# Joint Appendix — IBP, Inc. v. Alvarez

> Briefs, arguments, decisions, and more.

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385014_0745%3A08

## Record

- **Collection:** Supreme Court brief
- **Document type:** Joint Appendix
- **Published:** January 1, 2005
- **Citation:** 546 U.S. 21

## Text

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No. 03-1238 | MAY 1 6 2095
—_—_——————————————————————————————————————————
IN THE |

Supreme Court of the United States

IBP. INC..,

Petitioner,

V.

GABRIEL ALVAREZ, individually and as a class representative;
RANULFO GUTIERREZ, individually and as a class
representative; PEDRO HERNANDEZ, individually and as a
class representative; MARIA MARTINEZ; RAMON MORENO;
ISMAEL RODRIQUEZ,

Respondents.

On Writ of Certiorari to the United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

JOINT APPENDIX

CARTER G. PHILLIPS*
JOSEPH R. GUERRA
REBECCA K. WOOD
NORINA IRANI EDELMAN
SIDLEY AUSTIN BROWN
& WOOD LLP
1501 K Street, NW
Washington, DC 20005
(202) 736-8000

MICHAEL J. MUELLER

JOEL M. COHN

AKIN GUMP STRAUSS HAUER
& FELD LLP

1333 New Hampshire
Avenue, NW

Washington, DC 20036

(202) 887-4000

Counsel for Petitioner

May 16, 2005

WILLIAM RUTZICK*

KATHRYN GOATER

SCHROETER GOLDMARK
& BENDER

810 Third Avenue #500

Seattle, WA 98104

(206) 622-8000

DAVID MARK

LAW OFFICE OF DAVID MARK
810 Third Avenue #500
Seattle, WA 98104

(206) 340-1840

Counsel for Respondents

* Counsel of Record

od
PETITION FOR CERTIORARI FILED FEBRUARY 26, 2004

CERTIORARI GRANTED FEBRUARY 22, 2005
WiItSON-EPES PRINTING CO., INC. — (202) 789-0096 - WASHINGTON, D. C. 20001

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
United States District Court, Eastern District of
Washington, Relevant Docket Entries

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit,
Relevant Docket Entries :

Second Amended Complaint, Alvarez v. /BP,
Inc., No. CT-98-5005 RHW (E.D. Wash. filed

Sept. 10, 1999)

Alvarez v. IBP, Inc., No. CT-98-5005 RHW (E.D.
Wash. Aug. 3, 2001) (Order on Objections)

Order Granting Certiorari, /BP, Inc. v. Alvarez,
No. 03-1238 (U.S. Feb. 24, 2005)

NOTICE
The following documents have been omitted in the printing of
this Joint Appendix. They may be found in the Petitioner’s
Appendix to the 03-1238 Petition For A Writ Of Certiorari at
the following pages:

Alvarez v. IBP, Inc., 339 F.3d 894 (9th Cir.

Alvarez v. IBP, Inc., No. CT-98-5005-RHW (E.D.
Wash. Sept. 14, 2001)

l
WASHINGTON EASTERN DISTRICT COURT

Case No. 2:98-cv-5005
GABRIEL ALVAREZ, et al.,

Plaintiff,
v.
IBP, INC.
Defendant.
RELEVANT DOCKET ENTRIES
DATE NO. PROCEEDINGS

06/30/1998 1 COMPLAINT FOR MINIMUM WAGE
ACT AND FAIR LABOR STANDARDS
ACT VIOLATIONS (Summons(es) issued)
Fee-status: pd Receipt #: 039823 (KH)
(Entered: 06/30/1998)

* * * *

08/17/1998 4 Defendant IBP, Inc..s ANSWER To
Plaintiffs’ Complaint (ECH) (Entered:
08/18/1998)

* * * *

03/08/1999 59 Firs’ AMENDED COMPLAINT for Mini-
mum Wage Act and Fair Labor Standards
Act violations [1-1] (KH) Modified on
04/23/1999 (Entered: 03/08/1999)

* * * &*

05/07/1999 70 ANSWER by defendant IBP Inc to Plain-
tiffs First Amended Complaint (KH)
(Entered: 05/10/1999)

2
Ee erTETEEEEEEEEEEEEEEe
DATE NO. PROCEEDINGS

* * * *

06/11/1999 72 Stipulation re: class certification (KH)
(Entered: 06/15/1999)

* * * *

08/02/1999 101 Response by defendant to Plaintiff's motion
to file a second amended complaint [94-1]
(KH) (Entered: 08/05/1999)

* * * *

08/25/1999 102 ORDER Granting Motion to Amend And
Class Certification by Judge Robert H.
Whaley (granting motion to amend com-
plaint to add class representatives [94-1]
granting motion for (order) Resolving
Disputed Class Certification Issues [71-1])
(cc: all counsel) (KH) (Entered: 08/26/1999)

09/10/1999 103 Second AMENDED COMPLAINT for
Minimum Wage Act and Fair Labor
Standards Act Violations [59-1], [1-1] (KH)
(Entered: 09/10/1999)

* * *& *

04/12/2001 664 Findings of fact and conclusions of law by
Judge Robert H. Whaley; pltfs to submit
obj or clarifications to these findings by
4/27/01; proposed jgm ddl 4/27/01; deft obj
ddl 5/11/01; rply ddl 5/18/01; following obj
hrg to be set; all outstanding motions are
denied as moot except mtn #574 to recon-
sider rest break claims; parties to submit
briefing re issue of injunctive relief COB-
179-93 (cc: all counsel) (SAP) (Entered:
04/12/2001)

* * *& *

3

SS mm a ee

DATE NO. PROCEEDINGS

05/18/2001 66° ORDER by Judge Robert H. Whaley
granting pltf’s motion for reconsideration of
rest break claims [574-1]; w/in 3 wks of this
order pltfs to brief re evidence & pro-
vide damage figures; parties to schedule 1/2
day of trial time (cc: all counsel) (SAP)
(Entered: 05/21/2001)

* * * *

06/26/2001 718 DAMAGES REPORT by plaintiff (at-
tachments not scanned, filed in separate
expando file, Vols. 104-105) (LE) Modified
on 06/28/2001 (Entered: 06/26/2001)

* * * *

07/10/2001 775 Revised Damages Reports by plaintiffs {See
Expando File for Attachments) (SAP)
(Entered: 07/10/2001)

*_ * * *

08/03/2001 828 ORDER on Objections by Judge Robert H.
Whaley, plaintiff's objections and clarifi-
cations to the court’s proposed findings is
granted in part and denied in part, [ct. rec.
716] defendant’s objections and clarifica-
tions to the court’s proposed findings is
granted in part and denied in part {ct.
rec.793] (cc: all counsel) (VR) (Entered:
08/03/2001)

*_ * * *

08/28/2001 834 Stipulation for Purposes of Facilitating
Rest Break Hearing & Admissibility of
Overall Damage Calculations (SAP) (En-
tered: 08/28/2001)

4

DATE NO. PROCEEDINGS
* * * *
09/14/2001 844 Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law by

09/14/2001 845

Judge Robert H. Whaley: pltfs to present
proposed jgm consistent with this Order and
w/Court’s Order on Objections; court will
hear tele oral arg on issue of injunctive
relief 10/4/01 at 1:30 p.m.; if parties request
oral arg in person, they shall notify Court-
room Dep MF by 10/1/01 COB: 182-95 (cc:
all counsel) (LE) (Entered: 09/14/2001)

JUDGMENT: by Judge Robert H. Whaley:
pltfs recover of dft IBP sum of
$3,098,517.00 w/interest thereon at the rate
provided by 29 USC 1961, 3.43%. This jgm
based on damages calculated through
5/14/00 and is comprised of $1,751,126.00
in Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA)
overtime damages, $156,344.00 in Wash-
ington Minimum Wage Act (MWA)
overtime damages for periods preceding the
FLSA limitations period, $286,119 in MWA
minimum wage damages, and $904,928.00
in rest break damages under Washington
law (which includes rest break prejudgment
interest); pltfs entitled to costs of action and
reasonable attys’ fees and costs under
applicable state and fed law; pltfs to file mtn
to establish these attys’ fees w/in 4 weeks
from entry of this jgm and to file a cost bill
with the Clerk (cc: all counsel) COB: 182-
94 (LE) Modified on 11/27/2001 (Entered:
09/14/2001)

5

DATE NO.

PROCEEDINGS

01/18/2002 988

02/26/2002 998

02/26/2002 999

* * * *

ORDER by Judge Robert H. Whaley grant-
ing motion for stay of execution of judg-
ment pending appeal & for approval of
supersedeas bond pursuant to FRCP 62(d) &
FRAP 8(a)(1) [967-2]; order is without
prejudice to any right of pltfs to apply for
further relief under FRAP 8(a) (cc: all
counsel) (SAP) (Entered: 01/22/2002)

* * * *

REPORTER’S TRANSCRIPT FILED. CR:
Debra Clark before Judge Robert H. Whaley
City: Richland, WA Date: 9/27/00 Type of
Proceeding: Bench Trial, Vol 6 of 43,
Pgs 81-162 [See Expando File Vol 113]
(SAP) Modified on 02/28/2002 (Entered:
02/27/2002)

REPORTER’S TRANSCRIPT FILED. CR:
Debra Clark before Judge Robert H. Whaley
City: Richland, WA Date: 9/28/00 Type of
Proceeding: Bench Trial, Morning Pro-
ceedings, Vol 7 of 43, Pgs 163-243 [See
Expando File Vol 113] (SAP) Modified on
02/28/2002 (Entered: 02/27/2002)

02/26/2002 1000 REPORTER’S TRANSCRIPT FILED. CR:

Debra Clark before Judge Robert H. Whaley
City: Richland, WA Date: 9/28/00 Type of
Proceeding: Bench Trial, Afternoon Pro-
ceedings, Vol 8 of 43, Pgs 244-321 [See
Expando File Vol 113] (SAP) Modified on
02/28/2002 (Entered: 02/27/2002)

6
DATE NO. PROCEEDINGS

02/26/2002 1001 REPORTER’S TRANSCRIPT FILED. CR:
Debra Clark before Judge Robert H. Whaley
City: Richland, WA Date: 9/29/00 Type of
Proceeding: Bench Trial, Vol 9 of 43,
Pgs 322-480 [See Expando File Vol 113]
(SAP) Modified on 02/28/2002 (Entered:
02/27/2002)

02/26/2002 1002 REPORTER’S TRANSCRIPT FILED. CR:
Debra Clark before Judge Robert H. Whaley
City: Richland, WA Date: 10/3/00 Type of
Proceeding: Bench Trial, Morning Pro-
ceedings, Vol 10 of 43, Pgs 481-570 [See
Expando File Vol 114] (SAP) Modified on
02/28/2002 (Entered: 02/27/2002)

02/26/2002 1003 REPORTER’S TRANSCRIPT FILED. CR:
Debra Clark before Judge Robert H. Whaley
City: Richland, WA Date: 10/3/00 Type of
Proceeding: Bench Trial, Afternoon Pro-
ceedings, Vol 11 of 43, Pgs 571-677 [See
Expando File Vol 114] (SAP) Modified on
02/28/2002 (Entered: 02/27/2002)

J2/26/2002 1004 REPORTER’S TRANSCRIPT FILED. CR:
Debra Clark before Judge Robert H. Whaley
City: Richland, WA Date: 10/4/00 Type of
Proceeding: Bench Trial, Morning Pro-
ceedings, Vol 12 of 43, Pgs 678-771 [See
Expando File Vol 114] (SAP) Modified on
02/28/2002 (Entered: 02/27/2002)

7
DATE NO. PROCEEDINGS

02/26/2002 1005 REPORTER’S TRANSCRIPT FILED. CR:
Debra Clark before Judge Robert H. Whaley
City: Richland, WA Date: 10/4/00 Type of
Proceeding: Bench Trial, Afternoon Pro-
ceedings, Vol 13 of 43, Pgs 772-888 [See
Expando File Vol 114] (SAP) Modified on
02/28/2002 (Entered: 02/27/2002)

02/26/2002 1006 REPORTER’S TRANSCRIPT FILED. CR:
Debra Clark before Judge Robert H. Whaley
City: Richland, WA Date: 10/5/00 Type of
Proceeding: Bench Trial, Morning Pro-
ceedings, Vol 14 of 43, Pgs 889-1020 [See
Expando File Vol 114] (SAP) Modified on
02/28/2002 (Entered: 02/27/2002)

02/26/2002 1007 REPORTER’S TRANSCRIPT FILED. CR:
Debra Clark before Judge Robert H. Whaley
City: Richland, WA Date: 10/5/00 Type of
Proceeding: Bench Trial, Afternoon Pro-
ceedings, Vol 15 of 43, Pgs 1021-1109 [See
Expando File Vol 115] (SAP) Modified on
02/28/2002 (Entered: 02/27/2002)

02/26/2002 1008 REPORTER’S TRANSCRIPT FILED. CR:
Debra Clark before Judge Robert H, Whaley
City: Richland, WA Date: 10/6/00 Type of
Proceeding: Bench Trial, Vol 16 of 43, Pgs
111 1257 [See Expando File Vol 115]
(SAP) Modified on 02/28/2002 (Entered:
02/27/2002)

8

DATE NO. PROCEEDINGS

02/26/2002 1009 REPORTER’S TRANSCRIPT FILED. CR:
Debra Clark before Judge Robert H. Whaley
City: Richland, WA Date: 10/9/00 Type of
Proceeding: Bench Trial, Morning Pro-
ceedings, Vol 17 of 43, Pgs 1258-1448 [See
Expando File Vol 115] (SAP) Modified on
02/28/2002 (Entered: 02/27/2002)

02/26/2002 1010 REPORTER’S TRANSCRIPT FILED. CR:
Debra Clark before Judge Robert H. Whaley
City: Richland, WA Date: 10/9/00 Type of
Proceeding: Bench Trial, Afternoon Pro-
ceedings, Vol 18 of 43, Pgs 1449-1523 [See
Expando File Vol 115] (SAP) Modified on
02/28/2002 (Entered: 02/27/2002)

02/26/2002 1011 REPORTER’S TRANSCRIPT FILED. CR:
Debra Clark before Judge Robert H. Whaley
City: Richland, WA Date: 10/10/00 Type
of Proceeding: Bench Trial, Morning Pro-
ceedings, Vol 19 of 43, Pgs 1524-1691 [See
Expando File Vol 115] (SAP) Modified on
02/28/2002 (Entered: 02/27/2002)

02/26/2002 1012 REPORTER’S TRANSCRIPT FILED. CR:
Debra Clark before Judge Robert H. Whaley
City: Richland, WA Date: 10/10/00 Type of
Proceeding: Bench Trial, Afternoon Pro-
ceedings, Vol 20 of 43, Pgs 1692-1762 [See
Expando File Vol 116] (SAP) Modified on
02/28/2002 (Entered: 02/27/2002)

9

DATE NO. PROCEEDINGS

02/26/2002 1013 REPORTER’S TRANSCRIPT FILED. CR:
Debra Clark before Judge Robert H. Whaley
City: Richland, WA Date: 10/11/00 Type of
Proceeding: Bench Trial, Vol 21 of 43, Pgs
1763-1932 [See Expando File Vol 116]
(SAP) Modified on 02/28/2002 (Entered:
02/27/2002)

02/26/2002 1°! } REPORTER’S TRANSCRIPT FILED. CR:
Debra Clark before Judge Robert H. Whaley
City: Richland, WA Date: 10/12/00 Type
of Proceeding: Bench Trial, Morning Pro-
ceedings, Vol 22 of 43, Pgs 1933-2097 [See
Expando File Vol 116] (SAP) Modified on
02/28/2002 (Entered: 02/27/2002)

02/26/2002 1015 REPORTER’S TRANSCRIPT FILED. CR:
Debra Clark before Judge Robert H. Whaley
City: Richland, WA Date: 10/12/00 Type of
Proceeding: Bench Trial, Afternoon Pro-
ceedings, Vol 23 of 43, Pgs 2098-2316 [See
Expando File Vol 116] (SAP) Modified on
02/28/2002 (Entered: 02/27/2002)

02/26/2002 1016 REPORTER’S TRANSCRIPT FILED. CR:
Debra Clark before Judge Robert H. Whaley
City: Richland, WA Date: 10/13/00 Type of
Proceeding: Bench Trial, Vol 24 of 43, Pgs
2317-2501 [See Expando File Vol 117]
(SAP) Modified on 02/28/2002 (Entered:
02/27/2002)

10

DATE NO. PROCEEDINGS

02/26/2002 1017 REPORTER’S TRANSCRIPT FILED. CR:
Debra Clark before Judge Robert H. Whaley
City: Richland, WA Date: 10/17/00 Type
of Proceeding: Bench Trial, Morning Pro-
ceedings, Vol 25 of 43, Pgs 2502-2601 [See
Expando File Vol 117] (SAP) Modified on
02/28/2002 (Entered: 02/27/2002)

02/26/2002 1018 REPORTER’S TRANSCRIPT FILED. CR:
Debra Clark before Judge Robert H. Whaley
City: Richland, WA Date: 10/17/00 Type of
Proceeding: Bench Trial, Afternoon Pro-
ceedings, Vol 26 of 43, pgs 2602-2674 [See
Expando File Vol 117] (SAP) Modified on
02/28/2002 (Entered: 02/28/2002)

02/26/2002 1019 REPORTER’S TRANSCRIPT FILED. CR:
Debra Clark before Judge Robert H. Whaley
City: Yakima, WA Date: 10/19/00 Type
of Proceeding: Bench Trial, Morning Pro-
ceedings, Vol 27 of 43, Pgs 2675-2814 [See
Expando File Vol 117] (SAP) Modified on
02/28/2002 (Entered: 02/28/2002)

02/26/2002 1020 REPORTER’S TRANSCRIPT FILED. CR:
Debra Clark before Judge Robert H. Whaley
City: Yakima, WA Date: 10/19/00 Type of
Proceeding: Bench Trial, Afternoon Pro-
ceedings, Vol 28 of 43, Pgs 2815-2966 [See
Expando File Vol 117] (SAP) Modified on
02/28/2002 (Entered: 02/28/2002)

1]
DATE NO. PROCEEDINGS

02/26/2002 1021 REPORTER’S TRANSCRIPT FILED. CR:
Debra Clark before Judge Robert H. Whaley
City: Richland, WA Date: 10/20/00 Type
of Proceeding: Bench Trial, Morning Pro-
ceedings, Vol 29 of 43, Pgs 2967-3137 [See
Expando File Vol 118] (SAP) Modified on
02/28/2002 (Entered: 02/28/2002)

02/26/2002 1022 REPORTER’S TRANSCRIPT FILED. CR:
Debra Clark before Judge Robert H. Whaley
City: Richland, WA Date: 10/20/00 Type of
Proceeding: Bench Trial, Afternoon Pro-
ceedings, Vol 30 of 43, Pgs 3138-3262 [See
Expando File Vol 118] (SAP) Modified on
02/28/2002 (Entered: 02/28/2002)

02/26/2002 1023 REPORTER’S TRANSCRIPT FILED. CR:
Debra Clark before Judge Robert H. Whaley
City: Richland, WA Date: 10/24/00 Type
of Proceeding: Bench Trial, Morning Pro-
ceedings, Vol 31 of 43, Pgs 3263-3405 [See
Expando File Vol 118] (SAP) Modified on
02/28/2002 (Entered: 02/28/2002)

02/26/2002 1024 REPORTER’S TRANSCRIPT FILED. CR:
Debra Clark before Judge Robert H. Whaley
City: Richland, WA Date: 10/24/00 Type of
Proceeding: Bench Trial, Afternoon Pro-
ceedings, Vol 32 of 43, Pgs 3406-3547 [See
Expando File Vol 118] (SAP) Modified on
02/28/2002 (Entered: 02/28/2002)

12
DATE NO. PROCEEDINGS

02/26/2002 1025 REPORTER’S TRANSCRIPT FILED. CR:
Debra Clark before Judge Robert H. Whaley
City: Richland, WA Date: 10/25/00 Type of
Proceeding: Bench Trial, Vol 33 of 43, Pgs
3548-3681 [See Expando File Vol 119]
(SAP) Modified on 02/28/2002 (Entered:
02/28/2002)

02/26/2002 1026 REPORTER’S TRANSCRIPT FILED. CR:
Debra Clark before Judge Robert H. Whaley
City: Richland, WA Date: 10/26/00 Type of
Proceeding: Bench Trial, Morning Pro-
ceedings, Vol 34 of 43, Pgs 3682-3872 [See
Expando File Vol 119] (SAP) Modified on
02/28/2002 (Entered: 02/28/2002)

02/26/2002 1027 REPORTER’S TRANSCRIPT FILED. CR:
Debra Clark before Judge Robert H. Whaley
City: Richiand, WA Date: 10/26/00 Type
of Proceeding: Bench Trial, Afternoon Pro-
ceedings, Vol 35 of 43, Pgs 3873-3979 [See
Expando File Vol 119] (SAP) Modified on
02/28/2002 (Entered: 02/28/2002)

02/26/2002 1028 REPORTER’S TRANSCRIPT FILED. CR:
Debra Clark before Judge Robert H. Whaley
City: Richland, WA Date: 10/27/00 Type of
Proceeding: Bench Trial, Vol 36 of 43, Pgs
3980-4216 [See Expando File Vol 119]
(SAP) Modified on 02/28/2002 (Entered:
02/28/2002)

——[== IT

i3

DATE NO. PROCEEDINGS

02/26/2002 1029 REPORTER’S TRANSCRIPT FILED. CR:
Debra Clark before Judge Robert H. Whaley
City: Spokane, WA Date: 11/3/00 Type of
Proceeding: Bench Trial, Vol 37 of 43, Pgs
4217-4350 [See Expando File Vol 120]
(SAP) Modified on 02/28/2002 (Entered:
02/28/2002)

* * * *

02/28/2002 1037 Copy 9CCA certificate of record - Original
forwarded to 9CCA 9CCA: 02-35042 (SAP)
(Entered: 02/28/2002)

* * * *

14

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
NINTH CIRCUIT

Court of Appeals Docket No. 02-35042

GABRIEL ALVAREZ, individually and as class representatives;
RANULFO GUTIERREZ, individually and as class repre-
sentatives; PEDRO HERNANDEZ, individually and as class
representatives; MARIA MARTINEZ; RAMON MORENO;
ISMAEL RODRIQUEZ,

Plaintiffs-Appellees.
Vv.

IBP, INC., a Delaware corporation
Defendant-Appellant,

RELEVANT DOCKET ENTRIES

DATE PROCEEDINGS

1/9/02 DOCKETED CAUSE AND ENTERED AP-
PEARANCES OF COUNSEL. CADS SENT
(Y/N): no. setting schedule as follows: appel-
lant’s designation of RT is due 1/7/02; appellee’s
designation of RT is due 1/17/02; appellant shall
order transcript by 1/28/02; court reporter shall
file transcript in DC by 2/27/02; certificate of
record shall be filed by 3/6/02; appellant’s
opening brief is due 4/15/02; appellees’ brief
is due 5/15/02; appellants’ reply brief is due
5/29/02; [02-35042] (crw) [02-35042]

* * * *

6/6/02 Filed original and 15 copies IBP, Inc.’s first brief
on cross-appeal, (Informal : no ) of 60 pages and
2 excerpts of record; served on 6/3/02 [02-35042,
02-35110] (dg) [02-35042 02-351 10]

15
DATE PROCEEDINGS

* * * *

7/24/02 Filed original and 15 copies plaintiffs second
brief on cross-appeal ( Informal : no ) of 62
pages and 3 vols excerpts of record; served on
7/22/02 [(02-35042, 02-35110] (dg) [02-35042
02-35110)

* * * *

10/8/02 Filed original and 15 copies IBP, Inc.’s third
brief on cross-appeal ( Informal : no ) of 69
pages and 5 copies | excerpts of record; served
on 10/4/02 [02-35042, 02-35110] (dg) [02-35042
02-351 10}

* * * *

11/19/02 ‘Filed original and 15 copies IBP, Inc.’s [sic]
reply brief, ( Informal : no ) of 30 pages & 5
supp exc of record; served on 11/18/02 [02-
35042, 02-351 10] (dg) [(02-35042 02-35110]

* * * *

4/22/03 FILED CERTIFIED RECORD ON APPEAL
IN: 45 clerk’s records, 42 reporter’s transcripts, 9
under seal exhibits in envs. From dc transmittal.
[02-35042] (jk) [02-35042}

* * * *

8/5/03 FILED OPINION: AFFIRMED IN PART,
REVERSED IN PART, AND REMANDED.
Each party to bear their own costs. (Terminated
on the Merits after Oral Hearing; Affirmed (in
part) and Reversed (in part); Written, Signed,
Published. Dorothy W. NELSON; Sidney R.
THOMAS, author; Susan Y. Illston.) FILED
AND ENTERED JUDGMENT. § [02-35042,
02-351 10] (dg) [(02-35042 02-351 10]

11/28/03

16

See BS
Filed order (Dorothy W. NELSON, Sidney R.
THOMAS, Susan Y. Illston): .. . . The petn for

rhrg is denied and the suggestion for rhrg en banc
is rejected. [02-35042, 02-35110] (crw) [02-
35042 02-351 10)

* * * *

17

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON

[Filed Sep. 10, 1999]

No. CT-98-5005 RHW
CLASS ACTION

GABRIEL ALVAREZ, VIRGINIA ALVAREZ, MARIA CHAVEZ,
RANULFO GUTIERREZ, PEDRO HERNANDEZ, MARIA
MARTINEZ, RAMON MORENO, and ISMAEL RODRIQUEZ,
individually and as class representatives,

Plaintiffs,
Vv.

IBP, INC., a Delaware Corporation,
Defendant.

SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT FOR MINIMUM
WAGE ACT AND FAIR LABOR STANDARDS
ACT VIOLATIONS

Jurisdiction

1. The Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1331 and 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) over plaintiffs’ Fair Labor
Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (“FLSA”) claims. The
Court has supplemental jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1367 over plaintiffs’ state law claims which are based on
the Minimum Wage Act, RCW chapter 49.42 (“MWA”),
Industrial Welfare Act, RCW chapter 49.12, Wages-
Deductions-Contribution-Rebates Act, RCW chapter 49.52
and regulations issued thereunder.

Parties

2. Plaintiffs Gabriel Alvarez, Maria Chavez, Ranulfo
Gutierrez, Pedro Hernandez, Maria Martinez, Ramon Moreno,

18

and Ismael Rodriquez are adults employed at defendant's
Pasco, Washington plant and have been so employed during
the three years prior to the filing of this complaint. Virginia
Alvarez is adult who was employed at defendant’s Pasco,
Washington plani from approximately 1991 until early i999.

3. Defendant IBP, Inc. is a Delaware Corporation head-
quartered in Dakota City, Nebraska. It is the world’s largest
producer of fresh beef, pork and related allied products. It
operates a beef slaughtering and processing plant that it
commonly refers to as its Pasco plant.

Facts

4. Plaintiffs are employed by defendant at its Pasco
plant, with the exception of Virginia Alvarez whose employ-
ment with defendant ceased in early 1999.

5. Plaintiffs have been employed by defendant at the
Pasco plant for periods ranging from approximately 5 years to
more than 15 years.

6. During the past 5 to 15 years, plaintiffs have worked
and continue to work in the Pasco plant processing or slaugh-
tering divisions.

7. Plaintiffs are employed and have been employed by
defendant during the past three years in an enterprise engaged
in commerce and in the production of goods for commerce, as
these terms are used in Sections 6 and 7 of the FLSA, 29
U.S.C. §§ 206-207.

8. Plaintiffs perform unpaid work each morning, includ-
ing, but not limited to, activities such as donning protective
equipment (wire mesh gloves, wire mesh aprons, protective
sleeves, rubber gloves, cloth gloves, plastic gloves, safety
boots, scabbards, hard hats, safety glasses, hairnet, earplugs
and other equipment), receiving and donning outer gloves,
obtaining sand paper, obtaining knives, sanding their steel
(equipment used to sharpen knives), waiting in line dur-

19

ing these previous activities, and performing production
floor work.

9. Plaintiffs have thirty-minute meal periods deducted
from their pay, even though a substantial amount of their
meal period is devoted to work activities such as production
floor work after the start of the meal period, doffing safety
equipment and related garments, cleaning themselves and
equipment, donning safety equipment and related garments,
and returning to work on the production floor prior to the end
of the thirty-minute meal period.

10. Plaintiffs work more than 8 hours in a day without
receiving a second paid rest break.

11. Plaintiffs perform unpaid work after the official end of
the paid work day, including but not limited to activities such
as completing production floor work, doffing safety equip-
ment and related garments, cleaning safety equipment,
bagging gloves and garments, storing safety equipment in
lockers and waiting in line at various steps in the above-
described process.

12. Plaintiffs clock in at or near the beginning of the
workday and clock out at or near the end of their workday,
but are paid based on the official start and stop time, which
excludes work performed before and after official hours.

13. Much of plaintiffs’ off-the-clock work is performed in
workweeks in which plaintiffs work in excess of forty hours.

14. Plaintiff Ramon Moreno works in the slaughter divi-
sion and for approximately 2 years has worked under an
incentive wage, where employees are paid a daily pro-
ductivity bonus to the extent that they complete assigned
work in advance of allowed time for the work. That pro-
ductivity bonus is not included as part of Mr. Moreno regular
rate of pay for purposes of calculating state and federal
overtime premium pay.

20

15. Plaintiffs have been and continue to be subject to a
rule under which deductions are made from their wages for
company equipment that is lost or stolen without their being
involved in any dishonest or willful act. For example, in July
1996, plaintiff Ranulfo Guttierez suffered such a $197
equipment deduction that brought his pay to below state and
federal minimum wage. The equipment deduction does not
accrue to the benefit of the plaintiffs. Instead, the employer
derives a financial benefit by obtaining wage rebates to cover
missing company equipment, much of which is found and
used in production work without reimbursing the employees
who paid for the equipment.

16. The events described hereinabove were continuing at
the time of the complaint and amended complaint, and, on
information and belief, will continue.

17. Defendant has been and continues to willfully violate
state and federal wage and hour statutes and regulations with
the intent to deprive plaintiffs of a part of their wages.

18. Defendant has been engaged in extensive similar liti-
gation with the United States Department of Labor and with
private parties, resulting in final judgment affirmed in Metzler
v. IBP, Inc., 127 F.3d 959 (10th Cir. 1997) and Bernard v.
IBP, Inc., 154 F.3d 259 (Sth Cir. 1998), such that collateral
estoppel should be applied against defendant from these
judgments and other judgments presently unknown to plain-
tiffs on issues that will likely arise during this litigation.

Class Facts

19. Plaintiffs file this action on behalf of themselves and a
class defined as follows:

All individuals performing production work in defen-
dant’s Pasco plant processing and slaughtering divisions,
during any time between June 30, 1995 to the present
time, excluding supervisors, managers, quality control

21

employees, guards, mechanics, laundry room employees,
janitors, knife room employees, rendering employees,
and packaging work performed outside the production

line vicinity.
20. Class members are employed and have been em-
ployed by defendant during the past three years in an enter-
prise engaged in commerce and in the production of goods for

commerce, as these terms are used in Sections 6 & 7 of the
FLSA, 29 U.S.C. §§ 206-207.

21. Class members perform unpaid work each morning,
including, but not limited to, activities such as donning
protective equipment (wire mesh gloves, wire mesh aprons,
rubber aprons, protective sleeves, rubber gloves, cloth gloves,
plastic gloves, safety boots, scabbards, hard hats, safety
glasses, hairnets, ear plugs and other equipment), receiving
and donning outer gloves, obtaining sand paper, obtaining
knives, sanding their steel (equipment used to sharpen
knives), waiting in line during these previous activities, and
performing production floor work.

22. Class members have thirty minute meal periods de-
ducted from their pay, even though a substantial amount of
their meal period is devoted to work activities such as
production floor work after the start of the meal period,
doffing safety equipment and related garments, cleaning
themselves and equipment, donning safety equipment and
related garments, and returning to work on the produciion
floor prior to the end of the thirty-minute meal period.

23. Class members work more than 8 hours in a day
without receiving a second paid rest break.

24. Class members perform unpaid work after the official
end of the paid work day, including but not limited to
activities such as completing production floor work, doffing
safety equipment and related garments, cleaning safety equip-
ment, bagging gloves and garments, storing safety equipment

22
in lockers and waiting in line at various steps in the above-
described process.

25. Class members clock in at the beginning of their work
day and clock out at the end of their work day, but are
nonetheless paid based on the official start and stop time,
which excludes work performed before and after official
hours.

26. Much of the class members’ off-the-clock work is
performed in workweeks in which class members work in
excess of forty hours.

27. For approximately two years, class members in the
slaughter division have worked under an incentive wage,
where employees are paid a daily productivity bonus to the
extent that they complete assigned work in advance of
allowed time for the work. That productivity bonus is
not included as part of the employees’ regular rate of pay
for purposes of calculating state and federal overtime
premium pay.

28. Class members have been and continue to be subject
to a rule under which deductions are made from their wages
for company equipment that is lost or stolen without their
being involved in any dishonest or willful act. Such deduc-
tions sometimes reduce pay to below state and federal
minimum wage. The equipment deduction does not accrue to
the benefit of the plaintiffs. Instead, the employer derives a
financial benefit by obtaining wage rebates to cover missing
company equipment, much of which is found and used in
production work without reimbursing the employees who
paid for the equipment.

29. The events described hereinabove were continuing at
the time of filing of the complaint and first amended com-
plaint, and, on information and belief, will continue.

23

30. Defendant has been and continues to willfully violate
state and federal wage and hour statutes and regulations with
the intent to deprive class members of a part of their wages.

31. Defendant has been engaged in extensive similar
litigation with the United States Department of Labor and
with private parties, resulting in final judgment affirmed in
Metzler v. IBP, Inc., 127 F.3d 959 (10th Cir. 1997) and
Bernard v. IBP, Inc., 154 F.3d 259 (Sth Cir. 1998), such that
collateral estoppel should be applied against defendant on
these judgments and other judgments presently unknown
to the class members on issues that will likely arise during
this litigation.

32. The proposed class numbers in excess of 2,000
individuals and, therefore, joinder of all members _ is
impracticable.

33. There are questions of law and fact common to the
class.

34. Virtually all legal issues in this case will be common
class issues, such as state law lunch and rest break issues,
MWA statute of limitations issues, legal similarities and
dissimilarities between the MWA and FLSA, FLSA work and
Portal-to-Portal act issues, FLSA meal break issues, inter-
pretation of 29 U.S.C. § 203(0), deference to be given to the
Wage and Hour Opinion entitled “Hours Worked/Cleaning,
Putting on Safety Gear” (December 3, 1997), collateral
estoppel issues based on Metzler v. IBP, Inc., and Bernard v.
IBP, Inc., supra, legal issues raised by affirmative defenses
advanced by defendant, and other legal issues which will
arise during this litigation.

35. Class members share numerous common issues of
fact, involving matters such as amounts of time it takes to do
various activities, the time that production floor work begins
and ends in relation to paid starting and stopping time,
liability and damages issues which will be tried applying

24

MWA and FLSA principles of representative evideace, and
the willfulness of defendant’s violations for purposes of RCW
49.52.050 & .070 exemplary damages and the FLSA 3-year
statute of limitations, 29 U.S.C. § 254.

36. The claims of the representative parties are similar to
the class claims. See allegations supra and infra.

37. The named plaintiffs will fairly and adequately protect
the interests of the class and have made arrangements with
experienced counsel to represent the class members with
vigor and zeal within the bounds of the law.

38. The questions of law and fact common to the mem-
bers predominate over any questions affecting only individual
members, particularly in light of the rules of representative
evidence and the relaxed burdens of proof in MWA and
FLSA cases.

39. A class action is superior to other available methods
for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy.

40. Individual class members have little interest in indi-
vidually controlling the prosecution of their claims given the
relatively small amounts of each claim, their relative lack of
sophistication, and the difficulties involved in bringing indi-
vidual litigation against one’s current employer.

41. Plaintiffs are unaware of any other litigation concern-
ing this controversy commenced by or for other class
members.

42. This litigation should be concentrated in this forum
because all class members were employed in defendant’s
Pasco plant, located within this forum.

43. The Court has the resources, abilities and procedures
to effectively manage this class action, particularly with
application of the substantive wage and hour law of repre-
sentative evidence and relaxed burdens of proof.

25

44. Defendant has been and continues to willfully violate
state and federal wage and hour statutes and regulations with
the intent to deprive class members of a part of their wages.

First Claim—State Wage and Hour Law Violations

45. Plaintiffs repeat and reallege the prior allegations of
the complaint as if repeated completely.

46. Defendant violates RCW 49.46.020 by permitting un-
paid work to be performed prior to and after the start of the
paid workday.

47. Defendant violates RCW 49.46.130 by permitting
plaintiffs and class members to perform off-the-clock over-
time work, i.e., unpaid work performed by an employee who
has worked in excess of forty hours during a week.

48. Defendant violates RCW 49.46.130 by failing to
include slaughter division incentive pay as part of the regular
rate for purposes of calculating overtime premium pay.

49. Defendant violates RCW 49.46.020, RCW 49.46.130,
RCW 49.12.0005 and WAC 296-126-092 by failing to pay
for meal breaks that are less than 30 minutes, the minimum
length for an unpaid meal break under state law.

50. Defendant violates RCW 49.12.0005 and WAC 296-
126-092 by failing to provide a second 10-minute rest break
on days when plaintiffs work 8 hours or more.

51. Defendam violates RCW chapter 49.12, RCW
49.52.050-49.52.070 and, WAC 296-126-025 by deducting
the cost of lost or stolen equipment from wages of employees
who have not been engaged in any dishonest or willful act
relative to the lost or stolen equipment, a deduction that is not
for the benefit of employees and on which defendant derives
financial gain. Defendant violates RCW 49.46.020 when
the deduction brings the employee’s realized wages below
minimum wage.

26

52. Defendant violates RCW 49.52.050 and RCW
49.52.070 by willfully and with intent to deprive class mem-
bers of wages, failing to pay wages owed pursuant to statute.

Second Claim—Fair Labor Standards Act Violations

53. Plaintiffs repeat and reallege the prior allegations of
the complaint.

54. Plaintiffs and class members are similarly situated
with regard to the claims made in this complaint.

55. Defendants violates Section 6 of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C.
§ 206, by deducting equipment cost from wages and not
paying for hours worked, when the net effect of these
violations is to effectively reduce the employee’s average
hourly earnings for the workweek to below the FLSA mini-
mum hourly wage.

56. Defendant violates the overtime provisions of Section
7 of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 207, by permitting unpaid
overtime work, including unpaid overtime work prior to the
start of the paid work day, during meal periods that do
not qualify as bona fide meal periods pursuant to FLSA
regulations and case law, and after the end of the paid
work day.

57. Defendant violates the overtime provisions of Section
7 of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 207, by failing to include
slaughter division incentive pay in the regular rate for pur-
poses of calculating the overtime premium.

Prayer for Relief

Wherefore, plaintiffs, individually and on behalf of the
class, pray for relief as follows:

1. With regard to the state law claims, plaintiffs pray for
Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(b)(2) and 23(b)(3) class certification, dam-
ages, exemplary damages, prejudgment interest, costs, attor-
ney fees pursuant to RCW 49.46.090, RCW 49.48.030, RCW

27

49.52.070 and equitable grounds, and for such other and
further relieve[sic], inctuding final injunctive relief, as the
Court deems just and equitable;

2. With regar¢e to the FLSA claims, plaintiffs pray for
FLSA class certification pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b),
damages, liquidated damages, prejudgment interest, costs,
attorney fees pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b), and such other
and further relief as the Court deems just and equitable.

DATED this 20th day of July 1999.

LAW OFFICE OF DAVID N. MARK

/s/ David N. Mark
by: DAVID N. MARK (WSBA #13908)

SCHROETER, GOLDMARK & BENDER

/s/ William J. Rutzick
by: WILLIAM J. RUTZICK (WSBA# 11533)
Attorneys for the Plaintiffs

28

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON
[Filed Aug. 3, 2001]

NO. CT-98-5005-RHW

GABRIEL ALVAREZ, et al.,
Plaintiffs,

Vv.

IBP, INC., a Delaware corporation,
Defendant.

ORDER ON OBJECTIONS

A hearing was held on July 27, 2001. Before the Court are
Plaintiffs’ Objections and Clarifications to the Court's Pro-
posed Findings (Ct. Rec. 716) and Defendant's Objections
and Clarifications to the Court’s Proposed Findings (Ct. Rec.
793). Plaintiffs were represented by William Rutzick; Defen-
dant by Barbara Duffy and Nancy Anderson. This will

memorialize the Court’s oral rulings.
DISCUSSION

I. Plaintiffs’ Objections
A. Meal Break Damages

Plaintiffs request that the Court clarify or, in the alter-
native, reconsider its Findings and Conclusions related to the
amount of recovery for meal-break violations. Plaintiffs con-
tend that the entire 30 minutes of the meal break should be
recovered. Additionally, Plaintiffs argue that Wingert v. Yellow
Freight, 104 Wash. App. 583 (2000), which holds that WAC
296-126-092 does provide a private right of action for rest
break violations, also would apply to meal-break violations
and, therefore, recovery of the full 30 minutes is required.

29

The Court clarifies its conclusion to only allow recovery
for the time spent working during the meal break up to 10
minutes under the state law claim. If the time spent working
during the meal break exceeds 10 minutes, so that the total
uninterrupted meal break is less than 20 minutes, the entire 30
minute period shall be recoverable. This conclusion is based
on the fact that the Plaintiffs’ claim under the MWA is
brought to compensate employees for time worked for which
they were not compensated. The interpretive guideline under
the WAC 296-126-092 indicates that if an employee works
during the meal period, the period is to be extended to give
the employee a 30-minute meal break. This indicates to the
Court that the purpose of both the MWA and the regulation
are to allow for time as a remedy for a violation, not
necessarily monetary compensation for the entire meal break,
when only a portion of the meal break is spent working. This
finding is also consistent with the FLSA provision for meal-
break violations.

B. Class Work Codes

Plaintiffs move for the class member damages to be based
on work codes set forth in exhibits 74 and 75, which were the
documents relied upon in the Proposed Findings, and wish to
include those codes in “exhibit 1048 and the record herein.”
Ex. 1048 was a stipulated exhibit, which set forth which
packaging department jobs are in the class and which are not.
IBP does not object to the inclusion of packaging jobs
referenced in exhibit 1048, and these work codes will be
included.

Additionally, Plaintiffs wish to include class codes that are
not in exhibits 74, 75, and 1048, but which were testified to at
trial and are contained in exhibits. These codes involve saw
operator jobs and other jobs appearing on IBP’s list of jobs
(Ex. 369a and 370a-d} and were testified to by Superin-
tendents Salter and Johnson. Plaintiffs are permitted to rely
upon representative testimony to establish the equipment used

30

and work performed by class members in job codes, as long
as the evidence was introduced at trial. Plaintiffs provided a
list in Appendix A, which includes references to testimony
and exhibits that support inclusion of these job categories.
These work codes will be included if admissible evidence
was introduced at trial about the job so that the appropriate
equipment can be determined from the admitted evidence.

Defendant objects on the grounds that because the Court
ordered that damages should be awarded on an individualized
basis, the Plaintiff should not be able to use representative
evidence to demonstrate what work was performed by what
job codes. This argument rests on a fundamental misun-
derstanding of the Court's proposed Findings and Conclu-
sions. The Court’s proposed Findings and Conclusions,
although concluding that damages should be determined on
an individualized basis, also held that the foundation for
determining what job categories were entitled to damages and
in what amount, were to be deiermined by reference to the
representational evidence. The Court held that the repre-
sentational evidence was adequate to determine what work
was done and in what amounts. To read the Court’s holding
consistent with the Defendant's interpretation would mean
that only those Plaintiffs who testified at trial are entitled to
recovery. That was clearly not the Court’s intent. As the
Court stated in the Proposed Findings and Conclusions “the
documentary and expert testimony provide the evidence for
jobs not testified to by employees. IBP documents identify
which jobs at the Pasco plant require protective equipment.
(Ex. 74.) Documents also identify jobs for which protective
equipment is not required. (Ex. 75.) Internal documents
demonstrate which equipment must be removed prior to
employees going to lunch or to break. (Exs. 82 and 83.) Other
evidence presented indicated which jobs require which items
of personal safety equipment. (Exs. 90-93.) Plaintiffs’ expert
developed average observed times for most activities per-
formed by employees. (Ex. 1035.) Both IBP’s and Plaintiffs’

31

experts performed auditing exercises for certain activities for
each position. (Ex. 358-363.)” What the Court intended by
referencing individualized damage calculations was to de-
velop more narrow categories than ihe ones proposed by the
parties, of slaughter and processing or knife-carrying and
nonknife-carrying job categories. The Court believes that the
evidence presented at trial allows for more narrow definitions
of job categories, and that calculating damages on
the more narrow categories is the most accurate method of
determining damages. It was for this reason that the Court
determined that the day began with the donning of the first
compensable piece of equipment, and also allotted average
times for various equipment donning and doffing. It was also
for this reason that the Court indicated that even as to jobs
for which there was no testimony, recovery would be per-
mitted and could be determined from the expert testimony
and trial exhibits.

C. Damage Calculat.ons

Plaintiffs’ damage calculations are based on CD-ROM data
through January 30, 2000 and the Mobius payroll data from
February 6, 2000 to May 14, 2000.

1. Dr. Abbot's calculations

Defendant objects to the use of Dr. Abbot’s calculations on
the grounds that the calculations are new evidence. The Court
overrules this objection. Defendant argues that the calcu-
lations are based on new evidence, new job codes, new
assumptions about minimum equipment requirements, and
new testimony from class members. The Court has resolved
these issues and determines that Dr. Abbot is simply using the
information already in evidence and ruled on by this Court to
determine damage calculations. Furthermore, according to
Dr. Abbot, the Mobius data includes the same information as
the CD-ROM, (which was admitted into evidence) but, unlike
the CD-ROM, it covers pay periods after January 30, 2000.

32

Dr. Abbot’s manipulation of the admitted data is not new
evidence. If the Defendant has objections to the calculations
the Court will consider a motion to repopen the testimony on
this limited issue.

2. Mobius Data

Defendant objects that Plaintiffs failed to identify what
Mobius data they intend to rely upon to form the basis for
judgment from January 30 through May 14, 2000, and that
Mobius data for the 4 months from January 30, 2000 to May
14, 2000 was never introduced at trial and never admitted into
evidence. Defendant asserts that this evidence was not pro-
duced by IBP, as it was altered by counsel for Plaintiffs at
one time. The Court overrules these objections. Plaintiffs
identify Exhibit 178(b), which indicates that it calculates
damages for “[wJeek ending dates February 6, 2000 through
May 14, 2000 based upon Mobius (PFA) reports.” If, after the
re-calculations have been performed, the Defendant iden-
tifies problems in the data or calculations for the Court, the
Court will consider a motion to reopen the testimony on this
limited issue.

3. Pre-judgment Interest

Preiudgment interest is allowable only when (1) an ammount
claimed is “liquidated;” or (2) the amount of an “wnliqui-
dated” claim is for an amount of money that is “determinable
by computation with reference to a fixed standard contained
in [a] contract, without reliance on opinion or discretion.”
Prier v. Refrigeration Eng’g Co., 74 Wash. 2d 25, 32, 442
P.2d 621 (1968). A “liquidated” claim is defined as one
whose “exact amount is fixed and known.” Prier, 74 Wash.
2d at 32, citing Charles T. McCormick, Damages (Hornbook
Series), § 54 (1935); See also Taylor v. Shigaki, 84 Wash.
App. 723, 732 (1997). Defendant argues that the meal-break
claims are not for a sum determinable without reliance on
opinion or discretion as there is no precedent in this area. This
argument rests on a misperception of the requirement of a

33

fixed standard and of what pre-judgment interest is designed
to accomplish.

Prejudgment interest is not awarded only in those cases
where the law is clear on whether the amount claimed is
owed but, rather, once it is determined that the amount is
owed, whether the amount can be determined with exactness.
“The fact that a dispute exists over all or part of a claim does
not make the claim unliquidated. This is true ‘even thought
the adversary successfully challenges the amount and suc-
ceeds in reducing it.” Aker Verdal v. Neil F. Lampson, Inc.,
65 Wash. App. 177, 190 (1992), quoting Pier at 33. “It
follows from the foregoing that, where the amount sued for
may be arrived at by a process of measurement or computa-
tion from the data given by the proof, without any reliance
upon opinion or discretion after the concrete facts have been
determined, the amount is liquidated and will bear interest.”
Prier at 33-34. Here, the amount of recovery for the time
spent working during the meal period is the time spent work-
ing, and if that time extends beyond 10 minutes, the entire 30-
minute period is recoverable. The compensable time is easily
determined by looking to the pay rates for employees and
calculating the time spent working during the meal break on
days where a meal break was required. Finally, prejudgment
interest is not to punish Defendant but, rather, to compensate
the Plaintiffs for money wrongfully withheld. “Prejudgment
interest is not a penalty imposed on a defendant for wrong-
doing nor is its purpose to deter wrongdoing.” Hansen v.
Rothaus, 107 Wash. 2d 468, 475 (1987).

Defendant claims that pre-judgment interest is also part of
the Plaintiffs’ damage calculation on the rest break—this will
be addressed at the hearing on the rest break evidence.

4. Damages to May 14, 2000—No Judgment Bar Thereafter

Plaintiffs indicate that they have detailed electronic payroll
data only through the week ending May 14, 2000, which was

34

near the end of discovery. They request that the Court’s final
findings calculate damages through this period and hold that
work performed thereafter is not being subject to any judg-
ment bar. Plaintiffs are capable of running projections, but do
not want to do so as it raises various issues for appeal.
Defendant objects to Plaintiffs’ damage calculations, which
would allow a future supplemental order as the Court’s find-
ings in this case would not be a final order. The Court will
issue a final judgment on the issue with damages calculated
through May 14, 2000. The Court will not hold that work
performed thereafter is or is not subject to any judgment bar.

5. May Provide Duplicate Recovery

Defendant objects that Plaintiffs’ damage calculations may
provide for duplicate recovery under FLSA and MWA be-
cause where the MWA damages are not higher than the FLSA
damages, Dr. Abbot has applied a calculation to attempt to
factor in the MWA’s statute of limitation and other differ-
ences with the FLSA. Defendants argue thai this results in a
rough estimate, in violation of the individualized damages
notion. As outlined above, the Court does mot see a rough
estimate of damages a violation of its order that damages
should be considered on an individualized basis. However,
the Court reiterates that Plaintiffs are entitled to recovery on

one theory only.
D. Equipment Beyond the Minimal Equipment List

Plaintiffs have matched work codes with the equipment
sets in IBP’s Required Equipment Lists in Exhibits 90-93.
Plaintiffs also indicate that certain job codes require addi-
tional safety equipment, which is not identified on IBP’s
Required Equipment List, but about which there was testi-
mony and other evidence: introduced at trial. Plaintiffs seek to
have these other activities included in damages calculations.
The requested additional activities are outlined below. The
Court finds that the representational testimony was adequate

35

in proving what additional equipment was required beyond
the Required Equipment Lists. As the Court indicated in its
Proposed Findings and Conclusions on the representational
evidence, “[t}he combination of this evidence convinces the
Court that employees have, in fact, performed work for which
they were improperly compensated, and that they have pro-
duced sufficient evidence to show the amount and extent of
that work as a matter of just and reasonable inference.”

While the Court concluded that the MWA and the FLSA
protect individual rights and that damages should be calcu-
lated on an individualized basis, it also determined that it. was
satisfied by the amount and quality of representational evi-
dence and that it was “untroubled here, based om the combi-
nation of employee testimony, documentary evidence, and
expert testimony.” McLaughlin v. Ho Fat Seto, 850 F.2d 586,
589 (9th Cir. 1988) (holding that while the testimony of the
five employee witnesses was inconsistent in terms of exact
days and hours of overtime, they had established “‘as a matter
of just and reasonable inferenge’ that all of the employees
regularly worked over eight hours on weekdays and over six
hours on many Saturdays.”)

“The employee testimony established that pre- and post-
shift and meal-time work activities were unpaid, what activi-
ties were being performed during these times, and the time
each activity takes to complete. Just over 40 employees
of IBP’s Pasco Plant testified at trial; 25 employees from
the Processing Division testified, and employees from the
Slaughter Division testified to over 40 job positions. Each
employee testified to their various pre- and post-shift activ-
ities, as well as their donning and doffing practices during the
30-minute meal break period. While it is true that employees
vary in some of the equipment they are required to don and
doff, each employee spent some uncompensated time both
pre- and post-shift and during the 30-minute meal break.
Most employees share at least some of the required protective

36

equipment.” The Court also had the benefit of visiting and
viewing the operations at the IBP Plant in Pasco, Washington.

1. Scabbards and steels in straight knife user equipment
sets.

The Court grants Plaintiffs’ request to include scehbards
and steels in straight knife user equipment sets. Straight knife
usage is determined from the record of testimony from Salter
and Johnson. Defendant does not object to this inclusion.

2. Two cloth gloves for every job code in processing.

Plaintiffs’ request to include two cloth gloves for every job
code in processing is granted. Defendant objects and cites to
the Plaintiffs’ excluded declarations, which do not indicate
cloth gloves on equipment lists. The Court will include the
two cloth gloves, as the evidence at trial was that the gloves
are “integral and indispensable.” As the Court indicated in its
proposed findings “[t}he workers testified that they could not
hold the knives safely without the clean gloves because of the
blood and fat that made them slip. Many workers changed
their gloves multiple times a day in order to keep them clean.
Some had as many as six to eight pair that they changed
throughout the day. In addition to safety concerns, the em-
ployees testified that the gloves were necessary as insulation
from the cold of the refrigerated carcasses and the cold
temperature of the processing floor. Cold hands made it *..ore
dangerous to use knives, saws, and other types of cutting
equipment.”

3. Three cloth gloves for knife users in processing.

Plaintiffs’ request to include three cloth gloves for knife
users in processing is granted. The Defendant objects on the
grounds that these are not indicated in the Plaintiffs’ excluded
post-trial declarations. Plaintiffs have identified particular
page numbers of testimony and equipment list exhibits, which
indicate three cloth gloves were used by knife carriers in

37

processing. (Maria Salvi p. 31, 41-42, 43-44, 45-46, Ex.
1000; Rufino Vasquesz p. 30, Ex. 1001; Modesto Reynaga
p. 14-15, Ex. 1002; Martina Sanchez p. 15, Ex. 1004.) Defen-
dant points to no admitted evidence that refutes that knife
users in processing do not use three cloth gloves.

| The Court finds that three cloth gloves are “integral and
indispensable” to knife users in processing, and this time is
compensable.

4. A rubber apron for saw operators in processing.

Plaintiffs’ request to include a rubber apron for saw opera-
tors in processing is granted. The Defendant objects on the
grounds that this information is, again, not indicated in the
Plaintiffs’ excluded declarations of saw operators. Plaintiffs
have identified particular page numbers of testimony and
equipment list exhibits which indicate a rubber apron was
worn by saw operators. ( Jose Zamora p. 47, Ex. 1003; Victor
Rangel Ex. 1016; Pedro Piceno p. 18.) Defendant points to no
admitted evidence that refutes that saw operators in proc-
essing wear rubber gloves. The Court finds a rubber apron is
“integral and indispensable” to saw operators in processing,
and this time is compensable.

5. Two yellow plastic sleeves and a weight belt for pack-
aging workers in processing.

Plaintiffs’ request to include two yellow plastic sleeves and
a weight belt for packaging workers in processing is granted
in part and denied in part. The Defendant objects on the
grounds that this equipment is not required, and that many of
Plaintiffs’ excluded declarations cite only one or the other.
The Court concludes that two yellow plastic sleeves are
“integral and indispensable” to packaging workers in proc-
essing, and that this time is compensable, but does not find
the same for the weight belt, as testimony regarding the
weight belt varied for individual workers.

38

6. Two rubber gloves to workers on the hamburger codes
in processing.

Plaintiffs’ request to include two rubber gloves for workers
on the hamburger codes in processing is granted. Defendant
objects again, pointing to Plaintiffs’ excluded declarations.
Plaintiffs have identified particular page numbers of testi-
riony and equipment list exhibits that indicate hamburger
workers in processing wear two rubber gloves. (Maria
Espinoza p. 13, Ex. 1023; Sofia Gutierrez, Ex. 1014; Victoria
Vaca. Ex. 1019.) Defendant points to no admitted evidence
that refutes that hamburger workers in processing wear two
rubber gloves. The Court finds that two rubber gloves are
“integral and indispensable” to workers on the hamburger
codes in processing and this time is compensable.

7. Two cloth gloves to steam vac operators in the
slaughter division.

Plaintiffs’ request to include two cloth gloves to steam vac
operators in the slaughter division is granted. Plaintiffs have
identified particular page numbers of testimony and equip-
ment list exhibits that indicate steam vac operators In the
slaughter division wear two cloth gloves. (Patsy Tovar P. 16-
17: Ex. 1039; Rosario Robles Ex. 1042; Enedina Ramirez p.
14. Ex. 1043.) Defendant points to no admitted evidence that
refutes that steam vac operators in the slaughter division wear
two cloth gloves. The Court finds that two cloth gloves are
“integral and indispensable” for steam vac operators in the
slaughter division, and that this time is compensable.

8. Two rubber gloves and a rubber apron to straight knife,
whizzard, and air knife users in slaughter.

Plaintiffs’ request to include two rubber gloves and a rub-
ber apron to straight knife, whizzard, and air knife users in
slaughter is granted. Plaintiffs have identified particular page
numbers of testimony and equipment list exhibits which in-

39

dicate that particular knife users in slaughter wear two rubber
gloves and a rubber apron. (Air Knife Users—Arturo Aguillar
Ex. 1034; Miguel Lopez Ex. 1033; Luis Moreno p. 34, Ex.
1024, Antonio Martinez p. 7, Ex. 1045; Rosario Robles, p. 6,
Ex. 1042; Jose Santiago Ex. 1027. Knife Users Patsy Tovar
p. 5, 11, Ex. 1039; Miguel Alvarado Ex. 1030; Paz Arroyo
Ex. 1041; Cruz Escobar Ex. 1029; Pedro Galvan, Ex. 1047;
Salvador Guzman Ex. 1031; Miguel Lopez Ex. 1033, etc.)
Defendant points to no admitted evidence that refutes that
knife users in slaughter wear two rubber gloves and a rubber
apron. The Court finds that two rubber gloves and a rubber
apron are “integral and indispensable” to straight knife, whiz-
zard, and air knife users in slaughter, and that this time is
compensable.

F. Allocation of Activities to Work Codes

1. Walk time from the locker to work station and work
station to locker

Defendant objects to walk time from the locker to work
station and work station to locker for all class members. The
Court rejects this objection as to employees who wear com-
pensable protective equipment. As noted in the proposed
findings, most processing and slaughter employees don com-
pensable safety equipment in the locker room. Thus, if the
employees’ first compensable activity is donning equipment
in the locker room, they are to be compensated from then on.
As the Court’s Findings and Conclusions held

[t]he employee is, thus, to be paid upon arrival at his
or her locker when he or she dons his or her first piece
of compensable safety equipment. The employee’s day
ends when he or she has washed and removed his or her
last piece of equipment and placed it in his or her locker.
The employer has chosen to store the items in the
employees’ lockers and, thus, the employees will be paid
from the time of arrival at their locker until the last piece

40

of equipment is put away. This time is not based on a
locker-to-locker theory of the work day, but rather on the
reality that the worker dons his or her first piece of
equipment upon arrival at his or her locker.

The Court finds that this time is not compensable for cloth
glove wearers who do not wear any other compensable equip-
ment. These employees are to be compensated for the time
spent waiting for gloves and from then on, including walking
from the cafeteria, where gloves are retrieved, to the work

station.

Defendant seeks to exclude walk time to the cafeteria to get
gloves from processing employees who are compensated for
locker-to-work-station walk time. Defendant identifies these
as mostly knife-carriers. The Court rejects this objec-
tion, as the evidence demonstrated that the gloves were
distributed in the cafeteria, and that employees were required
to go their locker and then go to the cafeteria to retrieve
gloves. Since compensable time begins with the donning of
compensable equipment at the locker, walk time to the cafete-
ria to get gloves is included for processing employees, except
B-shift employees, who only wear gloves, where the evidence
indicated that employees do not wait to get gloves in the
cafeteria’. As the Court held in its Findings and Conclusions
“(wJalking time is compensable if it occurs after the start of
the work day. 29 U.S.C. § 254(a). Walking time is excluded
under the Portal to Portal Act only if it occurs ‘either prior to
the time on any particular work day at which such employee
commences, or subsequent to the time on any particular work
day at which he ceases, such principal activity or activities.”
Id. The work day begins with the commencement of an
employee’s principal activity or activities and ends with the
completion of the employee's activity; thus, the inclusion of
Dr. Mericle’s walking time as compensable time.”

' Although the Court does hold that these employees are entitled to
compensation for time waiting to get gloves.

4]

3. [sic] Walk from work station to cafeteria and walk from
cafeteria to wort station

Defendant objects to the inclusion of time for walking from
work station to cafeteria and walking from cafeteria to work
station to all class members. IBP argues that walking to the
cafeteria at meal break is primarily for the employees’ bene-
fit, per Anderson v. Mt. Clemons Pottery Co., 69 F. Supp.
710, 719 (1947) and is, therefore, not compensable. The
Court accepts this objection, in part, and orders that em-
ployees will not be compensated for walk time to the cafeteria
at the meal break, but will be compensated for the time it
takes to don and doff equipment during the meal break.

4. Wait for wash to all class members

Defendant objects to wait for wash time to all class mem-
bers. Where any compensable equipment is required, wait for
wash time will be included. The Court will not limit wait to
wash time to mesh equipment. The Court found that workers
“hose down and scrub aprons, sleeves, rubber gloves,” and
the evidence indicated an average wait for wash time is re-
quired. Wait to wash time shall be given to all employees
wearing compensable protective equipment.

5. Wash and Clean Equipment

Defendant objects to the wash and clean equipment time
for all class members. Where any compensable equipment is
required, wait for wash time will be included. The Court will
not limit wait to wash time to mesh equipment. The Court
found that workers “hose down and scrub aprons, sleeves,
rubber gloves,” and the evidence indicated an average wait
for wash time is required. Wash and clean equipment time
will be given to all employees wearing compensable pro-
tective equipment.

42
6. Handle equipment, get ready, pul away

Defendant objects to the inclusion of time for “handle
equipment, get ready and put away” for all class members.
All job categories using compensable equipment on the
slaughter or processing floor will be compensated for this

time.

7. Wait and Obtain Gloves

Defendant objects to time given to processing employees
on the B shift for wait and obtain gloves time, as distribution
is different from the A shift. The Court finds that gloves are
integral and indispensable, and the wait time is compensable
for employees on both processing shifts.

F. Clarifications

Plaintiffs withdrew their request that the Court correct the
proposed findings by indicating on Page 6, line 22 that proc-
essing employees get a frock after going to their locker room.

Plaintiffs request that the Court amend Page 11, line 5 to
indicate a total of 815 class members. The Court will amend

the Order with this number.

Plaintiffs request the Court to fill in blank exhibit numbers
with specific exhibits they have identified. The Court will
supplement the Order with these exhibit numbers.

Il. Defendant’s Objections

A. Willfulness, Statute of Limitation, Double Damages and
Representative Evidence

Defendant objects to the Court’s findings on willfulness,
the statute of limitation, double damages, and the adequacy of
the representative testimony. The Court is not in a posture to
reconsider its substantive legal conclusions and will not con-
sider these arguments at this time.

43

The Court also will not reconsider arguments relating to
the factual showings. The Court will address any mistakes or
clarifications, but will not consider the same arguments that
were made at trial and in motion practice on which a ruling
already has been made.

B. Objections Related to Pasco Plant

Il. Page |, Footnote |: job classifications are staffed with
multiple workers, and workers who work alongside each
other .. . using virtually the same equipment.

The Court rejects Defendant's objection to Page |, foot-
note | which indicates that job classifications are staffed with
multiple workers, and workers who work alongside each
other . . . using virtually the same equipment. The Defendant
argues that the evidence was that employees wear different
types as well as quantities of protective clothing. The entire
text of the footnote does not indicate that the Court was
concluding that workers who work alongside each other wear
virtually identical protective clothing but, rather, that work-
ers who do work side by side have different work code
classifications. Additionally, the Court found the represen-
tational evidence adequate, and that many class members
wear the same equipment.

2. Page 3, line 10-12: Sunshine pay is extra compensation
for working more efficiently and more quickly.

Defendant objects to this description of Sunshine Pay. The
ae rejects this objection, based on the testimony received
at trial.

C. Objections Related to “Bargaining History” Section

1. Page 3, line 13: The majority of workers at IBP’s Pasco
plant are Hispanic.

Defendant objects that there was no testimony relating to
the overall characteristics of the class. The Court rejects this
objection, based on the testimony received at trial.

44
D. Objections Related to “DOL Litigation”

1. Page 4, line 5-9: The courts also held IBP liable for un-
paid pre-shift and post-shift donning, doffing, and cleaning of
special packinghouse industry safety equipment.

IBP objects that only some equipment was found com-
pensable, and that walking and waiting was found to be not
compensable. The Court rejects this objection, as the state-
ment accurately reflects the Reich court holding.

2. Page 4-5. Footnote 3: /BP claimed to have reduced
compensable time from 14 minutes to 4 minutes by moving
knife distribution and by installing additional equipment
washing sinks to reduce waiting time. In late 1998 and early
1999. IBP and DOL negotiated and agreed to 4 minutes of
compensation at the non-union plants for pre- and post-shift
activities.

The Court rejects IBP’s objection that this mischaracterizes
the evidence that the DOL indicated in a stipulation dis-
missing with prejudice its claims against IBP, that IBP had
fully satisfied the DOL.

E. Objections to “Pre- and Post-Shift Activities .

1. Page 6, lines 14-15: Most Slaughter employees don most
of their safety equipment in the locker room.

The Court rejects IBP’s objection that the testimony varied
about where employees donned safety equipment. The state-
ment indicates most employees, and the finding was based on
adequate representative evidence.

2. Page 6, line 24-26: Much of the pre-shift routine for
processing surrounds the distribution of glove pins with yel-
low cotton gloves, and protective sleeves and gloves.

The Court rejects IBP’s objection related to the variety
of distribution methods. Again, the Court’s conclusion was
based on adequate representative testimony.

45

3. Page 7, line 8-9: A majority of employees do use the
restroom during the meal break.

The Court rejects IBP’s objection relating to the adequacy
of the representative testimony. Again the Court's conclusion
was based on adequate representative testimony.

F. Objections to “Uncompensated Activities”

1. Page 8, line 11-14: During the 30 minute meal break
employees are required to doff and hang up the safety
equipment they were wearing before they can begin to use the
break as their own time.

The Court rejects IBP’s objection that employees are not
required to doff all safety equipment at meal break times, as
that is also indicated clearly in the findings.

2. Page 8, line 15-18: After working on their last piece of
meat, the workers are on the production floor and are
required to wash their equipment and doff and store their
equipment upon returning to their lockers.

The Court rejects IBP’s objection relating to the adequacy
of the representative testimony. Again the Court’s conclusion
was based on adequate representative testimony.

3. Page 9, lines 7-14: JBP urges that it relied on DOL’s
exclusion of union plants in this litigation to conclude
that clothes changing time was not compensable at union

plants . . . (negotiated settlement of 4 minutes clothes changing
time ).

The Court rejects IBP’s objection that their reliance on
DOL includes the Reich decision, and that IBP re-engineered
their plants to reduce clothes changing time. IBP also objects
that referring to the 4 minutes as negotiated implies that it
was a compromise of a disputed claim, and that this im-
plication is wrong as this was the reality of how long it took
to actually don and doff the protective clothing. The Court
rejects these objections as the factual recitation in the Court’s

46

Findings and Conclusions indicates the thrust of IBP’s
reliance argument at trial and the extra facts relayed by
Defendant in this objection are not relevant to the Court's
determination that they were not, in fact, relying on DOL.
The facts surrounding IBP’s claim of reliance are further
outlined in the section on Good Faith Reliance.

G. Objections to “Other Claims Re: Noncompensability ©

The Court rejects IBP’s objections to “Other Claims Re:
Noncompensability” as the listed items, arguments by IBP
about why certain items are noncompensable, are dealt with
elsewhere in the order. The specific arguments listed by IBP
in objection are each addressed elsewhere in the Court's

proposed Order.
H. Objections to “The Class”

IBP claims there is not a definite class number. The Court
is amending the findings to include a total class number of
815, calculated as follows: From Ex. 266-816 opt ins + 5 of
the 6 original named Plaintiffs (Pedro Hernandez is #346 on
Ex. 266 and should not be counted twice) -5 for five Ex. 266
opt ins stipulated as untimely and -1 Ex. 266 who is double
counted (Ms. Hernandez, #’s 338 and 341), for a total of 815
class members.

I. Objections re: Representative Evidence

The Court rejects objections by IBP to the legal conclu-
sions in the proposed Findings and Conclusions regarding the
adequacy of the representative evidence. The Court is not in a
posture to reconsider its substantive legal conclusions, and
will not consider these arguments at this time.

J. Objections re: Employer Rebuttal

The Court rejects objections by IBP to the legal con-
clusions in the proposed Findings and Conclusions regarding
the adequacy of IBP’s rebuttal of the representational evi-

47

dence. The Court is not in a posture to reconsider its substan-
tive legal conclusions, and will not consider these arguments
at this time.

K. Objections re: Statute of Limitation

| The Court rejects objections by IBP to the legal conclu-
sions in the proposed Findings and Conclusions relating to
the statute of limitation and willfulness. The Court is not in a-
posture to reconsider its substantive legal conclusions, and
will not consider these arguments at this time.

L. Objections re: Overtime Under the FLSA
1. Page 17, line 8-10 re: 29 CFR. § 785.7.

The Court rejects Defendant's objection that the Court does
not indicate that the Portal to Portal Act provides an excep-
tion for preliminary and postliminary activities.

M. Objections re: Compensable Time

Defendant's objections under this section, based on their
argument that there was not adequate representative evidence
for these findings, are rejected by the Court.

The Court rejects IBP’s objection relating to the adequacy
of the representative testimony. Again, the Court’s conclusion
was that the representational evidence was adequate.

Item 5, which notes that the Court should include hair net
in the list at Page 19, line 5-8, is well taken, and hair net will
be added to the list of noncompensable activities as is indi-
cated elsewhere in the Findings and Conclusions.

Item 8, which requests clarification re: polar and clean cut
gloves. Plaintiffs concede that polar and clean cut gloves are
identical, and the Order will be changed to reflect this.

ltem 9, which requests clarificatior regarding cloth gloves.
The Court has determined that two cloth gloves will be

48

awarded to all processing members, and is not limited to only
those Plaintiffs who testified at trial.

Item 10 which requests a “*” by hair net and cloth gloves.
The Court will add a “*” by hair net. No such amendment
will be made for cloth gloves, as the Court has found these to
be “integral and indispensable” and compensable.

Item 11, which requests that it be noted at page 21,
footnote 9 that no compensation is required at lunch for
boots, safety glasses, hard hat, ear plugs, etc. The Court
rejects this request, as the point of the footnote is to indicate
what is excluded under 3(0), which does not exclude the time
during meal periods.

Items 12-22, which request clarification on recovery for
certain items for certain job categories. This is dealt with
above on the issue of what will be included in damages
calculations.

Item 23, Page 23, line 10-11: /BP furnishes new gloves to
the workers on a weekly basis. IBP objects that there was no
evidence on this. The Court recalls this evidence and

testimony and rejects this objection.

N. Objections re: walk and wait time

The Court rejects objections by IBP to the legal conclu-
sions in the proposed Findings and Conclusions regarding
walk and wait time. The Court is not in a posture to recon-
sider its substantive legal conclusions and will not consider
these arguments at this time. Many of these objections are
considered in the Plaintiffs’ objections and requests for
clarifications outlined above.

O. Objections re: Meal Breaks
Defendant's objections regarding meal breaks are addressed

in the section regarding Plaintiffs’ objections. Again, Defen-
dant objects to the recitation that employees are required to

49

use the restroom. Again, the Court will not reconsider the
adequacy of the representative evidence on this issue.

P. Objections re: Affirmative Defenses

The Court rejects objections by IBP to the legal conclu-
sions in the proposed Findings and Conclusions regarding the
adequacy of their affirmative defenses. The Court is not in a
posture to reconsider its substantive legal conclusions and
will not consider these arguments at this time.

The objections that do not argue legal conclusions are as
follows:

1. Page 29, line 4-7. . . clothes changing is limited to
changing into and out of the frock and wash time is limited to
washing of the person.

The Court adopts Defendant’s clarification and will include
the listed items; hard hat, ear plugs, safety glasses, boots, and
hairnet in this excluded category as well.

Q. Objections Re: Portal to Portal

The Court rejects objections by IBP to the legal conclu-
sions in the proposed Findings and Conclusions regarding
the Portal to Portal Act. The Court js not in a posture to
reconsider its substantive legal conclusions, and will not
consider these arguments at this time.

Item 2: the Court will add hair net to the items excluded
under 3(0).

R. Objections re: “Overtime Claims”

The Court rejects objections by IBP to the legal con-
clusions in the proposed Findings and Conclusions regarding
overtime claims. The Court is not in a posture to reconsider
its substantive legal conclusions, and will not consider these
arguments at this time.

50
S. Objections re: Damages

The Court rejects objections by IBP to the legal con-
clusions in the proposed Findings and Conclusions regarding
damages. The Court is not in a posture to reconsider its
substantive legal conclusions, and will not consider these
arguments at this time.

IBP objects to the Court requiring Plaintiffs to go outside
the record to prove damages. This has been addressed in the
Court’s order striking the Plaintiffs’ post-trial declarations.

T. Other Items Not Considered by the Court
1. Four Minutes of Clothing Time Paid Since July 1998.

Plaintiffs indicate that they have given 4 minutes of
clothes-changing time credit since July 1998 in their damages
calculations. The offset will be expressly referred to in the
judgment regarding damages calculations.

2. Form of Judgment

IBP queries whether each individual employee will be a
judgment creditor. The Court will enter one judgment, with
an overall damages calculation.

3. Occurrence of Simultaneous Activity

IBP argues that many acts are performed simultaneously.
The Court adopts Dr. Mericle’s findings on the time required
for each activity. As the Court’s proposed Findings and
Conclusions held “[t}]he Court acknowledges that there are
considerable differences in how and where each employee
dons and doffs his or her equipment. Given these differences,
the compensable time for each activity is on the basis of a
reasonable time, rather than the actual time required for each
activity. Evidence of reasonable time was supplied by
employee and expert testimony supplied by the Plaintiff, and
not rebutted by IBP.”

51
4. Meal Break

IBP requests several clarifications regarding meal-break
time, which are addressed above in this order.

5. Preemption |

IBP states that the Court does not address federal labor law
preemption. This objection is rejected, and the Court refers
Defendant to the Proposed Findings at page 28-29. “Union
representatives may not bargain away employee rights under
the FLSA. See Featsent v. City of Youngstown, 70 F.3d 900,
905 (6th Cir. 1995), citing Walling v. Harnischfeger Corp.,
325 U.S. 427, 431-32 (1945). The Ninth Circuit has held “that
the FLSA’s minimum wage and overtime provisions . . . are
guarantees to individual workers that may not be waived
through collective bargaining.” Albertson's, Inc., v. United
Food & Commercial Workers Union, AFL-CIO & CLC, 157
F.3d 758, 761 (9th Cir. 1998) (internal quotations omitted)
citing Locai 246 Utility Workers Union v. Southern Cal.
Edison Co., 83 F.3d 292 (9th Cir 1996) (holding where em-
ployees’ claim is based on substantive rights under the FLSA,
no resort to arbitration under the CBA is required). See also
Collins v. Lobdell, 188 F.3d 1124, 1127-28 (9th Cir. 1999)
(holding congressionally granted FLSA rights take prece-
dence over conflicting provisions in a collectively bargained
compensation arrangement). The Supreme Court also has
held that FLSA rights “cannot be abridged by contract or oth-
erwise waived because this would ‘nullify the purposes’ of
the statue and thwart the legislative policies it was designed
to effectuate.” Barrantine v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., 450
U.S. 728, 740 (1981) (citations omitted.) Conflicting provi-
sions between FLSA and collective bargaining agreements
are resolved in favor of the FLSA. See id.”

6. Class certification

IBP requests reconsideration of class certification based on
the difficulty in calculating damages. Again, this is based on a

52

misunderstanding of the Court’s proposed findings, and an
attempt to distort the concept of individualized damages. The
Court is requiring individualized damages calculations in an
over-abundance of caution to the Defendant. The Court could
have determined that the evidence was sufficient to permit a
more generalized damages calculation, but because the evi-
dence and testimony per:nitted a more discrete determination
as to timing by job description, equipment list, and activities
testified to, the Court determined that this calculation would
lead to a recovery that relates to what work was actually
performed. Defendant’s objection will be denied based on the
findings of adequate representative evidence.

IT IS HEP -BY ORDERED:

1. Plaintiffs’ Objections and Clarifications to the Court’s
Proposed Findings (Ct. Rec. 716) is GRAN. ED in part and
DENIED in part, as outlined in the above order.

2. Defendant’s Objections and Clarifications to the Court’s
Proposed Findings (Ct. Rec. 793) is GRANTED in part and
DENIED in part as outlined in the above order.

IT IS SO ORDERED. The District Court Executive is
directed to enter this order and to provide copies to counsel.

DATED this 2nd day of August 2001.

/s/ Robert H. Whaley
ROBERT H. WHALEY
United States District Judge

53
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

No. 03-1238

IBP, INC..,
Petitioner

Vv.

GABRIEL ALVAREZ, Individually and on
Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated, et al.

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI to the
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, No. 02-
35042, 02-35110.

ON CONSIDERATION of the petition for a writ of certio-
rari herein to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit.

IT IS ORDERED by this Court that the said petition is
granted limited to Question | presented by the petition. This
case is consolidated with No. 04-66 and a total of one hour is
allotted for oral argument.

February 22, 2005

A true copy WILLIAM K. SUTER

Test:
Clerk of the Supreme Court of the United States
By

Deputy

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/brief%3Amicro_IA40385014_0745%3A08. Public record. Not legal advice.
