# Record and brief — Entergy Corp. v. Riverkeeper, Inc.

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URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385015_0045%3A0

## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Record and brief
- **Published:** January 1, 2009
- **Citation:** 556 U.S. 208

## Text

DOCKET

No 07-888

Vide 07-589, 07-

$97
Title

Docketed
Lower Ct
Case Nos

Entergy Corporation. Petitioner
\
Riverkeeper. Inc . et al

November 2, 2007
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
(04-6692 ag - 04-0099ag)

Decision Date January 25, 2007

Rehearing
Denied.

Questions

Presented

~Date~-
Sep 20 2007

Sep 25 2007

Nov 2 2007
Nov 2 2007
Nov 20 2007

Nov 29 2007
Nov 30 2007

Dec 3 2007
Dec 3 2007
Jan 14 2008

Feb 25 2008

Feb 29 2008
Mar 3 2008
Mar 3 2008
Mar 18 2008
Mar 19 2008
Apr 14 2008

July $, 2007

~~~Proceedings and Orders~~-
Application (07 4257) to extend the time to file a petition for a wnt of
certiorari from October 3. 2007 to November 2. 2007. submitted to Justice
Ginsburg
Application (074257) granted by Justice Ginsburg extending the time to
file until November 2, 2007
Petition for a writ of certiorari filed. (Response due December 3, 2007)
Appendix of Entergy Corporation filed.
Order extending time to file response to petition to and including February
1, 2008. for all respondents
Waiver of right of respondent Utility Water Act Group to respond filed

Waiver of right of respondents PSEG Fossil LLC and PSEG Nuclear LLC
to respond filed.

Brief amicus curiae of Nuclear Energy Institute filed VIDED
Briet amici curiae of Nebraska, et al filed VIDED

Order further extending time to file response to petition to and including
February 29, 2008, for all respondents.

Order further extending time to file response to petition to and including
March 3, 2008. for all respondents

Brief of respondents Riverkeepers, Inc . et al. in opposition tiled VIDED.
Brief of Federal Respondents in opposition filed VIDED

Brief of respondents Rhode Island. et al. in opposition filed. VIDED
Reply of petitioner Entergy Corporation filed.

DISTRIBUTED for Conterence of April 11, 2008

Petition GRANTED and is consolidated with No 07-589 and No 07-597.
limited to the following question Whether Section 316(b) of the Clean
Water Act. 33 U SC. 1326(b). authorizes the Environmental Protection

May 9 2008

Agency (EPA) to compare costs with benefits in determining the "best
technology available for minimizing adverse environmental impact” at
cooling water intake structures. A total of one hour is allotted for oral
argument

The time within which to file the joint appendix and petitioners’ briefs on
the merits is extended to and including June 30, 2008 VIDED

May 14 2008 The time within which to file respondents’ briefs on the merits is extended

Jun 5 2008

Jun § 2008

Jun 23 2008

Jun 24 2008

Jun 24 2008

Jun 30 2008

Jul 11 2008

Jul 14 2008
Jul 14 2008

Jul 14 2008

Jul 14 2008
Jul 18 2008

Jul 18 2008
Jul 21 2008
Jul 21 2008
Jul 2) 2008
Jul 21 2008
Jul 21 2008

Jul 2) 2008

Sep 8 2008

to and including September 15, 2008. VIDED

The time within which to file the joint appendix and petitioners’ briefs on
the merits is further extended to and including July 14, 2008 VIDED

The time within which to file respondents’ briefs on the merits is further
extended to and including September 29. 2008. VIDED

Application (074A 1032) for leave to file a consolidated petitioners brief on
the merits in excess of the word limitation, submitted to Justice Ginsburg

Consent to the filing of amicus curiae briefs in support of either or neither
party received trom counsel for respondents Riverkeeper, Inc , et al
VIDED

Application (07A 1032) denied by Justice Ginsburg

Consent to the filing of amicus curiae briefs in support of either or neither
party received from counsel for petitioners’ in case Nos. 07-588, 07-589 &
07-597. VIDED

Consent to the filing of amicus curiae briefs in support of either or neither
party received from counsel for the State respondents. VIDED

Joint appendix filed (statement of costs received) VIDED

Brief of petitioner Entergy Corp. and petitioners PSEG Fossil LLC, et al
filed VIDED

Brief of respondents Environmental Protection Agency, et al. in support of
petitioners filed VIDED

Brief of petitioner Utility Water Act Group filed VIDED

Brief amicus curiae of National Association of Home Builders filed
VIDED.

Brief amicus curiae of Pacific Legal Foundation filed. VIDED

Brief amicus curiae of Nuclear Energy Institute filed VIDED

Brief amicus curiae of American Petroleum Institute tiled VIDED
Brief amici curiae of American Chemistry Council, et al. filed VIDED
Brief amici curiae of Nebraska, et al. filed VIDED

Brief amicus curiae of California Council for Environmental and Economic
Balance filed

Brief amici curiae of AEI Center For Regulatory and Market Studies. et al
filed VIDED

SET FOR ARGUMENT ON Tuesday. December 2. 2008

Sep 12 2008
Sep 23 2008
Sep 29 2008
Sep 29 2008
Sep 29 2008

Oct | 2008
Oct | 2008
Oct 6 2008

Oct 6 2008
Oct 6 2008
Oct 6 2008

Oct 6 2008
Oct 6 2008
Oct 6 2008
Oct 6 2008

Oct 6 2008
Oct 6 2008

Oct 14 2008
Oct 14 2008

Oct 28 2008
Oct 29 2008

Oct 29 2008

Oct 29 2008
Nov 18 2008

CIRCLLATED

Motion for divided argument filed by the Solicitor General. VIDED
Brief of respondents State-Respondents filed VIDED (Distributed)
Briet of respondents Riverkeeper, Inc . et al. tiled VIDED. (Distributed)

Letter from counsel for respondents Riverkeeper, Inc . et al. proposing to
lodge six documents from the records of the Senate Committee on Public
Works related to congressional consideration of the Federal Water
Pollution Control Act of 1972

Motion for divided argument filed by respondents Rhode Island. et al
VIDED

Letter of respondents Riverkeeper. Inc.. et al. in support of State-
Respondents motion for divided argument filed

Briet amici curiae of Environment America. et al filed VIDED
(Distributed)

Letter requesting caption change received
Briet amicus curiae of OMB Watch filed

Briet amici curiae of Commercial Fisherman of America. et al. filed
VIDED (Distributed)

Brief amici curiae of Economists Frank Ackerman. et al filed VIDED
(Distributed)

Briet amici curiae of Clean Air Task Force. et al. filed VIDED
(Distributed)

Briet amici curiae of National Wildlife Federation. and Sierra Club filed
VIDED (Distributed)

Briet amici curiae of Voices of the Wetlands. et al. filed VIDED
(Distributed)

Briet amici curiae of Illinois. et al. tiled VIDED. (Distributed)

Briet amici curiae of Environmental Law Professors filed VIDED
(Distributed)

Motion for divided argument filed by respondents Rhode Island. et al
DENIED VIDED

Motion for divided argument filed by the Solicitor General GRANTED
VIDED

Reply of respondent Utility Water Act Group filed VIDED (Distributed)

Reply brief of respondents The Federal Parties in support of petitioners
tiled VIDED. (Distributed)

Reply of petitioners Entergy Corp, PSEG Fossil LLC. and PSEG Nuclear
LLC filed. VIDED (Distributed)

Record received from the L SC A. for the Second Circuit. (3 boxes)

The Clerk has approved respondents’ proposed lodging Lodging consisting
of six documents from the National Archives, received from counsel for

Dec 2 2008

respondents Riverkeeper, et al. VIDED. (Circulated)

Argued. For Environmental Protection Agency, et al. in support of
petitioners: Daryl! Joseffer, Deputy Solicitor General, Department of
Justice, Washington, D.C. For petitioners: Maureen E. Mahoney,
Washington, D.C. For respondents: Richard J. Lazarus, Cambridge, Mass

PETITION

FOR
WRIT OF

CERTIORARI

Supreme Court
FILED sis
07-58 Rr i 1 - 20N7
Cl OOFFICE OF THE CLERK

No. 07-

IN THE

Supreme Court of the Anited States

ENTERGY CORPORATION,
Petitioner,
V.
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY ET AL.,
Respondents.

On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the United
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

CHUCK D. BARLOW ELISE N. ZOLI

ENTERGY SERVICES, INC. Counsel of Record
308 E. Pearl Street KEVIN P. MARTIN
Jackson, MS 39201 GOODWIN PROCTER LLP
(601) 969-2542 53 State Street

Boston, MA 02109
(617) 570-1000

Counsel for the Petitioner
November 2, 2007

Questions Presented

This case involves regulation under the Clean
Water Act (“CWA”) of the intake structures used by
power plants to take in cooling water. After 30 years
of regulating new facilities, the Environmental
Protection Agency (“EPA”) promulgated a regulation
requiring existing cooling water intake structures to
be retrofitted to comply with EPA’s latest
determination of the “best technology available for
minimizing adverse environmental impact,”
measured in terms of the potential effects on early
life stages of fish. The Second Circuit, deferring to
EPA, held that EPA has authority to retrofit existing
facilities. Siding with environmental petitioners and
against EPA, the court also held that EPA’s weighing
of costs and benefits is limited to a narrow “cost-
effectiveness” test. The questions presented, all of
which implicate splits in circuit court authority, are:

1. Whether the CWA provides EPA authority to
impose new requirements under Section 316(b) of the
Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1326(b), with respect to existing
cooling water intake structures?

2. Whether a court should accord Chevron
deference to an agency's interpretation of its own
statutory jurisdiction?

3. Whether Sections 301 and 316(b) of the CWA,
33 U.S.C. §§ 1301, 1326(b), limit EPA’s weighing of
costs and benefits only to the Second Circuit's “cost
effectiveness” test?

ll.
Parties to the Proceeding

Petitioner Entergy Corp. (“Entergy”) was a
petitioner in the court of appeals. Utility Water Act
Group, PSEG Fossil LLC, and PSEG Nuclear LLC,
expected to be separate petitioners in this Court.
were also petitioners in the court of appeals.

Respondents are the United States
Environmental Protection Agency, a respondent in
the court of appeals, and the following petitioners in
the court of appeals: Riverkeeper, Inc.; Natural
Resources Defense Council: Waterkeeper Alliance:
Soundkeeper,. Inc.: Scenic Hudson, Inc.: Save the
Bay-People for Narragansett Bay: Friends of Casco
Bay: American Littoral Society: Delaware
Riverkeeper Network: Hackensack Riverkeeper, Inc.:
New York/New Jersey Baykeeper: Santa Monica
Baykeeper: San Diego Baykeeper; California
Coastkeeper: Columbia Riverkeeper: Conservation
Law Foundation: Surfrider Foundation: Appalachian
Power Company: and Illinois Energy Association;
and the States of Connecticut... Delaware,
Massachusetts. New Jersey. New York, and Rhode
Island.

Corporate Disclosure Statement
Entergy. a Delaware corporation. is a publicly
traded company, and no publicly-held company has a
10°. or greater ownership interest in Entergy.

Page
I a endian ane eieipiieeibindal 1.
RE: Ol BIND FRUIT 30. nce .c cece cncceiccccsescccccsesessesese ll.
ELIE IIE TORT RT EE RIOT iV.
a ciaseninsleseaicmnininndadsiomaiiices |
SERIE SE OCT AE RS CERNE TOT 1
Statutory Provision Involved ....................ccececseeseseeeeees l
EET TT ETT 2
A. Statutory Background. ................0..sccccccoccesce 4
B. Environmental Protection Agency
ESI, eS OnE ne 7
Ee The Second Circuit’s Decision.................... 10
Reasons for Granting the Petition............................. 13
A. The Second Circuit's Holding that
EPA Has Authority under Section
402 to Impose Section 316(b)
Regulations on Existing Facilities
Conflicts with the Decisions of Two
Other Circuit Courts of Appeal.................. 15
B. The Second Circuit’s Deference to

111.

Table of Contents

EPA on the Existing Facilities Issue
Implicates a Split Among the Courts
of Appeal Over Deference to Agency

Assertions of Jurisdiction ...................

panes 22

IV.

c. The Second Circuit’s Holding

Limiting EPA to a Narrow “Cost-
Effectiveness” Test under Sections
301 and 316(b) Conflicts with the

Holdings of Other Courts of Appeal .......... 25
RNIN is 5 scons igasherncliens dikieideesinibnteieidadineepneioenteiiaide 36
Appendices:

A. 2007 Court of Appeals opinion ....................000200 la
B. Court of Appeals order denying petition for
ee a 95a
C. Relevant statutory provisions ................6..0.c0008 97a
Clean Water Act § 301(a)-(c), 33 U.S.C.
a lit a reds cialna 97a
Clean Water Act § 304(a)—(b), 33 U.S.C.
ca i aia aaa iteiscia iteictaiasiitaiealh 10la
Clean Water Act § 306, 33 U.S.C. § 1316....... 108a
Clean Water Act § 316, 33 U.S.C. § 1326....... ll2a
Clean Water Act § 401, 33 U.S.C. § 1341....... ll3a
Clean Water Act § 402(a), 33 U.S.C.
EES ae Se eee Seno TD 119a
I ial 122a
I Giitinitcnsiitecs addtihtintilieibositielvctiebinlbasinecsnauetinenniinapt 122a

Amendments to 40 C.F.R.........................000000: 542a

Vv.

Table of Authorities
CASES:

ACLU v. FCC, 823 F.2d 1554 (D.C. Cir.

IT siicescetsiiaiusasiinieneannsaaieiehiensindeaiaamaiibiannadtl Aan
Addison v. Holly Hill Fruit Prods., Inc..,

EE OF a Te Ci ivivccdkcincdvcttneceen 16, 22, 23,
Am. Petroleum Inst. v. EPA, 858 F.2d 261

ne arta SUMO caesinecitlaincecinsacasteelaaiealietteseadiaaee aaticaere Raa
Am. Textile Mfrs. Inst., Inc. v. Donovan,

Se ee ee iiiictvnlnscccccciobintinamness 12, 33,
American Corn Growers Ass'n v. EPA,

SE Fe 2 GK AR, Bi cccvccseccccnecssscstes 32,
Appalachian Power Co. v. EPA, 566 F.2d

Be Cas Ga. Fe Pickin cesecsvessntiddioncsencreaniennaes
BP Exploration & Oil v. EPA, 66 F.3d 784

Ee SA, nisi dnsiceiindnditiniabaciipdiumheniaecatiee 30,
Business Roundtable v. SEC, 905 F.2d 406

Tl ag RI le esters svi oR rs a
Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def.

rouncil, 467 U.S. 837 (1984)....................08 4,

Dunn v. Commodity Futures Trading

Comm hn. 519 U.S. 465 (1907).............c.scccc.ccee0.
E.E.O.C. v. Seafarer’s Intl Union, 394 F.3d

Cr COs GA, Be icitdstccmarcisictticeeeneee

25

25

31

34

31

29

34

28

24

V1.
EPA v. National Crushed Stone Ass’n, 449
ie 29, 30, 31

First Gibraltar Bank, FSB v. Morales, 42
BP ee ED CUED GEM. BUDUIUDD ..-ccccccccccccccccccccscccccccecs 24

Gulf Restoration Network v. United States
Dept. of Trans., 452 F.3d 362 (5th Cir.

Holderfield v. Merit Sys. Prot. Bd., 326
if ey of) |” Bo | nee 24

Mississippi Power & Light Co. v.
Mississippi, 487 U.S. 354 (1988)............... 23, 24

Nat! Wildlife Fed’n v. EPA, 286 F.3d 554
ESO PSO 31

Natural Res. Def. Council v. EPA, 859 F.2d
I i spataccenencsoe 19

Newton v. FAA, 457 F.3d 1133 (10th Cir.
a csmsesene 24

NLRB vy. City Disposal Sys., Inc., 465 U.S.
EEN LESSER 23

Northern Illinois Steel Supply Co. v.
Secretary of Labor, 294 F.3d 844 (7th
es cauweceueuneins 24, 25

Puerto Rico Mar. Shipping Auth. v. Valley
Freight Svsts., Inc., 856 F.2d 546 (3rd
Ns 24

Vil.

Reynolds Metal Co. v. United States EPA,

760 F.2d 549 (4th Cir. 1066) .....................0002.. 31
Rybachek v. EPA, 904 F.2d 1276 (9th Cir.

Seri sisccscisesdieieicinsiecietcadabh leibedisiciiadiad Renieionasded eiebadilehde 31
Seacoast Anti-Pollution League v. Costle,

BOT Fe BOS Chak Cie. BOTBD cccccessccssccccccsccccsess 27
U.S. Steel Corp. v. Train, 556 F.2d 822 (7th

TENE CITI ins jndssicencebicsiunchiaiaanaienuiiamatabiniadaimmaaandianda: 20
Va. Elec. & Power Co. v. Costle, 566 F.2d

NS. Se neni csiicinnnsseiniadaiitibesetians 18, 19
W. Chicago v. NRC, 701 F.2d 632 (7th Cir.

See insintiisatinslichagaadaacadescmatidianadinndasamhemasuseiata 20
Wevyerhauser Co. v. Costle, 590 F.2d 1011

Gs ERs MUI ccschiecionieineesiteiseadadiadeadilasidnstinadnineneadall 31
Whitman v. American Trucking Ass ‘ns,

i Se rs Se Ce rincascencécnsescatatnaddoocadinnl 21

STATUTES:

Be as Oe TE nicistiictnsidachenksondindilidhaadensoastoummadadainis 1
Be rs ae IID sccesicisnicoteiccialiesunciaiansalstinenineeaenie 22

Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1251 et seq

Section 301, 33 U.S.C. § 1371 ................. passim
Section 304, 33 U.S.C. § 1314 ..................... 6, 28

Section 306, 33 U.S.C. § 1316 0.0... passim

Vill.

Section 316(a), 33 U.S.C. § 1326(a)....... 5, 21, 35
Section 316(b), 33 U.S.C. § 1326(b)......... passim
Section 316(c), 33 U.S.C. § 1326(c).............. 5, 21
Section 401, 33 U.S.C. § 13411 ..................... 7,18
Section 402, 33 U.S.C. § 1342 ................. passim
EE Oe ET aisieniese pttiscniteeiteentcinnticibeiapadaliblietia 10
Ee Le nea ee 31
REGULATIONS:
ee NE IID scchinrectesicsiiensiivintiniensioniisiewiinitienniiiciiniebiieansin 8
ee ee irdcitncintiindcinneaiinnminimennvtinanetiaibindd 9,10
44 Fed. Reg. 32,956 (June 7, 1979) .......... cee eeeeee 7
69 Fed. Reg. 41,576 (July 9, 2004) ............... 8, 9, 20
OTHER AUTHORITIES:
American Heritage Dictionary (3d ed. 1992)....... 16
Black's Law Dictionary (6th ed. 1990) ........... 15, 16

Oxford English Dictionary (2d ed. 1989).............. 16

Petitioner Entergy respectfully seeks a writ of
certiorari to the United States Court of Anpeals for
the Second Circuit.

Opinion Below

The opinion of the court of appeals (App. la—94a)
is reported at 475 F.3d 83 (2d Cir. 2007).

Jurisdiction

The court of appeals entered its judgment on
January 25, 2007. An order denying petitions for
rehearing en banc was entered on July 5, 2007. An
order extending the time for filing a petition for
certiorari to November 2, 2007 was granted on
September 25, 2007. The jurisdiction of this Court is
invoked under 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1).

Statutory Provisions Involved

This case generally involves the Clean Water Act,
33 U.S.C. § 1251 et seq., and in particular concerns
Section 316(b), 33 U.S.C. § 1326(b). Relevant
statutory provisions are set forth in the appendix.

Statement of the Case

This case presents three questions of importance
beyond the confines of the present dispute, with
respect to which the opinion of the Second Circuit
below is in conflict with decisions of several other
courts of appeal. Unless reviewed and reversed, the
Second Circuit’s decision will overthrow decades of
settled regulatory practice under the Clean Water
Act (the “CWA” or the “Act”). It will also impose
upon the nation’s electric-generating sector a regime
of potentially continuous retrofitting of power plants,
costing—by EPA's reckoning—billions of dollars each

(1)

2

a

year, even where such retrofitting cannot be shown,
in the case of a particular plant, to provide any
environmental benefits.

The case concerns the infrastructure used by
power plants, including nuclear plants, to bring
surface water into their facilities. Such water is
necessary to offset the heat created by power
generation, thereby permitting the safe operation of
such plants. The means by which cooling water is
drawn into, and circulated through, a plant is a
fundamental factor in plant design, and the amount
of cooling water a power plant can utilize necessarily
affects the amount of power a plant can generate. '

While cooling water ts necessary for plant
operation, the intake structure through which water
is drawn may pose a risk of mortality to early life
stages of fish through “entrainment” (passage of
juvenile fish or larvae through the intake structure)
and “impingement” (contact by fish with the screens
or exterior of the intake structure).

To address these potential impacts from the
intake of cooling water, Congress, in Section 316(b)
of the CWA, authorized EPA (and delegated state
authorities) to regulate the “location, design,
construction, and capacity of cooling water intake
structures,” to ensure that such structures “reflect
the best technology available for minimizing adverse
environmental impact,” or “BTA.” 33 U.S.C.
§ 1326(b).

! Broadly speaking, some electric-generating facilities draw
in water, circulate it once through the plant, and then release it
back into the environment (‘once-through cooling”); other
plants draw water and then consume it through cooling towers
(“closed-cycle cooling”).

3

In its decision below, the Second Circuit
interpreted Section 316(b) and other provisions of the
CWA in a manner inconsistent with the plain
meaning of the Act and in conflict with other circuit
courts on numerous. issues. First, the court
interpreted Section 316(b) to create a regime under
which regulators must select as BTA the technology
that is most effective even by a single fish larvae
at reducing impingement and entrainment, unless
the cost of that technology either cannot be
reasonably borne by the electric generating sector as
a whole, or a_ substitute technology, capable of
achieving at least one identical result, is available at
a “markedly lower” cost. Other than in this limited
manner, EPA is entirely forbidden from inquiring
whether the environmental benefits of the selected
BTA are outweighed by its costs. In so holding, the
Second Circuit also interpreted a separate provision
of the CWA applicable to all industry, Section 301, as
similarly restraining EPA’s authority to weigh costs
and benefits in regulating the discharge of
pollutants.

Second, the court deferred to EPA’s interpretation
of Section 316(b) as permitting regulators to revisit
their preconstruction approvals of power plants’
cooling water intake structures. Under this holding
such facilities are in perpetual risk of being required
to retrofit fundamental plant infrastructure
constructed in rehance on _ initial regulatory
approvals. In validating this portion of its opinion
and reconciling it with the remainder of the Act, the
Second Circuit interpreted the CWA’s pollutant
“discharge” permitting provision to permit regulation
of the “intake” of ambient water. In combination
with the Second Circuit's restrictive reading of what
constitutes BTA, the holding below creates a regime

4

under which the nation’s existing electric supply may
be forced to shut down during lengthy retrofits—
costing hundreds of millions or even billions of
dollars for nuclear facilities—with no assurance that
EPA will not force another round of retrofits if the
agency concludes it would guaranty the survival of a
single additional fish egg or larvae.

The Second Cuircuit’s decision is wrong as a
matter of law, rests on a flawed understanding of
this Court's pre-Chevren precedent,? and conflicts
with the decisions of other courts of appeal on
several issues, including: Whether regulators have
authority under Section 402 of the CWA to regulate
cooling water intake structures and the intake of
water; whether a court should defer to an agency's
interpretation of its own statutory authority; and the
meaning of BTA under Section 316(b) and the term
“best available technology” (“BAT”) under Section
301. For the reasons given herein, this Court should
grant the writ of certiorari to review and reverse the
decision below.

A. Statutory Background

This case centers around the interpretation of
Section 316 of the CWA, “Thermal Discharges,” and
in particular Section 416(b), “Cooling Water Intake
Structures.”

Section 316, uniquely within the CWA, targets
power plants and aquatic ecosystems, for the most
part /imiting EPA’s authority to impose restrictions
on the former for the benefit of the latter. Section
316(a) requires EPA to relax otherwise applicable

See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natura: Res. Def. Council, 467
US. 837 (1984).

oO

thermal discharge requirements if the discharger
demonstrates that a proposed relaxed requirement
“will assure the protection and propagation of a
balanced, indigenous population of shellfish, fish,
and wildlife.” Section 316(c), meanwhile, prohibits
regulators from imposing new thermal discharge
requirements on previously modified facilities for the
shorter of either 10 years or until the cost of the
modification is amortized or depreciated. 33 U.S.C. §
1326(a), (c).

Between these two subsections concerning the
“protection and _ propagation of a_ balanced,
indigenous population of shellfish, fish and wildlife”
is sandwiched the single sentence of Section 316(b),
which provides, in full:

Any standard established pursuant to section
301 or section 306 of this Act and applicable to
a point source shall require that the location,
design, construction, and capacity of cooling
water intake structures reflect the best
technology available for minimizing adverse
environmental impact.

33 U.S.C. § 1326(b). The CWA says nothing about
how EPA is to consider costs in selecting BTA under
Section 316(b).

. The sections of the Act cross-referenced by the
Section 316(b)—Sections 301 and 306—do not
address the intake of water. Instead, both govern
the discharge of pollutants. Section 301 requires
EPA to- establish pollutant-specific effluent
limitations that “shall be applied to all point sources
of discharge of pollutants,” whether existing or new.
See 33 U.S.C. § 1311(e). Section 306 required EPA to
begin a rolling process of issuing “standards of

6
performance” exclusively for new point sources of
pollution on a category by category basis, with the
standards of performance applied to new facilities
“the construction of which is commenced after the

publication of proposed regulations * * * which will
be applicable to such source.” See 3? U.S.C. § 1316.

Sections 301 and 306 contribute to the CWA’s
alphabet soup of technological standards. Section
301 initially called for “the application of the best
practicable control technology currently available”
(“BPT”), but required, by March 31, 1989, the
implementation of a “best available technology
economically achievable” standard (“BAT”). 33
U.S.C. §§ 1311(b)(1)(A). (b)(2)(A). Section 306,
meanwhile, requires standards of performance to be
set under a “best available demonstrated control
technology” standard, or “BADCT.” 33 U-S.C.
§ 1316(a)(1).

Both Sections 301 and 306 expressly incorporate
Section 304, in which Congress provided some
guidance on how regulators may consider the cost
and benefits of comphance in selecting one or
another technology. Section 304 of the Act provides
that, in selecting BPT under Section 301, EPA
should consider “the total cost of application of
technology in relation to the effluent reduction
benefits to be achieved by such application,” while in
selecting the more stringent BAT, the agency must
still consider “the cost of achieving such effluent
reduction * * * and such other factors as the
Administrator deems appropriate.” 33 U.S.C. §§
1314(b)(1)(B), (b)(2)(B). Section 306 states that, in
selecting BADCT, EPA is required to consider “the
cost of achieving * * * effluent reduction, and any

7

non-water quality environmental impact and energy
requirements.” 33 U.S.C. § 1316(b)(1)(B).

Under Section 401 of the CWA, proposed facilities
requiring a_ federal license must obtain a
preconstruction certificate that “shall set forth any
effluent limitations and other limitations” specific to
the facility, including, where appropriate, facility-
specific requirements under Section 316(b). See 33
U.S.C. § 1341 (emphasis added). Section 402 of the
Act further provides that operating facilities must
obtain, subject to renewal every five years, a
National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System
(“NPDES”) permit with respect to the “discharge of
any pollutant,” which may contain § different
discharge limitations than found in_ the
preconstruction Section 401 permit. See 33 U.S.C. §
1342(a)(1). Unhke Section 401, however, Section 402
refers only and specifically to “discharges,” not to
“other limitations.”

3. Environmental Protection Agency
Rulemaking

EPA's initial attempt at implementing Section
316(b) was abandoned following procedural missteps.
See Appalachian Power Co. v. EPA, 566 F.2d 451.
457 (4th Cir. 1977); 44 Fed. Reg. 32956 (June 7.
1979). EPA did not go gently back to. the drawing
board. Rather, for nearly thirty years, EPA
addressed potential impacts on fis.i attributable to
new power plants by making preconstruction BTA
determinations on a site-specific basis. Power plants
then were constructed with the approved cooling
water intake structures. which determined the
design of, and that were integrated with. the hearts
of the plants.

8

The rulemaking at issue here has its origin in a
consent decree between EPA and environmental
groups requiring the issuance of regulations
implementing Section 316(b). The rulemaking was
conducted in three phases. In Phase I, EPA set forth
standards for cooling water intake structures at new
steam-electric generating facilities, and in Phase III,
EPA promulgated regulations for new industrial
facilities, as well as certain existing industrial and
steam-electric generating facilities below a threshold
size of cooling water use (among other factors).

At issue in this case is the Phase II rulemaking,
which concerns existing electric-generating facilities
above the threshold size. See 69 Fed. Reg. 41576
(July 9, 2004). codified at 40 C.F.R. Part 125,
Subpart J (the “Rule”) (App. 122a—593a). The Rule is
targeted exclusively at the reduction in assumed
mortality of aquatic organisms through entrainment
and impingement. under the assumption that
offsetting assumed mortality from those causes may
assist aquatic populations taxed by over-fishing. See
td. at 41590 (App. 188a).

EPA crafted the Rule to require “technology that
is technically available, economically practicable,
and cost-effective while at the same time authorizing
a range of technologies that achieve comparable
reductions in adverse environmental impact.” 69
Fed. Reg. at 41583 (App. 157a—158a). To evaluate
the costs and benefits of the Rule. EPA developed
facility-specific estimates of the costs, along with
estimated benefits to, eg.. commercial and
recreational fishermen. See id. at 41648~-55, 41655—
64 (App. 439a-51ada). These analyses were
supported by voluminous technical documents
setting forth EPA’s methodologies and estimated

9

costs and benefits of the Rule. See id. at 41577 (App.
127a).

In formulating the Rule, EPA rejected as BTA a
requirement that all existing facilities replace their
cooling systems (not just their intake structures)
with closed-cycle cooling, i.e., cooling towers. Cf.
supra, 2 & n. 1. EPA reasoned, inter alia, that: (a)
closed-cycle cooling, with a _ total social cost
conservatively estimated at about $3.5 billion
annually, “is not the most cost-effective approach for
many existing facilities’; (b) decreased energy
production associated with retrofits would
necessitate the construction of 20 new power plants;
(c) a cooling-tower mandate would increase fossil fuel
consumption, with resulting air-quality impacts from
those new plants; (d) inadequate data existed on
cooling-system conversions at existing facilities; and
(e) non-water quality impacts, such as water loss,
icing, fogging and noise, would be associated with
closed-cycle cooling. 69 Fed. Reg. at 41605—06 (App.
255a—60a).

Instead of selecting a single technology as BTA
for use in all facilities, EPA designated a suite of
technologies, including, inter alia, fine- and wide-
mesh screens, aquatic filter barrier systems, barrier
nets, and fish return systems. 69 Fed. Reg. at 41599
(App. 228a). The Rule requires the use of technology
to reduce entrainment by 60 to 90% from a defined
baseline condition, and impingement mortality by 80
to 95% from the same baseline. See 40 C.F.R.
§ 125.94(b)(1), (2). EPA also provided a variance
from these requirements for facilities where the costs
of achieving the performance’ standards are
significantly greater than, inter alia, the fisheries
benefits of compliance. See id., § 125.94.

10
C. The Second Circuit’s Decision

EPA’s rule was challenged in petitions filed under
33 U.S.C. § 1369(b) by environmental, State, and
industry __— petitioners, with the challenges
consolidated before the Second Circuit.

1. In its petition, Entergy argued that Congress
did not intend Section 316(b) to apply to existing
facilities. In particular, Entergy contended that the
integrated phrase “location, design, construction, and
capacity” limit the section’s application solely to new
facilities, t.e., facilities that have not yet been
located, designed, constructed or sized with respect
to their intake structures. Entergy further argued
that this reading of Section 316(b) is supported by
the structure of the CWA: The Act provides no
continuing mechanism for imposing new
requirements on existing cooling water intake
structures, since the NPDES permitting system—
through which the other recuirements of the CWA
are amended for existing facilities—only pertains to
the regulation of “discharges” of pollutants.

The Second Circuit found Entergy’s plain
language argument “superficially appealing,” App.
63a, and its argument that Section 316(b)
requirements have no place in NPDES discharge
permits “a closer question.” App. 75a. Nevertheless,
brushing aside the absence of any clear authority in
the Act for regulating existing cooling water intake
structures as a mere “textual hiccup,” see ibid., the
Second Circuit ultimately rejected Entergy’s
arguments by deferring to EPA on the scope of its
authority. See id. 77a. The court adopted EPA's
assertion of jurisdiction, based largely on 316(b)’s
cross-reference to Section 301 of the Act. which
allows EPA to regulate discharges from new and

11

existing facilities. See id. 76a—77a. It also concluded
that EPA could impose new Section 316(b)
requirements on existing facilities via NPDES
permits. See id. 75a—76a (“EPA's decision to use the
NPDES process to enforce section 316(b) is not
unreasonable.”).

2. Ruling in favor of the Environmental and
State petitioners, the Second Circuit also rejected
EPA’s designation of a suite of technologies—not
closed-cycle cooling—as BTA. The court held that
the plain language of Section 316(b), in the context of
the CWA, requires EPA to select as BTA the one
technology most effective at reducing impingement
or entrainment, unless (1) that “benchmark”
technology is not affordable to the industry as a
whole, or (2) use of another technology is justified
under a “cost-effectiveness test.” Accusing EPA of
inappropriately considering costs and benefits in a
different manner (characterized by the court as “cost-
benefit analysis’), the court remanded for EPA to
apply the court’s own standard.

In detailing the mechanics of its novel “cost-
effectiveness” test, the Second Circuit initially
suggested that the new test permits substitution of a
less expensive technology that “achieves essentially
the same results as the benchmark” technology.
App. 26a. The court, however, then went on to
demonstrate its test, confirming that the substitute
technology must in fact be capable of achieving, in at
least some cases, an_ identical result as the
benchmark technology:

Assuming the EPA has determined that power
plants governed by the Phase II rule can
reasonably bear the price of technology that
saves between 100-105 fish, the EPA, given a

12

choice between a technology that costs $100 to
save 99-101 fish and one that costs $150 to
save 100-103 fish (with all other
considerations, like energy production or
efficiency, being equal), could appropriately
choose the cheaper technology on_ cost-
effectiveness grounds.

x“**

[T]he EPA could not choose the cheaper
technology on cost considerations under
section 316(b) if the EPA had first determined
that the power plants could reasonably bear

the cost of technology that could save at least
102 fish.

App. 27a—28a.

In interpreting Section 316(b) to permit only this
cost-effectiveness test, the Second Circuit conceded
that “Section 316) does not itself set forth or cross-
reference another statutory provision enumerating
the specific factors that EPA must consider in
determining BTA.” See App. 20a; see also id., 23a
(same). The court, however, reached its holding in
reliance on two principal factors. First, the Second
Circuit invoked this Court’s pre-Chevron decision in
Am. Textile Mfrs. Inst., Inc. v. Donovan, 452 USS.
490, 510 (1981), on which the court reled for the
proposition that “[w]hen Congress has intended that
an agency engage in cost-benefit analysis, it has
clearly indicated such intent on the face of the
statute.” App. 25a. The court also relied upon the
purported “linguistically similar” wording of Section
316(b)'s BTA standard compared with Section 3801's
BAT standard, concluding that because—in the
Second Circuit's understanding—cost-benefit

13
analysis is forbidden under the BAT standard, it
must be forbidden for BTA as well. See id., 23a

Bypassing what it acknowledged as EVDA’s
veneral authority to issue variances, the court also
intuited a plain meaning in the Act barring EPA
from instituting the Rule's site-specific variance
program based on a weighing of costs and benefits.
In rejecting this particular provision, the court
rationalized that the plain language of Section 316(b)
does not permit consideration of “the degraded
quality of waterways in selecting a_ site-specific
BTA,” i.e., the fact that no fish hve in a particular
body of water is irrelevant to whether BTA must be
implemented at a facility drawing water from that
source. See App. 58a.

Reasons for Granting the Petition

This case presents three important questions for
this Court’s review, each of which implicates a split
in authority among the courts of appeal. and each of
which has implications beyond the case at hand.

First is the question whether EPA has authority,
under Section 316(b), to compel the retrofitting of
existing cooling water intake structures. a process
that would be disruptive of the nation’s electric
supply and that could cost billions of dollars
annually. The Second Circuit, pointing to the
NPDES program, found that the agency does have
such authority, and in doing so placed itself squarely
into conflict with both the DC and Fourth Circuits.
Those courts of appeal previously had held,
respectively, that the NPDES permitting system
applies only to “effluent,” i.e., discharge limitations,
and that Section 316(b) regulations are not discharge
limitations. If not reviewed and reversed, the Second

14

Circuit's decision will extend EPA authority to a
panoply of activities not authorized, or even
contemplated, by Congress.

Second, the court of appeals explicitly deferred to
EPA on the scope of the agency’s own authority.
This deference implicates a robust split among
multiple circuits on the question whether agency
assertions of jurisdiction are entitled to deference,
with three other courts of appeal holding, as did the
Second Circuit, that such deference is warranted,
and at least two courts of appeal holding that it is
not.

The third question presented by this case is
whether EPA’s discretion to weigh costs and benefits
in selecting BTA under Section 316(b) is limited to
the Second Circuit’s rigidly defined, and wholly
manufactured, “cost effectiveness” test. The court’s
refusal to allow EPA to weigh costs and benefits in
any other fashion is in direct conflict with the
previously authoritative interpretation of Section
316(b) by the First Circuit. Furthermore, the Second
Circuit reached its reading of Section 316(b) in part
by concluding that EPA’s discretion in selecting BAT
under Section 301 of the CWA is. similarly
constrained. That interpretation of Section 301 is
squarely in conflict with the Sixth Circuit’s reading
of the section, inconsistent with other circuit courts’
reading of the section, and incongruent with the
reading by other courts of similar language in other
environmental statutes. The Second Circuit's
holding on this question should be reviewed and
reversed to preserve the previously — settled
understanding of EPA’s discretion to weigh costs and
benefits under both Sections 316(b) and 301 of the
Act.

15

A. The Second Circuit's Holding that EPA
Has Authority under Section 402 to
Impose Section 316(b) Regulations on
Existing Facilities Conflicts with the
Decisions of Two Other Circuit Courts of
Appeal

The Court should take this case to review the
Second Circuit's erroneous conclusion that Section
316(b) allows EPA to require the retrofitting of
existing cooling water intake structures. The Second
Circuit’s reading of Section 316(b) runs counter to
Congress's clear intent, is in conflict with decisions
from two other courts of appeal, and threatens the
stability of the nation’s supply of electricity.

1. Nothing in the text of the CWA reasonably can
be read to authorize EPA to require the retrofitting
of existing cooling water intake structures.

As an initial matter, the plain meaning of Section
316(b) itself limits its application to cooling water
intake structures that have yet to be built. This is
seen in the Section’s reference to “the location,
design, construction, and capacity of cooling water
intake structures.” 33 U.S.C. § 1326(b) (emphasis
added). The ordinary meaning of this phrase—held
together with the conjunction “and’—limits
application of Section 316(b) to prospective
equipment, i.e.. those intake structures not yet
constructed, designed, located. and sized to a
particular capacity, and does not make sense when
applied to existing structures. See, e.g., Black’s Law
Dictionary (6th ed. 1990) (“Construction” means “the
creation of something new, as distinguished from the

16

repair or improvement of something already
existing’ ).3

There are many ways Congress could have
expressed an intent to mandate perpetual
retrofitting of major power plant infrastructure.
Congress might have omitted the Act's specific
reference to the “location, design, construction, and
capacity” of cooling water intake structures and
instead simply provided that EPA “shall require that
cooling water intake structures reflect the best
technology available.” The Second Circuit, however,
cannot attain such a reading of the Act by applying a
“blue pencil” to the statute as written. Addison v.
Holly Hill Fruit Prods., Inc., 322 U.S. 607, 617
(1944).

In concluding that Section 316(b) applies to
existing facilities, the Second Circuit relied, in part.
on Section 316(b)’s cross-reference to Section 301.
Section 301, as the Second Circuit noted, does apply
to existing facilities. That, however, ts only because
Section 301 allows EPA to regulate “al/ point sources
of discharge of pollutants” including newly
constructed facilities not within a category subject to
a more stringent standard of performance under
Section 306. See 33 U.S.C. § 1311(e) (emphasis

’ Definitions of the other statutory terms are to similar effect.
See, e.g.. Black's Law Dictionary (6th ed. 1990) (“Design™ means
“the plan or scheme conceived in mind and intended for
subsequent execution..) (emphasis added); Oxford English
Dictionary (2d ed. 1989) (“Design™ means “a plan or scheme
conceived in the mind and intended for subsequent execution:
the preliminary conception of an idea that is to be carried into
effect by action; a project.”) (emphasis added); American
Heritage Dictionary (3d ed. 1992) (“Location” means “the act or
process of locating.”).

17

added). Given the language of Section 316(b) itself,
the most natural reading of Section 316(b)’s cross
reference to both Sections 301 and 306 is that
Congress intended Section 316(b) requirements to be
applied to all new facilities, irrespective of whether a
given facility's discharges happen to be regulated
primarily under Section 301 or Section 306.

2. That Section 316(b) does not provide EPA
authority to require the retrofitting of existing
cooling water intake structures is confirmed by the
absence of any CWA mechanism for imposing new
requirements relating to the intake of water on
existing facilities. While the Second Circuit
ultimately deferred to EPA’s argument that such
authority does exist, that conclusion conflicts with
earlier decisions from both the D.C. Circuit and the
Fourth Circuit.

EPA and the Second Circuit purport to find
authority for EPA to impose new requirements on
existing cooling water intake structures in the
NPDES permitting process of Section 402 of the Act,
which requires existing facilities to apply to receive a
discharge permit every five years. The limited scope
of the NPDES program, however, is evident from the
plain language of the Act. Section 402 of the Act,
which establishes the NPDES program, states in
pertinent part that:

{t}he Administrator may, after opportunity for
public hearing, issue a permit for the
discharge of any pollutant, or combination of
pollutants, notwithstanding section 131 1(a) of
this title, upon condition that such discharge
will meet either (A) all applicable
requirements under sections 1311, 1312, 1316,
1317, 1318, and 1343 of this title, or (B) prior

18

‘ to the taking of necessary implementing
actions relating to all such requirements, such
conditions as the Administrator determines
are necessary to carry out the provisions of
this chapter.

33 U.S.C. § 1342(a)(1) (emphases added). No
reference to Section 316(b), 33 U.S.C. § 1326(b), is
made in Section 402. Further, no reasonable
analysis of its language allows a requirement related
to the intake of water under Section 316(b) to be
transformed into a requirement relating to the
“discharge of any pollutant, or combination of
pollutants.” This is confirmed by the Section 401
preconstruction pe.mitting process’s _ broader
reference to “effluent limitations and _ other
limitations,” including, where appropriate, Section
316(b) limitations. See 338 U.S.C. § 1341(d)
(emphasis added); see also supra at 6—7. If Congress
intended NPDES permits to cover more than
limitations pertaining to “discharges,” it knew how to
Sav so.

The Second Circuit dismissed the permitting
process's limitation to “discharge” requirements as a
mere “textual hiccup.” See App. 75a. In glossing
over the plain language of the Act. however. the
Second Circuit placed itself into conflict with two
other courts of appeal.

First, in Va. Elec. & Power Co. v. Costle, 566 F.2d
446 (4th Cir. 1977). the Fourth Circuit considered
whether it possessed jurisdiction to hear appeals
from an EPA rulemaking promulgating regulations
under Section 316(b), an issue which required the
court to consider, inter alia, whether Section 316(b)
regulations are “effluent limitations” or “other

19

limitations.” ‘n concluding that they are not
“effluent limitations,” the court explained:

No contention is raised that the § 316(b)
regulations are themselves effluent
limitations. /t is obvious that they are not, for
the statute defines “effluent limitation” as any
restriction established by a State or the
Administrator on‘ quantities, rates, and
concentrations of chemical, physical,
biological, and other constituents which are
discharged from point sources into navigable
waters. * * * The regulations involved here
are concerned with structures used _ to
withdraw water for cooling purposes, not the
discharge of pollutants into the water.

Id. at 449 (emphases added).

Second, in Natural Res. Def. Council v. EPA, 859
F.2d 156 (D.C. Cir. 1988), the D.C. Circuit considered
challenges to EPA’s issuance of regulations
governing the NPDES permitting process. Industry
petitioners challenged EPA’s attempt to implement
requirements unrelated to “water quality” through
NPDES permits. The D.C. Circuit sided with
petitioners, rejecting an argument by EPA that the
agency can use NPDES permits “to impose permit
conditions unrelated to effluents,” i.e., discharges. Id.
at 170 (emphasis added).

Thus, the courts of appeal are divided on the
question whether Section 316(b) requirements can be
implemented through the NPDES permitting process
of Section 402. On the one hand. the Fourth Circuit
has concluded that Section 316(b) regulations are not
effluent limitations, and the DC Circuit has held that
only effluent limitations may be imposed through

20

NPDES permits. On the other hand, the Second and,
arguably, Seventh Circuits have held that NPDES
permits can be used to impose Section 316(b) intake
requirements on existing facilities.1 Whether EPA
has authority to impose non-effluent requirements,
including Section 316(b) requirements, under Section
402 is a matter of broad import, implicating the very
purpose and scope of the CWA, and should be
reviewed and answered by this Court.

3. The Second Circuit's conclusion that EPA has
authority to require the retrofitting of existing
cooling water infrastructure is not only incorrect as a
matter of law, it poses significant risks to the
nation’s electric supply. Retrofitting the cooling
svstems of existing facilities is no simple or
inexpensive proposition. With respect to nuclear
facilities, EPA concluded that retrofitting with
cooling towers, if possible at all, would be a long
process of several years. with at least ten months
during which the facilities that currently power
American homes and businesses could produce no
electricity, and after which the retrofits would
precipitate compromised electric-system reliability,
escalating electricity prices and increases in harmful
air emissions. See 69 Fed. Reg. at 41605—07 (App.
254a—263a). EPA conceded that annual costs of the
Rule, in excess of potential benefits, could exceed
$3.5 billion annually. See td. ai 41605 (App. 256a).

These serious health, safety and economic
impacts not only underscore the need for this Court's
review, but confirm the flaws in the Second Circuit's

+ See U.S. Steel Corp. v. Train, 556 F.2d 822, 850 (7th Cir.
1977), abandoned on other grounds, W. Chicago v. NRC. 701
F.2d 632 (7th Cir. 1983).

21

interpretation of the Act. Section 316 embodies
Congress's concern that the protection of fish not
impose unreasonable costs on the electric-generating
sector and, correspondingly, the essential service
those facilities provide. Congress specifically added
Sections 316(a) and 316(c) to allow power plants to
employ alternative, less stringent thermal limits, if
those discharges nonetheless protect a balanced
indigenous fish community. See supra at 4—5. It
beggars belief that Congress, so careful to restrain
EPA’s hand with respect to thermal discharges,
contemplated the retrofitting of the intake structures
of that same sector over the very same aquatic
impacts.

As this Court has cautioned, Congress “does not
* ** hide elephants in mouse holes.” Whitman v.
American Trucking Ass'ns, Inc., 551 U.S. 457, 468
(2001). If Congress intended to impose on the
electric-generating sector a perpetual retrofitting
regime, it would have done so more clearly than
through a provision limiting EPA’s authority to
regulating the “location, des‘gn, construction, and
capacity of cooling water «take structures.” or
through a licensing provision directed to “the
discharge of any pollutant.”. The Court should take
this case to resolve the split among the courts of
appeal over EPA’s authority through the NPDES
permitting program to require retrofitting of power
plants for anything other than pollutant-discharge
requirements, particularly requirements under
Section 316(b).

22

B. The Second Circuit’s Deference to EPA on
the Existing Facilities Issue Implicates a
Split Among the Courts of Appeal Over
Deference to Agency Assertions of
Jurisdiction

1. As described above, while the Second Circuit
disagreed with Petitioner that the plain language of
the Act deprives EPA of jurisdiction to require the
retrofitting of existing cooling water’ intake
structures. it did find some ambiguity—i.e., the
“textual hiccup’—on this point. The court ultimately
concluded that it would defer to EPA’s assumption of
authority over existing structures. App. 72a (“We
conclude * * * that, at the very least, the EPA
permissibly interpreted the statute to cover existing
facilities and that its interpretation is therefore
entitled to deference under Chevron’). In deferring
to EPA’s determination of its own jurisdiction over
existing facilities. the Second Circuit placed itself in
the middle of a well-developed circuit split on the
appropriate level of deference to agencies making
determinations of the scope of their own jurisdiction.

2. For decades. this Court's precedent had
suggested that courts should not grant agencies
deference on the subject of agency jurisdiction. In
Addison v. Holly Hill Fruit Prods., Inc., 322 U.S.
607. 608 (1944), this Court considered the validity of
a regulation passed pursuant to the Fair Labor
Standards Act. The Act exempted employees “within
the area of production (as defined by _ the
Administrator). engaged in * * * canning of
agricultural * * * commodities for market” from
certain regulation /d. (citing 29 U.S.C. § 210(a)(10)).
The Administrator issued a regulation defining “area
of production’ to include those employees (1) engaged

23

in canning of goods that were obtained by farms in
the immediate locality of the place of employment,
and (2) who are employed at an establishment with
no more than seven employees. Jd. at 609-10.

The Court struck down the regulation, holding
that the Administrator's attempt to regulate some
workers engaged in the canning of agricultural
commodities (those at establishments employing
more than seven employees) exceeded its authority
under the Act. /d. at 616~—19. In refusing to defer to
the Administrator’s interpretation of “area of
production,” the Court explained that “[t]he
determination of the extent of authority given to a
delegated agency by Congress is not left for the
decision of him in whom authority is vested.” /d. at
616.

However, in NLRB vy. City Disposal Sys., Inc., 465
U.S. 822 (1984), decided earlier in October Term
1983 than Chevron, the Court rejected the argument
that it should not defer to NLRB’s determination
that certain labor conduct came within the scope of
“concerned activities” protected under the National
Labor Relations Act. The respondent in that case
had argued that no deference should be granted,
because such a determination was “essentially a
jurisdictional or legal question concerning the
coverage of the Act.” Jd. at 830 n. 7. This Court
stated, without citing Addison, that it had “never
* * * held that such an exception exists to the normal

standard of review of Board interpretations of the
Act.” Ibid.

The tension between Addison and City Disposal
has not, since Chevron, been conclusively resolved by
the Court. The issue. however, has been addressed
by individual justices. most notably in Mississippi

24

Power & Light Co. v. Mississippi, 487 U.S. 354
(1988). In his concurrence in that case. Justice
Scalia stated that “it is settled law that the rule of
deference applies even to an agency's interpretation
of its own statutory authority or jurisdiction.” Jd. at
381. Rhode Island. Connecticut. Delaware. Massachusetts. New
Jersey, and New York.

~ Riverkeeper. Inc.. Natural Resources Defense Council.
Waterkeeper Alliance. Soundkeeper. Inc... Scenic Hudson, Inc..
Save the Bay People for Narragansett Say, Friends of Casco
Bay. American [attoral Society. . elaware Riverkeeper
Network. Hackensack Riverkeeper. Inc.. New York/Now Jersey
Baykeeper. Santa Monica Baykeeper. San Diego Baykeeper.
California Coastkeeper. Columbia Riverkeeper, Conservation
Law Foundation. and Surfrider Foundation

19a

ment of notice and comment; and (6) the Agency has
classified certain new constructions as “existing
facilities” contrary to the definitions set forth in the
Phase 1 Rule without providing adequate notice and
opportunity for comment.

[18] Three groups of industry petitioners, which we
will refer to collectively as the “industry petitioners”
or individually as Entergy Corporation (“Entergy”).
the Utility Water Act Group (““UWAG’),° and PSEG
Fossil LLC and PSEG Nuclear LLC (“PSEG’),
advance various challenges to the Phase Il Rule.
Their challenges raise the following arguments: (1)
section 316(b) of the CWA does not apply to existing
facilities; (2) the Agency's definition of “adverse
environmental impact” is insufficiently supported by
the record; (3) the EPA’s assumption of zero
entrainment survival is insufficiently supported by
the record; (4) the EPA improperly requires
evaluation of qualitative non-use benefits in site-
specific cost-benefit analyses; (5) the Agency failed
to account for the Rule's disproportionate impact on
nuclear facilities; [*97] (6) the EPA gave inadequate
notice of the independent-suppher provision: and (7)
the Agency provided no notice of its post-rulemaking
definition of “Great Lakes.” The industry petitioners
also seek to preserve the right on this petition for
review to raise new challenges to the Rule if we
remand significant aspects of it. We consider first
the challenges raised by the state and environmental

UWAG petitions this court in conjunction with = the
Appalachian Power Company and the Illinois” Energy
Association.

20a

petitioners and then will turn to the industry
petitioners’ challenges.

Ill. The State and Environmental Petitioners
A. Determination of BTA

Perhaps the most significant challenge to the
Phase II Rule is the petitioners’ contention that the
EPA exceeded its authority in rejecting closed-cycle
cooling, and selecting instead the = suite of
technologies, as the “best technology available” as
required by section 316(b), 38 U.S.C. § 1326(b), in
large part because the Agency engaged in improper
cost considerations.

[19] This challenge requires us at the outset to
determine to what extent, if any, the EPA can
consider cost when selecting “the best technology
available for minimizing adverse environmental
impact” under the statute.

1. Cost Analysis Pursuant to Sections 301 and
306

Section 316(b) does not itself set forth or cross-
reference another statutory provision enumerating
the specific factors that the EPA must consider in
determining BTA. The statute, however, does make
specific reference to CWA sections 301 and 306,
which we have taken previously as “an invitation” to
look to those sections for guidance in “discerning
what factors Congress intended the EPA to consider
in determining” BTA. Riverkeeper /, 358 F.3d at 186.
We look to each of these statutes in turn.

Section 301(b)(1)(A) established the BPT standard
that governed the effluent limitations applicable to
existing sources through 1989. Congress provided

Pia

that, in determining BPT. the Agency could consider
“the total cost of application of technology in relation
to the effluent reduction benefits to be achieved from
such application.” CWA § 304(b)(1)(B), 33 U.S.C.
§ 1314(b)(1)(B). As noted above, however, the CWA
created standards that were to become increasingly
stringent over time. and in 1989, the more lenient
BPT standard for existing sources was replaced by
the BAT standard of section 301(b)(2)(A), in which
Congress provided that the EPA could consider only
“the cost of achieving such effluent reduction.” CWA
§ 304(b)(2)(B), 33 U.S.C. § 1314(b)(2)(B). Notably
omitted from the list of permissible factors to which
the EPA could look in determining BAT was the cost
of technology in relation to the benefits that
technology could achieve.

This shift from BPT to BAT fundamentally @” »red
the way in which the EPA [20] could factor cost into
its CWA determinations. Indeed, in analyzing BPT
and BAT. the Supreme Court stated that in
“assessing BAT{,] total cost is no longer to be
considered in comparison to effluent reduction
benefits.” as it had been in assessing BPT. EPA v.
Nat? Crushed Stone Ass'n, 449 U.S. 64, 71, 101 S. Ct.
295, 66 L. Ed. 2d 268 (1980). The Court indicated
that the less stringent BPT standard had allowed for
a “limited cost-benefit analysis” intended to “ ‘limit
the application of technology only where the
additional degree of effluent reduction is wholly out
of proportion to the costs of achieving such marginal!
level of reduction. “/d. at 71 n. 10, 101 S. Ct. 295
(quoting Remarks of Senator Muskie reprinted in
Legislative [*98] History of the Water Pollution
Control Act Amendments of 1972 (Committee Print
compiled for the Senate Committee on Public Works

22a

by the Library of Congress) Ser. No. 93-1, p. 170
(1973)). In determining BAT, by contrast, the EPA
may consider cost as a factor to a limited degree, see
id., but only as to whether the cost of a given
technology could be reasonably borne by the industry
and not the relation between that technology's cost
and the benefits it achieves, Riverkeeper I, 358 F.3d
at 195.

Section 306, which governs the effluent limitations
that apply to new sources, provides that a “standard
of performance” established by the EPA must reflect
the “best available demonstrated control technology.”
CWA § 306(a)(1), 33 U.S.C. § 1316(a)(1). In language
identical to the text of § 304(b)(2)(B) governing BAT,
Congress provided that in establishing standards of
performance, the EPA “shall take into consideration
the cost of achieving such effluent reduction,” CWA
§ 306(b)(1)(B), 33 U.S.C. § 1316(b)(1)(B), but did not
require the EPA to conduct cost-benefit analysis.
Nat! Wildlife Fed’n v. EPA, 286 F.3d 554, 570 (D.C.
Cir. 2002) (“[S]eetion 306 requires that, when setting
the [new source performance standards], the
Administrator must take costs into consideration,
but does not require that she conduct a [21] cost-
benefit analysis.”). Sections 301 and 306 of the CWA
thus demonstrate that. after 1989, cost is a lesser,
more ancillary consideration in determining what
technology the EPA should require for comphance
under those sections.

The shift from the BPT standard to the more
stringent BAT one clearly signaled Congress's intent
to move cost considerations under the CWA from a
cost-benefit analysis to a cost-effectiveness one. We
understand the difference between these two

23a

analyses to turn en the difference between means
and ends. Cost-benefit analysis, like BPT. compares
the eosts and benefits of various ends, and chooses
the end with the best net benefits. By contrast, cost-
effectiveness considerations, lke BAT, determine
which means will be used to reach a specified level of
benefit that has already been established.'° Given
the above and considering the parallel language of
sections 304(b)(2)(B) and 306(b)(1)(B), the reasoning
of National Crushed Stone strongly suggests that
cost-benefit analysis is no longer permitted under
those sections of the CWA.

2. Cost Analysis Pursuant to Section 316(b)

As already noted, section 316(b) does not itself set
forth the factors that the Agency can consider in
determining the “best technology available for
minimizing adverse environmental impact.” The
BTA standard of section 316(b), however, is
linguistically similar to the BAT standard of section
301 and the standard that applies to new sources
under [22] section 306, and to the extent that cost-
benefit analysis is precluded under those statutes.
one might reasonably conclude that it is similarly not
permitted under section 316(b). We conclude in any
event that the language of section 316(b) itself

See, e.g.. OMB Circular A-94. Guidelines and Discount
Rates for Benefit-Cost Analysis of Federal Programs, Appendix
A (1992) (defining “benefit-cost analysis” as “|a!] systematic
quantitative method of assessing the desirability of government
projects or pohcies when it is important to take a long view of
future effects and a broad view of possible side-effects” and
“cost-effectiveness” as “|a] svstematic quantitative method for
comparing the costs of alternative means of achieving the same
stream of benefits or a given objective ).

Yd4a

plainly indicates that facilities must adopt the dest
technology available and that cost-benefit analysis
[*99] cannot be justified in light of Congress's
directive.

We stated in Riverkeeper J] that the EPA can
consider cost in establishing BTA. but only in a
limited fashion and not as a primary consideration.
Indeed, “[w]ith respect to costs, ‘the Administrator
must inquire into the initial and annual costs of
applying the technology and make an affirmative
determination that those costs can be reasonably
borne by the industry. “Riverkeeper I, 358 F.3d at
195 (quoting Chem. Mfrs. Ass'n v. EPA, 870 F.2d 177,
262 (5th Cir. 1989)) (emphasis added). While the
statutory language suggests that the EPA may
consider costs in determining BTA, in that a
technology that cannot not be reasonably borne by
the industry is not “available” in any meaningful
sense. cost-benefit analysis is not similarly supported
by the language or purpose of the statute. Section
316(b) expressly requires a technology-driven result,
cf. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. EPA, 822 F.2d
104, 123 (D.C. Cir. 1987) ("[T]he most salient
characteristic of [the CWA’s] statutory scheme,
articulated time and again by its architects and
embedded in the statutory language. is that it 1s
technology-forcing.”). not one driven. by cost
considerations or an assessment of the desirability of
reducing adverse environmental impacts in light of
the cost of doing so. A selection of BTA based on
cost-benefit considerations is thus impermissibly
cost-driven, but a selection based in part on cost-
effectiveness considerations. while taking cost into
account, remains technology-driven. The statute
therefore precludes cost-benefit analysis because

25a

“Congress itself defined the basic relationship
between costs and [23] benefits.” Am. Textile Mfrs.
Inst., Inc. v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490, 509. (1981).
Moreover. this conclusion is further supported by the
fact that Congress in establishing BTA did not
expressly permit the Agency to consider the
relationship of a technology's cost to the level of
reduction of adverse environmental impact it
produces.'!' “When Congress has intended that an
agency engage in cost-benefit analysis. it has clearly
indicated such intent on the face of the statute.” Jd.
at 510. 101 S. Ct. 2478.

' This conclusion accords with the analysis mm Riverkeeper !
that the EPA may consider cost in establishing BTA pursuant
tu section 316(b), but only in a himited way. In our discussion of
the EPA's choice of closed-cycle. rather than dry. cooling as BTA
for Phase | facilities. see358 F.3d at 194-95. 194 n. 22. we noted
that “dry cooling costs more than ten times as much per year as
closed-cycle wet cooling.” but emphasized that “it is estimated
to reduce water intake by only an additional 5 percent relative
to once-through cooling” Id. at 194 (Gnternal footnotes
omitted). We acknowledged that drv cooling is both much more
effective and much more expensive than closed-cvycle cooling in
absolute terms. but stressed that. as compared to the baseline
of once-through cooling systems. the marginal benefits of drv
cooling were small: “it is undeniably relevant that that
difference represents a relatively small improvement over
closed-cycle cooling at a very significant cost.” Id. at 194 n 22
In dicta. we characterized this mode of analvsis as “relevant
and stated that it “adds a useful perspective.” id., but did not
treat it as the fulcrum of our analysis. Ultimately. we deferred
to the EPA’s determination insofar as it was based on the
grounds that dry cooling was too expensive for industry
reasonably to bear and that dry cooling has negative
environmental effects best left to the considered judgment of
the Agency. Jd. at 195-96

2boa

Given the above, the EPA may _permissibly
consider cost in two ways: (1) to determine what
technology can be “reasonably borne” by the industry
and (2) to engage in cost-effectiveness analysis in
determining BTA. Thus, the EPA must first
determine what is the most effective technology that
may reasonably be borne by the industry. In making
this initial determination, [*100] the most effective
technology must be based not on the average Phase
Il facility but on the optimally best performing Phase
II facilities, see, e.g., Kennecott v. United States EPA,
780 F.2d 445, 448 (4th Cir. 1985) (“In setting BAT,
EPA uses not the average pant, but the [24]
optimally operating plant, the pilot plant which acts
as a beacon to show what is possible.”), although, of
course, the EPA must still ascertain whether the
industry as a whole can reasonably bear the cost of
the adoption of the technology, bearing in mind the
aspirational and technology-forcing character of the
CWA. This technology constitutes the benchmark for
performance. Once this determination has been
made, the EPA may then consider other factors,
including cost-effectiveness, to choose a_ less
expensive technology that achieves essentially the
same results as the benchmark.'2 For example,

'’ We note that the EPA ts by no means required to engage in
cost-effectiveness analysis. Indeed, to require the Agency to
conduct cost-effectiveness analysis would transform such
analysis into a primary factor in choosing BTA, which clearly is
contrary to the technology-forcing principle that animates the
CWA. Equally important, we note that the Agency may also
depart from this performance benchmark because of other
permissible considerations aside from cost, for instance, energy
efficiency or environmental impact. See Riverkeeper 1, 358 F.3d
at 195-96 (noting “the EPA was permitted to consider

27a

assuming the EPA has determined that power plants
governed by the Phase II Rule can reasonably bear
the price of technology that saves between 100-105
fish, the EPA, given a choice between a technology
that costs $100 to save 99-101 fish and one that
costs $150 to save 100-103 fish (with all other
considerations, like energy production or efficiency,
being equal), could appropriately choose the cheaper
technology on _ cost-effectiveness grounds. Cost-
benefit analysis, however, is not permitted under the
statute because, as noted, Congress has already
specified the relationship between cost and benefits
in requiring that the [25] technology designated by
the EPA be the best available.'* Cf. Am. Textile
Mfrs. Inst., 452 US. at 509-10. The Agency
accordingly could not make the policy decision, in the
face of Congress’s determination that facilities use
the best technology available, that an economically
feasible level of reduction of impingement mortality
and entrainment is not desirable in lght of its cost.
. Indeed, in the example above, the EPA could not
choose the cheaper technology on cost considerations
under section 316(b) if the EPA had first determined

energy efficiency in determining the ‘best technology available’ “
and could also factor in environmental impact). While the EPA
has indicated throughout the record and its briefing before us
that its determination of BTA here’ included = such
considerations as energy efficiency and production concerns, we
nevertheless must remand, as we explain below, for further
explanation from the Agency. Accordingly, we express no view
on the merits of the EPA's determination regarding the other
factors it claims influenced its decision.

'\' For this reason, we reject Entergy’s argument that the
Rule is improper because its cost exceeds its benefits.

28a

that the power plants could reasonably bear the cost
of technology that could save at least 102 fish.

We nevertheless acknowledge that the comparable
technologies considered by the Agency need not be
identically effective for the Agency to engage in cost-
effectiveness analysis. Were that the case, all that
would be required would be the simple determination
of which among competing technologies that
achieved the same degree of reduction of adverse
environmental impacts is the cheapest. Instead, the
specified level of benefit is more properly understood
as a narrowly bounded range, within which the EPA
may permissibly [*101] choose between two (or
more) technologies that produce essentially the same
benefits but have markedly different costs. With
these considerations in mind, we turn to the Rule as
promulgated.

3. The Determination of BTA under the Phase Il
Rule

As noted previously, unlike the Phase I Rule, the
Phase II Rule does not require facilities to reduce
intake flow to a level commensurate with the intake
of closed-cycle systems. Instead, the Rule requires
facilities to meet the national performance standards
associated with the suite of technologies the EPA
identified as BTA. Petitioners’ challenge here has
two [26] components. First, the state petitioners
contend that closed-cycle cooling is the _ best
technology available and that the EPA has exceeded
its authority by promulgating a rule that does not
require closed-cycle cooling, or the use. of
technologies producing a commensurate reduction of
water usage for existing facilities in the same
manner as the Phase | Rule required for new

29a

facilities.'' Second, the environmental petitioners
argue that the EPA improperly rejected closed-cycle
cooling as BTA for the largest facilities on the most
sensitive waterbodies at the direction of OMB
because it sought to maximize net economic benefits
rather than to minimize adverse environmental
impact. They further argue that the BTA standard
of section 316(b) requires a commitment of the
maximum resources economically feasible to the goal
of eliminating adverse environmental impacts and
that the statute does not permit the EPA to select
BTA on the basis of cost-benefit analysis.

For the reasons that follow, we conclude that the
statute's “best technology § available” standard
permits cost-effectiveness considerations to influence
the choice among technologies whose performance
does not essentially differ from the performance of
the best-performing technology whose cost the
industry reasonably can bear, but that the statute
does not permit the EPA to choose BTA on the basis
of cost-benefit analysis. As we explain below,
however, the record is unclear as to the basis for the
EPA’s selection of the suite of technologies as BTA,
and we therefore remand for clarification of the basis
for the Agency's decision and potentially for a
reassessment of BTA.

[27] The EPA stated in the Rule's preamble that
the BTA standard should be interpreted as “best

' While the state petitioners trame their argument as a
challenge to the site-specific compliance alternatives, their bref
presses the view that closed-cycle cooling is the best technology
available and that the EPA exceeded its authority in failing to
require Phase II facilities to adopt it.

30a

technology available commercially at an
economically practicable cost,” and explained that
“an important component of economic practicability”
is “the relationship of costs to environmental
benefits.” 69 Fed. Reg. at 41,604. The EPA further
explained that this inquiry required that “there
should be some reasonable relationship between the
cost of cooling water intake structure control
technology and the environmental benefits associated
with its use.” Id. (emphasis added).

The EPA took this “economically practicable”
concept directly from the text of a floor speech of a
single representative—the only specific reference to
section 316(b) in the congressional debates. See »
Riverkeeper I, 358 F.3d at 186 n.12. We noted in
Riverkeeper I that the “paucity” of legislative history
“counsels against imputing much specific intent to
Congress beyond the section's words themselves.”
Id. |*102] Moreover, we _ find the EPA's
interpretation of section 316(b) problematic because
its construction significantly resembles the less
stringent, and now obsolete, BPT standard of section
301(b)(1)(A). As noted earlier, in setting forth the
factors for the EPA to consider in establishing BPT
under section 301(b)(1)(A) and the more stringent
BAT under section 301(b)(2)(A), Congress made only
one distinction: while the Agency could consider the
relationship between cost and_ benefits in
establishing BPT, CWA § 304(b)(1)(B), 33 U.S.C.
§ 1314(b)(1)(B), it could consider cost insofar as it can
be “reasonably borne” by the industry, but not the
relationship between cost and_ benefits, in
establishing BAT, CWA § 304(b)(2)(B), 33 U.S.C.
§ 1314(b)(2)(B). Riverkeeper 1, 358 F.3d at 195.

Sla

This difference in how the EPA can consider cost
under section 304(b) in establishing BPT and BAT is
directly mirrored by the most significant textual
distinction [28] between sections 301(b)(1)(A) and
301(b)(2)(A)—the requirement that a technology be
“practicable” under only the less stringent BPT
standard. Compare CWA § 301(b)(1)(A), 33 U.S.C.
§ 1311(b)(1)(A) (BPT is the “best practicable control
technology”) with CWA § 301(b)(2)(A), 33° U.S.C.
1311(b)(2)(A) (BAT is the “best available techno-
logy”). The use of the word “practicable,” therefore,
when coupled with the ~ permissible cost
considerations under section 304, signals. that
Congress intended the EPA to strike a_ balance
between cost and benefits in determining BPT. But
the word “practicable” is missing from the more
stringent BAT standard, under which Congress
prohibited the EPA from considering the relation of
cost to benefits. This omission is thus significant.
See Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 23, 104 S.
Ct. 296, 78 L. Ed. 2d 17 (1983) ¢[W]here Congress
includes particular language in one section of a
statute but omits it in another section of the same
Act, it is generally presumed that Congress acts
intentionally and purposely in the disparate
inclusion or exclusion.” (quotation marks and
citation omitted; alteration in original)). Because
Congress also omitted “practicable” from section
316(b), we are troubled by the Agency's
interpretation of the statute to require
“practicability’ analysis here and _ its implicit
corollary that the Agency can undertake a_cost-
benefit analysis in establishing BTA under section
316(b).

32a

Our concern with the EPA’s determination with
respect to section 316(b) is further deepened by the
Agency's rejection of closed-cycle cooling and
selection of a suite of technologies as the basis for
BTA for existing facilities because the suite of
technologies were the most “cost effective” option. 69
Fed. Reg. at 41,667. The EPA explained this decision
on several grounds. It first noted that it was
rejecting closed-cycle cooling as BTA because of (1)
“its generally high costs (due to conversions),” (2)
“the fact that other technologies approach the
performance of this [29] option,” and (3) “concerns
for energy impacts due to retrofitting existing
facilities, and other considerations.” /d. at 41,605.
The EPA emphasized that it selected BTA based on
its determination that “a national requirement to
retrofit existing systems is not the most cost-effective
approach and at many existing facilities, retrofits
may be impossible or not economically practicable.”
Id. It further explained that its rejection of closed-
cycle cooling as BTA was based on “total social costs”
and “lack of cost-effectiveness,” as well as “concerns
regarding potential energy impacts.” /d. at 41,606.

Given the EPA’s discussion, noted above, of
economically practicability, it is unclear whether the
Agency improperly weighed the benefits and the
costs of requiring closed-cycle cooling. Indeed, a
[*103] comparison between the cost of closed-cycle
coohng and the monetized benefits of this technology
appears to have played some role in the EPA's
rejection of this option as BTA. In the preamble to
the proposed Rule, for instance, the EPA examined
whether to require closed-cycle cooling on specific
large bodies of waters and_ stated that “the
incremental costs of [this closed-cycle cooling] option

33a

relative to the proposed option ($413 mulhon)
significantly outweigh the incremental benefits ($146
million).” 67 Fed. Reg. at 17,158. Other record
evidence on the EPA's rejection of closed-cycle
cooling as BTA is a terse EPA memorandum
indicating that a requirement commensurate with
closed-cycle cooling for facilities on _ sensitive
waterbodies would cost three times as much as the
option ultimately adopted by the EPA and reduce
entrainment, at most, by 1.33 times that option.

Given the above indications that the EPA engaged
in cost-benefit analysis, we remand for the EPA to
explain its conclusions. At the outset, it is difficult to
discern from the record how the EPA determined
that the cost of closed-cycle cooling could not be
reasonably [30] borne by’ the — industry.!®
Additionally, the EPA did not explain its statement
that the suite of technologies “approachles|” the
performance of closed-cycle cooling. We see no
adequate comparison in the Rule's proposal, the final

Indeed, at one point in the Rule's proposal. the EPA
mentions that requiring closed-cycle cooling at 539 existing
power plants nationwide subject to the Phase J] Rule would cost
upwards of $2.26 billion and could close nine power plants
(about 1.6". of all Phase 1) facilities). 67 Fed. Keg. at 17.155.
There is little discussion about whether the industry could
reasonably bear this burden. We note that in Riverkeeper 1. it
appears the EPA supplied the court with better data on this
question, noting that of the 83 facilities subject to the Phase |
Rule. dry cooling compliance costs would equal on average more
than 4°. of revenue for all 83 producers and more than 10’.o of
the revenue at 12 facilities (nearly 15". of all Phase I facilities).
presenting a possibly high barrier to entry for new facilities
See Riverkeeper I, 358 F.3d at 194. We have found no
comparable data in the record, nor has the EPA cited any.

34a

Rule or its preamble, or the EPA's submissions to
this Court of the effectiveness of closed-cycle cooling
and the group of technologies whose effectiveness
provided the basis for the Phase II Rule's
performance standards.'® In a [*104] technical [31]

'* Some limited evidence, however, is available in the record
in intelligible form. In the Rule's proposal, the EPA noted that
closed-cycle systems “generally reduce the water flow from 72
percent to 98 percent, thereby using only 2 percent to 28
percent of the water used by once-through systems.” Proposed
Regulations to Establish Requirements for Cooling Water Intake
Structures at Phase I] Existing Facilities; Proposed Rule, 67
Fed. Reg. 17.122, 17,189 (Apr. 9, 2002). The Agency went on to
state that “i]t is generally assumed that this would result in a
comparable reduction in impingement and entrainment,” id.,
indicating that closed-cycle systems reduce the adverse impacts
of impingement and entrainment by 72 to 98 percent. In a
technical development document (“TDD”) for the proposal.
however, the EPA disaggregated these data, stating that closed
cycle cooling systems use 96 to 98 percent less fresh water and
70 to 96 percent less salt water than once-through systems.
TDD for the Proposed § 316(b) Phase II Existing Facilities Rule
4-1, see also Riverkeeper 1, 358 F.3d at 194 n. 22 (“(C}losed-
cycle wet cooling systems use 96 to 98 percent less fresh water
(and 70 to 96 percent less salt water) than similarly situated
once-through systems. (citing 66 Fed. Reg. at 65,273)). The
EPA's analysis in its proposal suggests that the disaggregated
data indicate that closed-cvcle cooling would reduce
impingement mortality and entrainment by 96 to 98 percent at
facihties that use fresh water and by 70 to 96 percent at
facilities that use salt water. A 72 to 9&8 percent reduction of
impingement mortality and entrainment, and the
corresponding disaggregated percent reductions for facilities
using salt and fresh water, differs from the Phase II
requirement that facilities reduce impingement mortality by 80
to 95 percent and entrainment by 60 to 90 percent. These
differences seem potentially significant, especially in
determining whether this suite of BTA technologies achieve
essentially the same result as closed-cycle cooling, but are

35a

area of this sort, it is difficult for judges or interested
parties to determine the propriety of the Agency's
action without a justification for the action supported
by clearly identified substantial evidence whose
import is explained. The record evidence alone here,
which consists in large part of a voluminous
database compilation of studies that assess the
efficacy of various technologies at different locations,
is oblique, complicated, and insufficient to permit us
to determine what the EPA relied upon in reaching
its conclusion. As the Supreme Court has
emphasized, “[oJur recognition of Congress’ need to
vest administrative agencies with ample power to
assist in the difficult task of governing a vast and
complex industrial Nation carries with it the
correlative responsibility of the agency to explain the
rationale and factual basis for its decision, even
though we show respect for the agency’s judgment in
both.” Bowen v. Am. Hosp. Ass'n, 476 U.S. 610, 627,
106 S. Ct. 2101, 90 L. Ed. 2d 584 (1986) (plurality
opinion).

The EPA was required to explain its judgment and
the basis for it. Because the EPA purported to base
its decision in large part on _ cost-effectiveness
considerations, it was required to identify and
explain any evidence indicating a minimal
performance difference between comparable
technologies, but it did not do so here. It stated only

neither explained nor adequately compared for purposes of our
review here. For instance. there does not appear to be any
discussion regarding the seemingly large differences in the
rates of impingement and entrainment reduction between
closed-cycle cooling and the Phase II national performance
standards

36a

that the performance of the technologies it identified
as BIA “approach” the performance of closed-cycle
cooling.!’

{32} We therefore find it impossible to judge
whether the performance of these technologies is
essentially the same as the performance of closed-
cycle cooling, or whether they simply are cheaper per
percentage point of reduction in entrainment and
impingement mortality. That is, on the record before
us, it is impossible to tell whether the EPA based its
decision on permissible cost-effectiveness analysis or
exceeded its authority by relying impermissibly upon
a cost-benefit analysis. To the extent that the record
does not indicate the EPA’s basis, however, its
statement that “the relationship of costs to
environmental benefits is an important component of
economic practicability,” 69 Fed. Reg. at 41,604,
indicates that cost-benefit analysis, under the cover
of considerations of “practicability.” was central to
the Agency’s decisionmaking.

In short, the EPA’s failure to explain its decision
frustrates effective judicial review. If the EPA
construed the statute to permit cost-benefit analysis.
its action was not “based on a_ permissible
construction of the statute.” Chevron, 467 U.S. at
843. It may also be that the EPA misunderstood or
misapplied cost-effectiveness analysis. If so, its

' The Agency. however, did provide some indication of the
relative costs of closed cycle cooling and the suite of
technologies identified as BTA. The EPA stated in the preamble
to the Rule that the “total social cust” of closed-cycle cooling
would be “$3.5 billion per year,” 69 Fed. Reg. at 41.605, and .
that the “final rule will have total annualized social (pre-tax)
costs of $389 million.” id. at 41.650.

37a

decision was arbitrary and capricious because the
Agency relied on factors Congress has not intended it
to consider. See Waterkeeper Alliance, 399 F.3d at
498. Finally, the [*105] EPA may have simply failed
either to perform the required analysis or to explain
adequately a decision that was within its authority
to make. We cannot opine on this subject, because
we must consider only those justifications that the
EPA offered at the time of the rulemaking. See SEC
v. Chenery, 318 U.S. 80, 87-88. Moreover, while the
EPA could rely on factors other than impingement
and entrainment in establishing BTA, such as
negative environmental impacts or concerns about
energy production and efficiency, see Riverkeeper 1,
358 F.3d at 195-96, we are unable to determine, on
the record before us, whether the EPA gave
paramount consideration to an improper factor in
determining [33] BTA. We therefore remand for
clarification of the basis for the Agency's action and
possibly for a new determination of BTA.'®

'' As previously noted, the environmental petitioners, sup-
ported by amicus curiae OMB Watch, have challenged the
EPA's decision to reject closed-cycle cooling as BTA for 59
facilities on the most sensitive waterbodies in part because of
OMB’s participation in the rulemaking precess. They contend
that the EPA’s action ts not entitled to deference because the
EPA was improperly influenced by OMB tn promulgating this
aspect of the Phase II Rule. The petitioners and the EPA have
also sought either to strike from the record or to supplement
the record with certain OMB review documents. Because we
have granted the petitioners challenge to the EPA's
determination of BT.\ without considering OMB’s role in
interagency review, we do not reach the petitioner's arguments
regarding OMB’'s.involvement in the rulemaking and deny the
motions to strike and to supplement as moot. See Waterkeeper
Alliance, 399 F.3d at 524 n.34 (denying petitioners’ motion to

38a
4. Performance Standards Expressed as Ranges

The Phase II Rule establishes performance
standards expressed as an 80 to 95 percent reduction
in impingement mortality and a 60 to 90 percent
reduction in entrainment, which existing power
plants must achieve, subject to certain exceptions, in
order to be considered in comphance with the Rule.
40 C.F.R. § 125.94(b)(1), (2). The environmental
petitioners challenge the Rule's “wide and indeter-
minate ranges” as failing to constitute “precise
single-level limitations based on the best technology
available for minimizing adverse environmental
impact” and argue that these ranges are inconsistent
with Congress's intent that there be a national
standard under section 316(b). We agree in part
and, because the EPA in reconsidering its selection of
BTA on remand may alter the suite of technologies it
originally selected, thereby causing a coordinate
alteration in the performance ranges, we provide
some guidance to the EPA insofar as the petitioners’
challenge touches on the limits of the Agency's
authority. Although the EPA may, in the circum-
stances to be discussed, set performance standards
as ranges, it must [34] require facilities to minimize
the adverse environmental impacts attributable to
their cooling water intake structures to the best
degree they can.

The petitioners note that the EPA has found that
certain screens and filter systems can reduce
impingement mortality by up to 99 percent and that

supplement the record with OMB review documents as moot
where the Court granted the petitions without considering the
OMB review documents).

39a

similar technologies can produce 80 to 90 percent
reduction in entrainment. 69 Fed. Reg. at 41.599. °
They contend that the CWA therefore requires the
EPA to set BTA standards reflecting these best
performers, see Texas Oil & Gas Ass'n v. EPA, 161
F.3d 923, 928 (5th Cir. 1998) (“Congress intended
these [BAT] limitations to be based on the perfor
mance of the single best-performing plant in an
industrial field."(citation and internal quotation
{[*106] marks omitted)), particularly given the EPA's
acknowledgment that “|t]he higher end of the range
is a percent reduction that available data show many
facilities can and have achieved with the available
technologies upon which the performance standards
are vased.” 69 Fed. Reg. at 41,600. The petitioners
emphasize that the Rule’s ranges impermissibly fail
to require facilities even to attempt to achieve
performance equal to the upper bound of the
prescribed ranges.

According to the EPA, section 316(b) does not
require a single-numeric standard applicable to all
Phase II existing facilities, and expressing the
performance standards as ranges is necessary to
account for the variables involved in reducing
impingement mortality and entrainment under loca!
conditions at particular facilities. The EPA contends
that “[blecause the Phase I] requirements are
applied in a variety of settings and to existing
facilities of different types and sizes, no. single
technology is most effective for all facilities subject to
the Rule.” The Agency argues that the technologies
do not provide a fixed level of performance at all
facilities and that their performance is affected by
the nature of the waterbody, facility intake [35]
requirements, climatic conditions, and _ the

40a

waterbody's biology. The EPA argues also that the
permit process requires facilities to reduce
impingement mortality and entrainment
commensurate with the efficacy of the installed
technologies, which it claims ensures that the
installed technologies will be maintained to ensure
their utmost efficacy.'° The difficulty with the EPA’s
arguments is that the Rule does not require facilities
to choose technologies that produce the greatest
reduction possible.

Our decision in Riverkeeper I sheds some light on
the parties arguments. In that case, we discussed
the differences between the two tracks in the Phase I
Rule: Track I set forth precise velocity and capacity
requirements while Track I] permitted compliance
via technologies that would achieve at least 90
percent of the reduction in impingement mortality
and entrainment that compliance with Track | would
yield. See358 F.3d at 182-83. The petitioners in
that case challenged the Track II provision on the
ground that it deviated from the — statutory
requirement that the EPA establish a single level of
performance applicable to all facilities. Jd. at 187.
The EPA argued that Tracks I and II reflected the
same standard and that 10 percent is an acceptable
margin of error given that measurements of
reduction of impingement mortality and entrainment

'' The specific provision requires that when a facility's permit
expires, any reissued permit must contain a requirement that
“the facility ... reduce impingement mortality and
entrainment ... commensurate with the efficacy at the facility
of the installed design and construction technologies,
operational measures. and/or restoration measures.” 40 C.F.R.
§ 125.98(b)(1)(in).

4la

are necessarily inexact and depend upon natural
fluctuations in animal] populations and sampling
errors. Jd. at 188. In assessing the parties’
arguments, we stated that “the EPA, consistent with
Congress's intention that there be a_ national
standard governing the discharge of pollutants, must
[36] promulgate precise effluent limitations under
sections 301 and 306... .” Jd. (emphasis added). We
went on to note, however, that while pollutant
concentration and the velocity and volume of water
withdrawn can be measured accurately,
impingement mortality and entrainment “cannot
always be measured directly and with mathematical
precision.” Jd. at 189. We concluded that the EPA
acted reasonably in specifying “how much ambiguity
it is willing to tolerate in measuring compliance and
what it considers a reasonable [*107] margin of
error in comparing the performance of different
technologies.” Jd. In short, we acknowledged that
the Track Il performance requirements, unlike the
Track I requirements, could not be measured
precisely and that it was therefore reasonable to
consider a margin of error in comparing performance
under the two standards.

This case is not entirely similar to Riverkeeper /
because of the rationales that animate the EPA’s
creation of the performance ranges in Phases I and
II. The Phase I] Rule generally requires facilities to
reduce impingement mortality and entrainment by
the specified percent ranges from the calculation
baseline. 40 C.F.R. § 125.94(b). These ranges, as
explained by the EPA, are based on the reductions
achievable by using various technologies. See 69
Fed. Reg. at 41.599. The EPA explained that it
expressed the performance standards “in the form of

4%a

ranges rather than a single performance benchmark
because of the uncertainty inherent in predicting the
efficacy of any one of these technologies.” Jd. at
41,600. It stated further that the lower end of the
range is the percent reduction it “expects all facilities
could eventually achieve if they were to implement
and optimize available design and _ construction
technologies and operational measures on which the
performance standards are based” and that the
higher end of the range “is a percent reduction that
available data show many facilities can and have
achieved [37] with the available technologies upon
which the performance standards are based.” Id.
Unlike Riverkeeper I, therefore, a margin of error
from a relatively precise benchmark that is tolerable
given measurement difficulties is not at issue here.
Instead, the performance standards reflect the range
of performance associated with various technologies
identified as BTA. That performance. in turn,
depends in part on local conditions and natural
fluctuations. Id.

Record evidence supports the EPA’s conclusion
that the percent reduction of impingement mortality
and entrainment is not completely within the control
of a facility and therefore may not be precisely
achieved by a facility. See TDD for the Final § 316(b)
Phase I] Existing Facilities Rule 4-3. Reducing these
adverse environmental impacts is not as easily
measured and controlled as are the discharge of
pollutants and the capacity and flow rate of water
intake.” We therefore acknowledge that in many

“" Nothing in Hooker Chems. & Plastics Corp. v. Train, 537
F.2d 620 (2d Cir. 1976), suggests the contrary. While we did
announce in that case that performance ranges did not comport

43a

cases it may be difficult, as a practical matter, for the
EPA or other permitting authority to predict which
plants will be able to achieve the upper, as opposed
to the lower, end of the ranges. This uncertainty,
however, does not justify a rule that permits even
those facilities that could achieve the upper end of a
range to be deemed in complhance if they reach only
the lower end, particularly when the EPA has
acknowledged that many facilities “can and have”
achieved reductions at the high end of the range. 69
Fed. Reg. at 41,600. Congress's use of the
superlative “best” in the statute cannot be read to
mean that a facility that achieves the lower end of
the ranges, but could do better, has complied with
the law. [37] The statutory directive requiring
facilities to adopt the best technology cannot be
construed to permit a facility to take measures
[*108] that produce second-best results, see Chevron,
467 U.S. at 843, especially given the technology-
forcing imperative behind the Act, Natural Res. Def.
Council,* 822 F.2d at 123. Insofar as the EPA
establishes performance standards instead = of
requiring facilities to adopt particular technologies,
it must require facilities to choose the technology
that permits them to achieve as much reduction of
adverse environmental impacts as is technologically
possible“! For this reason, the EPA on remand

— ——~—— — ————

with the effluent limitations established by the CWA, id. at
630, the discharge limitations at issue there were easily
measured, unlike the reductions in = impingement and
entrainment at issue in both this case and Riverkeeper 1, which
“cannot always be measured directly and with mathematical
precision,” Riverkeeper [, 358 F.3d at 189.

“* Although it may be difficult to know ex ante which plants
can achieve the upper end of the range. this ts at least in part

44a

should address these concerns if in its BTA
determination, it retains performance ranges.

B. Restoration Measures

The Phase II Rule allows a facility to meet the
national performance standards set [39] forth in 40
C.F.R. § 125.94(b) through the use of restoration
measures such as restocking fish killed by a cooling

because the technologies preferred by the EPA are somewhat
new and untested. In future permitting cycles, permitting
authorities will be lhkely to have a clearer notion of which
facilities can feasibly achieve the upper end of the range.

Finally, the upper end of the range established by the EPA,
should it retain this provision on remand, should not be set at a
level that many facilities “have achieved” with the installation
of one or more of the technologies determined to be BTA but, as
we noted earlier, at the best possible level of impingement and
entrainment reduction the EPA determines these technologies
can achieve. See, e.g., Kennecott, 780 F.2d at 448 (“In setting
BAT, EPA uses not the average plant. but the optimally
operating plant, the pilot plant which acts as a beacon to show
what is possible.”). If, at a particular Phase II facility, the
adoption of BTA technologies can achieve a 95"o reduction in
entrainment and impingement, it is unclear why, under our
jurisprudence and the clear dictates of the CWA, the EPA could
establish a performance standard that has placed the ceiling at
the 90% threshold which “many” Phase II facilities “can and
have” achieved with the same technology. See Am. Iron & Steel
Institute v. EPA, 526 F.2d 1027, 1051 (3d Cir. 1975) (“It will be
sufficient, for the purpose of setting the level of control under
available technology, that there be one operating facility which
demonstrates that the level can be achieved.”) (internal
quotation marks and citations omitted). This would not require
every Phase II facility to meet the upper end of the ranges, but
only that each Phase I facility achieve the highest reduction it
can with the installation of technologies determined by the EPA
to be BTA. The performance ranges, if retained on remand,
should accordingly reflect this understanding.

Ada

water system and improving the habitat surrounding
the intake structure in order, as the EPA explains,
“to provide additional flexibility to facilities in
complying with the rule by’ eliminating” or
significantly offsetting the adverse environmental
impact caused by the operation of a cooling water
intake structure.” 69 Fed. Reg. at 41,609; 40 C.F.R.
§ 125.94(c). The state and environmental petitioners
contend that the EPA exceeded its authority by
allowing compliance with section 316(b) through
restoration measures because Riverkeeper | held that
the statute’s meaning is plain and that restoration
measures cannot substitute for the “best technology
available for minimizing adverse environmental
impact” in cooling water intake structures. The EPA
contends that its interpretation of the statute to
permit restoration measures as a means. of
compliance is entitled to deference because it defined
certain statutory terms in the Phase II Rule that it
had not defined in the Phase I Rule. The EPA also
relies on the Supreme Court’s holding in National
Cable & Telecommunications Association v. Brand X
Internet Services, 545 U.S. 967, 125 S. Ct. 2688, 162
L. Ed. 2d 820 (2005), and our statement in
Riverkeeper / \imiting the decision’s reach to the
Phase I Rule, to argue that our prior interpretation
of the statute does not [*109] trump the Agency's
construction. We agree with the petitioners that
Riverkeeper I held that the Agency's decision to
permit restoration measures in the Phase | Rule was
not “based on a»permissible construction of the
statute,” Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843, 104 S. Ct. 2778,
and that this holding applies equally here.

We began Riverkeeper I by noting that we were
remanding the Phase I restoration provision because

46a

it “contradicts Congress's clearly expressed intent.”
358 F.3d at 181. We went on to state that “however
beneficial to the environment, [restoration measures]
have nothing to do with the location, the design, the
construction, or the capacity of cooling water intake
{40] structures, because they are unrelated to the
structures themselves.” /d. at 189. “Restoration
measures correct for the adverse environmental
impacts of impingement and entrainment,” we noted,
but “they do not minimize those impacts in the first
place.” Jd. (emphasis added). For this reason and
others, we concluded in Riverkeeper T that the EPA
had exceeded its authority in promulgating the
Phase | Rule by allowing comphance with section
316(b) through restoration measures because this
Rule was “plainly inconsistent” with the statute's
text and Congress's intent. Jd. at 189, 191.

The EPA’s argument that Riverkeeper J is not
binding on this issue here has three components.
First, the EPA contends that our rejection of the
restoration measures at issue in Riverkeeper I did
not turn on the statute's text, but instead was based
on various other indicators of Congressional intent.
The Agency makes much of Riverkeeper I's brief
discussion of Congress's rejection of a proposed
amendment to section 316(b) that would have
explicitly allowed restoration measures and of the
KPA’s support of that amendment because in its
opinion, the existing language did not authorize
restoration measures. /d. at 190-91. Seeond, the
EPA argues that its interpretation of section 316(b)
in the Phase II Rule is entitled to deference because
the Rule defined certain statutory terms it had not
defined in the previous rulemaking phase and that
its reasonable interpretation of these terms 1s

47a

entitled to deference. Specifically, the Agency
“defined” three statutory terms in the preamble: it
(1) read the phrase ‘“minimizie}] adverse
environmental impact” to let facilities “minimize
adverse environmental impact by reducing impinge-
ment and entrainment, or to minimize adverse
environmental impact by compensating for those
impacts after the fact.” 69 Fed. Reg. at 41,628; (2)
interpreted “reflect” to authorize it to consider the
full range of technologies, including restoration
measures, that [41] minimize adverse environmental
impact; and (3) viewed “restoration measures as
part of the ‘design’ of a cooling water intake
structure,” and “one of several technologies that may
be employed ... to minimize adverse environmental
impact,"69 Fed. Reg. at 41,637. Finally, the EPA
relies on our statement in Riverkeeper J] that our
ruling on the Phase I Rule was not meant to
“predetermine the factors and standard|s] applicable
to Phases II and ; of the rulemaking,”358 F.3d at
186 n.13, and on the Supreme Court’s holding in
Brand X that “[a] court’s prior judicial construction
of a statute trumps an agency construction otherwise
entitled to Chevron deference only if the prior court
decision holds that its construction follows from the
unambiguous terms of the statute and thus leaves no
room for agency discretion.” 545 US. at 982, 125 S.
Ct. at 2700.

We reject each of the EPA’s contentions. First, our
primary conclusion in Riverkeeper 1 was_ that
restoration measures are “plainly inconsistent” with
the statute's text, 358 F.3d at 189, and our
statements regarding the legislative history [*110] of

> .
a proposed amendment, which we offered as
ancillary, but not dispositive, support for our

48a

construction of the statute, in no way diminish the
force of our conclusion that Congress unambiguously
expressed its intent in the statute. See Chevron, 467
U.S. at 842-43, 104 S. Ct. 2778 (“If the intent of
Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter; for
the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to
the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.”).
Second, as to the EPA’s claim that ats construction of
the statute is entitled to deference because it has
now interpreted certain statutory terms, our holding
in Riverkeeper I was and remains clear: restoration
measures contradict the unambiguous language of
section 316(b). The EPA’s promulgation of the Phase
Il Rule obviously did nothing to alter the text of
section 316(b), and the Agency cannot create
ambiguity where none otherwise exists by defining
statutory terms contrary to their plain meaning.
Finally, as the foregoing analysis [42] suggests, our
decision in Riverkeeper I foreclosed the EPA from
interpreting section 316(b) in the Phase II Rule to
permit restoration measures as a means of
complying with the statute, and, therefore, nothing
in Brand X undermines the precedential value of our
prior holding. Our statement in Riverkeeper | that
we did not “mean to predetermine the factors and
standard applicable to Phases I] and III of the
rulemaking,” was made in the narrow context of
identifying “one reasonable reading” of particular
statutory language relating to the standard for new
and existing sources, not the restoration measures.
358 F.3d at 186 n. 13. Where we held that the
statutory language is unambiguous, Riverkeeper I is
binding.

Even assuming arguendo that we did not consider
ourselves bound by Riverkeeper I, we are persuaded

49a

by its reasoning as applied here. Restoration
measures are not part of the location, design,
construction, or capacity of cooling water intake
structures, Riverkeeper [, 358 F.3d at 189, and a rule
permitting comphance with the statute through
restoration measures allows facilities to avoid
adopting any cooling water intake — structure
technology at all, in contravention of the Act’s clear
language as well as its technology-forcing principle.
As we noted in Riverkeeper I, restoration measures
substitute after-the-fact compensation for adverse
environmental impacts that have already occurred
for the minimization of those impacts in the first
instance. /d. ‘The Agency's attempt to define the
word “minimize” to include “compensatilon]|
after the fact,” 69 Fed. Reg. at 41,628, is simply
inconsistent with that word’s dictionary definition:
“to reduce to the smallest possible extent,’ Webster's
Third New Int'l Dictionary 1438 (1986).

Accordingly, the EPA impermissibly construed the
statute by allowing compliance with section 316(b)
via restoration measures, and we remand that aspect

of the Rule.
[43] C. Site-Specific Compliance Alternatives

As noted earlier, the Phase II Rule includes two
site-specific complhance alternatives or variances
from the generally applicable requirements. The
cost-cost alternative authorizes a_— site-specific
determination that “data specific to fa] facility
demonstrate that the costs of comphance under
this section would be significantly greater than the
costs considered by the Administrator ...~ in
establishing the applicable performance standards,”
40 C.FLR. § 125.94(a)(5)Q). while the cost-benefit

50a

alternative authorizes a site-specific determination
that “data specific to |a] facility demonstrate that the
costs of comphance under ... this section would be
[*111] significantly greater than the benefits of
complying with the applicable performance
standards.” /d. § 125.94(a)(5)(ii). If a facility makes
either showing, the permitting authority “must make
a site-specific determination of the best technology
available” and impose “site-specific alternative
requirements that are “as close as practicable to the
applicable performance standards.” Id.
3 125.94(a)(5)Q), (11).

Petitioners challenge the cost-cost compliance
alternative because, inter alia, they claim as a
threshold matter that the Agency failed to comply
with the APA’s notice and comment requirements by
disclosing cost data for specific facilities that would
be used in determining whether a facility qualifies
for the cost-cost compliance alternative only at the
time the final Rule was issued. Petitioners also
challenge the cost-benefit compliance alternative on
two substantive grounds. They contend that this
alternative (1) impermissibly allows compliance with
the statute to be based on cost-benefit analysis and
(2) is analogous to a water-quality standard, which
the Act permits only for thermal pollution. CWA
§ 316(a), 33 U.S.C. § 1326(a). We address each [44]
of these arguments In turn.*”

*. Section 316(b) does not specifically authorize the Agency to
allow variances from generally applicable requirements. In
Riverkeeper 1, we accepted the argument that the EPA can
allow variances even in the absence of explicit statutory
authority. 358 F.3d at 193. Although the statutes to which
section 316(b) refers contained variance provisions, we did not

dla
1. Cost-Cost Compliance Alternative

As already noted, a variance may be available to a
facility pursuant to 40 C.F.R. § 125.94(a)(5)G) if the
facilitys comphance costs would be “significantly
greater than” the costs considered by the Agency “in
establishing the applicable performance standards.”
This variance requires a calculation of compliance
costs based on the suite of BTA technologies that the
EPA has identified and promulgated in the final
Rule. 69 Fed. Reg. at 41,644 46. We remand this
provision because (1) the EPA did not give interested
partics the requisite notice and opportunity to

read them to require that section 316(b) permit (or by its silence
prohibit) variances. Instead, we stated that

[sJection 316(b)'s silence with respect to variances does
not... equal an unambiguous prohibition. In the absence
of such a statutory bar, we think, consistent with
precedent, that it is reasonable for the EPA to allow
variances from regulations promulgated pursuant to
section 316(b), for a regulatory system which allows
flexahility, and a lessening of firm proscriptions in a proper
case, can lend strength to the system as a whole.

Id. at 193 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

Riverkeeper I thus rejected the view that the EPA’s authority
to grant a variance from the generally applicable requirements
of a rule promulgated pursuant to section 316(b) derives from
the statutory variance provisions in other sections of the Act.
Instead, Riverkeeper | found that the variance provision would
not be authorized if it left alternative requirements to the
Agency's “unfettered discretion” but would be authorized if it
“vuide[d] the permitting authority to consider appropriate
factors and allowled| relaxation of the Rules uniform
technology requirements only insofar as necessary to account
for unusual circumstances not considered by the Agency during
its rulemaking. /d. at 193-94 (internal quotation marks
omitted).

52a

challenge the variance by failing to identify cost data
for actual, named facilities, as opposed to model
facilities, until after the notice and comment period
had ended, Sprint Corp., 315 F.3d at [45] 371, and
(2) the variance is expressly premised on the validity
of the BTA determination,”* [*112] which itself has
been remanded for further explanation, see, e.g.,
Solite Corp. v. U.S. EPA, 952 F.2d 473, 494-95 (D.C.
Cir. 1991) (remanding rule where the underlying
grounds for its promulgation had been remanded to
the EPA for procedural defects); cf. Chenery, 318
U.S. at 87-88 (a rule may only be upheld on the
grounds that the agency proffers).

In the Rule’s proposal, the EPA indicated that it
had estimated compliance costs for 539 “model
plants” based on factors such as “fuel source, mode of
electricity generation, existing intake technologies,
waterbody type, geographic location, and intake
flow.” 67 Fed. Reg. at 17,144. An accompanying
technical development document set forth the
Agency's cost calculation methodology for these
model plants and listed the compliance cost
estimates for each of the 539 model plants. ‘The
proposal indicated that a facility must “determine
which model plant [it] most closely” resembles in
order to identify the costs considered by the Agency
in establishing the national performance standards.

This variance requires a comparison between the actual
costs of compliance and those contemplated by EPA under the
Rule. Because the Ageney has calculated the costs it believes
specific facilities will incur in adopting the appropriate BTA
technologies (as currently defined) and then promulgated these
costs in the final Rule, any change in the selection of BTA on
remand will necessarily alter these costs.

53a

See id. The EPA subsequently published in the
Federal Register a_ so-called Notice of Data
Availability (“NODA”) in which it explained that it
had changed its methodology for estimating the
model plants’ compliance costs. Proposed Regula-
tions to Establish Requirements for Cooling Water
Intake Structures at Phase Ill Existing Facilities,
Notice of Data Availability; Proposed Rule, 68 Fed.
Reg. 13,522, 13,527 (Mar. 19, 2003). Accompanying
documents explained in greater detail the costing
methodology and cost data underlying the revised
approach. The revisee proposal, however, did not
depart from the [46] “niodel plant” approach. The
final Rule, by contrast, assigned cost estimates to
specific, named facilities rather than model facilities.
69 Fed. Reg. at 41,670—-82. The Agency explained in
the preamble to the final Rule that the EPA will
adjust facility-specific costs pursuant to a multiple
step calculation formula to arrive at a final
estimated cost the EPA considers a comparison for
purposes of the cost-cost variance. /d. at 41,644—47.

The EPA acknowledges that it did not disclose in
the proposal or the NODA specific facility names in
connection with cost data and explains that it failed
to do so because it needed to protect certain
confidential business information (“CBI”) and had
not developed during the proposal stage a means to
protect that information while still providing cost
data t, the public. We accept the EPA’s argument
that masking the facility names did not prevent
interested parties from commenting on the methodo-
logy and general cost data underlying the EPA's
approach because the NODA explained the costing
methodology and because the general cost data,
while not identified by the Agency as relating to

54a

actual, specifie facilities, was made available to
interested parties. Nat’ Wildlife Ked., 286 F.3d at
564-65 (holding that the EPA cannot be faulted for
lack of notice in not releasing CBI data). We are
persuaded, however, that the release of information
and request for comments on the EPA’s new
approach to developing compliance cost modules via
the NODA did not afford adequate notice of the costs
associated with specific facilities promulgated in the
final Rule.

We have previously stated that “[n]otice is said not
only to improve the quality of rulemaking through
exposure of a proposed rule to comment, but also to
provide fairness to interested parties and [*113] to
enhance judicial review by the development of a
record through the commentary process.” Nati
Black Media Coalition v. FCC, 791 F.2d 1016, 1022
(2d Cir. 1986).

[47] “While a final rule need not be an exact
replica of the rule proposed in the Notice, the final
rule must be a ‘logical outgrowth’ of the rule
proposed.” Jd. “The test that has been set forth is
whether the agency's notice would fairly apprise
interested persons of the subjects and issues” of the
rulemaking. /d. (citation and internal quotation
marks omitted).2' Agencies accordingly are not

“4 The D.C. Circuit has phrased the test somewhat
differently, stating that “[w]hether the ‘logical outgrowth’ test 1s
satisfied depends on whether the affected party ‘should have
anticipated’ the agency's final course in light of the initial
notice.” Covad Comms. Co. v. FCC, 450 F.3d 528, 548 (D.C. Cir.
2006) (citation omitted). It has also indicated that “[t]he ‘logical
outgrowth’ doctrine does not extend to a final rule that finds no
roots in the agency's proposal because something is not a logical

dda
permitted “to use the rulemaking process to pull a
surprise switcheroo.” Enuvtl. Integrity Project, 425
F.3d at 996.

Here, only the final Rule identified facilities by
name in estimating compliance costs. Interested
parties therefore could not comment on the basis for
particular facilities’ cost figures that the EPA
established. This is problematic because the availa-
bility of a variance turns on the relationship between
the costs estimated in the Rule and those that a
specific facility establishes in a permit proceeding.
The EPA focuses on the notice it gave of its intended
methodology for calculating the costs the Agency
considered, but ignores the overriding importance of
the cost estimates for a particular facility in deter-
mining whether a site-specific cost-cost variance is
appropriate. Thus, the EPA should have afforded
notice and an opportunity to challenge the cost
estimates for specific facilities and not simply an
opportunity to comment [48] on the EPA's
methodology and gencral cost data.2> We remand

outgrowth of nothing. nor does it apply where interested parties
would have had to divine the agency's unspoken thoughts
because the final rule was surprisingly distant from the
Agency's proposal.” Enotl. Integrity Project v. EPA, 425 F.3d
992, 996 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (citations, internal quotation marks,
and alteration omitted).

“> Because we remand on this procedural ground, we do not
consider the provision on the merits.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385015_0045%3A0. Public record. Not legal advice.
