# Amicus Curiae Brief — Utility Water Water Act Group Group v. Riverkeeper, Inc. (Nos. 07-597, 07-588, 07-589)

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## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Amicus Curiae Brief
- **Published:** January 1, 2009

## Text

\ FILED
JUL 21 2008

(") «*) OFFICE OF THE CLERK
Nos. 67-588, 07-589, 07-597SPBBEMEGOMUNT. U.S._|

Hn the
Supreme Court of the Anited States

ENTERGY CORP.,
PSEG FossiIL LLC AND PSEG NUCLEAR LLC,

AND
UTILITY WATER ACT GROUP,
PETITIONERS,
V.

RIVERKEEPER INC, ET AL.
RESPONDENTS.

ON WRITS OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES
COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

BRIEF OFAMIC! CURIAE THE AEI CENTER FOR
REGULATORY AND MARKET STUDIES AND 33
INDIVIDUAL ECONOMISTS IN SUPPORT OF
PETITIONERS

ROBERT E. LITAN

Counsel of Record
BROOKINGS INSTITUTION

1775 MASSACHUSETTS AVE, NW
WASHINGTON, DC 20036
202 797 6120

Full Names of Individual Amici Listed on Inside
Cover
JULY 21, 2008

AMICI CURIAE

KENNETH ARROW, WILLIAM J. BAUMOL,
JAGDISH BHAGWATI, MICHAEL J. BOSKIN,
ROBERT CRANDALL, MAUREEN L. CROPPER,
MICHAEL GREENSTONE, ROBERT W. HAHN,
DAVID HARRISON, JR., R. GLENN HUBBARD,
ALFRED E. KAHN, LESTER B. LAVE, ROBERT LITAN,
PAUL McAvoy, JAMES C. MILLER, III,
ALBERT L. NICHOLS, WILLIAM A. NISKANEN,
ROGER G. NOLL, WALLACE E. OATES, PETER PASSELL,
SAM PELTZMAN, PAUL R. PORTNEY, HARVEY S. ROSEN,
MILTON RUSSELL, THOMAS C. SCHELLING,
RICHARD SCHMALENSEE, CHARLES L. SCHULTZE,
V. KERRY SMITH, VERNON L. SMITH,

ROBERT N. STAVINS, KIP VISCUSI,

MURRAY WEIDENBAUM, LAWRENCE J. WHITE, AND
RICHARD ZECKHAUSER

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page
ne Wie I SI ii scccdcctsndncctsnctnientiirnasiiliniindiicnnta 1
| EE AAR OT a TOR RTO O EE NTRP Ee 2
A. Issue Presented to the Court .....................8. 2
B. Comparisons of Benefits and Costs
under Section 316(b) of the Clean
SURES CRP PECADO ae eee 3
EESTI. SELL FORTE ARTE ESD 5
NN encisissonnpinintsieancahiibilliaaeicimietusithpshbanibienbiidubinwsavnnenaneeiniii 6
A. Benefit-Cost Comparisons Are a
Well-Established Tool to Foster
Rational Decision Making............................ 6
B. A Group of Economists Has
Developed Consensus on the Use of
Benefit-Cost Assessments for
Environmental Regulation.......................+ 10
a a Ot cnainindiuieiabienel 13

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page
Cases:
Riverkeeper, Inc. v. United States EPA,
475 F.3d 83 (3d Cir. 2007) ........0...cccrcsssscocseesesses 4
Seacoast Anti-Pollution League v. Costle,
597 F.2d 306 (18 Cir. 1979) ............cccccceseeeeeees 3,4
Statutes and Regulations:
Executive Order 12044, 43 Fed. Reg.
12,661 (Mar. 24, 1978)...... "EF et MN MORO: 7
Executive Order 12291, 46 Fed. Reg.
UI, ca ciecicsecscennncccnseccendseeee 7,8
Executive Order 12866, 58 Fed. Reg.
ee I MR TIED iciceniecscnssinnscapegsswesecenens 7,8,9
Executive Order 13422, 72 Fed. Reg. 2,763
RR RE aes ee aE 8
Miscellaneous:
Brief for the Federal Respondents in
ae caesmsebetinporemaasninl 2

Brief Amici Curiae for AEI-Brookings Joint
Center for Regulatory Studies et al. in
Whitman v. American Trucking
Associations, 531 U.S. 457 (2001) ........0...0...... 11

Cass Sunstein. Cost-Benefit Default
Principles, AEI-Brookings Joint Center

for Regulatory Studies, Working Paper

00-7 (2000)..............0065 idilinniiasdiatebdaaiiiniaianteeniaibina 9
EPA, Guidelines for Preparing Economic
I I iciindiiedntrhthnteniniticitiettiatinncininsonesenene 10

“Letter to Joseph Priestly” in Benjamin
Franklin: Representative Selections,
with Introduction, Bibliography and
Notes, Frank Luther Mott and Chester
E. Jorgenson, eds., (New York:
American Book Company, 1936,
pp. 348-349), as cited in Boardman et
al., Cost-Benefit Analysis: Concepts and
Practice, Second Edition, (New Jersey:
Prentice Hall, 2001, pp. 1-2).........2....000..000.002. 6,7

Office of Water, EPA, Economic and
Benefits Analysis for the Final Section
316(b) Phase II Existing Facilities Rule
SERRE EEUU A Jeet othe Oe ae SE ee a eae 4

Office of Management and Budget.
Circular A-4 to the Heads of Executive
Agencies and Establishments.
I aici acensorectnncveree 10

Kenneth J. Arrow, Maureen L. Cropper,
George C. Eads, Robert W. Hahn,
Lester B. Lave, Roger G. Noll, Paul R.
Portney, Milton Russell, Richard
Schmalensee, V. Kerry Smith, and
Robert N. Stavins. Benefit-Cost
Analysis in Environmental, Health, and
Safety Regulation: A Statement of
Principles. American Enterprise
Institute, The Annapolis Center, and
Resources for the Future (1996)...................... 11

Kenneth J. Arrow, Maureen L. Cropper,
George C. Eads, Robert W. Hahn,
Lester B. Lave, Roger G. Noll, Paul R.
Portney, Milton Russell, Richard
Schmalensee, V. Kerry Smith, and
Robert N. Stavins. Is There a Role for
Benefit-Cost Analysis in
Environmental, Health, and Safety
Regulation?. Science (Apr. 12, 1996).
ED, TE TE dcnscdusvicsininianebiassimisiediaimaaanl 11

|
INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE

This brief is being submitted on behalf of a group
of economists.' The purpose of this brief is to provide
information to the Court’ related to the
appropriateness of using benefit-cost comparisons in
the context of § 316(b) of the Clean Water Act, a
section regulating the cooling water intake
technology—in the interest of protecting fish and
shellfish—of electricity generating units and certain
other facilities that require large quantities of water
to cool equipment for operational and safety reasons.
We emphasize that the brief does not address the
legal question of whether the U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency (“EPA”) has statutory authority to
consider the benefits and costs of alternatives in
setting requirements for facilities covered under
§316(b). Nor does our brief discuss specifics of how
benefit-cost comparisons should be used under that
section or under the Clean Water Act more
generally. Rather, we provide an overview of the
extensive historical precedent for comparing benefits
and costs in evaluating environmental regulations
and the general principles’ regarding’ such
comparisons that are widely accepted by economists.

As practicing economists and citizens, we have a -
substantial interest in seeing that EPA is allowed to
compare benefits and costs to help it identify the

' No counsel for a party authored this brief in whole or in part,
and no counsel or party made a monetary contribution intended
to fund the preparation or submission of this brief. No person
other than amicus curiae, its members, or its counsel made a
monetary contribution to its preparation or submission. The
parties have consented to the filing of Amicus bricts.

2

relevant tradeoffs and make sound decisions under
§316(b). The societal resources at stake are
substantial with regard both to §316(b) of the Clean
Water Act and environmental, health and safety
regulation more generally. Indeed, it is_ not
uncommon for permitting decisions concerning
individual plants under §316(b) to include fish-
protection measures that may cost hundreds of
millions of dollars. The economists who are
signatories to this brief have identified general
principles that we believe are appropriate in making
decisions regarding fish protection under §316(b)
and other environmental measures. We submit this
brief in the interest of improving environmental
decision-making.

BACKGROUND
A. Issue Presented to the Court

We understand that the issue before the Court is,
in the words of the Government’s bricf responding to
the petition for a writ of certiorari,

Whether Section 316(b) of the Clean
Water Act, 33 USC. _ 1326(b),
authorizes the Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) to compare
costs with benefits in determining the
“best technology available for
minimizing adverse’ environmental
impact” at cooling water intake
structures.”

2 Br. for Federal Resp’ts in Opp'n at (I)

3

We further understand that the issue is not
whether EPA is required to base its decisions
regarding “best technology available” (or “BTA”) on a
benefit-cost test, but only whether the Agency is
allowed to weigh costs and benefits, among other
factors, in deciding what controls must be installed
to reduce fish and shellfish losses at the water
intake structures of affected facilities.

We further understand that this issue is before
the Court in part because of a difference among
circuit courts, with the current Second Circuit
decision in conflict with a prior First Circuit
interpretation of the legality of comparing benefits
and costs.*

As economists, we are not qualified to opine on
how to interpret the statutory language of §316(b) or
on how prior case law applies in this area. Rather,
we respectfully offer our observations on the
economic issues presented in this case in the hope
that the comments will prove useful to the Court.

B. Comparisons of Benefits and Costs
under Section 316(b) of the Clean
Water Act

Our understanding is that for several decades,
EPA (and the state agencies that have assumed
permitting authority in some states) implemented
§316(b) on a case-by-case basis that included
weighing costs and benefits and declining to require
technology “whose cost is wholly disproportionate to
the environmental benefit to be gained,” as affirmed

’ Seacoast Anti-Pollution League v. Costle, 597 F.2d 306 (1s
Cir. 1979)

4

in a 1979 decision by the First Circuit.4 We
understand that under the terms of a consent decree
requiring the issuance of regulations implementing
§316(b) on a national basis, in 2004 EPA issued its
“Phase II” rules (applying to about 550 existing
power plants) that are at issue in this case. EPA’s
Phase II rules set national performance standards
for BTA and also allowed facilities to request site-
specific standards for BTA where they could provide
information on costs and benefits and, if appropriate,
demonstrate that the costs of meeting the national
standards would be “significantly greater” than the
benefits.5 The technology selected by the permitting
authority under the site-specific provision has to
achieve an efficacy level that comes as close as
practicable to the national performance standards
without resulting in costs that are “significantly
greater” than the benefits.

As we understand it, Riverkeeper I] © found that
EPA is prohibited from comparing costs and benefits
in setting requirements under §316(b) or authorizing
site-specific determinations. EPA may consider costs
but only in determining whether a technology can be
“reasonably borne” by the industry as a whole or in
choosing among equally protective alternatives
(what Riverkeeper II calls a “cost-effectiveness”
analysis). EPA is not allowed under Riverkeeper II
to consider costs in relation to benefits—to consider,

4 Id.

5 Office of Water, EPA, Economic and Benefits Analysis for the
Final Section 316(b) Phase IT Existing Facilities Rule (2004)

6 Riverkeeper, Inc. v. United States EPA, 475 F.3d 83 (2d Cir.
2007)

5

for example, whether the costs of a_ slight
improvement in fish protection are disproportionate
to the benefits.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

As economists, we believe that the Second
Circuit’s ruling, by not allowing the consideration of
important information about the _ relationships
between the benefits and costs of alternatives, is
economically unsound. In particular, we believe that,
as a general principle, regulators cannot make
rational decisions unless they are allowed to
compare costs and benefits and to use the results,
along with other factors as appropriate, to choose
among xiternatives.

To the extent permissible under the statute and
case law, EPA should be allowed to consider benefits
and costs in establishing rules for implementing
§316(b). We believe it would not be sensible to
preclude the comparison of benefits and costs in
setting §316(b) requirements. The potential costs of
setting technology-based requirements for cooling
water intakes can be very large, on the order of
hundreds of millions of dollars for a single facility.

The Court’s allowing EPA to consider benefits
and costs would improve both the decision making
process—by making it more transparent—and the
regulatory decisions by allowing important relevant
information to be considered explicitly.

6
ARGUMENT

A. Benefit-Cost Comparisons Are a Well-
Established Tool to Foster Rational
Decision Making

The general concept of comparing benefits and
costs is familiar and long standing. Indeed, in 1772,
Benjamin Franklin wrote in a letter about a method
for making private decisions (which Franklin called
“Moral or Prudential Algebra”) that illustrates the
basic features of benefit-cost assessments.? He
recommended carefully listing pros (i.e., benefits)
and cons (i.e., costs), estimating weights (i.e., valuing
them in some common unit, such as dollars), and
then determining their balance (calculating net
benefits equal to benefits minus costs). Franklin’s
letter emphasizes the crucial importance of following
a systematic process in complex situations in which
there are a host of factors pointing one way or the
other for a given decision. Specifically, Franklin
writes:

When those difficult cases occur, they
are difficult chiefly because while we
have them under Consideration, all the
Reasons pro and con are not present to
the Mind at the same time: but

7 “Letter to Joseph Priestly” in Benjamin Franklin:
Representative Selections, with Introduction, Bibliography and
Notes, Frank Luther Mott and Chester E. Jorgenson, eds..,
(New York: American Book Company, 1936 pp. 348-349), as
cited in Boardman et al., Cost-Benefit Analysis: Concepts and
Practice, Second Edition, (New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 2001,
pp. 1-2).

7

sometimes one Set present themselves,
and at other times another, the first
being out of sight. Hence the various
Purposes or Inclinations that
alternatively prevail, and the
Uncertainty that perplexes us.®

The basic logic of Franklin’s advice—that pros
and cons should be described and compared to one
another in making decisions—applies in the case of
important environmental and other government
regulatory decisions. Indeed, this basic logic and the
increase in the importance of environmental, health
and safety regulation cver the past three decades
has led all presidents since President Carter in 1978
to establish formal procedures - requiring the
preparation of benefit-cost assessments for various
federal regulations. President Carter issued
Executive Order 12044 in 1978 to require federal
agencies to conduct detailed regulatory analyses of
certain proposed rules. President Reagan’s 1981
Executive Order 12291 required agencies to evaluate
the costs and benefits of all major future rules.'° The
first President Bush continued Executive Order
12291 when he took office in 1989.

In 1993, President Clinton issued Executive
Order 12866, which also required that agencies
compare the benefits and costs of major rulemakings
and set guidelines for using the results of these
assessments in regulatory decision making.'! The

* Id.

* 43 Fed. Reg. 12,661 (1978)
10 46 Fed. Reg. 13,193 (1981)
11 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735 (1993)

8

current President Bush continued Executive Order
12866 with relatively minor changes although in
2007 he issued Executive Order 13422 that required
agencies to consider the need for and consequences
of regulatory “guidance” (i.e., agency interpretation
or policy on a regulatory issue that is generally non-
binding).!2

These executive orders have emphasized the
importance of balancing costs and benefits and
maximizing the net benefits (i.e., benefits minus
costs) in setting regulations. Executive Order 12866
requires that agencies “propose or adopt a regulation
only upon a reasoned determination that the
benefits of the intended regulation justify its costs.”!%

The similarity in the language of these executive
orders across decades indicates the bipartisan
support for comparing benefits and costs in making
regulatory decisions. President Reagan’s Executive
Order 12291 stated that,

Regulatory action should not be
undertaken unless’ the potential
benefits to socicty for the regulation
outweigh the potential costs to society
... Regulatory objectives shall be chosen
to maximize the net benefits. to
society. '4

In a similar vein, President Clinton’s Executive
Order 12866 notes that,

1272 Fed. Reg. 2,763 (2007)
19 58 Fed. Reg. 51,736 (1993)
446 Fed. Reg. 13.193 (1981)

9

In deciding whether and how to
regulate, agencies should assess all
costs and benefits of available
regulatory alternatives, including the
alternative of not regulating ... Further,
in choosing among alternative
regulatory approaches, agencies should
select those approaches that maximize
net benefits . . . unless a _ statute
requires another regulatory approach.'§

All presidents since Jimmy Carter have
emphasized the importance of weighing benefits and
costs in making regulatory decisions concerning the
environment and other areas. Indeed, a prominent
legal scholar writing in 2000 concluded that the
nation was nearing the end of a “first generation”
debate about balancing benefits and costs through
the development of benefit-cost “default principles”. '6
In this context, he argued, the issue of whether
benefit-cost analysis should be allowed to assist in
sound decision making has been resolved, with
“second generation” issues including details of how
to implement the benefit-cost methodologies.

The practical assessment of benefits and costs
has been furthered by detailed guidance on how it
can be applied in ervironmental regulatory settings.
KPA has provided important guidelines for assessing
benefits and costs, first in 1983 and more recently in

18 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735 (1993)

‘6 Cass Sunstein. Cost-Benefit Default Principles, AEI-
Brookings Joint Center for Regulatory Studies, Working Paper
00-7 (2000).

10

2000.'? These guidelines provide detailed guidance
on the key concepts involved in implementing such
assessments. The EPA Guidelines were thoroughly
reviewed by the Environmental Economics Advisory
Committee of EPA’s Science Advisory Board,
comprised of thirteen well-recognized economists.
The Office of Management and Budget has
developed similar guidelines.!®

In summary, carefully considering the social
benefits and social costs of a given regulatory
decision makes good sense, as presidents over the
last three decades have recognized. Economists and
other analysts have developed methods for making
these assessments that fall under the general label
of benefit-cost analysis. Benefit-cost assessments do
not provide “answer machines” but rather provide a
useful framework for evaluation of regulatory
alternatives. As Franklin’s early example makes
clear, this framework is particularly important when
the factors involved are complicated and numerous.

B. A Group of Economists Has Developed
Consensus on the Use of Benefit-Cost .

Assessments for Environmental
Regulation

There is a wide consensus among economists on
various fundamental principles regarding the
assessment of benefits and costs. In 1996, a group of
distinguished economists assembled to develop
principles for assessing benefits and costs in

'7 EPA, Guidelines for Preparing Economic Analyses (2000).

18 Office of Management and Budget. Circular A-4 to the Heads
of Executive Agencies and Establishments. (Sept. 17 2003).

11

environmental, health and safety regulation. The
resulting Statement of Principles was published
jointly by the American Enterprise Institute, the
Annapolis Center, and Resources for the Future.!9

These same principles can inform what we
believe to be the appropriate use of benefit-cost
comparisons in making decisions under Section
316(b)..The following is a summary of principles that
we believe underlie the appropriate use of benefit-
cost comparisons in making decisions under this
section.”°

Benefit-cost assessments provide a useful means
of organizing a comparison of the favorable and
unfavorable effects of proposed policies. Systematic
comparisons of benefits and costs can help decision
makers better understand the implications of
various decisions. Such comparisons can provide
useful estimates of the overall benefits and costs of

19 Kenneth J. Arrow, Maureen L. Cropper, George C. Eads,
Robert W. Hahn, Lester B. Lave, Roger G. Noll, Paul R.
Portney, Milton Russell, Richard Schmalensee, V. Kerry Smith,
and Robert N. _ Stavins. Benefit-Cost Analysis in
Environmental, Health, and Satety Regulation: A Statement of
Principles. American Enterprise Institute, The Annapolis
Center, and Resources for the Future (1996). A similar statement
was published in Science magazine, Kenneth J. Arrow, Maureen L.
Cropper, George C. Eads, Robert W. Hahn, Lester B. Lave, Roger G.
Noll, Paul R. Portney, Milton Russell, Richard Schmalensee, V. Kerry
Smith, and Robert N. Stavins 7st There a@ Role for Benefit-Cost Analysis
in Environmental, Health, and Safety Regulation?. Science (Apr. 12,
1996) pp 221-222.

20 These principles also draw on similar ideas put forth in an
Amicus brief filed with this court in 2000. Brief Amici Curiae
for AEI-Brookings Joint Center for Regulatory Studies in
Whitman v. American Trucking Associations, 531 U.S. 457
(2001).

12

proposed decisions. In many _ cases,’ these
comparisons cannot be used to prove that the
economic benefits of a particular decision will exceed
or fall short of the costs because of uncertainties
involved. But comparisons of benefits and costs can
play an important role in informing the decision
process even when the results are not conclusive.

Agencies should not be bound by a strict benefit-
cost test, but should be allowed to consider available
estimates of benefits and costs. There may be factors
other than economic benefits and costs that agencies
will want to weigh in decisions, such as equity
within and across generations.

It is important to compare the benefits and costs
of a proposed regulatory requirement not only to the
status quo but also to alternative regulatory
approaches and levels of stringency that could be
adopted. Systematic review of benefits and costs can
often identify opportunities to modify proposed
requirements in ways that increase benefits at
relatively low cost or reduce costs substantially with
little loss in benefits.

The scale of the benefit-cost assessment should
be related to the importance of the decision. The
scale of the assessment should depend on both the
stakes involved and the likelihood that the resulting
information wil affect the ultimate decision.

Not all impacts of a decision can be quantified or
expressed in dollar terms. Care should be taken to
ensure that quantitative factors do not dominate
qualitative factors in decision making. A common
critique of benefit-cost comparisons is that they do
not emphasize factors that are not easily quantified

13

or monetized. That critique has merit. There are two
principal ways to address it: first, quantify as many
factors as reasonable and quantify or characterize
the relevant uncertainties; and second, give due
consideration to factors that defy quantification but
are thought to be important.

CONCLUSION

We believe that this case provides the Court with
an important opportunity to provide for sound
decision making in_- environmental matters.
Systematic comparisons of benefits and costs have
been important elements of government decision
making in_- environmental matters—including
§316(b) of the Clean Water Act—for many decades.
We believe that decisions on environmental matters
should be based upon a full assessment of benefits
and costs, taking into account elements that cannot
be quantified as well as uncertainties regarding
various costs and benefits. This information will
permit the appropriate balancing of benefits and
costs in key environmental decisions.

Respectfully Submitted,

Robert E. Litan

Counsel of Record

Brookings Institution

1775 Massachusetts Ave, NW
Wash, DC 20036

202 797 6120

14
LIST OF AMICI CURIAE

Kenneth Arrow
Professor of Economics Emeritus, Stanford
University

Wilham J. Baumol

Professor of Economics Emeritus, Princeton
University

Academic Director, Berkley Center for
Entrepreneurial Studies, New York University

Jagdish Bhagwati
University Professor, Economics and Law, Columbia
University

Michael J. Boskin

T.M. Friedman Professor of Economics and Hoover
Institution Senior Fellow, Stanford University

Former Chairman, President's Council of Economic
Advisers

Robert Crandall

Senior Fellow, Brookings Institution

Maureen L. Cropper
Professor of Economics, University of Maryland

Michael Greenstone

3M _ Professor of Environmental Economics,
Massachusetts Institute of Technology

Nonresident Senior Fellow, Brookings Institution

Robert W. Hahn
Executive Director, Center for Regulatory and
Market Studies and Senior Fellow, AEI

15

David Harrison, Jr.

Senior Vice President, National Economic Research
Associates

Former Senior Staff, President's Council of Economic
Advisers

R. Glenn Hubbard

Dean and Russell L. Carson Professor of Finance
and Economics, Graduate School of Business,
Columbia University

Former Chairman, President’s Council of Economic
Advisers

Alfred E. Kahn

Robert Julius Thorne Professor of Political Economy
Emeritus, Cornell University

Former Chairman, Civil Aeronautics Board

Lester B. Lave

University -Professor and Higgins Professor of
Economics, Carnegie Mellon University

Former Member, EPA Advisory Council on Clean Air
Compliance Analysis

Robert Litan
Senior Fellow, Brookings Institution

Paul McAvoy

Wiliams Brothers Professor of Management Studies
Emeritus, Yale School of Management, Yale
University

Former Member, President's Council of Economic
Advisers

16

James C. Miller, III

Former Director, Office of Management and Budget

First Administrator, Office of Information and
Regulatory Affairs

Albert L. Nichols

Vice President, National Economic Research
Associates ,

Former Director, Economic Analysis Division, EPA

William A. Niskanen

Chairman, Cato Institute

Former Member, President’s Council of Economic
Advisers

Roger G. Noll
Professor of Economics Emeritus, Stanford
University

Wallace E. Oates |
Professor of Economics, University of Maryland
University Fellow, Resources for the Future

Peter Passell
Senior Fellow, Milken Institute

Sam Peltzman

Ralph and Dorothy Keller Distinguished Service
Professor Emeritus of Economics, Graduate
School of Business, University of Chicago

Paul R. Portney

Dean, Eller College of Management, University of
Arizona

Former Chief Economist, President’s Council on
Environmental Quality

17

Harvey S. Rosen

John L. Weinberg Professor of Economics and
Business Policy, Princeton University

Former Chairman, President's Council of Economic
Advisers

Milton Russell

Senior Fellow, Institute for a Secure and Sustainable
Environment

Professor Emeritus, Department of Economics,
University of Tennessee, Knoxville

Thomas C. Schelling

Distinguished University Professor Emeritus,
University of Maryland

Nobel Laureate in Economics

Richard Schmalensee

Howard W. Johnson Professor of Management and
Economics, Massachusetts Institute of
Technology

Former Member, President’s Council of Economic
Advisers

Charles L. Schultze

Senior Fellow Emeritus, Brookings Institution

Former Chairman, President's Council of Economic
Advisers

V. Kerry Smith
W.P. Carey Professor of Economics, W.P. Carey
School of Business, Arizona State University

18

Vernon L. Smith

Professor of Economics and Law, Chapman
University

Nobel Laureate in Economics

Robert N. Stavins

Albert Pratt Professor of Business and Government,
John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard
University

Former Chairman, EPA Environmental Economics
Advisory Committee

Kip Viscusi

University Distinguished Professor of Law,
Economics and Management, Vanderbilt
University

Murray Weidenbaum

Edward Mallinckrodt Distinguished University
Professor, Washington University, St. Louis

Former Chairman, President's Council of Economic
Advisers

Lawrence J. White
Professor of Economics, Stern School of Business,
New York University

Richard Zeckhauser

Frank P. Ramsey Professor of Political Economy,
John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard
University

---

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