# Amicus Curiae Brief — Utility Water Water Act Group Group v. Riverkeeper, Inc. (Nos. 07-597, 07-588, 07-589)

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Amicus Curiae Brief
- **Published:** January 1, 2009

## Text

S\ laeay i “3 eT
\ (a) %\ sp) OCT 6 - 2008

Nos. 07-588, 07- Ve onsoy’ OF oe THE CLUKK

ee ee sae

_—_—— =

Jn the Supreme Court of * United States

— SE” -_——- — —-

ENTERGY Guciiniaiaines Petitioner, Qy2>% 2

Vv.

ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, ET AL., Respondents.

PSEG FossiL LLC, ET AL., Petitioners,

Vv.

RIVERKEE” EF , INC., ET AL., Respondents.

Utiuity WaTER Act GRoupP, Petitioner,

V.

RIVERKEEPER, INC., ET AL., Respondents.

On Writ of Certiorari to the United States
Court of Appeals for the Second Circutt

PRIEF FOR THE STATES OF ILLINOIS, [OWA, MARYLAND,
MONTANA, OHIO, AND OKLAHOMA, THE COMMONWEALTH
OF PENNSYLVANIA, DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL
PROTECTION, AND THE COMMONWEALTH OF PUERTO
RICO AS AMICI CURIAE IN SUPPORT OF RESPONDENTS

Micwae- A. Scopro* Lisa MADIGAN
Solicitor General Attorney General of Illinois
100 West Randolph Street
JANE ELINOR Notz Chicago, Illinois 60601

Deputy Solicitor General (312) 814-3698
* Counsel of Record

{additional counsel listed on signature page]

Becker Gallagher - Cincinnati, OH - Washington, D.C. - 800.890.5001

i
QUESTION PRESENTED

Whether § 316(b) of the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C.
§ 1326(b), authorizes the Environmental] Protection
Agency to compare costs with benefits in determining
the “best technology available for minimizing adverse
environmental impact” at cooling water intake
structures.

n

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page
i yy 8 Be 4. yy: | ne i
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES .................. ill
INTEREST OF THE AMICI CURIAE ........... HT
I a arn ad oa mist oe wn kid Re 2
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT .................. 9
a6 Oe et Mates bi WS eel ieee 10

I. SITE-SPECIFIC CONSIDERATIONS ARE PROPERLY
ADDRESSED THROUGH THE VARIANCE PROCESS,
WITHOUT RezsortT To CostT-BENEFIT
ee ee vi oe ieee oo hae eens ws 10

Il. Use Or Cost-BENEFIT ANALYSIS POSES
SIGNIFICANT PRACTICAL PROBLEMS FOR STATE
PERMITTING AUTHORITIES ................. 17

Te eee ee oT ee ee 23

ill
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases: Page

Alabama Power Co. v. Costle,
636 F.2a 323 (D.C. Cir. 1979) .............- 14

Appalachian Power Co. v. Train,
og Ff fe ey: re 4

EI. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Train,
ee I cc ue rewucaeeeue 12,13

E.P.A. v. Nat'l Crushed Stone Ass'n,
I I ee ian he a te oe a 12

Monsanto Co. v. Kennedy,
613 F.2d 947 (D.C. Cir. 1979) ......... ieee ae

Riverkeeper, Inc. v. United States Environmental
Protection Agency, 358 F.3d 174
ee oa his eee ae eae 2 passim

Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Costle,
590 F.2d 1011 (D.C. Cir. 1978) ............. 13

Statutes and Rules:
Ne ee tae aS eM 4

ee iio Pn a Bd 4

Se EE 6 ok be eee eeu s ees ols 12

iV

oN ee ere 16
EE in ow coe een we ewe enews passim
CL Tree rT rer Tre 6
BE err rrr 6
et eee eee ere Tere 6
oe ee ee 6
I nv cn ce bh ceecndcenecues 5
Oe OM ong cccco ccc cekccucees 5
Gar ae Oe ID no vec cccceecenaces 18
40 C.F.R. § 125.95(b)(6)GiM(A) ................. 19
40 C.F.R. § 125.95(b)(G)GiM(C) ..... 2.2.22. 19
40 C.F.R. § 125.95(b)(6)(ii)(E) .. 2... eee. 19
66 Fed. Reg. 65,256-01 (2001) ............. 20, 21
69 Fed. Reg. 41,576 (2004) .............. passim
Miscellaneous:

Frank Ackerman & Lisa Heinzerling,
Pricing the Priceless: Cost-Benefit Analysis of
Environmental Protection, 150 U. Pa. L. Rev.
FCAT sd host, (ed ace darken & kaso Ra 17

Vv

James R. May & Maya K. van Rossum, The
Quick and the Dead: Fish Entrainment,
Entrapment, and the Implementation and
Application of Section 316(b) of the Clean
Water Act, 20 Vt. L. Rev. 373 (1995) ..........

Thomas O. McGarity, A Cost-Benefit State, 50
Peps. To: TG. Fe 6 4.450054c00anennnes

1
INTEREST OF THE AMICI CURIAE

The amici have two critical interests in the
outcome of this case. First, the amici are devoted to
preserving the aquatic ecosystems on which they
depend. Absent stringent regulation, cooling water
intake structures have devastating effects on fish and
other aquatic organisms, which are not only important
environmentally, but also serve critical commercial,
economic, and recreational purposes. Both because of
the importance of aquatic ecosystems and because
many have already been substantially compromised,
the amici have a vital interest in protecting these
ecosystems from additional, undue predation by
human activity.

Second, because the States share responsibility for
enforcing the Clean Water Act (“Act”) with the federal
Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”), the amici
have a powerful interest in a regulatory system that is
workable in practice and provides for accurate and
consistent results. Yet under the EPA regulations
challenged here, permitting authorities are required to
undertake complicated and costly assessments that
Congress has not authorized and that EPA itself failed
to complete. The amici are concerned that requiring
state agencies to conduct such assessments would
strain state resources, encourage needless disputes
between state permitting authorities and applicants,
slow the permitting process—delaying the issuance of
timely permits—and likely lead to inconsistent or
inaccurate permitting decisions.

2
STATEMENT

1. Many power plants and other industrial
facilities cool their equipment with water drawn from
oceans, rivers, lakes, and streams using one of two
basic “cooling water intake structures.” Pet. App. 6a,
12a n.3.' A “once-through” cooling system takes in
water, sends it through the facility once to absorb heat,
and returns it directly to the water body at a much
higher temperature. /d. at 12 n.3. By contrast, a
“closed-cycle” system draws in an initial quantity of
water and then continually recirculates it between
heat-bearing machinery and an external cooling device,
such as a cooling tower or pond. /bid. Because new
water is added to closed-cycle systems solely to
compensate for evaporation, they use 96 to 98 percent
less fresh water (and 70 to 96 percent less salt water)
than comparable once-through systems. 69 Fed. Reg.
41,576, 41,601 1.44 (2004).

2. The environmental impact of withdrawing
large amounts of cooling water is “staggering.”
Riverkeeper, Inc. v. United States Environmental
Protection Agency, 358 F.3d 174, 181 (2d Cir. 2004)
(hereafter “Riverkeeper I’). In the rule at issue here,
EPA determined that cooling water intake structures
may cause “multiple * * * undesirable and
unacceptable environmental impacts,” including:

entrainment andimpingement; reductions of
threatened and endangered species; damage
to critica] aquatic organisms, including

' Citations are to the appendix to the petition for certiorari in
Utility Water Act Group v. Riverkeeper, Inc., No. 07.597 (U.S.).

3

important elements of the food chain;
diminishment of a population’s compensatory
reserve; losses to populations including
reductions of indigenous species populations,
commercial fisheries stocks, and recreational!
fisheries; and stresses to. overall
communities and ecosystems as evidenced by
reductions in diversity or other changes in
system structure and function.

69 Fed. Reg. at 41,586.”

Notwithstanding these devastating effects, the
nation’s power plants and factories continue to
withdraw more than 279 billion gallons of cooling
water each day. See Riverkeeper J, 358 F.3d at 181.
EPA estimates that the use of cooling water by the
thermoelectric power industry accounts for fully 47
percent of all withdrawals from U.S. waters. 69 Fed.
Reg. at 41,586. Because of the vast quantities of
cooling water used, and the associated destruction of
fish and other organisms, the power industry
“{cjollectively * * * constitutes the country’s single
largest consumer of aquatic life.” James R. May &
Maya K. van Rossum, The Quick and the Dead: Fish
Entrainment, Entrapment, and the Implementation and
Application of Section 316(b) of the Clean Water Act, 20
Vt. L. Rev. 373, 381 (1995). Indeed, EPA has
determined that the nation’s larger power plants alone
destroy the equivalent of more than 3.4 billion fish and

* “Impingement” occurs when larger organisms, like fish and

shellfish, are crushed against the screens at the mouth of the
intake pipe, while “entrainment” refers to smaller organisms, like
plankton, eggs, and larvae, being sucked into the pipe and killed
hy the system's pressure and heat. 69 Fed. Keg. at 41,586

4

shellfish each year. 69 Fed. Reg. at 41,586. This
means that a single power plant may impinge more
than one million adult fish in a three-week period. See
Riverkeeper I, 358 F.3d at 181.

3. In 1972, Congress amended the Clean Water
Act “to restore and maintain the chemical, physical,
and biological integnty of the Nation’s waters,” 33
U.S.C. § 1251(a), “the national! goal” being to achieve
“water quality which provides for the protection and
propagation of fish, shellfish, and wildlife,” 33 U.S.C.
§ 1251(a)(2). Because of the devastating ecological!
impacts of impingement and entrainment, Congress
called on the EPA to remedy the problem by
“requir[ing] that the location, design, construction, and
capacity of cooling water intake structures reflect the
best technology available [(“BTA”)}] for minimizing
adverse environmental impact.” 33 U.S.C. § 1326(b).
Congress recognized that even as the Act’s pollution
control efforts improve overall water quality, the
effects of impingement and entrainment could inhibit
the recovery and preservation of aquatic ecosystems.

In 1976, EPA issued its first regulations pursuant
to § 316(b), which the Fourth Circuit remanded to EPA
without addressing their merits. 69 Fed. Reg. at
41,583-41,584 (discussing Appalachian Power Co. v.
Train, 566 F.2d 452 (4th Cir. 1977)). After years
passed without new regulations, environmental groups
sued EPA and won a consent decree requiring the
agency to establish a timetable to issue rules under
§ 316(b) in three phases. 69 Fed. Reg. at 41,583.
Phase Il regulates intake structures at new sources,
Phase II covers large, existing power plants, and Phase

5

Ill regulates other power plants and industrial
facilities. Thbid.

The Phase I Rule requires use of a closed-cycle
cooling system or alternative technology capable of a
comparable reduction in impingement and
entrainment. 69 Fed. Reg. at 41,601. Because closed-
cycle systems withdraw substantially less water than
once-through systems, they destroy far less aquatic life.
69 Fed. Reg. at 41,601 & n.44. EPA estimates that a
closed-cycle system may reduce impingement mortality
and entrainment by as much as 98 percent, when
compared with a once-through system. Jbid. On
judicial review, the Second Circuit largely upheld the
Phase I Rule. See Riverkeeper I, 358 F.3d at 181.

4. On July 9, 2004, EPA issued its Phase II Rule.
Because large, existing power plants withdraw
approximately 214 bilhon gallons of cooling water each
day, 69 Fed. Reg. at 41,586, this rule regulates the vast
majority of withdrawals. EPA declined to select closed-
zycle cooling as BTA for large, existing power
plants—as it had for new plants under the Phase |
Rule—and instead adopted national performance
standards based on reductions in impingement
mortality and entrainment associated with a “range” of
technologies (including fine- and wide-mesh screens,
aquatic filter barrier systems, barrier nets, and fish
return systems) that EPA “determined to be
commercially available for the industries affected as a
whole.” 69 Fed. Reg. at 41,598-41,599, 41,601. The
performance standards require as little as 60 percent
reduction in entrainment and 80 percent reduction in
impingement mortality. 40 C.F_R. § 125.94(b)(1), (2).
Thus, the Phase II standards require far less than the

6

98 percent reductions achievable with closed-cycle
cooling.

The Phase II Rule also allows for two site-specific
exceptions from the general requirements—a “cost-cost
variance” and a “cost-benefit variance.” 40 C.F.R.
§ 125.94(a)(5)(i), (ii). The former is available if a plant
demonstrates that its costs of complying “would be
significantly greater than the costs considered by the
Administrator * * * in establishing the applicable
performance standards,” while the latter applies where
a plant shows that its compliance costs “would be
significantly greater than the benefits of complying
with the applicable performance standards.” J/bid.
Variance requests are evaluated by the applicable
permitting authority, including a state permitting
authority operating under the National Pollution
Discharge Elimination System (“NPDES”). 69 Fed.
Reg. at 41,593.° If a facility makes either required
showing, the permitting authority “must make a site-
specific determination” of BTA and impose “site-
specific alternative requirements” that are “as close as
practicable to the applicable performance standards.”
40 C.F.R. § 125.94(a)(5)G), (ii). Or the permitting
authority may conclude that additional measures are
unnecessary, either because of their “significantly
greater costs” under the cost-cost variance or because

. NPDES is the permitting process though which the
requirements of the Act and its regulations are enforced. 33
U.S.C. § 1342(b). Every facility operating a cooling water intake
structure must obtain a permit from either EPA or an EPA-
approved state agency. /bid.; see also 40 C.F.R. § 123.1(d). Forty-
five States and the Virgin Islands are authorized to administer the
NPDES permitting program. 69 Fed. Reg. at 41,582.

7

the “costs would be significantly greater than the
benefits” under the cost-benefit variance. Jbid.

5. On petition for review, the Second Circuit
remanded for additional explanation of EPA’s choice of
BTA and, if necessary, for a new determination of BTA.
Pet. App. 4la-42a. The court noted that “the record is
unclear as to the basis for the EPA’s selection of the
suite of technologies as BTA,” and suggested that EPA
rejected closed-cycle cooling as BTA only by using cost-
benefit analysis in violation of § 316(b). Pet. App. 34a-
4ta. Because the Rule’s cost-benefit variance
authorized site-specific determinations of BTA based
on cost-benefit analysis, the court rejected it as well.
Pet. App. 63a.

The court did not reject outright the cost-cost
variance. Instead, the court noted that although
§ 316(b) does not expressly authorize EPA to allow
permitting authorities to grant variances from
gencrally applicable requirements, it did not doubt
that EPA could allow variances so long as the agency
“guide[d] the permitting authority to consider
appropriate factors and allow[ed] relaxation of the
Rule’s uniform technology requirements only insofar as
necessary to account for unusual circumstances not
considered by the Agency during its rulemaking.” Pet.
App. 55a-56a n.22 (brackets in original) (quoting
Riverkeeper 1, 358 F.3d at 193-194). However, because
of procedural problems in the promulgation of the cost-
cost variance and because the variance is expressly
premised on the validity of the BTA determination,
which itself was remanded for further explanation, the
court found it necessary to remand the cost-cost

8

variance, too, for additional proceedings. Pet. App.
56a-57a.

On April 14, 2008, this Court granted certiorari on
the question “[w]hether Section 316(b) of the Clean
Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1326(b), authorizes the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to compare
costs with benefits in determining the ‘best technology
available for minimizing adverse environmental
impact’ at cooling water intake structures.”

9
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

This Court should affirm the judgment below for
all of the reasons set forth in state-respondents’ brief.
Petitioners’ contrary position is impossible to square
with the plain language of § 316(b), the provision’s
context within the Clean Water Act, and the legislative
history of the 1972 Clean Water Act amendments.
This brief provides two additional reasons—both of
particular significance to the States, who share
responsibility for enforcing the Clean Water Act—for
affirming the decision below.

First, petitioners and their amici incorrectly argue
that, without the authority to undertake a cost-benefit
analysis, neither EPA nor state permitting authorities
will be able to account for local circumstances by
providing for site-specific compliance alternatives. As
the Second Circuit correctly concluded, a properly
crafted variance provision would address site-specific
considerations, without weighing costs and benefits in
making these individualized determinations. Neither
petitioners nor their amici successfully identify any
circumstance under which site-specific relief from
generally applicable standards would be appropriate
under the Clean Water Act but somehow unavailable
without a cost-benefit variance provision.

Second, requiring state permitting authorities to
perform cost-benefit analysis on a case-by-case basis
would strain state resources, fuel needless disputes
between permit writers and applicants, and prolong
the permitting process. Given the complex nature of
biological systems and the concomitant complexities
associated with quantifying and monetizing
environmental benefits, any such analysis is a time-

10

consuming and resource-intensive process. Moreover,
because EPA failed to complete its own benefits
analysis for the Phase II Rule, and therefore
undervalued environmental benefits, there is a real
risk that States also will be unable to fully value the
benefits associated with reductions in impingement
and entrainment, yielding inconsistent or inaccurate
permitting decisions. For these practical reasons,
States should not be expected to perform cost-benefit
analysis when EPA itself did not deliver it and when
not required by Congress.

ARGUMENT

Petitioners and their amici fail in their effort to
overcome language and history with a_ policy
argument—that only a cost-benefit analysis can
account for loca] factors specific to individual sites. In
fact, the variance process already accounts for these
factors, without departing from the <Act’s plain
language and legislative history. And even if the
promotion of good policy were a sound basis for
ignoring text and history, that policy surely favors the
respondents here, for the rule that petitioners espouse
would require States needlessly to undertake
burdensome cost-benefit analyses.

I. SitTeE-SPECIFIC CONSIDERATIONS ARE PROPERLY
ADDRESSED THROUGH THE VARIANCE PROCESS,
WITHOUT RESORT TO COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS.

Petitioners and their state amici argue that the
court below unadvisedly adopted a “one-size-fits-all”
approach to the regulation of cooling water intake
structures, Entergy/PSEG Br. 31, Nebraska Br. 10, and
that, without the authority to undertake cost-benefit
analysis when determining BTA, permitting

ll

authorities will be unable to “tak(e] account of local
waterbody characteristics” when writing permits and
“provide site-specific compliance options,” Nebraska Br.
8; see also Entergy/PSEG Br. 48. This concern is
misplaced. The Second Circuit correctly concluded that
site-specific considerations may be addressed through
the variance process, and that cost-benefit analysis is
unnecessary in making these’ individualized
determinations. Pet. App. 55a-56a & n.22. Tellingly,
neither petitioners nor their amici identify a single,
hypothetical circumstance in which a deviation from
generally applicable standards would be appropriate
yet unavailable without cost-benefit analysis.

Although the Second Circuit remanded the cost-
cost variance provision for further proceedings, the
court did not doubt EPA’s authority to make site-
specific compliance alternatives available. Pet. App.
55a-57a & n.22. The court thus followed its prior
holding in Riverkeeper I that while § 316(b) does not
specifically authorize EPA to allow site-specific
variances from general standards, this silence does not
prohibit EPA from allowing such variances, so long as
the variance provision does not leave “alternative
requirements to the Agency’s ‘unfettered discretion”
and “guide[s] the permitting agency to consider
appropriate factors * * *.” Pet. App. 55a-56a n.22
(quoting Riverkeeper I, 358 F.3d at 193-194). Although
the issue of whether EPA is either authorized or
required to provide for variances from § 316(b) for site-
specific conditions is not before this Court, neither
respondents nor their amici question the EPA’s ability
to provide site-specific compliance options—provided
their availability is limited by consideration of
appropriate factors—in light of this Court’s decision in

12

E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Train, 430 U.S. 112
(1977).

In du Pont, the Court held that § 301 of the Act
allows the EPA to set uniform, industry-wide effluent
limitations for existing plants, “so long as some
allowance is made for variations in individual plants.”
430 U.S. at 128. In particular, the Court found that
although § 301 only expressly contemplates variances
from standards set pursuant to § 301(b)(2)(A),
(describing effluent limitations to become effective by
July 1, 1983), EPA also must authorize variances from
standards set pursuant to § 301(b)(1)(A) (describing the
effluent limitations to become effective by July 1,
1977). See 430 U.S. at 128; see also E.P.A. v. Nat'l
Crushed Stone Ass'n, 449 U.S. 64, 72 (1980) (noting du
Pont’s holding that although no “explicit variance
provision exists with respect to [1977] standards,” such
a provision was nevertheless “a necessary aspect of
[1977] limitations applicable by regulations to classes
and categories of point sources”).* The Court suggested

* Section 301(c) provides that

{t!he Administrator may modify the requirements
of subsection (b)(2)(A) of this section with respect
to any point source for which a permit application
is filed after July 1, 1977, upon a showing by the
ow ner or operator of such point source satisfactory
to the Administrator that such modified
requirements (1) willrespect the maximum use of
technology within the economic capability of the
owner or operator; an@ (2) will result in
reasonable further progress toward the
elimination of the discharge of pollutants.

33 U.S.C. § 131) ¢e).

13

that a variance provision was necessary to give state
permitting authorities an important role in
administering the Clean Water Act. See du Pont, 430
U.S. at 133 n.24; see also Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Costle,
590 F.2d 1011, 1034 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (explaining that,
in du Pont, “[t]he Court subscribed to the view that, by
leaving the granting of variances to the state agencies
in the first instance, the significance of their role would
be preserved”).

Following du Pont, therefore, the Secc nd Circuit
correctly recognized EPA’s authority to allow variances
from generally applicable requirements. Accordingly,
petitioners and their amici are wrong to contend that
state permitting authorities will be unable to make
site-specific determinations under the Second Circuit’s
decision.

Nor do petitioners or their amici offer even a
hypothetical scenario in which a variance from
generally applicable standards would be appropriate
but unavailable under the decision below. As an initial
matter, the suggestion that without cost-benefit
analysis, permitting authorities will be forced to
“require technology to protect aquatic organisms that
are not present” because the affected water bodies
contain “essentially minimal aquatic life,” Nebraska
Br. 9; see also Entergy/PSEG Br. 50 (“[t]he Second
Circuit’s interpretation would compel EPA to order
retrofits that are enormously expensive symbolic
gestures”), may quickly be put to the side. The Second
Circuit did not hold, and respondents do not contend,
that facilities must install outrageously expensive
technology under circumstances where it would provide
only trivial gains in effectiveness. To the contrary, the
court below emphasized that certain facilities “fac{ing]

14

high compliance costs to achieve the national
performance standards * * * may qualify for the cost-
cost variance if such variance is retained on remand.”
Pet. App. 65a.° Thus, if a power plant were situated on
a water body naturally devoid of aquatic life, the
plant’s operator would not have to retrofit it with
expensive technology that would achieve at best de
minimis reductions in impingement and entrainment
just for the sake of complying with the national rule.
Similarly, if the physical constraints of a plant’s
location made it technologically impossible to meet the
national requirements, that facility also could obtain
an exception from the generally applicable standards.

Petitioners and their amici also maintain that
cost-benefit analysis is a necessary tool because under
certain circumstances once-through cooling may
provide a better means of protecting native aquatic
populations than closed-cycle cooling. See UWAG Br.
52 & n.24; Nebraska Br. 9. But petitioners and their
amici together identify only two examples of this
purported phenomenon, neither one of which is
persuasive.

® The Second Circuit's approach comports with longstanding case
law authorizing agencies to make de minimis exceptions to
regulatory requirements even when the statutory language does
not authorize such exceptions. See Alabama Power Co. vu. Costle,
636 F.2d 323, 360 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (recognizing an “agency power,
inherent in most statutory schemes, to overlook circumstances
that in context may fairly be considered de minimis”); Monsanto
Co. v. Kennedy, 613 F.2d 947, 954 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (finding
“latitude inherent in the statutory scheme to avoid literal
application of the statutory [language] * * * in those de minimis
situations that * * * clearly present no public health or safety
concerns’).

15

First, amici argue that once-through cooling offers
the “best means of maintaining the native aquatic
organisms” in water bodies where “the major fish
species that would incur impingement and
entrainment mortality is invasive.” Nebraska Br. 9;
see also UWAG Br. 52-53 n.24. But as petitioners
concede, EPA itself has disapproved this view, see
ibid.; see also id. at 19 (noting that EPA “chose not to
draw distinctions * * * based on the type of species
affected”), rejecting in both the Phase I and Phase II
rulemaking the power industry’s argument that not all
impingement and entrainment effects qualify as
“adverse” environmental impacts because some
“nuisance” species “require eradication.” Pet. App. 86a
(citing Riverkeeper I, 358 F.3d at 196). The Second
Circuit, tn turn, has twice approved EPA’s approach on
this score as “eminently reasonable.” Riverkeeper J,
358 F.3d at 196; see also Pet. App. 86a-87a. In any
event, because the warmer water discharged by once-
through cooling may provide welcome habitat for
invasive species while negatively impacting native
organisms, there is no assurance that the use of this
method wili have the favorable outcome petitioners
and their amici hypothesize. Moreover, neither the
Clean Water Act nor § 316(b) contemplates that cooling
water intake structures, notwithstanding their
negative environmental effects, should be used to
address environmental problems from other sources.
States are far better off addressing invasive aquatic
organisms at their source than by counting on
environmentally destructive cooling methods to do so
incidentally.

Second, petitioners and their amici point to
Florida’s West Indian Manatee population, which now

16

makes its habitat in the heated water discharged by
once-through systems. See UWAG Br. 55-56 & n.27;
Nebraska Br. 9-10. This concern relates to the effects
of thermal discharges rather than impingement and
entrainment, however, and thus is properly addressed
by the Act’s provisions regulating the thermal
component of cooling water intake structures, not by
§ 316(b). Notably, § 316(a) of the Act provides for a
variance from the general requirements for thermal
discharges if the permit applicant can show that the
applicable limitation is “more stringent than necessary
to assure the protection and propagation of a balanced,
indigenous population of shellfish, fish, and wildlife in
and on the body of water into which the discharge is to
be made.” 33 U.S.C. § 1326(a). Accordingly, so long as
a permit applicant can establish that the effluent
limits for heat are unnecessary to maintain a balanced
indigenous population, the permitting authority may
allow a variance from the effluent discharge limits.

Finally, petitioners’ amici maintain that, unless
authorized to apply cost-benefit analysis, States
suffering from water shortages will be unable to
“ensure that the minimal water necessary is
consumed.” Nebraska Br. 10. But closed-cycle cooling
systems withdraw far less water—as much as 98
percent less—than once-through systems. Accordingly,
any concern that the use of closed-cycle cooling might
interfere with States’ efforts at water conservation
rings hollow. Not only will closed-cycle cooling
engender the substantial environmental benefits
associated with a reduction in impingement and
entrainment, but there is no reason to believe that
such systems will interfere with States’ water
management.

17

Il. Use Or CostT-BENEFIT ANALYSIS POSES
SIGNIFICANT PRACTICAL PROBLEMS FOR STATE
PERMITTING AUTHORITIES.

As amici explain, although cost-benefit analysis
may in some circumstances be a useful tool for
identifying when the benefits of regulation exceed its
costs and thereby assist in the process of allocating
resources efficiently, use of cost-benefit analysis results
in a misallocation of resources if benefits are not
correctly valued. See Economists Ackerman, et al. Br.
8-15. Critically, the complicated nature of biological
systems raises substantial challenges to efforts to
assign an accurate monetary value to environmental!
benefits. See id. at 8, 12. Quantifying and monetizing
environmental benefits is a complex, time-consuming,
and costly process, and, if the analysis is not completed
properly, there is a risk that the effects of maintaining
a healthy, biologically diverse environment will be
undervalued. See, e.g., Frank Ackerman & Lisa
Heinzerling, Pricing the Priceless: Cost-Benefit Analysis
of Environmental Protection, 150 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1553,
1563-1581 (2002); Thomas O. McGarity, A Cost-Benefit
State, 50 Admin. L. Rev. 7, 50-72 (1998).

The difficulties in accurately assessing the value
of environmental benefits would raise significant
practical problems for States under petitioners’ cost-
benefit approach. The Phase II Rule requires state
permitting authorities to verify that a permit applicant
meets the requirements of the approved compliance
alternative the applicant selects. 69 Fed. Reg. at
41,643. Under petitioners’ view that EPA may weigh
costs and benefits when setting national performance
standards for cooling water intake structures—and
make available a_ “cost-benefit” compliance

18

option—state agencies would have to perform cost-
benefit analyses in reviewing permit requests for such
structures.° But undertaking a cost-benefit analysis
is a labor-intensive and lengthy process that is likely
to strain already limited state resources, encourage
contention between applicants and permitting
authorities, and slow permitting decisions, thereby
delaying the timely issuance of necessary permits. In
addition, given EPA’s admitted failure to complete its
analysis of environmental benefits in the Phase II
Rule, there is a real risk that States also will be unable
to account for potentially significant benefits
associated with the installation of a_ particular
technology.

As petitioners acknowledge, see UWAG Br. 23-24,
to qualify for a cost-benefit variance, a permit
applicant must submit—and the permitting authority
must evaluate for accuracy—documents including a
“Benefits Valuation Study,” 40 C.F.R. § 125.95(b)(6)(ii).
The study must attempt to “fully value the impacts of
impingement mortality and entrainment” at the
applicant’s facility “and the benefits achievable by
meeting the applicable performance standards.” Ibid.
Accordingly, the applicant must assign a monetized
value to all of the benefits (commercial, recreational,
and ecological) of comphance with national standards.
40 C.F.R. § 125.95(b)(6)Gi)(A). The applicant also must
quantify and monetize certain “non-use” benefits,

® Petitioners’ amici suggest that under petitioners’ approach,

States would be permitted but not required to undertake a
weighing of costs and benefits. See Nebraska Br. 13. To the
contrary, if the cost-benefit variance is upheld, State permitting
authorities will be required to perform cost-benefit analyses when
reviewing permit requests that rely on the variance. *

19

ibid.—that is, benefits that arise from reduced impacts
to ecological resources that the public considers
important, such as threatened or endangered species,
69 Fed. Reg. at 41,647. Attaching « reliable value to
non-use benefits can be difficult, however, and,
according to EPA, for at least some of these benefits
“monetization is not feasible.” 69 Fed. Reg. at 41,648
n.50. The Benefits Valuation Study must also include
“a narrative description of any non-monetized benefits”
arising from compliance with national standards “and
a qualitative assessment of their magnitude and
significance.” 40 C.F.R. § 125.95(b)(6)(@i)(E). Finally,
if the permit applicant utilizes an entrainment
survival rate other than zero, the applicant must
support its chosen rate with “[aJn analysis of the effects
of significant sources of uncertainty on the results of
the study.” 40 C.F.R. § 125.95(b)(6)(11)(C).

Every request for a cost-benefit variance thus
requires the permitting authority to perform a complex
review in an effort. to verify the accuracy of the permit
applicant’s efforts to quantify and monetize the
benefits of using a given technology at a particular
facility. Indeed, in the rulemaking at issue here, EPA
failed to complete its own analysis of the
environmental benefits and conceded the difficulty of
this undertaking, explaining that:

[e]stimating economic benefits is challenging
becau se of the many steps necessary to link
reductions in impingement and entrainment
to changes in impacted fisheries and other
aspects of relevant aquatic ecosystems, and
then to link those ecosystem changes to the
resulting changes in quantities and values
for the associated environmental goods and

20

services that are ultimately linked to human
welfare.

69 Fed. Reg. at 41,655. Thus, EPA’s own findings
confirm that the availability of a cost-benefit variance
will make any agency’s review of a permit application
seeking such a variance an onerous process that will
require substantial expertise and consume significant
resources. Moreover, under petitioners’ view, state
permitting authorities will often be called upon to
make these difficult determinations. In petitioners’
own words, impingement and entrainment effects
“vary dramatically from facility to facility,” and, as a
result, a significant number of BTA determinations

must be made on a case-by-case basis. Entergy
Corp./PSEG Br. 47; accord UWAG Br. 51-57.

EPA’s findings also demonstrate that use of cost-
benefit analysis is hkely to slow down the permitting
process. For example, under the_ cost-benefit
compliance option, the permitting authority
determines BTA only after it attempts to predict the
benefits that reductions in impingement and
entrainment will have on the fishing industry. As EPA
acknowledged, however, although there is no doubt
that “reducing the number of fish killed will increase
the number of fish available for harvest,” “[m]Jeasuring
the benefits of this effect is less straightforward.” 69
Fed. Reg. at 41,659. This is because, as EPA explained
in the Phase I Rule, “it is very difficult to assess the
cause and effect of cooling water intake structures on
ecosystems or an important species within an
ecosystem.” 66 Fed. Reg. 65,256-01, 65,285 (2001).
Such assessments require complex biological studies,
which “can take multiple years” and, in addition,
because the studies are performed outside controlled

21

laboratory conditions, they implicate “a multitude of
confounding factors,” making them “very difficult to
perform and * * * causation, in particular, very difficult
to determine.” Jbid. Thus, EPA concluded, “the time
and complexity of conducting population studies
properly is generally inconsistent with making fast and
reliable permitting decisions.” Ibid.

Finally, EPA, by its own admission, failed to
complete the benefits analysis, which raises a real
possibility that States will be unable to accurately
eonduct their own cost-benefit analyses. In the
ralemaking below, EPA conceded that it had not
assessed the value of all benefits associated with the
expected results of the Phase II Rule, resulting in the
undervaluation of environmental! benefits. 69 Fed.
Reg. at 41,657-41,661. For example, EPA
acknowledged that “[b]ecause of the uncertainties and
assumptions” underlying its analysis, its “estimates of
benefits * * * may understate the benefits to
recreational anglers.” 69 Fed. Reg. at 41,659. The
agency also recognized that although reducing
impingement and entrainment losses “may result in
both use and non-use benefits” and that “there is a real
possibility that ignoring non-use values could result in
serious misallocation of resources,” it was “unable to
value the non-use benefits associated with” the Phase
IT Rule. 69 Fed. Reg. at 41,660-41,661 (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted); see also 69 Fed.
Reg. at 41,666 (“EPA was not able to estimate the
monetary value of non-use benefits resulting from the
rule, although the Agency believes non-use benefits
may be significant.”).

There is no reason to believe that state permitting
authorities—who generally have fewer resources in

22

terms of funding and expertise than EPA—will be able
to perform an analysis that EPA failed to deliver.
Instead, the difficulties in quantifying and monetizing
environmental benefits will only fuel needless disputes
between permit writers and applicants, further
drawing out the permitting process and draining state
resources. Moreover, because regulated companies will
likely devote more resources to assessing the costs of
installing a particular technology than its benefits, the
complexity of the benefits inquiry may lead to
inconsistent permitting decisions or, worse, decisions
that purport to weigh costs against benefits but fail to
account for the full environmental benefits associated
with a particular technology and therefore authorize
less effective methods at the expense of aquatic
ecosystems. Given the Clean Water Act’s commitment
to preserving and maintaining the nation’s water
bodies, either result is intolerable.

23

CONCLUSION

The judgment of the court of appeals should be
affirmed.

Respectfully submitted.

LISA MADIGAN
Attorney General of Illinois

MICHAEL A. SCODRO*
Solicitor General

JANE ELINOR NOTZ
Deputy Solicitor General
100 West Randolph Street
Chicago, Illinois 60601
(312) 814-3698

* Counsel of Record mscodro@atg.state.il.us

OCTOBER 2008

TOM MILLER

Attorney General of lowa
1035 E. Walnut Street
Des Moines, [A 50319

DOUGLAS F. GANSLER

Attorney General of
Maryland

200 Saint Paul Place

Baltimore, MD 21202

MIKE MCGRATH

Attorney General of
Montana

P.O. Box 201401

Helena, MT 59620

NANCY H. ROGERS
Attorney General of Ohio

30 East Broad St., 17th FI.

Columbus, OH 43215

W.A. DREW EDMONDSON

Attorney General of
Oklahoma

313 N_E. 21st Street.

Oklahoma City, OK 73105

24

SUSAN SHINKMAN

Chief Counsel

Pennsylvania Department of
Environmental Protection

Richard P. Mather

Deputy Chief Counsel

400 Market Street

Harrisburg, PA 17105

ROBERTO J. SANCHEZ RAMOS
Secretary of Justice
Commonwealth of

Puerto Rico
P.O. Box 9020192
San Juan, PR 00902-0192

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385015_0048%3A37. Public record. Not legal advice.
