(p), 33 U.S.C. § 1311(p).............. cece eee ees 35
§ 304(a), 33 U.S.C. § 1314(a)..........0.0 ee. 1, 30
§ 304(b)-(c), 33 U.S.C.§ 1314(b)-(c)..00 eee eee 6
Sa EY PPI ci caidadandccdtusencncsocnnneas 6, 38
§ 306(a)(1), 33 U.S.C. § 1316(a)(1)
sisaiiatiielpiaelilaeitinialctacibeizen 6, 8, 25, 30, 32
§ 306(a)(2), 33 U.S.C. § 1316(a)(2) ........0. ee. 29
§ 306(a)(3), 33 U.S.C. § 1316(a)(3) ..... ee. 25, 29
© Es Se CEG. © BRI cece ccccsccscccccocecsccese 29

§ 306(d), 33 U.S.C. § 1316(d)....... cece eeeees 33

x

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

Page(s)
§ 306(e), 33 U.S.C. § 1316(e)
sonliiadiods 7, 17, 20, 24, 25, 27, 33, 34
FM Gs 7 ef: : aoe aay snree 6
§ 307(a)(5), 33 U.S.C. § 131 7(a)(5) «0... eeeeerceeeeeees 37
§ 307(d), 33 U.S.C. § 1817(d).......... ccc eeeeeeeeeenens 7
F & Le Se 5) | eee 21, 28, 35
As i Ry TE BI a cccnniccpesiniseneancacndsunsestuuatess 33
fF 8 Lit | ef Serene 38
§ 402(a)(1), 33 U.S.C. § 1342(a)(1)
ieieciasanaiaile 7, 33, 36, 37, 38, 39, 48
§ 402(a)(5), 33 U.S.C. § 1342(a)(5).......... 22, 40, 43
§ 402(k), 33 U.S.C. § 1342(k)..........00000.. 28, 37, 40
§ 404, 33 U.S.C. § 1B44..............0.0..ccescceeeees 7, 21, 36
§ 404(a), 33 U.S.C. § 1344(a)
‘sieatilaaiieidinhctadibaiiceabalie 20, 21, 27, 29, 33
§ 404(b), 33 U.S.C. § 1344(b) 0... ccececeeeeeeees 29, 37
§ 404(f), 33 U.S.C. § 1344(f) «0.0.0.0... 32, 33, 37, 50
§ 404(h), 33 U.S.C. § 1344(h) ....... ee. 37, 50
§ 404(n), 33 U.S.C. § 1344(m) ........ ee. 21, 28, 35
§ 404(p), 33 U.S.C. § 1344(p)............. 21, 28, 37, 50
§ 404(r), 33 U.S.C. § 1344(r).....cccceeeeee. 32, 37, 50
§ 404(s), 33 U.S.C. § 1344(S)......ccccccscesesseseseeeees 28

§ 405(a), 33 U.S.C. § 1345(a).................ceceessceees 33

Xl

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

Page(s)
§ 502(6), 33 U.S.C. § 1362(6).............. eee eee 29
§ 502(7), 33 U.S.C. § 1862(7).................ecceceeeseeeees 5
§ 502(11), 33 U.S.C. § 13862(11)........0 ee. 6
§ 502(12), 33 U.S.C. § 1362(12)......... ee 29
§ 502(14), 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14)......... ee. 29
§ 504(a), 33 U.S.C. § 13864 (a)... eee ee eeeee eee 33
§ 505, 33 U.S.C. § 136B....................cccccccsserees 33, 35
§ 511d), 33 U.S.C. § 1371Gd)..............cccccsesceeceees 33
CONGRESSIONAL MATERIALS:
118 Cong. Rec. 33,705-06 (1972) 2.00.0... eeeeeee eee 43
118 Cong. Rec. 33,713 (1972)...................ssecccsscoseeee 43
118 Cong. Rec. 33,765 (1972).............ccccccccccssssccsseese 42
118 Cong. Rec. 36,780 (1972).............cccccceeeceveceeeeeees 42
S. Rep. No. 92-414 (1971) ........... ee. 6, 7, 24, 31, 41
REGULATIONS
33 C.F.R.
Part 320
I i te 27
Part 323
I 11, 46

EE Tamme aes 44, 46, 57

xll

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

Page(s)
40 C.F.R.
Part 122
ESSE Rae eae oR. 7 16, 53
I I oo ss ssc eesennanednnnenenesoes 47, 50
Part 230
ST 27
Section 230.10(a)(4)-(5) ............cccccececeeeeeeeeeeee 27
Section 230.10(b)(2).........0..cccccceeeceeeeeceeeee 50, 57
Section 230.10(b)(3)-(4) ..........ccccccceeeeeseeeeeeeeee 27
Part 401
I sds ccovnidsndpoceessenssetnnonesenatbeds 3
I II . .. ccccsssisecsdacosonnecousen 3, 49
ID ccirncisvesesuscnvndisenecocsersvasieseenniened 3
REE ne a 51
Part 412
ESE IS A ITEM Le 45
NS ETE TE ee RRR SERED om 57-58
Part 440
NN ie aT RE ae 10
I oi cicccccccccscccsecetctccsedeccstecneves 10
BI II oo ccccccccvcocsccsecsesconsecsneccesenes 57
Section 440.100(a)(2)...........ccccceecececeeeeeeeeceeees 24

Be MI ccs csunscsessececceocsersccccovonsassee 26

Xlll

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

Page(s)
Section 440.104(b)(1)
Reactant 8, 15, 17, 24, 25, 47, 49
te SE UE viincctiocseidedsnicndeiandonbanniiiinn 57
RTE an ae ee SOc ene 2
ADMINISTRATIVE MATERIALS
33 Fed. Reg. 18,670 (Dec. 18, 1968) ........................ 41
36 Fed. Reg. 6564 (April 7, 1971)....................00. 40, 41
38 Fed. Reg. 24,462 (Sept. 7, 1973)...............sseceeeees 45
38 Fed. Reg. 29,008 (Oct. 18, 1973).............. eee 45
38 Fed. Reg. 33,170 (Nov. 30, 1973)...............cesseeeee 45
40 Fed. Reg. 51,722 (Nov. 6, 1975)...............0cccc000 8, 9
40 Fed. Reg. 51,748 (Nov. 6, 1975)..............c.scceseeeeees 7
42 Fed. Reg. 37,122 (July 19, 1977) ........................ 10
42 Fed. Reg. 37,294 (July 20, 1977) .............. cee ceeeees 45
44 Fed. Reg. 32,854 (June 7, 1979) ......................... 48
45 Fed. Reg. 33,290 (May 19, 1980)..................00.. 48
45 Fed. Reg. 44,926 (July 2, 1980) .................00....... 45
45 Fed. Reg. 68,328 (Oct. 14, 1980)...................0.0ee, 45
47 Fed. Reg. 25,682 (June 14, 1982)
jncccinendiemaiade 2, 3, 8, 9, 10, 50, 51, 55
47 Fed. Reg. 31,794 (July 22, 1982) ......ccccceseeee 54, 55

X1V
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued
Page(s)
47 Fed. Reg. 54,598 (Dec. 3, 1982)

49 Fed. Reg. 9108 (March 9, 1984)...............c eee 45
51 Fed. Reg. 8871 (March 14, 1986)................... 10, 52
65 Fed. Reg. 21,292 (April 20, 2000)............ 12, 14, 56
66 Fed. Reg. 2960 (Jan. 12, 2001) ............. cee cee seen 45
67 Fed. Reg. 31,129 (May 9, 2002)............... 12, 13, 56
67 Fed. Reg. 57,872 (Sept. 12, 2002)....................... 45
MISCELLANEOUS
Army Corps of Engineers, Qs and As on the
CUES eee 13
Kate Golden, EPA puzzled by Coeur Alaska
pullout, Juneau Empire, Sept. 25, 2008............ 19

Robert W. Adler, Jessica C. Landman, &
Diane M. Cameron, The Clean Water Act
a siunsosnnatiansosse 30

The Chicago Manual of Style (15th ed. 2003)......... 47

STATUTES AND REGULATIONS INVOLVED

Relevant portions of the statutes and regulations
involved in this case, including Clean Water Act sec-
tions 301, 304, 306, 307, 309, 402, 404, and 502 (33
U.S.C. §§ 1311, 1314, 1316, 1317, 1319, 1342, 1344,
1362), 33 C.F.R. § 323.2, and 40 C.F.R. §§ 122.2,
122.3, 230.10, 401.11, 440.100, 440.104, and 440.132,
are reproduced in the appendix to this brief.

INTRODUCTION

The Clean Water Act identifies by name just four
“conventional pollutants” that the Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) must regulate, two of which
are suspended solids and pH. 33 U.S.C. § 1314(a)(4).
One of the most common technologies for removing
suspended solids is the settling pond, an artificial
structure that allows solids to settle out before any
wastewater is discharged into navigable waters. In
adopting effluent limitations, the Act’s principal
regulatory mechanism for controlling pollution, EPA
has identified settling ponds as the best technology
for many industries to reduce or eliminate suspended
solids.

At issue here is whether a new source of pollution
may escape strict EPA performance standards by us-
ing a navigable lake as its settling pond. ‘I'he type of
source here—a newly constructed mill for processing
gold ores—has been subject to EPA effluent limita-
tions since 1975 and to a new source performance
standard prohibiting any wastewater discharges
since 1982. In an unprecedented decision, the Army
Corps of Engineers granted a permit to discharge the

2

mill’s process wastewater directly into a lake as “fill
material,” bypassing EPA’s no-discharge standard.
The Corps acknowledged that the mill would use the
lake as a “settling pond” to remove suspended solids
and dilute elevated pH. J.A. 360a.

While this approach is undeniably cheaper for the
mill owner, it defeats the purpose of the Clean Water
Act and EPA’s effluent limitations, which is to re-
duce or eliminate pollutants before they are dis-
charged to navigable waters. More to the point, it
violates both the plain language of the Act and the
stated intent of the agencies when they adopted the
relevant regulations. Upholding this approach would
vitiate the effluent limitations not only for ore mills,
but for the many other industrial sources whose
process wastewater contains significant quantities of
suspended solids.

STATEMENT

1. Beneficiation mills process ores to make them
suitable for refining or smelting. See 40 C.F.R.
§ 440.132(f). In the “froth-flotation” process, a mill
grinds large quantities of ore into fine particles and
introduces water, air, and chemicals in large tanks.
The mill at the Kensington Mine, for example, will
use potassium amyl xanthate (a conditioner), MIBC
(a frother), flocculants, polymers, surfactants, scale
inhibitors, and lime. This process creates a gold-
bearing froth that floats to the top and is removed for
further processing off-site. See J.A. 189a-9la; 47
Fed. Reg. 25,682, 25,684 (June 14, 1982).

Left in the tanks is process wastewater, a slurry
consisting of water, chemicals, metals, and sus-

3

pended solids (or “tailings”).' According to EPA,
process wastewater from froth-flotation mills “is
characterized by very high suspended solids levels
(often in the percent range rather than milligrams
per liter), high metals levels, and process reagents
such as cyanide.” 47 Fed. Reg. at 25,685. Metals
dissolved in the wastewater are reduced by raising
the pH, typically with lime, causing the metals to
precipitate. Jd. at 25,691, 25,692. The resulting ele-
vated pH levels can be toxic to aquatic life. See J.A.
206a.

The process wastewater from the froth-flotation
mill at the Kensington Mine will be 70% water and
30% solids by volume. See J.A. 304a (total slurry

' “Tailings” is an imprecise term, undefined in the statutes
and regulations at issue. Petitioners and the Corps most often
use it to refer to the solid component of the process wastewater.
See, e.g., Fed. Br. at 6; Coeur Br. at 6; State Br. at 12. How-
ever, record documents sometimes use it to refer to the entire
wastewater slurry. See, e.g., J.A. 192a (describing tailings as
material remaining in flotation tanks after processing and
transported as slurry), 206a (measuring tailings in gallons per
minute), 263a (requiring monitoring of dissolved solids in tail-
ings).

EPA’s regulations define “process wastewater” to include
any water that comes into contact with, or results from the pro-
duction of, any waste product. 40 C.F.R. § 401.11(q). It in-
cludes “pollutants,” such as “solid waste,” id. § 401.11(f),
“present in process waste water.” Jd. § 401.11(r). EPA uses the
term to describe discharges with high levels of suspended sol-
ids, see 47 Fed. Reg. at 25,685, “including mine tailings.” J.A.
291a.

There is no dispute that the discharge in this case is process
wastewater. The section 404 permit at issue authorizes dis-
charge of the entire wastewater slurry, not just the solids. See
J.A. 275a (4 10), 304a, 360a-61a.

4

throughput will be 354 gallons per minute, of which
247 will be water). By weight, it will be about 45%
water and 55% solids. Jd. It will be sufficiently liq-
uid to flow at a rate of 354 gallons per minute, by
gravity, for 3.5 miles through a 6-inch pipe without
clogging. See id.; J.A. 194a. At this rate, the dis-
charge would be about 510,000 gallons per day.?

If discharged into a lake, river, stream, or wet-
land, the process wastewater of the Kensington mill
would, like that of other such mills, cause substan-
tial pollution. The wastewater will have a pH of
about 10, which would be toxic to aquatic life and ex-
pected to dilute in the lake. J.A. 206a, 360a. It will
contain “trace concentrations of metals bearing sul-
fides, metal oxides, metal sulfates, and carbonate
salts.” J.A. 343a. Tests of decant water (wastewater
samples after the solids have settled) revealed vary-
ing traces of 18 metals, including aluminum, chro-
mium, copper, lead, and mercury. ER 334.°

The discharge would kill all fish in Lower Slate
Lake and most other aquatic life. J.A. 197a, 374a.
Whether aquatic life would be able to repopulate the
lake after discharges ceased is uncertain. Two tests
of the toxic effects of settled solids from the process
wastewater on freshwater organisms showed clear

2 An appendix to the Environmental Impact Statement as-
sumed that the volume would be abvuut 148 gallons per minute,
or 210,000 gallons per day. J.A. 206a. The record does not ex-
plain this discrepancy, but in any event there will be a substan-
tial volume of process wastewater containing a high level of
suspended solids.

3 ER stands for the Excerpts of Record in the Ninth Circuit.
SER stands for the Supplemental Excerpts of Record.

5

harm to biological productivity. In one test, only 5%
of tested organisms survived in the “tailings sedi-
ments,” far below the EPA’s minimum allowable rate
of 80%. J.A. 201la. In the other, organisms survived
but showed “a statistically significant reduced emer-
gence rate,” below EPA’s recommended endpoint. Id.
The agencies saw “some uncertainty” in these re-
sults, but found that a reasonable worst-case as-
sumption was that “the tailings would not support
macroinvertebrates after closure....” J.A. 202a. To
mitigate these toxic effects, the owner would be re-
quired to cap the lake bottom with four inches of na-
tive material when discharges cease. J.A. 309a. The
administrative record contains no studies demon-
strating the efficacy of this requirement. EPA, not-
ing the uncertainty, concluded that “the weight of
the evidence suggests that restoring and ‘improving’
the lake would take decades, not years.” ER 429.

2. In the Clean Water Act, Congress established
a “national goal that the discharge of pollutants into
the navigable waters be eliminated by 1985....”. 33
U.S.C. §1251(a)(1).4 Though the goal was not
achieved, the measures enacted to pursue it remain
in place.

To achieve this goal, Congress mandated the use
of different technologies and standards for different
sources of pollution. Section 301(b) requires EPA to
adopt technology-based effluent limitations for exist-
ing pollution sources, to become increasingly strin-

4 “Navigable waters” ‘« defined as “waters of the United
States,” 33 U.S.C. § 1362,,), and this brief uses the terms inter-
changeably.

6

gent over time. See id. § 1311(b); Chem. Mfrs. Ass’n
v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 470 U.S. 116, 118
(1985); EI. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Train, 430
U.S. 112, 121 (1977). Section 306 requires the
agency to adopt even more stringent effluent limita-
tions—called standards of performance'—for new
sources. 33 U.S.C. § 1316. Section 307 requires spe-
cial effluent limitations for toxic pollutants. /d.
§ 1317(a). Section 304 requires EPA to publish “ef-
fluent limitation guidelines” providing information
about technologies available to reduce and eliminate
pollution from different sources and to comply with
effluent limitations and performance standards. Id.

§ 1314(b)-(c).

The strictest standards are for new sources under
section 306, because those sources present the best
opportunity to achieve the Congressional goal of
eliminating discharges. These national performance
standards must reflect “the greatest degree of efflu-
ent reduction which [EPA] determines to be achiev-
able through application of the best available
demonstrated control technology....” Id. § 1316(a){1).
The Act directs EPA to adopt, “where practicable, a
standard permitting no discharge of pollutants.” Td.
With these standards, Congress “intended to insure
national uniformity and ‘maximum feasible control of
new sources.” Du Pont, 430 U.S. at 138 (quoting S.
Rep. No. 92-414, at 58 (1971), reprinted in 1972
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3668, 3724). The Senate Report cited
in Du Pont states that “this section ... is among the

5 The Act’s definition of “effluent limitation” includes a
standard of performance. See 33 U.S.C. §§ 1316(a)({1), 1362(11).

7

most significant in the legislation.” S. Rep. No.
92-414, at 57, 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3723-24. The fo-
cus on new construction “is considered by the Com-
mittee to be the most effective and, in the long run,
the least expensive approach to pollution control.”
Id. at 58, 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3724.

The Act’s reliance on technology means that there
are no limitations generally applicable to all pollu-
tion sources. Rather, limitations are different for
each source category, depending on what control
technologies are available and feasible. See generally
Du Pont, 430 U.S. at 126-30.

The Act requires all sources to comply with any
applicable effluent limitations under sections 301,
306, and 307. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311(a), (b), (e), 1316(e),
1317(d). Section 402 of the Act directs EPA to estab-
lish the “National Pollutant Discharge Elimination
System” (NPDES), requiring individual sources to
obtain permits conditioned on compliance with these
limitations. Id. § 1342. Section 404 authorizes the
Army Corps of Engineers to issue permits for the dis-
charge of one type of pollutant, dredged or fill mate-
rial, subject to guidelines developed in conjunction
with EPA. Jd. § 1344. If a discharge is authorized by
a valid fill-material permit under section 404, a sec-
tion 402 permit is not required. ld. § 1342(a)(1)
(“Except as provided in sections [318] and [404]...”).

3. Recognizing the severe adverse effects of proc-
ess wastewater discharges from ore beneficiating
mills, EPA in 1975 identified “ore mining and dress-
ing” as a category of sources of pollution under the
Clean Water Act. 40 Fed. Reg. 51,748 (Nov. 6, 1975).
Simultaneously, the agency adopted rules describing
waste characteristics of various ore-processing mills,

8

identifying best technologies to control discharges,
and setting limits for total suspended solids, pH, and
various metals in discharges from existing sources.
See 40 Fed. Reg. 51,722 (Nov. 6, 1975). Included
were limitations for mills using the froth-flotation
process for gold ores. Jd. at 51,732 (adopting 40
C.F.R. § 440.22(a)(2)).

In 1982, EPA adopted a strict no-discharge stan-
dard, which remains in effect today, for new froth-
flotation mills: “there shall be no discharge of proc-
ess wastewater to navigable waters from mills that
use the froth-flotation process ... for the beneficiation
of ... gold ... ores....”. 40 C.F.R. § 440.104(b)(1); see
47 Fed. Reg. 54,598, 54,619 (Dec. 3, 1982). EPA ex-
plained the no-discharge standard for new facilities
as follows:

New facilities have the opportunity to im-
plement the best and most efficient ore min-
ing and milling processes and wastewater
technologies. Accordingly, Congress directed
EPA to consider the best demonstrated proc-
ess changes and end-of-pipe treatment tech-
nologies capable of reducing pollution to the
maximum extent feasible through a standard
of performance which includes, “where prac-
ticable, a standard permitting no discharge of
pollutants.”

47 Fed. Reg. at 25,696 (quoting 33 U.S.C.
§ 1316(a)(1)). The agency noted that while some ex-
isting sources would require expensive retrofitting to
achieve zero discharge, “[t]his concern does not apply
to new sources,” which can be designed to meet the
standard. Id. at 25,697.

9

In both the 1975 and 1982 rules, EPA identified
essentially the same best control technology: re-
moval of solids in large settling ponds, usually called
tailings ponds or impoundments, preceded by lime-
precipitation. See 40 Fed. Reg. at 51,724 (subpart
B(2)); 47 Fed. Reg. at 25,691. For new sources, the
agency found that it was possible to achieve zero dis-
charge by recycling water from tailings ponds back to
the mill: “Raw wastewater discharged from a typical
ore mill is usually routed to a settling pond for sus-
pended solids and metals removal. In complete recy-
cle, all treated water is routed back to the mill for
reuse in the beneficiating process.” 47 Fed. Reg.
at 25,692.

EPA found that 46 out of 90 existing facilities
were already achieving zero discharge through com-
plete recycling. 47 Fed. Reg. at 54,602. The agency
rejected arguments that zero discharge would be too
expensive in wet or mountainous areas (like Alaska),

finding that it had been successfully achieved in
both. Id.

Addressing permitting requirements, EPA ex-
plained that the effluent limitations and perform-
ance standards “will be applied to individual ore
mines and mills through NPDES permits issued by
EPA ... under Section 402 of the Act.” Jd. at 54,606
(emphasis added). Notwithstanding the high solid
content of process wastewater from these mills, see
47 Fed. Reg. at 25,685, EPA nowhere suggested that
the Corps could permit these discharges as “fill ma-
terial.” Nor did EPA suggest that a mill could use a
navigable lake as its settling pond, which would have
directly contradicted the plain language of the rule
prohibiting discharges to navigable waters.

10

4. Throughout most of the history of the Clean
Water Act, the Corps’ regulations explicitly pre-
cluded the use of a “fill material” permit to discharge
process wastewater. From 1977 until 2002, the
Corps’ regulatory definition of “fill material” ex-
cluded “any pollutant discharged into the water pri-
marily to dispose of waste, as that activity is
regulated under Section 402 of the Clean Water Act.”
J.A. 27a (quoting former 33 C.F.R. § 323.2(e); em-
phasis added by agencies); see 42 Fed. Reg. 37,122,
37,145 (July 19, 1977). EPA had a much broader
definition of “fill material,” encompassing discharges
with the “effect” of fill, see J.A. 27a, but EPA does not
issue section 404 permits.

To resolve confusion created by their different
definitions of “fill material,” the two agencies entered
into a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) in 1986.
See 51 Fed. Reg. 8,871 (March 14, 1986). The MOA
confirmed that “a pollutant ... will normally be con-
sidered by EPA and the Corps to be subject to section
402 if it is a discharge in liquid, semi-liquid, or sus-
pended form,” like the wastewater discharge from
the Kensington mill. /d. at 8,872 § B.5. The MOA
cited “titanium mining wastes” as one example of
such a discharge. Jd. EPA had adopted performance
standards for titanium mining wastes, including
those from mills using flotation methods, in the same
rulemaking that established the gold ore beneficia-
ting rule in this case. See 47 Fed. Reg. at 54,614-15
(adopting 40 C.F.R. §§ 440.52(b) and 440.54(b)).
Wastewater discharges from titanium mills, like
those from gold mills, are high in suspended solids
and metals, and require the use of settling ponds and
pH adjustment as primary treatment technologies.
See 47 Fed. Reg. at 25,687.

11

Under the MOA and the Corps’ former regula-
tions, the Corps did not grant section 404 permits for
discharges subject to EPA effluent limitations. See
Kentuckians for the Commonwealth v. Rivenburgh,
317 F.3d 425, 445, 448 (4th Cir. 2003). Rather, EPA
granted section 402 permits for these discharges,
even if they met EPA’s effect-based definition of “fill
material.” J.A. 83a-84a. This longstanding practice
recognized that even if a discharge could be defined
as “fill material,” it was not eligible for a section 404
permit if it was subject to an effluent limitation.

Acting in accordance with the performance stan-
dards and longstanding regulatory policies of the
agencies, Coeur Alaska applied for and obtained
permits in 1997 to open the Kensington Mine using a
“dry tailings facility” on land near Comet Beach.
J.A. 165a, 177a-78a; ER 232-39, 252-62. This design
“is a standard industry technology in use at other
mines in Alaska.” ER 450; see also SER 837 44 10-11
(describing other mines using dry tailings -facilities).
It would not have involved any discharge of process
wastewater into navigable waters. ER 235 (“Waste-
water from the milling process would be recycled.”).
These permits were never challenged in court. Nev-
ertheless, Coeur abandoned this option and never
opened the mine under these permits. J.A. 161la.

5. In 2000, the Corps and EPA jointly proposed a
new definition of “fill material’—finalized in 2002—
intended to harmonize the agencies’ differing defini-
tions. Following EPA’s approach, the new definition
includes any material that “has the effect of ...
[clhanging the bottom elevation of any portion of a
water of the United States.” 33 =C.F.R.
§ 323.2(e)(1)(Gi). In adopting the rule, the agencies

12

stated that it “is generally consistent with current
agency practice and so it does not expand the types
cf discharges that will be covered under section 404.”
67 Fed. Reg. 31,129, 31,133 (May 9, 2002); see also
id. at 31,130, 31,132, 31,135; J.A. 46a, 47a-48a, 83a-
84a.

The rule as proposed would have included an ex-
plicit exception for discharges subject to effluent
limitations:

The term fill material does not include
discharges covered by proposed or final efflu-
ent limitations guidelines and standards un-
der sections 301, 304 or section 306 of the
Clean Water Act (see generally, 40 CFR part
401), or discharges covered by an NPDES
permit issued under section 402 of the Clean
Water Act.

65 Fed. Reg. 21,292, 21,299 (April 20, 2000). The
agencies explained that this approach was consistent
with the approach they had taken for many years
under the 1986 MOA, and they specifically refer-
enced paragraph B.5 of the MOA, providing that dis-
charges “in liquid, semi-liquid, or suspended form”
require section 402 permits. Jd. at 21,297.

The agencies decided not to include the express
exception in the final rule, but they stated explicitly,
repeatedly, and consistently that they intended the
rule to retain the same effect. They deleted the pro-
vision because of concerns that it was vague, that it
inappropriately relied on “proposed” effluent limita-
tions, and that it was unclear whether it was in-
tended to cover future effluent limitations or only
those then in effect. 67 Fed. Rey. at 31,135. The

13

agencies explained: “[A]lthough we have removed
the language in question from the rule itself, we em-
phasize that today’s rule generally is intended to
maintain our existing approach to regulating pollut-
ants under either section 402 or 404 of the CWA.”
Id.; see also id. at 31,130, 31,133. Thus, “[iJf EPA
has previously determined that a discharge is cov-
ered by an |effluent limitation guideline], that de-
termination is not altered by today’s rule.” J.A. 46a;
see also J.A. 47a-48a, 83a-84a. They offered the
same explanation to the public in a document posted
on the Corps’ website: “Although the effluent guide-
line provision in the proposed regulatory language
was removed, because commenters found it confus-
ing, the approach that would be followed with re-
spect to effluent guidelines would remain the same
as in the proposal.” Qs and As on the “Fill” Rule at 2,
available at www.usace.army.mil/cw/cecwo/reg/
fillqas.pdf (last visited Nov. 4, 2008).

The agencies reiterated this point with reference
to the precise circumstances of this case, where mine
tailings meet the new definition of fill material and
are also subject to effluent limitations. Responding
to a comment expressing confusion over whether
“mine tailings” would be subject to section 402 or
404, the agencies first stated the general principle
that “slurry” and “tailings” are considered fill mate-
rial under the new definition. J.A. 47a-48a. The

6 The Response to Comments document, J.A. 22a-127a, was
part of the agencies’ explanation for the final rule, cited in the
Federal Register and incorporated into the administrative re-
cord. 67 Fed. Reg. at 31.131.

14

agencies immediately qualified that statement as fol-
lows:

Nevertheless, if EPA has previously deter-
mined that certain materials are subject to
an [effluent limitation guideline] under spe-
cific circumstances, then that determination
remains valid. Moreover, NPDES permits is-
sued pursuant to section 402 are intended to
regulate process water and provide effluent
limits that are protective of receiving water
quality. This distinction provides the frame-
work for today’s rule.

J.A. 48a.

The agencies reiterated this point by reference to
paragraph B.5. of the 1986 MOA, which provides
that mining wastewater with suspended solids is
subject to section 402. “As explained in the proposed
rule’s preamble (65 FR 21296), many of the dis-
charges referred to in Section B.5. of the 1986 MOA
are subject to effluent guidelines and NPDES per-
mitting, and today’s rule would not alter that exist-
ing scheme.” J.A. 83a-84a. The Federal Register
page cited in this sentence explained that discharges
subject to effluent hmitations and performance stan-
dards would continue to require section 402 permits
and listed titanium mining wastes—which are func-
tionally indistinguishable from gold mining wastes—
as an example. 65 Fed. Reg. at 21,296. The agencies
also stated that the 1986 MOA remains in effect,
even after adoption of the new rule. J.A. 87a.

Denying that they had weakened the regulation
to allow impermissible waste disposal, the agencies
stated that “the suggestion that this rulemaking now

15

provides a legal basis for previously illegal activities
is not the case—no discharges that were previously
prohibited are now authorized as a result of this
rulemaking.” J.A. 32a. Process wastewater dis-
charges from new gold ore beneficiation mills were,
of course, “previously prohibited.” IJd.; see 40 C.F.R.
§ 440.104(b)(1).

6. In 2001, while the proposed rule-change was
pending, Coeur Alaska submitted its application for
a revised plan of operations for the Kensington Mine,
which abandoned the dry tailings facility permitted
in 1997 in favor of the less expensive option of dis-
charging wastewater directly to Lower Slate Lake.
J.A. 165a, 175a, 182a-83a. As the Corps later ex-
plained in its Record of Decision, “Lower Slate Lake
will be used as the settling pond and disposal site for
the tailings generated from the mill.” J.A. 360a.

Two years after the 2002 rule-change, EPA and
the Corps decided to consider Coeur’s request for a
permit under section 404 rather than enforce EPA’s
no-discharge performance standard. Despite the
clear statements published in the Federal Register
by the heads of both agencies with the promulgation
of the final rule that EPA effluent hmitations would
govern such situations, lower-ranking officials re-
versed course in an internal agency memo (the “Re-
gas memo’) that was never published or made
available for public comment. J.A. 14la-49a. ‘lhe
memo purported to interpret the 2002 fill rule but
disregarded the agencies’ statements in adopting
that rule that they intended to continue their prac-
tice of requiring section 402 permits for discharges
subject to effluent hmitations. J.A. 143a-45a. Ignor-
ing those statements and section 306’s prohibition of

16

all discharges in violation of performance standards,
the memo concluded that the discharge of “tailings”
from the Kensington Mine could be permitted as a
discharge of “fill material” under section 404 and was
exempt from otherwise applicable effluent limita-
tions. Id.

In considering Coeur’s permit application, the
federal agencies disagreed among themselves as to
which alternative was environmentally preferable.
While the Corps concluded that lake disposal was the
best option, J.A. 366a, EPA argued that the dry tail-
ings alternative permitted in 1997 was preferable.
J.A. 295a, 298a-300a. EPA noted that the dry tail-
ings facility “is the only alternative that avoids the
habitat loss and the loss of natural ecological func-
tions in Lower Slate Lake during mine operations.”
J.A. 299a. While the Corps focused on the acreage of
forested wetlands lost with the dry tailings facility,
J.A. 364a-66a, EPA focused on the quality of habitat:
“EPA believes that forested wetlands are far more
plentiful, and of far less ecological value at this loca-
tion, than lacustrine and palustrine emergent wet-
lands, which are rare and ecologically important at
this location.” ER 455; see also J.A. 204a (“Lower
Slate Lake provides high values for fish habitat [and]
high values for wildlife habitat”). The Forest Service
found the alternatives equal. J.A. 224a-2da.

Importantly, both the Corps and EPA agreed that
discharges to Lower Slate Lake were not exempt
from Clean Water Act compliance on the ground that
the lake could be deemed a “waste treatment sys-
tem,” which would exclude it from “waters of the
United States” under the Act. See J.A. 145a-146a; 40
C.F.R. § 122.2 (definition of “Waters of the United

17

States”).? Recognizing that the lake is a navigable
water body under the Act, the Corps issued the sec-
tion 404 permit on June 17, 2005. J.A. 266a-86a.

7. Respondents Southeast Alaska Conservation
Council, et al., (collectively “SEACC”) promptly filed
this action, alleging that the permit violates sections
301(e) and 306(e) of the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C.
§§ 1311(e), 1316(e), because it fails to comply with
the no-discharge performance standard for new
froth-flotation mills. See 40 C.F.R. § 440.104(b)(1);
J.A. 473a-75a. SEACC alleged in the alternative
that, if the 2002 revised definition of “fill material”
were interpreted to allow the direct discharge into
Lower Slate Lake, the rule itself would be arbitrary,
capricious, and contrary to the Act. J.A. 475a, § 72.

The district court entered summary judgment for
the Corps. J.A. 478a-96a. The premise of the court’s
holding was that the new “fill material” definition
includes mine tailings. The court dismissed sections
301 and 306 without analysis and did not address
the agencies’ intent regarding the relationship be-
tween effluent limitations and the new fill rule. J.A.
488a n.35, 490a-95a.

The Ninth Circuit reversed. The court began
with the language of the Act, as required by Chevron,
U.S.A. v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984). J.A.
527a. The court concluded that the plain language of

7 The Alaska Department of Environmental Conservation,
by contrast, was able to certify the discharge as consistent with
state water-quality standards only by deciding that the lake
would become a “treatment work” under state law, exempting it
from the standards. J.A. 258a.

18

sections 301(a), 301(e), and 306(e) prohibits any dis-
charge that does not comply with applicable effluent
limitations and performance standards. J.A. 531la.
Addressing Petitioners’ arguments that sections 402
and 404 of the Act implied an exception to these pro-
visions, the court applied this Court’s well-
established rule that “[e]xceptions to clearly deline-
ated statutes will be implied only where essential to
prevent ‘absurd results’ or consequences obviously at
variance with the policy of the enactment as a
whole.” J.A. 532a (quoting United States v. Ruther-
ford, 442 U.S. 544, 552 (1979)). The court reviewed
each of the Corps’ and Petitioners’ arguments for an
implied exception and found they did not meet this
standard. J.A. 532a-35a.

Although the court found the language of the Act
sufficient to decide the case, it also considered the
agencies intent when they adopted both relevant
regulations—the performance standard and the defi-
nition of fill material. The court reviewed the regu-
latory history and concluded that the new definition
of fill material was not intended to create an excep-
tion to effluent limitations. J.A. 535a-46a. “The
agencies could not have been more clear in articulat-
ing that this would be their preferred approach.”
J.A. 546a.

The court also concluded that if the agencies in-
tended to repeal or create an exception to the long-
standing regulations governing froth-flotation mills,
they were “obligated to supply a reasoned analysis
for the change.” J.A. 547a (quoting Motor Vehicle
Mfrs. Ass'n of U.S. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.,
463 U.S. 29, 42 (1983)). The court found that the
agencies had said just the opposite: that they in-

19

tended no change in their past practice. If the rule’s
effect differed from the agencies’ stated intent, the
rule would be arbitrary and capricious. J.A. 547a-
48a.

Finally, in addressing whether to apply the “fill
material” definition or the performance standard for
froth-flotation mills to the discharge, the court ap-
plied the familiar principle that the more specific
rule—here, the performance standard—governs.
J.A. 548a.

The Ninth Circuit denied a petition for rehearing
en banc, with no active judge requesting a vote on
the petition. J.A. 552a-53a.

Shortly after the appellate court’s decision, Coeur
and SEACC entered into discussions mediated by the
mayor of Juneau for the purpose of finding a tailings
disposal site that would comply with the Clean Wa-
ter Act. As a result, Cocur agreed to pursue permits
for a facility on the upland site authorized in 1997.
The new proposal would deposit the tailings in
“paste” form and would not discharge process waste-
water into navigable waters. See http://www.juncau
org/clerk/misc/news_items/2007-11-15_Kensington_
Corrected_Version.pdf. Shortly after submitting its
opening brief in this Court, as the agencies neared
the end of their review process, Coeur abruptly with-
drew its application. See Kate Golden, EPA puzzled
by Coeur Alaska pullout, Juneau Empire, Sept. 25,
2008, at 1, available at http://www.juneauempire
.com/stories/092508/sta_3°S770591.shtml.

20

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

The dispute in this case—whether a process
wastewater discharge meeting the agencies’ defini-
tion of “fill material” is exempt from EPA perform-
ance standards—turns on the interplay between
sections 306 and 404 of the Clean Water Act. Section
306(e) declares categorically that “it shall be unlaw-
ful” to operate any new source in violation of any ap-
plicable performance standard, and lists. no
exceptions. 33 U.S.C. § 1316(e). Section 404(a) pro-
vides that the Corps “may” issue permits for the dis-
charge of “fill material,” but does not exempt the
Corps from compliance with other provisions of law
in exercising this discretionary authority. Id.
§ 1344(a). In this case, the process wastewater dis-
charge from the Kensington Mine’s beneficiation mill
is prohibited by a new source performance standard
adopted by EPA, but it also meets the agencies’ new
definition of “fill material,” because its suspended

solids will settle and raise the bottom elevation of
Lower Slate Lake.

To resolve this question, the Court follows the
two-step approach articulated in Chevron, 467 U.S.
at 842-43, focusing first on the language of the stat-
ute and second, if necessary, on the agency's inter-
pretation of any statutory ambiguities or gaps that
Congress intended the agency to fill.

Congress has spoken directly to the question pre-
sented. Section 306(c) of the Clean Water Act de-
clares in plain terms a categorical prohibition,
unambiguously applicable to the Kensington mill.
See 33 U.S.C. § 1316(e). Section 404 does not set
forth any exceptions to the prohibition. but merely

21

authorizes the Corps to issue permits for fill-material
discharges. See id. § 1344. Section 404 explicitly al-
lows EPA to take enforcement actions for violations
of section 306, id. §§ 1344(n), 1319(a)(3), (b),
(c)(1)-(3), (d), (g)(1), and does not shield permittees
from enforcement of section 306. Jd. § 1344(p).

Petitioners and the Corps urge the Court to find
an imphed exception to section 306(e) for any dis-
charge that meets the agencies’ new definition of “fill
material,” but the Court will do so only if applying
the plain terms of the statute would cause “absurd
results’ or consequences obviously at variance with
the policy of the enactment as a whole.” Rutherford,
442 U.S. at 552 (quoting Helvering v. Hammel, 311
U.S. 504, 510-11 (1941)). Applying the plain lan-
guage of section 306(e) produces results that are nei-
ther absurd nor at variance with the Act’s purposes.
To the contrary, it much better serves the explicit
Congressional goal of eliminating all discharges of
pollutants to navigable waters. See 33 U.S.C.
§ 1251(a)(1).

This result does not conflict with section 404.
That section is merely a grant of discretionary au-
thority to the Corps. See id. § 1344(a). In exercising
this authority, the Corps must respect other applica-
ble laws, including section 306(e). Because section
404 makes no provision for the Corps to incorporate
applicable section 306 performance standards in its
permits, discharges from sources subject to perform-
ance standards must be permitted, if at all, under
section 402.

The legislative history of the Act supports this
plain-language interpretation. ‘The Act designates
the NPDES permit program administered by EPA

22

under section 402 as the successor to the Corps’ for-
mer permit program under the Refuse Act, 33 U.S.C.
§ 407. See id. § 1342(a)(5). EPA and the Corps had
required over 20,000 industrial sources to apply for
permits under that program, among them Reserve
Mining Company’s iron-ore beneficiation mill, which
was then discharging its process wastewater as a
tailings slurry into Lake Superior. Congress specifi-
cally discussed this case in its deliberations, reveal-
ing an intent that industrial sources like Reserve
Mining would be subject to permits under section
402, not 404.

Because the statute is clear, there is no need to
consider the agency’s interpretation under Chevron
step two. However. even if the Act were ambiguous,
the agencies directly addressed this question when
they adopted the 2002 fill rule and stated in no un-
certain terms that, in changing the definition of “fill
material,” they did not intend to authorize the Corps
to issue permits for discharges subject to effluent
limitations. Such an authorization would have been
a reversal of longstanding practice, which they made
clear they did not intend. This interpretation,
adopted by the heads of the agencies and published
in the Federal Register, is reasonable and entitled to
deference.

The subsequent reinterpretation of the 2002 fill
rule for the Kensington Mine is not entitled to defer-
ence. The Regas memo was written by subordinate
agency officials and neither published nor made
available for public comment. It purports to construe
the 2002 rule but ignores the repeated statements in
the Federal Register and the rulemaking record that
the agencies did not intend to change their long-

23

standing practice of applying effluent limitations—
specifically including those applicable to mine tail-
ings—through section 402 permits. The agencies’
new position would effectively nullify EPA’s per-
formance standard, again without explanation.
Thus, even if the Corps’ position in this case could be
squared with the text of the regulations at issue—
which it cannot—it would not be a construction wor-
thy of deference.

ARGUMENT

I. UNDER THE PLAIN LANGUAGE OF THE
CLEAN WATER ACT, THE CORPS LACKS
AUTHORITY TO PERMIT WASTEWATER
DISCHARGES FROM SOURCES SUBJECT
TO EPA PERFORMANCE STANDARDS.

To determine whether the Clean Water Act ex-
empts discharges defined as “fill material” from sec-
tion 306(e), one must begin with the language of the
statute. “First, always, is the question whether Con-
gress has directly spoken to the precise question at
issue. If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the
end of the matter....” Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842. The
Court uses “traditional tools of statutory construc-
tion” in making this determination. Jd. at 843 n.9.

A. Section 306(e) Prohibits Any Wastewater
Discharge from the Kensington Mill.

Section 306(e) of the Act provides in its entirety:

24

After the effective date of standards of per-
formance promulgated under this section, it
shall be unlawful for any owner or operator
of any new source to operate such source in
violation of any standard of performance ap-
plicable to such source.

33 U.S.C. § 1316(e). Because 306(e) contains no ex-
ceptions—a conspicuous absence in a statute other-
wise replete with highly detailed exceptions—this
Court has observed that performance standards are
“absolute prohibitions” and that “a variance provi-
sion would be inappropriate in a standard that was
intended to insure national uniformity and ‘maxi-
mum feasible control of new sources.” Du Pont, 430
U.S. at 138 (quoting S. Rep. No. 92-414, at 58, 1972
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3724).

The no-discharge standard at 40 C.F.R.
§ 440.104(b)(1), adopted under section 306, unambi-
guously applies to the new mill at the Kensington
Mine. The regulation’s applicability provision leaves
no room for interpretation: “The provisions of this
subpart J are applicable to discharges from ... Mills
that use the froth-flotation process ... for the benefi-
cet of ... @On ... GOR... 40 C.F.R.
§ 440.100(a)(2). The standard itself further verifies
that it applies to the Kensington mill by prohibiting
discharges “from mills that use the froth-flotation
process ... for the beneficiation of ... gold ... ores....”
Id. § 440.104(b)(1). EPA confirmed that “the New
Source Performance Standards (NSPS) for gold
mines and mills are applicable to the [Kensington]
project (40 CFR 440.104).” JA. 291a.

Invoking language limiting section 306(e) to “any
standard of performance applicable to such source,”

25

33 U.S.C. § 13816(e), the Corps implausibly denies
that the performance standard for new froth-
flotation mills is “applicable” to the Kensington mill.
See Fed. Br. at 25. The agency reaches this conclu-
sion by misreading the quoted language, arguing
that “[t]o determine whether a performance standard
is applicable to a source, one must again refer back
to the Act as a whole and, in particular, to Section
404 when the discharge of fill material is at issue.”
Id. However, neither “the Act as a whole” nor section
404 addresses the sources to which section 306 stan-
dards are applicable. To determine whether a “stan-
dard of performance” is “applicable” to a “source,” 33
U.S.C. § 1316(e), one must examine the standard and
the source. Here, the standard (40 C.F.R.
§ 440.104(b)(1)) is plainly applicable to the source
(the Kensington mill). See also 33 U.S.C.
§ 1316(a)(1), (a)(3) (defining “standard of perform-
ance” and “source’”).

The Corps jumps the tracks by focusing on
whether the mill’s wastewater discharge meets the
definition of “fill material.” But that is irrelevant
under the plain language of section 306(e), which
says nothing about the composition of the discharge.
It refers only to standards and sources.

The Corps also argues that section 301(e) does not
require discharges meeting the definition of “fill ma-
terial” to comply with section 301 effluent limita-
tions, but the agency misinterprets the phrase “in
accordance with the provisions of this chapter.” Fed.

26

Br. at 25 (quoting 33 U.S.C. §1311(e)).2 Section
301(e) provides:

Effluent limitations established pursuant
to this section or section [302] shall be ap-
plied to all point sources of discharge of pol-
lutants in accordance with the provisions of
this chapter.

33 U.S.C. § 1311(e). Because the Corps infers an ex-
ception for fill material under section 404, the agency
concludes that the “provisions of this chapter” do not
require compliance with otherwise applicable efflu-
ent limitations. Section 301(e) precludes such an
implied exception by requiring that effluent limita-
tions be applied to “all point sources ... in accordance
with the provisions of this chapter.” Jd. (emphasis
added). The Corps reads the section as if it said “ex-
cept in accordance with the provisions of this chap-
ter,” but Congress did not say “except.” The section
is, literally, a requirement that any applicable efflu-
ent limitations be applied to ail point sources in ac-
cordance with the Act.

B. There Is No Conflict Between Section
306(e) and Section 404.

Petitioners mistakenly argue that sections 306(e)
and 404 are in conflict, requiring resort to canons of
statutory construction to determine which controls

8 In addition to the section 306 performance standard, EPA
has adopted effluent hmitations under section 301 for froth-
flotation mills. 410 C.F.R. § 440.102(b). The latter are less
strict, but the discharge authorized by the Corps here would
comply with neither.

27

the discharge in this case. See Coeur Br. at 13,
27-28. There is no conflict between the two sections.
While section 306(e) is a categorical prohibition, see
33 U.S.C. § 1316(e) (“it shall be unlawful”), section
404 is a permissive grant of discretionary authority
that does not exempt fill material discharges from
compliance with other applicable legal requirements.
See id. § 1344(a) (“The Secretary may issue per-
mits...”).

Section 306(e) is only one of many legal require-
ments the Corps must respect in exercising its dis-
cretionary authority under section 404. The Corps
and EPA have long recognized that section 404 does
not exempt fill-material discharges from other re-
quirements of law. The first sentence of the 404(b)
guidelines states, “Because other laws may apply to
particular discharges..., a discharge complying with
the requirement of these Guidelines will not auto-
matically receive a permit.” 40 C.F.R. § 230.10. The
agency's regulations identify over a dozen other stat-
utes that may limit the agency’s discretion. See id.
§ 230.10(a)(4)-(5), (b)(3)-(4); 33 C.F.R. § 320.3. In
some cases, these laws may prohibit the Corps from
issuing a permit. See, e.g., 40 C.F.R. § 230.10(b)(3)
(prohibiting discharges that would jeopardize listed
species under Endangered Species Act).

Just as the Corps must comply with other appli-
cable laws in issuing or denying section 404 permits,
the agency must also refrain from authorizing dis-
cheucges that would violate section 306(e). Section
404’s enforcement provision—subsection (n)—makes
this particularly clear: “Nothing in this section shall
be construed to limit the authority of the [EPA] Ad-
ministrator to take action pursuant to section [309].”

28

33 U.S.C. § 1344(n). Section 309, in turn, authorizes
EPA to take enforcement actions for violations of
various provisions of the Act, including, explicitly,
section 306. Id. § 1319(a)(3), (b), (c)(1)-(3), (d), (g)(1).
This enforcement authority is in addition to, and
separate from, authority to enforce conditions in
permits issued under sections 402 and 404. See id.;
see also id. § 1344(s). Moreover, while compliance
with a section 404 permit shields the permittee from
actions enforcing sections 301 and 307, it does not
provide a shield for violators of section 306. See id.
§ 1344(p). In contrast, section 402 provides that
NPDES permittees are deemed to comply with sec-
tion 306. See id. § 1342(k).

In short, nothing in section 404 exempts fill ma-
terial discharges from compliance with section 306,
limits EPA’s authority to bring actions for violations
of section 306, or protects permittees from those ac-
tions. These features reveal unambiguously that
Congress did not intend section 404 to authorize the
Corps to permit discharges that violate performance
standards under section 306(e).

There is thus no conflict between the two sec-
tions. Absent a conflict, there is no need to resort to
the canon of construction, urged by Petitioners, that
specific provisions control over general ores. See
Nat'l Cable & Telecomms. Ass'n v. Gulf Power Co.,
534 U.S. 327, 335-36 (2002) (holding that the rule
does not apply when there is no conflict).

* Even uf the specific/general canon applied, section 306 ts
more specific than section 404 regarding the issues of greatest
concern to Congress. Although section 404 is more specific as to

(footnote continued...)

29

The absence of conflict distinguishes this case
from National Association of Home Builders v. De-
fenders of Wildlife, 127 S. Ct. 2518 (2007). That case
reconciled two mandatory statutes directing the
agency to take inconsistent actions, td. at 2531-32, by
deferring to the agency’s reasonable interpretation of
the conflicting provisions as expressed in regula-
tions. Jd. at 2534. The Court expressly distin-
guished a situation where Congress enacted
discretionary and mandatory provisions, holding that
the discretionary action was subject to the manda-
tory one, id. at 2536-37, and that there was “no clear
repugnancy between them. /d. at 2537 n.9. Sim1-
larly, the discretionary authority here (section 404)
must be exercised in compliance with the mandatory
(section 306(e)).

C. Section 306(e) Has No Implied Exception
for Fiil Material.

Petitioners and the Corps argue, in effect, that
various provisions of the Act and its structure as a

——

the form of discharges covered (dredged and fill material), sec-
tion 306 is much more specific as to the sources regulated and
standards applied. Section 404 applies to discharges from any
“point source,” see 33 U.S.C. §§ 1344(a), 1362(6), (12), a broadly
defined term, id. § 1362(14), while section 306(e) applies only to
“new sources,” a narrow subset of point sources. Id.
§ 1316(a)(2), (3). Section 306 also requires detailed standards
specific to each industry source category, while section 404 re-
quires only one set of general guidelines applicable to all dis-
charges. Compare id. § 1316(b) with id. § 1344(b). Congress
attached high importance to new sources. See supra pp. 6-7
Were there actually a conflict between sections 406(e) and 404,
Congress has expressed its intent that the more specific provi-
sions for new sources under section 306 control.

30

whole create an implied exception to the plain lan-
guage of section 306(e), and to effluent limitations
adopted under section 301, whenever a discharge
meets the agencies’ definition of “fill material.” This
argument cannot pass muster.

To begin with, Petitioners’ construction is highly
unlikely given the Act’s purposes. It would hinge the
entire regulatory structure on one term—“fill mate-
rial”—that Congress did not define and that was not
Congress’ central concern. Congressional delibera-
tions focused overwhelmingly on industrial and mu-
nicipal waste discharges.!° The Act seeks to
eliminate these discharges primarily through a sys-
tem of increasingly strict, technology-based effluent
limitations for industrial source categories that must
prohibit any discharges where practicable. See 33
U.S.C. §§ 1251(a)(1), 1311(b)(2)(A), 1316(a)(Q1). To
allow a new industrial source to escape these re-
quirements because its wastewater contains a high
level of one pollutant—suspended solids—would be
contrary to this explicit legislative purpose and par-
ticularly anomalous given Congress’ explicit com-
mand that EPA regulate suspended solids. See 33
U.S.C. § 1314(a)(4). It would reward the worst in-
dustrial discharges by exempting them from the very
mechanism Congress adopted to achieve the national
goal. The use of a navigable lake as a wastewater

‘0 The Clean Water Act was enacted in the wake of highly
publictzed problems such as the Cuyahoga River fire, massive
fish kills, and contaminated drinking water supplies, all caused
by industrial pollution. See Robert W. Adler, Jessica C. Land-
man, & Diane M. Cameron, The Clean Water Act 2U Years Later
5-6 (1993).

31

settling pond is also contrary to the guiding principle
that “[t]he use of any river, lake, stream or ocean as
a waste treatment system is unacceptable.” S. Rep.
No. 92-414, at 7, 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3674. The
Act’s language and structure do not support this
unlikely outcome.

1. Courts Should Rarely Infer Excep-
tions.

“Exceptions to clearly delineated statutes will be
implied only where essential to prevent absurd re-
sults or consequences obviously at variance with the
policy of the enactment as a whole.” Rutherford, 442
U.S. at 552 (quotation marks omitted). “Only when a
literal construction of a statute yields results so
manifestly unreasonable that they could not fairly be
attributed to congressional design will an exception
to statutory language be judicially implied.” /d.
at 555. “Whether, as a policy matter, an exemption
should be created is a question for legislative judg-
ment, not judicial inference.” Jd. at 559, quoted in
United States v. Oakland Cannabis Buyers’ Coop.,
532 U.S. 483, 490 (2001).

The presumption against implied exceptions has
particular force in a statute that, like the Clean Wa-
ter Act, contains highly detailed, explicit exceptions.
See Du Pont, 430 U.S. at 138 (reasoning that explicit
exception in section 301(c) reinforces conclusion that
Congress intended no exceptions to section 306(e));
TRW Inc. v. Andrews, 534 U.S. 19, 28 (2001) (“Where
Congress explicitly enumerates certain exceptions to
a general prohibition, additional exceptions are not
to be implied, in the absence of evidence of a contrary
legislative intent.”) (quoting Andrus v. Glover Constr.

32

Co., 446 U.S. 608, 616-17 (1980)); Oakland Cannabis
Buyers’ Coop., 532 U.S. at 489-90 (declining to find
implied exception where statute provided express ex-
ception).

Requiring a new source to comply with applicable
performance standards as provided in section 306(e),
even if its wastewater meets a broad definition of “fill
material,” is neither an “absurd result” nor “obvi-
ously at variance with the policy ef the enactment as
a whole.” Rutherford, 442 U.S. at 552. To the con-
trary, it is the result that best achieves the Act’s
purposes. Exempting new sources from performance
standards, which must prohibit any discharge
“where practicable,” 33 U.S.C. § 1316(a)(1), would
move in the opposite direction of the express Con-
gressional goal of eliminating all discharges. Id.
§ 1251(a)(1).

2. Sections 306 and 404 Reflect a Delib-
erate Choice by Congress Not te In-
clude the Exception Sought by the
Corps.

Sections 306 and 404, like the rest of the Act, in-
clude specific, detailed exceptions where Congress
intended them. The absence of an express exception
from section 306 for discharges meeting the agencies’
definition of “fill material” strongly suggests that
Congress did not intend any such exception.

While nothing in section 404 exempts fill-material
discharges from section 306(e), section 404 does con-
tain other specific exceptions, and exceptions to the
exceptions. See 33 U.S.C. §§ 1344(f), (r). Similarly,
while section 306 contains no exception for fill mate-
rial, it does exempt new sources from stricter stan-

33

dards for a ten-year period following completion of
construction. See id. § 1316(d).

Had Congress intended section 404 permits to ex-
empt new sources from compliance with performance
standards, it could have used a variety of devices
employed elsewhere in the Act to convey that intent.
It could, for example, have qualified section 306(c)
with the preface, “Except as provided in section
404....” That is exactly what the Act provides in sec-
tions 301(a) and 402(a)(1), but not in 306(e). Com-
pare id. §§ 1311(a), 1342(a)(1) with id. § 1316(e).
Congress used the same formulation repeatedly
throughout the Act, including in section 404(f). See,
e.g., id. §§ 1344(f, 1311G)(1)(A), (J), 1322(H, (n)(6)(A),
1365(a).

Another way to provide the exemption sought by
Petitioners in this case would have been to preface
section 404 with the phrase, “Notwithstanding sec-
tion 306....”. This type of formulation also appears
throughout the Act, including in section 306(d), but
not in section 404. Compare id. §§ 1316(d), 1311(f),
1345(a), 1364(a), 1371(d) with id. § 1344(a).

3. Sections 301 and 306 Have Independ-
ent Effect and Do Not Depend on
Other Provisions to Trigger Them.

Section 306, like the effluent-limitation provisions
of section 301, applies directly to discharges and is
enforceable independent of any other provisions in
the Clean Water Act. Petitioners repeatedly mis-
characterize the Act by asserting that EPA adopts
these limitations “under” or “as part of” the 402 per-
mit program, Coeur Br. at 3, 21, and that they apply
only “where other provisions of the CWA make them

34

applicable.” State Br. at 21. Several provisions of
the Act, including sections 306 and 301 themselves,
reveal that this view is incorrect. This Court has
drawn the same conclusion. Du Pont, 430 U.S.
at 133 n.24 (“a number of provisions of the Act seem
to assume that § 301 effluent limitations have some
existence apart from § 402 permits”).

The Act’s central prohibition against unlawful
discharges demonstrates that sections 301 and 306
have independent effect. Section 301(a) provides:
“Except as in compliance with this section and sec-
tions (302, 306, 307, 318, 402, and 404], the dis-
charge of any pollutant by any person shall be
unlawful.” 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a) (emphasis added). If
Congress intended the standards and limitations of
sections 301, 302, 306, and 307 to apply only to the
extent they were included as conditions in permits
under sections 402 or 404, section 301(a) would sim-
ply say, “Except as provided in sections 402 or
404....”. The inclusion of the other five provisions
would be pure surplusage. That Congress enumer-
ated all of these provisions demonstrates that each
was intended to have independent effect.

Moreover, sections 306 and 301 on their face re-
quire compliance with their limitations independent
of any permit conditions. See, e.g., 33 U.S.C.
§§ 1316(e) (prohibiting discharges in violation of per-
formance standards), 1311(b)(2)(E) (requiring, with-
out reference to permits, “compliance with effluent
limitations ... which ... shall require application of
the best conventional pollutant control technology as
determined in accordance with regulations issued by
the Administrator”), 1311(e) (requiring application of
effluent hmitations to “all point sources’),

35

1311G)(3)(B), (n)(7) (requiring, without reference to
permits, that discharges must comply with effluent
limitations when requests to modify limitations are
denied). EPA is authorized, under specified circum-
stances, to modify these requirements in permits.
Id. § 1311(c), (h), (k), (m), (p)(1). The contrast in the
wording of these subsections shows that the effluent
limitations are applicable on their own but that EPA
may modify them in a permit.

That sections 301 and 306 are independently en-
forceable underscores the point. EPA or a citizen can
bring an action to enforce sections 301 or 306, or,
separately, to enforce permit conditions. See 33
U.S.C. §§ 1319(a)(3), (6), (©)(1)-(3), (@d, (g)Q),
1365(a)(1), (Hh. Section 404 expressly preserves
EPA’s authority to bring enforcement actions under
these provisions. Jd. § 1344(n). The Act thus explic-
itly gives enforceable legal effect to effluent limita-
tions under sections 301 and 306 independent of any
permit.

The Act’s structure further supports the inde-
pendent applicability of sections 301 and 306. Those
sections are included in Subchapter III, “Standards
and Enforcement.” That subchapter includes section
301(a)’s general prohibition against discharges, id.
§ 1311(a), all the Act’s effluent limitations and wa-
ter-quality standards, id. §§ 1311-17, and its en-
forcement provisions. Jd. § 1319. Sections 402 and
404 are included separately in Subchapter IV, “Per-
mits and Licenses.” Had Congress intended effluent
limitations to be dependent entirely on permits, a
more logical organization would have been to group
sections 306 and the effluent lmitation provisions of

36

section 301 with sections 402 and 404, rather than
with the prohibition and enforcement provisions.

4. Neither Section 402 nor Section 307
Establishes an Implied Exception to
Section 306(e).

Petitioners and the Corps argue that section 402
implicitly exempts any discharge meeting the defini-
tion of “fill material” from the prohibition of section
306(e). They rely initially on section 402’s preface,
“Except as provided in sections [318 and 404]....” 33
U.S.C. § 1342(a)(1).

The preface does not create an exception to sec-
tion 306. It means that if a discharge is authorized
in a section 404 permit, it does not also need a sec-
tion 402 permit, but it says nothing about whether
the Corps may lawfully grant a section 404 permit in
any particular case. Indeed, that Congress used this
preface in section 402 but not 306 is strong evidence
that Congress did not intend it to apply to section
306.

Petitioners and the Corps rely heavily on the fact
that permits under section 402, but not 404, must
include conditions requiring compliance with effluent
limitations under sections 306 and 301. Compare id.
with id. § 1344. They then leap to the conclusion
that section 404 authorizes discharges otherwise
prohibited by sections 306 and 301. The Ninth Cir-
cuit aptly noted that they were relying on a negative
inference to find an implied exception, J.A. 531a,
and found a much simpler explanation for the differ-
ence between sections 402 and 404: Congress did not
intend the Corps to issue “fill material” permits for
discharges subject to effluent hmitations. J.A. 533a.

37

This interpretation gives full meaning to all the sec-
tions of the Act without resort to implied exceptions
from the plain language of sections 306 and 301.

All parties agree that Congress did not authorize
the Corps to issue section 404 permits incorporating
effluent limitations under sections 306 or 301. Sec-
tion 404 permits must comply with the 404(b) guide-
lines and with effluent standards for toxic pollutants
under section 307. Jd. § 1344(b), (H, (h)(1)(A)Q), (x);
see also id. § 1317(a)(5). In contrast, section 402
permits must include conditions requiring comphi-
ance with effluent limitations under sections 301,
306, 307, and others. See id. § 1342(a)(1). Similarly,
Congress provided a shield from enforcement under
section 306 for discharges complying with a section
402 permit, but not with a section 404 permit. Com-
pare id. § 1342(k) with id. § 1344(p). As Petitioners
note, the Court must presume Congress acted pur-
posely in writing the two provisions differently. See
S.D. Warren Co. v. Maine Bd. of Envtl. Prot., 547
U.S. 370, 384 (2006).

Petitioners and the Corps carry the argument too
far, however, when they infer that Congress intended
an exception from section 306 and 301 effluent limi-
tations for any discharge meeting a broad definition
of “fill material.” Sections 306 and 301 unambigu-
ously prohibit discharges in violation of the effluent
limitations they require, and only section 402 au-
thorizes the issuance of permits that can carry out
that command. Thus, the statutory text and struc-
ture compel the conclusion that the reason for the
different language in sections 402 and 404 is to en-
sure that all point sources subject to effluent limita-
tions under sections 306 or 301 be permitted, if at

38

all, under section 402, not section 404. This inter-
pretation is far preferable, because it honors the
plain language of sections 306 and 301 and the pre-
sumption against implied exceptions.!!

5. The Ninth Circuit Correctly Inter-
preted Section 301(a).

In a sideshow, the Corps and Petitioners take is-
sue with the Ninth Circuit’s conclusion that the use
of Ose connector “and” in section 301(a) signifies
Congrese’ intent that discharges must comply with
each applieable provision. See 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a);
4 A. 53ia@ Mischaracterizing the opinion, they assert
that *his mterpretation would require compliance
with inapplicable provisions.

The Ninth Circuit recognized that discharges are
subject only to “applicable” provisions. J.A. 531a.
For example, an old source is not subject to section
306, which by its plain terms applies only to new
sources. See 33 U.S.C. § 1316. Similarly, a person
with a valid section 404 permit need not obtain a sec-
tion 402 permit for the same discharge, because sec-
tion 402 applies only “[e]xcept as provided in sections
[318 and 404]....” Id. § 1342(a)(1). The Ninth Circuit
did not suggest otherwise.

'! The difference between the language of section 404 and
that of section 318, 33 U.S.C. § 1328, on which the State of
Alaska relies, see State Br. at 28, reinforces the conclusion that
section 404 permits cannot be tssued for sources subject to ef.-
fluent limitations under sections 301 und 306. Section 318 spe-
cifically provides for the incorporation of such limits into
permits, see id. § 1328&(b), while section 104 does not.

39

This interpretation is entirely consistent with the
plain language of section 301(a) and the use of “and”
as a connector. If one of the listed sections has no
application to a particular discharge, then the dis-
charge cannot be in violation of it. In that sense, the
discharge is literally “in compliance” with that provi-
sion. Id. § 1311(a).

Moreover, Coeur cannot be correct in suggesting
that “and” actually means “or.” See Coeur Br. at 25.
As the Corps recognizes, this would eviscerate the
statute. See Fed. Br. at 25 n.6. However, the Corps
is equaily incorrect in suggesting that section 301(a)
simply requires compliance with “the overall body of
law.” Id. at 24. The statute enumerates seven sepa-
rate provisions, a plain statement that every dis-
charge must comply with every applicable provision.
33 U.S.C. § 1311(a). Indeed, the State of Alaska con-
cedes this point. State Br. at 31.

None of this, however, resolves the question in
this case. While section 301(a) clearly evinces a
Congressional intent that each of the enumerated
provisions has independent effect, it does not, by it-
self, answer whether a particular section applies to a
particular source or discharge. To do that, one must
consult the provision in question. As demonstrated
above, section 306(e) applies to and prohibits the dis-
charge at issue here.

40

D. The Language and History of the Act
Demonstrate That Congress Intended
Wastewater Discharges from Ore Benefi-
ciation Mills to Be Governed by Section
402 Permits.

Section 402(a)(5) of the Act further demonstrates
Congress’ intent that process wastewater discharges
from industrial sources—including, specifically, ore
beneficiation mills—were to be regulated under sec-
tion 402. Section 402(a)(5) terminated the Corps’ au-
thority to issue permits under the Refuse Act, 33
U.S.C. § 407, and provided that pending Refuse Act
permit applications be deemed applications for sec-
tion 402 permits. 33 U.S.C. § 1342(a)(5); see also id.
§ 1342(k) (transition provisions for Refuse Act en-
forcement).

When the Clean Water Act was enacted, the
Corps had recently established a comprehensive
permit program under the Refuse Act, also known as
section 13 of the Rivers and Harbors Act. See 36
Fed. Reg. 6564 (April 7, 1971). Although the Refuse
Act dated from the 19th Century, the Corps histori-
cally had construed it as limited to discharges affect-
ing navigation and even then only rarely invoked it.
In response to severe and worsening water pollution,
the president in 1970 issued an executive order re-
quiring adoption of a Refuse Act permit program.
See United States v. Pa.. Indus. Chem. Corp., 411
U.S. 655, 659 n.9, 672 (1973). The resulting 1971
regulations for the first time encompassed “all direct
and indirect discharges or deposits” into navigable
waters. 36 Fed. Reg. at 6565 (§ 209.131(d)(1)).

In adopting these regulations, the Corps drew a
distinction between “discharges or deposits,” which

41

would require permits under the Refuse Act, see id.,
and “work” or “structures” in navigable waters,
which would require permits under section 10 of the
Rivers and Harbors Act, 33 U.S.C. § 403 (a predeces-
sor to the section 404 permit program). See 33 Fed.
Reg. 18,670, 18,671 (Dec. 18, 1968) (adopting
§ 209.120, “Permits for work in navigable waters”);
36 Fed. Reg. at 6567 (adopting § 209.131(f), explain-
ing difference in programs); see also Pa.. Indus.
Chem. Corp., 411 U.S. at 672 (describing section 10
regulations as “dealing with construction and exca-
vation in navigable waters’”).}2

The Refuse Act permit program adopted in 1971
was the template for section 402 of the Clean Water
Act, a fact discussed repeatedly in the legislative his-
tory and formalized in section 402(a)(5). ‘The Senate
Report noted that Congress had made a conscious
“effort to weave the [Refuse Act] permit program into
this legislation.” S. Rep. No. 92-414, at 71, 1972
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3737. While deliberations over the
Act were underway, a district court declared the Re-
fuse Act regulations unlawful. Kalur v. Resor, 335
IF. Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1971). The Administrator of EPA
wrote in a letter published in the Congressional Re-
cord that “|t]he enrolled bill formalizes” the Refuse
Act permit program and “affords EPA the opportu-

‘2 This Court had previously held that an industrial waste
discharge containing solids could be considered both an “ob-
struction” under section 10 and a “discharge” under the Refuse
Act. See United States v. Republic Steel Corp., 362 U.S. 482,
485 (1960). However. in its later permitting regulations, the
Corps drew the line described above between permits under the
two provisions.

42

nity to extricate the Permit Program from its current
judicial morass.” 118 Cong. Rec. 36,780 (1972). Rep-
resentative Clark remarked:

At the present time, [the Refuse Act permit]
program has broken down completely and no
permits are being issued. Over 20,000 appli-
cations have been filed, but all discharges
could be considered in technical violation of
the law, because they have no permits. Sec-
tion 402 transfers the program from the
corps |sic] to EPA....

Id. at 33,765.

Members of Congress discussed one of these
20,000 applications specifically during deliberations
over the Clean Water Act’s final passage: the dis-
charge from Reserve Mining Company’s iron-ore
beneficiation plant into Lake Superior. The dis-
charge was a slurry containing 67,000 tons per day of
suspended tailings that settled on the lake bottom.
See Reserve Mining Co. v. EPA, 514 F.2d 492, 500
(8th Cir. 1975). It contained asbestos, posing a
threat to the drinking-water supply of Duluth, Min-
nesota, among other health concerns. Id. at 501. Al-
though Reserve held a section 10 permit under the
Rivers and Harbors Act addressing impediments to
navigation, id. at 530,.it had to apply for a Refuse
Act permit under the Corps’ new program in 1971.
ld. at 531. The permit was not granted before pas-
sage of the Clean Water Act, td., and in February
1972 EPA sued to abate the ongoing harm. /d.
at 501. EPA ultimately succeeded in forcing Reserve
to discontinue discharges into the lake and develop
an on-land tailings disposal site. Jd. at 537-38.

43

The situation was brought to Congress’ attention
as a result of some members’ concerns that passage
of the Clean Water Act not impede EPA’s lawsuit—
concerns that led to inclusion of an uncodified sav-
ings provision to ensure the Reserve Mining case and
others would continue. See id. at 531 n.75; 118 Cong.
Rec. 33,705-06, 33,713 (1972) (statements of Sens.
Griffin, Muskie and Hart). In light of Congress’ spe-
cific attention to the Reserve Mining situation, its
decision to transfer permitting authority for such
discharges from the Corps under the Refuse Act to
EPA under section 402(a) cannot be squared with Pe-
titioners’ view that such discharges fall outside
EPA’s authority. Indeed, Reserve’s application to
discharge the tailings slurry from its ore benefici-
ation mill was transferred to EPA under section
402(a), not to the Corps under section 404. See Re-
serve Mining, 514 F.2d at 531; 33 U.S.C. § 1342(a)(5).

The State of Alaska thus draws exactly the wrong
conclusion from the Reserve Mining case. See State
Br. at 37-38. It is true, as the State points out, that
Reserve had a permit under section 10 of the Rivers
and Harbors Act and that section 404 of the Clean
Water Act was a successor to the section 10 permit
program. But by the time of the Clean Water Act's
enactment, that permit was no longer sufficient to
authorize the discharge of tailings. A Refuse Act
permit was required, and the new permitting author-
ity was transferred to EPA, not retained by the
Corps.

Contrary to the assertions of Petitioners and the
Corps, continued enforcement of effluent limitations
by EPA is entirely consistent with the division of re-
sponsibilities intended by Congress. It will have no

44

impact on traditional regulation of fill material, be-
cause typical fill-material discharges do not come
from sources regulated by EPA effluent limitations.
Fill material is normally used to build roads, build-
ings, dams, causeways, levees, seawalls, and other
useful structures in waters. See 33 C.F.R. § 323.2(f).
Discharges of fill material also include placement of
overburden (the unprocessed rock overlying a coal
seam) and other mining-related materials that are
not subject to effluent limitations. See id.; Kentucki-
ans, 317 F.3d at 445, 448; J.A. 542a, 546a. As far as
the record reflects, this case is the first time the
Corps has tried to use a fill material permit to au-
thorize a wastewater discharge from an industrial
source subject to effluent limitations.

E. Exempting Wastewater Discharges Con-
taining Solids from Effluent Limitations
Would Undermine Congressional Goals.

If the Corps’ position in this case is upheld, any
source that generates wastewater with significant
suspended solids will be able to escape EPA effluent
limitations by labeling the discharge “fill material.”
Such sources will similarly seck to save money by
using navigable waters as “settling ponds,” defeating
the Congressional goal of eliminating all discharges
to navigable waters, 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(1), and re-
versing decades of progress in reducing pollution
through the Act’s scheme of technology-based efflu-
ent limitations. EPA has frequently identified set-
tling ponds as the best technology for removing
solids from process wastewater, allowing the agency
to set strict limits on suspended solids through efflu-
ent limitations. Examples include:

45

e aluminum smelting, 38 Fed., Reg. 33,170,
33,175 (Nov. 30, 1973) (noting that the solid portion
of untreated wastewater “approaches 70 percent by
volume’);

e copper smelting, 45 Fed. Reg. 44,926, 44,930
(July 2, 1980);

e inorganic chemicals manufacturing, 42 Fed.
Reg. 37,294, 37,296 (July 20, 1977);

e ferroalloy manufacturing, 38 Fed. Reg. 29,008,
29,010 (Oct. 18, 1973);

e cement manufacturing, 38 Fed. Reg. 24,462,
24,463 (Sept. 7, 1973);

e concentrated aquatic animal production, 67
Fed. Reg. 57,872, 57,888 (Sept. 12, 2002) (“Solids,
which come from feces and uneaten feed, are the
largest mass of pollutants generated in CAAP facili-
ties.”);

e beef cattle feedlots, 66 Fed. Reg. 2960, 2988
(Jan. 12, 2001); see also 40 C.F.R. § 412.31(a) (pro-
hibiting “discharge of manure, litter, or process
wastewater pollutants into waters of the U.S.”);

e coal-fired power plants, 45 Fed. Reg. 68,328,
68,337 (Oct. 14, 1980): and

e battery manufacturing, 49 Fed. Reg. 9108,
9122 (March 9, 1984).

46

Il. IF THE CLEAN WATER ACT WERE AM-
BIGUOUS, THE COURT SHOULD DEFER
TO THE INTERPRETATION STATED BY
THE HEADS OF BOTH AGENCIES UPON
PROMULGATION OF THE 2002 FILL RULE.

If the Court were to find the Clean Water Act
ambiguous as to whether all discharges meeting the
definition of “fill material” are exempt from section
306(e), the Court should defer to the reasonable in-
terpretation of the Act adopted by EPA and the
Corps when they adopted the relevant regulations,
see Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843-44, and not to the sub-
sequent mischaracterization of those regulations in
the Regas memo.

A. The Agencies’ Regulations Reveal that
Some Discharges Meeting the Definition
of “Fill Material” Are Subject to Effluent
Limitations and NPDES Permits.

The plain language and history of the relevant
regulations, and the practices of EPA and the Corps,
reveal that the agencies have long recognized that
some discharges defined as “fill material” are never-
theless subject to effluent limitations and NPDES
permits and not eligible for section 404 permits.

As an initial matter, the 2002 fill rule on its face,
though not ambiguous, does not answer the question
presented. It is merely a definition that does not, by
itself, purport to authorize anything. See 33 C.F.R.
§ 323.2(e)-(f). The question in this case is whether a
wastewater discharge mecting that definition is ex-
empt from otherwise applicable performance stan-
dards under section 306.

47

To be sure, the new definition did create the po-
tential for confusion because it is broad enough to
encompass many discharges that are subject to efflu-
ent limitations, like the one in this case. Were the
new fill definition construed to authorize the dis-
charge here, there would be a direct conflict between
that definition and the performance standard prohib-
iting the discharge. See 40 C.F.R. § 440.104(b)(1).
To resolve this potential conflict, it is necessary to
examine the agencies’ regulations, their history, and
what the agencies said in adopting them.

Petitioners and the Corps rely heavily on 40
C.F.R. § 122.3(b), but that regulation actually proves
the opposite of the point for which they cite it. It ex-
empts from NPDES _ permitting requirements
“(djischarges of dredged or fill material into waters of
the United States which are regulated under section
404 of the CWA.” 40 C.F.R. § 122.3(b). There is no
comma preceding “which.” By its plain terms, this
regulation provides that only those fill material dis-
charges that are regulated under section 404 are ex-
empt from section 402; its language assumes that
some “fill material” discharges are not regulated un-
der section 404.'° The regulation thus interprets and
applies the prefatory “except as provided” clause in

'* Were there a comma preceding “which,” the words follow-
ing the comma would be a “nonrestrictive clause,” i.e., one “that
could be omitted without essential loss of meaning....”. The Chi-
cago Manual of Stvle 250, § 6.38 (15th ed. 2003). The absence
of a comma makes it a “restrictive” clause, t.e., one that 1s “es-
sential to the meaning of the sertence....” Jd. While it is stvlis-
tically preferable to use “that” rather than “which” for a
nonrestrictive clause, it is the absence or presence of the comma
that determines whether the clause ts restrictive. jd.

48

section 402(a)(1): If a discharge is properly permit-
ted under section 404, it does not also require a 402
permit, but not all discharges of “fill material” are
properly permitted under section 404. See 33 U.S.C.
§ 1342(a)(1).

The history of section 122.3(b) confirms this in-
terpretation. As the Corps correctly points out, the
original regulation purported to exempt all fill mate-
rial, without restriction. See Fed. Br. at 27 (citing 40
C.F.R. § 125.4(d) (1973)). The Corps overlooks that
EPA changed this regulation just a few years later to
exempt only those discharges that are both
“{djischarges of dredged or fill material into waters of
the United States and regulated under section 404 of
the Act.” 44 Fed. Reg. 32,854, 32,902 (June 7, 1979)
(adopting 40 C.F.R. § 122.4(a)(2)) (emphasis added).
The following year, EPA changed “and” to “which
are,” the same language that remains today. 45 Fed.
Reg. 33,290, 33,442 (May 19, 1980) (adopting 40
C.F.R. § 122.51(c)(2)(i)). The preamble did not ex-
plain: this specific change but stated generally, “Mi-
nor editorial and stylistic changes ... have been made
in all sections and are not discussed.” /d. at 33,294.
This history reveals that the “which are” clause was
intended to be restrictive—requiring that the dis-
charge be both “fill material” and regulated under
section 404-——consistent with proper grammar."

'4 This interpretation was necessary when the rule in its
current form was adopted, because EPA and the Corps had dif.
fering definitions of “fill material.” Many discharges that EPA
considered “fill material” were not within the Corps’ definition
and were therefore ineligible for section 401 permits. See supra
p. 10; infra pp. 49-50.

49

That the new “fill material” definition did not
create an exception to EPA’s effluent limitations is
further compelled by the canon of construction that
“a statute dealing with a narrow, precise, and spe-
cific subject is not submerged by a later enacted
statute covering a more generalized spectrum.”
Radzanower v. Touche Ross & Co., 426 U.S. 148, 153
(1976). The 1982 performance standard is much
more “narrow, precise, and specific” than the “later
enacted” fill rule. The latter is a broad definition of
“fill material” without independent operative effect.
The 1982 performance standard is more specific as to
the discharges covered (“process wastewater,” as de-
fined at 40 C.F.R. § 401.11(q)), the source to which it
applies (new mills using the froth-flotation process
for the beneficiation of gold ores), and the effect of
the rule (“no discharge”). 40 C.F.R. § 440.104(b)(1).

B. EPA Intended the Effluent Limitations
for Ore Beneficiation Mills to Be Applied
in Permits Under Section 402, Not 404.

Longstanding practice confirms that the agencies
did not intend all discharges meeting the definition
of “fill material” to be exempt from EPA’s effluent
limitations. For decades, EPA issued NPDES per-
mits for discharges that met its effect-based defini-
tion of “fill material” but were also subject to effluent
limitations. See J.A. 83a-84a. Throughout that time,
EPA continued to adopt effluent limitations for
sources—including the ore mills at issue—whose
wastewater contained high concentrations of sus-
pended solids and would therefore have a filling ef-
fect if discharged directly to navigable waters. See
supra pp. 7-9, 44-45. Thus, EPA recognized that
some discharges meeting its definition of “fill mate-

50

rial” were not regulated under section 404 and there-
fore not exempt from NPDES permitting under 40
C.F.R. § 122.3(b). Indeed, even the Regas memo rec-
ognizes that some discharges—those with an “inci-
dental!” filling effect—would meet the new definition
of “fill material” but not be eligible for section 404
permits. J.A. 145a.

When adopting new source performance stan-
dards for ore mines and mills in 1982, EPA left no
doubt as to the intended permitting requirements:
“The ... [standards] in this regulation will be applied
to individual ore mines and mills through NPDES
permits issued by EPA ... under Section 402 of the
Act.” 47 Fed. Reg. at 54,606. Nowhere in the rule or
preamble, or in their predecessors or subsequent mi-
nor amendments, did EPA suggest that a mill could
escape these standards through a permit to dis-
charge wastewater as “fill material” under section
404. This was true even though EPA recognized that
the wastewater contained very high levels of sus-
pended solids, generally requiring the use of settling
ponds as a treatment technology. See supra pp. 3, 9.

Further evidence of EPA’s intent is that it used
limits on suspended solids as a surrogate for limits
on certain toxic pollutants. As Petitioners and the
Corps point out, the Corps must ensure that dis-
charges of fill material comply with any effluent
limitations for toxic pollutants adopted under section
307 of the Act. See 33 U.S.C. § 1344(f, (h)(1)(A)Q),
(p), (r); 40 C.F.R. § 230.10(b)(2). One of the toxic
substances of concern in the wastewater discharges
of many beneficiation mills is asbestos, as the Re-
serve Mining case illustrates. See 47 Fed. Reg. at
25.694 (“Asbestiform fibers’ are evident in dis-

51

charges from ore mining and milling facilities, and
chrysotile asbestos was detected in wastewaters in
all subcategories and _ subparts.”); 40 C.F.R.
§ 401.15(7) (isting asbestos as toxic pollutant under
CWA § 307(a)(1)); Reserve Mining, 514 F.2d at 501,
514-20. EPA did not adopt section 307 effluent limi-
tations for asbestos from beneficiation mills because
it found that limits on total suspended solids (TSS)
under sections 301 and 306 would effectively control
asbestos and obviate the significant expense of moni-
toring for it. See 47 Fed. Reg. at 25,694-95; see also
id. at 25,703-04; 47 Fed. Reg. at 54,605. If a mill
were allowed to escape the TSS limitations by ob-
taining a “fill material” permit under section 404, it
would effectively escape the intended limit on asbes-
tos, a result at odds with section 404’s intent to con-
trol discharges of toxic pollutants.

That EPA used this approach (rather than prom-
ulgating section 307 standards for asbestos that
could be enforced through section 404) shows that
the agency could not have intended section 404 per-
mits to be used to authorize discharges subject to its
ore-mill performance standards. It also illustrates
the potentially dangerous effects of the interpreta.
tion sought by the Corps in this case. Authorizing
ore beneficiation wastewater discharges with section
404 permits could reprise the Reserve Mining sce-
nario, one of the very problems Congress intended to
stop

In the decades following adoption of the first ef-
fluent limitations for ore beneficiation mills in 1975
and the new source performance standards in 1982,
the agencies repeatedly confirmed that section 404
permits were not available for process wastewater

52

discharges from these facilities. From 1977 to 2002,
the Corps’ regulations excluded discharges for the
primary purpose of waste disposal from the defini-
tion of “fill material.” See supra p. 10. The agencies’
1986 MOA provided that discharges “in liquid, semi-
liquid, or suspended form,” including various “mining
wastes,” would require section 402 permits.!5 See id.
The agencies interpreted their regulations to pre-
clude the use of section 404 permits for discharges
subject to effluent limitations. See Kentuckians, 317
F.3d at 445, 448.

‘5 Petitioners and the Corps rely on a sentence from the
MOA’s preamble that has no applicability to wastewater dis-
charges from ore mills for the purpose of waste disposal, which
were described in paragraph B.5. See Fed. Br. at 27; Alaska Br.
at 9. They quote the second sentence of the following para-
graph:

This agreement does not affect the regulatory re-
quirements for materials discharged into waters of the
United States for the primary purpose of replacing an
aquatic area or of changing the bottom elevation of a
water body. Discharges listed in the Corps definition of
“discharge of fill material,” 33 CFR 323.2(1) remain sub-
ject to section 404 even if they occur in association with
discharges of wastes meeting the criteria in the agree-
ment for section 402 discharges.

51 Fed. Reg. at 8.871. This explanation discussed and incorpo-
rated the Corps’ “fill material” defimtion, which at that time
required that the primary purpose of the discharge be to create
dry land or change the bottom of the water body, not to dispose
of waste. See id. Thus, the sentence merely clarified that dis-
charges meeting this definition were subject to section 404
permits even if they occurred in association with waste other-
wise subject to section 402. This clarification did not apply to
discharges like the one here, whose only purpose was to dispose
of process wastewater

53

Accordingly, as far as the record reflects, the
Corps never issued a permit to discharge process
wastewater into a navigable water body before the
2005 Kensington Mine permit. Cocur cites three
permits it holds out as counterexamples, see Coeur
Br. at 40-42, but all three miss the mark.

The Red Dog and Fort Knox permits were both
permits to use solid fill material to build tailings im-
poundments and associated structures; they did not
permit the ongoing discharge of wastewater into
navigable waters. See SER 979 (authorizing permit-
tee to “place ... mine tailings in the south fork of Red
Dog Creek and adjacent wetlands to construct a 150’
high x 2,400’ long dum”)'© (emphasis added);
SER 1099 (Red Dog Decision); SER 983 (authorizing
discharge of fill material for “construction of im-
poundment structures, stockpiles, rock dumps, cul-
verted road crossings, and other components” of Fort
Knox mine). Neither mine obtained a permit for dis-
charges into the tailings ponds themselves, because
the agencies determined that the tailings ponds were
“waste treatment systems” not considered “waters of
the United States” under the Clean Water Act. See
40 C.F.R. § 122.2 (definition of “Waters of the United
States”). Thus, the decision document for the Fort
Knox mine explicitly stated that “[n]lo discharge of
waste water to waters of the United States is ex-
pected....” SER 989 (emphasis added).

In contrast, EPA and the Corps rejected a sugges-
tion that Lower Slate Lake be deemed an exempt

'® Dewatered tailings are sometimes used as a construction
material in dams at mines.

54

“waste treatment system,” notwithstanding the con-
struction of a dam to expand its capacity. J.A. 145a-
46a. The Kensington Mine’s 404 permit, unlike
those for the Red Dog and Fort Knox mines, ex-
pressly authorizes discharges of process wastewater
into navigable waters. See J.A. 275a (€ 10), 283a
(Area 24), 266a (authorizing discharge to “navigable
waters of the United States”).!?

Nor did the other permit cited by Coeur—
Nationwide Permit 21, for minimal-impact surface
coal-mining work—authorize discharges of process
wastewater into navigable waters. It was originally
promulgated in the same Federal Register notice as a
re-promulgation of the Corps’ former “fill material”
definition, which precluded discharges for the pri-
mary purpose of waste disposal. See 47 Fed. Reg.
31,794, 31,811 (July 22, 1982) (adopting “fill mate-
rial” definition); id. at 31,833 (adopting Nationwide
Permit 21). Presumably, the Corps did not intend to
contradict itself within the same document. Thus,

'? There is a legal question whether, or under what circum-
stances, the Corps may deem an impoundment in a navigable
stream to be a “waste treatment system.” See, e.g., Ohio Valley
Envtl. Coal. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, No. 3:05-0784, 2007
WL 2200686 (S.D. W.Va. June 13, 2007), appeals docketed, Nos.
07-1355, 07-1479, 07-1480, 07-1964 (consolidated) (4th Cir.).
Normally, the tailings pond can be constructed outside of any
stream by diverting the stream around the tailings pond, segre.
gating the waste treatment system from navigable waters. See,
e.g., SER 995; see also Pac. Legal Found. Amicus Br. at 14 (dia-
gramming “stream bypass”). This Court need not address these
questions here because the agencies expressly declined to deem
the lake a “waste treatment system” and recognized it as “wa-
ters of the United States.”

55

the “[s]tructures, work, and discharges,” id. at
31,833, authorized in Nationwide Permit 21 could
not have included wastewater discharges.

In short, if the Corps ever granted a “fill mate-
rial” permit to discharge process wastewater to navi-
gable waters before the Kensington permit, it has not
been brought to the attention of the Court, even
though Petitioners canvassed the country to find one.
SEACC is unaware of any such examples.

Granting section 404 permits for wastewater dis-
charges from ore beneficiation mills would, therefore,
be a substantial change in agency practice. It would
effectively repeal EPA’s effluent limitations for those
sources, because the wastewater from these mills is
inherently “very high” in suspended solids, 47 Fed.
Reg. at 25,685, and will therefore always raise the
bottom elevation of a water body when the solids set-
tle. In adopting the effluent limitations, EPA ex-
pected that solids would be removed in settling
ponds, not in navigable waters. See supra pp. 8-9.

If the agencies wished to reverse this practice,
they would be required to provide an explanation.
“(A]n agency changing its course by rescinding a rule
is obligated to supply a reasoned analysis for the
change....”. State Farm, 463 U.S. at 42. The failure
to do so would render the decision arbitrary. /d.
at 42-43.

C. When the Agencies Adopted Their New
Definition of Fill Material in 2002, They
Did Not Intend to Change Past Practice.

In adopting the 2002 fill rule, the agencies did not
supply an analysis for changing course—"“reasoned”
or otherwise, td. at 42—because, as they repeatedly

56

explained, they did not intend to change course. See
supra pp. 11-15. The original proposal would have
expressly excluded discharges subject to effluent
limitations, consistent with longstanding agency
practice. See 65 Fed. Reg. at 21,297, 21,299. The
agencies stated that they removed that language
only because it was confusing as drafted and that the
deletion did not reflect any intention to change their
existing practice. See 67 Fed. Reg. at 31,135; J.A.
46a. They repeated this statement specifically in the
context of “mine tailings,” noting that mine tailing
discharges subject to effluent limitations would re-
main so and that section 402 permits would still be
needed for “process water” discharges. J.A. 47a-48a.
They reiterated the point by citing paragraph B.5 of
the 1986 MOA, J.A. 82a-84a, and explained that the
new definition would not authorize discharges that
were previously prohibited or expand the types of
discharges covered under section 404. 67 Fed. Reg.
at 31.133: J.A. 32a. They made these statements in
the Federal Register, in their response-to-comments
document incorporated in the Federal Register, and
in a document posted on the Corps’ website to ex-
plain the new rule to the public. See supra p. 13.

These statements were not isolated snippets, but
were critical to the agencies’ analysis and to their
explanation for deleting language from the proposed
regulation. Moreover, the agencies said nothing to
contradict this explanation. Petitioners and the
Corps cite general statements from the Federal Reg-
ister that mine tailings would be considered fill ma-
terial under the new rule and that EPA does not
regulate fill material. See Fed. Br. at 35-37. How-
ever, none of these general statements addresses the
specific question created where a wastewater dis-

57

charge, including one containing mine tailings, both
meets the new “fill material” definition and is subject
to a performance standard or other effluent limita-
tion. The agencies specifically foresaw this circum-
stance, addressed it several times, and stated each
time that the effluent limitation would govern.

The Corps argues that this interpretation would
render meaningless the regulation’s inclusion of
“tailings,” the placement of which is “generally” con-
sidered a discharge of fill material in the revised
definition. See Fed. Br. at 39-40; 33 C.F.R. § 323.2(f).
This is not so, because discharges of “slurry” or “tail-
ings” are still eligible for section 404 permits if they
are not covered by section 306 performance stan-
dards or section 301 effluent limitations. There are
many minerals whose tailings are not subject to such
limitations, including: platinum (40 C.F.R.
§ 440.110-.115)!8; antimony (id. § 440.90-.95); tin (no
regulation); and numerous minerals covered under
40 C.F.R. Part 436 such as mica and sericite (sub-
part 1), trona (subpart P), lithium (subpart U), atta-
pulgite and montmorillonite (subpart AB), kyanite
(subpart AC), aplite (subpart AE), kaolin § (sub-
part AG), feldspar (subpart Al), and talc, steatite,

‘* EPA has adopted effluent limitations under section 307
for toxic pollutants from froth-flotation mills for platinum ores,
40 C.F.R. § 440.113(b). but no effluent limitations for conven-
tional pollutants and no performance standards. See id.
§§ 440.112, .114, .115. Because the Corps may apply section
307 effluent limitations (but not section 301 or 306 limitations)
in section 404 permits, see 40 C.F.R. § 230.10(b)(2), the tailings
from a platinum beneficiation mill could be subject to a section
404 permit.

58

soapstone, and pyrophyllite (subpart AJ), among
others.

In short, when they adopted the new definition of
“fill material,” EPA and the Corps did not intend to
make any change in EPA’s effluent limitations or in
the agencies’ longstanding practice of applying those
limitations to the process wastewater from ore ben-
eficiation mills through section 402 permits. If the
Court finds that the 2002 fill rule has the effect of
reversing that practice, as the Corps now argues, see
Fed. Br. at 40, the Court should set the regulation
aside as arbitrary, since the agency did not provide a
“reasoned analysis” for—and actually denied the ex-
istence of—this change. State Farm, 463 U.S. at 42;
5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A); see J.A. 475a, J 72.

D. The Regas Memo Could Not Change the
Agencies’ Authoritative Interpretation
Published in the Federal Register.

The Regas memo, which purported to construe
the 2002 fill rule, J.A. 143a-45a, could not reverse
the agency's interpretation explained in the Federal
Register upon adoption of the rule. An authoritative
expression of an agency’s interpretation of its rule is
entitled to deference as to the rule’s meaning. See
Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461 (1997). A clear
statement in the Federal Register upon promuiga-
tion of a rule is “dispositive” of the agency's intent.
See Hillsborough County v. Automated Med. Labs.,
Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 714-16 (1985). Subsequent, in-
consistent interpretations of the regulation do not
receive deference. See Thomas Jefferson Univ. v.
Shalala, 512 U.S. 504, 512 (1994) (‘we must defer to
the Secretary's interpretation unless an ‘alternative

59

reading is compelled ... by other indications of the
Secretary's intent at the time of the regulation’s
promulgation”) (quoting Gardebring v. Jenkins, 485
U.S. 415, 430 (1988)); accord, Gonzales v. Ore-
gon, 546 U.S. 243, 258 (2006) (“That the current in-
terpretation runs counter to the ‘intent at the time of
the regulation's promulgation,’ is an additional rea-
son why Auer deference is unwarranted.”) (citation
omitted). Formal notice-and-comment rulemaking
procedures tend “to foster the fairness and delibera-
tion that should underlie a pronouncement of such
force.” United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218,
230 (2001) (denying Chevron deference to informal
Customs classification rulings); see also Alaska Prof'l
Hunters Ass’n v. FAA, 177 F.3d 1030, 1033-34 (D.C.
Cir. 1999) (Randolph, J.) (agency may not change de-
finitive interpretation of rule without new notice-
and-comment rulemaking).

If subordinate officials could alter an agency’s in-
terpretation of regulations as published in the Fed-
eral Register by writing an internal, unpublished
memo, preambles to rules published in the Federal
Register would become largely meaningless. The
Regas memo reveals the lack of “fairness and delib-
eration,’ Mead Corp., 533 U.S. at 230, in this ap-
proach. The memo neglects entirely the repeated
statements in the Federal Register and the rulemak-
ing record that the rule was not intended to exempt
discharges from applicable effluent limitations. See
J.A. 143a-45a. Instead, the Regas memo substitutes
a distinction between discharges whose filling effects
are “immediate” and those that are “incidental,” a
distinction with no clear boundary or basis in the
language of the rule and that was never mentioned
at the time of the rule’s promulgation. J.A. 144a-

60

45a. To give effect to the Regas memo would be in-
appropriate and inconsistent with this Court’s prece-
dents.

CONCLUSION

The judgment of the court of appeals should be af-
firmed.

Respectfully submitted,

‘THOMAS S. WALDO
Counsel of Record
EARTHJUSTICE
325 Fourth Street
Juneau, AK 99801
(907) 586-2751

ScoTt L. NELSON
PUBLIC CITIZEN
LITIGATION GROUP
1600 20% St., NW
Washington, DC 20009
(202) 588-1000

la

APPENDIX

STATUTES INVOLVED

Section 101 of the Clean Water Act,
33 U.S.C. § 1251

§ 1251. Congressional declaration of goals
and policy

(a) Restoration and maintenance of chemical,
physical and biological integrity of Nation's waters;
national goals for achievement of objective

The objective of this chapter is to restore and
maintain the chemical, physical, and biological in-
tegrity of the Nation's waters. In order to achieve
this objective it is hereby declared that, consistent
with the provisions of this chapter—

(1) it is the national goal that the discharge of pol-
lutants into the navigable waters be eliminated by
1985;

Section 301 of the Clean Water Act,
33 U.S.C. § 1311

§ 1311. Effluent limitations

(a) Illegality of pollutant discharges except in
comphance with law

Except as in compliance with this section and sec-
tions 1312, 1316, 1317, 1328, 1342, and 1344 of this
title, the discharge of any pollutant by any person
shall be unlawful.

2a
(b) Timetable for achievement of objectives

In order to carry out the objective of this chapter
there shall be achieved—

(1)(A) not later than July 1, 1977, effluent limita-
tions for point sources, other than publicly owned
treatment works, (i) which shall require the applica-
tion of the best practicable control technology cur-
rently available as defined by the Administrator
pursuant to section 1314(b) of this title, or (i) in the
case of a discharge into a publicly owned treatment
works which meets the requirements of subpara-
graph (B) of this paragraph, which shall require
compliance with any applicable pretreatment re-

quirements and any requirements under section
1317 of this title; and

(B) for publicly owned treatment works in exis-
tence on July 1, 1977, or approved pursuant to sec-
tion 1283 of this title prior to June 30, 1974 (for
which construction must be completed within four
years of approval), effluent lmitations based upon
secondary treatment as defined by the Administrator
pursuant to section 1314(d)(1) of this title; or,

(C) not later than July 1, 1977, any more strin-
gent limitation, including those necessary to meet
water quality standards, treatment standards, or
schedules of compliance, established pursuant to any
State law or regulations (under authority preserved
by section 1370 of this title) or any other Federal law
or regulation, or required to implement any applica-
ble water quality standard established pursuant to
this chapter.

3a

(2)(A) for pollutants identified in subparagraphs
(C), (D), and (F) of this paragraph, effluent limita-
tions for categories and classes of point sources,
other than publicly owned treatment works, which (1)
shall require application of the best available tech-
nology economically achievable for such category or
class, which will result in reasonable further pro-
gress toward the national goal of eliminating the dis-
charge of all pollutants, as determined in accordance
with regulations issued by the Administrator pursu-
ant to section 1314(b)(2) of this title, which such ef-
fluent hmitations shall require the elimination of
discharges of all pollutants if the Administrator
finds, on the basis of information available to him
(including information developed pursuant to section
1325 of this title), that such elimination is techno-
logically and economically achievable for a category
or class of point sources as determined in accordance
with regulations issued by the Administrator pursu-
ant to section 1314(b)(2) of this title, or (ii) in the
case of the introduction of a pollutant into a publicly
owned treatment works which meets the require-
ments of subparagraph (B) of this paragraph, shall
require compliance with any applicable pretreatment
requirements and any other requirement under sec-
tion 1317 of this title;

(B) Repealed. Pub.L. 97-117, § 21(b), Dec. 29,
1981, 95 Stat. 1632.

(C) with respect to all toxic pollutants referred to
in table 1 of Committee Print Numbered 95-30 of the
Committee on Public Works and Transportation of
the House of Representatives compliance with efflu-
ent limitations in accordance with subparagraph (A)
of this paragraph as expeditiously as practicable but

4a

in no case later than three years after the date such
hmitations are promu!gated under section 1314(b) of
this title, and in no case later than March 31, 1989;

(D) for all toxic pollutants listed under paragraph
(1) of subsection (a) of section 1317 of this title which
are not referred to in subparagraph (C) of this para-
graph compliance with effluent limitations in accor-
dance with subparagraph (A) of this paragraph as
expeditiously as practicable, but in no case later than
three years after the date such limitations are prom-
ulgated under section 1314(b) of this title, and in no
case later than March 31, 1989;

(E) as expeditiously as practicable but in no case
later than three years after the date such limitations
are promulgated under section 1314(b) of this title,
and in no case later than March 31, 1989, compliance
with effluent limitations for categories and classes of
point sources, other than publicly owned treatment
works, which in the case of pollutants identified pur-
suant to section 1314(a)(4) of this title shall require
application of the best conventional pollutant control
technology as determined in accordance with reguia-
tions issued by the Administrator pursuant to sec-
tion 1314(b)(4) of this title; and

(F) for all pollutants (other than those subject to
subparagraphs (C), (D), or (E) of this paragraph)
compliance with effluent limitations in accordance
with subparagraph (A) of this paragraph as expedi-
tiously as practicable but in no case later than 3
years after the date such limitations are established,
and in no case later than March 31, 1989.

(3)(A) for effluent hmitations under paragraph
(1)(A)Q) of this subsection promulgated after January

da

1, 1982, and requiring a level of control substantially
greater or based on fundamentally different control
technology than under permits for an industrial
category issued before such date, compliance as ex-
peditiously as practicable but in no case later than
three years after the date such limitations are prom-
ulgated under section 1314(b) of this title, and in no
case later than March 31, 1989; and

(B) for any effluent limitation in accordance with
paragraph (1)(A)(i), (2)(A)(i), or (2)(E) of this subsec-
tion established only on the basis of section
1342(a)(1) of this title in a permit issued after Feb-
ruary 4, 1987, compliance as expeditiously as practi-
cable but in no case later than three years after the
date such limitations are established, and in no case
later than March 31, 1989.

(c) Modification of timetable

The Administrator may modify the requirements
of subsection (b)(2)(A) of this section with respect to
any point source for which a permit application is
filed after July 1, 1977, upon a showing by the owner
or operator of such point source satisfactory to the
Administrator that such modified requirements (1)
will represent the maximum use of technology within
the economic capability of the owner or operator; and
(2) will result in reasonable further progress toward
the elimination of the discharge of pollutants.

(d) Review and revision of effluent limitations

Any effluent limitation required by paragraph (2)
of subsection (b) of this section shall be reviewed at
least every five years and, if appropriate, revised
pursuant to the procedure established under such
paragraph.

6a

(e) All point discharge source application of efflu-
ent limitations

Effluent limitations established pursuant to this
section or section 1312 of this title shall be applied to
all point sources of discharge of pollutants in accor-
dance with the provisions of this chapter.

Section 304 of the Clean Water Act,
33 U.S.C. § 1314

§ 1314. Information and guidelines

(a) Criteria development and publication

(4) The Administrator shall, within 90 days after
December 27, 1977, and from time to time thereafter,
publish and revise as appropriate information identi-
fying conventional pollutants, including but not lim-
ited to, pollutants classified as biological oxygen
demanding, suspended solids, fecal coliform, and pH.
The thermal component of any discharge shall not be
identified as a conventional pollutant under this
paragraph.

(b) Effluent limitation guidelines

For the purpose of adopting or revising effluent
limitations under this chapter the Administrator
shall, after consultation with appropriate Federal
and State agencies and other interested persons,
publish within one year of October 18, 1972, regula-
tions, providing guidelines for effluent limitations,

7a

and, at least annually thereafter, revise, if appropri-
ate, such regulations. Such regulations shall

(1)(A) identify, in terms of amounts of constitu-
ents and chemical, physical, and biological character-
istics of pollutants, the degree of effluent reduction
attainable through the application of the best practi-
cable contro) technology currently available for
classes and categories of point sources (other than
publicly owned treatment works); and

(B) specify factors to be taken into account in de-
termining the control measures and practices to be
applicable to point sources (other than publicly
owned treatment works) within such categories or
classes. Factors relating to the assessment of best
practicable control technology currently available to
comply with subsection (b)(1) of section 1311 of this
title shall include consideration of the total cost of
application of technology in relation to the effluent
reduction benefits to be achieved from such applica-
tion, and shall also take into account the age of
equipment and facilities involved, the process em-
ployed, the engineering aspects of the application of
various types of control techniques, process changes,
non-water quality environmental impact (including
energy requirements), and such other factors as the
Administrator deems appropriate;

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385015_0065%3A17. Public record. Not legal advice.
